Philosophical Review

Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals by Axel Hägerström; Karl Olivecrona; C. D. Broad
Review by: Bernard Wand
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Apr., 1955), pp. 304-307
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 THE PHILOSOPHICALREVIEW

fundamentally different, the historian may possibly use some of the

same modes of thought in fulfilling his aim as the scientist uses in ful-
filling his. For example, the historian is forbidden to use contrary to
fact conditional statements, though how he (or Mrs. Swabey) could
assess the role of ideas or values in history without using such state-
ments is never explained. (3) It is an elementary fact that if we are to
have any clarity in discussions of history, we must distinguish between
at least two senses of the word "history": the sense in which we refer
to events in the past, and the sense in which we refer to accounts of
these events. However, Mrs. Swabey shifts rapidly back and forth
between these two different senses of the word, attempting to show that
both of the following propositions are true: (a) that values play at least
as large a role in the historical process as do economic factors, (b) that
the philosophical historian's appeal to universally valid values in
organizing and writing his account of the past guarantees the objectiv-
ity of that account. Both of these propositions may be true, but neither
follows from the other. On the whole, Mrs. Swabey's arguments for the
first are much stronger than her arguments for the second; in fact,
the chief support which she can apparently find for the second, is
that the first is true. Had Mrs. Swabey not been so intent upon attack-
ing scientific naturalism, she would have noted that many scientific
naturalists also share her conviction that values (however interpreted)
play an important role in the historical process. But had she stopped
to note this point, the whole skein of her argument would have un-
ravelled.
MAURICE MANDELBAUM
Dartmouth College

INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE OF LAW AND MORALS. By

AXEL HXGERSTR6M. Edited by KARL OLIVECRONA. Translated
by C. D. BROAD.Stockholm, Almquist & Wiksell, I953. Pp. xxxii,
378. Sw. cr. 2.oo; bound, Sw. cr. 30.00.
English readers owe Professor Broad a special debt of gratitude for
this translation of a selection of essays from the work of Axel Hager-
str6m. For until now his theory of value has been available to them
only through the writings of others. As helpful as these may have been
toward an understanding of it a direct reading of even a selection,
such as this one, reveals a breadth of erudition and subtlety of analysis
which is necessarily lacking in summary accounts. The selection has
been made by the book's editor, Karl Olivecrona, who also contributes
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 REVIEWS OF BOOKS

an excellent summary of Higerstrbm's views, and consists of six essays

most of which are devoted to a criticism of legal positivism.
Hdgerstrbm's chief interest was in the critical analysis of legal
concepts. But he would accept no account of these which implied a
denial of the meanings ordinarily assigned to the normative terms of
right or duty. A valid legal philosophy must, at the very least, be in
accord with the facts of morality. Accordingly, in the field of law, legal
rights and duties cannot be identified with the commands of the state.
For, apart from a multiplicity of other cogent objections which Hager-
str6m offers, such a view is inconsistent with the moral facts.
In the field of morals proper, Hdgerstrom likewise rejects the re-
duction of right or wrong to either the demands of public opinion or
to our moral feelings. For although both may influence us in our moral
conduct, public opinion must be believed right if it is to be morally
justified and an action must be believed right if it is to evoke the feeling
of moral approval. Nor can the rightness or wrongness of any action be
identified with our valuations or fears. To do so is to destroy the ul-
timacy of our duties. For we do not consider an action right which is
merely a means to the satisfaction of our desires or to the avoidance of
our possible pains.
In so far as Hdgerstrom is concerned with the meaning of ethical
terms or with the facts of the ordinary moral consciousnesshis position
is very much like that of the deontologists. Both agree that moral
terms are sui generis and cannot be referred to any purely empirical
realities. But whereas the deontologist's theoretical account of morality
is an objectivist one, Higerstrbm's is subjectivist in its nature. He
refuses to allow that there are peculiar properties of right or wrong
which we somehow intuit. Indeed, he claims that such a view is "un-
scientific." For it appeals to a supersensible realm which can never be
an object of experience. Higerstrbm's epistemology is a thorough-
going empiricism. Thus the fundamental problem of moral valuation
for him is to account for the grounds of our belief that there are such
objective properties even though scientific (i.e. empiricist) analysis
clearly shows their nonexistence.
HWgerstr6mconsiders the analogy, so often noted in the history of
ethics, between commands and obligations. If the state of consciousness
of the recipient of a command is compared with the feeling of being
obliged to perform an action certain similarities will be discerned. In
each instance there is in the person's mind an association between the
idea of the action and a conative impulse to perform it. But whereas a
command is most readily expressed in the imperative form, "Do so

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 THE PHILOSOPHICALREVIEW

and so," an obligation is most readily expressed in the indicative form,

"The action, as being right, is my duty." This manner of expressing
obligations misleads us into believing that there is some objective
property attributable to the action. We are so misled because unlike a
command an idea of duty has reference to a system of rules of conduct
and lacks a determinate source of authority. However, the system of
rules only arises through the commands of various authorities, which
have been issued since childhood, to perform certain types of actions.
The idea of any rule now carries with it the same emotive power as
the original specific commands. Obligations can be expressed in the
indicative form because the cognitive component-the idea of an
action-is dominant over the conative component-the impulse to
perform it. In commands, however, the conative component is dom-
inant. The belief in rightness as an objective property then arises from
the peculiar mental state brought about when a person finds himself
in the relevant situations. But rightness itself has no independent
existence.
No bare statement of Higerstrom's basic theme can reveal the
freshness of his thought or the dexterity of his argument. Possible
objections which might strike the reader are often brought out by
Hlgerstr6m himself and met within the terms of his own theory. Ir-
respective of one's philosophical predilections his handling of a prob-
lem, tough going as it may be, is always rewarding. For there is little
doubt that we have here not only the most competent but, in its
insistence on,keeping to the moral facts, the most adequate statement of
the emotivist account of moral valuation which has yet appeared.
It is a pity that it was not more generally available at the time when
the controversy concerning the emotive meaning of ethical terms was a
livelier issue than it is today.
Two general objections to Higerstr6m's account of moral valuation
suggest themselves. First, it may be doubted that the proper task of a
moral philosopher is to engage in such psychological analysis. But the
psychologist rarely concerns himself with this type of analysis and when
he does he has no more exacting tools at his disposal than the philoso-
pher. Second, granted the correctness of Higerstr6m's account, the
content of the system of rules must still be established, and it is a
characteristic moral claim that it shall be universally acceptable.
Hdgerstr6m considers this claim, at least by inference, but it cannot be
said that he successfully meets it. He holds that the rules established in
any given community are those needed for its maintenance and
security; and their morality is due to the authoritative commands
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 REVIEWS OF BOOKS

associated with them. But systems of rules do differ between societies

and authorities do conflict. On his view it is not merely that resolution
is not allowed for but that the possibility of impartiality is precluded.
BERNARD WAND
PrincetonUniversity

THOUGHT, ACTION, AND PASSION. By RICHARD McKEON.

Chicago, University of Chicago Press, I954. PP. x, 305. $5.00.
It is impossible in a few sentences to summarize this closely packed,
many-sided book; no convenient pigeonhole exists by which to classify
it, for the good reason that it aims at making a sustained assault on
rigid and complacent subject-partitioning, especially in the fields of
philosophy, history, rhetoric, and poetry. The four "themes" discussed
("love," "truth," "freedom," "imitation") are selected not only for
their intrinsic importance in the history of thought, but also for their
refusal to remain within the bounds of any one "subject," their per-
sistent reappearance in theory after theory, surviving countless radical
transformations without loss of identity. Love (which is a theme for
poetry) receives philosophical treatment in Plato's Symposiumand the
numerous debates which followed it. Our knowledge of the Pre-
Socratics depends considerably upon Plato's and Aristotle's citation of
them in expounding their own philosophies. If Plato's dialectical
development of their doctrines yields imaginatively sympathetic
insights into the doctrines themselves, Aristotle comes nearer their
ipsissima verba, although using them more as preliminary flourishes
before the statement of his own views. In both cases philosophy and
the history of philosophy are subtly interwoven. The rhetoric of
Pericles' Funeral Oration, in setting before the Athenians the "true
causes" of the Peloponnesian War, may have been as much concerned
with molding the future as with exploring the past, with bringing into
being the freedom described as actual in Athens. The complex web of
ambiguities in the concept of "imitation" reflects in aesthetics differing
ideas of the relation between art and nature: the presentations of Plato
and Aristotle, Democritus and the Sophists, are the subject of endless
variations down to the twentieth century. Striking metamorphoses
occur even in the "techniques" by which these themes are handled;
philosophy itself is assimilated in some theories to poetry, to grammar,
to study of the methodology of science.
Thought,Action, and Passion is not, however, an attempt simply to

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