Prilepina 1!

Julia Prilepina

ANG 6032

Amaryll Chanady

Quest for Meaning beyond the Phantasm through the Deferred Copy

In his analysis of the phantasm, Foucault poses provoking questions many of which

continue to percolate for us. One of these questions that invites further discussion comes from his

“Theatricum Philosophicum”: “If the role of thought is to produce the phantasm theatrically and

to repeat the universal event in its extreme point of singularity, then what is thought itself if not

the event that befalls the phantasm and the phantasmatic repetition of the absent event?” (1). This

question motivates us at once to reflect on the role of the phantasm in the production of meaning

and to find ways to extend beyond its limitations. In what follows, I will expand on Foucault’s

discussion of the phantasm to suggest that for him meaning is not simply absent but rather

deferred through the bad copy or the phantasm. Foucault thus engages with Derrida’s ideas by

questioning the absence of meaning or the transcendental signified that is constantly being

deferred. I would like to take his argument further by suggesting that while this search for

meaning is perpetually delayed I will claim that the phantasm is the ultimate culmination of it.

To begin with, I will give a brief overview of Foucault’s discussion of the phantasm

before exploring its connection to the production or expression of meaning. Foucault introduces

the phantasm by arguing against the finitude of the historical event. To begin my discussion of

the concept, I will focus briefly on its connection to the historical moment. I will then expand

from a consideration of the historical event to an exploration of it from a broader perspective.

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Foucault demonstrates that our fixation on the historical finitude of the event obscures our

understanding of its significance. According to Robert Young’s discussion of the phantasm,

Foucault escapes this predicament by suggesting that the event as such is never actually finished

in the sense that it is “constituted through its repetition in thought as a phantasm” (119). In his

attempt to “wean [the event] from its finitude,” Foucault thus implies that while historically it

may have ended for us, its significance continues to reverberate in our thoughts (119). Hence for

the observer who perpetually reflects on its effects, the historical event continues indefinitely. In

this sense, then, as Foucault comments, “[the phantasm] makes the event indefinite so that it

repeats itself as a singular universal” (118). As the phantasm, the event is now independent of its

connection to time and history. Instead it now exists by itself “as an effect of meaning not

identifiable with anything in the event as such” (119). To this end, it is no longer tied to place or

time but repeats itself indefinitely as a universal.

To proceed with my discussion of the phantasm, I will next explore how it affects the

meaning of the event, whether historical or not. In particular, I will connect Foucault’s analysis

of the phantasm to Deleuze’s notion of disjunction. To begin with, Foucault questions the

significance of the event by discussing it in terms of discontinuity. According to Young’s

exploration of the phantasm, Foucault focuses on the discontinuous precisely because “so much

stress is usually placed on the continuous” (112). By choosing to look for meaning in rupture and

discontinuity, Foucault thus turns away from a focus on junction and continuity. Hence he

attempts to locate meaning in discontinuities and picks up shreds of significance from among

disjointed pieces of information. To apply Young’s discussion to my own argument, I will next

attempt to demonstrate how in the theory of the phantasm the significance of the event is actually
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assembled from discontinuities and disjunctions as opposed to continuities. To that end, I believe

that the meaning of the event can be constructed from the links between discontinuities.

By looking more closely at the notion of disjunction, we realize that for Foucault the

discontinuities in our thoughts should not discourage us from thinking altogether. Rather, the

process of thinking difference could encourage us to describe the significance of what we see and

express. In her discussion of Foucault’s problematization of thought from Deleuze’s perspective,

Wendyl Luna argues that “Foucault makes it possible to think again precisely by thinking

difference, in particular by thinking through the anisomorphism or disjunction between the

articulable and the visible” (54). By focusing on difference as opposed to conjunction, Luna

questions the connection between event and phantasm as such. If the significance of the event is

constructed from links between discontinuities, then the connection between event and phantasm

might also be constructed on a discontinuity precisely because the phantasm is always a bad

copy that according to Young “breaks down all adequation between copy and model, appearance

and essence, event and Idea” (119). Per Luna’s argument, by thinking of difference as opposed to

continuity, we can come closer to deconstructing the difference between the copy and the

original. Ultimately, by looking at disjunction as opposed to conjunction between events, we can

approach an understanding of how meaning for Foucault is actually constructed.

By examining the construction of meaning through the lens of Foucault’s phantasm, we

realize that for him it is not simply made up of discontinuities. Neither is it actually absent. And

yet, for Foucault, the phantasm exploits the possibility of ever approaching some sort of absolute

truth. To this end, through the theory of the phantasm, we can come closer to a version of truth

that is not absolute by any means but that at least offers an interpretation of an idea without
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attempting to parade as the model of perfection. In one of his reviews of two different texts,

Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, Foucault explains the phantasm’s relationship

to truth: “It is useless, in any case, to seek a more substantial truth behind the phantasm, a truth

to which it points as a rather confused sign…; it is also useless to contain it within stable figures

and to construct solid cores of convergence where we might include, on the basis of their

identical properties, all its angles, flashes, membranes, and vapors…” (1). By discussing the

futility of seeking truth behind the phantasm, Foucault turns away from the notion of perfection

or from an ideal version of it. Instead, he touts the phantasm as a potential version of truth that

we can consider and use. Hence for him the phantasm represents just one way of finding

meaning. More generally, since it does not replace the search for truth by any measure, as a

concept the phantasm helps us reformulate the relationship between meaning and truth.

Having explored the connection of the phantasm to the event and especially to truth, I

would now like to consider ways in which the relationship of meaning and truth is expressed

specifically through difference, not just through discontinuities. To do so, I will look at

Foucault’s phantasm through the lens of Deleuze’s discussion of Plato’s simulacrum. According

to Deleuze, we should attempt to see the simulacrum not as an inferior version of the original but

as a copy without resemblance: “If we say of the simulacrum that it is a copy of a copy, an

endlessly degraded icon, an infinitely slackened resemblance, we miss the essential point: the

difference in nature between simulacrum and copy, the aspect through which they form the two

halves of a division” (48). By seeing the simulacrum as a copy of a copy, we thus move away

from the notion of absolute truth. In doing so, we focus not on the similarity between the original

and the copy or between copies but on the difference between copy and copy. The copy by itself
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would always be already inferior to the original and thus would never replace it. By seeking to

characterize the relationship between the simulacrum and the copy, however, we can see how it

is constructed through the difference between the phantasm and truth. Just as the copy would

always be already inferior to the original, so would the phantasm always be already inferior to

the truth. As opposed to the relationship between simulacrum and copy, however, it would have

already replaced the truth by establishing itself as the new version of the original idea. Thus it

can be seen not as absolute by any means but at least as a potential version of the truth.

By looking at Foucault’s phantasm through the lens of Plato’s discussion of the

simulacrum, we move further away from the notion of absolute truth and advance closer to an

understanding of truth as the product of multiple versions. We thus begin to see truth as the

product of several copies or even drafts of the original with a marked difference in each one. To

this end, if we look at the notion of absolute truth through the lens of Foucault’s phantasm, we

can conclude that it is the result of multiple versions none of which is more perfect than any

other. Hence I would like to expand on Deleuze’s discussion of the simulacrum by suggesting

that we could now see truth as the product of multiple drafts, so to speak, where each copy

contributes to an understanding of a more holistic version of it. Before I explore Deleuze’s

discussion of the simulacrum, I would like to examine the origin of the concept by delving into

Plato’s characterization of likeness-making: “One is the art of likeness-making;-generally a

likeness of anything is made by producing a copy which is executed according to the proportions

of the original, similar in length and breadth and depth, each thing receiving also its appropriate

colour” (https://web.archive.org/web/20051230161511/http://philosophy.eserver.org/plato/

sophist.txt). In his discussion of the simulacrum, Plato demonstrates that the copy preserves all
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the proportions of the original and is similar to it in every characteristic. Hence it is modeled on

the original, yet different from it. Consequently, as we gradually move away from the absolute,

we might consider a different approach to our formulation of truth. The new versions of the truth

do not have to be identical to the original, yet they resemble it. By thinking of the simulacrum in

this way, we become privy to the existence of multiple truths that do not necessarily form any

kind of unity.

Alternatively, we can view these multiple truths as individual and unique representations

of truth that is neither single nor absolute. Hence we can reject the notion of the absolute and use

the phantasm to develop an appreciation of truth’s multiple versions. In his discussion of

Deleuze’s simulacra, Piotrek Świątkowski suggests that what Deleuze is interested in is precisely

the mechanism on which it hinges: “Deleuze analyses the working of simulacra, the object of the

heights, the images, amongst which are the image of the phallus and in the end, the phantasm

proper. We will notice that these positions lead to experiences of pleasure, tension, fear and

aggression” (22). In his analysis, Świątkowski focuses on the feelings that the simulacra evoke in

an attempt to determine whether they trigger experiences of ‘pleasure, tension, fear and

aggression’ (22). By seeing the search for truth as the product of multiple versions as opposed to

a vision of the absolute, we can move away from attempts to find the holy grail, so to speak.

Instead, by looking at the phantasm through Deleuze’s perspective, we thus become aware of the

diversity of truths available to us.

To proceed with my exploration, I will next apply Derrida’s concept of differance to my

discussion of Foucault’s phantasms. By examining the search for absolute truth, I will consider

how the Derridean concept both intertwines with and extends Foucault’s exploration of the
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phantasm. In particular, I will analyze how the interplay of difference helps us move away from a

search for the ideal copy and approach an imperfect but more realistic version of the truth. To

this end, I will apply Derrida’s reading of differance to the phantasm. In one of his earlier essays

“Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” Derrida argues that the play

of signifiers is inevitably intertwined with the finitude of discourse. Paradoxically, this finitude

clashes with the freeplay of signifiers: “Th[e] field [of freeplay] permits these infinite [linguistic]

substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible

field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it:

a center which arrests and founds the freeplay of substitutions” (2). Because this field of freeplay

lacks a center, it thus permits the use of infinite linguistic substitutions that enable us to come

closer to some version of the truth without looking for absolute meaning. Since Foucault’s

phantasm is always inevitably intertwined with the expression of an event in thought, it is also

tensely connected to ways of using language to convey meaning effectively. In his exploration of

the relationship between signifier and signified, Derrida thus discusses the infinite substitutions

of language to help us approach a better approximation of truth.

By looking at Foucault’s phantasms from the perspective of Derrida’s discussion of the

play of signifiers, we can thus move away from a fixation on language. To this end, I would like

to extend my discussion of Foucault’s phantasms by exploring the connection between the play

of signifiers and the search for meaning. By describing the concept of the phantasm in terms of

the play of signifiers, we can see that just like in Derrida’s formulation, the search for the perfect

copy in the theory of the phantasm is infinite. More importantly, Derrida demonstrates that the

absence of a center or origin in the system of signification prevents us from ever moving past the
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play of signifiers: “this moment of … when everything became a system where the central

signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of

differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the interplay of

signification ad infinitum” (1). In his discussion of this play, Derrida argues that the center is

actually never present outside the system. As a result, the play of signifiers becomes infinite

precisely because the center is always missing. Given this lack, the play thus becomes endless

and eventually loses its meaning. If I apply this discussion to Foucault’s theory of the phantasm,

I can conclude that the center is always unavailable precisely because it is outside the system.

Just like in Derrida’s infinite play of signifiers that always seek an absent center but never find it,

in the theory of the phantasm, we also continuously look for meaning but always end up with

only the imperfect version of it.

To continue with my discussion, I will next use Derrida’s analysis of differance to help

extend Foucault’s idea of the phantasm. In particular, I will focus on the sign and its problematic

relationship with writing. To that end, I will first turn to Young’s discussion of Foucault’s

phantasms and then connect it to Derrida’s differance. In his discussion of the relationship

between history and writing, Young poses the following question: “If it had previously operated

critically outside history’s limits, offering the only available possibility of critical distance, how

might writing work transgressively within it?” (109). I will attempt to respond to this question by

invoking the problematic of the sign and of writing. Hence I will refer to Derrida’s discussion of

this problematic in order to suggest that writing and history are inextricably bound up with one

another. In his discussion of this problematic, Derrida explores how the sign helps us approach

meaning. To explain the role of the sign in differance, he claims that “[it] is usually said to be put
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in the place of the thing itself, the present thing, ‘thing’ here standing equally for meaning or

referent. When we cannot grasp or show the thing, state the present, the being-present, when the

present cannot be presented, we signify, we go through the detour of the sign” (1). In this

instance, Derrida suggests that the role of the sign is to help us express that which is difficult to

express. By taking the place of what cannot be expressed, the sign actually enables us to discuss

a concept that is difficult at once to describe and explain. As such, it is almost like the

intermediate point between signifier and signified. In what follows, I will go back to Foucault’s

discussion of the phantasm and suggest that it is precisely the juncture between the copy and the

original.

By looking at this juncture, I will use the concept of differance to extend Foucault’s

examination of the phantasm. In particular, I will consider how we might bridge the gap between

the copy and the original. To this end, I will apply the concept of differance to demonstrate that

the phantasm is precisely the bad copy that cannot be used. To reiterate Derrida’s point regarding

the sign, “[it] is usually said to be put in the place of the thing itself, the present thing” (1).

Hence the sign is put there to represent the concept and as such it essentially replaces the “thing

itself”. In the case of the phantasm, however, it does not simply replace the “thing itself” but

rather, as Young claims, “breaks down all adequation between copy and model, appearance and

essence, event and Idea” (119). Hence the phantasm breaks down and transcends the relationship

between copy and model, seeking instead to show that there is no actual difference between

them.

By going beyond Foucault’s exploration of the phantasm and attempting to reconcile the

relationship between signs, I will suggest that this concept is first of all predicated on the absence
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of meaning. In his examination of Foucault’s practice of thinking, Charles Scott asserts the

following: “His work … is attuned primarily to the mix of form and absence. He identifies the

ruptures, emerging formations, and hierarchies of power that define the continuities in their

positive limitations… As truth is found to be a power relation which is a product of power

relations, the absence of unity and completeness is also revealed” (80). In these words, Scott

suggests that Foucault’s work is focused specifically on a mixture of form and absence. In

particular, he argues that while Foucault identifies the ruptures, formations, and power

hierarchies, he cannot seem to pinpoint where truth could actually be found. According to Scott,

for Foucault, truth is a power relation which in turn is also a product of other power relations. As

such, we can never actually describe truth without involving the interaction of power hierarchies.

Instead, as I mentioned above, Foucault’s exploration of the phantasm distances us from the

possibility of ever reaching some sort of absolute.

By expanding on Foucault’s argument, I propose to forgo a discussion of the truth

altogether and go beyond his concept of the phantasm. In particular, if we take the absolute truth

out of this search, we can accept the presence of multiple truths all of which come together for us

in some sort of holistic end. Consequently, we can go beyond Foucault’s argument by accepting

the multiplicity of truth and by abandoning the search for a single and definitive version of it

altogether. By seeing differance as a potential solution to the search for meaning, I would like to

propose that it is precisely in the very absence of meaning that we can find some consolation.

Having abandoned the quest for absolute truth altogether, we might learn to accept the ‘bad copy’

of the truth in its place. By taking up the endless play of signifiers, we can learn to content

ourselves with approximations of meaning or copies of the original. To this end, we would no
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longer be concerned about whether our expression of the truth is accurate or not. Neither would

it matter if it comes in a single version or multiple. Instead, by applying differance to this quest

for meaning, we can thus eliminate the boundaries between our approximations of it. In doing so,

we can also erase the distinctions between copies of the truth. Hence our new version of the truth

would culminate in the absence of meaning. One potential approach for us then is to learn to

content ourselves with its lack. By adapting differance as a solution, we can thus use the concept

of the phantasm to our advantage. In his exploration of thought as phantasm, Nathan Widder

emphasizes the approach taken by differance: “By affirming divergence, the differenciator

obliterates any correspondence between thought and bodies, and between incorporeal ‘sayables’

and events, but the challenge this poses to knowledge differs from the traditional problems that

the Stoics address” (105). By arguing for the lack of correspondence between thought and

bodies, we thus affirm divergence to help reconcile ourselves to the search for meaning. To this

end, thought and bodies almost become extensions of one another.

Through the lens of the phantasm, we can eventually bridge the gap between the signifier

and the signified. In what follows, I will discuss how we can reach beyond this theory in order to

help us heal the rupture between them. With this in mind, I will explore the phantasm as a

phenomenon, not just as a theory. In his examination of the phantasm through a deconstructive

perspective, Michael Naas seeks to frame it precisely as a phenomenon: “Though the phantasm

as phenomenon, as an appearing to the self, always introduces appearance, ability, and, thus,

difference into every self-relation, the phenomenon of the phantasm suggests an expulsion,

repression, or purification of this phenomenon” (5). By discussing the phantasm in this way,

Naas prompts us to think specifically about the etymology of the word phenomenon. According
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to the Collins Dictionary definition, phenomenon refers to “a thing as it appears and is

interpreted in perception and reflection, as distinguished from its real nature as a thing-in-

itself” (https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/phenomenon). With this definition

in mind, I would suggest that Naas views the phantasm precisely in this sense. For him, then, it is

at once a phenomenon because it appears to the self and changes the self’s relationship with

itself. At the same time, the phenomenon of the phantasm pertains to an “expulsion, repression,

or purification” of itself.

In view of the above, I would like to discuss the relationship between the two senses of

the word phantasm. In particular, I will look at how this relationship can be described in terms of

Kierkegaard’s conception of the self-referentiality of the self. The relationship between the two

senses of the word phantasm can be described in terms of his definition of the self: “The self is a

relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation that the relation relates itself

to its own self; the self is not the relation but that the relation relates itself to its own

self” (https://www.religion-online.org/book-chapter/chapter-1-that-despair-is-the-sickness-unto-

death/). By looking at Kierkegaard’s description of the self-referentiality of the self, I can thus

conclude that the relationship of the self to itself is reminiscent of Deleuze’s formulation of the

phantasm. To reiterate, according to this formulation, Deleuze reverses Plato by verifying the

simulacrum of the good copy “on the grounds that precisely because it is a bad copy, it breaks

down all adequation between copy and model, appearance and essence, event and Idea” (119). I

will make the connection to Kierkegaard’s discussion of the self as a relation by suggesting that

the phantasm is indeed self-referential. After all, it does not have a copy and thus can only refer

back to itself. Consequently, since the phantasm is self-referential, it does not need a referent
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other than itself. To this end, given this self-referentiality, the two senses of the word phantasm I

mentioned above (e.g. a thing as it appears and is interpreted in perception and reflection, as

distinguished from its real nature as a thing-in-itself) come together in reflection. Ultimately,

through the aid of the self-referential nature of the phantasm, we can thus move beyond the gap

between the signifier and the signified.

By extending beyond the phantasm, we would thus be able to engage in the freeplay of

signification. In the process, we will find a way to heal the rupture between phantasm and

referent. In what follows, I will discuss the phantasm as a simulacrum, as a force of image-

making. In his examination of the phantasm in Derrida’s work, Fics frames it as a force that

allows us to conceive of what is real: “A phantasm, then, is a simulacrum — a force or drive of

image-making that represents what one imagines to be ‘the real’ yet is only a small fragment, or

trace, of what we imagine to be ‘reality.’ Indeed, a phantasm is one projected perspective, yet it

influences the imagination and perception of others” (106). By examining the phantasm as the

drive of image-making, Fics invites us to think beyond what we see. He suggests that the

phantasm can be viewed as our unique projection of reality. It is a reality that we do not

necessarily see but one that nonetheless exists beyond simply the image and its referent. If we

apply this argument to the relationship between signifier and signified, we would be able to do

more than move past the gap between them. To extend Fics’s argument, we would be able to

conceive of how the phantasm influences not just the individual imagination but our collective

perceptions of reality. By projecting beyond what we see then, we would not only heal the

rupture. We would also find new ways to describe what we imagine to be the ‘real’. To this end,
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we would engage in the freeplay of signification in order to come to terms with our projected

reality.

As a final thought, I would like to extend beyond the freeplay of signification and the

phantasm. To this end, I will discuss the process of meaning-making in terms of Rorty’s theory

of redescription. By tapping the potential of the phantasm to create meaning, we can thus apply

the process of redescription to move toward a unique version of the truth. In his discussion of his

theory, Rorty explains the ironists’ purpose in relying on this process: “We redescribe ourselves,

our situation, our past, in those terms and compare the results with alternative redescriptions

which use the vocabularies of alternative figures. We ironists hope, by this continual

redescription, to make the best selves for ourselves that we can” (80). In this instance, Rorty

relies on the power of redescription to continuously improve the ironists’ vocabularies.

Consequently, he suggests that the ironists can use it to make as perfect a version of themselves

as possible. In doing so, Rorty thus conceives of an idealized solution for meaning-making. If we

think about this solution in terms of the phantasm, we will see that just like in Rorty’s theory, we

are continuously modifying copies of the truth in order to attain a more perfect and more clear

version of it. Ultimately, by using the phantasm as a way to help us create meaning, we thus tap

its potential and open up new possibilities for redescribing our quest for truth.

In conclusion, I have explored Foucault’s theory of the phantasm in terms of the process

of meaning-creation. In particular, I have suggested that for him this meaning is not simply

absent. Rather it is actually deferred through the phantasm. As I close this discussion, I would

like to go even further by suggesting that as a theoretical construction the phantasm allows us to

look beyond the quest for meaning. In fact, by applying the process of redescription to the
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phantasm, we can free ourselves from the play of signification. In particular, by relying on

redescription, we can thus use the phantasm to our advantage without getting lost in the endless

quest for meaning. By redescribing meaning-creation through a discussion of the phantasm, I

believe that we can come closer to an understanding of our reality. Ultimately, by relying on the

play of signification to help us understand how we create meaning, we can eventually train

ourselves to rely on an individual and unique approach to unraveling the phantasm.

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Derrida, Jacques. “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.” Modern

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Fics, Ryan. “Our Sovereign Others: Phantasms, Heidegger, Animality.” Mosaic: An

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Foucault, Michel. “Theatrum Philosophicum.” Critique 282 (1970): 885-908.

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