A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO EPISTEMOLOGY

OVERVIEW
Epistemology

Epistemology =df. the theory (or study) of knowledge

The Analysis of Knowledge

Main Question: What is knowledge? Under what conditions does a subject know something to be the case?

We are trying to give a definition of knowledge – i.e., we are trying to give a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for knowing. But here we face a puzzle

Meno’s Paradox

Key Passage: [A] man cannot inquire either about what he knows or about what he does not know – for
he cannot inquire about what he knows, because he knows it, and in that case is in no need of inquiry;
nor again can he inquire about what he does not know, since he does not know about what he is to
inquire. (80d-e)

1. If one knows what one is looking for, inquiry is unnecessary.

2. If one does not know what one is looking for, inquiry is impossible.
3. Either one knows what one is looking for, or one does not.
4. Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible.

Consider the following conflicting claims:

(i) Engaging in conceptual analysis can tell us something new and unobvious. E.g., That knowledge
is so-and-so. That justice is such-and-such.

(ii) Engaging in conceptual analysis can never tell us something new and unobvious. Because, if our
analysis is correct, we are just giving a definition.

To stand any chance of engaging in conceptual analysis correctly we need to know the meaning of the
concept, since we cannot possibly know if we are on the right track in our analysis if we do not. But if
we must already know the meaning of a concept before we can give a correct analysis of it, then a
correct analysis of it is not going to reveal anything interesting or informative. Is this line of reasoning
correct?

The traditional analysis, which we get from the Theaetetus, holds that

Knowledge: For a subject to know that p,

(i) Truth Condition: it must be true that p;

Cannot know a falsehood. Knowledge is a success term. It is to credit someone with having gotten
things right. For example, I cannot know that the earth is flat. Why? Because it is not the case that
the earth is flat.

(ii) Belief Condition: she must believe that p.

Someone who is in serious doubt as to whether a particular proposition is true or, perhaps even
more obviously, who has never so much as considered or entertained that proposition cannot have

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 knowledge of it. Again, knowledge is a success term. But for it to be your success belief in the
proposition is essential, otherwise this success is not creditable to you.

(iii) Justification Condition: she must be justified in believing that p

True belief is insufficient for knowledge. For, as Socrates argues in the Theaetetus (200d5–201c7),
accidental true beliefs cannot be knowledge. For example, a lawyer might get a jury to have true
beliefs but for the wrong reasons. And a mere lucky guess or hunch does not suffice for knowledge
even though it may produce a true belief. For example, a rabid sports fan who is sure that his team
will win a certain game even though there is no real evidence or other basis for this claim did not
know beforehand that his team would win (even if, in fact, the team does win). So, what’s needed
for knowledge is a reason or justification that is truth-conducive – one that increases the likelihood
that the belief is true.

Again remember that knowledge is a success. And you cannot have a success completely by
accident – this would be no credit to you at all. So merely getting things right – mere true belief –
is not enough. To have success, it must be the result of your efforts (not chance). This suggests that
forming one’s belief must be done in a way that, usually, leads to a true belief. Possession of good
reasons does just this. It increases the likelihood that your belief turns our to be true.

Value of Knowledge

Main Question: Is knowledge valuable? Is knowledge worth having? Is it more valuable than, say, merely true
belief?

Meno Problem: How can knowledge be more valuable than merely true belief, when being confident in the
truth leads to success when you act on it just as well as knowledge?

True belief about the correct way to Larissa is as much practical use as knowledge of the way to Larissa—both
will get us to our destination. So, “why is knowledge prized far more highly than right opinion, and
why are they different?”

Key Passage: For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are
not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man's mind, so that they are not worth much until one
ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why. […] After they are tied down, in the first place
they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than
correct opinion, and knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down. (Meno 98a-b)

Knowledge ‘ties-down’ the truth. That is, knowledge, unlike mere true belief, gives one confidence in
having secured the truth, and it is this property that accounts for the distinctive value of knowledge
over mere true belief.

If one has merely true belief that this is the correct way to Larissa, then the first (misleading) sign that
runs contrary to this opinion will shake her from this belief (leading her astray).

If one knows that this is the correct way to Larissa, then even if (misleading) signs appear one will
remain steadfast in her belief (and get to Larissa).

A General Principle: If X and Y are otherwise equal goods, but X is more permanent (more
modally robust) than Y, X is better than Y.

So, knowledge gives one confidence – we are less likely to give up on true beliefs if we are justified in
believing them. That is, knowledge is resistant to misleading counterevidence.

For example, suppose I am a robber and plan to steal a diamond from a house.

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 True Belief. I believe that the diamond is in the house because someone has told me that
the diamond is under the bed. But when I break in, there’s no diamond under the bed.
Given that my only reason for thinking the diamond was in the house was because I
believed the diamond was under the bed, when I see there’s no diamond under the bed, I
leave empty handed. My belief that the diamond is in the house was defeated by the
counterevidence that there’s no diamond under the bed. But, let’s assume the diamond
was in the house, and with a little searching I could find it.

Knowledge. I believe that the diamond is in the house because, given the evidence, I know
that the diamond is in the house. Now when I check under the bed and there’s no
diamond then, even in the face of this counterevidence, I do not give up on the search.

The point is that we are not as easily misled out of knowledge as we are out of merely true beliefs.
With knowledge we have confidence. Our true beliefs are “tied down.”

Justification Needed for Knowledge

Main Questions: What strength of justification is required for knowledge? Does the justification need to be
accessible to the agent?

Infallibilism v. Fallibilism

Infallibilism =df. The subject must be in an optimal epistemic position in order to have the justification
needed for knowledge: namely, she could not go wrong in believing that p. (Justification for p is
conclusive. Justification for p is incompatible with p being false.)

Fallibilism =df. The subject need not be in an optimal epistemic position in order to have the justification
needed for knowledge: namely, she could go wrong in believing that p without excluding her from
knowing p. (Justification for p is less than conclusive. Justification for p is compatible with p being false.)

Internalism v. Externalism

Epistemic Internalism =df. Matters of justification depend on factors internal to the believer’s point of view
– factors to which the believer has special access.

Epistemic Externalism =df. Matters of justification do not depend on factors internal to the believer’s point
of view – factors to which the believer has special access.

The Structure of Knowledge

Main Question: Often a belief, A, is justified because it is based on another belief, B, that one holds and that
constitutes evidence for A. But it seems B can only support A if belief B is itself a justified belief. But how did B
get to be justified? Perhaps it was based on still another of one's beliefs, C. But, again, it seems this can only
work if C is already justified. How can the process of basing beliefs on other beliefs come to an end?

This is called the regress problem: an infinite regress of support cannot put a subject in a strong enough epistemic
position for knowledge.

Foundationalists avoid justificatory skepticism by denying that all of our beliefs need to be based on other
beliefs in order to be justified. Some of our beliefs are justified independent of their being based on any
other beliefs. These properly basic beliefs then serve as the "foundation" upon which all of the rest of our
justified beliefs are built.

Assumption: Justification is linear. We start with the foundation and work up.

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 Coherentists hold that only evidence-like relations among one's beliefs can render any of our beliefs justified,
and they thus reject the foundationalist’s properly basic beliefs. The coherentist instead avoids the regress
problem by accepting that there can be "circles" of justification: sometimes A can be justified by being
based on B, which is (perhaps indirectly, through a long series of basings) based on A.

Revisionary Assumption: Justification is ultimately holistic in character, with all of the beliefs involved
standing in relations of mutual support. We build a mutually reinforcing web.

What renders our beliefs justified on the coherentist picture is how well our beliefs cohere with one
another, rather than on how well they are based on some foundation of “properly basic” beliefs.
Consider

Meg’s Book: Suppose someone stole a Book from Meg's locker. There were three witnesses, none
particularly reliable: Andy, Becky, and Claire. Andy, Becky, and Claire each, independently,
testify that the person who took the book was wearing a green hat. Andy, Becky, and Claire thus
provide, independently, a coherent story.

Verdict: A set of independently formed beliefs (which merely happened to be held by different
people), because coherent, boost the justification for a given proposition. So, despite individual
unreliability, together they enhance the justifiability of <the person who took the book was
wearing a green hat>.

Extent of Our Knowledge

Main Question: What do we know? Do we possess knowledge?

Pessimistic accounts of the scope of our knowledge have it that we know less than we think we know.
Radically pessimistic accounts – i.e., skepticism – have it that we know nothing.

Methodism v. Particularism (Look back a Meno’s Paradox. How does this debate relate to it?)

Methodism = df. We start by identifying a conception of the characteristics knowledge has, and then
go on to investigate whether or not we have any knowledge.

How can we identify items of knowledge unless we already have a prior conception of what
knowledge is?

Particularism =df. We should take as a given datum that people have knowledge and then go on to
discover what its characteristics are.

But, how can we get a conception of what knowledge is if we have not already determined
what items are to count as items of knowledge? Yet to motivate the choice of items that count
as knowledge, one would seem to require a prior conception of what knowledge is. So, back to
Methodism…?

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 ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE: DESCARTES AND LOCKE
Background

In the Theaetetus we landed on the JTB analysis of knowledge. This account has three conditions. For S to know
that p:

(i) Truth Condition: p must be true.

(ii) Belief Condition: S must believe that p.
(iii) Justification Condition: S must be justified in believing that p

We were, however, unable to land on a precise account of the justification condition. The two dominant views
are

Infallibilism =df. The subject must be in an optimal epistemic position in order to have the justification
needed for knowledge: namely, she could not go wrong in believing that p.

Fallibilism =df. The subject need not be in an optimal epistemic position in order to have the justification
needed for knowledge: namely, she could go wrong in believing that p without excluding her from knowing
p.

Evidence

We can get a bit more precise concerning the difference between infallibilism and fallibilism by looking at the
relationship between the evidence and the proposition it supports.

Imagine we take all of the evidence that supports p, and make one long sentence. For example,

Evidence Sentence: There’s blood on the knife, the glove does not fit, and there was a strong motive….
The Proposition Supported: She killed him.

We can then ask: Is the truth of the evidence sentence consistent with the falsity of the proposition
supported? If we answer Yes, we have fallible justification. That is, our evidence is defeasible – it could be
defeated by later evidence that undermined it.

If we answer No, our justification is infallible. That is, our evidence is indefeasible – it could not be defeated
by additional evidence. We are, that is, justified in a way that ensures immunity from mistakes.

DESCARTES
Background

Descartes realizes that many of the things he previously believed are false. The question he confronts is what he
should do about this.

Notice that an examination of a particular belief would inevitably rely in large part on your other beliefs. If
these other beliefs were mistaken, then you would be as likely to retain old errors and even introduce new
ones as to weed out existing errors.

Key Passage: Yet I will struggle on […] eliminating everything in which there is the smallest element of doubt,
exactly as if I had found it to be false through and through; and I shall pursue my way until I discover something
certain; or, failing that, discover that it is certain only that nothing is certain. Archimedes claimed, that if only he
had a point that was firm and immovable, he would move the whole earth; and great things are likewise to be
hoped, if I can find just one little thing that is certain and unshakeable.

Withholding Policy: If an opinion appears to be at all uncertain, or if it is possible to doubt it, I will withhold
assent from it, i.e., I will suspend judgment concerning it.

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Cartesian Infallibilism

Key Passage: [K]nowledge is conviction based on a reason so strong that it can never be shaken by any stronger
reason.” That is “a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a conviction is
clearly the same as the most perfect certainty.”

Knowledge, for Descartes, requires indefeasible conviction. That is, justified (where the standard of
justification is infallibility) true belief.

Cartesian Knowledge: For S to know that p

(i) Truth Condition: p must be true.

(ii) Belief Condition: S must believe that p.
(iii) Infallible Justification Condition: S must have indefeasible evidence for p.

Argument for Descartes’ Epistemic Criterion:

1. Knowledge is something which is certain.

2. If something admits of any doubt it is not certain.
3. If one is attempting to acquire knowledge, then if something admits of any doubt, then we can
dismiss it as a possible candidate of knowledge.

Motivation for Infallibility: If the aim of our cognitive endeavors is truth, and justification is the means
by which we achieve this goal, then only infallible justification allows us to be sure that the goal has
been achieved; with anything less than this, success would be to some extent uncertain.

This is a natural extension of the idea that we express by asking people who claim to know
something: “But are you sure?”

Method of Doubt

Since Descartes wants knowledge that is indefeasible, he runs through the following list of skeptical doubts (any
doubt counts as a defeater).

These doubt-makers help to distinguish genuine, unshakable foundations from the mere appearance of
them. As Descartes writes, “I shall subtract whatever it has been possible to cast doubt on, even in the
slightest degree […] so that in the end there shall remain exactly and only that which is certain and
unshakeable.”
Doubtmakers
My senses have deceived me in the Observations made in circumstances where
past. senses have deceived me.
Casts doubt on
Dreaming. Present observations of external world.

Evil Demon. Almost everything, but only if I believe in

God.

My faculties, perhaps caused by the evil Perhaps everything. Applies even if I don’t
demon, may be imperfect. Making false believe in God. (Recall, from Plato, you are
things seem true. the final arbitrator of your own mental life.)

Deductive closure: If I know that p, and know p entails q, then I know that q. That is, the class of things you know
extends to all your beliefs that are the known deductive consequences of everything you know already.

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 Closure can be used for skeptical purposes. If I know that <I’m sitting by the fire>, and know that <if I’m
sitting by the fire I’m not asleep in bed dreaming>, then I know that <I’m not asleep in bed dreaming>. But
If I can’t rule out that I’m now asleep in bed dreaming the fireside experience, then, by modus tollens, I
don’t know I’m sitting by the fire. And if I don’t know by sense experience something as palpable as I’m
sitting by the fire, I can't know anything about the world by sense experience.

Brain in the Vat Argument

1. Closure Principle: If you know that p and know that p entails q, then you can know that q.
2. You can’t know you’re not a BIV. Argument for this:
a. Our sensory experiences are the only evidence we can have for claims about the external world.
b. If you were a BIV, you would have the same sort of sensory experiences as you actually have.
c. Your experiences are not evidence that you’re not a BIV.
d. You cannot have evidence that you’re not a BIV.
e. You can’t know you’re not a BIV.
3. Therefore, you don’t know, for example, that you have two hands. (Implicit: Having two hands
entails not being a BIV.)

We can represent the Meditator’s belief-set at the end of Meditation 1 as follows:

Believe Doubt

A good God exists

All propositions
?
of…
sensory experience
physics
astronomy
medicine
arithmetic
geometry

Infallible Justified Belief: The Cogito

Key Passage: I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no
bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly
existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me.
In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will
never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything
very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put
forward by me or conceived in my mind.

Here’s one way of spelling out the argument:

1. In order to doubt everything, I must be conscious that I am something – the thing doubting or a thing
being deceived.
2. If I am not nothing, then I exist.
3. In order to doubt everything, I cannot doubt that I exist.
4. Therefore, I cannot doubt that I exist.

“I” = a thinking thing. I have to exist to doubt anything. So a thinking thing must exist insofar as there is any
thought whatsoever. By “thoughts” Descartes means anything that you are aware of in your mind when you are
conscious. So, I cannot be mistaken about the existence of my own consciousness, hence I cannot be mistaken
about my own existence, because it is my essence to be a conscious – that is, thinking – being, a mind.

Here is another way of making the argument (virtuously) self-sealing/verifying:

Performative contradiction: I say (or think), “I do not exist!”

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 Saying (or thinking) is predicated on existing. “To say (or think)” assumes existence (E).

So to say (or think) [implying E] that “I do not exist” [asserting ~E] is really to perform “E” while
“~E”. A prerequisite of the performance is denied by the content of the utterance.

Upshot: The evidence each of us has of our own existence is indefeasible: it is obviously impossible both to
be aware of yourself (or anything else) and not to exist.

Content of Mental States. Perhaps we can say more beyond the cogito. As Descartes writes, “Is it not the very same
‘I’ who now doubts almost everything, who nevertheless understands something, who affirms that this one thing
is true, who denies other things, who desires to know more, who wishes not to be deceived, who imagines many
things even against my will, who also notices many things that appear to come from the senses? What is there in
all of this that is not every bit as true as the fact that I exist—even if I am always asleep or even if my creator
makes every effort to mislead me? […] For example, I now see a light, I hear a noise, I feel heat. These things
are false since I am asleep. Yet I certainly do seem to see, hear, and feel warmth. This cannot be false.”

The evil demon could no more deceive him about the contents of those states of mind than about his own
existence. So, according to Descartes, we can know propositions describing how things appear (or seem) to
us, and other propositions describing our present, conscious mental states.

We can represent the Meditator’s belief-set at the end of Meditation 2 as follows:

Believe Doubt

I exist A good God exists

I think, i.e., I doubt, All propositions
will, imagine, of…
perceive, etc. Sensory Experience
How things appear physics
to me; present, astronomy
conscious mental medicine
states. arithmetic
geometry

The Structure of Knowledge: Foundationalism

Foundationalism: There is a class of beliefs, of which we have secure knowledge, and we can counts some of our
other beliefs as knowledge by showing that they are properly supported by the members of this class of
foundational beliefs.

The Cogito is Descartes’ foundational belief. But we are still left with the question: what other beliefs can qualify
as knowledge by being supported by the cogito? Is there a rationally legitimate way of inferring from the
contents of our subjective mental states to facts about the external, material world?

External World Skepticism Looms

Cartesian Knowledge, given the Infallible Justification Condition, is demanding. Indeed, it is hard to think of
any beliefs about physical objects that Descartes could claim to know.

Descartes’ needs to move from (a) the fact that the content of his mental states has a certain specific feature
can only be explained by supposing that (b) that feature is caused by and correctly represents something
existing outside of his mind. The trouble, of course, is making this move in a way that satisfies the Infallible
Justification Condition.

All our evidence concerning the external world is, it seems, defeasible – especially if we accept the closure
principle. If we want to avoid external world skepticism, the obvious thing to do is weaken the justification
condition.

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 LOCKE

Lockean Fallibilism

Key Passage: The certainty of things existing [in the nature of things] when we have the testimony of our senses for it is
not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For, our faculties being suited no to the full
extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the
preservation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to the use of life: they serve to our purpose well enough, if
they will but give us certain notice of those things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us.

Skepticism may seem a real possibility in a philosophy classroom, but no one could survive as a skeptic in the
real world. Moreover, absolute certainty is simply beyond what we are concerned with. (Note the connection
here to the ‘value of knowledge’ question.)

Lockean Knowledge: For S to know that p

(i) Truth Condition: p must be true.

(ii) Belief Condition: S must believe that p.
(iii) Fallible Justification Condition: S must have adequate – but not necessarily indefeasible – evidence for
p.

Remaining Problems

The Threshold Problem: What counts as adequate? More specifically, how do we set the level of justification
requisite for knowledge in a non-ad hoc way?

Further problem: Suppose, treating justification akin to probability, we say the threshold is .9. Now
suppose you have exactly satisfy this threshold for p, and exactly satisfy this threshold for q, such that you
know that <p> (with .9 probability) and you know that <q> (with .9 probability). But do you know
that <p and q>? Well, it seems not. The probability of a conjunction is equal to the product of the
probabilities of the conjuncts. So the probability of the conjunction will be only 0.81, which is below
our, arbitrarily chosen, threshold.

BIV Problem: The BIV has the same evidence as us. So does the BIV know?

Relying on the Truth Condition: Locke’s explanation of why you do not know things about the external
world is that in the cases of deception, your beliefs are false. So, Locke claims, his account is
extensionally adequate even if we turn out to be systematically mistaken.

This, however, does not allay the worry. We can easily generate cases where, say, the brain in the
vat is thinking that <it is sunny outside> and, in reality, it is in fact sunny outside. So the brain’s
belief is true.

Lockes’ Causal Representative Realism

The BIV argument relied on the thought that we would be unable to discriminate between our experiences
provided by the external world and our experiences provided by the computer-fed electrodes attached to our
brain. But why should we think this?

Well, on a fairly commonsense view, one that both Locke and Descartes subscribed to, we indirectly have access
to the external world but have direct access to our own ideas. (Let “idea” refer to conscious contents of any sort).
Here’s a quick sketch of Locke’s account:

Realism: There is an external world that exists independently of us.

Representative: We are only indirectly aware of this world, by means of mental representations.

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 Mind

Idea of
causes via the senses Banana
Mind’s
Eye
Direct Awareness

On this picture, we experience the external world via the mediation of our ideas, which are experienced
directly. We, in other words, never immediately or directly experience ordinary objects in the material
world.

Argument from Illusion

Shepard Tables Muller-Lyer Lines

1. What I am immediately aware of, the thing that is directly before my mind, is undeniably a certain
way – the Muller-Lyer lines look different lengths.
2. But the only relevant material object, the lines on the page, are not this way – they are the same
length.
3. Therefore, since things having incompatible properties cannot be identical, the immediate object
of my experience cannot be the physical lines on the page.

Skeptical Worry

Veil of Perception: Since we only have direct access to our ideas, we cannot compare our representations of the
world with the world itself. There is a gap between how things seem (in our ideas) and how they are (in reality).
So we cannot rule out that all our ideas of the external world are just an illusion or hallucination.

The BIV and the Non-BIV can have the same ideas without our being able to discern a difference between
those caused by the external world and those caused by the computer.

Locke’s Response

Involuntariness Argument: We cannot choose the experiences we have. Our sensory experience is involuntary,
independent of our will. I can decide whether or not to open my eyes. But I cannot choose whether I will see
this computer in front of me once I do open my eyes. So something other than my own mind must cause my
experiences.

Another difference between our immediate sensory experiences and other sorts of ideas, such as those of
imagination and memory, is that sensory ideas of certain kinds are accompanied by pain, whereas the
corresponding ideas of imagination and memory are not.

Consistency Argument: Our senses in many cases bear witness to the truth of each other’s report. Qualities are
accessible through more than one sense. For example, we can check on what our eyes tell us when we see a fire

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by using our hands to feel its warmth. And our various sensory experiences are, in general, related to each other
in such a way as to fit together into a cohesive whole, thus differing significantly from the fragmentary
experiences characteristic of dreams

The argument here is abductive: The reason for accepting various claims about the material world is that
they provide the best explanation for facts about the contents of our mental states. More precisely,
experience that is both involuntary and orderly demand some sort of further explanation: what is it that
produces and sustains the order? The best explanation: There’s an external world.

Problem: If you are a brain in the vat your experiences would be involuntary and consistent, but you would
still be wrong if you believed your senses. And the evil demon could make Descartes’ experiences both
consistent and involuntary.

Response: But between the BIV explanation and the external world explanation, we should go with the
external world. BIV explanation, assuming your vat is located in the external world, is less probable
(given the principle concerning probabilities and conjunction stated above) than the external world
explanation alone.

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 GETTIER
Background

Here’s where we left off with Locke: For S to know that p

(i) Truth Condition: p must be true.

(ii) Belief Condition: S must believe that p.
(iii) Fallible Justification Condition: S must have adequate – but not necessarily indefeasible – evidence for
p.

Gettier’s two assumptions:

• First, justification is fallibilistic – we can be justified in believing things that are false.
• Second, a person is justified (at least to the same degree) in believing any proposition that she
competently deduces from the original.
o By using defeaters – e.g., holograms, robots, &c. – we can generate Gettier cases without this
second assumption.
The Argument

Ford Case: Smith justifiably believes <Jones owns a Ford>. He has seen Jones driving a Ford many times, heard Jones
talk about his Ford, &c. Smith validly infers from this, and believes, <Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona>.
Smith has no idea where Brown is; he just picked Barcelona at random. It turns out that Jones actually doesn’t own
a Ford (it was just sold, or whatever), but, coincidentally, Brown is in Barcelona.

Verdict: Smith does not know <Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona>. So, we can satisfy the Lockean
conditions for knowledge with what are intuitively not cases of knowledge.

All of Smith’s evidence was for the false disjunct and only the truth of the second preserved the truth of Smith’s
belief. Lucky indeed for Smith that he, willy-nilly, velled on a truth. The destruction of knowledge comes from
Smith’s justification hooking on to the wrong disjunct. ‘Luckily true beliefs’ cannot be knowledge. But that
means JTB is insufficient for knowledge.

1. If knowledge is justified true belief, then it is not possible for a person to have a justified true belief that
isn’t knowledge.
2. A person can be justified in believing a false proposition.
3. If a person is justified in believing some proposition, then she is justified (at least to the same degree) in
believing any proposition that she competently deduces from the original.
4. Smith, in our example, is justified in believing the (false) proposition <Jones owns a Ford>.
5. From the proposition in (4) Smith competently deduces <Jones owns a Ford or my friend Brown is in
Barcelona>.
6. Smith is justified in believing the proposition in (5).
7. Smith’s belief in the proposition in (5) is true but only by luck.
8. Luckily true beliefs are not knowledge.
9. It is possible for a person to have a justified true belief that isn’t knowledge
10. It is not the case that justified true belief is knowledge.

Recipe for constructing Gettier cases

i. Start with an example of a case where a subject has a justified false belief.
ii. Modify the case so that the belief is true merely by luck.

Here’s a non-epistemic case that has this structure.

Double Gust. Suppose a skilled archer shoots an arrow at a target. However, unpredictably, a gale-force wind
sweeps across the shooting range, blowing the arrow wide. We would here, in assessing the shot, not want
to attribute success to the archer. The archer, qua archer, has failed. But next suppose, again unpredictably,
that a gale-force wind sweeps across the shooting range in an equal and opposite direction as the first gust,

12
 returning the arrow to its initial trajectory. The arrow hits the target. In assessing the shot, we would not,
given that success was destroy by the first gust of wind (and the archer has done nothing in the interim),
want to reattribute success to the archer, even though (because of the second gust) she achieves her aim.
She hits the target, but not as a result of her skill.

Gettier cases are like Double Gust. We experience double luck. We are unlucky in that our justification fails
to track the target – the truth. But we are lucky in that, despite this, we still hit the truth. Luck, however,
destroys knowledge. Smith, for example, achieves true belief. But, like our archer, not in the right way for
success; he achieves true belief not as a result of his justification.

Consider

Stopped Clock. You look at the clock on the wall. It reads 3:00. You form the justified belief that it is 3:00.
Unbeknownst to you, the clock is actually stopped (unlucky); however, it just happens to be 3:00
anyway (lucky).

Verdict: You do not know <it is 3:00>.

Two Possible Solutions:

• Go with Descartes – strengthen justification so that false beliefs are ruled out.
o Downside: Hard to resist skepticism.
• Find a suitable fourth condition – knowledge = JTB+X
o Downside: X has proved elusive.
General Lesson

If we do not want to strengthen the justification condition, then knowledge demands more in the way of
cooperation from the world than simply that the belief in question is true.

On the JTB account of knowledge there is one condition which relates to the world (the truth condition)
and two conditions that relate to us as agents (the belief and justification conditions). These last two
conditions don’t demand anything from the world in the sense that they could obtain regardless of how the
world is. If I were the victim of a hallucination, for example, then I might have a whole range of wholly
deceptive experiences, experiences which, nonetheless, lead me to believe something and, moreover, to
justifiably believe it.

The moral of the Gettier cases is, however, that you need to demand more from the world than simply that
one’s justified belief is true if you are to have knowledge.

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 INTERNALISM & EXTERNALISM

Background

The Cartesian account of knowledge – which requires infallible justification – leads to skepticism concerning the
external world. So we weakened the justification condition.

But Locke’s account of knowledge – which does not require infallible justification – faces two related problems:
First, Gettier cases. Second, the BIV knows things that it doesn’t know.

We thus are looking for an account of knowledge that can avoid these problems. It is best to start with the
Gettier problem. We need an account of knowledge before declaring that, when it comes to the external
world, we don’t have any.

A (failed) Solution to the First Problem

A natural thought about Gettier cases is this: there seems to be something fishy about how one arrives at the
beliefs. More precisely, the problem seems to stem from the fact that what causes your belief is disconnected
from the truth. This idea drove some to accept:

Knowledge: S knows that p if and only if

(i) Truth Condition: p is true,

(ii) Belief Condition: S must believe that p,
(iii) Appropriate Cause Condition: S’s belief that p is caused by the fact that p is true.

The fact, for example, that Brown is in Barcelona was not part of the cause of Smith’s believing <Jones
owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona>. The causal theory thus provides a neat explanation for why Smith
doesn’t know.

However, despite its initial plausibility, the Causal Theory faces its own variant of the Gettier problem. Consider

Fake Barn County. You are driving through an area where there seem to be many barns. Unknown to you, all
but one of them are mere barn facades that look just like barns from the road. Among all the phony barns,
there is one real barn. You believe each of the objects (phony and real barns) to be barns. You point out the
window, happening to point at the one real barn (so you’ve satisfied the Appropriate Cause Condition), and
you say, “That’s a barn.”

Verdict: You do not know that <that’s a barn>. We should reject this version of the Causal Theory – where
the Appropriate Cause is the fact that p is true.

Internalism v. Externalism

The Causal Theory offers a revisionary Justification Condition. Traditional epistemologist – e.g., Descartes &
Locke – assumed that the difference between those who are justified in believing something and those who are
not depend on states of which people are consciously aware. But since causal processes, even those pertaining to
your own mental states can, and often do, occur without your conscious awareness, the Causal Theory drops
this assumption. The Causal Theory subscribes to what we call an externalist account of justification.

Epistemic Externalism =df. Externalism is the denial of internalism. Matters of justification do not depend on
factors internal to the believer’s point of view – factors to which the believer has special access.

Epistemic Internalism =df. Matters of justification depend on factors internal to the believer’s point of view –
factors to which the believer has special access. That is, only factors that are (or potentially can be) available
to the agent’s conscious awareness can contribute to the justification of her belief.

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 Justification, for Descartes, must be indefeasible. And if you have indefeasible evidence, you can tell
that you have it simply by reflection on the contents of your own conscious mind. Put differently, for
Descartes, the person must realize that the belief is infallible, must see or grasp the reason why its truth
is guaranteed, since a belief that is in fact infallible but not recognized as such could still be doubted.

For Locke, justification comes from experience, but experience too, as he conceived of it, is something
you are aware you have whenever you have it.

A (better) Solution to the First Problem: Reliabilism

Given Fake Barn County, we should reject the Causal Theory as specified above. But we can, by revisiting the
case, offer a more plausible variant of externalism.

The problem with ascribing knowledge to you when driving through Fake Barn County is that in such
circumstances, simply looking out of your car window will lead you to believe that there is a barn on many
occasions when there isn’t one. Just looking out of your car window is, in other words, unreliable.

Building on this idea we might say that if you want to have knowledge, the appropriate way of acquiring a true
belief is through a reliable faculty, mechanism, or process. The view we then get is

Knowledge: S knows that p if and only if

(i) Truth Condition: p is true,

(ii) Belief Condition: S must believe that p,
(iii) Appropriate Cause Condition: S’s belief that p is caused by a reliable faculty, mechanism, or process.

The Appropriate Cause Condition here is, again, externalist. The agent need not be consciously aware that the
way in which she is forming her beliefs is reliable. That is, the view does not require that the believer have
cognitive access to the fact that the belief-producing process is reliable in order for the belief to be justified.

Since reliabilism posits a conceptual connection between justification and truth – i.e., what it is for a process to
be reliable is for it to be truth-tracking; to be a process that leads to a high proportion of true beliefs – it looks
like we have a solution to the Gettier problem.

Unreliable Process: Barn observations in Fake Barn County; Adding disjuncts in the Ford Case.

Lesson: We need a process that rules out arriving at true belief by mere chance.

Reliable Process: Perception in our world.

Perception can cause certain beliefs. But to have these beliefs the entity need not be aware or conscious
that perception is what’s causing them.

For example, if you are able to perceive the difference between twins Trudy and Judy without
knowing what it is about them that allows you to do it, then you have a reliable method of forming
the belief that this one is Trudy. If you belief correctly <this one is Trudy>, then the reliabilist says
that you know <this one is Trudy>.

Benefits: Allows for the possibility of knowers, like dogs and children, which are ruled out by
internalism. In addition, it allows us to classify people as knowers who are able to perform some task –
e.g., sort chickens based on sex, or point out which Jalapeños are hot – but cannot explain how they
are so able.

Externalism & Skepticism: An Answer to the Second Problem?

Recall the worry with Locke’s theory:

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 If you were a BIV, either (a) your belief that <it’s a sunny day> (when it is, in fact, a sunny day) is justified;
or (b) your belief is not justified. If (a), we are stuck concluding that you, as a BIV, know that <it’s a sunny
day>. If (b), we are stuck with the skeptical conclusion that non-BIVs who believe that <it’s a sunny day>
are not justified either.

Reliabilist Solution

Non-BIV: You know you aren’t a BIV, provided your true belief that you have a body that moves about in
the physical world is produced by a process that is reliable in the circumstances. Since, in fact, you are not a
brain in a vat, your beliefs about the world are produced by perception. Hence, you know that you are not
a BIV.

BIV: If you were a brain in a vat, you would not know that you were. As a matter of fact, you would know
practically nothing about the physical world. The computer would be the mechanism by which you formed
your beliefs, and that is a rather unreliable way of forming beliefs.

We know we aren’t brains in a vat, even though we would have had exactly the same experiences if we
were.

Objections to Externalism

External factors insufficient for justification. Consider

Clairvoyance. Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with
respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the
general possibility of such a cognitive power or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day
Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or
against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power under circumstances in
which it is completely reliable.

Verdict: Despite Norman’s reliability, he’s not justified in believing that the President is in New York.

Lesson: What’s missing is that Norman, from his own point of view, has no reason to think the President
is in New York, nor is he aware of any possible way he could come to have a true belief, given
everything of which he is aware.

Upshot: First, a negative claim: external justification is insufficient. Second, a positive claim:
awareness on the part of the subject is required for beliefs to be justified.

But the problems for externalism do not end here. Not only are external factors insufficient for justification, they
are also unnecessary. Consider

New Evil Demon. Imagine you have a counterpart in a possible world who has indistinguishable perceptual
experiences from your own. However, all of your unfortunate counterpart’s perceptions were induced by a
Cartesian evil demon. Suppose you look at your hands, believing <I have hands>. Your counterpart does
the same.

Verdict: You and your counterpart are, in terms of justification, on a par in terms of the belief that <I have
hands>.

Lesson: Externalism tells us that, since your counterpart is in a demon world, perception is an unreliable
belief forming process. But, since you are not in a demon world, perception is reliable for you. You and
your counterpart are, in terms of justification, not on a par. That is hard to believe.

Upshot: External factors are not necessary for justification. So internalism is true. Moreover, we
can, by returning to the brain in the vat, state the following plausible principle:

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 Justificatory Symmetry: The extent to which S is justified in believing that p is just the same as the
extent to which S’s recently BIVed duplicate is justified in believing that p.

Generality Problem

The reliabilist holds that a belief is justified if the general sort of cognitive process from which it results is
reliable. But at what level of generality should the relevant process be characterized?

Consider the visually produced belief that there is a cup sitting on my table. Next consider different
ways in which the cognitive process from the belief results could be: (i) as the visual perception of a cup
under good lighting at close range, (ii) as the visual perception of a medium-sized physical object, (iii) as
visual perception in general, &c.

Which of these various descriptions of the cognitive process in question is the relevant one for applying
the reliabilist’s principle of justification?

What makes this question a serious problem for the reliabilist is that the proportion of true beliefs
produced by these different processes vary widely. In specifying the process, we face a new
threshold problem.

On the one hand, we could individuate the process with such precision that it would apply to
only this particular case. But then the process described would be either 100 percent reliable
(if the belief is true) or 100 percent unreliable (if the belief is false).

Or, on the other hand, we could individuate the process broadly. But then we would get
wildly varied results, in terms of reliability, across cases.

Meno’s Challenge: Externalism and the Value of Knowledge

Does externalism rob knowledge of its value over true belief?

Practical Value of Knowledge: Merely having a reliably produced belief without any reason for thinking
that it is reliably produced seems like having money in the bank without knowing that it is there.

Meno: We want to make sure we get to Larissa, and we want our getting there to be modally
robust. True belief, unlike knowledge, fails to be modally robust in this way. But is externally
justified true belief any different, in terms of our confidence, than merely true belief?

Moreover, if a reliably produced belief without any reason for thinking that it is reliably produced
qualifies as knowledge, then it’s possible for there to be knowledge that is in-principle unteachable
– an odd result.

Epistemic Value of Knowledge (the swamping problem): The good of the product makes the reliability of
the source that produces it good, but the reliability of the source does not then give the product an
additional boost of value. If the espresso tastes good, it makes no difference if it comes from an unreliable
machine. If the belief is true, it makes no difference if it comes from an unreliable belief-producing source.
Whatever value is conferred on a cup of coffee through being produced by a reliable coffee-making
machine, this value is ‘swamped’ by the value conferred on that coffee in virtue of it being a great cup of
coffee.
[Note: The swamping problem is not unique to reliabilism. It applies to all who accept that true belief
is the ultimate, fundamental epistemic good.]

Return of Gettier

Can you generate an example of a reliably formed true belief that is still essentially due to luck?

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 MOORE’S PROOF OF AN EXTERNAL WORLD

Background

External World Skepticism =df. We cannot have knowledge about any contingent truths about the external world.

External world: That which is independent of one’s own mind.

Contingent truths: Things that could (conceivably) have been otherwise.

“It remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us […]
must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to
counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.” – Kant

Moore’s Proof

If someone were to question whether there were three typos on a certain page in a book, it would be a perfectly
acceptable proof to open the book and say “Here’s one typo, here’s another, and here’s the third.”

Moore’s Proof of an External World:

1. Here’s a hand.
2. Here’s another hand.
3. So, there are hands.
4. If hands exist, then there is an external world.
5. So, there is an external world.

Here is how the proof generalizes: Let “o” refer to an ordinary, commonsense proposition, like <I have hands>,
“s” to a proposition describing some skeptical scenario, like <I am merely dreaming that I have hands>, and
“K” for the knowledge-operator.

1. Ko
2. If Ko, then K(not s)
3. K(not s).

Three Ways Proofs Might Fail

First, a proof must not be question-begging – the conclusion is merely identical to one of the premises.

Moore claims his proof does not fail in this way. The conclusion might have been true, even if the premises
(because they are more specific) had been false. If he had his hands amputated, “Here is a hand” would be
false, but “there exists two human hands” might still be true; check the ends of your arms.

Although, this is too narrow a notion of question-begging. For, if correct, arguments like “the bible
says god exists, so god exists” aren’t objectionably question-begging.

Second, the premises must be known.

He certainly did at the moment know (1) and (2) as evidenced by the combination of certain gestures with
saying the words ‘There is one hand and here is another.’

Three, the argument is valid – the truth of the conclusion is guaranteed by the truth of the premises.

The Moorean Shift

We can imagine Descartes objecting: Well, how do you know (1)?

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 Moorean Response: We’re more confident that we have hands than we are of the premises in the skeptic’s
arguments. That is, the relevant knowledge-claims, like (1), are more plausible than are the premises of any
philosophical argument intended to show that they are false.

Moore’s move here is to flip the skeptic’s argument on its head.

1. All knowledge is thus and so. (fill in your preferred analysis of knowledge here)
2. Alleged knowledge of hands is not thus and so.
3. Thus, no one ever knows that there are hands.

Since the conclusion (3) follows from the premises, what the argument shows is that one cannot
simultaneously accept statements (1), (2), and (4):

4. I know that this is a hand.

In a successful argument, each premise must be more plausible than the negation of the conclusion. So,
what you must do is decide which statement you have the least confidence in and reject it. Moore’s point is
that given the confidence you have in (4), you must reject either (1) or (2).

In short, Moore’s anti-skeptical line is this: Premise (4) is far more plausible than any of the skeptic’s claims,
thereby making it more reasonable to conclude that something in the skeptic’s position must be mistaken
than to accept the skeptical conclusion.

Objections

The approach has the effect of ruling out even relatively weak versions of skepticism absolutely and conclusively
from the beginning. This seems both question-begging and dogmatic. Moore appears to rule out illegitimately
the apparent possibility (for it does seem to be at least a possibility) that commonsense might be mistaken, and
that skepticism might in fact be true.

How do we know which propositions – e.g., <this is a hand> – are Moorean propositions? That a proposition
seems intuitively compelling seems insufficient, since (a) in the past things that have been intuitively compelling
have proven to be false, and (b) disagreements occur for which both parties find their respective viewpoints
intuitively compelling but regarding which at most one can be correct.

THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION

Sorting True from False Appearances

Key Passage: To know whether things are really as they seem to be, we must have a procedure for distinguishing
appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedure is a good
procedure, we have to know whether it really succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from
appearances that are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which
appearances are true and which ones are false. And so we are caught in a circle.

Two principles & the Circle

o To distinguish true appearances from false (and endorse them as true), we must have a good procedure
to distinguish them.

o To distinguish good distinguishing procedures from bad, we must identify the ones that distinguish true
appearances from false.

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Two Questions for Knowledge

The basic question of epistemology is: How are we to distinguish the real cases of knowledge from what appear
to be cases of knowledge? Put differently, how are we to decide in any particular case whether we have genuine
items of knowledge?

We would have an answer to this general question if we could answer either of the following two questions:

i. What specific things do we know? (What is the extent of our knowledge?)

ii. What standards or conditions must be satisfied in order to know something? (What are the criteria
of knowing?)

Key Passage: If we know the answer to either one of these questions, then, perhaps, we may devise a procedure
that will enable us to answer the other. If we can specify the criteria of knowledge, we may have a way of
deciding how far our knowledge extends. Or if we know how far our knowledge does extend and are able to say
what the things are that we know, then we may be able to formulate criteria enabling us to mark off the things
we do know from those that we do not. But if we do not have the answer to the first question, then, it would
seem, we have no way of answering the second. And if we do not have the answer to the second, then, it would
seem, we have no way of answering the first.

Problem: We cannot seem to settle on a starting point for epistemological investigation.

Is there a way out?

The skeptic argues you cannot answer either question without presupposing an answer to the other. That is, we
need to answer (ii) to answer (i), but we need to answer (i) to answer (ii); this interdependency leaves us without
knowledge. That is, the skeptic gets the anti-skeptic to articulate his own standard for knowledge or justification
– his criterion – and then argues that the anti-skeptic cannot defend it in a non-question-begging way.

Two possible strategies of response:

Methodists: Try to formulate a criterion of knowledge without appeal to any instances of knowledge. That is,
we begin with intuitively determined criteria of knowledge and seek to determine on that basis which
specific beliefs are cases of knowledge.

Methodists think they have an answer to question (ii), and then, in terms of it, work out their
answer to question (i) – e.g., Locke answers (ii): Derived from sense experience.

Particularists: Try to find out what we know without making use of any criterion of knowledge or of justified
belief. That is, we begin with particular, intuitively determined instances of beliefs that (allegedly) constitute
knowledge, and then seek to generalize from them to the correct general criteria of knowledge.

Particularists think they have an answer to question (i), and then, in terms of it, work out their
answer to question (ii) – e.g., Moore answers (i): I have hands!

Problem for Methodists

Any criteria is going to be very broad, far-reaching and at the same time completely arbitrary. How can one
begin with a broad generalization? How are we to decide which are the good methods and which are the bad
ones? To get an answer to this last question haven’t we just introduced the problem at a different, higher level?

In light of this challenge, there are four unacceptable possibilities:

(i) offers no reasons

(ii) offers the criterion as endorsing itself
(iii) offers another criterion. And then another. ….

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 Key Passage: If we could fix on a good method for distinguishing good and bad methods, we might be all set. But
this, of course, just moves the problem to a different level. How are we to distinguish between a good method
for choosing good methods? If we continue on in this way, of course, we are led to an infinite regress and we will
never have the answer to our original question.

(iv) appeals to the criterion’s track record.

“These methods turn out good beliefs.’ But how do we know that they do? It can only be that we already
know the difference between the good beliefs and the bad ones.”

Problem for Particularists

Particularists beg the question against the skeptic. They say we know p without having a defensible criterion to
back up why p is a bona fide instance of knowledge.

Particularists thus defeat the skeptic by fiat.

Rejection of the need for a Criterion

We should hold, like Moore, that we know <this is a hand>. From the fact that our senses do sometimes deceive
us, it hardly follows that your senses and mine are deceiving you and me right now. To be sure, it is more
reasonable to trust the senses than to distrust them.

Caveat: When everything seems all right. If on a particular occasion something about that particular
occasion makes you suspect that particular report of the senses, then you should (perhaps) have some
doubts about what you think you see, or hear, or feel, or smell.

In short, the senses should be regarded as innocent until there is some positive reason, on some particular
occasion, for thinking that they are guilty on that particular occasion.

Response to the Skeptic

What few philosophers have had the courage to recognize is this: we can deal with the problem only by begging
the question. Skepticism is only one of the three possibilities and it has no more to recommend it than the others
do.

Argument:

1. Skepticism, Methodism, and Particularism are all equally arbitrary.

2. Particularism saves the pre-theoretical thought that we know many things.
3. Skepticism and Methodism do not.
4. If a view saves our pre-theoretical view of things, then it is ceteris paribus preferable to views that do not.
5. Therefore, Particularism is preferable.

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 FLOW CHART OF OUR INQUIRY

Problem of the
Criterion
Skepticism Methodism

Particularism
Knowledge = JTB

Problem: Looks
dogmatic and Lingering Worry:
question-begging. Is the justification Where should we set
No
condition fallible? Yes the threshold for
justification?
Descartes: Infallible Locke: Fallible JTB
JTB

Problem: The extent of Problem: How do we Problem: Gettier Cases

our knowledge. keep from classifying
External world the BIV’s true beliefs
skepticism looms. as knowledge?
Lingering Worry:
Possible Solution: Generality problem.
Externalism How do we
individuate reliable
processes?

Problems: (a) Violates

Justificatory Symmetry. (b)
We lose the value of
knowledge.

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