TORTS AND DAMAGES PEOPLE VS VILLAR (G.R. No.
202708, APRIL 13, 2015)
CHIANG KAI SHEK SCHOOL VS CA (G.R. No. 58028, APRIL 18, 1989)
DOCTRINE:
 Failure of school to incorporate does not exempt it from suit as a
juridical entity. Having represented itself as possessed with juridical
personality to do so, the school is estopped from denying such
personality to defeat her claim against it.
 Award of moral and exemplary damages are proper when illegal
dismissal is done in wanton and oppressive manner.
FACTS: Ms. Oh, who has been continuously teaching in the Chiang Kai Shek
School for 32 years, has been dismissed from her work without cause and
due notice.
ISSUE: 1) WON the failure of school to incorporate will exempt it from suit.
2) WON Ms. Oh is entitled of the award of damages for having been
illegally dismissed.
HELD: 1) No. The failure of the school to incorporate should not prejudice
the private respondent in the assertion of her claims against the school.
There should also be no question that having contracted with the private
respondent every year for thirty two years and thus represented itself as
possessed of juridical personality to do so, the petitioner is now estopped
from denying such personality to defeat her claim against it. According to
Article 1431 of the Civil Code, "through estoppel an admission
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot
be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it."
2) Yes. The Court holds, after considering the particular circumstance of Oh's
employment, that she had become a permanent employee of the school
and entitled to security of tenure at the time of her dismissal. Since no
cause was shown and established at an appropriate hearing, and the notice
then required by law had not been given, such dismissal was invalid.
DOCTRINE: Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of
proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual
damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss,
credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts."
FACTS: Appellant and 2 other accused were charged of murder. The case
focused on the computation of the loss of earning capacity because the
basis of award by the RTC and CA was merely on the testimony of the
widow.
ISSUE: WON the lower court has erred in the award of loss of earning
capacity.
HELD: Yes. It is already settled jurisprudence that “the formula that has
gained acceptance over time has limited recovery to net earning capacity
meaning less the necessary expense for his own living.
In fine, it is settled that the indemnity for loss of earning capacity is in the
form of actual damages; as such, it must be proved by competent proof,
"not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow." By way of
exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded in two
instances: 1) the victim was self-employed and receiving less than the
minimum wage under the current laws and no documentary evidence is
available in the decedent's line of business; and, 2) the deceased was
employed as a daily wage worker and receiving less than the minimum
wage.
PNB VS SPS. ROCAMORA (G.R. No. 164549, SEPT. 18, 2009)
DOCTRINE: Moral damages are not recoverable simply because a contract
has been breached. They are recoverable only if the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
and oppressive or abusive. Likewise, a breach of contract may give rise to
exemplary damages only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
FACTS: Sps. Rocamora obtained a loan from PNB to which they
consequently have not paid in full. The PNB filed a complaint for defiency
judgment since the proceeds is not sufficient to pay the loan obligations.
However, the spouses refused to pay for the deficiency because the PNB
practically created the deficiency by increasing the interest rates on the
basis of the escalation clause from 12% to 42% and failing to immediately
foreclose the mortgage pursuant to PD 385. Thus, RTC and CA dismissed
PNB’s complaint and awarded damages to the spouses. In its petition, the
PNB contests the damages awarded to the spouses Rocamora, as the PNB
had no malice, nor any furtive design: when it increased the interest rates
pursuant to the escalation clause; when it decided to foreclose the
mortgages only in 1990; and when it sought to claim the deficiency.
ISSUE: WON Sps. Rocamora is entitled to damages by mere breach of
contract.
HELD: No. We are not suciently convinced that PNB acted fraudulently, in
bad faith, or in wanton disregard of its contractual obligations, simply
because it increased the interest rates and delayed the foreclosure of the
mortgages. Bad faith cannot be imputed simply because the defendant
acted with bad judgment or with attendant negligence. Bad faith is more
than these; it pertains to a dishonest purpose, to some moral obliquity, or to
the conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty attributable to a
motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Moral damages are not recoverable simply because a contract has been
breached. They are recoverable only if the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations.
The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, and
oppressive or abusive. Likewise, a breach of contract may give rise to
exemplary damages only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
PEOPLE VS MANERO (G.R. No. 86883, JANUARY 29, 1993)
DOCTRINE:
 A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages because, not
being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or
such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental
anguish or moral shock. It is only when a juridical person has a good
reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation, that
moral damages may be awarded.
 Moral damages and their causal relation to the defendant's acts
should be satisfactorily proved by the claimant. It is elementary that
in order that moral damages may be awarded there must be proof
of moral suffering.
 In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability
may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct
from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
FACTS: A foreign religious minister was senselessly killed with cruelty and
ignominy by the accused-appellants for no apparent reason. The RTC has
rendered the decision that the accused-appellants are guilty of Murder,
Attempted Murder and Arson and awarded moral damages in the amount
of P100,000 to the congregation to which the religious minister belonged.
ISSUE: WON the congregation, a juridical person, is entitled to moral
damages.
HELD: No. A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages because, not
being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such
sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral
shock. It is only when a juridical person has a good reputation that is
debased, resulting in social humiliation, that moral damages may be
awarded. Neither can we award moral damages to the heirs of the deceased
who may otherwise be lawfully entitled thereto pursuant to par. (3), Art.
2206, of the Civil Code, 33 33 for the reason that the heirs never presented
any evidence showing that they suffered mental anguish; much less did they
take the witness stand. Moral damages and their causal relation to the
defendant's acts should be satisfactorily proved by the claimant. It is
elementary that in order that moral damages may be awarded there must
be proof of moral suffering.
However, considering that the brutal slaying of Fr. Tulio Favali was attended
with abuse of superior strength, cruelty and ignominy by deliberately and
inhumanly augmenting the pain and anguish of the victim, outraging or
scoffing at this person or corpse, exemplary damages may be awarded to
the lawful heirs, 36 36 even though not proved nor expressly pleaded in the
complaint, 37 37 and the amount of P100,000.00 is considered reasonable.
ABROGAR VS COSMOS BOTTLING (G.R. No. 164749, MARCH 15, 2017)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence
causing the death of a participant in an organized marathon bumped by a
passenger jeepney on the route of the race.
According to Jose R. Castro, Jr., the President of Intergames, the
preparations for the event included conducting an ocular inspection of the
route of the race, sending out letters to the various cooperating agencies,
securing permits from proper authorities, putting up directional signs, and
setting up the water stations.
ISSUE:
 WON Intergames is negligent in conducting the marathon.
 WON Intergames’ negligence as the organizer is the approximate
cause of Rommel’s death.
 WON the doctrine of assumption of risk may apply to Rommel
 WON Cosmos is liable for the negligence of the Intergames as the
organizer
HELD:
1) Yes. We consider the "safeguards" employed and adopted by
Intergames not adequate to meet the requirement of due diligence.
Intergames had full awareness of the higher risks involved in staging the
race alongside running vehicles, and had the option to hold the race in a
route where such risks could be minimized, if not eliminated.
Another failing on the part of Intergames was the patent inadequacy of the
personnel to man the route.
Intergames' own evidence did not establish the conduct of proper
coordination and instruction. Castro, Jr. described the action plan adopted
by Intergames in the preparation for the race. Intergames had no right to
assume that the volunteers had already been aware of what exactly they
would be doing during the race. It had the responsibility and duty to give to
them the proper instructions despite their experience from the past races it
had organized considering that the particular race related to runners of a
different level of experience, and involved different weather and
environmental conditions, and trac situations.
In that respect, Intergames did not observe the degree of care necessary as
the organizer, rendering it liable for negligence. As the Court has
emphasized in Corliss v. The Manila Railroad Company, where the danger is
great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a
want of ordinary care under the circumstances.
2) Yes, the negligence of Intergames as the organizer was the
proximate cause of the death of Rommel.
The generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in
an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his
right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally or
some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and
the damage.
We hold that the negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause despite
the intervening negligence of the jeepney driver.
Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces an event, and
without which the event would not have occurred.
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.'
An examination of the records in accordance with the foregoing concepts
supports the conclusions that the negligence of Intergames was the
proximate cause of the death of Rommel; and that the negligence of the
jeepney driver was not an efficient intervening cause.
First of all, Intergames' negligence in not conducting the race in a road
blocked off from vehicular traffic, and in not properly coordinating the
volunteer personnel manning the marathon route effectively set the stage
for the injury complained of.
Secondly, injury to the participants arising from an unfortunate vehicular
accident on the route was an event known to and foreseeable by
Intergames, which could then have been avoided if only Intergames had
acted with due diligence by undertaking the race on a blocked-off road, and
if only Intergames had enforced and adopted more efficient supervision of
the race through its volunteers.
And, thirdly, the negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit an intervening
cause, was not efficient enough to break the chain of connection between
the negligence of Intergames and the injurious consequence suffered by
Rommel. An intervening cause, to be considered efficient, must be " one not
produced by a wrongful act or omission, but independent of it, and
adequate to bring the injurious results . Any cause intervening between the
first wrongful cause and the final injury which might reasonably have been
foreseen or anticipated by the original wrong doer is not such an efficient
intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as the
proximate cause of the final injury."
3) This Court does not agree.
With respect to voluntary participation in a sport, the doctrine of
assumption of risk applies to any facet of the activity inherent in it and to
any open and obvious condition of the place where it is carried on.
The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes
himself to an obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of
injury that may result therefrom.
It rests on the fact that the person injured has consented to relieve the
defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chance of
injury from a known risk, and whether the former has exercised proper
caution or not is immaterial.
The doctrine requires the concurrence of three elements, namely:
(1) the plaintiff must know that the risk is present;
(2) he must further understand its nature; and
(3) his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary.
Here, the concurrence of the three elements was not shown to exist.
Rommel could not have assumed the risk of death when he participated in
the race because death was neither a known nor normal risk incident to
running a race.
Nobody in his right mind, including minors like him, would have joined the
marathon if he had known of or appreciated the risk of harm or even death
from vehicular accident while running in the organized running event.
Without question, a marathon route safe and free from foreseeable risks
was the reasonable expectation of every runner participating in an
organized running event.
Neither was the waiver by Rommel, then a minor, an effective form of
express or implied consent in the context of the doctrine of assumption of
risk. There is ample authority, cited in Prosser, to the effect that a person
does not comprehend the risk involved in a known situation because of his
youth, or lack of information or experience, and thus will not be taken to
consent to assume the risk. Clearly, the doctrine of assumption of risk does
not apply to bar recovery by the petitioners.
4) No, Cosmos is not liable for the negligence of Intergames as the
organizer.
The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to financing the
race. Cosmos did nothing beyond that, and did not involve itself at all in the
preparations for the actual conduct of the race. Cosmos' mere sponsorship
of the race was, legally speaking, too remote to be the efficient and
proximate cause of the injurious consequences.
 5) Article 2202 of the Civil Code lists the damages that the plaintiffs in
a suit upon crimes and quasi-delicts can recover from the
defendant, viz. :
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for
all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act
or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have
been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant.
Accordingly, Intergames was liable for all damages that were the natural
and probable consequences of its negligence.
Article 2231 of the Civil C o d e stipulates that exemplary damages are to be
awarded in cases of quasi-delict if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
The foregoing characterization by the RTC indicated that Intergames'
negligence was gross. We agree with the characterization. Gross negligence,
according to M e n d o z a v. S p o u s e s G o m e z , is the absence of care or
diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or
property; it evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them. Indeed, the failure of Intergames to adopt
the basic precautionary measures for the safety of the minor participants
like Rommel was in reckless disregard of their safety. Conduct is reckless
when it is an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation in which a
high degree of danger is apparent; it must be more than any mere mistake
resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere
thoughtlessness or inadvertence, simple inattention.
The RTC did not recognize the right of the petitioners to recover the loss of
earning capacity of Rommel. It should have, for doing so would have
conformed to jurisprudence whereby the Court has unhesitatingly allowed
such recovery in respect of children, students and other non-working or still
unemployed victims. The legal basis for doing so is Article 2206 (1) of the
Civil C o d e , which stipulates that the defendant "shall be liable for the loss
of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to
the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent
physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death."
The basis for the computation of earning capacity is not what he would have
become or what he would have wanted to be if not for his untimely death,
but the minimum wage in effect at the time of his death. The formula for
this purpose is:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income less
Necessary Living Expenses]
Life expectancy is equivalent to 2/3 multiplied by the difference of 80 and
the age of the deceased. Since Rommel was 18 years of age at the time of
his death, his life expectancy was 41 years. His projected gross annual
income, computed based on the minimum wage for workers in the non-
agricultural sector in effect at the time of his death, then fixed at
P14.00/day, is P5,535.83. Allowing for necessary living expenses of 50% of
his projected gross annual income, his total net earning capacity is
P113,484.52.
Article 2211 of the Civil C o d e expressly provides that interest, as a part of
damages, may be awarded in crimes and quasi-delicts at the discretion of
the court. The rate of interest provided under Article 2209 of the Civil C o d
e is 6% p e r a n n u m in the absence of stipulation to the contrary. The legal
interest rate of 6% p e r a n n u m is to be imposed upon the total amounts
herein awarded from the time of the judgment of the RTC on May 10, 1991
until finality of judgment. 98 98 Moreover, pursuant to Article 2212 99 99 of
the Civil C o d e , the legal interest rate of 6% p e r a n n u m is to be further
imposed on the interest earned up to the time this judgment of the Court
becomes nal and executory until its full satisfaction.
Article 2208 of the Civil C o d e expressly allows the recovery of attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation when exemplary damages have been
awarded. Thus, we uphold the RTC's allocation of attorney's fees in favor of
the petitioners equivalent to 10% of the total amount to be recovered,
inclusive of the damages for loss of earning capacity and interests, which we
consider to be reasonable under the circumstances.
 of Court to issue a writ of possession in favor to the respondent. It awarded,
in both cases, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC. It deleted the
SPS. TIMADO VS RURAL BANK OF SAN JOSE (G.R. No. 201436, JULY 11,
moral damages for lack of legal justification and reduced the amount of
2016)
exemplary damages.
DOCTRINE:
ISSUE:
 Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example
 WON the award of exemplary damages is proper despite the CA
or correction for the public good, IN ADDITION to moral,
deleted the award of moral damages.
temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. The award of
 WON the award of attorney’s fees is supported by factual and legal
exemplary damages is allowed by law as a warning to the public
premises.
and as a deterrent against the repetition of socially deleterious
actions. HELD: 1) No, the award of exemplary damages is not proper.
 The award of attorney's fees to the winning party lies within the
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or
discretion of the court, taking into account the circumstances of
correction for the public good, IN ADDITION to moral, temperate,
each case. This means that such an award should have factual,
liquidated, or compensatory damages. The award of exemplary damages is
legal, and equitable basis, not founded on pure speculation and
allowed by law as a warning to the public and as a deterrent against the
conjecture. In addition, the court should state the reason for the
repetition of socially deleterious actions.
award of attorney's fees in the body of the decision.
The requirements for an award of exemplary damages to be proper are the
FACTS: Sps. Timado obtained a loan from Rural Bank. As a security to the
following:
loan, they executed a REM over a parcel of land, and a chattel mortgage
over a rice mill machinery and diesel engine. Eventually, they failed to pay 1. They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in
the loan amortizations. Consequently, the bank informed the petitioners addition only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages,
their intention to foreclose the REM and CM to cover the unpaid balance. In and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination
response, the petitioner filed a complaint for reformation of instruments w/ depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be
prayer of injunction and TRO. No writ of injunction or TRO was ever issued awarded to the claimant;
by the RTC. 2. the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate,
liquidated, or compensatory damages; and
Rural Bank proceeded with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM and sold
3. the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith; and the award
the property in the public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.
would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanted,
Then, the petitioner filed a petition for indirect contempt with damages.
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
While the cases were pending, Rural Bank filed an ex parte petition for
issuance of writ of possession. Thus, the petitioners filed its third petition Here, the CA found that the respondents are not entitled to moral damages,
for indirect contempt. the award of exemplary damages, too, must be deleted for lack of legal
basis.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for reformation of instruments and
petition for indirect contempt filed by the petitioners and ordered the Clerk 2) Yes, the respondents are entitled to attorney’s fees.
The law is clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees may be
awarded as actual or compensatory damages under any of the
circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of
damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the
right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit.
The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208
demands factual, legal, and award attorney's fees under Article 2208
demands factual, legal, and equitable justification.
The award of attorney's fees to the winning party lies within the discretion
of the court, taking into account the circumstances of each case. This means
that such an award should have factual, legal, and equitable basis, not
founded on pure speculation and conjecture. In addition, the court should
state the reason for the award of attorney's fees in the body of the decision.
In the present case, the RTC expressly stated in the body of its decision its
basis for awarding attorney's fees: On the other hand, the vexatious and
baseless action led by vexatious and baseless action led by plaintiffs-
petitioners plaintiffs-petitioners gave rise to a cause of action for damages
against them in favor of respondents for unnecessarily dragging the latter to
Court and compelling them to defend themselves as well as for causing
them to suffer anxiety and embarrassment.
FILIPINO BROADCASTING NETWORK VS AMECC-BCCM (G.R. No. 141994,
JANUARY 17, 2005)
DOCTRINE:
 Article 2219(7) expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages
in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
 Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or
juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation
can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and
claim for moral damages.
 The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Art. 2208 of
the NCC demands factual, legal, and equitable justification, without
which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being
improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all events, the
court must explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not only in
the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of
attorney's fees.
 An employer and employee are solidarily liable for a defamatory
statement by the employee within the course and scope of his or
her employment, at least when the employer authorizes or ratifies
the defamation.
 Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which
they commit. Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in,
aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit.
FACTS: Rima and Alegre, employees of FBNI, made malicious imputations
against AMEC.
FBNI contends that AMEC is not entitled to moral damages because it is a
corporation.
FBNI contends that since AMEC is not entitled to moral damages, there is no
basis for the award of attorney's fees.
FBNI contends that it is not solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for the
payment of damages and attorney's fees because it exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees.
ISSUE:
1) WON AMEC is not entitled to moral damages because it is a
corporation.
2) WON AMEC is not entitled of attorney’s fees.
3) WON FBNI is not solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for the
payment of damages.
HELD:
1) AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
AMEC's claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the
Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral
damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article
2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person.
Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for
libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages.
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se , the law implies damages.
2) AMEC is not entitled of attorney’s fees.
The award of attorney's fees is not proper because AMEC failed to justify
satisfactorily its claim for attorney's fees. AMEC did not adduce evidence to
warrant the award of attorney's fees. Moreover, both the trial and appellate
courts failed to explicitly state in their respective decisions the rationale for
the award of attorney's fees.
3) FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre.
The basis of the present action is a tort. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and
severally liable for the tort which they commit. Joint tortfeasors are all the
persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Thus, AMEC correctly
anchored its cause of action against FBNI on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code.
An employer and employee are solidarily liable for a defamatory statement
by the employee within the course and scope of his or her employment, at
least when the employer authorizes or ratifies the defamation. In this case,
Rima and Alegre were clearly performing their official duties as hosts of
FBNI's radio program Exposé when they aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither
alleged nor proved that Rima and Alegre went beyond the scope of their
work at that time. There was likewise no showing that FBNI did not
authorize and ratify the defamatory broadcasts.
Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima
and Alegre. FBNI merely showed that it exercised diligence in the selection
of its broadcasters without introducing any evidence to prove that it
observed the same diligence in the supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI did
not show how it exercised diligence in supervising its broadcasters.
SPS. ESTRADA VS PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES (G.R. No. 203902)
DOCTRINE:
 Moral damages, as a general rule, are not recoverable in an action
for damages predicated on breach of contract.
 Temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning
capacity, may be awarded where earning capacity is plainly
established but no evidence was presented to support the
allegation of the injured party's actual income.
FACTS: A collision occurred between passer bus driven by respondent
Saylan and owned by Phil. Rabbit Buslines and an Isuzu truck driven by Urez
and registered to Cuyton Jr. which injured the petitioner’s arm and was later
amputated.
Dionisio argued that there was a breach of contract of carriage and filed a
complant for damages wherein he prayed for moral damages of P500k,
actual damages of P60k, and attorney’s fees of 25k.
PRB contends that it carried Dionisio safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person
and with due regard for all the circumstance prevailing. It argued that the
cause of collision was an extraordinary circumstance independent of its
driver’s action or a fortuitous event.
The RTC held that PRB and its driver were jointly and severally liable for
actual and moral damages. On appeal, the CA ruled that PRB is solely liable
for actual damages since Eduardo is not a party to the contract of carriage.
However, CA ruled in favor of PRB ‘s contention that moral damages are not
recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract,
unless death of a passenger results, or it is proved that the carrier was guilty
of fraud or bad faith, even if death does not result. There was no finding of
bad faith on the part of PRB. Hence, the award of moral damages was
deleted.
ISSUE:
 WON moral damages are recoverable by Dionisio.
  WON temperate damages in lieu of actual daages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded.
HELD:
1) No, Dionisio is not entitled to moral damages.
Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
following and analogous cases: (1) a criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries; (2) quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) seduction, abduction,
rape or other lascivious acts; (4) adultery or concubinage; (5) illegal or
arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) illegal search; (7) libel, slander, or any other
form of defamation; (8) malicious prosecution; (9) acts mentioned in Article
309; and (1) acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34, and 35.
Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral
damages:
(1) there must be an injury clearly sustained by the claimant,
whether physical, mental or psychological;
(2) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established;
(3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and
(4) the award for damages is predicated on any of the cases stated
in Article 2219 of the Civil Code
Since breach of contract is not one of the items enumerated under Article
2219, moral damages, as a general rule, are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on breach of contract.
As an exception, such damages are recoverable [in an action for breach of
contract:]
(1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as
provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and
(2) in x x x cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Article 2220.
CIVIL CODE, Article 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance
with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a
passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.
CIVIL CODE, Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasidelict shall be at
least Three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
xxx xxx xxx
 (3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
CIVIL CODE, Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies
to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
It has been held, however, that "allegations of bad faith and fraud must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence." They are never presumed
considering that they are serious accusations that can be so conveniently
and casually invoked. And unless convincingly substantiated by whoever is
alleging them, they amount to mere slogans or mudslinging.
In this case, the fraud or bad faith that must be convincingly proved by
petitioners should be one which was committed by Philippine Rabbit in
breaching its contract of carriage with Dionisio. Unfortunately for
petitioners, the Court finds no persuasive proof of such fraud or bad faith.
There is no showing here that Philippine Rabbit induced Dionisio to enter
into a contract of carriage with the former through insidious machination.
Neither is there any indication or even an allegation of deceit or
concealment or omission of material facts by reason of which Dionisio
boarded the bus owned by Philippine Rabbit. Likewise, it was not shown
that Philippine Rabbit's breach of its known duty, which was to transport
Dionisio from Urdaneta to La Union, was attended by some motive, interest,
or ill will. From these, no fraud or bad faith can be attributed to Philippine
Rabbit.
Still, petitioners insist that since the defenses it pleaded in its Answer were
designed to evade liability, Philippine Rabbit is guilty of fraud or bad faith.
Again, it bears to mention that the fraud or bad faith must be one which
attended the contractual breach or one which induced Dionisio to enter into
contract in the first place.
 2) Yes, actual damages for loss/impairment of earning capacity are
also not recoverable. In lieu thereof, the court awards
temperate damages.
While petitioners denominated their claim for P500,000.00 as moral
damages, their computation was actually based on the supposed
loss/impairment of Dionisio's earning capacity.
Loss or impairment of earning capacity finds support under Article 2205 (1)
of the Civil Code, to wit: Art. 2205. Damages may be recovered: (1) For loss
or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent
personal injury;
It is, however, settled that "damages for loss [or impairment] of earning
capacity is in the nature of actual damages.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to
compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a
sense of natural justice, aimed at repairing the wrong done. To be
recoverable, they must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to
the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof
that they have suffered, and on evidence of the actual amount thereof.
Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate
the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
damages for loss [or impairment] of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased [or
the injured] was self-employed and earning less than the deceased [or the
injured] was self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact
that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or
(2) the deceased was employed as a daily worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws.
Here, it is unlikely that petitioners presented evidence to prove a claim for
actual damages based on loss/impairment of earning capacity since what
they were claiming at the outset was an award for moral damages. The
Court has nonetheless gone over the records to nd out if they have suciently
shown during trial that they are entitled to such compensatory damages
that they are now claiming. Unfortunately, no documentary evidence
supporting Dionisio's actual income is extant on the records.
It must be emphasized, though, that documentary proof of Dionisio's actual
income cannot be dispensed with since based on the above testimony,
Dionisio does not fall under any of the two exceptions aforementioned.
Thus, as it stands, there is no competent proof substantiating his actual
income and because of this, an award for actual damages for
loss/impairment of earning capacity cannot be made.
Nonetheless, since it was established that Dionisio lost his right arm,
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss/impairment of
earning capacity may be awarded in his favor.
Actual damages by way of medical expenses must be supported by official
receipts.
Anent petitioners' assertion that actual damages should be awarded to
them for the cost of replacement of Dionisio's amputated right arm, suce it
to state that petitioners failed to show during trial that the said amputated
right arm was actually replaced by an articial one. All that petitioners
submitted was a quotation of P160,000.00 for a unit of elbow prosthesis 56
56 and nothing more. It has been held that actual proof of expenses
incurred for medicines and other medical supplies necessary for treatment
and rehabilitation must be presented by the claimant, in the form of ocial
receipts, to show the exact cost of his medication and to prove that he
indeed went through medication and rehabilitation. In the absence of the
same, such claim must be negated.
DBP VS CA (G.R No. 110053, OCTOBER 16, 1995)
DOCTRINE:
 An action for money had and received lies to recover back money
paid on a contract, the consideration of which has failed.
 As a general rule, if one buys the land of another, to which the latter
is supposed to have a good title, and, in consequence of facts
unknown alike to both parties, he has no title at all, equity will
cancel the transaction and cause the purchase money to be
restored to the buyer, putting both parties in status quo.
  The admitted list of damages as evidence cannot constitute
sufficient legal basis for an award of reimbursement for land taxes
and expenses for the relocation survey, respectively. The list of
damages prepared extrajudicially without any supporting receipts as
bases thereof is necessarily self-serving and, on that account, should
have been declared inadmissible in evidence as the factum probans.
In order that damages may be recovered, the best evidence
obtainable by the injured party must be presented. Actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly
proved, and so proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A
court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the
fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent
proof that they have been suffered and on evidence of the actual
amount thereof. If the proof is flimsy and unsubstantial, no
damages will be awarded.
FACTS: Petitioner DBP executed Deed of Absolute Sale in favour of the Sps.
Mangubat over a parcel of land. Consequently,
Petitioner contends that the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals
erred in ordering the reimbursement of taxes and the cost of the relocation
survey, there being no factual or legal basis therefor. It argues that private
respondents merely submitted a "list of damages" allegedly incurred by
them, and not official receipts of expenses for taxes and said survey.
Furthermore, the same list has allegedly not been identified or even
presented at any stage of the proceedings, since it was vigorously objected
to by DBP.
ISSUE:
 WON DBP is obliged to return the purchase price to respondent.
 WON a submitted list of damages without official receipts of
expenses for taxes, even admitted as an evidence by trial court, can
be a valid basis for an award of reimbursement.
HELD:
1) Yes. An action for money had and received lies to recover back
money paid on a contract, the consideration of which has failed. As
a general rule, if one buys the land of another, to which the latter is
supposed to have a good title, and, in consequence of facts
unknown alike to both parties, he has no title at all, equity will
cancel the transaction and cause the purchase money to be
restored to the buyer, putting both parties in status quo.
2) No. However, despite that admission of the said list of damages as
evidence, we agree with petitioner that the same cannot constitute
sufficient legal basis for an award of P4,000.00 and P7,980.00 as
reimbursement for land taxes and expenses for the relocation
survey, respectively. The list of damages was prepared
extrajudicially by respondent spouses by themselves without any
supporting receipts as bases thereof or to substantiate the same.
That list, per se, is necessarily self-serving and, on that account,
should have been declared inadmissible in evidence as the factum
probans.
PEOPLE VS JUGUETA (G.R. No. 202124, APRIL 5, 2016)
DOCTRINE:
 It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a
fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. In
our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as
a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the
damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused,
which in a sense only covers the civil aspect.
 Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to
compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood
to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature,
calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered.
Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the
amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is
imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by
the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the
 cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. x replied that he had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered
x x. by the fact that Norberto filed a case against appellant's two other brothers
 The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in for molesting his daughter. Accused was found guilty of 2 counts of murder
Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: “[T]he award of moral damages is (Art. 248) and Multiple Attempted Murder(Art. 248 in relation to Article 51)
aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the
suffering inflicted.”
matter in detail as regards criminal cases where the imposable penalty is
 It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish
reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases,
or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral
there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil
damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it
indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may
does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
 Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be
awarded, not only due to the presence of an aggravating ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper for the Court to modify civil indemnity.
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show
HELD:
the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.
 When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the
single act done by the offender caused several crimes, the fact that
those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil SEVEN BROS. SHIPPING CORP. VS DMC (G.R. No. 193914, NOV 26, 2014)
indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the DOCTRINE:
number of victims.
 If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating FACTS:
circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance, but ISSUE:
the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein
the maximum penalty shall be imposed, then, for every victim who HELD:
dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. WERR CORP. INTL. VS HIGHLANDS PRIME (G.R. No. 187543, FEB. 8, 2017)
 In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important
DOCTRINE:
to determine the stage in which the crime was committed and
proven during the trial. FACTS:

FACTS: Appellant along with was charged with Double Murder, defined and ISSUE:
penalized under Article 248 for attacking and shooting, with Gilbert Estores
HELD:
and Roger San Miguel, the house (one-room nipa hut) occupied by the
family of Norberto Divina, his brother-in-law causing injury and killing the
children of the Norberto, Mary Grace and Claudine. In answer to questions
of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto DARINES VS QUINONES (G.R. No. 206468, AUGUST 2, 2018)
DOCTRINE:

FACTS: REPUBLIC VS LOOYUKO (G.R. No. 170966, JUNE 22, 2016)

ISSUE: DOCTRINE:

HELD: FACTS:

ISSUE:

ALVA VS HIGH CAPACITY SECURITY (G.R. No. 203328, NOV. 8, 2017) HELD:

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: PEOPLE VS WAHIMAN (G.R. No. 200942, JUNE 16, 2015)

ISSUE: DOCTRINE:

HELD: FACTS:

ISSUE:

PHILIPPINE NATL CONSTRUCTION CORP VS APAC MKTG. CORP. HELD:

(G.R. No. 190957, JUNE 5, 2013)

DOCTRINE:
YAMAUCHI VS SUNIGA (G.R. No. 199513, APRIL 18, 2018)
FACTS:
DOCTRINE:
ISSUE:
FACTS:
HELD:
ISSUE:

HELD:
SPS. TIMADO VS RURAL BANK OF SAN JOSE (G.R. No. 201436)

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD: