THIRD DIVISION Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpus (Corpus) as his co-accused in

the crime charged.[7] Furthermore, it directed the issuance of a

[ G.R. No. 186403, September 05,
warrant of arrest against Corpus.[8]
2018 ]
Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte at Corpuz
MAYOR "JONG" AMADO CORPUS, JR. AND
Street, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecjia on June 4, 2008, causing his
CARLITO SAMONTE, PETITIONERS, VS.
death.[9] Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto and thereafter

HON. JUDGE RAMON D. PAMULAR OF was arrested.[10] After the inquest proceedings, an

BRANCH 33, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA, Information[11] for murder dated June 5, 2008 was filed against

him, thus:[12]
MRS. PRISCILLA ESPINOSA,* AND NUEVA

ECIJA PROVINCIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR INFORMATION

FLORO FLORENDO, RESPONDENTS. Undersigned Inquest Prosecutor accuses CARLITO

SAMONTE y LAPITAN of the crime of Murder, committed as

follows:
DECISION

LEONEN, J.:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 2008 at around 10:30
An allegation of conspiracy to add a new accused without
a.m. at Corpuz St., Dist., in the Municipality/City of Cuyapo,
changing the prosecution's theory that the accused willfully
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
shot the victim is merely a formal amendment. [1] However, the
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
rule provides that only formal amendments not prejudicial to
and there, with malice aforethought and with deliberate intent
[2]
the rights of the accused are allowed after plea.  The test of
to take the life of ANGELITO ESPINOSA, willfully, unlawfully
whether an accused is prejudiced by an amendment is to
and feloniously, treacherously and taking advantage of
determine whether a defense under the original information will
superior strength attack the latter and shot with an unlicensed
still be available even after the amendment is made and if any
firearm (1 Colt .45 cal. pistol with SN 217815), thereby inflicting
evidence that an accused might have would remain applicable
upon him gunshot wounds, which directly caused the death of
even in the amended information. [3]
said Angelita Espinosa, to the damage and prejudice of his

heirs.
[4]
This Petition for Certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

assails the February 26, 2009 Order[5] and Warrant of

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arrest[6] issued by Judge Ramon D. Pamular (Judge Pamular)

of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija in

Cabanatuan City for Guimba, Nueva Ecija
Civil Case No. 2618-G. The assailed Order granted the
June 5, 2008.[13]
prosecution's Motion to Amend the Original Information for

murder filed against Carlito Samonte (Samonte) to include

Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded
self-defense. Trial on the merits ensued.[14] Bonifacio was not able to comply with the directive to

The wife of the deceased, Mrs. Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa personally submit his resolution by January 22, 2009,

(Priscilla), filed a complaint-affidavit captioned as Reply- prompting Florendo to order him to surrender the records of the

Affidavit[15] dated September 8, 2008 after the prosecution case as the latter was taking over the resolution of the case

presented its second witness.[16] She also filed an unsworn but based on the evidence presented by the parties. This order

signed Reply to the Affidavit of Witnesses [17] before First was released on January 23, 2009 and was received by

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge Floro F. Bonifacio on the same date.[35]

Florendo (Florendo).[18] Other affidavits of witnesses were also

filed before the prosecutor's office, which included the In his January 26, 2009 Resolution,[36] Florendo found probable

following: cause to indict Corpus for Angelita's murder. He directed the

filing of an amended information before the Regional Trial

a.)Affidavit[19] of Mr. John Diego, Vice Mayor of
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija; Court.[37] The amended information provided:
b. Original Affidavit[20] and a supplemental
[21]
) affidavit  of witness Alexander Lozano y Jacob; INFORMATION
and
c.)Joint Affidavit[22] of Victoria A. Miraflex, Ma.
Floresmina S. Sacayanan, Ma. Asuncion L. Silao
and Corazon N. Guerzon.[23]
Undersigned Prosecutor accuses Carlito Samonte y

Lapitan and Amado Corpuz, Jr. y Ramos of the crime of

Based on the affidavit[24] executed by Alexander Lozano Murder, committed as follows:

(Lozano) on June 30, 2008, Corpuz was the one who

instructed Samonte to kill Angelito.[25] That on or about the 4th day of June, 2008 at around 10:30

a.m. at Corpuz St., Dist., in the Municipality of Cuyapo,

In response to Priscilla's Reply-Affidavit, Corpuz filed a Province of Nueva Ecija, Phillippines (sic), and within the

Rejoinder Affidavit.[26] He also filed a Counter- jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named

Affidavit[27] against witness Lozano's affidavit.[28] accused, conspiring and confederating together, did then

and there, with malice aforethought and with deliberate intent

In its October 7, 2008 Resolution,[29] the Regional Trial Court to take [the] life of ANGELITO ESPINOSA, willfully, unlawfully

dismissed Priscilla's complaint and the attached affidavits of and feloniously, treacherously and taking advantage of

witnesses.[30] superior strength attack the latter and shot with an unlicensed

Priscilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[31] which was firearm (1 Colt .45 cal. Pistol with SN 217815), thereby inflicting

opposed by Corpus.[32] Florendo reconsidered and set aside upon him gunshot wounds, which directly caused the death of

the October 7, 2008 Resolution.[33] He also instructed Assistant said Angelito Espinosa, to the damage and prejudice of his

Public Prosecutor Edwin S. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) to conduct heirs.

the review.[34]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
 warrant of arrest should be suspended because the latter

Cabanatuan City for Guimba, Nueva Ecija, January 26, 2009. intended to appeal through a Petition for Review before the
[38]
 (Emphasis supplied) Department of Justice.[47]

Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review dated

Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a February 9, 2009 before the Department of Justice. [48] They

Review Resolution dated January 26, 2009, where he also filed a Manifestation and Motion dated February 9, 2009

reinstated the Regional Trial Court October 7, 2008 Resolution with the Regional Trial Court, asking it to desist from acting

and affirmed the dismissal of the murder complaint against further on the Amended Information in view of the Petition for

Corpus.[39] The dispositive portion of his Resolution provided: Review filed with the Department of Justice.[49]

In view of the foregoing and probable cause, the Resolution of

However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular of Branch
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edison V. Rafanan, dated
33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija issued the
October 7, 2008, being in accord with the facts obtaining in this
assailed February 26, 2009 Order, which granted the motion to
case and with established rules, procedures and jurisprudence,
amend the information and to admit the attached amended
is reinstated.
information. The assailed Order also directed, among others,

the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.[50] The

The criminal complaint for murder against respondent Mayor
dispositive portion of the Order read:
Amado "Jong" Corpu[s] is DISMISSED.[40] (Emphasis in the

original) WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court after

personally examining the amended information and its

supporting documents finds probable cause and hereby orders

Meanwhile, Florendo filed an undated Motion to Amend to:

Information, praying for the admission of the amended

1. Grant the motion to amend the information;
information.[41] Corpus and Samonte opposed this Motion by
2. Admit the attached amended information;
filing a Joint Urgent Manifestation/Opposition dated February 2,
3. Issue the Warrant of Arrest for the immediate
2009.[42]
apprehension of the respondent-movant Amado Corpu[s],

Jr.; and
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [43] Samonte
4. Deny the motion to defer/suspend arraignment and
and Corpus opposed this through a Vehement Opposition and
further proceedings of this case.
Omnibus Motion dated February 4, 2009.[44] They averred that
SO ORDERED.[51]
Judge Pamular's action was premature considering that the

Motion to Amend Information has yet to be scheduled for

hearing.[45] Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned.

Hence, a direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition
[46]
 Samonte and Corpus also claimed that the issuance of a
for Certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for an immediate
issuance of a temporary restraining order, was filed by Corpus

and Samonte on March 3, 2009.[52] This Petition seeks to enjoin

Judge Pamular from enforcing the February 26, 2009 Order She claims that the alleged lack of determination of probable

and the warrant of arrest issued pursuant to the Order, and cause before the issuance of a warrant has no basis since

from conducting further proceedings in the murder case. petitioners failed to present evidence or facts that would prove

their claim.[60]

Through its March 9, 2009 Resolution, this Court required

respondents to comment on the Petition.[53] It also granted Judge Pamular filed his Comment on April 8, 2009.[61] He

petitioners' prayer for a temporary restraining order. Judge asserts that he made a careful perusal of the case records in

Pamular, Florendo, Priscilla, and all other persons acting on issuing the assailed order. His independent judgment on the

the assailed Regional Trial Court February 26, 2009 Order existence of probable cause was derived from his reading and

were enjoined from implementing it and the warrant of arrest evaluation of pertinent documents and evidence. He states that

issued pursuant to it.[54] he had set the case for hearing on February 13, 2009, when

both parties were heard and given the opportunity to argue.

Priscilla filed her comment on April 3, 2009. [55] She [62]

 He also added:

cites Oaminal v. Castillo,[56] which provided that in filing a

Yes, indeed, while the undersigned could rely on the findings of
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1 there should be
the Honorable Provincial Prosecutor, I am nevertheless not
"no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
bound thereby. The termination by the latter of the existence of
ordinary course of law" available.[57] Considering that there is
probable cause is for a purpose different from that which is to
still a remedy available for the accused apart from filing a
be made by the herein respondent judge. I have no cogent
petition, the petition shall fail. She claims that petitioners
reason to question the validity of the findings of the Honorable
should have first filed a motion for reconsideration with the
Provincial Prosecutor. I have much respect for the latter. Thus,
Regional Trial Court before resorting to a petition for certiorari
after giving due course to the arguments of parties and their
before this Court.[58]
respective counsels, I was fully convinced in good faith that,

indeed, there was a reasonable ground to believe in the

She insists that the Regional Trial Court is correct in granting
existence of probable cause for ... the immediate apprehension
the motion to admit the amended information because it has no
and prosecution of Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpu[s], Jr. Hence,
effect on Samonte's case and reasoned that:
the issuance of the assailed controversial Order....[63]

[F]irst, because there would only be an addition of another

accused with prior authority f[ro]m the Honorable Provincial

Prosecutor, second, the amendment will not cause any On July 22, 2009, Priscilla filed a Manifestation[64] before this

prejudice to the rights of the accused and more importantly, Court. She asserts that this "present petition questioning the

that is what is provided for by the Rules[.][59] alleged impropriety of the admission of the amended

information as well as the issuance of a warrant of arrest

against Mayor Amado Corpu[s], Jr. has no more legal legs to before the respondent court should have proceeded with the

stand on."[65] She claims[66] that Florendo's January 26, 2009 amended information.[72] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Resolution was upheld by the Department of Justice in its June

26, 2009 Resolution,[67] the fallo of which read:

They further claim that lifting the temporary restraining order

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is
would be a relief "too harsh and preposterous" since Corpus
hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the Officer-in-Charge Provincial
would be immediately imprisoned and constrained to face trial
Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija is directed to file the appropriate
due to a flawed amended information.[73] In case this Court
Information against the respondent Mayor Amado Corpu[s],
resolves to quash the amended information and nullify the
Jr., and to report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days
warrant, Corpuz will have already "suffered grave and
from receipt hereof.
irreparable injury—as he would not be able to discharge his

constitutional mandate/duty to his constituents as their duly

SO ORDERED.[68] (Emphasis supplied)
elected mayor."[74] As to Samonte, he will be allegedly "forced

to face another set of defense—against the theory of

conspiracy in the amended information which, as we have

Priscilla asserts further that the issue regarding the suspension
heretofore stated, after his arraignment and trial half way, could
of proceedings pending resolution by the Department of Justice
no longer be proper."[75]
can now be considered moot and academic.[69]

On August 6, 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its

On July 24, 2009, petitioners filed a Counter Manifestation.
Comment.[76] It claims that petitioners should have made a
[70]
 They claim that respondent Priscilla's prayer for the lifting of
distinction on the propriety of respondent judge's acts in
the temporary restraining order is premature, thus:[71]
granting the admission of the amended information and in

[Priscilla] should have been more candid. [She] should have ordering the issuance of a warrant. It posits that these acts are

informed the Honorable Court that a motion for reconsideration at par with the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the subject

with the Department of Justice was filed by the herein matter and the person of the accused. These acts have nothing

petitioner, and is still pending resolution. And in the event said to do with the suspension of arraignment provided for under

motion for reconsideration is denied, and as a part of Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

petitioner/accused right to due process of law, it being clearly Procedure, which ordinarily happens after a trial court has

provided by the rules, he would elevate said resolution to acquired jurisdiction.[77]

the Court of Appeals on certiorari – and, certainly, the

aggrieved party would bring the matter before this The Office of the Solicitor General also adds that the insertion

Honorable Court - during which interregnum, the appealed of the phrase "conspiring and confederating together"  in the

resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor . . . would not have yet amended information will not affect Samonte's substantial

attained finality which is what jurisprudence underscores rights.[78] Thus, the original charge against Samonte of murder
and his deliberate manner of shooting Angelita remain defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings until the

unaltered:[79] appeal is resolved. Such deferment or suspension, however,

does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the
Even if one or all of the elements of the crime of murder as
resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once
alleged in the original information filed against petitioner
acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the
Samonte is not proven, the addition of conspiracy in the
secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss
amended information, if duly proven, would not in any way
the case.[86]
result in his conviction because conspiracy is not an essential

or qualifying element of the crime of murder.[80]

Petitioners also cite the dispositive portion of Tolentino v.

Bonifacio,[87] which directed the respondent judge in that case

The Office of the Solicitor General avers that respondent judge
to desist from proceeding with the trial until after the
was well acquainted with the legal and factual circumstances
Department of Justice would have finally resolved a pending
behind the filing of the original information against Samonte.
petition for review.[88] Thus:
The amended information merely added Corpus as a co-

conspirator. Thus, before respondent judge issued the assailed While [w]e have noted from the expediente  that the petitioner

order, a prior hearing was held on February 13, 2009, when all has utilized dilatory tactics to bring the case against her to trial,

the parties were heard.[81] still she is entitled to the remedy she seeks. The respondent

judge should not be more anxious than the prosecution in

The Office of the Solicitor General also asserts that while expediting the disposition of the case absent any indication of

respondent judge committed error when he denied petitioners' collusion between it and the defense. The Ministry of Justice

motion to suspend proceedings, what the law only requires should not be deprived of its power to review the action of the

under Rule 116, Section 11 is a maximum of 60-day City Fiscal by a precipitate trial of the case.

suspension of the arraignment. In this case, the 60-day period

had already lapsed, rendering the issue raised by petitioners WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The respondent judge is

moot. Hence, there is no longer any hindrance for respondent hereby ordered not to proceed with the trial of the above-

judge to continue with Corpus' arraignment.[82] numbered criminal case until after the Ministry of Justice has

resolved the petition for review filed by Mila P. Tolentino. No

Petitioners filed their reply on August 7, 2009.[83] They claim costs.[89] (Emphasis supplied)

that respondent judge should have suspended action on the

issuance of a warrant considering the pendency of their

Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.[84] They Petitioners claim that due to the theory of conspiracy in the

cite Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[85]  which stated: amended information, Samonte will have an additional burden

of setting up a new defense particularly on any acts of his co-

Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review
accused since "the act of one is the act of all." [90]
only after an information has been filed, trial courts should
Petitioners also claim that respondent judge failed to comply SO ORDERED.[98] (Emphasis in the original)

with the mandate of making a prior determination of probable

cause before issuing the warrant. They insist that this mandate

"is never excused nor dispensed with by the respondent Petitioners assert that Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised

[judge]'s self-serving narration of the law (not the required Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that upon motion by the

facts) stated in [his] assailed order."[91] proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended:[99]

Rule 116
On the issue of whether the arraignment of Corpus may
Arraignment and Plea
proceed despite the lapse of the 60-day maximum period of

suspension under Rule 116, Section 11(c), petitioners aver that

"[w]hat jurisprudence underscores is not the lapse of the 60-

Section 11. Suspension of Arraignment. — Upon motion by the
day period, but the issue of finality of the decision on
proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the
appeal."[92] The matter should not only cover the suspension of
following cases:
arraignment but for respondent judge to defer from further

proceedings on the amended information pending the final

....
resolution of the Department of Justice.[93]

(c A petition for review of the resolution of the

This Court, through its August 26, 2009 Resolution, required
) prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice, or the Office of the
the parties to submit their respective memoranda. [94] President; provided, that the period of suspension
shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
Petitioners filed their memorandum on October 15, 2009.[95] In

their memorandum, they attached the Department of Justice

September 8, 2009 Resolution,[96] which granted their motion Petitioners add that respondent judge should have refrained

for reconsideration, thus:[97] from issuing the assailed warrant of arrest because he was

aware of the fact that the amended information was a result of

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the
the flip-flopping stand of the public prosecutor from his original
respondent is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Resolution
stand.[100] Thus, they claim that the motive behind the filing of
promulgated on June 26, 2009 (Resolution No. 473) is
the amended information that included Corpus as an additional
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Provincial
accused is political.[101]
Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija is hereby directed to cause the

withdrawal of the information for murder against the

They aver that respondent judge failed to personally make his
respondent, if one has been filed in court, and to report the
independent findings of probable cause that will justify the
action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
issuance of the warrant. They insist that the February 26, 2009

Order only consists of three (3) short sentences, which merely

pointed out a certain legal provision, instead of facts, that allegation of conspiracy that was not previously included in the

would supposedly justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest, original information constitutes a substantial amendment:[106]

thus:[102]
The allegation of conspiracy among all the private

Elementary is the rule that the existence of probable cause is respondents-accused, which was not previously included

indispensable in the filing of the complaint or information and in in the original information, is likewise a substantial

the issuance of warrant of arrest. The legion of jurisprudence amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a

has defined probable cause to be concerned with probability, new defense in order to meet a different situation in the

not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not trial court. In People v. Zulueta, it was held that:

present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The

Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the
standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man
original charges will have to be radically modified to meet the
and not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown
new situation. For undoubtedly the allegation of conspiracy
trial. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a
enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused
specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the light of
Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even
conditions obtaining in a given situation.[103]
omissions of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of

the conspiracy. The amendment thereby widens the battlefront

to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered

Petitioners also cite Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules
weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp.
of Criminal Procedure, which prohibits substantial amendment
Thus it would seem inequitable to sanction the tactical
of information that is prejudicial to the rights of the accused
movement at this stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that
after his or her arraignment, thus:
the accused is only guaranteed two-days' (sic) preparation for

Rule 110 trial. Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases, the liberty,

Prosecution of Offenses even the life, of the accused is at stake, it is always wise and

proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any

possible surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution

Section 14. Amendment or Substitution.  — A complaint or has too many facilities to covet the added advantage of

information may be amended, in form or in substance, without meeting unprepared adversaries.

leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.

After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may

only be made with leave of court and when it can be done To allow at this stage the proposed amendment alleging

without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. conspiracy among all the accused, will make all of the
[104]
 (Emphasis in the original) latter liable not only for their own individual

transgressions or acts but also for the acts of their co-

conspirators.[107] (Emphasis in the original)

They cite People v. Montenegro,[105] which provided that an

 ang utos sa akin ni Mayor Amado Corpuz Jr.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Memorandum on Kusa po akong gumawa ng sarili kong affidavit at salaysay na

October 16, 2009, which merely reiterated the arguments and walang nagbayad, pumilit at nanakot sa akin para gawin ang

discussions in its Comment to the Petition.[108] Similarly, salaysay at affidavit kong ito, at marami pa po akong

respondent Priscilla's Memorandum adopted the arguments isasalaysay pagharap ko po sa korte.

presented by the Office of the Solicitor General in its comment

Gumagalang,     
and memorandum.[109]
Subscribed and sworn toCarlita Samonte
before me:(signed)            
On March 19, 2014, Priscilla filed a Manifestation,[110] which   (signed)
Atty. Marcus
provides that on October 30, 2013, Samonte executed an
Marcellinus S.
affidavit,[111] stating that Corpuz ordered him to kill Angelito. Gonzales[113]
[112]
 Samonte's affidavit provided:

SALAYSAY On April 14, 2014, this Court received Priscilla's letter dated

April 11, 2014 addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme

Court, asking for assistance in the resumption of trial in view of

Ako si Carlita Samonte kasalukuyang nakakulong sa Provincial Samonte's affidavit.[114]

Jail ng Cabanatuan City sa kasong Murder kay Angelita

Espinosa sa utos po ni Mayor Amado R. Corpuz Jr. ay matagal The issues for this Court's resolution are as follows:

na pong plano ang pagpatay kay Angelita Espinosa.

Nagsimula po ito sa pagwasak sa aircondition sa magiging First, whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular

opisina ni Angelita Espinosa at sa motor niyang single, at iyon committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

ay sa utos ni Mayor Amado R. Corpuz Jr. hanggang umabot sa excess of jurisdiction when he conducted further proceedings

puntong sabihan ako na ang tagal-tagal mo namang patayin si on the Amended Information and consequently issued a

Angelita Espinosa pagalit na sinabi sa akin. warrant of arrest against petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr. despite

the pendency of his and petitioner Carlito Samonte's Petition

At noong June 4, 2008 sa pagitan ng 9:30 AM at 10 AM ng for Review before the Department of Justice;

nasabing oras sinabi sa akin muli na "Ayokong maupo yang si

Angelita Espinosa bilang secretaryo ng Sangguniang Bayan." Second, whether or not the arraignment of petitioner Amado

Sinabi ni Mayor Amado R. Corpuz Jr. na gumawa ka ng Corpus, Jr. may proceed after the lapse of the maximum 60-

senaryo para huwag makaupo yan bilang B-SEC day period suspension provided for under Rule 116, Section

(Sangguniang Bayan Secretary) Bayan at kahit anong klaseng 11(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure;

senaryo patayin mo kung kaya mong patayin at ako na ang

bahala sa lahat. Kunin mo ang baril dito sa opisina ko, iyan po Third, whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board

excess of jurisdiction when he allegedly admitted the Amended or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has

Information in clear defiance of law and jurisprudence, which acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave

proscribes substantial amendment of information prejudicial to abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

the right of the accused; and jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a

Finally, whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular has person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the

personally determined, through evaluation of the Prosecutor's proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that

report and supporting documents, the existence of probable judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings

cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental

Amado Corpus, Jr. reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis supplied)

The Petition lacks merit.

Rivera v. Espiritu[117] enumerated the essential requisites for a

I
petition for certiorari under Rule 65:

(1) [T]he writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an

Before this Court delves on the substantive issues in this case, officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such

it first rules on the procedural matter involved. tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

Respondent Priscilla claims that petitioners should have first or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any

filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary

before resorting to this Petition. Failure to do so renders it course of law.[118] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

dismissible.[115]

This issue was not addressed by petitioners in their reply or The plain and adequate remedy pertained to by the rules is a

memorandum. However, petitioners justified their direct motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or decision.
[119]
recourse before this Court insisting that their case is anchored  Certiorari, therefore, "is not a shield from the adverse

on pure questions of law and impressed with public interest. consequences of an omission to file the required motion for

Thus, they claim that regardless of the rule on hierarchy of reconsideration."[120]

courts, their filing of a petition is not a matter of choice but even

mandatory.[116] It is settled that a motion for reconsideration is a

"condition sine qua non  for the filing of a Petition for

Rule 65, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure Certiorari."[121] This enables the court to correct "any actual or

provides: perceived error" through a "re-examination of the legal and

factual circumstances of the case."[122] To dispense with this

condition, there must be a "concrete, compelling, and valid

reason."[123] However, the following exceptions apply: Nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a motion for

reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court. Apart from bare

(a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a
conclusion, petitioners failed to present any plausible reason
quo has no jurisdiction;
why they failed to file a motion for reconsideration before filing

a petition before this Court. While this issue was raised by

(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
respondent Priscilla in her Comment, this was not sufficiently
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
addressed by petitioners either in their Reply or Memorandum.
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower

court;
It must be stressed that the filing of a motion for

reconsideration, as well as filing it on time, is not a mere

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
procedural technicality.[125] These are "jurisdictional and
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
mandatory requirements which must be strictly complied
the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
with."[126] Therefore, petitioners' failure to file a motion for
action is perishable;
reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court before filing this

Petition is fatal.
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for

reconsideration would be useless; II

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is

extreme urgency for relief; Two (2) kinds of determination of probable cause exist:

executive and judicial.[127] These two (2) kinds of determination

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is of probable cause were distinguished in People v. Castillo.
[128]
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is  Thus,

improbable;
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:

executive and judicial. The executive determination of

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for
probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It
lack of due process;
is afimction that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who

is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable

(h) where the proceedings [were] ex parte  or in which the
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held

for trial.  Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be
interest is involved.[124]
filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a

made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the

cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.

and may not be compelled to pass upon. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant

for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the

The judicial  determination of probable cause, on the other accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or

hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over

of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge the person of the accused.

must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted,

there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the

order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists

probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon

warrant. the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as

above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the

[T]he public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal

in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such

and that courts must respect the exercise of such discretion stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such

when the information filed against the person charged is valid reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal

on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While

discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to
[129]
 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in

court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court

whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the

Thus, courts do not meddle with the prosecutor's conduct of a case thereqfter should be addressed for the consideration of

preliminary investigation because it is exclusively within the the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court

prosecutor's discretion.[130] must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the

right of the People to due process of law.

However, once the information is already filed in court, the

court has acquired jurisdiction of the case. Any motion to Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it

dismiss or determination of the guilt or innocence of the was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the

accused is within its discretion.[131] Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was

submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its

Crespo v. Mogul  [132] provided: discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the

trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the

case.
 case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be

motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the

Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the

prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a

possibl[y be] designated by the Secretary of Justice who does reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice

not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the who reviewed the records of the investigation. [133] (Emphasis

fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case supplied, citations omitted)

thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.

The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as Hence, when a Regional Trial Court has already determined

We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to that probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of

secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. arrest, like in this case, jurisdiction is already with the Regional

Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the Trial Court.[134] Therefore, it can proceed in conducting further

fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the proceedings on the amended information and on the issuance

prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own of a warrant despite the pendency of a Petition for Review

independent judgment as to whether the accused should be before the Department of Justice.

convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the

III.A
responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines

even under such circumstances much less should he abandon

the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private

Petitioners insist that respondent judge should have deferred
prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void.
from conducting further proceedings on the amended
The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for
information and on the issuance of a warrant considering the
the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of
pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of
the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his
Justice.[135] They cite Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised
direction and control.
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or RULE 116
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as [to] Arraignment and Plea
its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests

in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains ....
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases

even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his Section 11. Suspension of arraignment — Upon motion by the
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the
on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the following cases:
 9, 2009 before the Regional Trial Court, informing it about their

.... pending Petition for Review of the Prosecutor's January 26,

2009 Resolution before the Department of Justice.[142] Thus,

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is respondent judge committed an error when he denied

pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the petitioners' motion to suspend the arraignment of Corpus

President; provided, that the period of suspension shall  not because of the pendency of their Petition for Review before the

exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition Department of Justice.

with the reviewing office.  (Emphasis supplied)

However, this Court's rule merely requires a maximum 60-day

period of suspension counted from the filing of a petition with

Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal the reviewing office.[143] Consequently, therefore, after the

Procedure pertains to a suspension of an arraignment in case expiration of the 60-day period, "the trial court is bound to

of a pending petition for review before the Department of arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer

Justice. It does not suspend the execution of a warrant of arraignment."[144]

arrest for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person

of an accused. Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review [145] before the

Department of Justice on February 9, 2009.[146] Thus, the 60-

In the assailed February 26, 2009 Order, Judge Pamular day period has already lapsed since April 10, 2009. Hence,

denied Corpus' motion to defer or suspend arraignment and respondent judge can now continue with the arraignment and

further proceedings.[136] Petitioners claim that he should have further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.

suspended action on the issuance of a warrant considering the

III.B
pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of

Justice, citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[137] and Tolentino v.

Bonifacio[138] as their bases.[139] Furthermore, they also assert

A reading of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[147] reveals that the
that the assailed Order defies Rule 116, Section 11 of the
provided ruling does not mainly tackle the issue presented in
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[140]
this case.

Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

In Ledesma, a complaint for libel was filed against Rhodora
Procedure provides for the grounds for suspension of
Ledesma (Ledesma) before the City Prosecutor's Office. Upon
arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment
finding "sufficient legal and factual basis,"[148] the City
shall be suspended in case of a pending petition for review of
Prosecutor's Office filed an information against Ledesma
the prosecutor's resolution filed before the Department of
before the Regional Trial Court. Ledesma then filed a petition
Justice.
for review before the Department of Justice, which gave due

course to the petition directing the Prosecutor to move for the

Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion[141] dated February
deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the records of to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the

the case to it. Conformably, the Prosecutor filed a Motion to secretary's recommendation finding the absence of probable

Defer Arraignment before the Regional Trial Court, which cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do

granted the motion and deferred arraignment until termination so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his

of the Department of Justice's petition for review. Without the reasons for disregarding the secretary's recommendation.

trial prosecutor's consent, the counsel for private complainant

filed a motion to lift the order and to set the case for trial or Had he complied with his judicial obligation, he would have

arraignment. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion then discovered that there was, in fact, sufficient ground to grant the

consequently scheduled Ledesma's arraignment. However, the motion to withdraw the information. The documents before the

Secretary of Justice reversed the prosecutor's findings trial court judge clearly showed that there was no probable

directing the trial prosecutor to file before the Regional Trial cause to warrant a criminal prosecution for libel.[149] (Emphasis

Court a motion to withdraw information, which was supplied)

subsequently denied. Its denial of the motion was affirmed by

the Court of Appeals.

This was reiterated in the ratio of that case, which read:

The main issue in Ledesma  was whether the respondent judge

When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on
in that case erred in denying the motion to withdraw
the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of
information and the consequent motion for reconsideration.
the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to
This Court held that the act of the judge was erroneous since
make an independent assessment of the merits of such
he failed to give his reasons for denying the motions, and to
motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial
make any independent assessment of the motion and of the
court is not bound by such resolution but is required to
resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Thus:
evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the

In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo  and Martinez; and secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A

considering that the issue of the correctness of the justice trial court, however, commits reversible error or even grave

secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such

petitioner's letter, the information, the resolution of the recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial

secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over

exhaustive discussion in the motion for reconsideration — all of the criminal action.[150] (Emphasis supplied)

which were submitted to the court — the trial judge committed

grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to

withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and Petitioners in this case hinge their claim on Ledesma in

ambiguous reliance on Crespo.  The trial court's order is arguing that respondent Judge Pamular should have

inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent and suspended action on the issuance of a warrant considering the

competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion

pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of expediting the disposition of the case absent any indication of

Justice, which stated:[151] collusion between it and the defense. The Ministry of Justice

should not be deprived of its power to review the action of the

Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review
City Fiscal by a precipitate trial of the case.
only after an information has been filed, trial courts should

defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings until the

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The respondent judge is
appeal is resolved. Such deferment or suspension, however,
hereby ordered not to proceed with the trial of the above-
does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the
numbered criminal case until after the Ministry of Justice has
resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once
resolved the petition for review filed by Mila P. Tolentino. No
acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the
costs.[155]
secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss

the case.[152]

Tolentino involved a petition for certiorari that sought to annul

the order of the respondent judge in that case to proceed with

While the quoted portion relates to the issue on suspending
the trial of the case premised on grave abuse of discretion.
arraignment pending the review of the Department of Justice,
[156]
 In that case, petitioners Mila Tolentino (Mila) and Roberto
there is nothing in Ledesma that speaks of suspending the
Tolentino were accused of falsification of public documents
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Although there is an error on
before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay. Prior to Mila's
the part of Judge Pamular in denying petitioners' motion to
arraignment, she asked for the suspension of the proceedings
suspend the arraignment of Corpus, he can validly issue a
due to the pendency of a petition for review before the Ministry
warrant of arrest upon finding probable cause to acquire
of Justice. The respondent judge in that case required the
jurisdiction over Corpus. Hence, this was strengthened in the
fiscal to comment. In the comment, the fiscal interposed no
cited case of Ledesma,  stating that "[j]urisdiction, once
objection on the motion. However, respondent judge denied
acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the
the motion stating that the city fiscal had already reinvestigated
secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss
the case and speedy trial should also be afforded to the
the case."[153]
prosecution. Hence, this Court ruled that respondent judge

should not proceed to trial pending the review before the

They also cited the dispositive portion of Tolentino, which
Ministry of Justice.
directed the respondent judge in that case to desist from

proceeding with the trial until after the Department of Justice

However, the factual milieu of Tolentino  is different from the
would have finally resolved the pending petition for review:[154]
present case. It does not involve the issuance of a warrant of

While We have noted from the expediente  that the petitioner arrest necessary for acquiring jurisdiction over the person of

has utilized dilatory tactics to bring the case against her to trial, the accused.

still she is entitled to the remedy she seeks. The respondent

IV.A
judge should not be more anxious than the prosecution in
 except if it is beneficial to the accused.[161]

Petitioners question the inclusion of Corpus and the insertion of Since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can

the phrase "conspiring and confederating together" in the invoke this rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot invoke this argument

amended information. They contend that Rule 110, Section 14 because he has not yet been arraigned.

of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits

substantial amendment of information that is prejudicial to the Once an accused is arraigned and enters his or her plea,

rights of the accused after his or her arraignment. [157] To Section 14 prohibits any substantial amendment especially

buttress their point, they cited People v. Montenegro,[158] which those that may prejudice his or her rights. One of these rights

provided that an allegation of conspiracy which was not includes the constitutional right of the accused to be infonned

previously included in the original information, cqnstitutes a of the nature and cause of the accusations against him or her,

substantial amendment.[159] which is given life during arraignment.[162]

Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Arraignment is necessary to bring an accused in court and in

Procedure provides: notifying him or her of the cause and accusations against him

or her.[163] "Procedural due process requires that the accused

Rule 110
be arraigned so that he [or she] may be informed of the reason
Prosecution of Offenses
for his [or her] indictment, the specific charges he [or she] is

bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could be

possibly meted against him [or her]."[164]

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or

information may be amended, in form or in substance, without

It is during arraignment that an accused is given the chance to
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
know the particular charge against him or her for the first time.
plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
[165]
 There can be no substantial amendment after plea because
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
it is expected that the accused will collate his or her defenses
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.  ...
based on the contents of the information. "The theory in law is
(Emphasis supplied)
that since the accused officially begins to prepare his [or her]

defense against the accusation on the basis of the recitals in

the information read to him [or her] during arraignment, then

Before an accused enters his or her plea, either formal or
the prosecution must establish its case on the basis ofthe
substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be
same information."[166] Aside from violating the accused's right
made without leave of court. After an entry of plea, only a
to due process, any substantial amendment in the information
formal amendment can be made provided it is with leave of
will burden the accused in preparing for his or her defense.
court and it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.
[160]
 After arraignment, there can be no substantial amendment
In a criminal case, due process entails, among others, that the
accusation must be in due form and that the accused is given The constitutionally mandated right against double jeopardy is

the opportunity to answer the charges against him or her. procedurally bolstered by Rule 117, Section 7 of the Revised
[167]
 There is a need for the accused to be supplied with the Rules of Criminal Procedure,[173] which reads:

necessary information as to "why he [or she] is being

RULE 117
proceeded against and not be left in the unenviable state of
Motion to Quash
speculating why he [or she] is made the object of a

prosecution, it being the fact that, in criminal cases, the liberty,

....
even the life, of the accused is at stake."[168]
Section 7. Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double Jeopardy. —

IV.B When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case

against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his

express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a

Apart from violating the right of the accused to be informed of valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient

the nature and cause of his or her accusation, substantial in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the

amendments to the information after plea is prohibited to accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal

prevent having the accused put twice in jeopardy. of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to

another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt

Article III,[169] Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides: to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense

which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
....
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall

constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

In substantiating a claim for double jeopardy, the following

requisites should be present:

The Constitutional provision on double jeopardy guarantees

the invocation of the law not only against the danger of a (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2)

second punishment or a second trial for the same offense, "but the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3)

also against being prosecuted twice for the same act where the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the

that act is punishable by . . . law and an ordinance."[170] When a first.[174]

person is charged with an offense and the case against him or

her is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any

other way without his or her consent, he or she cannot be With regard the first requisite, the first jeopardy only attaches:

charged again with a similar offense.[171] Thus, "[t]his principle

(a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience." [172]
after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an

was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope

consent.[175] of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State,

following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the

hope of securing a greater penalty.[180] (Emphasis supplied,

The test for the third requisite is "whether one offense is citations omitted)

identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a

frustration thereof; or whether the second offense includes or is

necessarily included in the offense charged in the first Double jeopardy is a fundamental constitutional concept which

information."[176] guarantees that an accused may not be harassed with

constant charges or revisions of the same charge arising out of

Also known as "res judicata in prison grey," the mandate the same facts constituting a single offense. When an accused

against double jeopardy forbids the "prosecution of a person traverses the allegations in the information by entering a plea

for a crime of which he [or she] has been previously acquitted during the arraignment, he or she is already put in jeopardy of

or convicted."[177] This is to "set the effects of the first conviction. Having understood the charges, the accused after

prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he [or entering a plea prepares for his or her defense based on the

she] shall not thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety possible evidence that may be presented by the prosecution.

of a second charge against him [or her] for the same The protection given to the accused by the double jeopardy

offense."[178] rule does not attach only after an acquittal or a conviction. It

also attaches after the entry of plea and when there is a prior

People v. Dela Torre[179] underscored the protection given dismissal for violation of speedy trial.

under the prohibition against double jeopardy:

An arraignment, held under the manner required by the rules,

Double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) against
grants the accused an opportunity to know the precise charge
a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2)
against him or her for the first time.[181] It is called for so that he
against a second prosecution for the same offense after
or she is "made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of
conviction, and (3) against multiple punishments for the same
his [or her] life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed
offense.
to him [or her]. At the very least then, he [or she] must be fully
....
informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized

against him [or her]."[182] Thereafter, the accused is no longer in

The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence.
the dark and can enter his or her plea knowing its
The doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it
consequences.[183] It is at this stage that issues are joined, and
prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an
without this, further proceedings cannot be held without being
instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a
void.[184] Thus, the expanded concept of double jeopardy
multitude of cases with accumulated trials.  It also serves
presupposes that since an accused can be in danger of
conviction after his or her plea, the constitutional guarantee the prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot

against double jeopardy should already apply. Angelita. Hence, the amendment is merely formal. As correctly

pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General:

IV.C

Even if one or all of the elements of the crime of murder as

alleged in the original information filed against petitioner

Any amendment to an information which only states with Samonte is not proven, the addition of conspiracy in the

precision something which has already been included in the amended information, if duly proven, would not in any way

original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for result to his conviction because conspiracy is not an essential

conviction of the crime charged is only a formal amendment or qualifying element of the crime of murder. The addition of

that can be made at anytime. [185] It does not alter the nature of conspiracy would only affect petitioner Corpuz, if together with

the crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the crime of murder leveled against petitioner Samonte, both

the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation. circumstances are duly proven by the prosecution.
[186] [189]
 Thus, the following are mere formal amendments:  (Emphasis supplied)

(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty

that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an

In People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, [190] this Court
amendment which does not charge another offense different or
held that an allegation of conspiracy which does not change
distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional
the prosecution's theory that the accused willfully shot the
allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the
victim is merely a formal amendment.
case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the

form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment

In that case, two (2) informations for frustrated homicide were
which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the
filed against accused Sixto Ruiz (Ruiz), who pleaded not guilty
accused, such as his right to invoke prescription. [187] (Citations
to both charges. A reinvestigation of these two (2) cases
omitted)
ensued in the Department of Justice, where the State

Prosecutor filed a motion for leave of court to amend the

information on the ground that the evidence revealed a prima

On the other hand, "[a] substantial amendment consists of the
facie  case against Luis Padilla (Padilla) and Magsikap
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
Ongchenco (Ongchenco) who acted in conspiracy with Ruiz.
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court."[188]
The trial judge denied the motion and reasoned that the

allegation of conspiracy constitutes a substantial amendment.

The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended
Consequently, the State Prosecutor filed two (2) new
information are similar to that of the original information except
informations for frustrated homicide against Padilla and
as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte's co-accused and the
Ongchenco, which included the alleged conspiracy with Ruiz.
insertion of the phrase "conspiring and confederating together."
Padilla and Ongchenco moved to quash the two (2) new
The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of
informations, which was denied by the Court of First Instance testified at the reinvestigation that the participation of Padilla

of Rizal. Ruiz also filed a motion to permit to quash and/or and Ongchenco surfaced and, as a consequence, there was

strike out the allegation of conspiracy in the two (2) new the need for the amendment of the informations or the filing of

informations. The trial judge ordered that the motions be new ones against the two.[193] (Emphasis supplied)

stricken out from the records and explained that "the allegation

of conspiracy in those cases does not alter the theory of the

case, nor does it introduce innovation nor does it present The records of this present case show that the original

alternative imputation nor is it inconsistent with the original information for murder against Samonte was dated June 5,

allegations."[191] This prompted Ruiz, Padilla, and Ongchenco to 2008.[194] Based on Lozano's affidavit dated on June 30, 2008,
[195]
file before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with  Corpus was implicated as the one who instructed Samonte

preliminary injunction, which was subsequently granted. to kill Angelito.[196] This prompted the prosecution to conduct a

However, this Court ruled: reinvestigation, which resulted in the filing of the amended

information.[197]
There is merit in this special civil action. The trial Judge should

have allowed the amendment ... considering that IV.D

the amendments sought were only formal.  As aptly stated by

the Solicitor General in his memorandum, "[T]here was no

change in the prosecution's theory that respondent Ruiz Petitioners quote the portion of People v. Montenegro[198] that

wilfully[,] unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and cited the case of People v. Zulueta[199]  as their basis for

shot with a gun Ernesto and Rogelio Bello ... The amendments asserting that the allegation of conspiracy is a substantial

would not have been prejudicial to him because his amendment because it warrants a new defense for the

participation as principal in the crime charged with respondent accused:[200]

Ruiz in the original informations, could not be prejudiced by the

Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the
proposed amendments."[192] (Emphasis supplied)
original charges will have to be radically modified to meet the

new situation. For undoubtedly the allegation of conspiracy

enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused

In that case, the amended information was impelled by a
Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even
disclosure implicating Padilla and Ongchenco. Thus,
omissions of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of

Otherwise stated, the amendments ... would not have the conspiracy. The amendment thereby widens the battlefront

prejudiced Ruiz whose participation as principal in the crimes to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered

charged did not change. When the incident was investigated weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp.

by the fiscal's office, the respondents were Ruiz, Padilla and Thus it would seem inequitable to sanction the tactical

Ongchenco. The fiscal did not include Padilla and Ongchenco movement at this stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that

in the two informations because of "insufficiency of the accused is only guaranteed two-days' preparation for trial.

evidence." It was only later when Francisco Pagcalinawan Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases, the liberty, even
the life, of the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper charge with a higher imposable penalty than that of the original

that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible charge to which they pleaded "not guilty."[203] Furthermore:

surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too

[T]he change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly
many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting
stolen into entirely different articles from those originally
unprepared adversaries.[201]
complained of, affects the essence of the imputed crime, and

would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the

allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of

Zulueta is inapplicable. In that case, this Court declined the
their defenses to the charge filed against them. It will be
admission of the amended information because it would
observed that private respondents were accused as
change the nature of the crime as well as the prosecution's
accessories-after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who
theory:
had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in

Indeed, contrasting the two informations one will perceive that the original information. To charge them now as accessories-

whereas in the first the accused is charged with after-the-fact for a crime different from that committed by the

misappropriation of public property because: (1) he deceived principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by

Angel Llanes into approving the bargain sale of nails to Beatriz the Court.[204] (Emphasis supplied)

Poblete or (2) at least, by his abandonment he permitted that

woman to obtain the articles at very cheap prices, in the

amended information a third ground of responsibility is The case cited by petitioners in this case rendered the addition

inserted, namely, that he connived and conspired with Angel of conspiracy in the amended information substantial because

Llanes to consummate the give-away transaction. it either alters the defense of the accused or alters the nature

of the crime to which the accused pleaded. However, the

Again it will be observed that the third ground of action in factual incidents of the cited cases are different from this

effect contradicts the original theory of the information: if the present case because the allegation of conspiracy in the

accused conspired with Llanes, he did not deceive the latter, amended information did not change the prosecution's basic

and did not by mere negligence permit the sale. [202]  (Emphasis theory that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelito.

supplied)
IV.E

Additionally, Montenegro is also inapplicable in this case

because the amendment to the information in that case was

Rule 110, Section 14 similarly provides that in permitting formal
considered as substantial due to the effect of changing the
amendments when the accused has already entered his or her
original crime charged from Robbery under Article 209 to
plea, it is important that the amendments made should not
Robbery in an Uninhabited Place under Article 302 of the
prejudice the rights of the accused. [205] In People v. Casey,
Revised Penal Code. With this, the accused were exposed to a
[206]
 this Court laid down the test in determining whether an

accused is prejudiced by an amendment. Thus,

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the he or she may produce.[209] They further assert that the assailed

amendment of an information has been said to be whether a February 26, 2009 Order only consists of three (3) short

defense under the information as it originally stood would sentences that merely contain a certain legal provision, instead

be available after the amendment is made, and whether of facts that will supposedly substantiate the issuance of a

any evidence defendant might have would be equally warrant of arrest.[210]

applicable to the information in the one form as in the

other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution reads:

an amendment to an information introduced after the accused

Article III
has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the
Bill of Rights
nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the

accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does

....
not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or

deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
substance — not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
Court.[207] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally

by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

It is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
information, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-
persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
defense.[208] While conspiracy is merely a formal amendment,

Samonte will be prejudiced if the amendment will be allowed

after his plea. Applying the test, his defense and corresponding
In Soliven v. Makasiar,[211] the issue raised by the petitioner in
evidence will not be compatible with the allegation of
that case called for the interpretation of Article III, Section 2 of
conspiracy in the new information. Therefore, such formal
the Constitution. It is apparent that the inclusion of the word
amendment after plea is not allowed.
"personally" after the word "determined" and the removal of the

V.A grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to

"other responsible officers as may be authorized by law" has

persuaded the petitioner to believe that what the Constitution

Petitioners claim that the assailed warrant of arrest was made now requires is for the "judge to personally examine the

in utter disregard of the constitutional mandate which directs complainant and his witnesses"[212] in determining probable

judges to personally conduct an independent examination, cause for the issuance of a warrant. However, this Court ruled

under oath or affirmation, of the complainant and the witnesses that this is not an accurate interpretation.
 warrant of arrest without bail "by simply relying on the

In that case, this Court underscored that the Constitution gives prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable

emphasis on the "exclusive and personal responsibility of the cause exists."[223] In that case, the preliminary investigation

issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable records conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate were still

cause."[213] In convincing himself or herself on the presence of in Masbate. However, the Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati

probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, the issuing judge still issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners. This

"is not  required to personally examine the complainant and his Court ruled that the respondent judge "committed a grave error

witnesses."[214] "Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and

judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination issued the questioned Order ... without having before him any

and investigation of criminal complaints instead of other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a

concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their probable cause"[224] and reasoned that:

courts."[215]
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of

the  1987 Constitution which requires "... probable cause to

In the 1987 Constitution, the judge is required
be personally determined by the judge ..." not by any other
to "personally" determine the existence of probable cause.
officer or person.
[216]
 This requirement, however, does not appear in the
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as
corresponding provisions found in our previous Constitutions.
in this case where all the records of the investigation are in
[217]
 This gives prominence to the framers' intent of placing
Masbate, he or she has  not personally determined probable
"greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that
cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
imposed under previous Constitutions."[218]
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been

satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

Probable cause cannot be merely established by showing that

a trial judge subjectively believes that he or she has good

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the
grounds for his or her action.[219] Thus, good faith does not
Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent
suffice because if "subjective good faith alone were the test,
Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued
the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the
the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no
people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers and
basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal
effects' only in the fallible discretion of the judge."[220] Before
determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for
issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself or
the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the
herself that based on the evidence presented, a crime has
Constitution. He could not possibly have known what
been committed and the person to be arrested is probably
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a
guilty of it.[221]
certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the

petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the

In Lim v. Felix,[222] the ruling in Soliven was reiterated. The
ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the
main issue raised in Lim is whether a judge may issue a
respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for
him to issue a warrant of
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar  that the Judge
does not have to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as
a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there
should be a report and necessary documents supporting the
Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the
Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report
and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case.
We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive
the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise
sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is
vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as
detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be
sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification
and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call
for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the
court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case
so
....
We reiterate that in making the required
determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the
evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of
the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is
subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge
abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he
[225]
issues a warrant of arrest.  (Emphasis supplied)
Soliven provided that as dictated by sound policy, an issuing
arrest. judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses as long as he or she has satisfied himself or
herself of the existence of probable cause.[226] To rule otherwise
would unduly burden judges with preliminary examination of
criminal complaints instead of attending to more important
matters. However, due to recent developments in the legal
system which include the judicial affidavit rule, the evil sought
to be prevented in Soliven does not exist anymore. To
minimize the time required for completing testimonies of
witnesses in litigated cases, this Court approved the use of
judicial affidavits in lieu of witnesses' direct testimonies.
[227]
 Thus, this is more in tune with the Constitutional mandate
by lessening the burden imposed upon judges by expediting
litigation of cases for them to attend to their exclusive and
personal responsibility of satisfying themselves with the
existence of probable cause when issuing a warrant.
V.B
Rule 112, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
require.
RULE 112
Preliminary Investigation
personal ....
Section 6. When Warrant of Arrest May Issue. —  (a) By the
Regional Trial Court.  — Within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested warrant, a hearing was conducted on February 13, 2009

pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the regarding the motions and manifestations filed in the case:[231]

preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information

On February 13, 2009, a hearing was held wherein the parties
was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
presented their arguments. On the issue regarding the undated
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
motion to amend information without notice of hearing and the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days
motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution, the court
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
ruled that the same is moot and academic due to the conduct
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
of the said hearing.[232]
(Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, respondent Judge Pamular has a working

Pursuant to the provision, the issuing judge has the following
knowledge of the circumstances regarding the amended
options upon the filing of an Information:
information that constrained him to find probable cause in

(1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to issuing the warrant. The pertinent portion of the Order

establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, provided:

issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the

Elementary is the rule that the existence of probable cause is
existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to present
indispensable in the filing of complaint or information and in the
additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be
issuance of warrant of arrest. The legion of jurisprudence has
resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the
defined probable cause to be concerned with probability, not
information.[228] (Citation omitted)
absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not

present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The

standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man

It is required for the judge to "personally evaluate the resolution
and not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown
of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence."[229] In case the
trial. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a
evidence on record fails to substantiate probable cause, the
specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the light of
trial judge may instantly dismiss the case. [230]
conditions obtaining in a given situation.[233]

The records of this case reveal that the February 26, 2009

Order presented a discussion showing both the factual and

In respondent Judge Pamular's Comment, he claimed that:
legal circumstances of the case from the filing of the original

information until the filing of the Motion to Amend Information. Be that as it may, still, the undersigned respondent judge made
Respondent Judge Pamular, therefore, is familiar with the a careful perusal of the records of the case. Sufficient copies
incidents of this case, which were his basis for issuing the of supporting documents and/or evidence were read and
warrant. Thus, before he issued the assailed Order and evaluated upon wlticll, independent judgment as to the
existence of probable cause was based.  But, then again, is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The case is remanded to the

still not satisfied, the undersigned even went beyond the face Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija for its preliminary

of the resolution and evidences (sic) presented before this examination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of

Court. On 13 February 2009, Criminal Case No. 2618-G was arrest and thereafter proceed to the arraignment of petitioner

set for hearing. The prosecution and the defense were given Amado Corpus, Jr.

the chance to argue on the matter and ample opportunity to be

heard.[234] (Emphasis supplied) SO ORDERED.

Peralta, (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, and J.

Apart from respondent judge's personal examination of the Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

amended information and supporting documents, the hearing

conducted on February 13, 2009 enabled him to find probable

cause prompting him to issue the warrant of arrest.[235]

VI

November 14, 2018

On March 19, 2014, Priscilla filed a Manifestation,[236] which

N O T I C E  O F  J U D G M E N T
provides that on October 30, 2013, Samonte executed an

affidavit[237] stating that Corpus ordered him to kill Angelito. [238]

Sirs / Mesdames:
Settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. [239] These

matters are left to the lower courts, which have "more

Please take notice that on September 5, 2018 a Decision,
opportunity and facilities to examine these matters."[240] This
copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in
Court is not a trier of facts and cannot receive new evidence
the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by
[241]
that would aid in the speedy resolution of this case.  It is not
this Office on November 14, 2018 at 3:05 p.m.
this Court's function to "analyze and weigh the evidence all

over again."[242] Very truly yours,

Therefore, based on the foregoing, this Court remands this (SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

case to the  Regional Trial Court for it to pass upon this factual Division Clerk of Court

issue raised by petitioner Samonte based on his October 30,

2013 affidavit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari

* [15]
 In some pleadings, Mrs. Espinosa is referred to as "Priscila."  Id. at 59-62, in I.S. No. 08F-1445 entitled Priscilla Alcantara-

For consistency, this Decision will use "Priscilla" as per her Espinosa v. Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpus, Jr.

signed Reply-Affidavit. See rollo,  p. 62.

[16]
 Id. at 410.
[1]
 People v. Court of Appeals, 206 Phil. 637 (1983) [Per J.
[17]
Relova, First Division].  Id. at 63-67.

[2] [18]
 Pacoy v. Cajigal, 560 Phil. 598 (2007) [Per J. Austria-  Id. at 410.

Martinez, Third Division].

[19]
 Id. at 68.
[3]
 People v. Casey, 190 Phil. 748-767 (1981) [Per J. Guerrero,
[20]
En Banc].  Id. at 69.

[4] [21]
 Rollo,  pp. 3-50.  Id. at 70-72.

[5] [22]
  Id. at 51-54.  Id. at 73-74.

[6] [23]
 Id. at 55.  Id. at 411. Ma. Floresmina Sacayanan is named as

"Floremina" in the signed Joint Affidavit. See rollo,  p. 74.

[7]
 Id. at 53.
[24]
 Id. at 310-311. The Department of Justice June 26, 2009
[8]
 Id. at 54. Resolution stated, in part:

. . . .
[9]
 Id. at 410. "Thereafter, the complainant's witness, Alexander Lozano,

executed a supplemental affidavit stating, among others, that

[10]
 Id. on the day of the shooting, at past nine o'clock in the morning

(9:00 A.M.), he went to the Sangguniang Bayan Office to

[11]
 Id. at 58. inquire from Vice Mayor John Diego about palay seeds being

distributed by the Municipality to the farmers. Lozano took the

[12]
 Id. at 410. route going to the gym at the back of the respondent mayor's

office. When he was beside respondent's office, he saw

[13]
 Id. at 58. Samonte whispering something to respondent outside the

latter's office. He noticed from the respondent's face that he got

[14]
 Id. at 410. angry from what Samonte whispered to him. Lozano saw

respondent hand to Samonte a stainless gun, then heard

respondent angrily say, "PUTANG INANG LITO YAN, SIGE!
[29]
BIRAHIN MO!" Lozano immediately assumed that respondent  Id. at 89-95. The Resolution, docketed as I.S. No. 08F-1445,

referred to the victim, Espinosa, because he knew respondent was penned by Prosecutor II Edison V. Rafanan and approved

entertained a grudge against the victim, since the latter led a by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo of

campaign against the alleged abuses in the respondent the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija,

mayor's office, and instigated the filing of criminal and Cabanatuan City.

administrative charges against him before the Ombudsman.

[30]
Thus, he immediately proceeded to the victim's office and told  Id. at 411.

the latter what he witnessed and heard, and advised him to

[31]
take care.  Id. at 96-107.

[32]
Lozano did not include the foregoing matters in his first affidavit  Id. at 411-412.

due to fear of reprisal, since it will implicate the respondent

[33]
mayor in the killing of the victim."  Id. at 108-109.

[25] [34]
 Id. at 514.  Id. at 412.

[26] [35]
 Id. at 84-88 and 411.  Id.

[27] [36]
 Id. at 75-83. See rollo,  p. 311 where the Department of  Id. at 122-125.

Justice June 26, 2009 Resolution stated, in part:

[37]
....  Id. at 412.

"Respondent, in his counter-affidavit, denied the accusation

[38]
against him and stated that he neither had any involvement nor  Id. at 56.

participation in the quarrel between Samonte and the victim.

[39]
What happened between them was a personal matter.  Id. at 110-121.

Respondent further quoted the police witness' statement that

[40]
the shooting incident was preceded by a heated altercation  Id. at 120-121.

between Samonte and the victim.

[41]
 Id. at 230-231 and 413.

"Among others, respondent further stressed that Lozano's

[42]
statement is biased, an afterthought, full of improbabilities and  Id. at 232-240 and 413.

were highly opinionated surmises and conjectures."

[43]
 Id. at 413. No copy of this Motion for Reconsideration is
[28]
 Id. at 411. attached in the rollo.
 [61]
 Id. at 279-282.
[44]
 Id. at 241-263.
[62]
 Id. at 281-282.
[45]
 Id. at 242-243.
[63]
 Id. at 282.
[46]
 Id. at 244-249.
[64]
 Id. at 307-309.
[47]
 Id. at 254-257.
[65]
 Id. at 308.
[48]
 Id. at 126-225.
[66]
 Id. at 307-308.
[49]
 Id. at 226-229.
[67]
 Id. at 310-313. The Resolution, docketed as I.S. No. 08F-
[50]
 Id. at 53-54. 1445, was signed by Acting Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera

of the Department of Justice.

[51]
 Id.
[68]
 Id. at 313.
[52]
 Id. at 3-50.
[69]
 Id. at 308.
[53]
 Id. at 254-255.
[70]
 Id. at 315-328.
[54]
 Id. at 256-258.
[71]
 Id. at 316.
[55]
 Id. at 268-276.
[72]
 Id. at 316-317.
[56]
 459 Phil. 542 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[73]
 Id. at 326.
[57]
 Rollo, p. 269.
[74]
 Id.
[58]
 Id. at 269-270.
[75]
 Id. at 327.
[59]
 Id. at 270.
[76]
 Id. at 409-430.
[60]
 Id. at 271.
[77]
 Id. at 416.
 [95]
 Id. at 456-495.
[78]
 Id. at 418.
[96]
 Id. at 496-499.
[79]
 Id. at 419.
[97]
 Id. at 457.
[80]
 Id.
[98]
 Id. at 498.
[81]
 Id. at 424-425.
[99]
 Id. at 473.
[82]
 Id. at 427-428.
[100]
 Id. at 473-474.
[83]
 Id. at 431-449.
[101]
 Id. at 485.
[84]
 Id. at 433.
[102]
 Id. at 476-477.
[85]
 344 Phil. 207 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[103]
 Id. at 477-478.
[86]
 Id. at 232.
[104]
 Id. at 490.
[87]
 223 Phil. 558 (1985) [Per J. Abad-Santos, Second Division].
[105]
 242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
[88]
 Rollo, pp. 472-473.
[106]
 Rollo, p. 491.
[89]
 Id. at 435.
[107]
 Id. at 491-492.
[90]
 Id. at 436-437.
[108]
 Id. at 500-523.
[91]
 Id. at 440.
[109]
 Id. at 534-544.
[92]
 Id. at 446.
[110]
 Id. at 556-560.
[93]
 Id.
[111]
 Id. at 559, handwritten Affidavit of Samonte dated October
[94]
 Id. at 450-451. 30, 2013, executed before Atty. Marcus Marcellinus S.

Gonzales of the Public Attorney's Office, Cabanatuan City.

 Amended Information would substancially prejudice accused
[112]
 Id. at 556. Samonte's right to due process" would now be not applicable.

(Grammatical errors in the original)

[113]
 Id. at 559.
[115]
 Id. at 270.
[114]
 Id. at 564-565. The letter stated, in part:
[116]
 Id. at 3-4.

April 11, 2014

[117]
 425 Phil. 169 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

Hon. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

[118]
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court  Id. at 179-180.

Padre Faura cor. Taft, Manila

[119]
 Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440

Dear Ma'am, Phil. 743, 753 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, First  Division].

[120]
....  Id. at 752.

Ma'am I do appreciate the court's initiative to bring justice to its

[121]
oppressed people but it seems that efforts made we're all be in  Republic v. Bayao, 710 Phil. 279, 287 (2013) [Per J.

vain if orders will not be implemented with sincerity and can be Leonen, Third Division].

an avenue for the criminals to escape their crime and left the
[122]
victims in agony and pain.  Id.

[123]
Last October 30, 2013 an unexpected turn of event came  Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440

where Carlita "Kuratong" Samonte executed his extrajudicial Phil. 743, 753 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, First Division).

confession freely and voluntarily before Atty. Marcus

[124]
Marcellinus S. Gonzales of the Public Attorney's office in  Id. at 751, citing Abraham v. NLRC, 406 Phil. 310 (2001)

Cabanatuan City where he admitted that it was Mayor Amado [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].

Corpus Jr. who ordered him to kill my husband.

[125]
 Republic v. Pantranco North Express, Inc.

This vital event have given me an opportunity to file a (Resolution), 682 Phil. 186 (2012) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First

manifestation before the honorable Supreme court through my Division].

counsel on March 19, 2014 hoping that the case will be

[126]
brought back to court to resume trial as petitioner Samonte  Id. at 195.

has, in effect, parted ways with his co-petitioner Corpuz; and

[127]
the allegation that "the new theory of conspiracy in the  People v. Castillo, 607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing,
Second Division].
[141]
 Id. at 226-229.
[128]
 607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
[142]
 Id. at 227.
[129]
 Id. at 764-765. ....

3. As regards both accused, the said 26 January 2009

[130]
 De Lima v. Reyes,  G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016 < Florendo's resolution having been elevated to the DOJ

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html? Secretary, by way of appeal, and giving due respect to the

file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/209330.pdf > [Per J. power of the DOJ Secretary under its power of control and

Leonen, Second Division]. supervision over all prosecutors, notwithstanding the filing of

the information in court, any further proceedings thereto need

[131]
 Id., citing Crespo v. Mogul,  235 Phil. 465 (1987) [Per J. be immediately deferred/suspended.

Gancayco, En Banc]. ....

[132] [143]
 235 Phil. 465 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].  RULES OF COURT, Rule 116, sec. 11.

[133] [144]
 Id. at 474-476.  Samson v. Daway, 478 Phil. 793 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-

Santiago, First Division].

[134]
 De Lima v. Reyes,  G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016 <
[145]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?  Rollo, pp. 126-225.

file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/209330.pdf> [Per J.
[146]
Leonen, Second Division].  Id. at 413.

[135] [147]
 Rollo, p. 469.  344 Phil. 207 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

[136] [148]
 Id. at 54.  Id. at 218.

[137] [149]
 344 Phil. 207 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].  Id. at 235-236.

[138] [150]
 223 Phil. 558 (1985) [Per J. Abad-Santos, Second  Id. at 217.

Division].
[151]
 Rollo, p. 433.
[139]
 Rollo, pp. 472-473.
[152]
 Id. at 434-435.
[140]
 Id. at 473.
[153]
 Id.
[167]
 Buhat v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 562 (1996) [Per J.
[154]
 Id. at 472-473. Hermosisima, Jr., First Division].

[155] [168]
 Id. at 435.  Id. at 575.

[156] [169]
 Tolentino v. Bonifacio,  223 Phil. 558 (1985) [Per J. Abad-  Bill of Rights.

Santos, Second Division].

[170]
 Ada v. Virola,  254 Phil. 341 (1989) [Per C.J Fernan, Third
[157]
 Rollo, p. 490. Division].

[158] [171]
 242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].  Mallari v. People, 250 Phil. 421 (1988) [Per J. Fernan,

Third Division].
[159]
 Rollo, pp. 489-490.
[172]
 Id. at 424.
[160]
 Matalam v. Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, 495
[173]
Phil. 664. (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].  Braza v. Sandiganbayan,  704 Phil. 476 (2013) [Per J.

Mendoza, Third Division].

[161]
 Mendez v. People,  736 Phil. 181 (2014) [Per J. Brion,
[174]
Second Division] stated: "Once the accused is arraigned and  Id. at 493.

enters his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the prosecution

[175]
from seeking a substantial amendment, particularly mentioning  Id. at 492.

those that may prejudice the rights of the accused."

[176]
 Id.
[162]
 Id.
[177]
 Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court,  258-A Phil. 620, 626
[163]
 Kummer v. People,  717 Phil. 670 (2013) [Per J. Brion, (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].

Second Division].
[178]
 Id. at 626-627.
[164]
 Id. at 687.
[179]
 430 Phil. 420 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[165]
 Id.
[180]
 Id. at 430.
[166]
 Mendez v. People,  736 Phil. 192 (2014) [Per J. Brion,
[181]
Second Division].  Borja v. Mendoza, 168 Phil. 83 (1977) [Per J. Fernando,
Second Division]. KARAGDAGANG SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY.

[182]
 Id. at 87. Ako ay si Alexander Lozano y Jacob, ... ay malaya at kusang

loob na nagsasalaysay gaya ng mga sumusunod:

[183]
 Id. ....

3. Na bago ako pumunta sa tanggapan ni Atty. Geminiano ay

[184]
 People v. Estomaca y Garque, 326 Phil. 429 (1996) [Per J. nagtungo muna ako sa Sangguniang Bayan lagpas alas-9 ng

Regalado, En Banc]. umagang iyon upang itanong kay Vice Mayor John Diego ang

tungkol sa binhi ng palay na ipinamamahaging kasalukuyan ng

[185]
 People v. Montenegro,  242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, munisipyo sa mga magsasaka.

Second Division]. 4. Na papunta sa tanggapan ni Vice Mayor ay doon ako

dumaan sa pasukan papuntang gym sa may likod ng opisina ni

[186]
 Ricarze v. Court of Appeals,  544 Phil. 237 (2007) [Per J. Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpus, Jr.

Callejo, Sr., Third Division]. 5. Na pagtapat ko sa tanggapan ni Mayor Corpus ay nakita ko

si Carlito Samonte na may ibinubulong kay Mayor habang sila

[187]
 Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 283 Phil. 956, 966 (1992) [Per ay nandoroon sa labas sa may gilid ng tanggapan ni Mayor, at

J. Regalado, En Banc]. naging kapansin pansin sa akin na ang sinasabi ni Samonte

kay Mayor ano man iyon dahil pabulong ang pagsasalita niya
[188]
 Id. ay ikinakagalit ni Mayor na bakas na bakas ko sa anyo ng

mukha ng nahuli.
[189]
 Rollo, p. 419. 6. Na kitang-kita ko rin ng abotan ni Mayor si Samonte ng

puting baril na eskwalado (stainless) at dinig na dinig ko ang

[190]
 People v. Court of Appeals, 206 Phil. 637 (1983) [Per J. sabay na pagalit na sinabi nito kay Samonte na "Putang inang

Relova, First Division]. Lito yan! Sige! Birahin mo!"

....
[191]
 Id. at 640.
[196]
 Id. at 514.
[192]
 Id. at 641.
[197]
 Id.
[193]
 Id. at 642.
[198]
 242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
[194]
 Rollo, p. 410.
[199]
 89 Phil. 752 (1951) [Per J. Bengzon, Third Division].
[195]
 Id. at 70-72. Lozano's affidavit stated, in part:
[200]
 Rollo, p. 491.
 Reyes, Third Division].
[201]
 Id. at 491-492.
[217]
 Id.
[202]
 People v. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 752, 754 (1951) [Per J.
[218]
Bengzon, Third Division].  Id. at 773.

[203] [219]
 People v. Montenegro,  242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla,  Allado v. Diokno,  302 Phil. 213 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo,

Second Division]. First Division].

[204] [220]
 Id. at 662.  Id. at 235.

[205] [221]
 Pacoy v. Cajigal,  560 Phil. 598 (2007) [Per J. Austria-  Ho v. People,  345 Phil. 597 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En

Martinez, Third Division]. Banc].

[206] [222]
 190 Phil. 748 (1981) [Per J. Guerrero, En Banc].  272 Phil. 122 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].

[207] [223]
 Id. at 759.  Id. at 130.

[208] [224]
 Rollo, p. 410.  Id. at 138.

[209] [225]
 Id. at 476.  Id. at 135-137.

[210] [226]
 Id. at 477.  Soliven v. Makasiar, 249 Phil. 394 (1988) [Per Curiam, En

Banc].
[211]
 249 Phil. 394 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[227]
 Judicial Affidavit Rule,  A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC (2012).
[212]
 Id. at 399.
[228]
 Ong v. Genio, 623 Phil. 835, 843 (2009) (Per J. Nachura,
[213]
 Id. Third Division].

[214] [229]
 Id.  Id.

[215] [230]
 Id. at 399-400.  Id.

[216] [231]
 Abdula v. Guiani, 382 Phil. 757 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-  Rollo, p. 51.
[232]
 Id. at 52.

[233]
 Id. at 53.

[234]
 Id. at 281-282.

[235]
 Id.

[236]
 Id. at 556-558.

[237]
 Id. at 559-560.

[238]
 Id. at 556.

[239]
 Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 290 Phil. 649 (1992) [Per J.

Campos, Jr., Second Division].

[240]
 Id. at 658.

[241]
 Land Bank of the Phils. v. Livioco,  645 Phil. 337 (2010)

[Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].

[242]
 Alicer v. Compas,  664 Phil. 730 (2011) [Per J. Carpio,

Second Division].

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Philippine
Supreme Court
Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year
2018 > July 2018 Decisions > G.R. No.
207040, July 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SHELDON
ALCANTARA Y LI, JUNNELYN ILLO Y YAN,
NATIVIDAD ZULUETA Y YALDUA, MA. REYNA
OCAMPO Y CRUZ, MAILA TO Y MOVILLON, MA.
VICTORIA GONZALES Y DEDIOS, ELENA
PASCUAL Y ROQUE, MARY ANGELIN ROMERO Y
BISNAR AND NOEMI VILLEGAS Y BATHAN,
Respondents.:
G.R. No. 207040, July 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SHELDON
ALCANTARA Y LI, JUNNELYN ILLO Y YAN,
NATIVIDAD ZULUETA Y YALDUA, MA. REYNA
OCAMPO Y CRUZ, MAILA TO Y MOVILLON, MA.
VICTORIA GONZALES Y DEDIOS, ELENA
PASCUAL Y ROQUE, MARY ANGELIN ROMERO Y
BISNAR AND NOEMI VILLEGAS Y BATHAN,
Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 207040, July 04, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SHELDON
ALCANTARA Y LI, JUNNELYN ILLO Y YAN,
NATIVIDAD ZULUETA Y YALDUA, MA.
REYNA OCAMPO Y CRUZ, MAILA TO Y
MOVILLON, MA. VICTORIA GONZALES Y
DEDIOS, ELENA PASCUAL Y ROQUE, MARY
ANGELIN ROMERO Y BISNAR AND NOEMI
VILLEGAS Y BATHAN, Respondents.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari1 filed by the People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), assailing the Decision 2 dated
April 26, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 123672 dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari filed by the OSG, which affirmed
the Order dated October 20, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 145, in Criminal Case No. 11-2408.
The Antecedent Facts
On September 20, 2011, the members of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group-
Women and Children Protection Division
(CIDG-WCPD) received information that
Pharaoh KTV and Entertainment Centre
(Pharaoh), a KTV bar, was being used as a
front for sexual exploitation, wherein young
students were being employed as entertainers.
An ABS-CBN News program called "XXX"
recorded the same by means of a hidden
camera used by their asset. As such, the
CIDG-WCPD conducted a series of surveillance
operations.3
On September 20, 2011, the members of
CIDG-WCPD, with Senior Police Officer 3
Leopoldo Platilla (SPO3 Platilla) acting as the
poseur-customer, went inside Pharaoh
together with four other members of the
entrapment team. The other team members
remained outside the establishment in order to
cordon off the area and act as the raiding
team.4
Once inside, SPO3 Platilla and his four
companions were met by Winchel Alega y
Aganan (Aganan), the receptionist. Aganan led
them to the 3rd floor, where they were met by
the floor manager, Junnelyn Illo (Illo). Illo
accompanied SPO3 Platilla to the aquarium
room with a huge one-way mirror where
women, dressed in cocktail dresses, were
displayed. SPO3 Platilla and his companions
selected their respective partners. The team
then paid P5,000.00 per hour for the rent of
the VIP room and P10,400.00 for each woman.
The said amount allegedly entitled them to
avail of "extra services" in the form of sexual
intercourse with their respective selected
partners. The team then proceeded to a VIP
room.5
Upon reaching the VIP room, SPO3 Platilla
asked Illo if there were available rooms where
they can avail the "extra services." Illo replied
that the hotel rooms at the 2nd floor of the
building were available. Thereafter, their
selected partners arrived, still dressed in
cocktail dresses, but allegedly without any
underwears.6
SPO3 Platilla texted the overall ground
commander to proceed with the raid. During
the raid, Illo, Sheldon Alcantara y Li, Natividad
Zulueta y Yaldua, Ma. Reyna Ocampo y Cruz,
Maila Toy Movillon, Ma. Victoria Gonzales y De
Dios, Elena Pascual y Roque, Mary Angelin
Romero y Bisnar and Noemi Villegas y Bathan
(collectively, the respondents), who were floor
managers, were arrested.7
Among the women rescued by the CIDG-WCPD
were Ailyn Almoroto Regacion, Jocelyn Toralba
Melano, Hazelyn Jane Dela Cruz Isidro, and
Garian Delas Penas Edayan8 (complainants),
who executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay. In
their Sinumpaang Salaysay, complainants
alleged that the VIP room contains a karaoke
and sofa. They claimed that they only serve
guests inside the VIP room, sing and/or eat
with them. Some guests tried to touch parts of
their body but they claimed that "ito'y pinipilit
na maiwasan at mapigilan."9 However, during
the preliminary investigation, complainants
withdrew their Sinumpaang Salaysay, and
claimed that "they never wanted to execute
any statement and that they do not want to
put their co-employees and friends from
Pharaoh in trouble."10
Respondents, on the other hand, denied that
Pharaoh was being used as a front for
prostitution and sexual exploitation. They
further claimed that the complainants and
other Customer Liaison Entertainment Officers
(CLEOs) were never recruited since they came
voluntarily to Pharaoh.11
On October 4, 2011, a Resolution 12 was issued
by the Assistant State Prosecutor and
Prosecution Attorney of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) finding probable cause for
charging respondents with violation of Section
4(a) and (e),13 in relation to Section 6(c) 14 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208,15 also known as
the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003. As
such, an Information16 charging the
respondents with qualified trafficking of
persons was filed in court.
Respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause17 before the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 145 presided by
Judge Carlito B. Calpatura (Judge Calpatura).
On October 20, 2011, the RTC issued its Order
finding no probable cause for the indictment of
the respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE, for lack of probable cause, the
information in this case filed against all the
[respondents]:
SHELDON ALCANTARA y LI,
JUNNELYN ILLO y YAN,
NATIVIDAD ZULUETA y YALDUA,
MA. REYNA OCAMPO y CRUZ,
MAILA TO y MOVILLON,
MA. VICTORIA GONZALES y DE DIOS,
ELENA PASCUAL y ROQUE,
MARY ANGELIN ROMERO y BISNAR and
NOEMI VILLEGAS y BATHAN
is ordered DISMISSED. The [respondents] are
ordered released from custody unless they or
any of them are detained for some other legal
cause or causes.
SO ORDERED.18
In issuing the assailed order, the RTC reasoned
as follows:
The court has closely examined the evidence
and found that no factual bases sufficient to
support the existence of probable cause of the
acts being charged. To illustrate, there is no
evidence that the named women were
vulnerable for recruitment, hiring, or to be
received or maintained as CLEO for purposes of
prostitution or pornography. On the contrary,
all the said women were in unison in claiming
that they were not recruited by the
[respondents] or any of the officers or
authorized agents of Pharaoh KTV. It is also
their claim that they applied with Pharaoh KTV
at their own free will and volition. No evidence
appears on record to contradict their claim.
On the aspect of pornography as an ingredient
of the offense charged, there is nothing in the
"Affidavit of Arrest" of the arresting officers nor
in the affidavits of the witnesses for the state
which would suggest acts of pornography as
defined under Sec. 3(h) of R.A. [No.] 9208. x x
x The OSG claimed that the determination of
On the aspect of prostitution, Sec. 3-c of the
same law defines the same as referring to 'any
act, transaction, scheme or design involving
the use of person by another, for sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange
of money, profit or any other consideration. x x
x
Again, going over the affidavits of the arresting
officers, and the supposed victims, there is
nothing which would indicate that there was
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct being
actually performed or about to be performed
when the raid took place. x x x
x x x x
Lastly, there is also no evidence of the alleged
payment of money for the alleged "extra
service". In entrapment, it is the normal
procedure which can be taken judicial notices
of by judges by reason of judicial function, that
the money should be properly marked,
recorded in the logbook of the operatives,
dusted in chemical to make it sure it will be
identifiable as to who received it. This
procedure will ensure the integrity of the
money as object evidence. This was also not
done.19
Aggrieved, the OSG filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the CA alleging that Judge
Calpatura gravely abused his discretion in
taking cognizance of the motion to determine
probable cause as the same is an executive
function that belongs to the prosecutor.
Further, the OSG alleged that Judge Calpatura
gravely abused his discretion when it found
that no probable cause exists for the filing of
charges against respondents.
On April 26, 2013, the CA rendered the
Decision20 dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari and affirming the RTC's ruling
that no probable exist to charge the
respondents.
Hence, this petition.
Arguments of the OSG
probable cause to hold a person for trial is a
function that belongs to the public prosecutor.
The correctness of the existence of which is a
matter that the trial court cannot pass
upon.21 If there was palpable error or grave
abuse of discretion in the public prosecutor's
finding of probable cause, the remedy should
be to appeal such finding to the Secretary of
Justice. In this case, the Information has
already been filed with the court and instead of
appealing the resolution of the prosecutor, the
respondents opted to file a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause.22
Issues
Ultimately, the issues to be resolved are: 1)
whether Judge Calpatura can determine the
existence of probable cause; and 2) whether
Judge Calpatura was correct in ordering the
dismissal of the case for lack of probable
cause.
Ruling of the Court
Judge Calpatura can personally determine
the existence of probable cause for the
purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides that:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. -
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten
(10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order if the accused
has already been arrested pursuant to a
warrant issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to
section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may
order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and
the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint
of information.
The fact that Judge Calpatura has jurisdiction
to determine probable cause for the purpose of
issuing a warrant of arrest has long been
settled. In the recent case of Liza L. Maza, et
al. v. Hon. Evelyn A. Turla, et al.,23 this Court
reiterated that:
Upon filing of an information in court, trial
court judges must determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause based on their
personal evaluation of the prosecutor's report
and its supporting documents. They may
dismiss the case, issue an arrest warrant, or
require the submission of additional
evidence.24 x x x.
It must, however, be emphasized that the
determination of probable cause has two
separate and distinct kinds an executive
function and a judicial function. In the case
of Mendoza v. People, et al.,25 this Court
distinguished the two, thus:
There are two kinds of determination of
probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is
one made during preliminary investigation. It
is a function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and thus should be held for
trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the
quasi-judicial authority to determine whether
or not a criminal case must be filed in court.
Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable
cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause,
on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to
issue the arrest warrant.
The difference is clear: The executive
determination of probable cause concerns itself
with whether there is enough evidence to
support an Information being filed. The judicial
determination of probable cause, on the other
hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued.26 (Citations omitted)
The determination of the judge of the probable
cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of
arrest does not mean, however, that the trial
court judge becomes an appellate court for
purposes of assailing the determination of
probable cause of the prosecutor. 27 The proper
remedy to question the resolution of the
prosecutor as to his finding of probable cause
is to appeal the same to the Secretary of
Justice.28 If the Information is valid on its face
and the prosecutor made no manifest error or
his finding of probable cause was not attended
with grave abuse of discretion, such findings
should be given weight and respect by the
courts.29 The settled policy of noninterference
in the prosecutor's exercise of discretion
requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor
the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information to the court.
Courts can neither override their determination
nor substitute their own judgment for that of
the latter; they cannot likewise order the
prosecution of the accused when the
prosecutor has not found a prima facie case.30
Judge Calpatura erred when he dismissed
the case for lack of probable cause
"Probable cause for purposes of filing a
criminal information is defined as such facts as
are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof."31 In the
case of People of the Philippines v. Borje, Jr.,
et al.,32 we held that:
For purposes of filing a criminal information,
probable cause has been defined as such facts
as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and
that respondents are probably guilty thereof. It
is such set of facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information, or any offense included therein,
has been committed by the person sought to
be arrested. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed
and was committed by the suspect. It need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. x x x.33 (Citations omitted)
Here, the records do not disclose that the
prosecutor's finding of probable cause was
done in a capricious and whimsical manner
evidencing grave abuse of discretion. As such,
his finding of probable cause, being primarily
lodge with him, should not be interfered with
by the courts. Clearly, Judge Calpatura erred
when he dismissed the case against the
respondents for lack of probable cause. To
note, Judge Calpatura stated that the
prosecution failed to show that there was
actual sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
being committed on the day of the raid.
Further, Judge Calpatura reasoned that there
was no evidence of payment of money for the
alleged "extra services," since the money used
to pay the same was not marked, recorded in
the logbook and dusted in chemical to make it
identifiable.34
The said reasons of Judge Calpatura in
dismissing the case for lack of probable cause
are evidentiary matters which should be
properly ventilated during the trial. 35 Thus, it
was clearly premature for Judge Calpatura and
the CA to make a definitive finding that there
was no illegal trafficking of persons simply for
the reason that no actual sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct was committed at the time
of the raid, and the police authorities failed to
mark the money used to pay for the alleged
"extra services." To reiterate, "the presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense that may be best passed upon after a
full-blown trial on the merits." 36
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated April 26, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123672 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to the
 11
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 145  Id. at 53-56.
in Criminal Case No. 11-2408 for appropriate
12
proceedings.  Id. at 44-61.

13
SO ORDERED. Sec. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It
shall be unlawful for any person, natural or
Peralta,**Del Castillo,***(Acting Chairperson), juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
and Gesmundo,****JJ., concur.
*
Leonardo-De Castro, (Acting Chairperson), J., (a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor,
on official leave. provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of
Endnotes: domestic or overseas employment or training
or apprenticeship, for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
*
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
 Designated as Acting Chairperson per Special
debt bondage;
Order No. 2559 dated May 11, 2018; on official
leave.
x x x x
**
 Designated as additional Member per Raffle
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in
dated August 9, 2017 vice Associate Justice
prostitution or pornography[.]
Francis H. Jarde1eza.
14
***
Sec. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The
 Designated as Acting Chairperson per
following are considered as qualified
Special Order No. 2562 dated June 20, 2018.
trafficking:
****
 Designated as additional Member per
x x x x
Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018.

1
(c) When the crime is committed by a
Rollo, pp. 7-30.
syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is
2
deemed committed by a syndicate if carried
 Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H.
out by a group of three (3) or more persons
Gaerlan, concurred in by Associate Justices
conspiring or confederating with one another.
Rebecca L. De Quia-Salvador and Apolinario D.
It is deemed committed in large scale if
Bruselas, Jr.; id. at 33-43.
committed against three (3) or more persons,
3
individually or as a group[.]
 Id. at 34.
15
4
 AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO
 Id. at 46.
ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
5
ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN,
 Id.
ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY
6
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE
 Id. at 47.
PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED
7
PERSONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS
 Id.
VIOLATIONS, AND FOR OTHER. Approved on
8
May 26, 2003.
 Id. at 50.
16
9
Rollo, pp. 63-64.
 Id. at 50-51.
17
10
 Id. at 66-92.
 Id. at 51.
18
 Id. at 35.
19
 Id. at 40-41.

20
 Id. at 33-43.

21
 Id. at 16.

22
 Id. at 16-17.

23
 G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017.

24
 Id.

25
 733 Phil. 603 (2014).

26
 Id. at 610, citing People v. Castillo, et al.,
607 Phil. 754, 764-765 (2009).

27
 Id. at 611.

28
Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., 470 Phil. 290, 300 (2004).
Republic of the Philippines
29 SUPREME COURT
Mendoza v. People, et al., supra at 612.
Manila
30
Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan, 725 Phil. EN BANC
486, 492-493 (2014).

31
Callo-Claridadv. Esteban, et al., 707 Phil.
172, 185 (2013).

32
 749 Phil. 719 (2014). G.R. No. 101978. April 7, 1993.

33
 Id. at 728. EDUARDO P. PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
34
Rollo, p. 41. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
35
People v. Engr. Yecyec, et al., 746 Phil. 634,
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
648 (2014).

36
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
 Id.
SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;

MOTION TO QUASH; ABSENCE OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION, NOT A GROUND. — The absence
of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash
a complaint or information under Section 3, Rule 117
of the Rules of Court.

2. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;

ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT AFFECT
JURISDICTION OF COURTS NOR IMPAIR
VALIDITY OF INFORMATION. — The absence of
preliminary investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective, but, if there were no preliminary
investigations and the defendants, before entering
their plea, invite the attention of the court to their
absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
Information, should conduct such investigation, order
the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the
inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may
be conducted . . . (Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People, G.R.
No. 72830, 149 SCRA 1 [1987] and reiterated in
Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85468, 177
SCRA 354 [1989]).
3. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO QUASH; LACK OF
JURISDICTION BY THE COURT AS A GROUND,
CONSTRUED. — The lack of jurisdiction
contemplated in Section 3(b), Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Court refers to the lack of any law conferring
upon the court the power to inquire into the facts, to
apply the law and to declare the punishment for an
offense in a regular course of judicial proceeding.
When the court has jurisdiction, as in this case, any
irregularity in the exercise of that power is not a
ground for a motion to quash.
4. ID.; JURISDICTION; ABSENCE THEREOF, NOT
SUBJECT TO WAIVER. — Lack of jurisdiction is not
waivable but absence of preliminary investigation is
waivable. In fact, it is frequently waived.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE
PROCESS; NOT DENIED WHERE PETITIONER
WAS REQUIRED TO ANSWER THE CHARGES
AGAINST HIM. — The facts on record show that in an
order dated October 3, 1990, Deputy Ombudsman
Domingo required petitioner to answer the charges
against him as stated in the affidavits-complaints and
supporting documents thereto. Petitioner fully
complied with said order and filed his and his
witnesses' affidavits. In other words, petitioner was
properly apprised of the act complained of and given
ample opportunity to rebut the same. Thus, petitioner
could not validly raise violation of his right to due
process because the bases for the information filed by
the Ombudsman were all reflected in the complaint
and the evidence supporting it.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; NOTHING MORE
THAN THE SUBMISSION OF THE PARTIES'
AFFIDAVITS AND COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS. — In
Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan, (G.R. Nos. 92362-67, 202
SCRA 727 [1991]) this Court held that preliminary
investigation is nothing more than the submission of
the parties' respective affidavits, counter-affidavits
and evidence to buttress their separate allegations.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERELY INQUISITORIAL. —
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it
is often the only means of discovering whether a
person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or
information.
8. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF CRIMINAL CHARGES
DETERMINED BY ACTUAL RECITAL OF FACTS. —
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information
nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions
of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. . . . it is not the technical
name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the
information that determines the character of the crime
but the facts alleged in the body of the Information.
9. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;
DEEMED WAIVED BY FAILURE TO SEASONABLY
INVOKED RIGHT THERETO. — The right to a
preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right
and may be waived expressly or by silence. Failure of
accused to invoke his right to a preliminary
investigation constituted a waiver of such right and
any irregularity that attended it. The right may be
forfeited by inaction and can no longer be invoked for
the first time at the appellate level.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY BE AVAILED OF EVEN AFTER
THE CASE HAS BEEN FILED. — Under the last
paragraph of Section 7, Rule 112 of 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the right to ask for preliminary
investigation is recognized even after the case has
already been filed.
11. ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE, DEFINED. —
Probable cause has been defined in the leading case
of Buchanan vs. Vda. de Esteban (32 Phil. 365) as
the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted. Probable cause is a
reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or
may be, well founded, such a state of facts in the
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain
an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.
12. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI;
FINDING BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR VIOLATION OF ANTI-
GRAFT AND PRACTICES ACT, NOT IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION NOR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. — Having found that respondent court
has not acted in excess of jurisdiction nor with grave
abuse of discretion in finding the existence of
probable cause in the case at bar and consequently,
in denying the motion to quash and motion for
reconsideration of petitioner, We dismiss as clearly
unfounded the insinuations of petitioner that Presiding
Justice Francis Garchitorena used the influence of his
office in initiating the complaint against him. We agree
with respondent court that the act of bringing to the
attention of appropriate officials possible
transgression of the law is as much an obligation of
the highest official of the land as it is the responsibility
of any private citizen.
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioner
seeks to annul the resolutions of respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16672, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo P. Pilapil"
dated June 27, 1991 denying his motion to quash the
information for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended. as well as the resolution
dated September 5, 1991 denying his motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner predicated his motion to
quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his
person because the same was filed without probable
cause. In addition thereto, petitioner cites the fact that
the information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was
filed although the complaint upon which the
preliminary investigation was conducted is for
malversation.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On October 16, 1987, the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) donated one ambulance
(a Mitsubishi L-300) to the Municipality of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur. Petitioner, who is the Congressman
of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur, received the
ambulance in behalf of the municipality. However, he
did not deliver the ambulance to said municipality.
Unaware of the donation, the Sangguniang Bayan of
the municipality passed a resolution (Resolution No.
16, Series of 1988) requesting PCSO for an
ambulance. Said request was reiterated in their
Resolution No. 117, Series of 1988. The mayor of the
municipality, Eleanor P. Lelis, thereafter sought the
intercession of Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
Francis Garchitorena, who is from the said
municipality, regarding said request. Thereafter,
Justice Garchitorena contacted the PCSO and
learned about the ambulance previously donated by
the latter to Tigaon through petitioner. He accordingly
informed Mayor Lelis that the municipality's request
cannot be favorably acted upon in view of the
previous donation.
Mayor Lelis reiterated the municipality's request for an
ambulance making reference to the certification of the
municipal treasurer that no vehicle from the PCSO or
from anyone has been received.
Upon verification of the whereabouts of the Mitsubishi
L-300 by the PCSO from the petitioner, the latter
indicated his willingness to return the ambulance. In a
letter dated December 22, 1988, he requested that
said vehicle be donated instead to the Municipality of
Tinambac, same province. Finally, on December 26.
1988, he personally returned the ambulance, then
already painted to cover the logo of the PCSO and the
other markings thereon.
With the return of the Mitsubishi L-300 to the PCSO,
the Municipality of Tigaon, through Mayor Lelis, finally
received a brand new Besta Kia Ambulance unit
complete with all accessories.
On January 2, 1989, Justice Garchitorena wrote the
then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan relating to him
the whole story of the ambulance.
On January 25, 1989, Justice Garchitorena also sent
Deputy Ombudsman Jose C. Colayco a letter-
complaint against petitioner regarding said
ambulance. Said letter-complaint was referred by
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez to the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, Manuel C. Domingo, for
appropriate action. Thereupon, Deputy Ombudsman
Domingo required Justice Garchitorena to submit all
relevant records and documents, as well as his
affidavit and those of his witnesses. Failing in this
regard, Justice Garchitorena was requested anew to
comply. In his stead, Anthony D. Jamora, the
Regional manager of the Special Projects Department
of the PCSO and Mayor Lelis of Tigaon, Camarines
Sur, submitted their respective affidavits.
On October 3, 1990, Deputy Ombudsman Domingo
issued an order requiring petitioner to submit his
counter-affidavit, affidavits of his witnesses and other
controverting evidence. This order was captioned as
Case No. OMB-1-89-0168 for "Malversation of Public
Property under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code."
On October 22, 1990, petitioner submitted his
counter-affidavit denying the imputation of said
offense claiming that the vehicle was not equipped
with any medical attachments or facilities so he was
constrained to request PAGCOR for assistance to
finance its conversion into a medical ambulance
which is evidenced by his letter dated November 15,
1987 to Mrs. Alice Reyes. He claimed that it was only
on April 28, 1988 that PAGCOR acted on his request,
but in lieu of financial assistance, said office donated
accessories, which can be installed at an estimated
cost of P5,000.00. Thus, he allegedly made personal
representations with PAGCOR for the latter to
shoulder the expenses of the installation. While
awaiting for the financial assistance, petitioner
claimed, in explanation why the logo of PCSO and the
other markings on the vehicle were removed, that he
acceded to the suggestion of his staff to include the
name of PAGCOR on the sides of the ambulance in
view of the substantial contribution of the latter.
On December 5, 1990, Ombudsman Investigator
Isaac D. Tolentino issued a resolution finding no
probable cause for malversation and recommended
that the case be dismissed, which recommendation
was approved by Deputy Ombudsman Domingo.
On January 5, 1991, Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo
Aportadera, Jr. recommended the disapproval of the
aforesaid resolution and instead, suggested the filing
of criminal information for violation of Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code. This was followed by
another resolution to the same effect by Special
Prosecution Officer Wilfredo Orencia dated February
14, 1991.
On April 1, 1991, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez
issued a resolution sustaining the finding of
Ombudsman Investigator Tolentino that there is no
malversation but found in the same resolution, a
prima facie case for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, the dispositive part of which
states:
"WHEREFORE, it is hereby directed that the
information to be filed against the respondent should
be for a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019." 1
On April 3, 1991, an information for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 16672, against petitioner was filed,
to wit:
"The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III
accuses EDUARDO P. PILAPIL of the crime for
'Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
'That on or about October 16, 1987 and subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Tigaon, Province of
Camarines Sur and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused is a public officer, he
being the Congressman of the Third Congressional
District of Camarines Sur, while in the discharge of his
official functions and taking advantage of his public
position, acted with manifest partiality and evident bad
faith, did then and there willfully cause undue injury to
the Municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, when he
failed to deliver the ambulance, Mitsubishi Van L-300,
received by him on behalf of the said municipality in a
Deed of Donation executed by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office in its favor, to the prejudice and
damage of the said municipal government.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
On April 12, 1991, a warrant of arrest was issued
against petitioner. On April 18, 1991, he was allowed
to deposit the sum of P15,000.00 in court to be
considered as bail bond and the warrant of arrest was
recalled.
On May 2, 1991, petitioner filed a motion to quash on
the ground that respondent Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over his person because the information
was filed without probable cause since there is
absolutely no proof adduced in the preliminary
investigation of any of the elements of the crime
defined in Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. On
June 27, 1991, respondent court denied the said
motion to quash holding that the factual and legal
issues and/or questions raised are evidentiary in
nature and are matters of defense, the validity of
which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits. On September 5, 1991, respondent
court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution and set the arraignment of
petitioner on October 21, 1991 at 8:30 a.m.
On October 12, 1991, petitioner filed the present
petition and by reason of such filing, respondent court
ordered that the arraignment be held in abeyance.
Petitioner enumerates the following as his reasons for
filing the petition:
"I. THAT RESPONDENT COURT IS ACTING
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH.
II. THAT RESPONDENT COURT IS NEGLECTING A
LEGAL DUTY IN NOT QUASHING THE
INFORMATION OR DISMISSING THE CASE.
III. THAT PETITIONER HAS NO PLAIN, SPEEDY
AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY
COURSE OF LAW EXCEPT THE PRESENT
PETITION." 3
Stated otherwise, the issue in this case is whether or
not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to quash and
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner harps on the lack of preliminary
investigation on the specific charge of violation of Sec.
3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, filed before
the Sandiganbayan. He alleges that the preliminary
investigation was conducted for the charge of
malversation.
At the outset, this Court bears mention of the
rudimentary rule that the absence of a preliminary
investigation is not a ground to quash a complaint or
information under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court. The proper procedure in case of lack of
preliminary investigation is to hold in abeyance the
proceedings upon such information and the case
remanded to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal or the
Ombudsman, for that matter, for him or the Special
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. 4
Thus, We enunciated in Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People, 5
and reiterated in Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 6 that:
"The absence of preliminary investigation does not
affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do
they impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective, but, if there were no preliminary
investigations and the defendants, before entering
their plea, invite the attention of the court to their
absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
Information, should conduct such investigation, order
the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the
inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may
be conducted . . ."
Petitioner takes exception to the doctrine and urges
this Court to take a second look arguing that lack of
preliminary investigation affects the court's jurisdiction
because it is violative of due process. He reasons out
that jurisprudence abounds with the rule that denial of
due process is grave jurisdictional defeat rendering
the judgment void.
We are not persuaded. The lack of jurisdiction
contemplated in Section 3(b), Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Court refers to the lack of any law conferring
upon the court the power to inquire into the facts, to
apply the law and to declare the punishment for an
offense in a regular course of judicial proceeding.
When the court has jurisdiction, as in this case, any
irregularity in the exercise of that power is not a
ground for a motion to quash. Reason is not wanting
for this view. Lack of jurisdiction is not waivable but
absence of preliminary investigation is waivable. In
fact, it is frequently waived.
We now come to the question of whether there was
no preliminary investigation conducted in this case
necessitating the suspension of the proceedings in
the case until after the outcome of such preliminary
investigation.
The facts on record show that in an order dated
October 3, 1990, Deputy Ombudsman Domingo
required petitioner to answer the charges against him
as stated in the affidavits-complaints and supporting
documents thereto. Petitioner fully complied with said
order and filed his and his witnesses' affidavits. In
other words, petitioner was properly apprised of the
act complained of and given ample opportunity to
rebut the same. Thus, petitioner could not validly raise
violation of his right to due process because the
bases for the information filed by the Ombudsman
were all reflected in the complaint and the evidence
supporting it. In Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan, 7 this
Court held that preliminary investigation is nothing
more than the submission of the parties' respective
affidavits, counter-affidavits and evidence to buttress
their separate allegations.
Petitioner attaches significance to the fact that the
preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman against him was under the title of
"malversation." According to him, this is not sufficient
to justify the filing of the charge of violation of Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Law.
Petitioner loses sight of the fact that preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the
only means of discovering whether a person may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information.
The preliminary designation of the offense in the
directive to file a counter-affidavit and affidavits of
one's witnesses is not conclusive. Such designation is
only a conclusion of law of Deputy Ombudsman
Domingo. The Ombudsman is not bound by the said
qualification of the crime. Rather, he is guided by the
evidence presented in the course of a preliminary
investigation and on the basis of which, he may
formulate and designate the offense and direct the
filing of the corresponding information. In fact, even,
the designation of the offense by the prosecutor in the
information itself has been held inconclusive, to wit:
". . . the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in
the complaint or information . . . it is not the technical
name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the
information that determines the character of the crime
but the facts alleged in the body of the Information." 8
Petitioner cites the case of Luciano vs. Mariano, 9 in
support of its view that a new preliminary investigation
is needed. In said case, however, the original charge
for falsification was dismissed for being without any
factual or legal basis and the category of the offense
was raised as the alleged violation of the Anti-Graft
Law was a graver charge. In the case at bar, there is
no dismissal to speak of because under the rules of
procedure of the office of the Ombudsman, a
complaint may be dismissed only upon the written
authority or approval of the Ombudsman. Besides,
even the petitioner admits that the violation of the
Anti-Graft law did not raise the category of the offense
of malversation.
The case of Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 10 also
cited by petitioner as another authority, is likewise
inapplicable as in said case, the information was
annulled as the then incumbent Tanodbayan was
without authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
Ombudsman. With the annulment of the information,
this Court held that a new preliminary investigation of
the charge was in order not only because the first was
a nullity but also because the accused demands it as
his right. In the case at bar, there is no old or new
information. Only one information was filed as a result
of the preliminary investigation conducted by the
office of the Ombudsman.
Even on the assumption that no preliminary
investigation was conducted for the information filed,
petitioner waived his right thereto for failure to ask the
Sandiganbayan or the Ombudsman for a new
preliminary investigation. On this score again,
petitioner's case is different from the Luciano and
Doromal cases where the attention of the lower court
was called to the lack of a new preliminary
investigation. Petitioner bewailed the absence of a
new preliminary investigation only before this Court. It
is noteworthy that his only basis for quashing the
information is the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the
court over his person because there is no probable
cause for the filing of the information.
It is well-settled that the right to a preliminary
investigation is not a fundamental right and may be
waived expressly or by silence. 11 Failure of accused
to invoke his right to a preliminary investigation
constituted a waiver of such right and any irregularity
that attended it. 12 The right may be forfeited by
inaction and can no longer be invoked for the first time
at the appellate level. 13
Petitioner's argument that he could not have asked for
a new preliminary investigation in the Office of the
Ombudsman since he came to know about the charge
only after the information was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, is not tenable. Under the last
paragraph of Section 7, Rule 112 of 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the right to ask for preliminary
investigation is recognized even after the case has
already been filed, to wit:
"If the case has been filed in court without a
preliminary Investigation having been first conducted,
the accused may within five (5) days from the time he
learns of the filing of the information, ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to
adduce evidence to his favor in the manner
prescribed in this Rule."
Clearly, the alleged lack of a valid preliminary
investigation came only as an afterthought to gain a
reversal of the denial of the motion to quash. Sad to
say, this last ditch effort came a bit late. His failure to
invoke this right below constituted a waiver of such
right.
As aforesaid, what was submitted for consideration
below was the motion to quash of petitioner on the
ground of want of jurisdiction by the trial court over his
person because of the filing of an information without
probable cause. There being no probable cause,
according to petitioner, then there could be no basis
to issue a warrant of arrest and hence, the respondent
court had no jurisdiction over his person.
Contesting the findings of respondent court that
probable cause exists in this case, petitioner insists
that there is no competent proof that all the elements
of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft law are present,
namely: that an act was done (1) causing undue injury
to the government, (2) with manifest partiality or
evident bad faith, and (3) by a public officer in the
discharge of his official duties.
Petitioner argues that the injury contemplated under
the law is real or actual damage and since there is
absolutely no proof of real or actual damages suffered
by the municipality, the finding of undue injury by the
Ombudsman has no factual basis. Concomitantly, he
says that since there is no undue injury, then, there
can be no bad faith, as bad faith is inseparable from
undue injury for undue injury must be through bad
faith. He claims that failure to inform the mayor of the
donation, that he returned the vehicle after one year;
that he kept the vehicle in storage; and that he caused
the repainting to erase the words PCSO are not
evidence of bad faith since they cannot manifest a
deliberate intent to do wrong or cause damage.
Finally, petitioner claims that the element of "public
office in the discharge of official duties" is also absent
as his acceptance of the vehicle in question from
PCSO and its non-delivery to the municipality of
Tigaon was not done in the discharge of his duty as a
congressman tasked with enacting laws. If at all, he
admits, the act was done in his private capacity as
political leader in his district.
We agree with respondent court that the presence or
absence of the elements of the crime are evidentiary
in nature and are matters of defense, the truth of
which can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits.
Probable cause has been defined in the leading case
of Buchanan vs. Vda. de Esteban 14 as the existence
of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within
the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded,
such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as
would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence
to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion,
that a thing is so" 15 The term does not mean "actual
and positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence
of the prosecution in support of the charge.
Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the
government and whether the same was done with
manifest partiality or evident bad faith can only be
made out by proper and sufficient testimony.
Necessarily, a conclusion can be arrived at when the
case has already proceeded on sufficient proof.
At the moment, in passing on a motion to set aside an
information on the ground that the accused has been
charged without probable cause, the court should not
be guided by the rule that accused must be shown to
be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather
whether there is sufficient evidence which inclines the
mind to believe, without necessarily leaving room for
doubt, that accused is guilty thereof.
Having thus found that respondent court has not
acted in excess of jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretion in finding the existence of probable cause in
the case at bar and consequently, in denying the
motion to quash and motion for reconsideration of
petitioner, We dismiss as clearly unfounded the
insinuations of petitioner that Presiding Justice
Francis Garchitorena used the influence of his office
in initiating the complaint against him. We agree with
respondent court that the act of bringing to the
attention of appropriate officials possible
transgression of the law is as much an obligation of
the highest official of the land as it is the responsibility
of any private citizen.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and
mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Campos, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 82.
2. Ibid., p. 83.
3. Ibid. p. 6.
4. People vs. Casiano, G.R. No. L-15309, 1 SCRA
478 (1961); Luciano vs. Mariano, G.R. No. L-32950,
July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187 (1971); Ilagan vs. Enrile,
G.R. No. 70748, 139 SCRA 349 (1985); Paredes vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 89989, 193 SCRA 464
(1991); Paderanga vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 96080, 196
SCRA 86 (1991), and People vs. Umbrero, G.R. No.
93021, May 20, 1991.
5. G.R. No. 72830, 149 SCRA 1 (1987).
6. G.R. No. 85468, 177 SCRA 354 (1989).
7. G.R. Nos. 92362-67, 202 SCRA 727 (1991).
8. People vs. Mendoza, G.R. NO. 67610, 175 SCRA
743 (1989).
9. G.R. No. L-32950, 40 SCRA 187 (1971).
10. G.R. No. 85468, 177 SCRA 354 (1989).
11. People vs. Mabuyo, 63 Phil. 532 91936).
12. People vs. Umbrero, supra.
13. People vs. Lazo, G.R. No. 75367, 198 SCRA 274
(1991); People vs. Maghanoy, G.R. No. 67170, 180
SCRA 111 (1989).
14. 32 Phil. 365.

15. Words and Phrases, Probable Cause, v. 34, p. 12.

Philippine
Supreme Court
Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year
2016 > January 2016 Decisions > G.R. No.
209330, January 11, 2016 - SECRETARY LEILA
DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR
STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO, ASSISTANT
STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO
AND ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD
E. GAERLAN, Petitioners, v. MARIO JOEL T.
REYES, Respondent.:
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016 -
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE
PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO,
ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M.
BARCELLANO AND ASSISTANT STATE
PROSECUTOR GERARD E. GAERLAN,
Petitioners, v. MARIO JOEL T. REYES,
Respondent.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT
STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A.
MARIANO, ASSISTANT STATE
PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO
AND ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR
GERARD E. GAERLAN, Petitioners, v. MARIO
JOEL T. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The Secretary of Justice has the discretion,
upon motion or motu proprio, to act on any
matter that may cause a probable miscarriage
of justice in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. This action may include, but is
not limited to, the conduct of a reinvestigation.
Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 questioning the regularity of
preliminary investigation becomes moot after
the trial court completes its determination of
probable cause and issues a warrant of arrest.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails
the Decision1 dated March 19, 2013 and
Resolution2 dated September 27, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals, which rendered null and void
Department of Justice Order No. 710 3 issued
by the Secretary of Justice.4 The Department
Order created a second panel of prosecutors to
conduct a reinvestigation of a murder case in
view of the first panel of prosecutors' failure to
admit the complainant's additional evidence.
Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known
as "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and anchor
of several radio shows in Palawan. On January
24, 2011, at around 10:30 am, he was shot
dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay
in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan.5 After a brief chase with police
officers, Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. On
the same day, he made an extrajudicial
confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega.
He also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O. Edrad
(Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando
"Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr.6
On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-
Terrorism Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation where he alleged that it was
former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes
(former Governor Reyes) who ordered the
killing of Dr. Ortega. 7
On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila
De Lima issued Department Order No.
0918 creating a special panel of prosecutors
(First Panel) to conduct preliminary
investigation. The First Panel was composed of
Senior Assistant Prosecutor Edwin S. Dayog,
Assistant State Prosecutor Bryan Jacinto S.
Cacha, and Assistant State Prosecutor John
Benedict D. Medina.9
On February 14, 2011, Dr. Patria Gloria
Inocencio-Ortega (Dr. Inocencio-Ortega), Dr.
Ortega's wife, filed a Supplemental Affidavit-
Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes
as the mastermind of her husband's murder.
Former Governor Reyes' brother, Coron Mayor
Mario T. Reyes, Jr., former Marinduque
Governor Jose T. Carreon, former Provincial
Administrator Atty. Romeo Seratubias, Marlon
Recamata, Dennis Aranas, Valentin Lesias,
Arturo D. Regalado, Armando Noel, Rodolfo O.
Edrad, and several John and Jane Does were
also implicated.10
On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its
preliminary investigation and issued the
Resolution11 dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint.
On June 28, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a
Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation,
which, among others, sought the admission of
mobile phone communications between former
Governor Reyes and Edrad.12 On July 7, 2011,
while the Motion to Re-Open was still pending,
Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution
dated June 8, 2011. Both Motions were denied
by the First Panel in the Resolution 13 dated
September 2, 2011.14
On September 7, 2011, the Secretary of
Justice issued Department Order No. 710
creating a new panel of investigators (Second
Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.
The Second Panel was composed of Assistant
State Prosecutor Stewart Allan M. Mariano,
Assistant State Prosecutor Vimar M.
Barcellano, and Assistant State Prosecutor
Gerard E. Gaerlan.
Department Order No. 710 ordered the
reinvestigation of the case "in the interest of
service and due process"15 to address the offer
of additional evidence denied by the First Panel
in its Resolution dated September 2, 2011. The
Department Order also revoked Department
Order No. 091.16
Pursuant to Department Order No. 710, the
Second Panel issued a Subpoena requiring
former Governor Reyes to appear before them
on October 6 and 13, 2011 and to submit his
counter-affidavit and supporting evidence. 17
On September 29, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega
filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition
for Review (Ad Cautelam) assailing the First
Panel's Resolution dated September 2, 2011. 18
On October 3, 2011, former Governor Reyes
filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order assailing the creation of the
Second Panel. In his Petition, he argued that
the Secretary of Justice gravely abused her
discretion when she constituted a new panel.
He also argued that the parties were already
afforded due process and that the evidence to
be addressed by the reinvestigation was
neither new nor material to the case. 19
On March 12, 2012, the Second Panel issued
the Resolution finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of informations on all
accused, including former Governor
Reyes.20 Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court
of Palawan subsequently issued warrants of
arrest on March 27, 2012. However, the
warrants against former Governor Reyes and
his brother were ineffective since the two
allegedly left the country days before the
warrants could be served.22
On March 29, 2012, former Governor Reyes
filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition
for Review Ad Cautelam23 assailing the Second
Panel's Resolution dated March 12, 2012. .
On April 2, 2012, he also filed before the Court
of Appeals a Supplemental Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order impleading Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan. 24
In his Supplemental Petition, former Governor
Reyes argued that the Regional Trial Court
could not enforce the Second Panel's
Resolution dated March 12, 2012 and proceed
with the prosecution of his case since this
Resolution was void.25 cralawred
On March 19, 2013, the Court of Appeals, in a
Special Division of Five, rendered the
Decision26 declaring Department Order No. 710
null and void and reinstating the First Panel's
Resolutions dated June 8, 2011 and September
2, 2011.
According to the Court of Appeals, the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion when she issued Department Order
No. 710 and created the Second Panel. The
Court of Appeals found that she should have
modified or reversed the Resolutions of the
First Panel pursuant to the 2000 NPS Rule on
Appeal27 instead of issuing Department Order
No. 710 and creating the Second Panel. It
found that because of her failure to follow the
procedure in the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, two
Petitions for Review Ad Cautelam filed by the
opposing parties were pending before her. 28

The Court of Appeals also found that the
Secretary of Justice's admission that the
issuance of Department Order No. 710 did not
set aside the First Panel's Resolution dated
June 8, 2011 and September 2, 2011
"[compounded] the already anomalous
situation."29 It also stated that Department
Order No. 710 did not give the Second Panel
the power to reverse, affirm, or modify the
Resolutions of the First Panel; therefore, the
Second Panel did not have the authority to
assess the admissibility and weight of any
existing or additional'evidence.30
The Secretary of Justice, the Second Panel,
and Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated March
19, 2013. The Motion, however, was denied by
the Court of Appeals in the Resolution31 dated
September 27, 2013.
In its Resolution, the Court of Appeals stated
that the Secretary of Justice had not shown the
alleged miscarriage of justice sought to be
prevented by the creation of the Second Panel
since both parties were given full opportunity
to present their evidence before the First
Panel. It also ruled that the evidence examined
by the Second Panel was not additional
evidence but "forgotten evidence"32 that was
already available before the First Panel during
the conduct of the preliminary investigation. 33
Aggrieved, the Secretary of-Justice and the
Second Panel filed the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari34 assailing the Decision
dated March 19, 2013 and Resolution dated
September 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Mario Joel T. Reyes filed his
Comment35 to the Petition in compliance with
this court's Resolution dated February 17,
2014.36 Petitioners' Reply37 to the Comment
was filed on October 14, 2014 in compliance
with this court's Resolution dated June 23,
2014.38
Petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice
acted within her authority when she issued
Department Order No. 710. They argue that
her issuance was a purely executive function
and not a quasi-judicial function that could be
the subject of a petition for certiorari or
prohibition.39 In their submissions, they point
out that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the
2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of
Justice has the power to create a new panel of
prosecutors to reinvestigate a case to prevent
a miscarriage of justice.40
Petitioners' position was that the First Panel
"appear[ed] to have ignored the rules of
preliminary investigation" 41 when it refused to
receive additional evidence that would have
been crucial for the determination of the
existence of probable cause.42 They assert that
respondent was not deprived of due process
when the reinvestigation was ordered since he
was not prevented from presenting
controverting evidence to Dr. Inocencio-
Ortega's additional evidence.43 Petitioners
argue that since the Information had been
filed, the disposition of the case was already
within the discretion of the trial court.44
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that
the Secretary of Justice had no authority to
order motu proprio the reinvestigation of the
case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to
submit her alleged new evidence to the First
Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. He argues that all parties had
already been given the opportunity to present
their evidence before the First Panel so it was
not necessary to conduct a reinvestigation. 45
Respondent argues that the Secretary of
Justice's discretion to create a new panel of
prosecutors was not "unbridled" 46 since the
2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that there
be compelling circumstances for her to be able
to designate another prosecutor to conduct the
reinvestigation.47 He argues that the Second
Panel's Resolution dated March 12, 2012 was
void since the Panel was created by a
department order that was beyond the
Secretary of Justice's authority to issue. He
further argues that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case since the
Information filed by the Second Panel was
void.48
The issues for this court's resolution are: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion when she issued
Department Order No. 710, and with regard to
this:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Whether the issuance of Department
Order No. 710 was an executive
 function beyond the scope of a petition
for certiorari or prohibition; and
b. Whether the Secretary of Justice is
authorized to create motu
proprio another panel of prosecutors in
order to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case.
Lastly, whether this Petition for Certiorari has
already been rendered moot by the filing of the
information in court, pursuant to Crespo v.
Mogul.49
I Though some cases describe the public
The determination by the Department of
Justice of the existence of probable cause is
not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the
actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming
or reversing the findings of prosecutors may
still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is
directed against "any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions."50 A quasi-judicial function is "the
action, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature."51 Otherwise stated, an administrative
agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it
renders awards, determines the rights of
opposing parties, or if their decisions have the
same effect as the judgment of a court. 52
In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor
does not determine the guilt or innocence of an
accused. The prosecutor only determines
"whether there is sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent-is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial."53 As such, the prosecutor does not
perform quasi-judicial functions. In Santos v.
Go:54
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation
does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. He does not exercise adjudication
nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is
often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare-his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except
that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting
as a quasi-court, for it. is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused,
not the fiscal.
prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is
true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial
bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the
executive department exercising powers akin
to those of a court, and the similarity ends at
this point. A quasi-judicial body is as an organ
of government other than a court and other
than a legislature which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or
rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency performs
adjudicatory functions such that its awards,
determine the rights of parties, and their
decisions have the same effect as judgments of
a court. Such is not the case when a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation
to determine probable cause to file an
information against a person charged with a
criminal offense, or when the Secretary of
Justice is reviewing the formers order or
resolutions.55 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
In Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice,56 a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus was filed against the Secretary of
Justice's issuance of a department order. The
assailed order directed all prosecutors to
forward all cases already filed against Celso de
los Angeles of the Legacy Group to the
Secretariat of the Special Panel created by the
Department of Justice.
This court dismissed the petition on the ground
that petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
directed only to tribunals that exercise judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance of the
department order was a purely administrative
or executive function of the Secretary of
Justice. While the Department of Justice may
perform functions similar to that of a court of
law, it is not a quasi-judicial agency:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The fact that the DOJ is the primary
prosecution arm of the Government does not
make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its
preliminary investigation of cases is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ
exercise a quasi-judicial function when it
reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on
the finding of probable cause in any
case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding,
stating:
. . . [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial,
and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except
that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting
as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately,
that pass judgment on the accused, not the
fiscal.
cralawlawlibrary
There may be some decisions of the Court that
have characterized the public prosecutor's
power to conduct a preliminary investigation as
quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this
characterization is true only to the extent that
the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial
body, is an officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court of
law.
But the limited similarity, between the public
prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly
ends there. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is
an organ of government other than a court of
law or a legislative office that affects the rights
of private parties through either adjudication
or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory
functions, and its awards and adjudications
determine the rights of the parties coming
before it; its decisions have the same effect as
the judgments of a court of law. In contrast,
that is not the effect whenever a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation
to determine probable cause in order to file a
criminal information against a person properly
charged with the offense, or whenever the
Secretary of Justice reviews the public
prosecutor's orders or resolutions.57 (Emphasis
supplied) cralawlawlibrary
Similarly, in Callo-Claridad v. Esteban,58 we
have stated that a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court cannot be
brought to assail the Secretary of Justice's
resolution dismissing a complaint for lack of
probable cause since this is an "essentially
executive function":59
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode
of appeal to be taken only to review the
decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-
judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly
those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the
matter before us, however, the Secretary of
Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-
judicial function. In reviewing the findings of
the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of
probable cause, the Secretary of Justice
performed an essentially executive function to
determine whether the crime alleged against
the respondents was committed, and whether
there was 'probable cause to believe that the
respondents were guilty thereof.60
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
A writ of prohibition, on the other hand, is
directed against "the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions."61 The Department of
Justice is not a court of law and its officers do
not perform quasi-judicial functions. The
Secretary of Justice's review of the resolutions
of prosecutors is also not a ministerial function.
An act is considered ministerial if "an officer or
tribunal performs in the context of a given set
of facts, in a prescribed manner and without
regard for the exercise of his or its own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of
the act done."62 In contrast, an act is
considered discretionary "[i]f the law imposes
a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed."63 Considering that "full
discretionary authority has been delegated to
the executive branch in the determination of
probable cause during a preliminary
investigation,"64 the functions of the
prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are
not ministerial.
However, even when an administrative agency
does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial function, the Constitution mandates
the exercise of judicial review when there is an
allegation of grave abuse of
discretion.65 In Auto Prominence Corporation v.
Winterkorn:66 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
his determination of the existence of probable
cause, the party seeking the writ of certiorari
must be able to establish that the Secretary of
Justice exercised his executive power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as
would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of
discretion is not enough; it must amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Excess of
jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction
over the case, but (he) transcended the same
or acted without authority.67
cralawlawlibrary
Therefore, any question on whether the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or
modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may
be the subject of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
II
Under existing laws, rules of procedure, and
jurisprudence, the Secretary of Justice is
authorized to issue Department Order No. 710.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1007168 outlines
the powers granted by law to the Secretary of
Justice. The provision reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 4. Power of the Secretary of Justice. -
The power vested in the Secretary of Justice
includes authority to act directly on any matter
involving national security or a probable
miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of
the prosecution staff, regional prosecution
office, and the. provincial prosecutor or the city
prosecutor and to review, reverse, revise,
modify or affirm on appeal or petition for
review as the law or the rules of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) may provide, final
judgments and orders of the prosecutor
general, regional prosecutors, provincial
prosecutors, and city prosecutors. cralawlawlibrary
A criminal prosecution is initiated by the filing
of a complaint to a prosecutor who shall then
conduct a preliminary investigation in order to
determine whether there is probable cause to
hold the accused for trial in court. 69 The
recommendation of the investigating
prosecutor on whether to dismiss the
complaint or to file the corresponding
information in court is still subject to the
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor.70
However, a party is not precluded from
appealing the resolutions of the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor to the
Secretary of Justice. Under the 2000 NPS Rule
on Appeal,71 appeals may be taken within 15
days within receipt of the resolution by filing a
verified petition for review before the Secretary
of Justice.72
In this case, the Secretary of Justice
designated a panel of prosecutors to
investigate on the Complaint filed by Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega. The First Panel, after
conduct of the preliminary investigation,
resolved to dismiss the Complaint on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding of probable cause. Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open
and a Motion for Partial Investigation, which
were both denied by the First Panel. Before Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega could file a petition for
review, the Secretary of Justice issued
Department Order No. 710 and constituted
another panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate
the case. The question therefore is whether,
under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the
Secretary of Justice may, even without a
pending petition for review, motu proprio order
the conduct of a reinvestigation.
The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the
filing of a petition for review before the
Secretary of Justice can reverse, affirm, or
modify the appealed resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor.73 The Secretary of Justice may also
order the conduct of a reinvestigation in order
to resolve the petition for review. Under
Section 11:
SECTION 11. Reinvestigation. If the Secretary
of Justice finds it necessary to reinvestigate
the case, the reinvestigation shall be held by
the investigating prosecutor, unless, for
compelling reasons, another prosecutor is
designated to conduct the same.
Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court, however, the Secretary of Justice
may motu proprio reverse or modify
resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor
or the chief state prosecutor even without a
pending petition for review. Section 4
states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor
and its review. — If the investigating
prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent
for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and
information. He shall certify under oath in the
information that he, or as shown by the record,
an authorized officer, has personally examined
the complainant and his witnesses; that there
is reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof; that the accused was
informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and that he was given
an opportunity to submit controverting
evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the
dismissal of the complaint.
. . . .
If upon petition by a proper party under such
rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of
Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor
concerned either to file the corresponding
information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or
move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The
same rule shall apply in preliminary
investigations conducted by the officers of the
Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlawlibrary
The Secretary of Justice exercises control and
supervision over prosecutors and it is within
her- authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or
modify the resolutions of her prosecutors.
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:74 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are
subject to appeal to the secretary of justice
who, under the Revised Administrative Code,
exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over said prosecutors; and who
may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify
cralawlawlibrary their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV. in relation to
Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the
Code gives the secretary of justice supervision
and control over the Office of the .Chief
Prosecutor and the Provincial and City
Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of
supervision and control is delineated in Section
38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the
Code:
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and
control shall include authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by
law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission
of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify
acts and decisions of subordinate officials or
units[.]75 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
Similarly, in Rural Community Bank ofGuimba
v. Hon. Talavera:76
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The actions of prosecutors are not unlimited;
they are subject to review by the secretary of
justice who may affirm, nullify, reverse or
modify their actions or opinions.' Consequently
the secretary may direct them to file either a
motion to dismiss the case or an information
against the accused.
In short, the secretary of justice, who has the
power of supervision and control over
prosecuting officers, is the ultimate authority
who decides which of the conflicting theories of
the complainants and the respondents should
be believed.77
cralawlawlibrary
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives
the Secretary of Justice the authority
to directly act on any "probable miscarriage of
justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution
staff, regional prosecution office, and the
provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor."
Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice may step
in and order a reinvestigation even without a
prior motion or petition from a party in order to
prevent any probable miscarriage of justice.
Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open
the preliminary investigation before the First
Panel in order to admit as evidence mobile
phone conversations between Edrad and
respondent and argued that these phone
conversations tend to prove that respondent
was the mastermind of her husband's murder.
The First Panel, however, dismissed the Motion
on the ground that it was filed out of time. The
First Panel stated: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Re-opening of the preliminary investigation for
the purpose of receiving additional evidence
presupposes that the case has been submitted
for resolution but no resolution has been
promulgated therein by the investigating
prosecutor. Since a resolution has already been
promulgated by the panel of prosecutors in this
case, the motion to re-open the preliminary
investigation is not proper and'has to be
denied.78cralawlawlibrary
In the same Resolution, the First Panel denied
Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration on the ground that "the
evidence on record does not suffice to establish
probable cause."79 It was then that the
Secretary of Justice issued Department Order
No. 710, which states:
In the interest of service and due process, and
to give both parties all the reasonable
opportunity to present their evidence during
the preliminary investigation, a new panel is
hereby created composed of the following for
the purpose of conducting a reinvestigation . . .
.
. . . .
The reinvestigation in this case is hereby
ordered to address the offer of additional
evidence by the complainants, which was
denied by the former panel in its Resolution of
2 September 2011 on the ground that an
earlier resolution has already been
promulgated prior to the filing of the said
motion, and such other issues which may be
raised before the present panel.80 (Emphasis
supplied) cralawlawlibrary
In her reply-letter dated September 29, 2011
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
to respondent's counsel, the Secretary of
Justice further explained that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The order to reinvestigate was dictated by
substantial justice and our desire to have a
comprehensive investigation. We do not want
any stone unturned, or any evidence
overlooked. As stated in D.O. No. 710, we
want to give "both parties all the reasonable
opportunity to present their evidence."81 cralawlawlibrary
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the
Secretary of Justice issued Department Order
No. 710 because she had reason to believe
that the First Panel's refusal to admit the
additional evidence may cause a probable
miscarriage of justice to the parties. The
Second Panel was created not to overturn the
findings and recommendations of the First
Panel but to make sure that all the evidence,
including the evidence that the First Panel
refused to admit, was investigated. Therefore,
the Secretary of Justice did not act in an
"arbitrary and despotic manner,'by reason of
passion or personal hostility."82
Accordingly, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's Petition for
Review before the Secretary of Justice was
rendered moot with the issuance by the
Second Panel of the Resolution dated March
12, 2012 and the filing of the Information
against respondent before the trial court.
III
The filing of the information and the issuance
by the trial court of the respondent's warrant
of arrest has already rendered this Petition
moot.
It is settled that executive determination of
probable cause is different from the judicial
determination of probable cause. In People v.
Castillo and Mejia:83
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There are two kinds of determination of
probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is
one made during preliminary investigation. It
is a function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and thus should be held for
trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the
quasi-judicial authority to determine whether
or not a criminal case must be filed in
court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor,
i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable
cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause,
on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to
issue the arrest warrant. 84 (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlawlibrary
The courts do not interfere with the
prosecutor's conduct of a preliminary
investigation. The prosecutor's determination
of probable cause is solely within his or her
discretion. Prosecutors are given a wide
latitude of discretion to detennine whether an
information should be filed in court or whether
the complaint should be dismissed. 85
A preliminary investigation is "merely
86
inquisitorial,"  and is only conducted to aid the
prosecutor in preparing the information. 87 It
serves a two-fold purpose: first, to protect the
innocent against wrongful prosecutions; and
second, to spare the state from using its funds
and resources in useless prosecutions.
In Salonga v. Cruz-Paño: 88
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him
from an open and public accusation of crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a
public trial, and also to protect the state from
useless and expensive trials.89
Moreover, a preliminary investigation is merely
preparatory to a trial. It is not a trial on the
merits. An accused's right to a preliminary
investigation is merely statutory;' it is not a
right guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence,
any alleged irregularity in an investigation's
conduct does not render the information void
nor impair its validity. In Lozada v.
Fernando:90 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It has been said time and again that a
preliminary investigation is not properly a trial
or any part thereof but is merely preparatory
thereto, its only purpose being to determine
whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to'believe the
accused guilty thereof. The right to such
investigation is not a fundamental right
guaranteed by the constitution. At most, it is
statutory. And rights conferred upon accused
persons to participate in preliminary
investigations concerning themselves depend
upon the provisions of law by which such rights
are specifically secured, rather than upon the
phrase "due process of law."91 (Citations
omitted)
cralawlawlibrary
People v. Narca92 further states: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It must be emphasized that the preliminary
investigation is not the venue for the full
exercise of the rights of the parties. This is why
preliminary investigation is not considered as a
part of trial but merely preparatory thereto and
that the records therein shall not form part of
the records of the case in court. Parties' may
submit affidavits but have no right to examine
witnesses though they can propound questions
through the investigating officer. In fact, a
preliminary investigation may even be
conducted ex-part'e in certain cases. Moreover,
in Section 1 of Rule 112, the purpose of a
preliminary investigation is only to determine a
well grounded belief if a crime was probably
committed by an accused. In any case, the
invalidity or absence of a preliminary
investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court which may have taken cognizance of
the information nor impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it
defective.93 (Emphasis supplied) cralawlawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
Once the information is filed in court, the court
acquires jurisdiction of the case and any
motion to dismiss the case or to determine the
accused's guilt or innocence rests within the
sound discretion of the court. In Crespo v.
Mogul:94 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The filing of a complaint or information in Court
initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the
authority to hear and determine the case.
When after the filing of the complaint or
information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the
accused either voluntarily submitted himself to
the Court or was duly arrested, the Court
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the
fiscal for the purpose of determining whether
a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon
the filing of the information in the proper court.
In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal
find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case, at such stage, the permission of the
Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action.
While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi
judicial discretion to determine whether or not
a criminal case should be filed in court or not,
once the case had already been brought to
Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel
should be proper in the case thereafter should
be addressed for the consideration of the
Court, the only qualification is that the action
of the Court must not impair the substantial
rights of the accused or the right of the People
to due process of law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or
not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation
by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of
Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was
submitted to the Court, the Court in the
exercise of its discretion may grant the motion
or deny it and require that the trial on the
merits proceed for the proper determination of
the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court
refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by
the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of
Justice will there not be a vacuum in the
prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the
case cannot possibly be designated by the
Secretary of Justice who does not believe that
there is a basis for prosecution nor can the
fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of
the case thereby defying the superior order of
the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or
prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice
is -done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused before the
Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the
contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed
with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to
arrive at its own independent judgment as to
whether the accused should be convicted or
acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the
responsibility of appearing for the People of the
Philippines even under such circumstances
much less should he abandon the prosecution
of the case leaving it to the hands of a private
prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will
be null and void. The least that the fiscal
should do is to continue to appear for the
prosecution although he may turn over the
presentation of the evidence to the private
prosecutor but still under his direction and
control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that
once a complaint or information is filed in
Court, any disposition of the case as to its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to
grant or deny the same. It does not matter if
this is done before or after the arraignment of
the accused or that the motion was filed after
a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records
of the investigation.95 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Thus, it would be ill-advised for the Secretary
of Justice to proceed with resolving
respondent's Petition for Review pending
before her. It would be more prudent to refrain
from entertaining the Petition considering that
the trial court already issued a warrant of
arrest against respondent.96 The issuance of
the warrant signifies that the trial court has
made an independent determination of the
existence of probable cause. In Mendoza v. Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del
People:97chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur. chanrobleslaw

While it is within the trial court's discretion to Endnotes:

make an independent assessment of the
evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of
determining whether a warrant of arrest should 1
Rollo, pp. 52-71. The Decision was penned by
be issued. The judge does not act as an Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan and
appellate court' of the prosecutor and has no concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda
capacity to review the prosecutor's Lampas Peralta and Francisco P. Acosta of the
determination of probable cause; rather, the Special Tenth Division of Five. Associate
judge makes a determination of probable Justices Noel G. Tijam and Romeo F. Barza
cause independent of the prosecutor's dissented. Associate Justice Acosta penned a
finding.98
cralawlawlibrary

Separate Concurring Opinion.

2
Here, the trial court has already determined,  Id. at 121-126. The Resolution was penned
independently of any finding or by Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan and
recommendation by the First Panel or the concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda
Second Panel, that probable cause exists for Lampas Peralta and Francisco P. Acosta of the
the issuance of the warrant of arrest against Special Tenth Division of Five. Associate
respondent. Probable cause has been judicially Justices Noel G. Tijam and Romeo F. Barza
determined. Jurisdiction over the case, voted to grant the Motion.
therefore, has transferred to the trial court. A
3
petition for certiorari questioning the validity of  Id. at 169.
the preliminary investigation in any other
4
venue has been rendered moot by the issuance  Id.
of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of
5
arraignment.  Id. at 846, Department of Justice Resolution
dated March 12, 2012.
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed
6
the Petition for Certiorari filed before them  Id. at 53, Court of Appeals Decision dated
when the trial court issued its warrant of March 19, 2013.
arrest. Since the trial court has already
7
acquired jurisdiction over the case and the  Id.
existence of probable cause has been judicially
8
determined, a petition for certiorari questioning  Id. at 1066.
the conduct of the preliminary investigation
9
ceases to be the "plain, speedy, and adequate  Id. at 54, Court of Appeals Decision.
remedy"99 provided by law. Since this Petition
10
for Review is an appeal from a moot Petition  Id. at 53-54.
for Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot.
11
 Id. at 546-567.
The prudent course of action at this stage
12
would be to proceed to trial. Respondent,  Id. at 54, Court of Appeals Decision.
however, is not without remedies. He may still
13
file any appropriate action before the trial court  Id. at 726-731.
or question any alleged irregularity in the
14
preliminary investigation during pre-trial.  Id. at 54, Court of Appeals Decision..

15
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for  Id. at 169.
being moot. Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
16
Court of Palawan is DIRECTED to proceed with  Id. at 55, Court of Appeals Decision.
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 26839.
17
 Id. at 170.
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

18
 Id. at 55, Court of Appeals Decision.
 46
 Id. at 1050.
19
 Id.
47
 Id. at 1050-1052.
20
 Id. at 56.
48
 Id. at 1059-1063.
21
 Id.

22 49
 Id. at 20, Petition for Review.  235 Phil. 465 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En
Banc].
23
 Id. at 880-944.
50
 Rules of Court, Rule 65, sec 1.
24
 Id. at 56, Court of Appeals Decision.
51
Securities and Exchange Commission v.
25
 Id. Universal Rightfield Property Holdings, Inc.,
G.R. No. 181381, July 20, 2015 [Per J. Peralta,
26
 Id. at 52-71. Third Division], citing United Coconut Planters
Bank v. E Ganzon, Inc., 609 Phil. 104, 122
27
 See 2000 NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
RULE ON APPEAL, sec. 12.
52
  See Santos v. Go, 510 Phil. 137 (2005) [Per
28
Rollo, pp. 61-65, Court of Appeals Decision. J. Quisumbing, First Division].

29 53
 Id. at 66.  RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, sec. 1.

30 54
 Id. at 67.  510 Phil. 137 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing,
First Division].
31
 Id. at 121-126.
55
 Id. at 147-148, citing Bautista v. Court of
32
 Id. at 124, Court of Appeals Resolution. Appeals, 413 Phil. 159, 168-169 (2001) [Per J.
Bellosillo, Second Division]; Cojuangco, Jr. v.
33
 Id. at 123-126. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, 268 Phil. 235 (1990) [Per J.
34
 Id. at 10-50. Gancayco, En Banc]; Koh v. Court of
Appeals, 160-A Phil. 1034 (1975) [Per J.
35
 Id. at 1028-1066. Esguerra, First Division]; Andaya v. Provincial
Fiscal of Surigao del Norte, 165 Phil 134
36
 Id. at 1021. (1976) [Per J. Fernando, First
Division]: Crespo v. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465
37
 Id. at 1114-1132. (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].

38 56
 Id. at 1084.  G.R. No. 188056, January 8,2013,688 SCRA
109 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
39
 Id.at 26-33, Petition for Review.
57
 Id. at 120-121, citing  Bautista v. Court of
40
 Id. at 34-35. Appeals,  413 Phil. 159, 168-169 (2001) [Per J.
Bellosillo, Second Division].
41
 Id. at 34.

42 58
 Id. at 24-36.  G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA
185 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
43
 Id. at 1116-1117, Reply.
59
 Id. at 197.
44
 Id. at 41.
60
 Id. at 196-197, citing Bautista v. Court of
45
 Id. at 1045-1050, Comment. Appeals, 413 Phil. 159 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo,
Second Division].
 74
 344 Phil. 207 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban,
61
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 2. Third Division].

62 75
Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June  Id. at 228-229.
30, 2015 <
76
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html  A.M. No. RTJ-05-1909, 495 Phil. 30 (2005)
? [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
file=/jurisprudence/2015/june2015/21055l.pdf
77
> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc]> citing Ongsuco, et  Id. at 41-42, citing Roberts Jr. v. Court of
al. vs. Hon. Malones, 619 Phil. 492, 508 (2009) Appeals, 324 Phil. 568 (1996) [Per J. Davide,
[Per J. Chico- Nazario, Third Division]. Jr., En Banc]; Crespo v. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465
(1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc];  Jalandoni
63
Carolino v. Senga, G.R. No. 189649, April 20, v. Secretary Drilon, 383 Phil. 855 (2000) [Per
2015 J. Buena, Second Division]; Vda. de Jacob v.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html Puno, 216 Phil. 138 (1984) [Per J. Relova. En
? Banc].
flle=/jurisprudence/2015/april2015/189649.pd
78
f> [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], citing Heirs Rollo, p. 737, Resolution dated September 2,
of Spouses Venturillc v. Judge Quitain, 536 2011.
Phil. 839, 846 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third
79
Division].  Id.

64 80
United Coconut Planters Bank v.  Id. at 169.
Looyuko, 560 Phil. 581, 591 (2007) [Per J.
81
Austria-Martinez, Third Division],  Id. at 1067.
citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v.
82
Tonda, 392 Phil. 797, 814 (2000) [Per J. Auto Prominence Corporation v.
Gonzaga- Reyes, Third Division]. Winterkorn, 597 Phil. 47 (2009) [Per J. Chico-
Nazario, Third Division].
65
 See CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1. See also
83
Unilever, Philippines v. Tan, G.R. No. 179367,  607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing,
January 29, 2014, 715 SCRA 36 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
Second Division].
84
 Id. at 764-765, citing Paderanga v.
66
 597 Phil. 47 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Drilon, 273 Phil. 290, 296 (1991) [Per J.
Third Division]. Regalado, En Bane]; Roberts, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 324 Phil. 568, 620-621 (1996) [Per J.
67
 Id. at 57, citing Sarigumba v. Davide, Jr., En Banc]; Ho v. People, 345 Phil.
Sandiganbayan, 491 Phil. 704 (2005) [Per J. 597, 611 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc],
Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
85
See Crespo v. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987)
68
 The Prosecution Service Act of 2010. [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].

69 86
 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 1(a)   Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101978,
and Rule 112, sec. 1. April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 349, 357 [Per J.
Nocon, En Bane].
70
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, sec 4.
87
 Id.
71
 Department Circular No. 70 (2000).
88
 219 Phil. 402 (1985) [Per J.Gutierrez, Jr., En
72
 2000 NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE Banc].
RULE ON APPEAL, sec. 2 and 4.
89
 Id. at 428, citing Trocio v. Manta,  203 Phil.
73
 2000 NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE 618 (1982) [Per J. Relova, First Division];
RULE ON APPEAL, sec. 12. and Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216 (1941)
[Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
 (1947) [Per J. Feria,' En Banc].
90
 92 Phil. 1051 (1953) [Per J. Reyes, En
96
Banc]. Rollo, p. 56, Court of Appeals Decision.

91 97
 Id. at 1053, citing U.S. v. Yu Tuico,  34 Phil.  G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA
209 [Per J. Moreland, Second Division]; People 647 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
v. Badilla, 48 Phil. 716 (1926) [Per J. Ostrand,
98
En Bane]; II Moran, Rules of Court, 1952 ed.,  Id. at 656.
p. 673; U.S. v. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil.
99
122 (1910) [Per J. Trent, En Banc].  RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec 1.

92
 341 Phil. 696 (1997) [Per J. Francisco, Third
Division].

93
 Id., citing Lozada v. Hernandez, 92 Phil.
1051 (1953) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc]; RULES
OF COURT, Rule 112, sec. 8; Rules of Court,
Rule 112, sec. 3(e): Rules of Court, Rule 112,
sec. 3(d); Mercado v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 109036, July 5, 199, 5, 245 SCRA 594 [Per
J. Quiason, First Division]; Rodriguez v.
Sandiganbayan, 306 Phil. 567 (1983) [Per J.
Escolin, En Bane]; Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No.
121234, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 652 [Per
J. Puno, Second Division]; Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan, 313 Phil. 870 (1995) [Per C.J.
Narvasa, En Banc]; and People v. Gomez, 202
Phil. 395 (1982) [Per J. Relova, First Division].

94
 235 Phil. 465 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En
Banc].

95
 Id. 474-476, citing Herrera v. Barretto, 25
Phil. 245 (1913) [Per J. Moreland, En
Bane]; U.S. v. Limsiongco, 41 Phil. 94 (1920)
[Per J. Malcolm, En Banc];  De la Cruz v.
Moir, 36 Phil. 213 (1917) [Per J. Moreland, En
Banc]; RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 1;
RULES OF CRIM. PROC. (1985), sec. 1; 21
C.J.S. 123; Carrington; U.S. v. Barreto, 32
Phil. 444 (1917) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Asst.
Provincial Fiscal of Bataan v. Dollete, 103 Phil.
914 (1958) [Per J. Montemayor, En
Bane]; People v. Zabala, 58 O. G.
5028; Galman v. Sandiganbayan,  228 Phil. 42
(1986) [Per C.J. Teehankee, En Banc]; People
v. Beriales, 162 Phil. 478 (1976) [Per J.
Concepcion, Jr., Second Division]; U.S. v.
Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442 (1915) [Per J.
Carson, En Bane];  U.S. v. Gallegos, 37 Phil.
289 (1917) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc]; People
v. Hernandez, 69 Phil. 672 (1964) [Per J.
Labrador, En Bane]; U.S. v. Labial, 27 Phil. 82
(1914) [Per J. Carson, En Bane]; U.S. v.
Fernandez, 17 Phil. 539 (1910) [Per J. Torres,
En Banc]; People v. Velez, 11 Phil. 1026

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2015 > July 2015 Decisions > G.R. No.
208587, July 29, 2015 - JM DOMINGUEZ
AGRONOMIC COMPANY, INC., HELEN D.
DAGDAGAN, PATRICK PACIS, KENNETH PACIS,
AND SHIRLEY DOMINGUEZ, Petitioners, v.
CECILIA LICLICAN, NORMA D. ISIP, AND
PURITA DOMINGUEZ, Respondents.:
G.R. No. 208587, July 29, 2015 - JM
DOMINGUEZ AGRONOMIC COMPANY, INC.,
HELEN D. DAGDAGAN, PATRICK PACIS,
KENNETH PACIS, AND SHIRLEY DOMINGUEZ,
Petitioners, v. CECILIA LICLICAN, NORMA D.
ISIP, AND PURITA DOMINGUEZ, Respondents.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208587, July 29, 2015
JM DOMINGUEZ AGRONOMIC COMPANY,
INC., HELEN D. DAGDAGAN, PATRICK
PACIS, KENNETH PACIS, AND SHIRLEY
DOMINGUEZ, Petitioners, v. CECILIA
LICLICAN, NORMA D. ISIP, AND PURITA
DOMINGUEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
Petitioners, through the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seek the reversal of the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision1dated August 30,
2012 and its Resolution2dated July 15, 2013 in
CA-G.R. SP No.108617. Said rulings nullified
the Orders authorizing the issuance of the
assailed warrants of arrest against respondents
for allegedly having been issued in grave abuse
of discretion.
The Facts
During the annual stockholders meeting of
petitioner JM Dominguez Agronomic Company,
Inc. (JMD) held on December 29, 2007 at the
Baguio City Country Club, the election for its
new set of directors was conducted. This event
was presided by then company president, and
herein respondent, Cecilia Liclican (Liclican),
and attended by her co-respondents Norma
Isip (Isip) and Purita Rodriguez, and by
petitioners Helen Dagdagan (Dagdagan),
Patrick Pacis, Kenneth Pacis, and Shirley
Dominguez (Dominguez) as well. Conflict
ensued when petitioners Patrick and Kenneth
Pacis were allegedly not allowed to vote on the
ground that they are not registered
stockholders of JMD. As pointed out, it was
their mother and grandmother, both deceased,
who are the stockholders in JMD, and that
there is still no settlement of their respective
estates to effectively transfer their shares in
the company to Patrick and Kenneth Pacis.3
Tensions rose and respondents, allegedly,
walked out of the meeting. But since the
remaining stockholders with outstanding
shares constituted a quorum, the election of
officers still proceeded, which yielded the
following result:4 cralawlawlibrary
Officers:
    1.      Helen D. Dagdagan as President
    2.      Patrick D. Pacis as Vice-President
    3.      Kenneth D. Pacis as Secretary
    4.      Shirley C. Dominguez as Treasurer
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After staging the walk-out, respondents, on
even date, executed a Board Resolution
certifying that in the stockholders meeting, the
following were elected directors and officers of
JMD:5 cralawlawlibrary
Board of Directors:
    1.      Cecilia D. Liclican – Chairman and
Presiding Officer
    2.      Norma D. Isip
    3.      Purita C. Dominguez
    4.      Tessie C. Dominguez, and
    5.      Shirley C. Dominguez
Officers:
    1.      Cecilia D. Liclican as President and
Presiding Officer
    2.      Norma D. Isip as Vice-President
    3.      Gerald B. Cabrera as Corporate
Secretary/Treasurer and
    4.      Oscar Aquino – Financial Consultant
Auditor
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In reaction to the foregoing developments,
petitioners Dagdagan, Patrick and Kenneth
Pacis, and Dominguez filed a Complaint against
respondents before the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City (RTC) for nullification of meetings,
election and acts of directors and officers,
injunction and other reliefs, raffled to Branch
59 of the court. Docketed as Civil Case No.
6623-R, the case, after a failed mediation, was
referred for appropriate Judicial Dispute
Resolution (JDR) to Branch 7 of the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner stockholders immediately
took hold of corporate properties, represented
themselves to JMD’s tenants as the true and
lawful directors of the company, and collected
and deposited rents due the company to its
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary bank account.6 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners
Dagdagan and Patrick Pacis, executed an
Affidavit-Complaint7 dated December 15, 2008
charging respondents Liclican and Isip with
qualified theft. Petitioners alleged in the
complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 3011 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio City,
that on January 2, 2008, Liclican and Isip,
without any authority whatsoever, conspired to
withdraw the amount of P852,024.19 from the
corporation’s savings account with the
Equitable-PCI Bank; and that the following
day, they issued Check No. C0002489901 8in
the amount of P200,000, payable to cash, and
to be drawn against JMD’s account with
Robinson’s Savings Bank.9 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In a separate complaint,10docketed as I.S. No.
3118, the corporation claimed that
respondents Liclican and Isip likewise issued
Equitable-PCI Bank Check No. 320953 11payable
to one Atty. Francisco Lava, Jr. for P200,000 to
be debited from the corporation’s account.
After due proceedings, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City, by Joint Resolution
of February 2, 2009, recommended the filing of
informations as follows:12 cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
undersigned recommends for approval the
attached Informations for Qualified Theft
against LICLICAN and ISIP in I.S. No. 3011
and another against LICLICAN in I.S. No. 3118.
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When filed, the informations were eventually
raffled to Branch 7 of the RTC, the same court
overseeing the JDR,13 presided over by Judge
Mona Lisa V. Tiongson-Tabora (JudgeTiongson-
Tabora). The criminal cases for qualified theft
were then docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
29176-R (based on I.S. No. 3118) and 29175-
R (based on I.S. No. 3111).
On March 10, 2009, Judge Tiongson-Tabora
issued an Order14 in Criminal Case No. 29176-
R, finding probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against Liclican, thus:
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WHEREFORE, the Information filed herein is amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
hereby given due course. Let the
corresponding warrant of arrest be issued SO
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ORDERED.
against the accused. As recommended, the bail
The appellate court held that Judge Tiongson-
is hereby fixed as Php 80,000.00.
Tabora should have refrained from determining
probable cause since she is well aware of the
SO ORDERED.
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pendency of the issue on the validity of JMD’s

A similar Order,15 also dated March 10, elections in Civil Case No. 6623-R. As the
2009,was issued in Criminal Case No. 29175-R judge overseeing the JDR of the said intra-
likewise finding probable cause against corporate dispute, she knew that there was still
respondents Liclican and
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Isip, viz: doubt as to who the rightfully elected directors
of JMD are and, corollarily, who would have the
WHEREFORE, the Information filed herein is
authority to initiate the criminal proceedings
hereby given due course. Let the
for qualified theft.17
corresponding warrant of arrest be issued
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against the accused. As recommended, the bail

The CA further noted that even as corporate
is hereby fixed at Php 80,000.00 each.
officers, as they claim to be, petitioners
Dagdagan and Patrick Pacis cannot file the
Considering that the address provided for
Complaint- Affidavit in the exercise of
accused Norma Isip is Washington, U.S.A., the
corporate powers without authority from the
private complainants are hereby given fifteen
board of directors under Sec. 23,18 in relation
(15) days from receipt hereof to provide the
to Sec. 2519of the Corporation Code.20 Any
Court with a local address for the said accused
doubt cast on the validity of the board
if she may be found in the Philippines.
elections would then necessarily extend to the
authority of the officers to act.
SO
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ORDERED.

Consequently, the corresponding warrants As

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further held by the CA:
were issued for the arrests of Isip and
x x x Since there is doubt in the instant case as
Liclican.16
to the sufficiency of the authority of a
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corporate officer, Judge Tiongson-Tabora

In due time, respondents lodged a petition for
should have exercised prudence by holding the
certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
criminal cases in abeyance pending resolution
No.108617, to annul and set aside the two (2)
of the intra-corporate dispute which private
March 10, 2009 Orders by the RTC Branch 7,
respondents themselves instituted. 21
anchored, among others, on the alleged chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

existence of a prejudicial question. According Aggrieved, individual petitioners moved for

to respondents, petitioner stockholders, by
filing the complaint-affidavit, are already
assuming that they are the legitimate directors
of JMD, which is the very issue in the intra-
corporate dispute pending in the RTC, Branch
59.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its assailed Decision, the CA granted the
petition for certiorari, disposing as follows:
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WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders both
dated March 10, 2009 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having
reconsideration, on the main contention that
their election as officers and directors of JMD
has already been sustained by the trial court
via its Judgment in Civil Case No. 6623-R
dated  May 6, 2011. They likewise claimed that
the issue on whether or not the RTC, Branch 7
committed grave abuse of discretion is already
rendered moot and academic by the judge’s
inhibition in Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and
29176-R, and the termination of the JDR
proceedings in Civil Case No. 6623-R.
Petitioners’ motion, however, proved futile as
the appellate court denied the same in its
January 13, 2013 Resolution.22
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been issued with grave abuse of discretion

Hence, the instant recourse.
The Issues
Plainly, the resolution of the extant case
depends on whether or not there exists a
prejudicial question that could affect the
criminal proceedings for qualified theft against
respondents. In the concrete, the issues are (i)
whether or not Civil Case No. 6623-R
constituted a prejudicial question warranting
the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal
Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R; and (ii)
whether or not grave abuse of discretion
attended the issuance of the two assailed
March 10, 2009 Orders in Criminal Case Nos.
29175-R and 29176-R.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The challenged Orders of the trial court
were issued in grave abuse of discretion
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of
discretion may arise when a lower court or
tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be grave as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by
or to act at all in contemplation of law. The
word “capricious,” usually used in tandem with
the term “arbitrary,” conveys the notion of
willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when
seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a
clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in
the exercise of discretion is imperative. 23 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that
Judge Tiongson-Tabora acted with grave abuse
of discretion when she ordered the arrests of
respondents Isip and Liclican despite the
existence of a prejudicial question.
As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial
question generally exists in a situation where a
civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the former an
issue that must be pre-emptively resolved
before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case.24The rationale behind the
principle is to avoid two conflicting
decisions,25and its existence rests on the
concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the
civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.26 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Here, the CA aptly observed that Civil Case No.
6623-R, the intra-corporate dispute, posed a
prejudicial question to Criminal Case Nos.
29175-R and 29176-R. To be sure, Civil Case
No. 6623-R involves the same parties herein,
and is for nullification of JMD’s meetings,
election and acts of its directors and officers,
among others. Court intervention was sought
to ascertain who between the two contesting
group of officers should rightfully be seated at
the company’s helm. Without Civil Case No.
6623-R’s resolution, petitioners’ authority to
commence and prosecute Criminal Case Nos.
29175-R and 29176-R against respondents for
qualified theft in JMD’s behalf remained
questionable, warranting the suspension of the
criminal proceedings.
Judge Tiongson-Taboracannot deny knowledge
of the pendency of Civil Case No. 6623-R as
the judge presiding over its JDR. As correctly
held by the CA:
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Judge Tiongson-Tabora is well-aware of
the existence of said prejudicial
question that should have barred the filing of
the criminal complaint against petitioners
Liclican and Isip, for the simple reason that a
juridical person can only act through its
officers, and the issue in the main case
submitted for JDR before Judge Tiongson-
Tabora is one for nullification of meetings,
election and act of directors and officers,
injunction and other reliefs. Thus, she knows
for a fact that there is a question as to
who are the legitimate directors of JMD
such that there is doubt as to whether
private respondents are in a position to
act for JMD. (emphasis added)
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This Judgment has, on June 6, 2011,become
final and executory, as per the Notice of Entry
of Judgment issued by the same trial
court.28 Evidently, whatever cloud of doubt
loomed over petitioners’ actuations has already
been dispelled. Petitioners then postulate that
the question on whether or not the challenged

Orders were issued in grave abuse of discretion

Verily, the RTC ought to have suspended the has already been rendered moot and academic
proceedings, instead of issuing the challenged by the June 6, 2011 ruling and by Judge
Orders issued by the RTC. Tiongson-Tabora’s subsequent inhibition in the
criminal proceedings. Consequently, they
argue that their motion for reconsideration
The subsequent resolution of the
should have been granted by the appellate
prejudicial question did not cure the court.
defect
We are not convinced.
It may be, as the petitioners pointed out in
their motion for reconsideration filed before the The resolution of the prejudicial question did
CA, that Civil Case No. 6623-R was eventually not, in context, cure the grave abuse of
resolved in their favor through a discretion already committed. The fact remains
27
Judgment  dated May 6, 2011 rendered by the that when the RTC, Branch 7 issued its
RTC, Branch 59, the dispositive portion of challenged Orders on March 10, 2009, the
which reads: Judgment in favor of petitioners was not yet
rendered. Consequently, there was still, at that
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WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing time, a real dispute as to who the rightful set
disquisitions, the Court hereby declares that of officers were. Plainly, Judge Tiongson-
the plaintiffs [petitioners herein] are the Tabora should not have issued the challenged
duly elected board of directors and Orders and should have, instead, suspended
officers of the JM Dominguez Agronomic the proceedings until Civil Case No. 6623-R
was resolved with finality.
Company, Inc. for the year 2008 and hold-
over capacity unless here had already
To grant the instant petition and rule that the
been an election of new officers.
procedural infirmity has subsequently been
cured either by the Judgment or by Judge
Consequently, all Corporate Acts which Tiongson-Tabora’s inhibition would mean
the defendants [herein respondents and one condoning the continuation of the criminal
Gerald Cabrera and one Oscar Aquino] have proceedings despite, at that time, the
done and performed and existence of a prejudicial question. Such
all documents they have executed and condonation would create a precedent that
issued have no force and effect. renders inutile the doctrine on prejudicial
question, such that the court trying the
Considering that the amount of Php850,000.00 criminal case will be permitted to proceed with
which defendants have withdrawn under the the trial in the aberrant assumption that the
resolution of the prior instituted civil case
account of JM Dominguez Agronomic Company,
would benefit the private complainant in the
Inc. from the Equitable – PCI Bank (now Banco
criminal proceedings. To reiterate, there was
de Oro) is the same subject in CC no. 29175-R no certainty yet on how the RTC, Branch 59
entitled Pp. vs. Cecilia Liclican and Norma D. would rule; thus, no assumption on Civil Case
Isip for Qualified Theft, the Court will no longer No. 6623-R’s resolution can be made when the
dwell on the same. challenged Orders were issued. Indeed, had
the RTC, Branch 59 not given credence to
x x x x petitioners’ arguments,it would have led to an
awkward situation wherein much time and
SO ORDERED. (emphasis and words in effort is wasted by the RTC, Branch 7 in trying
bracket added) criminal cases it should not have entertained.
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The foregoing notwithstanding, it should be 7
 Id. at 247-253.
made clear that the nullification of the March
10, 2009 Orders does not, under the premises, 8
 Id. at 252.
entail the dismissal of the instituted criminal
cases, but would merely result in the 9
 Id. at 247-248.
suspension of the proceedings in view of the
prejudicial question. However, given the 10
 Id. at 254-259.
resolution of the prejudicial question and Judge
Tiongson-Tabora’s inhibition, Criminal Case 11
Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R may already  Id. at 257.
proceed, and ought to be re-raffled to re-
12
determine the existence of probable cause for  Id. at 260.
the issuance of warrants of arrest against
respondents. 13
 Id. at 300.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 14

 Id. at 271.
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals’ August 30, 2012 15
 Id. at 269.
Decision and January 13, 2014 Resolution in
CA-G.R. SP No. 108617 are 16
 Id. at 270, 272.
hereby AFFIRMED.
17
Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R are  Id. at 307.
hereby REMANDED to the Executive Judge of
18
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City to be Section 23. The board of directors or
re-raffled to one of its branches other than trustees. – Unless otherwise provided in this
Branch 7. Code, the corporate powers of all corporations
formed under this Code shall be exercised, all
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary
business conducted and all property of such
corporations controlled and held by the board
Peralta, Villarama, Jr., Perez,* and Jardeleza, of directors or trustees to be elected from
JJ., concur. among the holders of stocks, or where there is
no stock, from among the members of the
Endnotes:
corporation, who shall hold office for one (1)
year until their successors are elected and
qualified. x x x
* 
Acting member per Special Order No. 2084
19
dated June 29, 2015. Section 25. Corporate officers, quorum. –
Immediately after their election, the directors
1
Rollo, pp. 294-312. Penned by Associate of a corporation must formally organize by the
Justice Magdangal M. de Leon and concurred in election of a president, who shall be a director,
by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and a treasurer who may or may not be a director,
Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez. a secretary who shall be a resident and citizen
of the Philippines, and such other officers as
2
 Id. at 361-362. may be provided for in the by-laws. Any two
(2) or more positions may be held concurrently
3
 Id. at 296. by the same person, except that no one shall
act as president and secretary or as president
4
 Id. at 320. and treasurer at the same time.

5
 Id. at 321. The directors or trustees and officers to be
elected shall perform the duties enjoined on
6
 Id. at 3-4. them by law and the by-laws of the
corporation. Unless the articles of incorporation
or the by-laws provide for a greater majority, a
majority of the number of directors or trustees
as fixed in the articles of incorporation shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction of
corporate business, and every decision of at
least a majority of the directors or trustees
present at a meeting at which there is a
quorum shall be valid as a corporate act,
except for the election of officers which shall
require the vote of a majority of all the
members of the board.

Directors or trustees cannot attend or vote by

proxy at board meetings.

20
Rollo, p. 309.

21
 Id. at 314-315.

22
 Id. at 361.

23
Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162580,
January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 411, 416.

24
Yap v. Cabales, G.R. No. 159186, June 5,
2009, 588 SCRA 426.

25
 Id.

26
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 7.

27
Rollo, pp. 353-355.Penned by Judge
Iluminada P. Cabato.

28
 Id. at 356.

*
 Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No.
2101 dated July 13, 2015. cralawred