G.R. No. L-22523             September 29, 1967
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN
VILLA Y MENDOZA. LUIS E. SANTOS, JR. and EDIPOLA V.
SANTOS, petitioners-appellants,  old, be declared their (petitioner's) son by adoption. Evidence was presented
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
A. E. Dacanay for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.
ANGELES, J.:
An appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
in Special Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing the petition instituted by the
spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the
minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger
brother.
The trial court dismissed the petition reasoning thus:
A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the parents of
the minor to be adopted are also the parents of the petitioner-wife.
The minor, therefore, is the latter's legitimate brother.
In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an incongruous
situation where the minor Edwin Villa, a legitimate brother of the
petitioner-wife, will also be her son. In the opinion of the court,
that incongruity not neutralized by other circumstances absent
herein, should prevent the adoption.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but the same was denied.
Hence, this appeal.
The facts are not disputed.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on
January 8, 1963, praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years
that the order setting the case for hearing has been duly published, Exhibit
A. There having been no opposition registered to the petition, the petitioners
were permitted to adduce their evidence.
It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos,
residing in the City of Manila. They were married in 1957 and have
maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of their
own blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate,
acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any
one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin
Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia
Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa
Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests
in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the
general manager of Medry Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen
Enterprises. His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-
petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning
of about P300.00.
It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958,
Exhibit C. He was a sickly child since birth. Due to the child's impairing
health his parents entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought
him up for the years thereafter, and as a result, there developed between the
petitioners and the child, a deep and profound love for each other. The
natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their
consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their
written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully
understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child by the
petitioners.
We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has been pointed to
Us by the Office of the Solicitor General who argues for the State in this
case, that relatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibited from adopting
one another. The only objection raised is the alleged "incongruity" that will
result in the relation of the petitioner-wife and the adopted, in the
circumstance that the adopted who is the legitimate brother of the adopter,
will also be her son by adoption. The theory is, therefore, advanced that
adoption among people who are related by nature should not be allowed, in
order that dual relationship should not result, reliance being made upon the
views expressed by this Court in McGee vs. Republic. L-5387, April 29,
1954, 94 Phil. 820.1awphîl.nèt
In that case, an American citizen, Clyde E. McGee married to a Filipina by
whom he had one child, instituted a proceeding for the adoption of two
minor children of the wife had by her first husband. The lower court granted
the petition of McGee to adopt his two minor step-children. On appeal by
the State. We reversed the decision. We said:
The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity
and filiation where none existed before. Where therefore the
relationship of parent and child already exists whether by blood or
by affinity as in the case of illegitimate and step-children, it would
be unnecessary and superfluous to establish and super impose
another relationship of parent and child through adoption.
Consequently, an express authorization of law like article 338 is
necessary, if not to render it proper and legal, at least, to remove
any and all doubt on the subject matter. Under this view, article
338 may not be regarded as a surplusage. That may have been the
reason why in the old Code of Civil Procedure, particularly its
provisions regarding adoption, authority to adopt a step-child by a
step-father was provided in section 766 notwithstanding the
general authorization in section 765 extended to any inhabitant of
the Philippines to adopt a minor child. The same argument of
surplusage could plausibly have been advanced as regards section
766, that is to say, section 766 was unnecessary and superfluous
because without it a step-father could adopt a minor step-child
anyway. However, the inserting of section 766 was not entirely
without reason. It seems to be an established principle in American
jurisprudence that a person may not adopt his own relative, the
reason being that it is unnecessary to establish a relationship where
such already exists (the same philosophy underlying our codal
provisions on adoption). So some states have special laws
authorizing the adoption of relatives such as a grandfather adopting
a grandchild and a father adopting his illegitimate or natural-child.
Notwithstanding the views thus expressed, a study of American precedents
would reveal that there is a variance in the decisions of the courts in
different jurisdictions regarding, the matter of adoption of relatives. It
cannot be stated as a general proposition that the adoption of a blood
relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for in many states of the Union,
no restriction of that sort is contained in the statutes authorizing adoption,
although laws of other jurisdiction expressly provide that adoption may not
take place within persons within a certain degree of relationship (1 Am. Jur.
628-629). Courts in some states hold that in the absence of express statutory
restriction, a blood relationship between the parties is not a legal
impediment to the adoption of one by the other, and there may be a valid
adoption where the relation of parent and child already exists by nature (2
Am. Jur. 2d 869). Principles vary according to the particular adoption
statute of a state under which any given case is considered. It would seem
that in those states originally influenced by the civil law countries where
adoption originated, the rules are liberally construed, while in other states
where common law principles predominate, adoption laws are more strictly
applied because they are regarded to be in derogation of the common law.
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt,
and it has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those
prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who
cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is under
consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law. Article 338, on the
other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or
mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a
step-child by the step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of course,
necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in these
cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between
them by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed when the
adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in these cases
enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no
matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be,
which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of
the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care
and education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to
encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear
and educate them (In re Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).
With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will
result in a dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother
will also be the son of the adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not
prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law.
The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting
parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly
provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative
of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the
legitimate children which they may have after the adoption except that the
law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption.
Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the
adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p. 652, citing 1 Oyuelos
284; Perez, Gonzales and Castan; 4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 177;
Muñoz P. 104). So even considered in relation to the rules on succession
which are in pari materia, the adoption under consideration would not be
objectionable on the ground alone of the resulting relationship between the
adopter and the adopted. Similar dual relationships also result under our law
on marriage when persons who are already related, by blood or by affinity,
marry each other. But as long as the relationship is not within the degrees
prohibited by law, such marriages are allowed notwithstanding the resulting
dual relationship. And as We do not find any provision in the law that
expressly prohibits adoption among relatives, they ought not to be
prevented.

For all the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is set aside,
and the petition for the adoption of the subject minor, granted. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,

Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69,
Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A.
CLOUSE, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
R.M. Blanco for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Special Proceeding
No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor named
Solomon Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of law.
The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private respondents
spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens to adopt
under Philippine Law.
There is no controversy as to the facts.
On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt
the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the
petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said Order was
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zambales
and City of Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks.
The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a
natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a
Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn
became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They
are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present,
Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of
private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother,
Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty
and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home
and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for
adoption.
Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law and that the adoption will redound to the
best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent judge rendered a decision
on June 20, 1990, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for adoption
filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse
and decrees that the said minor be considered as their
child by adoption. To this effect, the Court gives the
minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child of the
petitioners. Henceforth, he shall be known as SOLOMON
ALCALA CLOUSE.
 The Court dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his
natural parents and vests parental authority to the herein
petitioners and makes him their legal heir. Pursuant to
Article 36 of P.D. 603 as amended, the decree of adoption
shall be effective as of the date when the petition was
filed. In accordance with Article 53 of the same decree,
let this decree of adoption be recorded in the
corresponding government agency, particularly the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte where the
minor was born. The said office of the Local Civil
Registrar is hereby directed to issue an amended
certificate of live birth to the minor adopted by the
petitioners.
Let copies of this decision be furnished (sic) the
petitioners, DSWD, Zambales Branch, Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Merida, Leyte.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for
relief, contending:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF ALVIN AND
EVELYN CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT
QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
We rule for petitioner.
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents
spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks
to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino
citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing
exceptions may adopt Filipino children
in accordance with the rules on inter-
country adoption as may be provided by
law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not
qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional
cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former
Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America.
In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place,
when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship
when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to
qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother.
Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone
without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the
husband and wife. It reads:
 Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except
in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition
that must be read along together with Article 184.3
The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree 603
(The Child and Youth Welfare Code), provides that husband and wife
"may" jointly adopt.4 Executive Order No. 91 issued on December 17, 1986
amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband and wife
"shall" jointly adopt if one of them is an alien.5 It was so crafted to protect
Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code reiterated
the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in
the cases mentioned before. Under the said new law, joint adoption by
husband and wife is mandatory.6 This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation.7 As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses.8
In a distinctly similar case, we held:
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree
No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses
to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law
was silent when both spouses were of the same
nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty.
Article 185 thereof expresses the necessity for a joint
adoption by the spouses except in only two instances —
(1) When one spouse
seeks to adopt his
own illegitimate
child; or
(2) When one spouse
seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the
other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code,
on the parental authority, can aptly find governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one
spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, jointly
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in
accordance with this Code.9
Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its
interpretation. There is only room for application.10
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and
every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that
objective.11 Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare
of the child and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy
life.12 It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the child that
should be the principal criterion in adoption cases.13 Executive Order 209
likewise upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be adopted
should be the paramount consideration. These considerations
notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would
justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by
private respondents who are aliens.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the lower court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed
originally to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the Regional Trial
  Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, granting the petition of respondent spouses
to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag.

In its decision promulgated on April 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals

certified the case to the Supreme Court because the petition raised only
questions of law.

By resolution adopted on September 23, 1996, we accepted the appeal. We

shall treat the appeal as one via certiorari from a decision of the regional
trial court under Supreme Court Circular 2-90, dated March 9, 1990, on
pure questions of law.

The facts are undisputed and may be related as follows:

On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, a verified petition
to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag.

The trial court scheduled the petition for hearing on September 9, 1988, at
9:00 in the morning. At the hearing, with the attendance of an assistant city
fiscal of Angeles City, in representation of the Solicitor General,
respondents adduced evidence showing that:

Claude A. Miller, 38 years old and Jumrus S. Miller, 40

years of age, both American citizens, are husband and
wife, having been married on June 21, 1982.
G.R. No. 125932 April 21, 1999

They were childless and "do not expect to have sibling

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners 
out of their union on account of a medical problem of the
vs.
wife."
CLAUDE A. MILLER and JUMRUS S. MILLER, respondents.
Claude A. Miller was a member of the United States Air
 
Force, as airman first class, assigned at Clark Air Base
since January 26, 1985.
PARDO, J
 The family maintains their residence at Don Bonifacio
Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, since 1985. 1
The minor Michael Magno Madayag is the legitimate son
of Marcelo S. Madayag, Jr. and Zenaida Magno. Born on
July 14, 1987, at San Fernando, La Union, the minor has
been in the custody of respondents since the first week of
August 1987. Poverty and deep concern for the future of
their son prompted the natural parents who have no
visible means of livelihood to have their child adopted by
respondents. They executed affidavits giving their
irrevocable consent to the adoption by respondents.
The Department of Social Welfare and Development,
through its Regional office at San Fernando, Pampanga,
recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its
evaluation that respondents were morally, emotionally
and financially fit to be adoptive parents and that the
adoption would be to the minor's best interest and
welfare. 2
On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for
adoption, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that petitioners possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
adoption, the instant petition is hereby Granted, and this
Court decrees the minor MICHAEL MAGNO
MADAYAG freed from all obligation of obedience and
support with respect to natural parents and is hereby
declared the child of the herein petitioners by adoption.
The minor's surname shall be changed from
"MADAYAG" to "MILLER", which is the surname of the
herein  Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effective of
petitioners. 3
In due time, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals. As heretofore stated, the Court of Appeals
certified the case to this Court.
The issue raised is whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino
child despite the prohibition under the Family Code, 4 effective on August
3, 1988 5 when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under
the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 6 which allowed aliens
to adopt.
The issue is not new. This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt
under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of
the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected
by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. 7
Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988,
will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino
child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the
petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. "A
vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend
upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the
concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny." 8 "Vested rights include not
only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. 9
As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in
accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court
acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To
repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court,
whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a
subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. 10
the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said
Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the
Family Code. 11
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare
of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide
homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of
the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for
the manifestation of their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objective of the law. 12
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the appealed decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, in SP. Proc. No. 3562.1âwphi1.nêt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan and Nares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979
RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA, petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON,
BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE LEON and IRMA L.
VELOSO, respondents.
Ernesto T. Zshornack, Jr. for petitioner.
Jose W. Diokno Law Office private respondents the Leons.
Arturo E. Balbastro for privates respondent Veloso.
TEEHANKEE, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule respondent judge's
orders declaring that petitioner has failed to establish by competent
evidence his alleged status as an adopted child of the deceased Lazatin
spouses and prays for judgment of this Court "declaring as established the
fact of (his) adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to
succeed in their estates as such." Respondent judge correctly ruled that he
could not allow petitioner (who had filed a motion to intervene in the
proceedings to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de
Lazatin and to settle her estate as her adopted son, after having earlier filed
a motion to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her pre-deceased
husband as his admitted illegitimate [not natural] son), over the opposition
of private respondents, to introduce evidence that he had "enjoyed ... the
status of an adopted child of the without his first producing competent and
documentary that there had been judicial proceedings for his by the said
spouses which resulted in the final judgment of a competent court decreeing
his adoption.
On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin diamond intestate in Pasay
City, survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin
daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon, married to respondent Bernardo de
Leon, and respondent Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso.
One month after Mariano's death, his widow, Margarita de Asis,
commenced an intestate proceeding before the Court of First Instance of
Pasay, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and
Yvonne, claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr.
Lazatin with one Helen Munoz, intervened. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin
also intervened, claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not natural)
child.
Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow, Margarita de Asis, also
died, leaving a & holographic will executed on May 29, 1970, providing,
among others, for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene
de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of
her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of
petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.
During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the
People's Bank and Trust Company, Roxas Boulevard branch, which either
she or respondent Nora L. de Leon could open. Five days after Margarita's
death, respondent Nora L. de Leon, accompanied by her husband,
respondent Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety deposit box and removed
its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her
sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to
her mother. Respondent Nora L. de Leon claims that she opened the safety
deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held jointly by her and her
deceased mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her stock
certificates and other small items deposited therein. When she was to close
the deposit box, the bank personnel informed her that she needed an
authority from the court to do so, in view of her mother's death and so, she
removed everything from the box.
On June 3, 1974, private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of
the late Margarita de Asis, before docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P of
respondent Court, Days after having learned that respondent Nora L. de
Leon had opened this safety deposit box, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara,
filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed
a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its
production. He likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box.
Respondent Nora L. de Leon admitted that she opened the box but there
was no will or any document resembling a will therein.
Upon the order of the probate court, presided over by Judge Arsenio B.
Alcantara, the safety deposit box was opened on November 6, 1974, at
which time it was found to be empty, because prior thereto respondent Nora
L. de Leon had already removed its contents.
On November 22, 1974, or seven months after, the death of Margarita de
Asis, petitioner intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the
estate of the late Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326- P), as an
admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.
Under the same date of November 22, 1974, petitioner's son, Ramon, filed a
petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita de Asis to examine private
respondents on the contents of the safety deposit box, Whereupon, on
January 31, 1975, the probate court ordered respondent Nora L. de Leon to
deliver the properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of
Court. Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P,
Mariano Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the
sala of respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr.
On May 29, 1975, Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for
respondents Nora L. de Leon and Bernardo de Leon to produce all those
papers and items removed from the safety deposit box and to deliver the
same to the custody of the court within one week. Within the period
ordered, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with the Clerk of Court, not
the items themselves, but two keys to a new safety deposit box which could
only be opened upon order of the court.
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara
filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No.
2341-P, as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by
Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the
petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by
him. This affidavit was later modified on August 19, 1975 to state that
petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita
de Asis.
On September 29, 1975, Judge Campos found respondent' Nora L. de Leon
guilty of contempt of court for not complying with the orders of January 31,
1975 and May 29, 1975, requiring her to produce and deliver to the court an
the papers and items removed from the safety deposit box. Her former
counsel was also found guilty of contempt, sentenced to pay a fine of
P00.00 and suspended from appearing in the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-
P, Mariano M. Lazatin, and Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, Margarita de Asis), on
her testimony that she, Nora L. de Leon, acted upon his advice.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in
the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, at which hearings
petitioner presented no decree of adoption in his, favor. Instead, petitioner
attempted to prove, over private respondents' objections, that he had
recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by
them until their death; formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was
compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses
refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he
and his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of
Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at
Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they
continuously resided up to the present. Photographs were also intended to
be presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma Veloso where she
addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita
de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy; document showing that
petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin." 1
Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents' objections
to the admission of petitioner's evidence, but on November 14, 1975, when
petitioner could not present evidence on the issue of his alleged legal
adoption, respondent court discontinued the hearing and gave the parties
time to file memoranda on the question of the admissibility of the evidence
sought to be introduced by petitioner.
On March 4, 1976, respondent court barred the introduction of petitioner's
evidence because: têñ.£îhqwâ£
All the evidence submitted by Renato and Ramon Sta.
Clara through their counsel do not prove or have no
tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding
where the adoption of the parties above named were
taken up by any court. Neither do the evidence tend to
establish the presence of any record of a proceeding in
court where the adoption of the above named persons was
held. The evidence, however, tends to prove a status of a
recognized natural child which, however, is not the legal
basis for which Renato and Ramon seek to intervene in
this proceedings. In view thereof, and taking into
consideration the evidence heretofore presented by the
petitioners, any further introduction of similar evidence,
documentary or oral, would not prove or tend to prove the
fact of their adoption but rather of a recognized natural
child.
Petitioner then filed on March 16, 1976, in both cases, a motion to declare
as established the fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora L. de Leon's
refusal to comply with the orders of respondent court to deposit the items
she had removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita de Asis. As
authority therefor, petitioner invokes the sanction of Rule 29, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court, since according to him, the order of the court for the
production of the items in the safety deposit box can be considered as an
order for production and inspection of documents under Rule 27.
Private respondents opposed the motion, and on March 26, 1976,
respondent court denied petitioner's motion. On April 26, 1976, respondent
Nora L. de Leon deposited with respondent court the items she had removed
from the safety deposit box. An inventory was conducted by respondent
court, with notice to the parties, and the items surrendered consisted only of
pieces of jewelry and stock certificates.
On June 3,1976, respondent court, ruling on petitioners motion for definite
resolution on his previous n declare as established the fact of adoption,
issued the f order: têñ.£îhqwâ£
As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is his Petition to
establish his status as an adopted child, The Court has
ruled that he has failed to establish such status. The any
motion for reconsideration unless based on some
documentary proof.
Hence, the petition at bar.
We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and
jurisprudence.
1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem 2 which creates between
two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation. 3 Only an adoption made through the court, or in
pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court is valid in this jurisdiction. 4 It is not of natural law at all, but is
wholly and entirely artificial. 5 To establish the relation, the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an
absolute nullity. 6 The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The destruction
by fire of a public building in which the adoption papers would have been
filed if existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the
destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be presumed. On the
contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a
presumption of its non-existence. 7 Where, under the provisions of the
statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. 8
2. Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any
proof of judicial adoption. We can not pluck from his chain of evidence any
link to the real existence of a court decree of adoption in his favor.
Petitioner's proofs do not show or tend to show that at one time or another a
specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding
initiated by the late spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of
the latter. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are
presented or attempted to be presented. Petitioner merely proceeds from a
nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928
and 1932. By what particular court was the adoption decreed or by whom
was the petition heard, petitioner does not even manifest, much less show.
There are no witnesses cited to that adoption proceeding or to the adoption
decree. Apparently on the assumption that the adoption was commenced in
Manila, petitioner's counsel secured a certification from the Court of first
Instance of Manila which, however, negatively reported "(T)hat among the
salvaged records now available in this Office, there has not been found,
after a diligent search, any record regarding the adoption of Mr. Renato
Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara allegedly filed sometime in the years 1928
to 1931 by the spouses Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin and Margarita de Asis
Lazatin." The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila "(T)hat
our pre-war records relative to decisions of the Court of First Instance were
either destroyed or burned during the Liberation of the City of Manila,"
does not furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption in favor of
petitioner. This is because there was no proof that petitioner was really
adopted in Manila or that an adoption petition was filed in the Court of first
Instance of Manila by the deceased spouses, where, after hearing, a
judgment of approval was rendered by said court. Moreover, if there was
really such adoption, petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy of
the newpaper publication of the adoption as required under Section 4, Rule
99 of the Rules of Court (formerly Section 4, Rule 100) or a certification of
the publishing house to that effect. Petitioner's failure on this point is
anotherer strong indication of the non-existence of the one who gave the
written consent of the non-existence of the adoption paper. We also
observed to the adoption (Section 3, Rule 99, Rules of Court), whether the
parents or orphanage, does not appear on this point is not so difficult and
such proof must be presented if only to prove the real existence of the
adoption. And of course, if the war, the clear right and duty of petitioner
was to duly reconstitute the records as provided by law.
3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided
by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived
with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish
such adoption. 9 Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his
lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had
adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a
member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not
sufficient to establish the fact of adoption.10Nor does the fact that the
deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one like
petitioner as an adopted child, recognized and referred to one like petitioner
as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the child. 11 Withal,
the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of
the deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial
decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner's evidence is rather to establish
his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child which
status of an admitted illegitimate child was — the very basis of his
petitioner for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin,
as above stated. (Supra, at page 3 hereof)
We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree, although
hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of
persons who must know the truth. 12 Pedigree testimony is admitted because
it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil
might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. 13 But,
in proving an adoption, there is a better proof available and it should be
produced. The whereabouts of the child's family and circulation of the
jurisdiction in which they resided and investigation in those courts where
adoption are usually granted would surely produce an adoption order, if
indeed there was an order. 14 Besides, since the point in favor of receiving
hearsay evidence upon matters of family history or pedigree is its reliability,
it has been set forth as a condition upon which such evidence is received
that it emanate from a source within the family. Pursuant to this view,
before a declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to prove pedigree,
or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant, by either of blood or affinity to
the family in question, or a branch thereof, must ordinarily be established
by competent evidence. 15 Section 33 of Rule 130 states: "The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or outside of the Philippines, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such actor declaration ..."
4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of
adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the
former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if
necessary in the discretion of the court. 16 The sufficiency of the proof
offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within
the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the
particular case.17 As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the
former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or
destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first beer.
established that such adoption paper really existed and was lost. This is
indispensable. 18 Petitioner's supposed adoption was only testified to by him
and is allegedly to be testified to a brother of the deceased Mariano M.
Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the deceased spouses treated
petitioner as their child. If adoption was really made, the records thereof
should have existed and the same presented at the hearing or subsequent
thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be
the case, adduced. 19
Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their
child does not justify the conclusion that petitioner had been in fact
judicially adopted by the spouses nor does it constitute admissible proof of
adoption.
We cannot entertain the plea of petitioner that the sanction of Rule 29
should be applied to consider as established the fact of his adoption due to
the refusal of respondent Nora L. de Leon to produce the document of
adoption, because first, the fact or real existence of petitioner's adoption had
not been established; second, there is no proof that such document of
adoption is in the possession of respondent Nora L. de
Leon; third, the motu proprio order of the court for Nora de Leon to
produce the items retrieved from the safety deposit box cannot be treated as
a mode of discovery of production and inspection of documents under Rule
27; and fourth, the items deposited in the safety deposit box have already
been surrendered by respondent Nora L. de Leon on April 26; 1976 and no
document of adoption in favor of petitioner was listed as found in the safety
deposit box.
5. As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta.
Clara cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita
de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P as an adopted child because of lack of proof
thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he
has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an heir
or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. 20 A child by
adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor. by adoption unless the act
of adoption has been done in strict accord with the statue. Until this is done,
no rights are acquired by the child and neither the supposed adopting parent
or adopted child could be bound thereby. 21 The burden of proof in
establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. He
must prove compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the
jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. 22 A fortiori if no hereditary
interest in the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof
thereof, whether the will is probated or not, intervention should be denied as
it would merely result in unnecessary complication. 23 To succeed, a child
must be ligitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged illegitimate natural
child or natural child by legal fiction or recognized spurious child. 24
In the face of the verified pleadings of record (constituting judicial
admissions) which show that petitioner sought to intervene on November
22, 1974 in the estate proceedings of his alleged adoptive father Dr.
Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P) as an admitted illegitimate (not
natural) child, 25 while his intervention on August 20, 1975 in the estate of
Margarita de Asis, widow of the deceased Dr. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2341-
P) was as her adopted child on the basis of the affidavit of a brother of the
deceased Dr. Lazatin, Benjamin Lazatin, executed August 19, 1975 (which
affidavit modified a first affidavit executed on May 31, 1975, which failed
to estate by "oversight" petitioner, but stated that affiant knew petitioner to
be "an illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin who later "legally adopted (him) as a
son before the Court of First Instance of Manila sometime between the
years 1928 and 1921") and prescinding from the question of whether a
natural or spurious child may be legally adopted by the putative father, we
hold that no grave abuse of discretion nor error of law as committed by
respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders of March 4, 1976, March
26, 1976 and June 3, 1976 denying petitioner's petition "to declare as
established in this proceeding the fact of adoption" and denying "any
motion for reconsideration unless based on some documentary proof." The
Court finds no basis to grant the affirmative relief sought in this proceeding
by petitioner for a rendition of judgment "declaring as established the fact
of your petitioner's adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him
to succeed in their estates as such in accordance with the applicable law on
succession as to his inheritance."
Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 16, 1976 a
temporary restraining order; which as amended on July 21, 1976, restrained
respondent judge "from proceeding with the hearing scheduled on June 17,
1976 at 8:30 a.m., requiring the submission of evidence to establish heirship
in Special Proceedings No. 2326-P entitled 'Intestate Estate of the Late
Mariano M. Lazatin' and Special Proceedings No. 2341-P, entitled 'Testate
Estate of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin,' and from proceeding
with the probate of the alleged holographic will of the deceased Doñ;a
Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin scheduled on June 29, 1976, August 10
and 12, 1976 and on any other dates." With the Court's determination of the
issues as herein set forth, there is no longer any need for restraining the
proceedings below and the said restraining order shall be immediately
lifted.
On January 24, 1977, the Court upon petitioner's motion resolved to
conditionally allow respondent judge "to take the deposition of petitioner's
witnesses to perpetuate their testimonies pursuant to Rule 134, Section 7 of
the Rules of Court, subject to the Court's ruling in due course on the
admissibility of such testimonies." The Court thereby permitted in effect the
advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, principally among them
Rafael Lazatin and Esteban L. Lazatin, both brothers of the deceased Dr.
Mariano L. Lazatin and as stated in petitioner's motion of January 11,
1977: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Substantially, the testimony of the above-named
witnesses will be on the fact that they had been informed
by the deceased spouses, Mariano and Margarita Lazatin
that your petitioner was their [Mariano's and Margarita's]
judicially adopted son and to elicit further from them the
fact that your petitioner enjoys the reputation of being
their judicially adopted son in the Lazatin family.
The Court's resolution allowing the advance testimonies of petitioner's
witnesses was but in application of the Court's long standing admonition to
trial courts is reaffirmed in Lamagan vs. De la Cruz, 26, "to be liberal in
accepting proferred evidence since even if they were to refuse to accept the
evidence, the affected party will nevertheless be allowed to spread the
excluded evidence on the record, for review on appeal." The Court therein
once again stressed the established rule that "it is beyond question that
rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of
evidence during the course of the trial are interlocutory in nature and may
not be the subject of separate appeal or review on certiorari, but are to be
assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the
decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case," 27 and that a
party's recourse when proferred evidence is rejected by the trial court is to
make a offer stating on the record what a party or witness would have
testified to were his testimony not excluded, as well as to attach to the
record any rejected exhibits.
At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of heirship and
for probate of the alleged holographic the deceased Margarita de Asis Vda.
de Lazatin, pet who has failed to establish his status as an alleged ;m child
of Margarita de Asis (unless, as reserved to him by the court below, he can
show some documentary proof),and whose intervention in the estate of the
deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin is as an admitted illegitimate child, win have
to decide whether he will pursue his first theory of having the of such
admitted illegitimate child of said deceased. Whatever be his theory and his
course of action and whether or not he may be duly snowed to intervene in
the proceedings below as such alleged admitted illegitimate child, his
recourse in the event of an adverse ruling against him is to make a formal
offer of proof and of his excluded evidence, oral and documentary, and seek
a reversal on an appeal in due course.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed and the questioned orders

denying petitioner's petition below "to declare as established in this
proceeding the fact of [his] adoption" are hereby affirmed. The temporary
restraining order issued on June 16, 1976 and amended on July 21, 1976 is
ordered lifted, effective immediately. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-23828             February 28, 1966

PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS, petitioners, 

vs.
GREGORIA ARANZANSO and DEMETRIA VENTURA, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for the petitioners.
Eulogio Rafael for the respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by
Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the Court of First Instance of Manila
on June 4, 1949.1 Paulina Santos was then 17 years old and Aurora Santos,
8 years old. The petition, which was under oath, alleged inter alia, that the
whereabouts of the minors' nearest of kin, particularly their parents, were
unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minors have been
abandoned by their respective parents; and that for years, since their
infancy, said children have continuously been in petitioners' care and
custody. A guardian ad litem Crisanto de Mesa, was thereafter appointed for
the minors. Said guardian ad litem forthwith gave his written consent to the
adoption. Paulina Santos, being over fourteen years of age, likewise gave
her written consent thereto.2
After due publication and hearing, the adoption court (CFI) rendered on
August 25, 1949 a decision, hereunder quoted in full:
This is a petition for the adoption of the minors Paulina Santos
Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes by the spouses Simplicio Santos
and Juliana R. Santos. After due publication in the "National
Weekly", a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila,
once a week for three consecutive weeks, the case was then set for
trial. The office of the Solicitor General was duly notified of the
petition and at the hearing did not offer any objection.1äwphï1.ñët
From the evidence presented at the hearing, it appears that the
petitioners have been married for the past twenty-seven years and
have no children of their own. They desire to adopt the minors
Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes, both of whom are
and for years have been living under their care and custody; that
the former, since she was barely three months old has already been
taken care of by them up to the present time, and the latter has
been cared for since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos
Reyes is now seventeen years old and has given her consent to the
adoption as shown by her signature at the foot of the petition. She
ratified the same in open Court. Both parents of the minors have
long been unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts of the
petitioners to locate them, they could not be found. The consent to
the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by
the Court. The petitioners are both proprietors and have substantial
income, more than enough to support and educate the minors. The
Court is of the opinion that this adoption will be for the best
interest and welfare of the minors.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the petition of the spouses
Simplicio Santos and Juliana R. Santos to adopt the minors Paulina
Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes and in accordance with
Rule 100 of the Rules of Court in the Philippines, hence forth, the
minors are freed from all legal obligations to their natural parents
and are, to all legal intents and purposes the children of the
petitioners.
NOW, ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, August 25, 1949.
No appeal was taken from the aforesaid decision.
Subsequently — eight years later — on October 21, 1957, Juliana Reyes
died, in Manila, without testament. On November 25, 1957 Simplicio
Santos filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.3 In said petition he stated
among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, as
surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of
age, respectively. In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed
administrator of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed
on January 2, 1958 an opposition to the petition for appointment of
administrator. For her grounds she asserted that Simplicio Santos" marriage
to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void: and that the adoption
of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of
the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not
abandoned them. An answer to the opposition was filed by Simplicio Santos
on March 7, 1958 and oppositor Aranzanso filed a reply thereto on March
17, 1958.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise that she is the first cousin of the
deceased Juliana Reyes and adding that she is the mother of the child
Paulina Santos, filed on March 19, 1959 an opposition to the petition of
Simplicio Santos to be named administrator, and, moreover, thereunder
adopted, as her own, the pleadings filed by Gregoria Aranzanso.
By order of April 6, 1959, the Court of First Instance decided the point in
dispute, ruling that the validity of the adoption in question could not be
assailed collaterally in the intestate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 34354).
From the order Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
In its decision, promulgated on September 14, 1964, the Court of Appeals
reversed the appealed order, finding instead that the adoption was null and
void ab initio due to the absence of consent thereto by the natural parents of
the minor children, which it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to
collateral attack.
After denial of their motion for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals,
Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos appealed to this Court by way of petition
for review, filed on November 18, 1964, to which due course was given.
Five months after submission of this case for decision — or on October 14,
1965 — petitioners herein filed a petition for preliminary injunction, and
later, on October 26, 1965, a supplemental petition therefor, to stop the trial
court from allowing Gregorio Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, as well as
of two other persons, namely, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, to intervene in
the settlement proceedings or to withdraw cash advances from the estate.
It was alleged in the petition and supplemental petition for preliminary
injunction that on September 22, 1965 the probate court issued an order
allowing Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura to intervene in the
settlement proceedings of Juliana Reyes' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 34354); that
on October 2, 1965 said court issued an order allowing, on previous
motions therefor, withdrawal of the sum of P7,000 each, under bond, to all
the parties, including Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura; that on
October 7, 1965 two strangers to the proceedings — the aforesaid sisters
Consuelo and Pacita Pasion — filed a motion, stating that they are also first
cousins of the decedent and praying that an order be issued allowing them
to withdraw the sum of P7,000 each under bond; that on October 13, 1965
the same Pasion sisters filed a supplemental motion in the same proceedings
praying that their motion of October 7 be treated as a motion to intervene;
that on October 18, 1965 the probate court issued an order allowing the
Pasion sisters to intervene in the settlement proceedings and allowing them
to withdraw under bond the sum of P7,000 each from the funds of the
estate.
On November 4, 1965 respondents, together with Consuelo and Pacita
Pasion — who thereby submitted themselves to this Court's jurisdiction and
stated that they, "for purposes of expediency, are also denominated
respondents" — filed their "Comment", as required by this Court, opposing
the aforesaid petition for preliminary injunction. On November 15, 1965
this Court granted the prayer for preliminary injunction and the writ was
issued upon posting of a bond of P5,000 on November 20, 1965.
Respondents however moved for reconsideration or modification thereof on
November 23, 1965, stating inter alia that they would now be precluded
from taking part in the scheduled hearing for settlement of the accounts of
the special administratrix (Araceli A. Pilapil). On November 26, 1965 we
ordered modification of the preliminary injunction, so that on November 29,
the writ was modified so as to enjoin the probate court, until further orders:
(1) from hearing and/or approving the settlement of special administratrix's
accounts; (2) from allowing any sale, disposition or disbursement of the
estate except when essential for strictly maintenance purposes; and (3) from
allowing respondents, Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, or
Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, or any of them, to receive any advance, cash or
otherwise, from the funds of the intestate estate.
The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether respondents-
oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura, could assail in the settlement
proceedings the adoption decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos. In
sustaining their right to make such a collateral attack, the respondent Court
of Appeals rested as abovementioned on the premise that failure to obtain
the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the
adoption void ab initio. In its view, said consent was not properly dispensed
with, not only because the evidence adduced in the adoption proceedings
was insufficient to support a finding that the parents had abandoned the
children, but also since the adoption court fatally omitted to expressly and
specifically find that such abandonment in fact occurred.
In this regard it should be stated that the Court of Appeals completely relied
on American jurisprudence and authorities to the effect that parental
consent to the adoption is a jurisdictional requisite (E.g., 2 C.J.S., Adoption
of Children, Section 45[a] p. 435; Whetmore vs. Fratello, 282 P2d 667,
670). The point to remember, however, is that under our law on the matter,
consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite:
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.—There shall be filed with the
petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the child if
over fourteen years of age and not incompetent, and by each of its
known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate
or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by
the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the
child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or
benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of
such asylum, home, or society, or by such person; but if the child is
illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father
to the adoption shall not be required. (Rule 100, Old Rules of
Court.)4
Stated otherwise, if the natural parents have abandoned their children,
consent to the adoption by the guardian ad litem suffices. This brings as to
the question whether in the proceedings at bar the Court of Appeals can still
review the evidence in the adoption case and conclude that it was not
sufficiently established therein that the parents of Paulina and Aurora
Santos had abandoned them.
First of all, it is not quite accurate to say that the adoption court made no
determination of the fact of abandonment. As quoted earlier, it is stated in
the decision of the adoption court, that:
From the evidence presented at the hearing it appears that the
petitioners have been married for the past twenty-seven years and
have no children of their own. They desire to adopt the minors
Paulina Santos [y] Reyes and Aurora Santos [y] Reyes, both of
whom are and for years have been living under their care and
custody; that the former, since she was barely three months old has
already been taken care of by them up to the present time, and the
latter has been cared for since she was only fifteen days old.
Paulina Santos [y] Reyes is now seventeen years old. . . . Both
parents of the minors have long been unheard from and in spite of
diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them, they could not be
found. The consent to the adoption has been given by the
guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. . . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)
Abandonment — under persuasive American rulings — imports "any
conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child". It means
"neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and
support which parents owe to their children." (2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, Sec.
32, pp. 886-887.) It can thus readily be seen that altho the CFI judgment
approving the adoption does not use the word "abandoned", its findings
sufficiently contain a set of facts and circumstances which truly constitutes
a finding of abandonment.
Coming now to the power of the Court of Appeals to review in this case the
finding of abandonment made by the adoption court, we find that even
under American jurisprudence — relied upon, as stated, by said Court —
the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior or special
tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the
determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a
collateral attack upon its order (In re McKaeg's Estate, 141 Cal. 403, 74
Pac. 1039, 1040; In re Camp's Estate, 131 Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736).
Anent this point the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence,
2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and
the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be
considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory
compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of some
particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the
adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter
the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the
 jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined
upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth;
a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination
must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be
collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted
children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not
be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with
different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be
held by one court to have been valid, while another court would
hold it to have been of no avail.
Freeman on Judgments says the same thing:
In general, therefore, where the right of the court to assume
jurisdiction of a cause and proceed to judgment depends upon the
ascertainment of facts in pais and the court retains jurisdiction it
thereby impliedly adjudges that the requisite jurisdictional facts
exist and having found such facts in favor of jurisdiction, its
decision in this respect, whether erroneous or not, cannot be
questioned in a collateral proceedings, for a presumption arises in
such cases, when the validity of the judgment is attacked, that the
necessary jurisdictional facts were proven. . . . . (Vol. I, Sec. 350,
pp. 719-720.)
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, construing a statute akin to our law in
this regard, said in Parsons vs. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147, 148:
The statute to be considered is section 4022, Rev. St. 1878, which
reads as follows: "No such adoption shall be made without the
written consent of the living parents of such child unless the court
shall find that one of the parents has abandoned the child or gone
to parts unknown." Thus it will be seen that upon the fact being
established that the living parent has abandoned his child, he is
deemed by the statute to have thereby relinquished all parental
right to be consulted in respect to the child's welfare, and his
consent to the adoption is therefore dispensed with. The term
"abandon" obviously means no more than neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which
parents owe to their children. The fact of abandonment, judicially
determined, was essential to the jurisdiction; not essential that it
should be determined on proper evidence, necessarily, or in
accordance with the truth, because mere error in that regard does
not affect jurisdicition. If jurisdiction be obtained to determine a
fact, its determination wrong or on insufficient or improper
evidence is immaterial oh the question of legal right to proceed
judicially to the next step. That is deemed to be elementary... A
judicial determination may be contrary to conclusive evidence, or
legal evidence, or without any evidence, yet cannot be impeached
for want of jurisdiction. Van Fleet, Coll. Attack, Secs. 663, 665.
That rule applies to all judicial proceedings. . . . .
It follows, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing, under a
collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of
Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them. This is so even if such fact
of abandonment is deemed jurisdictional, a point which we need not — and
do not — rule upon in this case.
For the same reason, it is not in point to argue here that Simplicio Santos in
fact concealed the adoption proceedings from the natural parents, thereby
rendering the judgment obtained therein null and void or being secured by
extrinsic fraud. The rule is well recognized that a judgment can be set aside
on the ground of extrinsic fraud only in a separate action brought for that
purpose; not by way of collateral attack (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil.
717; Ramos vs. Mañalac, 89 Phil. 270).
Anent the alleged lack of notice of the adoption proceedings on the natural
parents, suffice it to mark that adoption is a proceeding in rem5 and that
constructive notice, such as the publication duly made as aforesaid, is
enough where the residence of the parents is unknown (2 Am. Jur., 2d,
Adoption, Sec. 56, p. 906). Notice, moreover, is not required in adoption
cases in regard to the abandoning parent (Parsons vs. Parsons, supra).
Assuming that Simplicio Santos was not validly married to Juliana Reyes, it
will not make any difference as far as the right of respondents to intervene
in the intestate proceedings is concerned. Juliana Reyes should then be
deemed to have filed the petition for adoption as a person whose status is
single, not married. The defect would then lie only as to Simplicio Santos,
who, as allegedly married to another person (a point that we do not decide
in this case), could not adopt without joining his wife in the petition.6 It
being the estate of Juliana Reyes that is the subject matter of the settlement
proceedings, the flaw, if any, would not affect the consideration of the right
of Paulina and Aurora Santos to succeed as adopted children of Juliana
Reyes, to the exclusion of respondents.
It must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption statutes is to
promote the welfare of the child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to
encourage adoption (Prasnik vs. Republic, 5 O.G. 1942) and every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective.
From 2 Corpus Juris Secundum 375-376 we quote:
as well as Consuelo and Pacita Pasion are declared without right to
intervene as heirs in the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.
The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved, except insofar as
it enjoins the intervention or allowance of withdrawals of properly from the
estate by Gregoria Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo and Pacita
Pasion, in the concept of heirs, as to which it is hereby made permanent. No
costs. So ordered.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, JJ., took no part.

Accordingly, as the main purpose of adoption statutes is the

promotion of the welfare of children, bereft of the benefits of the
home and care of their real parents, wherever possible without
doing violence to the terms of the statute, such a construction
should be given adoption laws as will sustain, rather than defeat,
this purpose.

Although, as against the interests of the child, the proceedings

must be strictly in accordance with the statute, there is a tendency
on the part of the courts, however, where the adoption has been
fully consummated, to construe the statute with a reasonable
degree of liberality, to the end that the assumed relationship and
the intention of the parties be upheld, particularly as against
strangers to the proceedings collaterally attacking them . . . .

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and

Ventura and those who, like them (Pasion sisters), claim an interest in the
estate of Juliana Reyes as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in
the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate
succession adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003,
New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must be — as
in the instant case — considered valid.

Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the
order of the probate court a quo sustaining the adoption, dated April 6,
1959, is affirmed. Respondents Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT,
Field Office No. 1, San Fernando, La Union, represented by
CORAZON M. LAYUG, complainant, 
vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, and ELMA P. VEDAÑA, Social Welfare Officer
II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
In this administrative complaint initiated by Corazon M. Layug, Social
Welfare Officer IV of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), Field Office No. 1 stationed in San Fernando, La Union,
respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is charged with rendering an erroneous decree of
adoption in violation of Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code," and the
corresponding Supreme Court circular thereon, namely, Circular No. 12
dated October 2, 1986.
Respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk
of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan is charged with
disregarding the provisions of the same Circular No. 12 of this Court in
connection with the aforementioned special proceeding.
As appears from the records, the spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora
Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a
verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo
Ibea, which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5830 of the Regional
Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, and assigned to Branch 38 thereof. In
due time, respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a decision dated
June 25, 1992, after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to
adopt the child as their own.
Among other evidence adduced before him, respondent Judge based his
decree primarily on the "findings and recommendation of the DSWD that
the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand
have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules
have been demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent
judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody. Said DSWD
findings and recommendations, as respondent judge asserted in his
judgment, are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child
Study Report" prepared by the local office of the DSWD through
respondent Elma P. Vedaña.1
However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the
requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive
parents in the United States, the department uncovered what it considered as
an anomalous adoption decree regarding said minor. It turned out that the
DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that
there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct
a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there was no
directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower
court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for
said minor's adoption
As the adoption never passed through the DSWD, it filed the present
administrative complaint against respondent judge charging him with
violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 which requires, inter
alia, that petitions for adoption shall be granted only after the DSWD has
conducted and submitted a case study of the adoptee, the natural parents and
the adoptive parents. It was also alleged by the DSWD that respondent
Elma P. Vedaña had asked for an undisclosed amount of money from the
adopting parents in order to expedite the adoption case with the DSWD. 2
In its 1st Indorsement dated April 19, 1996, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) of this Court required respondent to comment on the
letter-complaint of the DSWD. Respondent judge, in compliance therewith,
claimed that he directed respondent Vedaña to conduct the home and case
study, and thereafter submit the required reports thereon, precisely because
the same are among her duties under the Manual for Clerks of Court. Since
these functions were so provided to be performed by her, there was no need
for him to order said respondent social welfare officer to coordinate with
the DSWD as he assumed that it was routine procedure for her to do so. In
addition, respondent judge contends that, except only for direct coordination
with the DSWD in the preparation of said reports, no approval from the
DSWD is necessary for the home and case study reports and it need not be
furnished therewith. Finally, he says that he based his adoption decree not
only on the recommendations of respondent Vedaña but also upon all the
other evidence submitted in the adoption proceeding. 3
In the Informal Preliminary Inquiry report dated August 16, 1996 and
addressed by way of a memorandum to the Office of the Chief Justice, the
OCA recommended that respondent judge be administratively punished for
violating Circular No. 12 of this Court, dated October 2, 1986, and Article
33 of Presidential Decree No. 603. Respondent Elma P Vedaña, on the other
hand, was asked to explain her failure to coordinate with the DSWD
regional office in the preparation of the pertinent reports and to comment on
the allegation that she asked for money from the adopting parents.
In her comment, respondent Vedaña pointed out that there never was any
directive from respondent judge for her to coordinate with the DSWD
concerning the adoption in question. She was only ordered to conduct the
case study and submit her report thereon to the court at least one week
before the initial hearing of the case, as was also the practice in the other
Regional Trial Courts. She flatly denied that she ever asked for money from
the prospective adoptive parents of the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. 4
On November 27, 1996, this Court resolved to refer the administrative
matter against the two respondents to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, the said office reiterated the fact that
respondent judge definitely rendered the adoption decree in derogation of
the provisions of Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and of Circular
No. 12 of this Court. Additionally, while the act of corruption attributed to
her was not proved, respondent Vedaña, on her part, likewise failed to
comply with the requirement in Circular No. 12 that she should have
coordinated with the DSWD in connection with the preparation of the home
and case study reports.
Indeed, Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no
uncertain terms that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of
Social Welfare, or the Social Work and Counselling Division, in
case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case
study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the
prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and
recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition.
The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the
child if it finds, after such case study, that the petition should be
denied.
Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by this Court
precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by judges,
particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in
accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD
itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the
adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing
adoption cases:
(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development,
thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the
pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;
 (2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the
aforesaid decree . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x
The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial
Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services
and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal
of such case study. . . .
The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all
too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent
judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the
commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding
case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department
which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed
by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation.
Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was
routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD
regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and
to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings,
together with all the other requirements of the law.
By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly
placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was
under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device
by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the
social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated
unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being
to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation and submission of the
relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and recommend by
herself the facts on which the court was to act.
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a magistrate should be the
embodiment of, among other desirable characteristics, judicial
competence. 5 It need not be stressed here that among the prime duties to
which a judge of the law must ever be faithful is that of being abreast with
the law and jurisprudence, since, as has so often been advanced, the
administration of justice requires the continuous study of law and
jurisprudence. 6Respondent judge has obviously not been able to achieve the
level of this expectation.
In like manner, respondent Elma P. Vedaña has imprudently acted beyond
the bounds and strictures of her duties as a Social Welfare Officer II of the
Regional Trial Court. As an employee of court of justice, she should have
been well aware not only of the scope of her duties and responsibilities but
that she should have likewise been familiar with current laws, rules and
regulations pertinent to her position as such social welfare officer. By her
misfeasance, she has compromised the prescribed process in the
administration of justice in proceedings such as the one under consideration.
We are, however, persuaded that respondent judge acted in good faith when
he stated in his decision that the DSWD submitted the required reports to
his court through respondent Vedaña, presumably in the belief that it was
standard procedure for the Social Welfare Officer II of a Regional Trial
Court to do so in coordination with the DSWD. We also agree with the
findings of the OCA that there is no evidence whatsoever that respondent
Vedaña sought to obtain any amount from the adopting parents. In fact, this
is belied by the affidavit of the child's natural mother, Loreta Ibea. We are,
therefore, inclined to adopt a liberal view on the charges against
respondents.
ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court,
respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of
Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and
respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is
REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.
 MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC
Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA
BUNDOC, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age,

shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in
her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents
against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In
addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V]
against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and
exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without
discernment.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in
Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982,
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents,

reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not
they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority
had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition
for adoption was filed.
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then
actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased
nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for
adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling
that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable
parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December
1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental
motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing, however, that
the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the motion shall be given to all
parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion;
and that said notice shall state the time and place of hearing — both
motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On
28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June
1988, the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the
notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22
December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3
December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their
right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that
respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for
damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc.
Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or
not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file
the instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance
of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and
(2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is
concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their
adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet
lodged with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having complied with the
requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised
Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and
suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the
motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had
become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary
period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the
service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place
of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition,
and in order that substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its
right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent manifest
injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed
before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the
reglementary period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to
encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of
procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid technical
sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not
override, substantial justice. if d technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made their aim would be
defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-
delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
 existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil
Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the person herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence"
under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he
has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental
liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the
doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v.
Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from
negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for
the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so
elected — to limit such liability to cases in which the
person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is
morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public
policy. to extend that liability, without regard to the lack
of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a
position to exercise an absolute or limited control over
them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has
elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain
well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral
culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having
failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of
one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who,
by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for
their conduct.  7(Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor
children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the
parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The
civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its
parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the
child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in
other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with
presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties
accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of
course, only presumed and the presumption can be overtuned
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle
occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow
that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto,
are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a
decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura
spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of
the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto
had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they
were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly
tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the
report of the Department of Social Welfare or duly
licensed child placement agency and the evidence
submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner
is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child,
that the trial custody period has been completed, and that
the best interests of the child will be promoted by the
adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which
shall be effective he date the original petition was
filed. The decree shall state the name by which the child is
thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should
be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents,
except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving
natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been
dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis
of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing
between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom,
the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible
for the damage caused by the child under their parental
authority in accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted
upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in
the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing
damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under
their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so as
to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted
child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition
for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to
hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could
not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were
at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover,
would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying
the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of
parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort was committed.
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc
spouses. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, concur.

Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion  
reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:

Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall

be finally granted unless and until the adopting parents
are given by the courts a supervised trial custody
period of at least six months to assess their adjustment
and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the
period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested
in the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance
of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given
actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the
trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed
at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto
was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's
natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA
by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court, BAUTISTA, petitioners, 
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of vs.
jurisdiction. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON,
assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON
AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby
GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby
REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their
capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The
petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to the exclusion
of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and
Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died
on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981.
Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and
Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together
with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court
of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson,
who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents'
lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint,
this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and
Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay,
Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case
No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and
Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they
were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of
representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the
basis of practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26, 
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March
9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth
certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed
Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs
of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence,
excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were
consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent
court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No.
11541), the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In
Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed
decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo
Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of
the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is
affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari.
Reversal of the respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded
the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and
jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive
heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not
legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27,
1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth
of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is
Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1)
Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita
Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she
was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners
seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that
Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the
same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born
to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to
challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory.
That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper
parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of
adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and
Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should
have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did
not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge
to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action
for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or
not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a
presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the
judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional
facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec.
350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2
American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75,
p. 922, thus:

As the respondent court correctly observed: An adoption order implies the finding
of the necessary facts and the burden of
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about proof is on the party attacking it; it
TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order of cannot be considered void merely
Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court because the fact needed to show
about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps statutory compliance is obscure. While
withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have a judicial determination of some
filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of the particular fact, such as the abandonment
adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those of his next of kin to the adoption, may
provided by law for the revocation or rescission of an be essential to the exercise of
adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction to enter the order of
adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO adoption, this does not make it essential
SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, to the jurisdictional validity of the
the same not having been revoked or rescinded. decree that the fact be determined upon
proper evidence, or necessarily in
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel accordance with the truth; a mere error
Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not determination must stand until reversed
disqualified. on appeal, and hence cannot be
collaterally attacked. If this were not
the rule, the status of adopted children
 would always be uncertain, since the
evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded
with different effect by different
tribunals, and the adoption might be
held by one court to have been valid,
while another court would hold it to
have been of no avail. (Emphasis
supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the
trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's
birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed
means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of
the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate
offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita
Abila was understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party.
The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the
guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was
never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the
birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of
Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents
must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof
of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of
the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be
questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does
not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more
fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the
child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties, and within the period limited by
law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo,
as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants
succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come
from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting
parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first
to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and
thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one
of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his
children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their
continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of
law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the
place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
 Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by  
the law and not by the person represented. The
representative does not succeed the person represented
but the one who the person represented would have
succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants

of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall
inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.
Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father
would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the
shares of her grandparents' other children. 13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and

Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true
that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the
same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the
adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood
relatives of either party. 14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the
adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson
and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to
share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals
was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of
representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the
other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased
Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the

Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.


G.R. No. 97906 May 21, 1992
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  As earlier stated, on July 2, 1986, the matter was resolved in favor of
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the judgment of respondent Court of 
Appeals 1 in affirmance of the decision of the court a quo  2 granting the
petition filed by herein private respondent Maximo Wong for the change of
his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. which was his name prior to his adoption by
Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong.
The facts are undisputed. Private respondent Maximo Wong is the
legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he
was but two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and
his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the
consent of their natural parents 3 and by order of the court in Special Case
No. 593 4 issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong
and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now
deceased, was an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high
school teacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remained
childless after fifteen years of marriage. The couples showered their
adopted children with parental love and reared them as their own children.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then
married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University,
Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It
was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him
from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry
when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien
nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does
not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
private respondent, the trial court decreeing that, the jurisdictional
requirements having been fully complied with, petitioner's prayer to change
his name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted. 5 On
appeal to respondent court, and over the opposition of petitioner Republic
through the Solicitor General, the decision of the court below was affirmed
in full, hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The lone issue to be settled is whether or not the reasons given by private
respondent in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and
proper to warrant the granting of said petition.
The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of
ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and
cannot justify the petition for change of name. He claims that for private
respondent to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass ingratitude
to the memory of the latter and to his adoptive mother who is still alive,
despite her consent to the petition for change of name. Further, the Solicitor
General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates
Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adopted child to
use the surname of the adopter, and would identify him with his parents by
nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed his relationship with
his adoptive parents. 6
In refutation, private respondent argues that he did as the law required, that
is, upon adoption he used the surname of the adopter. However, being
already emancipated, he can now decide what is best for and by himself. It
is at this time that he realized that the Chinese name he carries causes him
undue ridicule and embarrassment and affects his business and social life.
In fact, his adoptive mother, being aware of his predicament, gave her
consent to the petition for change of name, albeit making it clear that the
same shall in no way affect the legal adoption, and even underwent the
rigors of trial to substantiate her sworn statement. If his adoptive mother
does not take offense nor feel any resentment, abhorrence or insecurity
about his desire to change his name, private respondent avers that there can
be no possible prejudice on her, much less the State. 7
We feel that we should preface our review of this case with a clear
comprehension of the legal significance of a person's name. For all practical
and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which be lives and is best known. It is
defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, of
in speaking of or dealing with him. 8 Names are used merely as one method
of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for
identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently
been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the
name is immaterial. 9
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper
name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the
family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 10
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute,
intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is
obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is
fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed
only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the
commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by
act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible. 11
Title XIII, Book I of the Civil Code, in Articles 364 to 380, provides the
substantive rules which regulate the use of surnames. Considering the
subject and personalities involved in this present review, particular attention
must be called to Article 365 which mandates that "(a)n adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter," in correlation with Article 341 on the
effects of adoption, among which is to"(e)ntitle the adopted person to use
the adopter's surname." This same entitlement of an adopted child is
maintained in Article 39(3), Title II of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code. More recently,
Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, or the
Family Code, echoes the same statutory right of an adopted child to use the
surname of the adopter. 12 Clearly, from the very wordings of the law, it
may be inferred that this use of the surname of the adopter by the adopted
child is both an obligation and a right.
Under Article 376 by the Civil Code, "(n)o person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority." The application for change of name
thereunder involves a special proceeding governed by and conducted under
the strictures of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and one which involves
substantial changes, with the declared objective of such judicial proceedings
being the prevention of fraud. The purpose of the statutory procedure
authorizing a change of personal name is simply to have, wherever possible,
a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, court to
which application is made should normally make its decree recording such
change of name. 13
A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person
involving his relation with others, that is, his legal position in, or with
regard to, the rest of the community. It is a proceeding in rem 14 and, as
such, strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on
publication, is essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction
thereover. 15 For this purpose, the only name that may be changed is the true
or official name recorded in the civil register. 16
To digress a little for purposes of clarification, the change of name
contemplated under Article 376 and reglementarily implemented by Rule
103 must not be confused with and cannot be effected through the summary
proceeding proposed in Article 412 of the some Code, as procedurally
regulated by Rule 108 of the Rules, which refers only to correction of
clerical errors, such as those which are visible to the eye or obvious to the business of Furniture but I have little
understanding, or an error made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in (sic) customer because no one believes
copying or writing, or some harmless or innocuous change, 17 and not those me that I am Muslim.
which will involve substantial changes. 18
Q You want to inform this Honorable
Turning now to the case at bar, we are guided by the jurisprudential dictum Court that this family name you are
that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities using which is "Wong" embarrassed
for the purpose of identification, and a change of name is not a matter of you from (sic) your friends and relatives
right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of reasons and also cause(d) damage to your
adduced and the consequences that will likely follow; 19 it is a privilege business?
which may be granted only upon a showing of a proper or reasonable cause
or compelling reason therefor. 20 A Yes sir.

We find unacceptable the assertion of the Solicitor General that private x x x           x x x          x x x

respondent's allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to the use of his
present surname is unsubstantiated. ATTY. DUMAMBA:

The testimony of private respondent in the lower court bears out the
existence of valid cause in his bid for change of name:
ATTY. DUMAMBA:
Q Now, after adoption, when you went
to school, what did you use as your
surname?
Q Now, considering that according to
you, you are embarrassed because of the
family name you are using, your friends
shy away from you and it is a handicap
in your business, what is your desire for
the Court to do in order to help you?
A Change my family name.

A "Wong," sir. Q From "Wong" to what do you want

your surname changed?
Q Now, after you adopted the surname
"Wong?" in your studies, what did you A "Alcala, Jr.", sir.
observe?
x x x           x x x          x x x
A I observed that "Wong" as a surname
embarrassed me to my friends and when COURT:
I go with Chinese friends I cannot talk
Chinese. I am living in Campo Muslim,
a Muslim community but no one can Q What is your purpose in changing
believe that I am Muslim. I have a little your family name from Maximo Wong
to Maximo Alcala, Jr.?
 A I feel embarrassed to my friends and
also to my relatives and as I said I have
a little business of furniture and only a
few customers buying for the fact that
they don't believe I am Muslim.
Cross.
ATTY. SERO:
With the permission of the Honorable
Court.
Q Your father's name is Maximo
Alcala, Sr., is he still alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what does your father say to this
proposed changed (sic) of your name,
your family name to your real family
name given to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q They have no objection to it?
A No, sir.
Q Stated before this Honorable Court,
the purpose why you wanted to change
your name from "Wong" to "Alcala" is
so that to avoid embarrassment because
you are a Muslim and your Muslim
relatives think that you are Chinese.
A Yes, sir.
Q Not for the purpose to hide anything
or what not?
A No, sir. 21
The foregoing testimony of private respondent is materially corroborated by
the testimony of private respondent's adoptive mother:
Q Now, what did you observe to (sic)
your son Maximo Wong after you and
your husband adopted him?
A When I adopted him and he used the
surname "Wong" I observed that some
of his relatives, cousins and friends
seem to shy away from him and despise
him in school that is why I agreed to
change his name. 22
We uphold these observations in the decision of respondent appellate court:
The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name as
contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his
personality and to provide his best interest. (Calderon vs.
Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In granting or denying the
petition for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court
and not all the best evidence available is required. (Uy vs.
Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965; Nacionales vs.
Republic, 
L-18067, April 29, 1966; both cases cited in 1 SCRA
843). In the present case, We believe that the court a
quo had exercised its discretion judiciously when it
granted the petition.
From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his
adopter mother Concepcion Ty-Wong, We discern that
 said appellee was prompted to file the petition for change
of name because of the embarrassment and ridicule his
family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his
relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and
living in a Muslim community. Another cause is his
desire to improve his social and business life. It has been
held that in the absence of prejudice to the state or any
individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of a former alien nationality which only
hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and
reasonable cause for change of name (Uy vs. Republic, L-
22712, Nov. 25, 1965, Que Liong Sian vs. Republic, L-
23167, Aug. 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1074). Justice dictates
that a person should be allowed to improve his social
standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause
prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or other
persons (Calderon vs. Republic, supra). Nothing
whatsoever is shown in the record of this case that such
prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of other
persons would result in the change of petitioner's name. 23
It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of name,
petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor
but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. 24Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid
are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as
in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; 25 (d) Having
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
unaware of her alien parentage; 26 (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; 27 and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest. 28
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper
and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best
evidence available. 29 Summarizing, in special proceedings for change of
name, what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of
the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results
in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is
to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it
must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the
adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption
proceedings. 30 The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and
child. More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and
affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so related
by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of
another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights
and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect
this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents,
the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an
incident than the object of the proceeding. 31 The welfare of the child is the
primary consideration in the determination of an application for adoption.
On this point, there is unanimous agreement. 32
It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural
parents to the adoptive parents the custody of the child's person, the duty of
obedience owing by the child, and all other legal consequences and
incidents of the natural relation, in the same manner as if the child had been
born of such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock, subject, however, to such
limitations and restrictions as may be by statute imposed. 33 More
specifically under the present state of our law, the Family Code,
superseding the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code on the matter, 34 relevantly provides in this wise with
regard to the issue involved in this case:
Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be
the legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire
the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
 adopted to use the surname of the adopters; (Emphasis
supplied.)
x x x           x x x          x x x
The Solicitor General maintains the position that to sustain the change of
name would run counter to the behest of Article 365 of the Civil Code and
the ruling in Manuel vs. Republic  35 that "one should not be allowed to use a
surname which otherwise he is not permitted to employ under the law," and
would set a bad example to other persons who might also seek a change of
their surnames on lame excuses. 36
While we appreciate the Solicitor General's apprehensions and concern, we
find the same to be unfounded. We do not believe that by reverting to his
old name, private respondent would then be using a name which he is
prohibited by law from using. True, the law prescribes the surname that a
person may employ; but the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly
prohibit the use of any other surname, and only subjects such recourse to
the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. What the law does not
prohibit, it permits.
If we were to follow the argument of the Solicitor General to its conclusion,
then there will never be any possibility or occasion for any person,
regardless of status, to change his name, in view of the supposed subsequent
violation of the legal imperative on the use of surnames in the event that the
petition is granted. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court would then be rendered
inutile. This could hardly have been the intendment of the law.
A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by
way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use
of surnames. The law fixes the surname that may be used by a person, at
least inceptively, and it may be changed only upon judicial permission
granted in the exercise of sound discretion. Section 1 of Rule 103, in
specifying the parties who may avail of said remedy, uses the generic term
"persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate
person may, under certain judicially accepted exceptional circumstances,
petition the court for a change of name, we do not see any legal basis or
logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an
adopted child. In other words, Article 365 is not an exception, much less
can it bar resort, to Rule 103.
We are of the view that the circumstances herein obtaining are within the
ambit of the established exceptions and find merit in private respondent's
submission:
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its primordial purpose
which (State) is to give a person in opportunity to
improve his personality and provide his best interest
(Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In the instant
case, the court a quo found the petition of Maximo Wong
for change of name justifiable after due hearing, thus its
factual findings and appreciation of testimonies count
heavily and need not be disturbed unless for strong and
cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better
position to examine real evidence as well as to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case
(Baliwag Transit, Inc. vs. CA, 147 SCRA 82). Moreover,
the trial court could take judicial notice of other existing
factors in the community where herein respondent lives
which it considers material in its judicious determination
of the case. . . .
Additionally, herein respondent is already of age and as
such he can decide what is best for him. His experience
with regards (sic) his social and business dealings is
personal and it is only him (sic) who can attest to the
same. Finding his predicament's proper remedy is solely
through legal process, herein respondent accordingly filed
a petition pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
which was granted by the Court a quo. 37
Besides, we have faith in the circumspection of our lower courts and that, in
the exercise of their discretion, said courts shall consider petitions for
change of name only on cogent and meritorious grounds as would justify
the granting of such applications. We do not expect our trial courts to cater
or give in to the whim or caprice of an applicant, aside from the fact that
there is always the safeguard and corrective interdiction of appellate review.
It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of private respondent to the
use of the name of his parents by nature as cross ingratitude. To go by the
Solicitor General's suggestion that private respondent should have his
adoption revoked if he wants to use the surname of his natural father would
be to exact too clear a toll for making use of an appropriate and valid
remedy available under the law.
Herein private respondent, before he filed the petition for change of name,
asked for his adoptive mother's permission to do so:
Q Now, in filing this petition for change
of surname, you had talked with your
adopted mother?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask permission from her
whether she wants you to change the
surname?
A Yes, sir. 38
True enough, the above testimony of private respondent was confirmed by
his adoptive mother in this manner:
Q How are you related to Maximo
Wong?
A My adopted son.
Q He is your adopted son, did your son
talk to you when he filed this petition
for change of his surname?
A Yes, he even tried to ask me and I
said, alright if you want to change.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Now, when you agreed to the filing
of this petition for change of name, did
you reduce your consent in writing?
A Yes, sir, I agreed also so that his
business will prosper because 
he is already Alcila and not Wong
because Wong they said is Chinese. 39
As proof of her assent to the filing of said petition (her husband having
already passed away), Concepcion Ty Vda. de Wong executed an affidavit
in Cotabato City on May 27, 1985, with these textual declarations:
That I am the same and identical person, who is the
surviving adapted (sic) parent of Maximo Wong.
That I personally discovered it myself from the time my
adapted (sic) son Maximo used the surname of my late
husband Wong, his relatives and childhood friends shy
away from him because he is branded as a son of a
chinese which is different from them whose parents are
muslim Filipinos;
That I pity my son who is often rediculed (sic) by his
friends and relatives because of his family name Wong,
hence, in order not to humper (sic) his social and business
life in the future, I am voluntarily and of my own free will
without being forced, coerced, or intimidated give (sic)
my consent to his desire to change his desire to change his
surname without affecting however the legal adoption
granted by the Court on September 9, 1967, making him
as one of my legal and compulsory heir (sic).
That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of
all the above mentioned facts and for all legal intent (sic)
and purposes. 40
There could be no other plausible reason for private respondent to first
secure has adoptive mother's consent before resorting to the questioned
legal recourse other than the parental respect and reverence which is owed
by and to be expected of a dutiful child. If private respondent was such an
ingrate, as the Solicitor General would have us believe, he would not have
bothered to seek his adoptive mother's counsel. In the same breath, had his
adoptive mother regarded him as an ungrateful adoptee, she would not have
executed the affidavit above quoted, much less testify in his behalf at the
hearing of his petition.
Moreover, worthy of note is the fact that private respondent's adoptive
mother emphasized that she executed the above affidavit "without affecting
the legal adoption granted by the Court on September 9, 1967, making him
as one of my legal and compulsory heir(s)." This is incontrovertible proof
that she never entertained any misgivings or reservations with respect to her
consent to his petition. This likewise dispels any possible confusion as to
private respondent's legal status or adoptive paternity and his successional
rights. Concordantly, we have heretofore held that a change of name does
not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the
rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity,
civil status or citizenship; what is altered is only the name. 41
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.
 
G.R. No. 117209             February 9, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN
MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y
ANDRADE, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Indeed, what's in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by
any other name would smell as sweet?
This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which
challenges, on pure questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City, dated September 13, 1994 1 in JDRC Case No.
2964. Said court is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of
Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein
for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to
complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent
to his adoption.
The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent
spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p
petition 2 to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging
therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for
adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well
as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the
aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private
respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said minor adoptee to
Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in
keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been called by his
adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at
private respondents' residence. 3
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the
relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal
opposition dated May 3, 1995, 4 petitioner reiterated its objection to the
joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a
single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and
pursued as two separate proceedings.
After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the
trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed
from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with
respect to his natural parents, and for all legal intents and purposes
shall be known as Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally
adopted child of Van Munson and Regina Munson effective upon
the filing of the petition on March 10, 1994. As soon as the decree
of adoption becomes final and executory, it shall be recorded in the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103,
respectively, of the Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in the
record of birth of the adopted child, which in this case is in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the child was born. Likewise,
send a copy of this Order to the National Census and Statistics
Office, Manila, for its appropriate action consisten(t) herewith. 5
At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by
petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting
parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered in their favor.
The records show that the latter have commendably established their
qualifications under the law to be adopters, 6and have amply complied with
the procedural requirements for the petition for adoption, 7 with the findings
of the trial court being recited thus:
To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this
Court dated March 16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh.
"A") was published in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of
the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation (Exhs.
"B" to "E" and submarkings). . . .
xxx       xxx       xxx
Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor
derogatory record (Exhs. "K" to "V"); and are physically fit to be
the adoptive parents of the minor child Kevin (Exh. "W"). Their
qualification to become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl finds
support also in the Social Case Study Report prepared by the
DSWD through Social Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
"Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible,
mature and friendly individuals. They are found
physically healthy; mentally fit, spiritually and financially
capable to adopt Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph.
"Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his
needs. They unselfishly share their time, love and
attention to him. They are ready and willing to
continuously provide him a happy and secure home life.
"Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally
under the care of the Munsons. He had comfortably
settled in his new environment. His stay with the
Munsons during the six months trial custody period has
resulted to a close bond with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and
vice-versa.
"We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the
adoption of Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph by Mr.
and Mrs. Van Munson be legalized." 8
It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower
court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are
accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this
Court. 9Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the
order of the court below granting the petition, for adoption.
The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized
mainly as follows. (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the
prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor
adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there
was lawful ground for the change of name.
I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the
given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of
name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed
by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs,
namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to change the giver or proper
name of the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted
separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements therefor under
Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation
to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly
be complied with. 10
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws
and rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for
change of name. 11 Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the
change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with
that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus
granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper
name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one's legal
name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being
conformably satisfied. 12
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for
adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule
2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted
and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the
Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as
two separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the
conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the
court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met. 13
Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding
change of name in view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a
system of identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of
justice. 14 Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal
construction and application of the Rules, the welfare and interest of the
adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant
proceeding. 15
On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that -
Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl
Bartolome to Aaron Joseph should not be treated strictly, it
appearing that no rights have been prejudiced by said change of
name. The strict and meticulous observation of the requisites set
forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the
purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State nor any
third person should be prejudiced by the grant of the petition for
change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely
over a year old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor
engaged in any contractual obligations. Neither can he nor
petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have any immoral, criminal
or illicit purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It stands to
reason that there is no way that the state or any person may be so
prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin Earl's first name. In
fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the intent of petitioners, the
prayer for change of name was caused to be published together
with the petition for adoption. 16
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal
effects of adoption:
 (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted
shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the
adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted,
parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by
both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and
other blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It
is the change of the adoptee's surname to follow that of the adopter which is
the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed
for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon
the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding,
such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in
this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in
the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear
and determine the same, 17 and shall continue to be so used until the court
orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as
recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in one's official or legal
name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the
statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have,
wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of
the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make
its decree recording such change. 18
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is
the name appearing therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can
only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or
grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional
trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name
resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be
changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the
petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the
change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and
place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or
the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at
such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the
allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the
change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as
prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the
civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the
same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance
with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction for its adjudication. 19 It is an independent and discrete
special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules.
A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To
consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding
would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject
petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, 20 all of which
taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition
sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully
deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a
petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of
imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive
joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents
on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Brit, et al. 21 and Peyer vs. Martinez, et
al. 22 is misplaced. A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of
causes of action would, therefore, appear to be called for.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is
meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action;
the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. 23 It is the
union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made
the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A
plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands,
controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. 24
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not
required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of
separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory
in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of
action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable
joinder rules be joined. 25 Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are
intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient
administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the
rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed. 26
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party
litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be
joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it
will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and
(b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature
and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits
where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting
in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and
litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite
the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be
construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without
prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the
provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies
between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be
made effectual as far as practicable, 27 with the end in view of promoting the
efficient administration of justice. 28
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is
to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve
kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving
a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal
application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal
or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. 29 While
the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may
have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and
a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the
restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties.
Unlimited joinder is not authorized. 30
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with
the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties 31 and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems
presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder. 32
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express
prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of
name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two
petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they
present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would
warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the
underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder
under our Rules.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General -
A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two
special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different
from each other. Each action is individually governed by particular
sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings involve disparate
issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to
evaluate the proposed adopter's fitness and qualifications to bring
up and educate the adoptee properly (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99
Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no
family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is
the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the
proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
xxx       xxx       xxx
. . . Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately
assessed and determined for neither action is dependent on the
other. 33
The rule on permissive joinder of: causes of action is clear. Joinder
may be allowed only if the actions show a commonality of
relationship and conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties (Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already
pointed out in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an
action for change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to
each other and do not arise out of the same relation between the
parties. While what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the
proposed adopter's fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for
change of first name may only prosper upon proof of reasonable
and compelling grounds supporting the change requested. Fitness
to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons
justifying a change of name. And similarly, a change of first name
cannot be justified in view of a finding that the proposed adopter
was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the two actions
can connect and find a common ground, thus the joinder would be
improper.
In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly
sought in one petition, private respondents rely upon Peyer
vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment)
We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both
cases, the fact of intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so
pronounced. In Peyer, an application to pronounce the husband an
absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to transfer the
management of conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an action for
declaration of heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent to
an action to recover the land subject of partition and distribution
proceeding. However, the commonality of relationship which
stands out in both cases does not characterize the present action for
adoption and change of name. Thus the rulings
in Peyer and Briz find no place in the case at bar.
Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two
actions was, in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not
indorse an automatic joinder and instead remanded the matter for
further proceedings, granting leave to amend the pleadings and
implead additional parties-defendants for a complete determination
of the controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such
cautionary stance all the more emphasizes that although joinders
are generally accepted, they are not allowed where the conditions
are not satisfactorily met. 34
It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will
make for a complete determination of all matters pertaining to the
coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one
petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in
form and substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the
adoptee. The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the
rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are
intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which
can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one
judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject matters or
corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken
up individually.
In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 the Court clarified the rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action:
The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory
rule, as there is no positive provision of law or any rule of
jurisprudence which compels a party to join all his causes of action
and bring them at one and the same time. Under the present rules,
the provision is still that the plaintiff may, and not that he must,
unite several causes of action although they may be included in
one of the classes specified. This, therefore, leaves it to the
plaintiff's option whether the causes of action shall be joined in the
same action, and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his
failure or refusal to do so. He may always file another action based
on the remaining cause or causes of action within the prescriptive
period therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the
Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for
change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and
adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be
invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal
deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert
the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at
compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers
alike would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative
justice requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely
designed to ensure its proper dispensation. 36 It has long been recognized
that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch
of judicial business. 37
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be
ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important
in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the
orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to
hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system
under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at
the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose
authority they acknowledge. 38
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own
wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to
be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness,
caprice, or whimsicality. 39 We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot
vs. CA, et al. that: 40
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly
administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in
judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose
that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each
other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not
exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of
fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as
complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the
dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights
is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such
rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of
court.
xxx       xxx       xxx
. . . (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the
most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant
of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. . .
. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this
does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and
at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and
assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews
anarchy.
Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes
substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the
court. In such situations, the courts are empowered, even obligated, to
suspend the operation of the rules. 41
We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private
respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the
proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put
to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to
his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would
justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that
stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case,
considering its natural interest in the methodical administration of justice
and in the efficacious maintenance of a system of identification of its
citizens.
The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules is that the violation of
or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the
proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to
the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place,
such questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure
laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of
public policy. 42 They are matters of public order and interest which can in
no wise be changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by
parties to an action for their singular convenience. 43
In Garcia vs. Republic, 44 we are reminded of the definiteness in the
application of the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the
appropriate proceeding:
. . . The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not
confuse or misapply one procedure for another lest we create
confusion in the application of the proper remedy.
Respondent judge's unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at
achieving stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his
prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being
unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted
manner in which he adjudicated this case may be characterized as a
regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law
and jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition
for change of name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the
only justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the
adoptee's baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been
known since he came to live with private respondents. 45
Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon
the grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new
identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name
given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first
name as prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely confirms the
designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he
lives. This largely echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the
child Aaron Joseph was symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as
adoptive parents, have as much right as the natural parents to freely select
the first name of their adopted child. 46
The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on
this point in this manner:
As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select
the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to
which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. . . .
xxx       xxx       xxx
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no
other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate
by a woman who had all intentions of giving him away. The
naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the grant
of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at
birth. 47
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated
ruling of respondent judge and must thus set it aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is a word
or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and
distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal
as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of
an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or
family name. The giver or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals.
The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he
belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be
freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law. 48
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the
civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil
register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. 49 And once the name of a
person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same
Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is
premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification. 50
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed
legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court. 51 For purposes of an application for change of name under Article
376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only
name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance
with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is
essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity. 52
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege,
not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which
has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and
to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be
authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that
which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he
must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which
may justify such change. 53
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being
sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest. 54
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was
baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which he
used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not
sanctioned. 55 For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a
change of name. 56 Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a
different name and has become known by it constitute proper and
reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. 57 A name given to a
person in the church records or elsewhere or by which be is known in the
community - when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is
unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name. 58
The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such
rulings of long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds
offered to justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child
had been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of
private respondents and that it was the name by which he had been called
and known by his family, relatives and friends from, the time he came to
live with private respondents. 59 Apart from suffusing their pleadings with
sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of the justified grounds for a
change of name has been alleged or established by private respondents. The
legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck
down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee
herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil
register, would be to countenance or permit that which has always been
frowned upon. 60
The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his
assailed order that -
(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely
select the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname
to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. . . .
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no
other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate
by a woman who had all the intentions of giving him away. The
naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant of
their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.
and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein
enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case
at bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the
change of his surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of
adoption granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty
Wong. Upon reaching the age of majority, he filed a petition in court to
change his surname from Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to
the adoption. He adduced proof that the use of the surname Wong caused
him embarrassment and isolation from friends and relatives in view of a
suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing
in a Muslim community, thereby hampering his business and social life, and
that his surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of name sought.
This Court granted the petition and regarded the change of the surname as a
mere incident in, rather than the object of, the adoption.
It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given
name, and the legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at
issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that
purpose with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to
reinforce the imperative necessity of seeking relief under and through the
legally prescribed procedures.
Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:
Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein
a child is being named for the first time by his natural parent, as
against one wherein, a child is previously conferred a first name by
his natural parent, and such name is subsequently sought to be
disregarded and changed by the adoptive parents. In the first case,
there is no dispute that natural parents have the right to freely
select and give the child's first name for every person, including
juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A., Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vo. I, 1987 edition, page
721). In the second case, however, as in the case at bar, private
respondents, in their capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to
name the minor adoptee after such right to name the child had
already been exercised by the natural parent. Adopting parents
have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right assertes
by private respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming the
adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely a privilege
necessitating judicial consent upon compelling grounds. 61
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to
the adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful
that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child, 62 should be understood in its proper context. It should not be
misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the
proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has
theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered,
regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the
purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name. This
effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain
unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an
appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized,
guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive
parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of
adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is
unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To
repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption
and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the
proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal
consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of
concern to the Court.
Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is
without prejudice to, private respondents' privilege to legally change the
proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is
exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the
grant thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional
requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced
therefor.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent
judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private
respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y
Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with
law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
CHRISTINA MARIE DEMPSEY, a minor and represented by her
mother, Janalita Rapada, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,  Christina R. Dempsey,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LXXV, Third Judicial
Region, Olongapo City, and JOEL DEMPSEY, respondents.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for petitioners.
Miguel F. Famularcano, Jr. for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition denominated as one for review on certiorari and/or a
special civil action for certiorari from the decision rendered by the
respondent court on November 28, 1986 in Criminal Cases Nos. 460-86 and
461-86, entitled "The People of the Philippines v. Joel Dempsey."
On January 30, 1986, two separate informations were filed against
respondent Joel Dempsey before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch II,
Olongapo City charging him with violation of Article 59 (par. 2) of P.D.
603 and Article 46, par. 8 of P.D. 603.
The Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 68-86
That on or about and during the period from December
1985 to the present, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously leave their conjugal dwelling
at No. 15 Ohio Street, Upper Kalaklan, Olongapo City
and abandon his child Christina R. Dempsey and deprive
him (sic) of his love, care and protection she from the
accused (sic) since then, by continuously failing and
refusing to give adequate support to the said minor child
and despite pleas, the accused without lawful justification,
failed, disregarded and still continues to fail and disregard
to perform his obligations to his said minor child
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 69-86
That on or about and during the period from December
1985 to the present, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail and refuse to provide his
child Christina R. Dempsey with adequate support, as
defined in Article 290 of the Civil Code, despite the fact
that he is capable of supporting his child, and despite
pleas, the accused without lawful justification, failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to provide his child with
adequate support, to the damage and prejudice of the said
child.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
The facts of the case are summarized by the Trial Court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The testimony of complainant Janalita Rapada purports to
show that in her cohabitation with the accused, without
the benefit of marriage, Christina Marie was born on
October 01, 1984, at the St. Jude's Family Clinic,
Olongapo City where she delivered the child. Her birth
certificate, Exhibit "A" bears an entry of the name of the
accused as the father and Exhibit "A-1 " the Affidavit of
the Acknowledgment duly signed by him.
At the present, the child receives a monthly support from
the accused in the sum of $150.00 thru the child's mother,
Janalita Rapada. Aside from this monthly support,
Janalita Rapada obtained a promise from the accused to
declare Christina Marie as his dependent and also a
commitment to declare the child after his citizenship. This
will entitle the child for all the benefits and privileges
extended to dependents of American US Navy
servicemen like free medical check-up. Efforts were made
with the Naval Legal Service Office, US Naval Facilities,
Subic Bay, Philippines to compel the accused to fulfill
these commitments but to no avail. To seek redress thru
the Court, she engaged the services of Atty. Estanislao L.
Cesa, Jr., offering P5,000.00 as Attorney's fee payable
after the cases are decided.
xxx xxx xxx
At the Naval Legal Service Office, someone entertained
her demand for the accused to declare Christina Marie as
his dependent and after his American citizenship. She was
of the belief that these could be done not knowing that the
American who entertained her demands had no authority
to effect the same. (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
Upon arraignment, the private respondent freely, voluntarily, and
spontaneously entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged in the
Information.
On August 26, 1986, the Trial Court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges against him, considering
the mitigating circumstances of his voluntary plea of
guilty, this Court sentences him to a prison term of Three
(3) Months and Eleven (11) days to Four (4) months of
Arresto Mayor, medium period and fine of Three hundred
(P300.00) Pesos for each of the cases and to pay the costs.
For the civil liability, judgment is rendered against
accused Joel Dempsey confirming the payment of US
$150.00 monthly support to Christina Marie and to
continue payment thru Janalita Rapada, to be used solely
for the needs of the child until she reaches the age of
majority; to recognize the child Christina Marie as his
natural child; to pay Christina Marie thru Janalita Rapada
the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damage; and to pay
 the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fee to Atty. Manuel
Rosapapan as Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid
of the IBP Chapter of Zambales Olongapo City and the
same to form part of the legal aid fund.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 23-24)
The private respondent appealed the municipal trial court's decision to the
regional trial court and prayed that the award on civil liability be set aside
and the penalty of imprisonment be reduced to a penalty of fine only.
In a decision rendered on November 28, 1986, the respondent regional trial
court reversed the municipal trial court's decision on the following grounds:
1. Parental authority to which certain parental obligations are attached
pertains only to legitimate and adopted children unlike petitioner who is an
acknowledged illegitimate minor child of private respondent; that in cases
of abandonment of minors, the proper forum is the Department of Social
Welfare where the person to whom the minor has been left must report
immediately (Art. 161, P.D. 603).
2. A person cannot he held criminally liable for failure to support a minor
child.
3. The Municipal Trial Court had determined a matter not within its
competence and authority.
Hence, the present petition on pure questions of law.
The petitioner maintains that the penalty of imprisonment and fine in both
cases is sanctioned by the law and jurisprudence and that the award of civil
liability is justified.
We find merit in the instant petition.
The respondent court committed reversible error when it failed to take into
account that the decision of the municipal trial court was based on the
private respondent's plea of guilty. Respondent Joel Dempsey did not and
does not challenge the validity of Presidential Decree No. 603, Articles 46
and 59 on certain obligations of parents to their children and Articles 60 and
210 penalizing violations of mandatory provisions. As a matter of fact,
respondent Dempsey's appeal impliedly recognizes the validity of the
judgment of conviction because he asked that the penalty of imprisonment
be changed to fine, not that the trial court's decision was void or that he be
acquitted.
There can be no question about the trial court's jurisdiction over the
criminal prosecutions. Article 69 of P.D. 603 penalizes abandonment of a
minor child by its parent, as provided in Article 59, with imprisonment from
two to six months or a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos or both.
Article 210 penalizes a violation of the obligation to give adequate support
found in Article 46 with imprisonment not exceeding one month or a fine
not exceeding two hundred pesos or both, unless a higher penalty is
provided for in the Revised Penal Code or special laws.
The respondent court erred in its ruling that the trial court determined a
matter not within its competence and authority. There is likewise no basis
for its gratuitous finding that a parent cannot be held criminally liable under
P.D. 603 for withholding support from his minor child. There is absolutely
no discussion on this ruling. The records show, however, that Joel
Dempsey's plea of guilt to the charge of withholding support from his minor
daughter was made without a full understanding of that particular charge.
Janalita Rapada herself testified that she is receiving $150.00 a month for
the support of the minor Christina Marie Dempsey. The amount of
P3,000.00 monthly appears to fulfill the requirement of "adequate support"
found in Par. 8, Art. 46 of P.D. No. 603. What Rapada wants is a judicial
declaration for this support to continue. This cannot be the basis of a
criminal conviction.
As to the information charging abandonment, the private respondent entered
his plea of guilt with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of
his act and with the assistance of his counsel. The reversal of conviction
based on a plea of guilty is an act which is not at all explained by the
respondent court and, therefore, in excess of its jurisdiction. It is well-
settled as a general rule that a plea of guilt is sufficient to sustain conviction
without introduction of further evidence (People v. Formentera, 130 SCRA
114; People v. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 119; People v. Gravino, et al., 122
SCRA 123; People v. Pajarillo, 94 SCRA 828). Only in such exceptional
cases as capital offenses is evidence still required.
The respondent court further ruled that Christina Dempsey is not entitled to
the rights arising from the parental responsibility of her father, she being an
illegitimate child. Reliance was made on Art. 17 of P.D. 603 which defines
the joint parental authority of parents over their legitimate or adopted
children. The respondent court's observations are wrong because the law
itself protects even illegitimate children. Illegitimate children have rights of
the same nature as legitimate and adopted children. This is enunciated in
Art. 3, P.D. 603 which provides that "all children shall be entitled to the
rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy,
sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors." Rights
must be enforced or protected to the extent that it is possible to do so.
The Solicitor General points out that the new Family Code promulgated as
Executive Order No. 209, July 17, 1978 erases any distinction between
legitimate or adopted children on one hand and acknowledged illegitimate
children on the other, insofar as joint parental authority is concerned.
Article 211 of the Family Code, whose date of effectivity is approaching,
merely formalizes into statute the practice on parental authority.
The respondent court would shift jurisdiction over the case from the
municipal trial court to the Department of Social Services and
Development. It is readily apparent that the DSSD cannot take cognizance
of and enforce the criminal sanctions of P.D. 603. Besides, Christina Marie
Dempsey is not an abandoned child in the strict sense of the word as she is
still in the custody and care of her mother. Art. 141 of P.D. 603 defines an
abandoned child as follows: "... Am abandoned child is one who has no
parental care or guardianship or whose parents or guardians have deserted
him for a period of at least six continuous months ... ." Article 161 cannot,
therefore, be applied to the case at bar. Thus, it is not the Department of
Social Services and Development which has jurisdiction but the Municipal
Trial Court.
There is one other point which has to be corrected. As part of the civil
liability in its judgment, the trial court required the accused to recognize
Christina Marie as his natural child. This should not have been done. The
recognition of a child by her father is provided for in the Civil Code and
now in the new Family Code. In this criminal prosecution, where the
accused pleaded guilty to criminal charges and the issue of recognition was
not specifically and fully heard and tried, the trial court committed
reversible error when it ordered recognition of a natural child as part of the
civil liability in the criminal case.
We also agree with the respondent regional trial court that the penalty
imposed is erroneous. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees
is improper. Although fathers like Joel Dempsey should be deterred from
committing similar acts of irresponsibility, the law does not allow us to
affirm the grant of exemplary damages only on the basis of the facts herein
presented. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded inasmuch as there is not
one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code).
As to the penalties, we agree with the Solicitor General that these should be
modified accordingly. And finally, it should be noted that the Regional Trial
Court after declaring that the Municipal Trial Court acted outside of its
competence merely set aside the appealed decision. Instead of acquitting the
accused, it suggested the filing of necessary pleadings before the proper
court.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, Branch 75 of the Third Judicial Region is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch II of the Municipal
Trial Court of Olongapo City is REINSTATED with the modification that
in Criminal Case No. 6886, Joel Dempsey is sentenced to imprisonment of
One (1) month and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) while in
Criminal Case No. 69-86 he is ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

HERBERT CANG, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and
MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a

natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The
answer to this interesting query, certainly not one of first impression, would
have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and jurisprudence, but
also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.

This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree
of adoption issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,2 in
Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, "In the Matter of the Petition for
Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all
surnamed Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago
Clavano, petitioners."
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on
January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973;
Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on
January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was
undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her
husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of
the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a
petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite 3 with the then
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu 4 which rendered a
decision5approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing
that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board." They
further agreed:
(c) That the children of the parties shall
be entitled to a monthly support of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00)
effective from the date of the filing of
the complaint. This shall constitute a
first lien on the net proceeds of the
house and lot jointly owned by the
parties situated at Cinco Village,
Mandaue City;
(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to
enter into any contract or agreement
with any person or persons, natural or
juridical without the written consent of
the husband; or any undertaking or acts
that ordinarily requires husband's
consent as the parties are by this
agreement legally separated; 6
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from
Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody
of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation at
all reasonable times and places" to petitioner. 7
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized
American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never
remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic
earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month8 a portion of which was remitted
to the Philippines for his children's expenses and another, deposited in the
bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano
and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law
of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of
the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The
petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to
his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that
her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that
her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her
in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the United
States to attend to a family business, "leaving the children would be a
problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and
that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children
for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to
enter into any contract without the written consent of her
husband;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal
alien in the United States and had been transferring from
one place to another to avoid detection by Immigration
authorities, and
3. Her husband had divorced her.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City,
returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, Philippines with a copy of this Decree of Adoption for
although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were registration purposes.
financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were "too
meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow anybody to SO ORDERED.
strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children."
In so ruling, the lower court was "impelled" by these reasons:
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to
reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had (1) The Cang children had, since birth,
transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to developed "close filial ties with the
private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Clavano family, especially their
City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, maternal uncle," petitioner Ronald
relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should Clavano.
be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver
custody over the minors to petitioner.
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano
were childless and, with their printing
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, press, real estate business, export
issued a decree of adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows: business and gasoline station and mini-
mart in Rosemead, California, U.S.A.,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for had substantial assets and income.
adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph
Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the petitioner-spouses (3) The natural mother of the children,
Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is Anna Marie, nicknamed "Menchu,"
hereby granted and approved. These children shall approved of the adoption because of her
henceforth be known and called as Keith D. Clavano, heart ailment, near-fatal accident in
Charmaine D. Clavano and Joseph Anthony D. Clavano 1981, and the fact that she could not
respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption shall: provide them a secure and happy future
as she "travels a lot."
(1) Confer upon the adopted children
the same rights and duties as though (4) The Clavanos could provide the
they were in fact the legitimate children children moral and spiritual direction as
of the petitioners; they would go to church together and
had sent the children to Catholic
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the schools.
parents by nature, of the children; and,
(5) The children themselves manifested
(3) Vest the same authority in the their desire to be adopted by the
petitioners. Clavanos — Keith had testified and
expressed the wish to be adopted by the
 Clavanos while the two younger ones
were observed by the court to have
"snuggled" close to Ronald even though
their natural mother was around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to
rest on "a very shaky foundation" because of its findings that:
(1) Petitioner was "morally unfit to be
the father of his children" on account of
his being "an improvident father of his
family" and an "undisguised Lothario."
This conclusion is based on the
testimony of his alleged paramour,
mother of his two sons and close friend
of Anna Marie, Wilma Soco, who said
that she and petitioner lived as husband
and wife in the very house of the Cangs
in Opao, Mandaue City.
(2) The alleged deposits of around
$10,000 that were of "comparatively
recent dates" were "attempts at
verisimilitude" as these were joint
deposits the authenticity of which could
not be verified.
(3) Contrary to petitioner's claim, the
possibility of his reconciliation with
Anna Marie was "dim if not nil"
because it was petitioner who "devised,
engineered and executed the divorce
proceedings at the Nevada Washoe
County court."
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S.
citizen, petitioner "is now an alien from
the standpoint of Philippine laws" and
therefore, how his "new attachments
and loyalties would sit with his
(Filipino) children is an open question."
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC
Social Worker in her Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as
follows:
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned
his children. And abandonment of a child by its (sic)
parent is commonly specified by statute as a ground for
dispensing with his consent to its (sic) adoption (Re
Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]).
Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed not only
without the consent of the parent, but even against his
opposition (Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99
Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131 Gal. 469,63 P. 736, 82
Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265
P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W.
160, citing R.C.L.; Steams v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67
N.E. 349; 97 Am. St. Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H.
483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564; Nugent v. Powell, 4
Wyo, 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17.) 9
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred
in holding that it would be in the best interest of the three children if they
were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He
asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to
divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written
consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and
Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the
petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study
report required by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent
of the natural parents of the child to be adopted. It has
been held however that the consent of the parent who has
abandoned the child is not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio,
92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The
question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be
considered as having abandoned the children. In adoption
cases, abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of
the parent to forego parental duties and relinquish parental
claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations which parents owe their
children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the
withholding of the parent's presence, his care and the
opportunity to display voluntary affection. The issue of
abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the
first error.
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar
remittances to the children and has in fact even
maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty to
provide support comes from two judicial
pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707
CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the children P1,000.00 a
month. The second is mandated by the divorce decree of
the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him to
pay monthly support of US$50.00 for each child.
Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to show
compliance with the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has
submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45)
drawn in the children's names totalling $2,126.98. The
last remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His
obligation to provide support commenced under the
divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6,
1987, oppositor should have made 53 remittances of
$150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No other remittances
were shown to have been made after October 6, 1987, so
that as of this date, oppositor was woefully in arrears
under the terms of the divorce decree. And since he was
totally in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the
inevitable conclusion is oppositor had not really been
performing his duties as a father, contrary to his
protestations.
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three
accounts in different banks, as follows —
Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name
of Bank
———— —————— ———— —
—————
1) 118-606437-4 July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western
Savings,
Oct. 29, 1987 Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
2) 73-166-8 March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan National
Bank
Oct. 26, 1987 of Williamson, West
Virginia, U.S.A.
3) 564-146883 December 31, 1986 2,622.19 Security
Pacific National
Oct. 29, 1987 Bank, Daly City, Cal.,
U.S.A.
The first and third accounts were opened however in
oppositor's name as trustee for Charmaine Cang and
Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In other words, the
accounts are operated and the amounts withdrawable by
oppositor himself and it cannot be said that they belong to
the minors. The second is an "or" account, in the names of
Herbert Cang or Keith Cang. Since Keith is a minor and
in the Philippines, said account is operable only by
oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him alone.
 The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written
claimed in his offer of evidence "the aim and purpose of consent of the following to the adoption shall be
providing for a better future and security of his family."10 necessary:

Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He (1) The person to be adopted, if
emphasized that the decree of legal separation was not based on the merits fourteen years of age or, over;
of the case as it was based on a manifestation amounting to a compromise
agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he and his wife agreed upon (2) The natural parents of the child or
the plan for him to leave for the United States was borne out by the fact that his legal guardian of the Department of
prior to his departure to the United States, the family lived with petitioner's Social Welfare or any duly licensed
parents. Moreover, he alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he child placement agency under whose
and his wife initiated the "joint complaint" for divorce. care the child may be;

Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his (3) The natural children, fourteen years
children was belied by the award to him of custody over the children in and above, of the adopting parents.
Civil Case No. JD-707. He took exception to the appellate court's findings (Emphasis supplied)
that as an American citizen he could no longer lay claim to custody over his
children because his citizenship would not take away the fact that he "is still On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
a father to his children." As regards his alleged illicit relationship with Order No. 91 amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and
another woman, he had always denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD- Youth Welfare Code. As thus amended, Article 31 read:
707 and the instant adoption case. Neither was it true that Wilma Soco was
a neighbor and family friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in
Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written
residents of Cebu City. Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco consent of the following to the adoption shall be
should not have been given weight for it was only during the hearing of the necessary:
petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Ronald, came to know
her and went to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a witness (1) The person to be adopted, if
for monetary considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be fourteen years of age or over;
hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim that they could love the children much
more than he could. 11 (2) The natural parents of the child or
his legal guardian after receiving
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before counselling and appropriate social
this Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it services from the Ministry of Social
did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 Services and Development or from a
(2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and duly licensed child-placement agency;
Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and
Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides — Development or any duly licensed
 child-placement agency under whose
care and legal custody the child may be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years
and above, of the adopting parents.
(Emphasis supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines
the jurisdiction of the court. 12 As such, when private respondents filed the
petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the
Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took
effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the Family Code, the
statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten
years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child,
the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children,
ten years of age or over, of the adopting
parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years
of age or over, of the adopting parents,
if living with said parent and the latter's
spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person
adopting or to be adopted. (Emphasis
supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the
amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such requirement
is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed with
the petition a written consent to the adoption signed by
the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not
incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by
each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or
if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum,
children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the
proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or
society, or by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate
and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to
the adoption shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written
consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree
of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child 13 or that such parent is
"insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over
the case even, without the written consent of the parents or one of the
parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to
warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with
the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
Thus, the Court declared:
. . . . The technical rules of pleading should not be
stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is
deemed more important that the petition should contain
facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give
information to those interested, than that it should be
formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally
 held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it
substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging
all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. 14
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was
attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural
father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of
abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father as follows:
3. That the children's mother, sister of petitioner
RONALD V. CLAVANO, has given her express consent
to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of Consent, Annex
"A". Likewise, the written consent of Keith Cang, now 14
years of age appears on page 2 of this petition; However,
the father of the children, Herbert Cang, had already left
his wife and children and had already divorced the
former, as evidenced by the xerox copy of the DECREE
OF DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe, State of
Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex "B") which was filed at the
instance of Mr. Cang, not long after he abandoned his
family to live in the United States as an illegal
immigrant. 15
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the
written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with
jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of
the circumstances under which our statutes and jurisprudence 16 dispense
with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because
his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned
his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of
abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an
adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of the oppositor
natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not
abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon
this Court. 17 This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast
the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 18 However,
although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and
reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it that these do not
conform to the evidence on record. 19
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court has held that the exceptions to
the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different
conclusion 21 on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his
children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to
forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea
of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with
which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the
meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's
rights or interests. 22 In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent,
the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and
legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children." 23
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. 24 While admittedly, petitioner was physically
absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural
and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He
maintained regular communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their
whims.
Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence
consisting of the following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and
children:
1. Exh. 1 — a 4-page updated letter of Menchu (Anna
Marie) addressed to "Dear Bert" on a C. Westates Carbon
Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated therein that it had
been "a long time since the last time you've heard from
me excluding that of the phone conversation we've had."
She discussed petitioner's intention to buy a motorbike for
Keith, expressing apprehension over risks that could be
engendered by Keith's use of it. She said that in the "last
phone conversation" she had with petitioner on the
birthday of "Ma," she forgot to tell petitioner that Keith's
voice had changed; he had become a "bagito" or a teen-
ager with many "fans" who sent him Valentine's cards.
She told him how Charmaine had become quite a
talkative "almost dalaga" who could carry on a
conversation with her angkong and how pretty she was in
white dress when she won among the candidates in
the Flores de Mayo after she had prayed so hard for it.
She informed him, however, that she was worried because
Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as she
loved clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told
petitioner that the boy was smart for his age and "quite
spoiled" being the youngest of the children in Lahug.
Joeton was mischievous but Keith was his idol with
whom he would sleep anytime. She admitted having said
so much about the children-because they might not have
informed petitioner of "some happenings and spices of
life" about themselves. She said that it was "just very
exciting to know how they've grown up and very pleasant,
too, that each of them have (sic) different characters." She
ended the letter with the hope that petitioner was "at the
best of health." After extending her regards "to all," she
signed her name after the word "Love." This letter was
mailed on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose
address was P.O. Box 2445, Williamson, West Virginia
25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 — letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery
with golden print of "a note from Menchu" on the left
upper corner. Anna Marie stated that "we" wrote to
petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith and Joeton were
very excited when petitioner "called up last time." She
told him how Joeton would grab the phone from Keith
just so petitioner would know what he wanted to order.
Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed that she
missed petitioner's call because she also wanted
something that petitioner should buy. Menchu told
petitioner that Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener,
light-colored T-shirts for her walking shorts and a (k)nap
sack. Anna Marie informed petitioner that the kids were
growing up and so were their needs. She told petitioner to
be "very fatherly" about the children's needs because
those were expensive here. For herself, Anna Marie asked
for a subscription of Glamour and Vogue magazines and
that whatever expenses he would incur, she would
"replace" these. As a postscript, she told petitioner that
Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored "Sperry topsider
shoes."
3. Exh. 3 — an undated note on a yellow small piece of
paper that reads:
Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a
wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It's
nice to be thought of at X'mas. Thanks again.
4. Exh. 4 — a two-page undated letter of Keith on
stationery of Jose Clavano, Inc. addressed to "Dear Dad."
Keith told his father that they tried to tell their mother "to
stay for a little while, just a few weeks after classes
start(s)" on June 16. He informed petitioner that Joeton
would be in Kinder I and that, about the motorbike, he
had told his mother to write petitioner about it and "we'll
see what you're (sic) decision will be." He asked for
chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and shorts, rubber shoes,
socks, headband, some clothes for outing and perfume.
He told petitioner that they had been going to Labug with
their mother picking them up after Angkong or Ama had
prepared lunch or dinner. From her aerobics, his mother
would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00
o'clock in the evening. He wished his father "luck and the
best of health" and that they prayed for him and their
other relatives. The letter was ended with "Love Keith."
5. Exh. 5 — another undated long letter of Keith. He
thanked his father for the Christmas card "with $40.00,
$30.00 and $30.00" and the "card of Joeton with $5.00
inside." He told petitioner the amounts following his
father's instructions and promise to send money through
the mail. He asked his father to address his letter directly
to him because he wanted to open his own letters. He
informed petitioner of activities during the Christmas
season — that they enjoyed eating, playing and giving
surprises to their mother. He apprised him of his daily
schedule and that their mother had been closely
supervising them, instructing them to fold their blankets
and pile up their pillows. He informed petitioner that
Joeton had become very smart while Charmaine, who was
also smart, was very demanding of their mother. Because
their mother was leaving for the United States on
February 5, they would be missing her like they were
missing petitioner. He asked for his "things" and $200.00.
He told petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like he
would make the sign of the cross even when they would
pass by the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his insistence that
Aquino was not dead because he had seen him on the
betamax machine. For Keith, Charmaine had become
"very maldita" who was not always satisfied with her
dolls and things but Joeton was full of surprises. He ended
the letter with "Love your son, Keith." The letter was
mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
6. Exh. 6 — an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked
petitioner for the bathing suit, key chain, pencil box,
socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and $50.00. She
reminded him of her birthday on January 23 when she
would turn 9 years old. She informed him that she wore
size 10 and the size of her feet was IM. They had fun at
Christmas in Lahug but classes would start on January 9
although Keith's classes had started on January 6. They
would feel sad again because Mommy would be leaving
soon. She hoped petitioner would keep writing them. She
signed, "Love, Charmaine."
7. Exh . 7 — an undated letter of Keith. He explained to
petitioner that they had not been remiss in writing letters
to him. He informed him of their trip to Manila — they
went to Malacañang, Tito Doy Laurel's house, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the executive house,
Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for one week. He
informed him that he got "honors," Charmaine was 7th in
her class and Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton would
be enrolled in Sacred Heart soon and he was glad they
would be together in that school. He asked for his
"reward" from petitioner and so with Charmaine and
Joeton. He asked for a motorbike and dollars that he could
save. He told petitioner that he was saving the money he
had been sending them. He said he missed petitioner and
wished him the best. He added that petitioner should call
them on Sundays.
8. Exh. 8 — a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but
apparently written by the latter. She asked for money
from petitioner to buy something for the school and
"something else." She, promised not to spend so much
and to save some. She said she loved petitioner and
missed him. Joeton said "hi!" to petitioner. After ending
the letter with "Love, Joeton and Charmaine," she asked
for her prize for her grades as she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 — undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner
that he had been writing him; that he would like to have
some money but he would save them; that he learned that
petitioner had called them up but he was not around; that
he would be going to Manila but would be back home
May 3; that his Mommy had just arrived Thursday
afternoon, and that he would be the "official altar boy."
He asked petitioner to write them soon.
10. Exh. 10 — Keith thanked petitioner for the money he
sent. He told petitioner that he was saving some in the
bank and he was proud because he was the only one in his
group who saved in the bank. He told him that Joeton had
become naughty and would claim as his own the shirts
sent to Keith by petitioner. He advised petitioner to send
pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and asked for a pair of
topsider shoes and candies. He informed petitioner that he
was a member of the basketball team and that his mom
would drive for his group. He asked him to call them
often like the father of Ana Christie and to write them
when he would call so that they could wait for it. He
informed petitioner that they had all grown bigger and
heavier. He hoped petitioner would be happy with the
letter that had taken him so long to write because he did
not want to commit any mistakes. He asked petitioner to
buy him perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner,
added that the latter should buy something for Mommy.
11. Exh. 11 — a Christmas card "For My Wonderful
Father" dated October 8, 1984 from Keith, Charmaine and
Joeton.
12. Exh. 12 — another Christmas card, "Our Wish For
You" with the year '83 written on the upper right hand
corner of the inside page, from Keith, Charmaine and
Joeton.
13. Exh. 13 — a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he
had written him even when their Mom "was there" where
she bought them clothes and shoes. Keith asked petitioner
for $300.00. Because his mother would not agree to buy
him a motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit that would
cost P12,000.00. He informed petitioner that he would go
to an afternoon disco with friends but their grades were all
good with Joeton receiving "stars" for excellence. Keith
wanted a bow and arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He
expressed his desire that petitioner would come and visit
them someday.
14. Exh. 14 — a letter of Keith with one of the four pages
bearing the date January 1986. Keith told his father that
they had received the package that the latter sent them.
The clothes he sent, however, fitted only Keith but not
Charmaine and Joeton who had both grown bigger. Keith
asked for grocery items, toys and more clothes. He asked,
in behalf of his mother, for low-heeled shoes and a dress
to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that would
make her look sexy. He intimated to petitioner that he had
grown taller and that he was already ashamed to be asking
for things to buy in the grocery even though his mother
had told him not to be shy about it.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in
the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption,
he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children. 25 Exhibits 24 to 45
are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising
why the courts below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence
on financial support but also the emotional exchange of sentiments between
petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below emphasized the
meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as
regards the bank deposits, these were "withdrawable by him alone." Simply
put, the courts below attached a high premium to the prospective adopters'
financial status but totally brushed aside the possible repercussion of the
adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt.
However, his seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his
testimony is contradicted by his feelings towards his father as revealed in
his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that Keith's
testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for adoption
that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to the
capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents' emotional attachment to the
children. This is hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young
lives, the children were used to their presence. Such attachment had
persisted and certainly, the young ones' act of snuggling close to private
respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their emotional
detachment from their father. Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt
of the children, could not but come to their succor when they needed help as
when Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald spent for his hospital
bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be
entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a larger
measure of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David v.
Court of Appeals, 26 the Court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate child
to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his
affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to
go with his mother. The Court said:
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of
affluence that private respondent promises if the child
lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is
earning a decent living and is able to support her children
according to her means.
In Celis v. Cafuir 27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of
whether to award custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster
mother, this Court said:
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of
having deprived mother and son of the beautiful
associations and tender, imperishable memories
engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We
should not take away from a mother the opportunity of
bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme
sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means; so that
afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a
sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts,
however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy
come true. We should not forget that the relationship
between a foster mother and a child is not natural but
artificial. If the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful
of what its foster parents had done for him, said parents
might yet count and appraise (sic) all that they have done
and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a
dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the
blunder of taking the child into their hearts and their
home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts
the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of
her associations with her child, however unpleasant and
disappointing. Flesh and blood count. . . . .
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court stated that "(I)n ascertaining the
welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family
Code to take into account all relevant considerations." Thus, in awarding
custody of the child to the father, the Court said:
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that
Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more intent on
emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother
separated from her children and the humiliation she
suffered as a, result of her character being made a key
issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best
interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds
between a mother and her small child are special in
nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound
to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One
cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of
the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and
other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child
which is the paramount consideration. (Emphasis
supplied) 29
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration
were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a
person of parental authority over his children. There should be a holistic
approach to the matter, taking into account the physical, emotional,
psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. 30 The
conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs
more evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the
material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There
should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his
children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to
adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that
petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him and his
children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to their
whims but also because he was a person they could share with their daily
activities, problems and triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond
petitioner's "meager" financial support to ferret out other indications on
whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his family. The omission of said
courts has led us to examine why the children were subjected to the process
of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to their father.
To our consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the
welfare of the children was not exactly the "paramount consideration" that
impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the
children in the country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a
problem that would naturally hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other
words, the adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her because
Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her children. 31 In
his testimony, private respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been
out of the country for two years and came home twice or three
times, 32 thereby manifesting the fact that it was she who actually left her
children to the care of her relatives. It was bad enough that their father left
their children when he went abroad, but when their mother followed suit for
her own reasons, the situation worsened. The Clavano family must have
realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed the adoption of the
children, they decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna Marie's
brother Jose. However, because he had children of his own, the family
decided to devolve the task upon private respondents. 33
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children.
A businessman, private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between
Cebu and Manila while his wife, private respondent Maria Clara, is an
international flight stewardess. 34 Moreover, private respondent Ronald
claimed that he could "take care of the children while their parents are
away," 35 thereby indicating the evanescence of his intention. He wanted to
have the children's surname changed to Clavano for the reason that he
wanted to take them to the United States as it would be difficult for them to
get a visa if their surname were different from his. 36 To be sure, he also
testified that he wanted to spare the children the stigma of being products of
a broken home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent
Ronald, his sister Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the
inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to keep the children away from
their father. One of the overriding considerations for the adoption was
allegedly the state of Anna Marie's health — she was a victim of an almost
fatal accident and suffers from a heart ailment. However, she herself
admitted that her health condition was not that serious as she could still take
care of the children. 37 An eloquent evidence of her ability to physically care
for them was her employment at the Philippine Consulate in Los
Angeles 38 — she could not have been employed if her health were
endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos' attempt at depriving petitioner
of parental authority apparently stemmed from their notion that he was an
inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her children
would "never be at ease with the wife of their father." 39
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a
womanizer and father to the sons of Wilma Soco. 40 As to whether he was
telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine society, being comparatively
conservative and traditional, aside from being Catholic in orientation, it
does not countenance womanizing on the part of a family man, considering
the baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may
the Court place a premium on the inability of a man to distinguish between
siring children and parenting them. Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner
carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for
the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit
father. 41 Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a
"bad" husband does not necessarily make a "bad" father. That a husband is
not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to
deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the
children. 42 Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his children
when he took the trouble of sending a telegram 43 to the lower court
expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately after learning
about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify
about his love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more
in the United States. 44
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by
the agreement with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an
illegal alien in the United States. As such, he could not have procured
gainful employment. Private respondents failed to refute petitioner's
testimony that he did not receive his share from the sale of the conjugal
home, 45 pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal
separation case. Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of
the sale redounded to the benefit of his family, particularly his children. The
proceeds may not have lasted long but there is ample evidence to show that
thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his wife and sent
his family money, no matter how "meager."
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the
rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful
that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective.
The Court's position, should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to
extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and
jurisprudence. 46 The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be
anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard
to the natural rights of the parents over the child. 47
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents' reliance on the
manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie
which became the basis of the decree of legal separation. According to
private respondents' counsel, 48 the authority given to Anna Marie by that
decree to enter into contracts as a result of the legal separation was "all
embracing" 49 and, therefore, included giving her sole consent to the
adoption. This conclusion is however, anchored on the wrong premise that
the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into contracts that
obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into
agreements leading to the adoption of the children. Such conclusion is as
devoid of a legal basis as private respondents' apparent reliance on the
decree of legal separation for doing away with petitioner's consent to the
adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the
decree of legal separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of
parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption.
Article 213 of the Family Code states: ". . . in case of legal separation of
parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
court." In awarding custody, the court shall take into account "all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit."
If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent
spouse the "exercise" of parental authority. Having custody of the child, the
innocent spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights with respect to
his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have the right to the child's
services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities and make
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and religion. 50
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority,
the joint exercise of which is vested by the law upon the parents, 51 as
. . . a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants
to parents for the purpose of the children's physical
preservation and development, as well as the cultivation
of their intellect and the education of their hearts and
senses. As regards parental authority, "there is no power,
but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor."
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and
may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver
of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and
it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the
law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of
unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to
keep them in their custody and company. 52 (Emphasis
supplied)
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been
completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of
custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award
was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the
spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a
compromise, 53 there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that
petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of
custody of his children or that there are grounds under the law that could
deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation case, the
court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna
Marie back to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna
Marie's motion for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano family also
vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that
the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them. 54
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child
only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal
separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not
petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his
consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the
effects of a decree of adoption. 55 But there cannot be a valid decree of
adoption in this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated
earlier, the finding of the courts below on the issue of petitioner's
abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was
tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled
in Tenchavez v. Escaño 56 that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after
the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is
contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an American citizen, as
regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the
divorce has no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of
established customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of
Appeals, 57 a case involving the visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent
over his child, the Court expressed the opinion that:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and
legal duty, to care for their children, see to their
 upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare.
This authority and responsibility may not be unduly
denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them.
Even when the parents are estranged and their affection
for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their
offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law
not the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of
course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well
being of the child.
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code,
there has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption
proceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples for a child, as on
the paramount interest, of a child who needs the love and care of parents.
After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family
Code, the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No.
8043 on Intercountry,
Adoption 58 and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the
domestic adoption of Filipino children. 59
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as
the following policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998":
(a) To ensure that every child remains
under the care and custody of his/her
parent(s) and be provided with love,
care, understanding and security
towards the full and harmonious
development of his/her personality. 60
(b) In all matters relating to the care,
custody and adoption of a child, his/her
interest shall be the paramount
consideration in accordance with the
tenets set forth in the United Nations
(UN) Convention on the Rights of the
Child. 61
(c) To prevent the child from
unnecessary separation from his/her
biological parent(s). 62
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound
to comply with its mandates. Of particular relevance to instant case are the
following provisions:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and
duties of parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent
with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate
direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the
rights recognized in the present Convention. 63
States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is
separated from one or both parents to maintain personal
relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular
basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests. 64
A child whose parents reside in different States shall have
the right to maintain on a regular basis, save in
exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct
contacts with both parents . . . 65
States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the
parents . . . to provide direction to the child in the exercise
of his or her right in a manner consistent with the
evolving capacities of the child. 66
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the
domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all
actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however,
to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or
parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis-à-
vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they
must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible.
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and
Charmaine are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching
eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be endowed with the
discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state that
this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best
interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the
petition for adoption was filed. 67 Said petition must be denied as it was
filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the
facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby

GRANTED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are
SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine
and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald
and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.


G.R. No. 118870 March 29, 1996
NERISSA Z. PEREZ, petitioner, 
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C.
PEREZ, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:p
Parties herein would have this Court duplicate the feat of King Solomon
who was hailed in Biblical times for his sagacious, if, at times unorthodox,
manner of resolving conflicts, the most celebrated case being that when his
authority was invoked to determine the identity of the real mother as
between two women claiming the same infant. Since there could only be
one mother, the daunting task that confronted the king/judge was to choose
the true one.
In the instant case, we are faced with the challenge of deciding, as between
father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a child who bears in
his person both their genes.
While there is a provision of law squarely in point, the two courts whose
authority have been invoked to render a decision have arrived at
diametrically opposite conclusions.
It has fallen upon us now to likewise act as judge between the trial court, on
the one hand, and the appellate, on the other.
On the issue of custody over the minor Ray Perez II, respondent Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of the boy's father Ray C. Perez, reversing the trial
court's decision to grant custody to Nerissa Z. Perez, the child's mother.
Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu
while Nerissa, his wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They
were married in Cebu on December 6, 1986. After six miscarriages, two
operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray
Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992.
Petitioner who began working in the United States in October 1988, used
part of her earnings to build a modest house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She
also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York.
She became a resident alien in February 1992.
Private respondent stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her
when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist
visa and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few
weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home
only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets.
However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and
promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to
reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York,
she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come
back immediately after winding up her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days, before Ray II's first birthday, the
couple was no longer on good terms. That their love for each other was
fading became apparent from their serious quarrels. Petitioner did not want
to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband's meager income of
P5,000.00.1 She longed to be with her only child but he was being kept
away from her by her husband. Thus, she did not want to leave RJ (Ray
Junior) with her husband and in-laws. She wished for her son to grow up
with his mother.
On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son
even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be
difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. They could
live comfortably on his P15,000.00 monthly income2 as they were not
burdened with having to pay any debts.
Petitioner was forced to move to her parents' home on Guizo Street in
Mandaue. Despite mediation by the priest who solemnized their marriage,
the couple failed to reconcile.
On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas
corpus3 asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the custody of their
son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her.
On August 27, 1993, the court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of
the one-year old child to his mother, Nerissa Perez, citing the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The dispositive portion
of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Order is
hereby issued ordering the respondent to turn over the
custody of their child Ray Cortes Perez II, his passport
and round trip ticket to herein petitioner with a warning
that if he will escape together with the child for the
purpose of hiding the minor child instead of complying
with this Order, that warrant for his arrest will be issued.
SO ORDERED.4
Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals, on September 27, 1994,
reversed the trial court's order and awarded custody of the boy to his father.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied,6 she filed the
instant petition for review where the sole issue is the custody of Ray Perez
II, now three years old.
Respondent court differed in opinion from the trial court and ruled that
there were enough reasons to deny Nerissa Perez custody over Ray II even
if the child is under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the
boy's father would be for the child's best interest and welfare.7
Before us is the unedifying situation of a husband and wife in marital
discord, struggling for custody of their only child. It is sad that petitioner
and private respondent have not found it in their hearts to understand each
other and live together once again as a family. Separated in fact, they now
seek the Court's assistance in the matter of custody or parental authority
over the child.
The wisdom and necessity for the exercise of joint parental authority need
not be belabored. The father and the mother complement each other in
giving nurture and providing that holistic care which takes into account the
physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the
child. By precept and example, they mold his character during his crucial
formative years.
However, the Court's intervention is sought in order that a decision may be
made as to which parent shall be given custody over the young boy. The
Court's duty is to determine whether Ray Perez II will be better off with
petitioner or with private respondent. We are not called upon to declare
which party committed the greater fault in their domestic quarrel.
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code
is the applicable law. It provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by
the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother. unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. (Emphasis supplied).
Since the Code does not qualify the word "separation" to mean legal
separation decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as
petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms.8
The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99,
section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides:
 Sec. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are
separated. Appeal. When husband and wife are divorced
or living separately, and apart from each other, and the
questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or
children of their marriage is brought before a Court of
First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other
proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may
be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of
each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting
the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it
be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit
to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity,
habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty. . . . No child
under seven years of age shall be separated from its
mother, unless the court finds there are compelling
reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under
seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word "shall" in
Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised Rules
of Court connotes a mandatory character. In the case of Lacson v. San Jose-
Lacson,9 the Court declared:
The use of the word shall in article 363 10 of the Civil
Code, coupled with the observations made by the Code
Commission in respect to the said legal provision,
underscores its mandatory character. It prohibits in no
uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child
below seven years, unless such separation is grounded
upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.11
The rationale for awarding the custody of children younger than seven years
of age to their mother was explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many
a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away
from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother
who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception
allowed by the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for
the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if
the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has
erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment
and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral
dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is
as yet unable to understand her situation. (Report of the
Code Commission, p. 12)12
The Family Code, in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child
below seven years old should not be separated from the mother (Article
363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, paragraph three of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) which
reduced the child's age to five years.13
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated
from his mother finds its raison d'être in the basic need of a child for his
mother's loving care.14 Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the
court's awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his
mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past
the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect,
abandonment,15 unemployment and immorality,16habitual
drunkenness,17 drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being
sick with a communicable disease.18
It has long been settled that in custody cases,  19 the foremost consideration
is always the welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an
international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
provides: "In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration."20
Courts invariably look into all relevant factors presented by the contending
parents, such as their material resources, social and moral
situations.21
In the case at bench, financial capacity is not a determinative factor
inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they have ample means.
Respondent court stated that petitioner has no permanent place of work in
the U.S.A. and has taken this point against her. The records, however, show
that she is employed in a New York hospital22 and was, at the time the
petition was filed, still abroad.23 She testified that she intends to apply for a
job elsewhere, presumably to improve her work environment and augment
her income, as well as for convenience. 24 The Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that a registered nurse, such as petitioner, is still very much in
demand in the United States. Unlike private respondent, a doctor who by his
own admission could not find employment there, petitioner immediately got
a job in New York. Considering her skill and experience petitioner should
find no difficulty in obtaining work elsewhere, should she desire to do so.
The decision under review casts doubt on petitioner's capability to take care
of the child, particularly since she works on twelve-hour shifts thrice
weekly, at times, even at night. There being no one to help her look after the
child, it is alleged that she cannot properly attend to him. This conclusion is
as unwarranted as it is unreasonable. First, her present work schedule is not
so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time for Ray II. Quite a
number of working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of
time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management
principles judiciously. Second, many a mother, finding herself in such a
position, has invited her own mother or relative to join her abroad,
providing the latter with plane tickets and liberal allowances, to look after
the child until he is able to take care of himself. Others go on leave from
work until such time as the child can be entrusted to day-care centers.
Delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care
centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter
exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up
by housemaids or "yayas" under the eagle eyes of the mother. Third, private
respondent's work schedule was not presented in evidence at the trial.
Although he is a general practitioner, the records merely show that he
maintains a clinic, works for several companies on retainer basis and
teaches part-time.25 Hence, respondent court's conclusion that "his work
schedule is flexible (and h)e can always find time for his son"26 is not well-
founded. Fourth, the fact that private respondent lives near his parents and
sister is not crucial in this case. Fifth, petitioner's work schedule cited in the
respondent court's decision is not necessarily permanent. Hospitals work in
shifts and, given a mother's instinctive desire to lavish upon her child the
utmost care, petitioner may be expected to arrange her schedule in such a
way as to allocate time for him. Finally, it does not follow that petitioner
values her career more than her family simply because she wants to work in
the United States. There are any number of reasons for a person's seeking a
job outside the country, e.g. to augment her income for the family's benefit
and welfare, and for psychological fulfillment, to name a few. In the instant
case, it has been shown that petitioner earned enough from her job to be
able to construct a house for the family in Mandaue City. The record
describes sketchily the relations between Ray and Nerissa Perez. The
transcripts of the three hearings are inadequate to show that petitioner did
not exert earnest efforts and make sacrifices to save her marriage.
It is not difficult to imagine how heart-rending it is for a mother whose
attempts at having a baby were frustrated several times over a period of six
years to finally bear one, only for the infant to be snatched from her before
he has even reached his first year. The mother's role in the life of her child,
such as Ray II, is well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the depth of a
mother's love has been immortalized times without number, finding as it
does, its justification, not in fantasy but in reality.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated September 27, 1994 as well as its Resolution dated
January 24, 1995 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of
the trial court dated August 27, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. Custody
over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is awarded to his mother, herein petitioner
Nerissa Z. Perez. This decision is immediately executory.

G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-
appellants,  the trial court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner
and President, respectively, of a school of arts and trades, known under
the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.),
VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE, defendants-
appellees.
Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. .
Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .
Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee Daffon. .
TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Manila. .
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador
Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical
Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on May 19, 1966, the action
below for damages arising from the death on March 10, 1966 of their son at
the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the
laboratory room of the said Institute. .
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant Antonio C.
Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise to his action
occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute;1 the
defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the defendant Santiago
M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and
the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. At the
beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship, but
lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated."
The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus narrated by
Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10,
1966, between two and three o'clock, they, together with another classmate
Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At
that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon
were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking
on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like
a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the
face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face,
which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated
apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both
exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused
him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was
administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to
a hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died. The foregoing
is the substance of the testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the and heads of school establishments over the conduct and
incident." actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents.

The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident, as CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180.
testified to by the lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of the NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED: —
protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who "has no motive or reason The clause "so long as they remain in
to testify one way or another in favor of any party" and rejected the self- their custody" contained in Article 2180
exculpatory version of defendant Daffon denying that he had inflicted any of the new civil code contemplated a
fist blows on the deceased. . situation where the pupil lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the
With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police control or influence on the pupil
Department who performed the autopsy re "Cause of death: shock due to supersedes those of the parents. In those
traumatic fracture of theribs (6th and 7th, left, contusion of the pancreas and circumstances the control or influence
stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and slight subarachnoid hemorrhage over the conduct and actions of the
on the brain," and his testimony that these internal injuries of the deceased pupil as well as the responsibilities for
were caused "probably by strong fist blows," the trial court found defendant their sort would pass from the father
Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.3 It and mother to the teachers. (Ciriaco L.
held that "(T)he act, therefore, of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased Mercado, Petitioner vs. the Court of
strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured his internal organs and Appeals, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al.,
caused his death falls within the purview of this article of the Code."4 respondents, G.R. No. L-14862, May
30, 1960).5
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-
officials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise: There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and
boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials
... Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article of the school. These defendants cannot therefore be made
2180 of the New Civil Code which reads: responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.

Art. 2180. ... . Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows:

Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students and apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.
In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not
applicable to the case at bar, since this contemplates the
situation where the control or influence of the teachers
1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the
plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a)
P6,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b)
P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c)
P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of
earning power, considering that the deceased was only
between sixteen and seventeen years, and in good health
when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus
the costs of this action. .
 2. Absolving the other defendants. .
3. Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of
merit.
Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the factual
findings of the trial court, which are now beyond review, the trial court
erred in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of holding them
jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with defendant Daffon, for the
damages awarded them as a result of their son's death. The Court finds the
appeal, in the main, to be meritorious. .
1. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the
ground that the provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which
expressly hold "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades ... liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody," are not
applicable to to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence that the
accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal fistblows]6 lived and
boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the
school. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for
the tort of the defendant Daffon."
The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum
in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals,7 that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so
long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the
pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these
circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the
pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would
the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear
in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and
go back to their homes with their parents after school is over." This dictum
had been made in rejecting therein petitioner father's contention that his
minor son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon City
[which was not a party to the case] should be held responsible, rather than
him as father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him for
the physical injury inflicted by his son on a classmate. [A cut on the right
cheek with a piece of razor which costs only P50.00 by way of medical
expenses to treat and cure, since the wound left no scar.] The moral
damages award was after all set aside by the Court on the ground that none
of the specific cases provided in Article 2219, Civil Code, for awarding
moral damages had been established, petitioner's son being only nine years
old and not having been shown to have "acted with discernment" in
inflicting the injuries on his classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier
case of Exconde vs. Capuno,8 where the only issue involved as expressly
stated in the decision, was whether the therein defendant-father could be
civilly liable for damages resulting from a death caused in a motor vehicle
accident driven unauthorizedly and negligently by his minor son, (which
issue was resolved adversely against the father). Nevertheless, the dictum in
such earlier case that "It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or
directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution" was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado. .
2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and
squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under
Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and students
against fellow students on the school premises. Here, the parents of the
student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was
already of age at the time of the tragic incident. There is no question, either,
that the school involved is a non-academic school,9 the Manila Technical
Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. .
The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and
teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and
Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and severally for damages to
plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of
defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to
defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors.
The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been
properly impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so
implead it, by impleading improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single
proprietor, the lower court found that it had been incorporated since August
2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have
been brought in as party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so,
notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to
plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly manifested and made of
record that "defendant Antonio C. Brillantes is not the registered
owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a corporation
and is not owned by any individual person."10
3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the
tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their
custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and
students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the child."11 This is expressly provided for
in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.12 In the law of torts, the
governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and
teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it
becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide
proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they
are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the
necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers
and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that
some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on
their fellow students. .
4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting
opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art.
1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc.
are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority" 13 and
"where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the
teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the
torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent
is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction." The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or
negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article.14
5. The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school
officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180,
Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the
cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law
that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously
held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde)
on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the
present decision. .
6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of
the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-
delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of
his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death
resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been
avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing
adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school
premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow
students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of
Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual
findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such
exemption from liability. .
7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6,000.00 as indemnity
for the death of their son should be increased to P12,000.00 as set by the
Court in People vs. Pantoja,15 and observed in all death indemnity cases
thereafter is well taken. The Court, in Pantoja, after noting the decline in
the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, had expressed its "considered
opinion that the amount of award of compensatory damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court
thereby adjusted the minimum amount of "compensatory damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206, Civil Code, from the
old stated minimum of P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, which amount is to be
awarded "even though there may have been mitigating circumstances"
pursuant to the express provisions of said codal article. .
8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court should
have awarded exemplary damages and imposed legal interest on the total
damages awarded, besides increasing the award of attorney's fees all
concern matters that are left by law to the discretion of the trial court and
the Court has not been shown any error or abuse in the exercise of such
discretion on the part of the trial court.16 Decisive here is the touchstone
provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence." No
gross negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to
warrant the imposition of exemplary damages, as well as of interest and
increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not been shown in this appeal
any compelling reason to disturb such finding. .
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide
as follows: .
1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and
Santiago M. Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the
deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador
Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00
for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e)
P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both instances;
2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.
dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .
Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. .
Dizon, J., took no part. .
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: .
I concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee but would like to clarify
that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the
responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be
limited to pupils who are minors (below the age of majority) is not in
accord with the plain text of the law. Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines is to the following effect: .
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. .
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company. .
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and
live in their company. .
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which
the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions. .
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry. .
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable. .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages.
Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed
therein is limited to illegal acts during minority, the article expressly so
provides, as in the case of the parents and of the guardians. It is natural to
expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil
responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article, it
would have expressly so stated. The fact that it has not done so indicates an
intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age.
Further, it is not without significance that the teachers and heads of
scholarly establishments are not grouped with parents and guardians but
ranged with owners and managers of enterprises, employers and the state, as
to whom no reason is discernible to imply that they should answer only for
minors. .
Giorgi, in his well-known "Teoria de las Obligaciones en el Derecho
Moderno", Volume 5, page 404, No. 272 (Sp. Ed.), after noting the split
among commentators on the point it issue, observes with considerable
cogency that —
272. Ante esta variedad de opiniones, ninguna de las
cuales se funds en argumentos merecedores de seria
ponderacion, no es facil tomar un partido. Esto no
obstante, debiendo manisfestar nuestra opinion, nos
acercamos a la de los que no estiman necesaria la menor
edad del discipulo o del aprendiz; porque si el
aforismo ubi voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit, no es siempre
argumento seguro para interpreter la ley, es infalible
cuanto se refiere a una misma disposicion relative a varios
casos. Y tal es el art. 1.153. Lo que haya establecido
important poco si, elevandones a los principios de razon,
puede dudarse de la oportunidad de semajante diferencia;
porque la voluntad cierta del legislador prevalece in iure
condito a cualquier otra consideracion. Por otra parte, si
bien se considera, no puede parecer extrano o absurdo el
suponer que un discipulo y un aprendiz, aunque mayores
de edad, acepten voluntariamente la entera vigilancia de
su preceptor mientras dura la educacion. Ni parece
dudoso desde el momento que los artesanos y los
preceptores deben, al par de los padres, responder
civilmente de los daños comitidos por sus discipulos, aun
cuando estos esten faltos de discernimiento.
Similarly, Planiol-Ripert, in their "Droit Civil Pratique," Volume VI, No.
635 (Spanish version), say that —
635. Personas de quien responde. — Si bien la
responsibilidad del maestro es originalmente una
estension de la de los padres (1), el art. 1384 no especifica
que los alumnos y aprendices han de ser menores de edad,
por lo que la presuncion de culpa funcionara aun cuando
sean mayores (2); pero, la vigilancia no tendra que ser
ejercida en iguales terminos. Aun respecto a los menores
variara segun la edad, extremo que tendra que ternese en
ceunta a los fines de apreciar si el maestro ha podido
impedir el acto nocivo o no. .
I submit, finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians, their
authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the
latter reaching majority age, the authority and custodial supervision over
pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter. A student over twenty-one, by
enrolling and attending a school, places himself under the custodial
supervision and disciplinary authority of the school authorities, which is the
basis of the latter's correlative responsibility for his torts, committed while
under such authority. Of course, the teachers' control is not as plenary as
when the student is a minor; but that circumstance can only affect the
decree of the responsibility but cannot negate the existence thereof. It is
only a factor to be appreciated in determining whether or not the defendant
has exercised due diligence in endeavoring to prevent the injury, as
prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 2180. .
Barredo, J., concurs.
 
Libi vs Intermediate Appelate Court

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is
sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the
instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of their years, a
bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While we cannot
expect to award complete assuagement to their families through seemingly
prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the
acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial contest resulting from the
unfortunate occurrence.

In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were
alternately initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us seeking the
reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated on January 2,
1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following decretal
portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff’s
complaint is hereby reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby rendered
sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the
following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed." 1  must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any
Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent
spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of
the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on
January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the
University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of
Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his
aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and
Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke
up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be
sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January,
1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but
the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats
against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best
friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña
Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of
the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances
surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the contending
parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their
interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and
evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted
that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm
and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other
hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their
son, rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party,
whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work
as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU),
witness and thereby avoid identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-
17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of
Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court below rendered
judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the evidence.
Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit." 2 
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing
the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another
judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in
the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution the following
issues in this case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in
accordance with established decisional laws; and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted
by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability. 3 
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-
Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on some
postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot wound was inflicted
on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue emphasis was
placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around
the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized,
however, that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in
the determination of whether it was suicide or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or
close-contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance wound. However, as
pointed out by private respondents, the body of deceased Wendell Libi must
have been washed at the funeral parlor, considering the hasty interment
thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the occurrence wherein he died. Dr.
Cerna himself could not categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi
was left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his
autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting
a paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder
residue on Wendell’s hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily
buried.cralawnad
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the
body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be exact,
eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the record of death; that
when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body of the
deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the stage of rigor mortis;
and that said body was not washed, but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect
examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the
body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or washed in the area of
the wound on the head which he examined because the deceased was inside
the morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as
far as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of
the wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6  states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head
of the victim and that he found no burning or singeing of the hair or
extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which are general
characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct examination, Dr.
Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there
would be no black residue or tattooing that could result from these guns
because they are what we call clean?
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
ATTY. ORTIZ:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless,
those indications that you said may not rule out the possibility that the gun
was closer than 24 inches, is that correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a
smokeless powder.
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you
have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the trajectory
of the bullet as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could
have been fired by the person himself, the victim himself, Wendell Libi,
because it shows a point of entry a little above the right ear and point of exit
a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath?
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of
the bullet is concerned and as far as the angle or the manner of fire is
concerned, it could have been fired by the victim." 7 
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the
scene of the crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann
Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the
Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, 9 shows
that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the right temple
of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna
x       x       x
"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion
collar widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located
at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right
external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward, upward and to the left,
involving skin and soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the temporal
bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its
course the brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an
EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left,
2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory
meatus.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
x       x       x
"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the
gunshot wound of entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing
of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance,
or separation of the skin from the underlying tissue, are absent." 10  the following answers to these questions:chanrobles.com : virtual law
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made
of record, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the
entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound,
and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please indicate to the Honorable
Court how would it have been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself?
Will you please indicate the 24 inches?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm’s length.
ATTY. SENINING:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by
extending his right arm almost straight towards his head." 11 
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the
testimonies of defendants’ witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the
first being a resident of an apartment across the street from the Gotiongs
and the second, a resident of the house adjacent to the Gotiong residence,
who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person at the gate of the Gotiong
house after hearing shots therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she
was staying faces the gas station; that it is the second apartment; that from
her window she can see directly the gate of the Gotiongs and, that there is a
firewall between her apartment and the gas station. 12 After seeing a man
jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans, she called the
police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with
James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate
towards his rooftop. 13 
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the
gate of the Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone regarding what
he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house with a garden in front
of it; that his house is next to Felipe Gotiong’s house; and he further gave
library
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong’s in relation to your house?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A It is about 8 feet.
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Q And where were you looking from?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A From upstairs in my living room.
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q From Your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14 

Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that
the same do not inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the
witnesses’ observations, since the visual perceptions of both were
obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation to the house
of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo Alfonso,
testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and his sister,
Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her
scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was going on
inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5)
seconds later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he went down from the
fence and drove to the police station to report the incident. 15 Manolo’s
direct and candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it was he
whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at
the gate of the Gotiong house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension
that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant
that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect in the crime
nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor can we
sustain the trial court’s dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his
own hand because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial,
documentary and pictorial — the confluence of which point to Wendell as
the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his
persistent pleas for a reconciliation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime
committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence on record
either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband,
Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a
drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety
deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all of which facts were
known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using
the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no
longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain
serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the
diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away.
Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the
safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to
the bag of his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and
child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as
parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his
minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of
Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent
and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both
parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring
and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be
engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug
users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of
Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18
holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he
was in possession of that firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners
civilly liable, as explained at the start of this opinion, respondent court
waved aside the protestations of diligence on the part of petitioners and had
this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who
may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs.
Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of
their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have
prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants
are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their
company.’
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having
access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box,
defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence of
the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company. This
vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the
Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v.
Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations
arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.’
‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of their
minor children who acted with discernment is determined under the
provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations which
arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for
the damages caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent.’ (3 SCRA 361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell
Libi somehow got hold of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept
under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had been
missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a picture
taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated this picture to
his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi was said to
have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a
CANU agent . . ." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
x       x       x
"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds
that the lower court was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-
appellants’ complaint because as preponderantly shown by evidence,
defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good
father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this
crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely
accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said
gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety
deposit box only after the crime had been committed." (Emphases ours.) 19  diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages."cralaw virtua1aw
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be
held liable for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications
was a crime committed by their minor son. We take this opportunity,
however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential
dicta which we feel require clarification.
In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners,
respondent court cites Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly holds
that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations
arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses," followed by an
extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their
minor children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with
pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder.chanrobles
law library
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents
liable, but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not
primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous
decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses.
Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for
crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents
can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On
the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct
and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor
children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and
not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides
for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act
or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death of
incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental
liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article
2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
library
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies
committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary.
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. —
x       x       x
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability
for acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over
nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment,
shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or
control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part."
(Emphasis supplied.) 21  result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the
foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by
their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the
defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such
damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that
the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own
property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus,
for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code
states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the
minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against
him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex
delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal
guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall
respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from
execution, in accordance with civil law."cralaw virtua1aw library
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children
contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited
case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this
Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen,
Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano,
et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically
on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their
minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with
discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these
situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both
instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be
resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases
hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article
2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would
would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In
said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in a
regrettable inconsistency in the Court’s determination of whether the
liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of
their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide
through reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the
crime the minor and his father were held jointly and severally liable for
failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. The
same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability was imposed in a
separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who
was found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194
of the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages
arising from the conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18
years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time, disregarding Article
2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as already explained, the
petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas
which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil
liability for serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On
the other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were
adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising from his conviction for
homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is
likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in
Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack of
intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since the son,
"although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from
him at the time of the occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of equity"
the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for
subsidiary liability only for persons causing damages under the compulsion
of irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear; 27
innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments; 28 employers,
teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry; 29 and principals,
accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused
in the other classes. 30  incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the
Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on Fuellas in its decision
in the present case, it is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for
subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that
what respondent court quoted verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the
present case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law
report of said case which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such
categorization does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in
Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and
Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its
decision in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis
of evidence submitted therein by both parties, independent of the criminal
case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon
which the present action was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code
(Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore
stated, any discussion as to the minor’s criminal responsibility is of no
moment."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the
parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising
from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal
authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that
the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto
caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15
years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their
children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15
years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31 
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected
against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This
was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that
the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or
guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or
family friend of the youthful offender. 32 However, under the Family Code,
this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over
the minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with
Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was
caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent
court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom.
Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it
therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we
conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the
requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 Maria Rosario B. Ragasa and Oscar L. Lindain for petitioners.

Jose C. Felimon for private respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 8,

1990 of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the complaint for annulment
of a sale of registered land, thereby reversing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of San Jose City.

The facts of the case in a nutshell are as follows:

When the plaintiffs were still minors, they were already

the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-63540 (Exh. D-1).
On November 7, 1966, their mother, Dolores Luluquisin,
then already a widow and acting as guardian of her minor
children, sold the land for P2,000 under a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Registered Land (Exh. 2) to the
defendants spouses Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered in the office of
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija.
TCT No. NT-66311 was issued to the vendees, Apolonia
Valiente and Federico Ila.

The defendants admitted that the property in question was

G.R. No. 95305 August 20, 1992
ELENA, OSCAR, CELIA, TERESITA and VIRGILIO, all surnamed
LINDAIN, petitioners,  registered owners thereof being all minors, upon advice of
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES APOLINIA
VALIENTE and FEDERICO ILA, respondents.
sold to them by the mother of the minors as evidenced by
a Deed of Sale (Exh. B for the plaintiffs and Exh. 2 for
the defendants) and although at first they were reluctant to
buy the property as the sale would not be legal, the
their counsel, the late Atty. Arturo B. Pascual, and the
counsel of Dolores Luluquisin, Atty. Eustaquio Ramos,
who notarized the documents, that the property could be
sold without the written authority of the court,
considering that its value was less than P2,000, they
 bought the property and had it registered in their names
under Certificate of Title No. 66311 (Exhibit C for the
plaintiffs).
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the sale of the lot by
their mother to the defendants is null and void because it
was made without judicial authority and/or court
approval.
The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the sale
was valid, as the value of the property was less than
P2,000, and, considering the ages of plaintiffs now, the
youngest being 31 years old at the time of the filing of the
complaint, their right to rescind the contract which should
have been exercised four (4) years after reaching the age
of majority, has already prescribed.
On May 25, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City rendered a
decision for the plaintiffs (now petitioners), the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
following:
(1) Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by the guardian
Dolores Luluquisin in favor of the defendants spouses
Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila over the property of
the minors covered by the TCT No. NT-66311 to be null
and void;
(2) Ordering defendants Spouses Apolonia Valiente and
Federico Ila to surrender to the Register of Deeds of San
Jose City Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66311;
(3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of San Jose City to
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66311 in the
names of Spouses Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila;
(4) Ordering the Register of Deeds to issue a new
Transfer Certificate of Title in lieu of what was ordered
cancelled in the names of plaintiffs, namely: Elena, Oscar,
Celia, Teresita and Virgilio, all surnamed Lindain;
(5) Ordering the defendants to vacate the lot covered by
TCT No. NT-66311 and deliver the possession of the
same to the plaintiffs subject however to the rights of the
defendants as buyers, possessors and builders in good
faith;
(6) Without cost. (pp. 41,42, Rollo.)
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed and another
one was entered dismissing the complaint without pronouncement as to
costs. The Court of Appeals applied the ruling of this Court in Ortañez vs.
Dela Cruz, O.G., Vol. 60, No. 24, pp. 3434, 3438-3439, that:
A father or mother acting as legal administrator of the
property of the child under parental authority cannot,
therefore, dispose of the child's property without judicial
authority if it is worth more than P2,000.00,
notwithstanding the bond that he has filed for the
protection of the child's property. But when the value of
such property is less than P2,000.00, the permission of
the court for its alienation or disposition may be
dispensed with. The father or mother, as the case may be,
is allowed by law to alienate or dispose of the same
freely, subject only to the restrictions imposed by the
scruples of conscience. (p. 64, Rollo.)
It upheld the sale and dismissed the complaint of the heirs who thereupon
filed this petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court and in ordering the
dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in total disregard of the findings of
facts of the trial court and contrary to the provisions of law on contracts and
guardianship.
The principal issue before us is whether judicial approval was necessary for
the sale of the minors' property by their mother.
We find merit in the petition for review.
Art. 320 of the New Civil Code, which was already in force when the
assailed transaction occurred, provides:
Art. 320.— The father, or in his absence the mother, is the
legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority. If the property is worth more
than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a
bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance.
Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from
judicial) administrator of the property of his/her minor children, does not
have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the property of said children
without judicial approval. The powers and duties of the widow as legal
administrator of her minor children's property as provided in Rule 84 by the
Rules of Court entitled, "General Powers and Duties of Executors and
Administrators" are only powers of possession and management. Her power
to sell, mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose of the property of her
minor children must proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89 which
requires court authority and approval.
In the case of Visaya, et al. vs. Suguitan, et al., G.R. No. L-8300, November
18, 1955, we held that:
It is true that under Art. 320 of the new Civil Code the
mother, Juana Visaya, was the legal administrator of the
property of her minor children. But as such legal
administrator she had no power to compromise their
claims, for compromise has always been deemed
equivalent to an alienation (transigere est alienare), and is
an act of strict ownership that goes beyond mere
administration. Hence, Art. 2032 of the new Civil Code
provides:
The Court's approval is necessary in
compromises entered into by
guardians, parents, absentee's
representatives and administrators or
executors of decedent's estates.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This restriction on the power of parents to compromise
claims affecting their children is in contrast to the terms
of Art. 1810 of the old Civil Code that empowered
parents to enter into such compromises, without requiring
court approval unless the amount involved was in excess
of 2000 pesetas. At present, the Court['s] approval is
indispensable regardless of the amount involved.
(Emphasis ours.)
In the recent case of Badillo vs. Ferrer, 152 SCRA 407, 409, this Court
stated.
Surviving widow has no authority or has acted beyond her
powers in conveying to the vendees the undivided share of
her minor children in the property, as her powers as the
natural guardian covers only matters of administration
and cannot include the power of disposition, and she
should have first secured court approval before
alienation of the property.
The above ruling was a reiteration of Inton vs. Quintana, 81 Phil. 97.
The private respondents' allegation that they are purchasers in good faith is
not credible for they knew from the very beginning that their vendor, the
petitioners' mother, without court approval could not validly convey to them
the property of her minor children. Knowing her lack of judicial authority to
enter into the transaction, the private respondents acted in bad faith when
they went ahead and bought the land from her anyway.
One who acquires or purchases real property with knowledge of a defect in
the title of his vendor cannot claim that he acquired title thereto in good
faith as against the owner of the property or for an interest therein (Gatioan
vs. Gaffud, 27 SCRA 706).

The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed for "real actions
over immovables prescribe after thirty years" (Art. 1141, Civil Code). Since
the sale took place in 1966, the action to recover the property had not yet
prescribed when the petitioners sued in 1987.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals is set aside and that of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City
dated May 25, 1989, being correct, is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against
the private respondents.

SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 127356 June 29, 1999

Cruz, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
DAVID SILVANO y HAYAG, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

It is not for humans to ravish what they produced. The rape committed by a
father against his own daughther regardless of whether it is done under the
cloak of parental discipline has no place in our society. That is why, it is
considered as a heinous felony meted with the supreme penalty of
termination of the assailant's life. For indeed those who lust must not last.

Once again the Court is saddled with another nightmare of lustful and
incestuous defloration committed by one from the victim expects
protection. The facts given credence by the trial court and quoted by both
the prosecution (with page reference) and the defense in their respective
Briefs, which are ably supported by evidence on record happened this
wise: *
Sheryl Silvano is a beautiful mestiza (as may be shown in
the pictures, Exhs. "T" to "T-5"), and already 5'6" tall at
her age of sixteen (16) years, having been born on
January 20, 1980. (Exhs. F and F-1) Her height have been
inherited from her parents as her father is 6'2" tall and her
mother is a mestiza. She is the legitimathe daughther of
David Silvano y Hayag, the accused in this case, and
Shirley Ann G. Pedrosa, as evidenced by a marriage
contract (Exhs. "E" & "E-1"). Sheryl is the eldest and the
only girl with two brothers, namely: John David, who was
born on July 29, 1984 and Noel William, who was born
on April 16, 1986. (pp. 1-5, tsn, August 14, 1996).
On January 23, 1996 at 10:30 in the evening, while Sheryl
was sleeping in her room at the second floor of their
house located at 134-C Scout Rallos Street, Barangay
Sacred Heart, Quezon City, ** she was awakened by her
father, the accused in this case. The accused then started
scolding Sheryl for her coming late. (pp. 6-7, tsn, ibid.)
The accused who appeared tipsy, started undressing
Sheryl by lifting her T-shirt, as a form of punishment for
her coming home late, which punishment she has been
experiencing from the accused since she was 13 years old.
After lifting Sheryl's T-shirt, as she was not then wearing
any bra, the accused started holding Sheryl's breast at the
same time kissing it. As Sheryl was practically leaning on
the bed, the accused dragged Sheryl at the edge of the bed
of that she would be facing the accused a little bit. The
accused then knelt down on the floor and continued
holding the breasts of Sheryl with one hand while the
other hand was holding the private organ of Sheryl.
Sheryl tried to prevent the accused from doing what he
was doing but the accused told Sheryl "you did something
wrong and I told you I would do that as a punishment to
you" (p. 7, tsn, ibid.). Despite the pleas of Sheryl, the
accused continued kissing her breasts. Afterwards, the
accused pulled Sheryl at the side of the bed and the
accused removed her pair of short pants and panty. After
removing the pair of short pants and panty of Sheryl, the
accused grasped the hips and waist of Sheryl and pulled
her towards him. Thereafter, when the accused was
already in between the thighs of Sheryl, the accused
started kissing the private organ of Sheryl, the accused
was at the same time inserting his finger into Sheryl's
vagina (p. 8, tsn, ibid.). Thereafter, the accused stood up a
bit, pulled down his short pants and knelt down at the side
of the bed. The accused then got a hold of Sheryl's two
feet and placed them on top of his shoulders. The accused
once again grasped the hips of Sheryl and pulled her
nearer to him. When Sheryl was pulled nearer to the
accused, the accused inserted his private organ into
Sheryl's private organ. Although Sheryl tried to free
herself by pushing the shoulders of the accused with her
two feet and telling the accused to stop what he was doing
to her, the accused, in order to have a full grip, got hold of
the legs of Sheryl and placed them in between the arms of
the accused (pp. 8-9, tsn, ibid). After inserting the
accused's private organ into the private organ of Sheryl,
the accused performed a pumping motion. Subsequently,
the accused's private organ was removed from the private
organ of Sheryl and the accused rubbed his organ with the
private organ of Sheryl. Thereafter, Sheryl felt something
cold which was a sticky liquid emitted from the private
organ of the accused and which the accused scattered in
between Sheryl's private organ and on her stomach. Later
on, the accused got a tissue paper and wiped the liquid-
like substance. The accused then put on his pair of pants
and left the room (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid.). The following
morning, Sheryl went to school at Jose Abad Santos
Memorial School (JASMS) in Quezon City.
On February 12, Sheryl who could no longer bear the
punishment in the form of sexual abuse she had been
getting from her father as in fact she was first raped when
she was thirteen (13) years of age, left their house at
Scout Rallos, Quezon City, and stayed at her maternal
grandmother's house at Scout Lozano, Quezon City.
When she was asked to go back to her parents' house and
settle her difference with the accused, Sheryl confided to
her mother and grandmother the real reason why she did
 not like to go back to their house. Thereupon, her mother
and grandmother immediately sought the assistance of
General Hercules Cataluña, Chief of the Central Police
District Command, who happens to be married to a cousin
of the mother of Sheryl.1
Consequently, appellant was charged with rape by his own daughter to
which he pleaded not guilty when arraigned. Prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution, the complaint was amended without objection
from appellant, who when re-arraigned entered the same plea. The amended
complaint reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of January, 1996 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused who is the father of the
Complainant by means of force and intimidation, to wit:
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
undressing the undersigned complainant who is under
eightheen (18) years of age and putting her legs on top of
his shoulders, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with
the undersigned complainant against her will and without
her consent.2
After the prosecution presenthed its case, appellant filed a motion for leave
to file demurrer to evidence on the ground that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, which motion, however, was denied by the lower
court. Appellant thus presented evidence for his defense. Thereafter, the
lower court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime charged,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, and ordered him to indemnify
the victim. The dispositive portion of the decision a quo states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused David
Silvano y Hayag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape defined in and penalized by Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the costs. The
accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim, Sheryl
P. Silvano, the amount of P50,000.00, as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.3
Upon automatic appeal to this Court, 4 appellant assails his conviction by
insisting on his innocence. He denied the accusation arguing that the charge
leveled against him was a mere ploy of his wife and the latter's relatives for
the purpose of severing their marital relationship.
In the review of death cases, foremost in the mind of the Court is the heavy
penalty which an accused faces. Aware that life once taken, is like virginity
which once defiled, can never be restored,5 a thorough scrutiny of the case
is in order. Against the proffered excuses of appellant, however, and guided
by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit:6
a.) An accusation for rape can be made
with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the person accused,
through innocent, to disprove;
b.) In view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape, where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant is scrutinized with
extreme caution; and
c.) The evidence of the prosecution
stands or falls on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the defense.
the fundamental presumption of innocence7 enjoyed by appellant
was overcome with the requisite quantum of proof in criminal
cases and his guilt sufficiently established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.8
The qualified rape of an underaged relative for which appellant was charged
is classified as a heinous crime and penalized under Section 335 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Section 11, Republic Act (R.A.)
7659,9 which provides:
When and how rape is committed — Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3.) When the woman is under twelve
years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons; the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim
become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim;
2.) When the victim is under custody of
the police or military authorities;
3.) When the rape is committed in full
view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the
third degree of consanguinity;
4.) When the victim is a religious or a
child below seven (7) years old;
5.) When the offender knows that he is
afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease;
6.) When committed by any member of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines of
Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency;
7.) When by reason or on the occasion
of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation.
(emphasis supplied) 10
In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary
elements of 1.) sexual congress 2.) with a woman 3.) by force and without
consent, 11 and in order to warrant the imposition of death penalty, the
additional elements that 4.) the victims is under 18 years of age at the time
of the rape and 5.) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate
or adopted) of the victim, should also be alleged and proven. All such
elements are undisputedly present in this case. The victim herein at the age
of sixteen (16) years was subjected to forced sexual intercourse by
appellant, as duly shown in her testimony:
Q. While you were sleeping at 10:30 in
the evening of January 23, 1996, what
happen? ***
ATTY. UMINGA:
Objection, your Honor, the question is
misleading, "while you were sleeping"
it does not mean established that she
was sleeping.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A I was awakened by my father.
Q When your father woke you up, what
happened?
A He was scolding me.
Q What did he say?
A He was asking me why I came home
late. That I knew that I had a
punishment.
Q What else did you father do, if there
was any aside from scolding you?
A He was trying to undress me,
particularly my shirt.
Q Was he able to undress you?
A Yes, he was able to lift up my shirt.
Q And then what happen?
A He was holding my breast and he was
kissing my breast.
Q What else did he do?
A I was leaning on the bed, he dragged
me on the side ways, so that, I will be
facing him a bit and then he knelt down
on the floor.
Q After he knelt down on the floor,
what else did he do?
A He continued kissing and holding my
breast, while he was holding his other
hand to my breast and he was kissing it,
he was holding my private organ his
other hand.
Q And what were you wearing at that
time?
A I was wearing t-shirt without bra.
Q And when he was holding your
private organ, what happened?
A I was trying to tell him, not to do this
to me, but he insisted and said that "you
did something wrong, and I told you
that I would do that punishment to you"
but I said that I did not agree.
Q And then what did he do if any, after
he was holding your private part and he
was holding and kissing your breast?
A He told me and he insisted that he
would do that to me, but I said "no
please don't."
Q When you answered him stop, what
did he do?
A He still continued kissing my breast
and kissing my private organ.
Q After that, what happened?
A He pulled me at the side of the bed.
Q When he pulled you at the side of the
bed, what did your father do?
A He undressed my shorts and panty.
Q After your father removed your
shorts and panty, what else did he do?
A He grasped me by my hips, he
grasped me by my waist, and he pulled
me towards him.
Q And where was his position when he
pulled you towards him?
A He was at the side of the bed.
Q And in relation to you, where was he
located?
A In between my things.
Q What did he do after that?
A He started kissing my private organ.
Q When he was kissing your private
organ, what else did he do?
A He was putting his finger inside my
vagina hole or opening and he
continued kissing it.
Q After putting his finger inside your
private organ, what else did he do?
A He stood up a bit, he removed or
lowered down his pants and then he
knelt down at the side of the bed.
Q After removing his pants, after
lowering down his pants, and kneeling
down a bit, what did your father do?
A He got my two feet and placed him
on top of his shoulder.
Q After putting your two feet on top his
shoulder, what did he do?
A He grasped me by my hips, he pulled
me nearer to him and he placed his
organ inside my organ.
Q After the accused, your father, placed
his organ inside your organ, what else
happen?
COURT:
Put on record that the witness is crying.
ATTY. MENDOZA: (to the witness)
Q After your father put his organ inside
your organ, what else did he do?
A He just put his organ inside my
organ. He was almost on top of me.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q What about you, what did you do,
when your father, the accused in this
case placed his organ inside your
organ?
A I was trying to remove to my two feet
on top of his shoulder I was pushing
him by his shoulder with my two feet
and I was telling him to "stop doing it to
me."
Q And what was the response of your
father?
A He kept on grasping my hips nearer
to him.
COURT: (to Atty. Mendoza)
Go ahead.
ATTY. MENDOZA: (to the witness)
Q So, while you were trying to free
yourself, and your father continued
grasping your hips closer to him, what
else happen?
A I was able to remove my feet a bit but
in order for me not to break free, he
placed my legs in between his arms and
both feet and then he gripped it.
Q When you were able to free your legs
from the shoulder of your father, he
grabbed your legs and grasped it with
his arms, what happen?
A He placed his organ in my organ.
Q And was he able to put his organ
inside your vagina?
A Yes, then I felt pain.
Q After that, what happen?
A I tried again resisting him, moving
again my two feet from his grasp. I tried
to get far from the edge of the bed, far
from him.
Q And you were able to remove his
arms from your legs?
A No, sir.
Q So, what happen?
A His organ removed from my organ,
but he tried to put it but since he can't.
Q Since he can't, what did he do?
A He placed his organ on top of my
organ.
Q And then, what did he do?
A Rubbing it on top of my organ.
Q And what were you saying in
tagalog?
A "kinikiskis po."
Q And then, what did you do?
A And then, I still tried telling him
"stop doing to me."
Q You cannot free yourself from your
father?
A No, sir.
Q And after that, he was rubbing his
organ with your organ, what happen?
A I felt cold, liquid-like substance on
top of my organ and somewhere in
between my stomach.
Q And then, after that, what happen?
A He got his shoe (should be tissue) and
then he wiped it.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Where did that fluid came from?
A It came from his organ.
Q Did you see?
A Yes, your Honor.
ATTY. MENDOZA: (to the witness)
Q Will you please tell to the Honorable
Court whether the place while your
father was doing this to you was
lighted?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the lighting?
A Fluorescent light.
Q And who put the lights on?
A He opened it.
Q After that, what did your father do?
A He stood up and wore his underpants.
Q And where did he go?
A He went out of the room.
Q And what did you do?
A I wore my underpants too then I
covered my face with the pillow.
(emphasis supplied)12
 The victim's claim that she was ravished is corroborated by the
medical findings of the physician who examined her, to wit:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female
subject. Breasts are hemispherical with pinkish brown
areola and nipples from which no secretions could be
pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is abundant growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are
full, convex and coaptated with the pinskish brown labia
minora presenting in between. On separating the same,
disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep healed
lacerations at 3, 7 and 9 o'clock positions. External
vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the
introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin-
sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with
prominent rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and
consistency.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application of any
form of trauma at the time of examination.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-
negative diplococci and for spermatozoa. (emphasis
supplied) 13
It is settled that carnal knowledge is consummated by the mere touching of
the woman's labia of the pudendum by the male sex organ. 14 The briefest
contact of penile invasion is as serious as full penetration and thus, rapture
of the hymen is not required. 15 In addition, the absence of fresh lacerations
does not disprove rape. 16 Appellant could have been held liable for
"instrument or object rape" under R.A. 8353 when he inserted his tongue
and finger into her daughter's vaginal orifice. Luckily for him, at the time he
committed such act, "instrument or object rape" was not yet punishable.
For his defense, appellant claims among others, that the victim offered only
a token resistance when the alleged sexual acts were being done. Be that as
it may, the failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance cannot be construed
as a voluntary submission to appellant's desires. 17 It is enough if the
prosecution had proven that force or intimidation concurred in the
commission of the crime, as in this case. The law does not impose upon a
rape victim the burden of proving resistance. 18 Moreover, physical
resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised
upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapist's lust
because of the fear for her life or personal safety. 19 The force, violence or
intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size,
and strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each
other. 20 Herein victim is only 16 years old, about 5'6" and weighs 128 lbs.
as compared to her father who is in his early 40's, about 6'2", weighs 210
lbs. 21 and a former driver/messenger in the Italian embassy. 22 Considering
also that the assailant is no less than the victim's own father who wields
parental influence over her person, the crime undoubtedly was committed
with facility. 23 The latter's moral ascendancy over the former substitutes for
violence or intimidation. 24A woman at such young age like the victim
herein can only cower in fear and yield into submission. Rape is nothing
more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which a man keeps
a woman in a state of fear and humiliation. Thus, it is not even impossible
for a victim of rape not to make an outcry against an unarmed assailant. 25
Appellants contention that he could not have possibly raped her own
daughter in the room where the latter was sleeping on the night of the
incident considering that it was small, is not a reason to exculpate him from
his barbaric and prurient desires. There is also no merit in his assertion that
the victim's two younger brothers — one of whom is deaf — who were
sleeping in the same room, would have been awakened when she struggled
against the advances of appellant. Suffice it to say, however, that while the
brutish sexual assault on the victim was being committed under the cloak of
the night and disguised as a form of parental sanction, it is "not impossible
nor incredible for the members of the complaint's family to be in deep
slumber and not be awakened" 26 because rape can be committed in the
same room where other members of the family are also
sleeping. 27 His argument that it is "unusual" and improbable" for the rape to
occur at about 10:30 in the evening since people are not "yet soundly
sleep" 28 lacks merit. Evidence without argument is worth more than
arguments without evidence. In their union they are inseparable. 29 In any
case, as consistently ruled by the Court, lust is no respecter her of time and
place 30 and also of kinship. Non-consensual acts of sex can be done even in
places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadsides, in school
premises, in a house where there are other occupants, 31 and even in places
which to many, would appear unlikely and high risk venues for its
commission. 32In any case, there is no rule that rape can be committed only
in seclusion. 33
Appellant alludes as "rather unusual" for him to rape his own daughter by
scolding her first, as it would certainly cause some noise. 34 This is no
excuse for a rapacious parent. Precisely, he scolded her to make a good
pretext that any noise created thereafter was nothing but part of the parental
sanction and discipline on an allegedly erring child and thus, distract, if not
mislead, possible assistance once he performs his evil instinct. Appellant
likewise argues that the rape is "implausible, improbable if not
impossible" 35 considering that the series of acts allegedly lasted for about
40 minutes — 15 minutes for kissing and sucking her breast and nipples, 15
minutes for kissing her private parts and about 15 to 20 minutes for doing
the motion. This is a trivial matter which does not go into the "why's" and
"wherefore's" of the crime. 36 On the contrary, it strengthened rather than
diminished the victim's credibility 37 as they erased suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony. 38 Lust may be consummated in a matter of second or it could
last for hours depending on the parties and the circumstances. To the
helpless victim, every second of the monstrous act is transformed into a
long period of agony. Besides, it is too much to demand from the rape
victim to keep track of the exact duration of every humiliating act done to
her to make an accurate account of her traumatic experience. 39 Errorless
testimony cannot be expected of her 40 for she may not be able to remember
and recount every ugly detail of the harrowing experience and appalling
outrage, especially so since she might in fact be trying not to remember
them, 41 as they are painful to recall. 42 In any case, the undisputed fact
remains that the copulation was against the victim's will. If somewhere
along the motion, she stopped resisting, it is not unreasonable to conclude
that the fear is still there or that fatigue had intervened in her tenacity to
fight the rapacity. A victim who cries rape, more so if she a minor, almost
always says all that is needed to signify that the crime has been
committed. 43 The intimate flow of revelations from a daughter to a mother
of a father's outrageous conduct impelled them to seek assistance from their
relatives including a police General. In turn, the latter ordered his men to
invite the appellant to the precinct without any warrant of arrest, an illegal
act which would all evidence obtained in violation of his right against a
warrantless arrest inadmissible. 44
Under R.A. No. 7438, the so-called "invitation" of a person in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have committed is a prohibited act for
which the inviting officer may be held liable. 45 Be that as it may, in
accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea. 46 Appellant pleaded without making such objection and the court has
to call the attention of appellant's counsel on whether he is going to
challenge the validity of the arrest. Despite his manifestation that he will do
so, nothing was filed nor initiated to that effect after probably realizing the
futility of such action. In addition thereto, appellant's failure to quash the
information, his participation in the trial and by presenting evidence in his
behalf placed him in estoppel to make such challenge. 47 He has patently
waived any objection or irregularities and is deemed as having submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. 48 It should be noted that the legality
of arrest affects only the jurisdiction of court over the person of the
accused. 49 Consequently, it objections on such ground is waived, the
illegality of the arrest is not sufficient reason for setting aside an otherwise
valid rendered after trial free, from error. 50 The technicality cannot render
the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict
the guilty when the facts on the record point to the culpability of the
accused. 51 In any case, appellant is not herein convicted on the basis of
whatever was illegally obtained by the police out of the "invitation" but by
the admissible proof presented by the prosecution particularly the victim's
credible testimony.
When charged before the court, appellant denied the accusation and
prefaced such denial with the assertion that he is giving her financial,
material and education support. With respect to his denial, it is inherently a
weak defense which cannot prevail over positive identifications. 52 It must
be bettressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit
credibility. 53 Otherwise, the same is self-serving and deserves no greater
evidentiary value. 54It should be noted that affirmative testimony, like that
of the victim's, is stronger than a negative one. 55 His excuse regarding
support is non-sequitur. The fact that he supports her does not give him the
license to rape her. It is his obligation to give support to her daughter as
provided in Article 195(2,3) as well as his right and duty under Article
220(1) of the Family Code which expressly provides: 56
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding
Articles, the following are obliged to support each other
to the whole extent set forth in the preceding Article:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children
Art. 220. The parents . . . shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and
duties:
(1) To . . . support (emphasis supplied).
The victim testified that appellant told her that she will be punished for
coming home late at night and the punishment is to have sex with him. This
ratiocination is the product of a sick mind of an equally sick parent who
does not deserve to be such. It is clear from the provisions of Article 209 of
the Family Code that from the mere status of being a parent flows one's
"natural right and duty not only of the "caring for" and the "rearing of" their
unemancipated children but above all "the development of their moral,
mental, and physical character and well-being." Although the Family Code
recognizes the parents' rights and duties to "impose discipline" on the
unemancipated children; "supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others . . .; and prevent them from acquiring habits
detrimental to their . . . morals", 57 it does not authorize them to force their
offspring to copulate with them under the mask of discipline, or invade their
honor and violate their dignity nor does it give them the license to ravish the
product of their marital union. Appellant's way of punishment comes not in
the form of correction but of an insane sexual gratification. Sex with one's
own child is per se abhorrent and can never be justified as a from of
parental punishment. The practice of sexual exploitation of the youth in the
guise of disciplinary action is not a solution to juvenile curiosity which is
part of growing up. His gratification instills an unnamed trauma in the
child's innocent mind when she still cannot understand the meaning of
sexual behavior. 58Moreover, instead of instructing and educating his own
daughter with "the right precept and good example", appellant provided her
with perversed and distorted "moral and spiritual guidance" 59 to the extent
of brainwash her that sex with one's father is nothing but a disciplinary
sanction and "part of sex education" 60 which the latter teaches her. Worse,
the daughter herein even entertained doubts as to the normality and
abnormality of her father's deplorable acts. 61 It is also appellant's duty
under the Family Code to give her "love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding." 62 Yet what she got was the humiliation
and the destruction of her life, good future and the very essence of her
existence.
Appellant further contends that her daughter's acts after the alleged rape,
such as going to school the next day, leaving their home after more than two
weeks had lapsed since the incident and reporting the same only when
confronted by her mother are inconsistent with the behavior of a rape
victim. The contention is without merit. The behavior and reaction of every
person cannot be predicted with accuracy. It is a time-honored precept that
"different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation
and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange or starting or frightful experience." 63 Not every
rape victim can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of
every one. 64 Some may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked
into insensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion. 65
The failure of the victim to immediately reveal his father's incestuous acts is
not indicative of fabricated charges. It should be noted that:
Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal
charges against their rapists. They prefer to bear the
ignominy and pain rather than reveal their shame to the
world or risk rapists making good their threats to kill or
hurt their victims. 66
 The victims herein is in no case different. Her shame and genuine
fear of what appellant might do to her brothers had temporarily
sealed her lips. This is why she left their home, the scene of her
defilement where her appellant father resides and went to her
maternal grandmother's place. Only when confronted why she
would not come back to their house did she reveal the avalanche of
shame and degradation that had befallen her at that tender age of
16 years from her very own father. It is not uncommon for a young
girl at such age to be intimidated into silence and conceal for
sometime the violation of her honor, even by the mildest threat
against her life. 67 Silence is not an odd behavior of rape victims
who do not always immediately go to the rooftop and denounce
their assailants. 68 This "natural reticence or aversion of the victims
to reveal the humiliation attaching to the crime" is a "stigma they
will have to bear indefinitely thereafter." 69 The fear of these young
victims of reprisals upon them or their families easily cows them
into submission and silence. Worse, in incestuous rape, that fear
which compels non-revelation is further reinforced by the moral
ascendancy of the rapist over his ravished relative. 70 As the father
of the victim, appellant whom she called "Daddy" had assumed
parental authority over her during her formative years.
Undisputedly, he exerts strong moral influence over
complainant. 71
The imputation by appellant of wrongful motive to his wife who allegedly
used their daughter as an instrument in concocting the rape just to sever
their marital ties is too shallow. It is unnatural for a parent to use her
offspring as an engine of malice especially if it will subject her to
embarrassment and even stigma. 72 No mother in her right mind would
subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a
prosecution for rape, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to
incarcerate the person responsible for her child's defilement 73 or if the same
is not true. 74 In the same vein, a mother would not expose her daughter to
such an ignominy merely to end relationship with her husband or to retaliate
against him for his transgressions as a family man. 75 And it is unbelievable
for a daughter to charge her own father with rape at the expense of being
ridiculed. 76 Accordingly, as the defense failed to prove that she was not so
moved and her testimony entitled to full faith and credit. 77
The contention that he cannot be convicted on the sole testimony of his
daughter with respect to the rape 78 easily crumbles in the light of the
doctrine that only two people are privy to the crime of rape and the
evaluation of the evidence presented ultimately resolves around the
credibility of complainant. 79 The trial court, giving full faith and credence
to the victim's testimony found it to be "logical, straightforward and candid
manner, without any artificialities or pretensions that would tarnish the
credibility of her testimony". 80 It even observed that she "shamelessly cried
as she was narrating the tragic experience" and her "stern demeanor evinces
the hatred she had for the accused". 81 Notwithstanding that the victim's
testimony is uncorroborated, the accused may be convicted solely on the
basis thereof so long as it meets the test of credibility, 82 and the prosecution
is not bound to present witnesses other than the victim. 83
It is highly unlikely that the victim, a 16-year old high school student,
presumably a virgin, an innocent and unsophisticated girl, unexposed to the
ways of the world, would concoct a reprehensible story of defloration, no
less than against her own father, allow an examination of her private parts
and then subject herself to the rigors, trouble, inconvenience, ridicule and
scandal of a public trial, where she has to bare her harrowing and traumatic
experience, and be subjected to harassment, embarrassment and humiliation
during cross-examination, unless she was in fact raped and deeply
motivated by her sincere desire to do so solely to seek justice and obtain
redress for the unforgivable and wicked acts committed upon her. 84 This
Court has repeatedly ruled that no young and decent Filipina would publicly
admit that she was ravished unless that is the truth for it is her natural
instinct to protect her honor. 85
Complainant's tender age further lends to her credibility. 86 Thus:
Apparent from the Court's decisions in rape cases with the
offended parties being young and immature girls from the
ages of twelve to sixteen,
. . . is (the) considerable receptivity on the part of this
Tribunal to lend credence to their version of what
transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to
which such a grueling experience as a court trial, where
they are called upon to lay bare what perhaps should be
 shrouded in secrecy, did expose them to. This is not to say
that an uncritical acceptance should be the rule. It is only
to emphasize that skepticism should be kept under
control. 87
Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of
witnesses. Jurisprudential annals is replete with the rule that the findings of
facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the
trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while
testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts 88 subject to
certain exceptions, 89 none of which, however, is attendant in this case. Trial
courts deal with live witnesses while appellate tribunals rely on the cold
pages of the written records. 90 In this case, the lower court's findings,
conclusions and evaluation of the testimony of witnesses is received on
appeal with the highest respect, 91 the same being supported by substantial
evidence on record. No cogent reason was shown that the court a quo had
overlooked or disregarded material facts and circumstances which when
considered would have affected the result of this
case 92 or justify a departure from its assessments and findings. 93
Coming now to the award of damages. Under the latest jurisprudence, a
victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) but if the commission of the crime of rape is effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty may be
imposed, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be not less than Seventy-
Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00). 94 In addition to such indemnity, the
victim or her heirs, as the case may be, can also recover moral damages
pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code 95 in such amount as the court
deems just, without the necessity for pleading or proof of the basis
thereof. 96 Civil indemnity is different from the award of moral and
exemplary damages. 97 The requirement of proof of mental and physical
suffering provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with
because it is "recognized that the victim's injury is inherently concomitant
with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per
se the award of moral damages". 98 Thus, it was held that a conviction for
rape carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim without need
for pleading or proof of the basis thereof 99 other than the fact of the
commission of the
offense. 100 Rape victims whose age ranges between 13 to 19 years are
entitled to moral damages. 101 Under the circumstances of this case,
appellant is liable to the victim for the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
With respect to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is
proper. Under Article 335 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659, this kind
of qualified rape when concurred in by any of the 7 102 qualifying
circumstances enumerated in the law carries the penalty of death, provided
that such circumstance is alleged and proven.
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that appellant is the father of the
victim, a fact which he even admitted during his direct examination 103 and
is further corroborated by the victim's duly certified Certificate of Live
Birth which indicates appellant as her father. 104 Moreover, such admission
is sufficient to establish paternity without further proof. This is so because,
acts and declaration about pedigree which includes "relationship" is an
admissible hearsay under the rules. 105 Besides, appellant interposed no
objection to the victim's testimony when she positively identified the former
as the one who raped her on January 23, 1996. 106 Such relationship of
father-daughter in rape cases is considered an aggravating circumstance
under Article 15 of the RPC. 107
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by
law for the crime of rape "when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent", the court has no option but to apply the
same "regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may
have attended the commission of the crime" 108 in accordance with article 63
of the RPC, as amended. 109 In similar per curiam cases, involving the rape
by a father of his minor daughter, the Court had imposed the penalty of
death. 110 The case at bench carries with it the penalty of death which is
mandatorily imposed by law 111 within the import of Article 47 of the RPC,
as amended, which provides:
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it
must be imposed under existing laws, except when the
guilty persons is below eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the crime or is more than
seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic
review of the case by the Supreme Court in required
 majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the without delay to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
death penalty, in which cases the penalty, in which cases clemency or pardoning power.1âwphi1.nêt
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
In an apparent, but futile attempt to mislead this Court, appellant quoted the
amended complaint in its Brief underscoring the words "eighteen (18) years Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
of age" 112 but omitted the word "under" to show that the victim was already Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and
at least 18 years old at the time of the rape. And, it is neither controverted Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
nor contested that the victim was below 18 years of age when her
father raped her on January 23, 1996. It can be easily verified from the Romero, J., is on leave.
records that his daughter was born at about 5:30 a.m. on January 20, 1980
as shown in the latter's authenticated Certificate of Live Birth. 113 Simple
arithmetic would shown that on the day she was raped, only three days has
just lapsed since the victim celebrated her sixteen (16) birthday. Besides,
appellant did not object to the victim's testimony that she was 16 years
old. 114 The testimony of a person as to her age is admissible although
another hearsay, though she can have no personal knowledge of the date of
her birth, as all knowledge as to one's age is acquired from whatever is told
by the parents or relative 115 — and such testimony constitute an assertion of
family tradition. 116 It is not also unreasonable to conclude that such was her
age considering that her parents were married sometime in July,
1979 117 and that their first offspring, the victim herein, would probably be
born within the next year.

Four justice of the Court, however, have continued to maintain the

unconstitutionality of Republic Act 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect
that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED with the

MODIFICATIONS that appellant is ordered to pay his daughter P75,000.00
as civil indemnity, in addition to the moral damages of P50,000.00 awarded
by the trial court. The award of exemplary damages is deleted for lack of
legal basis.

In accordance with Section 25 of the Republic Act No. 7659, amending

Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let
certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of this case be forwarded
G.R. No. L-23253               March 28, 1969

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR BETTY CHUA SY

ALIAS "GRACE CABANGBANG" FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. PACITA CHUA, petitioner-appellant, 
vs.
MR. & MRS. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG ET AL., respondents-
appellees.

Francisco R. Sotto and Associates for petitioner-appellant.

Teofilo F. Manalo for respondents-appellees Mr. & Mrs. Cabangbang.
Enrico R. Castro for respondent-appellee Victor T. Villareal.

CASTRO, J.:

  This is an appeal direct to this Court from the decision of May 21, 1964 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing Pacita Chua's petition
for habeas corpus directed against Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife
Flora Cabangbang.

  Pacita Chua, when still in the prime of youth, supported herself by

working in nightclubs as a hostess. And sexual liaison she had with man
after man without benefit of marriage. She first lived with a certain Chua
Ben in 1950 by whom she had a child who died in infancy. She afterwards
cohabited with Sy Sia Lay by whom she had two children named Robert
and Betty Chua Sy. The latter child was born on December 15, 1957.
Shortly after the birth of Betty, Pacita Chua and Sy Sia Lay separated.
Finding no one to fall back on after their separation, Pacita Chua lingered in
and around nightclubs and gambling joints, until she met Victor Tan
Villareal. In due time she became the latter's mistress. In 1960 another
child, a girl, was born to her. In 1961 when this last child was still an infant,
she and Villareal separated. Without means to support the said child, Pacita
Chua gave her away to a comadre in Cebu.
  Sometime in May 1958 Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, a childless
couple, acquired the custody of the child Betty who was then barely four
months old. They have since brought her up as their own. They had her
christened as Grace Cabangbang on September 12, 1958. 1
  There is some testimonial conflict on how the Cabangbang spouses
acquired custody of the girl Betty (or Grace), Pacita Chua avers that in
October 1958, while she and Villareal were still living together, the latter
surreptitiously took the child away and gave her to the Cabangbangs,
allegedly in recompense for favors received. She supposedly came to know
of the whereabouts of her daughter, only in 1960 when the girl, who was
then about three years old, was brought to her by Villareal, who shortly
thereafter returned the child to the Cabangbangs allegedly thru threats
intimidation, fraud and deceit. The Cabangbang spouses assert in rebuttal
that Mrs. Cabangbang found the child, wrapped in a bundle, at the gate of
their residence; that she reared her as her own and grew very fond of her;
and that nobody ever molested them until the child was 5-½ years of
age.lâwphi1.ñet
  At all events, it is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the
Cabangbang spouses by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Pacita
Chua.
  By letter dated June 6, 1963 addressed to the Cabangbang spouses, with
copy furnished to Villareal, Pacita Chua thru counsel demanded the
surrender to her of the custody of the child. Failing to secure such custody,
Pacita Chua (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) filed on June 14, 1963
a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
praying that the court grant her custody of and recognize her parental
authority over the girl. Named respondents in the petition were Villareal
and the spouses Cabangbang.
  On June 15, 1963 a writ was issued commanding the provincial sheriff of
Rizal or any of his deputies to produce the body of Betty Chua Sy or Grace
Cabangbang before the court a quo on June 17, 1963, at 8:30 a.m.
However, for reasons not stated in the record, the child was not produced
before the lower court as ordered.
  On June 21, 1963 Villareal filed his answer to the petition. The
Cabangbangs filed their answer the next day.
  After due trial, the lower court on May 21, 1964 promulgated its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
  IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court has come to the
conclusion that it will be for the welfare of the child Betty Chua Sy
also known as Grace Cabangbang to be under the custody of
respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang. Petition
dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
  In this appeal now before us, the petitioner tenders for resolution two
issues of law which, by her own formulation, read as follows: "The lower
court erred when it awarded the custody of petitioner's daughter Betty Chua
Sy or Grace Cabangbang, who is less than seven (7) years old, in favor of
respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang, and [2] illegally
deprived petitioner of parental authority over her daughter."
  We resolve both issues against the petitioner.
  I.
  Stated succinctly, the petitioner's thesis is that pursuant to the mandate
contained in article 363 of the Civil Code she cannot be separated from her
child who was less, seven years of age, and that she cannot be deprived of
her parental authority over the child because not one of the grounds for the
termination, loss, suspension or deprivation of parental authority provided
in article 332 of the same Code obtains in this case.
  Whether the petitioner can be legally separated from her child, Betty Chua
Sy or Grace Cabangbang, is an issue that is now moot and academic.
Having been born on December 15, 1957, the child is now 11 years of age.
Consequently, the second paragraph of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which
prohibits the separation of a child under seven years of age from her
mother, "unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure," has
no immediate relevance. The petitioner correctly argues, however, that the
reasons relied upon by the lower court — i.e., "petitioner is not exactly an
upright woman" and "it will be for the welfare of the child" — are not
strictly speaking, proper grounds in law to deprive a mother of her inherent
right to parental authority over her child. It must be conceded that minor
children — be they legitimate, recognized natural, adopted, natural by legal
fiction or illegitimate, other than natural as specified in art. 269 of the Civil
Code — are by law under the parental authority of both the father and the
mother, or either the father or the mother, as the case may be. But we take
the view that on the basis of the aforecited seemingly unpersuasive factual
premises, the petitioner can be deprived of her parental authority. For while
in one breath art. 313 of the Civil Code lays down the rule that "Parental
authority cannot be renounced or transferred, except in cases of
guardianship or adoption approved by the courts, or emancipation by
concession," it indicates in the next that "The courts may, in cases specified
by law deprive parents of their [parental] authority." And there are indeed
valid reasons, as will presently be expounded, for depriving the petitioner of
parental authority over the minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.
  It is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbangs
by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner. In support of
this finding, it cited the facts that the petitioner did not at all — not ever —
report to the authorities the alleged disappearance of her daughter, and had
not taken any step to see the child when she allegedly discovered that she
was in the custody of the Cabangbangs. It discounted the petitioner's claim
that she did not make any move to recover the child because the
Cabangbangs are powerful and influential. The petitioner is bound by the
foregoing findings of fact. Having taken her appeal directly to this Court,
she is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made
by the trial court. 2
  Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia:
  The courts may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend
the exercise of the same if they should treat their children with
excessive harshness or should give them corrupting orders,
counsels, or examples, or should make them beg or abandon them.
(emphasis supplied)
  Abandonment is therefore one of the grounds for depriving parents of
parental authority over their children.
  Was the petitioner's acquiescence to the giving by Villareal of her child to
the Cabangbangs tantamount to abandonment of the child? To our mind,
mere acquiescence — without more — is not sufficient to constitute
abandonment. But the record yields a host of circumstances which, in their
totality, unmistakably betray the petitioner's settled purpose and intention to
completely forego all parental response possibilities and forever relinquish
all parental claim in respect to the child.
  She surrendered the custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She
waited until 1963, or after the lapse of a period of five long years, before
she brought action to recover custody. Her claim that she did not take any
step to recover her child because the Cabangbangs were powerful and
influential, does not deserve any modicum of credence. A mother
who really loves her child would go to any extent to be reunited with her.
The natural and normal reaction of the petitioner — once informed, as she
alleged, and her child was in the custody of the Cabangbangs — should
have been to move heaven and earth, to use a worn-out but still respectable
cliche, in order to recover her. Yet she lifted not a finger.
  It is a matter of record — being the gist of her own unadulterated
testimony under oath — that she wants the child back so that Sy Sia Lay,
the alleged father, would resume providing the petitioner the support which
he peremptorily withheld and ceased to give when she gave the child away.
A woman scorned, she desires to recover the child as a means of
embarrassing Villareal who retrieved the jeep he gave her and altogether
stopped living with and supporting her. But the record likewise reveals that
at the pre-trial conducted by the court a quo, she expressed her willingness
that the child remain with the Cabangbangs provided the latter would in
exchange give her a jeep and some money.
  The petitioner's inconsistent demands in the course of the proceedings
below, reveal that her motives do not flow from the wellsprings of a loving
mother's heart. Upon the contrary, they are unmistakably selfish — nay,
mercenary. She needs the child as a leverage to obtain concessions —
financial and otherwise — either from the alleged father or the
Cabangbangs. If she gets the child back, support for her would be
forthcoming so she thinks — from the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay. On the
other hand, if the Cabangbangs would keep the child, she would agree
provided they gave her a jeep and some money.
  Indeed, the petitioner's attitude, to our mind, does nothing but confirm her
intention to abandon the child — from the very outset when she allowed
Villareal to give her away to the Cabangbangs. It must be noted that the
abandonment took place when the child, barely four months old, was at the
most fragile stage of life and needed the utmost care and solicitude of her
mother. And for five long years thereafter she did not once move to recover
the child. She continuously shunned the natural and legal obligations which
she owed to the child; completely withheld her presence, her love, her care,
and the opportunity to display maternal affection; and totally denied her
support and maintenance. Her silence and inaction have been prolonged to
such a point that her abandonment of the child and her total relinquishment
of parental claim over her, can and should be inferred as a matter of law. 3
  Note that this was not the only instance when she gave away a child of her
own flesh and blood. She gave up her youngest child, named Betty Tan
Villareal, to her comadre in Cebu because she could not support it.
  Of incalculable significance is the fact that nowhere in the course of the
petitioner's lengthy testimony did she ever express a genuine desire to
recover her child Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang — or, for that
matter, her other child Betty Tan Villareal — because she loves her, cares
for her, and wants to smother her with motherly affection. Far from it. She
wants Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang back so that the alleged father
would resume giving her (the petitioner) support. She wants her back to
humiliate and embarrass the respondent Villareal who, with her knowledge
and consent, gave the child to the Cabangbangs. But — "most unkindest cut
of all"! — she nevertheless signified her readiness to give up the child, in
exchange for a jeep and some money.
  We therefore affirm the lower court's decision, not on the grounds cited by
it, but upon a ground which the court overlooked — i.e., abandonment by
the petitioner of her child. 4
  Contrast the petitioner's attitude with that of the respondents Cabangbang
— especially the respondent Flora Cabangbang who, from the moment the
child was given to them, took care of her as if she were her own flesh and
blood, had her baptized, and when she reached school age enrolled her in a
reputable exclusive school, for girls.
  Ironically enough, the real heart-rending tragedy in this case would consist
not in taking the child away from the Cabangbangs but in returning her to
the custody of the petitioner.
  For, by her own admission, the petitioner has no regular source of income,
and it is doubtful, to say the very least, that she can provide the child with
the barest necessities of life, let alone send her to school. There is no
insurance at all that the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay — an unknown quantity,
as far as the record goes — would resume giving the petitioner support once
she and the child are reunited. What would then prevent the petitioner from
again doing that which she did before, i.e., give her away? These are of
course conjectures, but when the welfare of a helpless child is at stake, it is
the bounden duty of courts — which they cannot shirk — to respect,
enforce, and give meaning and substance to a child's natural and legal right
to live and grow in the proper physical, moral and intellectual
environment. 5
  This is not to say that with the Cabangbang spouses, a bright and secure
future is guaranteed for her. For life is beset at every turn with snares and
pitfalls. But the record indubitably pictures the Cabangbang spouses as a
childless couple of consequence in the community, who have given her
their name and are rearing her as their very own child, and with whom there
is every reason to hope she will have a fair chance of normal growth and
development into respectable womanhood.
  Verily, to surrender the girl to the petitioner would be to assume — quite
incorrectly — that only mothers are capable of parental love and affection.
Upon the contrary, this case precisely underscores the homiletic admonition
that parental love is not universal and immutable like a law of natural
science.
  II.
  The petitioner assails as illegal and without basis the award of the custody
of Grace Cabangbang or Betty Chua Sy to the Cabangbang spouses upon
the grounds, first, that the couple are not related by consanguinity or affinity
to the child, and second, because the answer of the spouses contains no
prayer for the custody of the child.
  The absence of any kinship between the child and the Cabangbangs alone
cannot serve to bar the lower court from awarding her custody to them.
Indeed, the law provides that in certain cases the custody of a child may be
awarded even to strangers, as against either the father or the mother or
against both. Thus, in proceedings involving a child whose parents are
separated — either legally or de facto — and where it appears that both
parents are improper persons to whom to entrust the care, custody and
control of the child, "the court may either designate the paternal or maternal
grandparent of the child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable
and discreet person to take charge of such child, or commit it to and
suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent society." 6
  Parenthetically, sections 6 and 7 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court belie the
petitioner's contention that the first sentence of art. 363 of the Civil Code,
which states that
  In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount.....
  applies only when the litigation involving a child is between the father and
the mother. That the policy enunciated, in the abovequoted legal provision
is of general application, is evident from the use of the, adjective all —
meaning, the whole extent or quantity of, the entire number of, every one
of. 7 It is, therefore, error to argue that if the suit involving a child's custody
is between a parent and a stranger, the law must necessarily award such
custody to the parent. Sec 7, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, precisely
contemplates, among others, a suit between a parent and a stranger who, in
the words of the provision, is "some reputable resident of the province."
And under the authority of the said rule, the court — if it is for the best
interest of the child — may take the child away from its parents and commit
it to, inter alia, a benevolent person.
  The petitioner's contention that the answer of the spouses Cabangbang
contains no prayer for the retention by them of the custody of the child, is
equally devoid of merit. The several moves taken by them are clear and
definitive enough. First, they asked for her custody pendente lite. Second,
they sought the dismissal of the petition below for lack of merit. Finally,
they added a general prayer for other reliefs just and equitable in the
premises. Surely the above reliefs prayed for are clearly indicative of the
Cabangbangs' genuine desire to retain the custody of Betty Chua Sy or
Grace Cabangbang.
  III.
  Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto." The petitioner has not proven that she is entitled
to the rightful custody of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang. Upon the
contrary, by wantonly and completely shunting aside her legal and moral
obligations toward her child, she must be deemed as having forfeited all
legitimate legal and moral claim to her custody. The lower court acted
correctly in dismissing her petition.
  ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No pronouncement as
to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 3236            March 27, 1907
SEBASTIAN ABIERA, administrator of the estate of JUAN ABIERA,
deceased, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
MIGUEL ORIN, defendant-appellant.
W.A. Kincaid for appellant.
Sebastian Abiera in his own behalf.
MAPA, J.:
There was no new trial asked for in this case and therefore this court can not
review the proofs presented in the same. The judgment of the lower court
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, as special administrator of the estate
of Juan Abiera, deceased, who died intestate, which judgment is in accord
with the prayer of the complaint herein and orders the defendant to pay the
sum of 1,000 pesos, as claimed in said complaint.
The court below states, among other things, in its judgment rendered herein,
the following:
Vicenta Cacao, Mariano Cacao, and Petra Cacao were brothers and
sisters. Vicenta Cacao married Miguel Orin and after her said
marriage left no descendants or ascendants, and Miguel Orin,
Mariano Cacao, and Juan Abiera in 1898 entered into an
agreement in writing covering the disposition of the properties and
animals had and acquired during the marriage of Miguel Orin and
Vicenta Cacao; Mariano Cacao and Juan Abiera as representatives
of their children, who are the only heirs as well as the natural
nephews of the deceased woman Cacao.
"Now, the plaintiff," continues the judgment, "has filed this complaint as
special administrator of his deceased father, Juan Abiera, alleging that the
defendant has not complied with the said contract and agreement and prays
the court to compel the compliance of the defendant therewith."
The tenor of this contract, according to the judgment referred to, is as
follows:
We, having knowledge and information of the inventory of the
properties acquired during the married state and life of Miguel
Orin and the said Vicenta Cacao, by our contract have agreed, that
Miguel Orin, The widower, obligates himself to deliver to his
brothers-in-law, as guardians and fathers of the heirs of Petra
Cacao, the value of one thousand pesos to each of them. The
period within which to comply with this contract is until August
15, next; this is the just amount of our inheritance.
From these statements of the judgment it is clearly seen that the deceased,
Juan Abiera, entered into a contract, the compliance of which is prayed for
in the complaint herein, not as a personal right, but in the name and
representation of his children. There can be no doubts as to this. The
contract deals with the matter of the extrajudicial partition of the estate left
by Vicenta Cacao whose heirs were according to the judgment, not Juan
Abiera but his children. Abiera, therefore, had to act by force of law in the
representation of these children in treating in such contract as to the manner
in which the said estate was to be divided. It was for this reason, says the
court below in emphatic terms, that Juan Abiera became a party to the said
contract as the representative of his children. It was for this reason also that
there is expressed in the same contract the fact that Miguel Orin obligated
himself to pay over 1,000 pesos to Juan Abiera as guardian and farther of
the heirs of Petra Cacao. This Petra Cacao was the deceased wife of Juan
Abiera and the sister of Vicenta Cacao, whose estate is dealt with herein
and which estate came to be inherited and participated in, through
legitimate succession by the children of Juan Abiera in representation of
their mother, the said Petra Cacao.
Therefore, the true interested parties in the obligation contracted by the
defendant herein, Miguel Orin, are the children of Juan Abiera, and not the
latter, for the simple reason that the obligation was executed in their favor
and not in favor of said Abiera. This being the fact, it is evident that the
plaintiff in his office as administrator of the deceased Juan Abiera has no
right to ask for the compliance with the said obligation. As such
administrator he has only the right to institute such actions as correspond
and pertain to the estate which he is administering, and no other action
dealing with contracts and obligations contracted in favor of third persons,
or others from whom he does not derive such right, can be brought as such
administrator.
On the other hand it is not necessary, it being too trivial, to refer to the right
of Juan Abiera to represent his children as father or guardian of the same,
and that he has not transferred nor could he transfer to the administrator of
his estate such right from the mere fact that he was such administrator. As
has been stated, the said right attached to parental authority or guardianship
was extinguished with the death of Abiera, together with the parental right
or the said guardianship — this in fact and law. This was an exclusively
personal right that could not survive the person who had such right.

Consequently by reason of the considerations expressed above the court

below incurred error in taking into consideration the propriety of the
complaint herein. This could not have been done legally, the plaintiff not
having the right of action and was without such right of action in the suit
brought by him, and this is the basis of the exception taken by the appellant
and now before this court. It is true that this exception on this point was not
brought forward in the Court of First Instance, but it is also true that the
exception based on the lack of right of action can be submitted during any
stage or state of the case, as provided in section 931 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

Wherefore the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint

dismissed, without special mention as to the costs in both instances. After
the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let
judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the
case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So
ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.


G.R. No. L-16903             March 18, 1921
MARIA CORTES, petitioner-appellant,  made. However all of this may be, one fact remains and this is, that the
vs.
CANDIDA CASTILLO and ADRIANO HERRERA, respondent-
appellees.
Antonio M. Jimenez for appellant.
Pedro Magsalin for appellees.
MALCOLM, J.:
By means of these proceedings in habeas corpus, the petitioner Maria
Cortes, widow of the deceased sergeant Alejandro Herrera, seeks to obtain
the return of her children, Arcadio and Bernardo, aged 6 and 4, respectively,
now under the control of their grandmother, Candida Castillo. The trial
judge, the Honorable Pedro Concepcion, in his decision, dismissed the
petition without special findings as to costs, and named the grandmother
Candida Castillo as the guardian of the minors. It is from this judgment that
the petitioner has appealed.
Maria Cortes and Alejandro Herrera were legally married. On the
complaint, however, of the husband, action was brought against the wife for
adultery and she was found guilty and sentenced to three years six months
and twenty-one days of imprisonment. The husband later condoned the
guilty spouse, secured her a pardon, and went to live with her a second time.
Not long thereafter, the husband again became suspicious of the conduct of
his wife and taking the two elder children, Arcadio and Bernardo, went to
live in the house of his mother. Action for divorce was begun by the
husband, Alejandro Herrera, but this was not terminated at the time of his
untimely and heroic death, while in the performance of his duties as a
member of the police force of the city of Manila.
The instant action may have been begun by the mother because of maternal
affection for her children, and again it may have been begun, as insinuated
by counsel for the respondents, because of the sum of money gathered for
the support of the children. Certain testimony was introduced intended to
show that Maria Cortes testimony was introduced intended to show that
Maria Cortes had insufficient means to support the children. Ineffectual
attempts to prove the continued immoral conduct of the mother were also
mother has been found guilty of adultery.
As suggested in the decision of the trial court, and by counsel on appeal, the
questions reduce themselves to these: Has the mother uncontrollable
authority over her children? Or is there a discretionary power in the courts
by means of which the mother can be deprived of such authority?
Article 171 of the Civil Code, presumably still in force, because of
continued judicial construction and enforcement, provides that parents who,
by the example set by them, tend to corrupt their offspring, may be deprived
by the courts of their parental authority. (There can also be noted sections
770 and 771 of the Code of Civil Procedure.) This provision of the law
imposes a discretionary power on the courts, which should be made use of,
with a primary regard for the welfare of the minor. (See 2 Manresa, Codigo
Civil, pp. 63, et seq.; decision of the supreme court of Spain, June 23,
1905.) Both under the civil law and the common law, the best interests of
the child is the paramount consideration.
In this instance, we are of the opinion that such unfitness on the part of the
mother has been shown as warranted the trial court, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion, in leaving the children in the custody of their
grandmother.
Judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street and Villamor, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997]
CARLITOS E. SILVA, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
SUZANNE T. GONZALES, Respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care
for their children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best
interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly
denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the
parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the
attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged.
Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course,
any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
The petition bears upon this concern.
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an
unmarried local actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The
union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not
very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according to
Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that
she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At
any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of
Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous
understanding, to have the children in his company on weekends. Silva filed
a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by
Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and
womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of
the children.
In an order, dated 07 April 1989, the trial court adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered directing
respondent to allow herein petitioner visitorial rights to his children during
Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he take out thechildren
without the written consent of the mother or respondent herein. No
pronouncement as to costs."1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales
interposed an appeal from the RTCs order to the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds
emigrated to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales; it
held:
"In all questions, regarding the care, custody, education and property of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration' - not the welfare of
the parents (Art. 8, PD 603). Under the predicament and/or status of both
petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant, We find it more wholesome
morally and emotionally for the children if we put a stop to the rotation of
custody of said children. Allowing these children to stay with their mother
on weekdays and then with their father and the latter's live-in partner on
weekends may not be conducive to a normal up-bringing of children of
tender age. There is no telling how this kind of set-up, no matter how
temporary and/or remote, would affect the moral and emotional conditions
of the minor children. Knowing that they are illegitimate is hard enough,
but having to live with it, witnessing their father living with a woman not
their mother may have a more damaging effect upon them.
"Article 3 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, provides in part:
"`Art. 3. Rights of the Child. - x x x
`(1) x x x
`(2) x x x
`(3) x x x
`(4) x x x
`(5) Every child has the right to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality
and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of his character.
`(6) x x x
`(7) x x x
`(8) Every child has the right to protection against exploitation, improper
influences, hazards and other conditions or circumstances prejudicial to
his physical, mental, emotional, social and moral development.
`x x x'
"With Articles 3 and 8 of PD 603, in mind, We find it to the best interest of
the minor children, to deny visitorial and/or temporary custodial rights to
the father, even at the expense of hurting said parent. After all, if indeed his
love for the children is genuine and more divine than the love for himself, a
little self-sacrifice and self-denial may bring more benefit to the children.
While petitioner-appellee, as father, may not intentionally prejudice the
children by improper influence, what the children may witness and hear
while in their father's house may not be in keeping with the atmosphere of
morality and rectitude where they should be brought up.
"The children concerned are still in their early formative years of life. The
molding of the character of the child starts at home. A home with only one
parent is more normal than two separate houses - (one house where one
parent lives and another house where the other parent with another
woman/man lives). After all, under Article 176 of the Family Code,
illegitimate children are supposed to use the surname of and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother.
"The child is one of the most important assets of the nation. It is thus
important we be careful in rearing the children especially so if they are
illegitimates, as in this case.
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
giving due course to the appeal. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City dated April 7, 1989 is hereby reversed. Petitioner-appellee's
petition for visitorial rights is hereby denied.
"SO ORDERED."2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Silva comes to this Court for relief.
The issue before us is not really a question of child custody; instead, the
case merely concerns the visitation right of a parent over his children which
the trial court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall
have visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in
no case (could) he take out the children without the written consent of the
mother x x x." The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a
noncustodial parent to his or her child or
children.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition
on the inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Article
150 of the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations include those x x
x (2) (b)etween parents and children; x x x." Article 209, in relation to own children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably
Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out
parents and those exercising parental authority to, among other things, the children without the written consent of the mother."
keep children in their company and to give them love and affection, advice
and counsel, companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing
speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights of parents in the thereby the judgment of the appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE.
rearing of the youth.4 There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these No costs.
provisions are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate
relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on support and SO ORDERED.
successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate
members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate
relationships as well.5 Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration Padilla, Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes
a void or inexistentmarriage, Article  49 of the Family Code provides for Hermosisima, Jr., J., on leave.
appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their
children.

There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare
is always the paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the
Solicitor General, who has recommended due course to the petition, that a
few hours spent by petitioner with the children, however, could not all be
that detrimental to the children. Similarly, what the trial court has observed
is not entirely without merit; thus:

"The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even

assuming as true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an
unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to the effect that petitioner
shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even
temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's
unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and
goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal
action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be
imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of
tender ages."6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their

well-meant concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that
petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parents
natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his
 On 14 December 1998, Nicholas Frederick London, then 11 years old,
assisted by his father, Michael London, executed and filed before the Office
of the City Prosecutor in Baguio City a complaint-affidavit for "Sexual
Harassment and/or Child Abuse and/or Acts of Lasciviousness and Unjust
Vexation" against respondent Francis Bastiano Simalong, a bowling
mechanic at the Baguio Country Club. The complaint contained
asseverations about an incident that was said to have occurred on 29
November 1998 at the Baguio Country Club. Nicholas was playing video
games at the recreation center of the club, when Simalong, then obviously
drunk, placed his hand around Nicholas and touched the latter’s penis.
Frightened, Nicholas immediately informed by telephone his parents about
it. Forthwith, his parents fetched him, and the three proceeded to the police
station to report the matter.

On 28 December 1998, the investigating prosecutor, finding probable cause

to prosecute Simalong, filed an Information for unjust vexation before the
Municipal Trial Court ("MTC"). On 09 October 1999, the MTC issued an
order to the effect that, Nicholas being a minor, the case should instead be
handled by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Baguio City in accordance
with Circular No. 11-99 of the Supreme Court and Republic Act No. 8369
(the Family Courts Act of 1997). The criminal case was transferred to the
RTC and docketed Criminal Case No. 17107-R. The private complainant
reserved his right to institute an independent civil action.

On 17 December 1999, Nicholas, represented by his father Michael, filed a

complaint for damages before the Baguio City RTC, against the Baguio
G.R. No. 145436             Otober 10, 2002 Country Club, the club’s General Manager Anthony de Leon, and Francis
Simalong. The civil action, docketed Civil Case No. 4587-R, was
MICHAEL LONDON for and in behalf of his minor  predicated on the civil liability of defendants for culpa acquiliana under the
son NICHOLAS FREDERICK LONDON, petitioner,  provisions of the Civil Code.
vs.
BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB CORPORATION, ANTHONY DE LEON On 04 February 2000, the Baguio Country Club and Anthony de Leon filed
and FRANCIS BASTIANO SIMALONG, respondents. a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
"Verification/Certification" against forum shopping attached to the
DECISION complaint did not disclose the existence and status of Criminal Case No.
17107-R.
VITUG, J.:
The Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 61 issued, on 18 April 2000, a
resolution granting the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff filed a motion for
the reconsideration of the order of dismissal. In the meantime, plaintiff
sought the inhibition of Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes of RTC Branch 61
from trying Civil Case No. 4587-R on the ground that the judge was a close
friend of the club’s president and counsel. Judge Reyes inhibited himself
and the case was transferred to Branch 59 of the Baguio City RTC presided
over by Judge Abraham B. Borreta. On 10 October 2000, Judge Borreta
issued an order denying the motion for the reconsideration of the 18th April
2000 order of dismissal of the civil case.
against Simalong cannot at all be invoked as being one of res judicata in the
independent suit for damages.
It may not be amiss to reiterate that rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid
application that would tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice are well to be avoided.4 Indeed, the Rules of Civil Procedure on
forum shopping are not always applied with inflexibility.5

On 29 November 2000, the plaintiff filed the instant petition for review WHEREFORE, the challenged resolutions, dated 18 April 2000 and 10
assailing the dismissal of his complaint in Civil Case No. 4587-R. October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 51, are
SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 4587-R is hereby ordered REINSTATED. No
The petition is meritorious. costs.

Forum shopping is the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings SO ORDERED.
grounded on the same cause upon the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition.1 For forum shopping to exist, the Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), concur.
actions must involve the same transaction, including the essential facts and Ynares-Santiago and Carpio, JJ., abroad on official business.
circumstances thereof, and must raise identical causes of actions, subject Sandoval-Gutierrez, (special member, per special order no. 269), concur.
matter and issues. The mere filing of two or more cases based on the same
incident does not necessarily constitute forum-shopping.2 In fine, there
should be (a) identity of parties or at least such parties who represent the
same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, such relief being founded on the same circumstances, and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered
in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the action under consideration, said requisites being likewise
constitutive of the elements of auter action pendent or litis pendencia.3

While, in this instance, both the criminal action and the civil complaint for
quasi-delict have arisen from an act of lasciviousness claimed to have been
committed by Simalong against the person of Nicholas Frederick London,
there are, however, material differences between the two actions. In the
criminal case, the real party plaintiff is the "People of the Philippines" and
the defendant is accused Simalong alone. In the civil case, the parties are
plaintiff Michael London, for and in behalf of his minor son Nicholas
Frederick London, and the defendants include not only Simalong but also
the Baguio Country Club and its general manager Anthony de Leon. Given
the circumstances, a judgment of conviction or acquittal in the criminal case
 This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 30,
2006 Decision2 and December 20, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229 affirming the August 17, 1999
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in
Civil Case No. 96-9591 and denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Factual Antecedents

Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar

spouses) died, intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February
8, 1994, respectively.  Included in their estate are two parcels of land
(herein subject properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
25896 and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod
(the subject titles).6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod
City (Bacolod RTC) a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages
against respondent Edna G. Siasat.  Docketed as Civil Case No. 96-9591
and assigned to Branch 49 of the Bacolod RTC, the Complaint7 alleged that
petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that
he (petitioner) discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he
suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same;
that he executed affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same
with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on June 22, 1996,
he filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of second
owner’s copy of Certificate of Title No. T-25896, which respondent
opposed; and that during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent
presented the two missing owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles. 
Petitioner thus prayed for mandatory injunctive relief, in that respondent be
ordered to surrender to him the owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles
in her possession; and that damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit be
awarded to him.
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner v. EDNA G. SIASAT, Respondents.
In her Answer,8 respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole
DECISION surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised
by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that
petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since
DEL CASTILLO, J.: Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter
inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no
issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for
safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.  By way of
counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar
spouses as their son.  To prove filiation, he presented the following
documents, among others:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School,
Purok No. 2, Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company (BMMC),
Bacolod City (Exhibit “C” and submarkings), wherein it is stated
that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent;chanrobleslaw
2. His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit “F”), which indicated
that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;chanrobleslaw
3. Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated
October 10, 1957 (Exhibit “G”), a public instrument subscribed
and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his employment
with BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb marks and
indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his
son and dependent;chanrobleslaw
4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employment with BMMC
dated October 29, 1954 (Exhibit “L”), indicating that petitioner is
his son;chanrobleslaw
5. Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit “M”),
where it is declared that the Aguilar spouses are his parents; and
6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit “O”) addressed to a
BMMC supervisor introducing petitioner as Alfredo Aguilar’s son
and recommending him for employment.
7. Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City
Civil Registry to the effect that the record of births during the
period 1945 to 1946 were “all destroyed by nature,” hence no true
copies of the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner could be issued
as requested (Exhibit “Q”).9
Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-
Aguilar (Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano (Aguilar-Pailano),
his aunt and sister of Alfredo Aguilar.  Abendan-Aguilar confirmed
petitioner’s identity, and she testified that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar
spouses and that during her marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter
in the Aguilar spouses’ conjugal home built on one of the subject
properties.  On the other hand, 81-year old Aguilar-Pailano testified that she
is the sister of Alfredo Aguilar; that the Aguilar spouses have only one son
– herein petitioner – who was born at BMMC; that after the death of the
Aguilar spouses, she and her siblings did not claim ownership of the subject
properties because they recognized petitioner as the Aguilar spouses’ sole
child and heir; that petitioner was charged with murder, convicted,
imprisoned, and later on paroled; and that after he was discharged on
parole, petitioner continued to live with his mother Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar in one of the subject properties, and continues to live there with his
family.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a retired
teacher; that she does not know petitioner very well, but only heard his
name from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not related by
consanguinity or affinity to petitioner; that she attended to Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was under medication in a hospital until her
death; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s hospital and funeral expenses were
paid for by Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an
affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir to her
husband Alfredo Aguilar’s estate; that she did not steal the subject titles, but
that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that a
prior planned sale of the subject properties did not push through because
when petitioner’s opinion thereto was solicited, he expressed disagreement
as to the agreed price.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera
(Siasat-Nicavera), 74 years old, who stated that the Aguilar spouses were
married on June 22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the sister of
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she does not know petitioner, although she
admitted that she knew a certain “Rodolfo” whose nickname was “Mait”;
that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar spouses; and that Alfredo
Aguilar has a sister named Ester Aguilar-
Pailano.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar (Exhibit “2”) announcing among others that she and Alfredo
have no issue, and that she is the sole heir to Alfredo’s estate.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision, decreeing as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid evidence
attesting to the fact that plaintiff herein is either a biological son or a legally
adopted one was ever presented.  Neither was a certificate of live birth of
plaintiff ever introduced confirming his biological relationship as a son to
the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar.  As a matter of
fact, in the affidavit of Candelaria S. Aguilar (Exhibit 2) she expressly
announced under oath that Alfredo and she have no issue and that she is the
sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is (sic) concrete proof that plaintiff herein
was never a son by consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the deceased
spouses Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar.
This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest
in this action to be considered qualified or entitled to the issuance of the
writ of mandatory injunction and damages prayed for.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff’s
complaint with cost.
The counterclaim of the defendant is likewise dismissed for lack of legal
basis.
SO ORDERED.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
14
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.   Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV
No. 64229, the appeal essentially argued that petitioner is indeed the
Aguilar spouses’ son; that under Article 172 of the Family Code,15 an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned constitutes proof of
filiation; that through the documentary evidence presented, petitioner has
shown that he is the legitimate biological son of the Aguilar spouses and the
sole heir to their estate.  He argued that he cannot present his Certificate of
Live Birth as all the records covering the period 1945-194616 of the Local
Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed as shown by Exhibits “Q” to
“Q-3”; for this reason, he presented the foregoing documentary evidence to
prove his relationship to the Aguilar spouses.  Petitioner made particular
reference to, among others, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”),
arguing that the same was made under oath and thus sufficient under Article
172 of the Family Code to establish that he is a child and heir of the Aguilar
spouses.  Finally, petitioner questioned the trial court’s reliance upon
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s affidavit (Exhibit “2”) attesting that she and
Alfredo have no children and that she is the sole heir to the estate of
Alfredo, when such piece of evidence has been discarded by the trial court
in a previous Order dated April 1, 1998, stating
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Except for defendant’s Exhibit “2”, all other Exhibits, Exhibits “1”, “3”, “4”
and “5”, together with their submarkings, are all admitted in evidence.17
On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the trial
court’s August 17, 1999 Decision, pronouncing
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his filiation with
the deceased spouses Aguilar deserve scant consideration by this Court. 
The Elementary School Permanent Record of plaintiff-appellant cannot be
considered as proof of filiation.  As enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
439:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
“Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not
constitute evidence of filiation.”
As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, WE hold that it cannot be considered as
evidence of filiation.  As stated by the Supreme Court in the case of
Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA 360:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of
filiation.  More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only
shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.”
With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is shown that the
parents of the former are Alfredo and Candelaria Siasat Aguilar does not
prove filiation.  The Highest Tribunal declared that a marriage contract not
signed by the alleged father of bride is not competent evidence of filiation
nor is a marriage contract recognition in a public instrument.
The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security Form E-1
(Exhibit “G”) and the Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar
(Exhibit “L”), allegedly tend to establish that plaintiff-appellant has been
and is presently known as Rodolfo Siasat Aguilar and he has been bearing
the surname of his alleged parents.
WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellant’s argument.  Use of a family surname
certainly does not establish pedigree.
Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of Employment of
Alfredo Aguilar are concerned, WE cannot accept them as sufficient proof
to establish and prove the filiation of plaintiff-appellant to the deceased
Aguilar spouses.  While the former is a public instrument and the latter
bears the signature of Alfredo Aguilar, they do not constitute clear and
convincing evidence to show filiation based on open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child.  Filiation is a serious matter
that must be resolved according to the requirements of the law.
All told, plaintiff-appellant’s evidence failed to hurdle the “high standard of
proof” required for the success of an action to establish one’s legitimate
filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous
possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the deceased
spouses Aguilar, thereby negating his right to demand the delivery of the
subject TCTs in his favor, this Court cannot grant the writ of mandatory
injunction being prayed for.
xxxx
In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a clear and
unmistakable right that has been violated.  Neither had he shown permanent
and urgent necessity for the issuance of the writ.
With respect to the damages prayed for, WE sustain the trial court in
denying the same.  Aside from the fact that plaintiff-appellant failed to
show his clear right over the subject parcels of land so that he has not
sustained any damage by reason of the withholding of the TCTs from him,
there is no clear testimony on the anguish or anxiety he allegedly suffered
as a result thereof.  Well entrenched in law and jurisprudence is the
principle that the grant of moral damages is expressly allowed by law in
instances where proofs of the mental anguish, serious anxiety and moral
shock were shown.
ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is
hereby DENIED.  The impugned Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED
IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 but in a December 20, 2011
Resolution, the CA held its ground.  Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
In an August 28, 2013 Resolution,20 this Court resolved to give due course
to the Petition, which raises the following
issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In issuing the assailed DECISION affirming in toto the Decision of RTC
Branch 49, Bacolod City, and the Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible
error [in] not taking into consideration petitioner’s Exhibit “G” (SSS E-1
acknowledged and notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo
Aguilar, recognizing the petitioner as his son) as public document that
satisfies the requirement of Article 172 of the [Family] Code in the
establishment of the legitimate filiation of the petitioner with his father,
Alfredo Aguilar.
The herein [P]etition raises the issue of pure question of law with respect to This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon,26 has held that –
the application of Article 172 of the Family Code particularly [paragraph] 3
thereof in conjunction with Section 19 and Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court relating to public document which is substantial enough to
merit consideration of this Honorable Court as it will enrich jurisprudence
and forestall future litigation.21

Petitioner’s Arguments

In his Petition and Reply22 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA
dispositions and praying that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to
surrender the owner’s duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
25896 and T-(15462) 1070, petitioner argues that Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS
Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. 
Petitioner contends that said SSS Form E-1 is a declaration under oath by
his father, Alfredo Aguilar, of his status as the latter’s son; this recognition
should be accorded more weight than the presumption of legitimacy, since
Article 172 itself declares that said evidence establishes legitimate filiation
without need of court action.  He adds that in contemplation of law,
recognition in a public instrument such as the SSS Form E-1 is the “highest
form of recognition which partake (sic) of the nature of a complete act of
recognition bestowed upon” him as the son of the late Alfredo Aguilar; that
respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot
collaterally attack his legitimacy; that the action to impugn his legitimacy
has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family
Code;23 and that having proved his filiation, mandatory injunction should
issue, and an award of damages is in order.

Respondent’s Arguments

In her Comment24 and Memorandum,25 respondent simply echoes the

pronouncements of the CA, adding that the Petition is a mere rehash of the
CA appeal which has been passed upon succinctly by the appellate court.

Our Ruling

The Court grants the Petition.

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established
by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In
the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.  The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. 
In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does
not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a
claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to
prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the
marriage of their parents.  The certificates of live birth would also
identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due
to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such
a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.  Quite remarkably,
upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper
cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be
legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed
and unassailable.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be
concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the
marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar28 and before
their respective deaths29 – has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate
issue of the Aguilar spouses.  As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo
Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) satisfies the requirement for proof of
filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the
Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an “admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.”
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth
since all the records covering the period 1945-1946  of the Local Civil
Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the
introduction of other documentary evidence – particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s
SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) – to prove filiation.  It was erroneous for the
CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172
of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph
thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due
recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. And,
relative to said form of acknowledgment, the Court has further held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt
the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of
the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is
made:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1)  Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2)  Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation
therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging
parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the “paramount
consideration” in resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly
emphatic:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.cralawred
It is thus “(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children x x x.”  Too, “(t)he State as parens patriae affords
special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.”30 (Emphasis supplied)
present case is not one impugning petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are
asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that
she is not a child of Jose at all.32
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses, then he is as well heir to the latter’s estate.  Respondent is then left
with no right to inherit from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s estate,
since succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct
line.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.  The August 30, 2006
Decision and December 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229, as well as the August 17, 1999 Decision  of
the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-
9591 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  Respondent Edna G. Siasat is
hereby ordered to SURRENDER to the petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the
owner’s duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-
(15462) 1070.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* , Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained
a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office
(NSO), since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy thereof was destroyed. 
He would not have had to go through the trouble of presenting other
documentary evidence; the NSO copy would have sufficed.  This fact is not
lost on petitioner; the Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the
Bacolod City Civil Registry (Exhibit “Q”) contained just such an advice for
petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar General at the NSO
in Manila to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, since for every
registered birth in the country, a copy of the Certificate of Live Birth is
submitted to said office.

As to petitioner’s argument that respondent has no personality to impugn

his legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the
action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles
170 and 171 of the Family Code, the Court has held before that –
Article 26331 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to
assert and prove that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the
 CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother

Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint1 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition and support against Ben-Hur
Nepomuceno (petitioner).

Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an

extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix
his signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten note
dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her
financial support in the amount of ₱1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each
month beginning August 15, 1999.

Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the handwritten

note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1) recognize her as his
child, (2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of ₱8,000 a
month, and (3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she
reaches the age of majority.

Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of
Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on
account of threats coming from the National People’s Army.2

By Order of July 4, 2001,3 Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, on the basis of

petitioner’s handwritten note which it treated as "contractual support" since
the issue of Arhbencel’s filiation had yet to be determined during the
hearing on the merits, granted Arhbencel’s prayer for support pendente lite
in the amount of ₱3,000 a month.

G.R. No. 181258               March 18, 2010 After Arhbencel rested her case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence
which the trial court granted by Order dated June 7, 2006,4 whereupon the
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, Petitioner,  case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
vs.
ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI The trial court held that, among other things, Arhbencel’s Certificate of
LOPEZ, Respondent. Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to petitioner as it did not
bear petitioner’s signature; that petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to
DECISION provide support did not contain a categorical acknowledgment that
Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no showing that petitioner
performed any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate
child after the execution of the note.
On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 20,
2007,5 reversed the trial court’s decision, declared Arhbencel to be
petitioner’s illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered petitioner to give
Arhbencel financial support in the increased amount of ₱4,000 every 15th
and 30th days of the month, or a total of ₱8,000 a month.
The appellate court found that from petitioner’s payment of Araceli’s
hospital bills when she gave birth to Arhbencel and his subsequent
commitment to provide monthly financial support, the only logical
conclusion to be drawn was that he was Arhbencel’s father; that petitioner
merely acted in bad faith in omitting a statement of paternity in his
handwritten undertaking to provide financial support; and that the amount
of ₱8,000 a month was reasonable for Arhbencel’s subsistence and not
burdensome for petitioner in view of his income.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated
January 3, 2008,6 petitioner comes before this Court through the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari.7
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the documentary evidence presented by
Araceli is an explicit statement made by him that he is the father of
Arhbencel; that absent recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate children
are not entitled to support from the putative parent; that the supposed
payment made by him of Araceli’s hospital bills was neither alleged in the
complaint nor proven during the trial; and that Arhbencel’s claim of
paternity and filiation was not established by clear and convincing evidence.
Arhbencel avers in her Comment that petitioner raises questions of fact
which the appellate court had already addressed, along with the issues
raised in the present petition.8
The petition is impressed with merit.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code9 that treat of the right to support
are Articles 194 to 196, thus:
Article 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.1awph!1
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and
from place of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the
following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in
the preceding article:
1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full
or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set
forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or
sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or
negligence. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Arhbencel’s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to
petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such,
her entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination
of her filiation.
Herrera v. Alba10 summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on
establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part as follows:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant
sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The
word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in
respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family,
either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be
received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable
as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often
cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by
such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written
acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code,
voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself
and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial
agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative
father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to
be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the
child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved
filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a
father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave
consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a
certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note
executed by petitioner which reads:
Manila, Aug. 7, 1999
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
support in the amount of ₱1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each Associate Justice
month for a total of ₱3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel
Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without WE CONCUR:
the necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs
of the child and my income. REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Chairperson
Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of
Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DE CASTRO
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. Associate Justice
Associate Justice
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement
to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the Associate Justice
putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of
filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation
through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it. CERTIFICATION

The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
her Certificate of Birth,11 has no probative value to establish filiation to conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same. the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s handwritten REYNATO S. PUNO
undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to Chief Justice
establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests
of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It
is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity
suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate
family.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision

of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE. The Order dated June 7, 2006 of Branch
130 of the Caloocan City RTC dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.