1. Philippine Agila Satelite, Inc. v. Lichauco, et.al.

[G.R. NO. 142362. MAY 3, 2006.] PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. and MICHAEL C. U. DE
GUZMAN, complainants, vs. JOSEFINA TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO Undersecretary for
Communications, Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) is a duly organized corporation, whose
President and Chief Executive Officer is copetitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was
established by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus
Garcia, concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. Under the
MOU, the launch of the satellite was to be an endeavor of the private sector, and the satellite
itself to be owned by the Filipino-owned consortium (subsequently organized as PASI). The
consortium was to grant the Philippine government one (1) transponder free of charge for the
government's exclusive use for non-commercial purpose, as well as the right of first refusal to
another one (1) transponder in the Philippine satellite, if available. 4 The Philippine government,
through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU to secure from the
InternationalTelecommunication Union the required orbital slot(s) and frequency assignment(s)
for the Philippine satellite. PASI itself was organized by the consortium in 1996. The government,
together with PASI, coordinated through the International Telecommunication Union two (2)
orbital slots, designated as 161º East Longitude and 153º East Longitude, for Philippine
satellites. On 28 June 1996, PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking
for official Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned
Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its satellites, which PASI had designated as the Agila satellites.
Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter dated 3 July 1996, confirming "the Philippine
Government's assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to [PASI] for its [Agila]
satellites." PASI avers that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine
government, it proceeded with preparations for the launching, operation and management of its
satellites, including the availment of loans, the increase in its capital, negotiation with business
partners, and an initial payment of US$3.5 Million to the French satellite manufacturer. However,
respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly "embarked on a
crusade to malign the name of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI."
Lichauco's purported efforts against PASI culminated allegedly in her offering orbital slot 153º
East Longitude for bidding to other parties sometime in December 1997, despite the prior
assignment to PASI of the said slot. It was later claimed by PASI that Lichauco subsequently
awarded the orbital slot to an entity whose indentity was unknown to PASI. Thus, a complaint
was filed against Lichauco for damages. A Motion to Dismiss was then filed by Lichauco. She
rooted her prayer for the dismissal of the complaint primarily on the grounds that the suit is a
suit against the State which may not be sued without its consent; that the complaint stated no
cause of action; and that the petitioners had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing
to seek recourse with the Office of the President. In an order 13 dated 14 August 1998, the RTC
denied the motion to dismiss. Lichauco assailed the RTC order through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, which subsequently nullified the RTC order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suit against Lichauco, the undersecretary of DOTC, is a suit against
the State.

HELD: As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. 'Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal
acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State,
and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated
by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit
in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not
have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be
sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity
cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. Thus, Lichauco, in alleging in her
Motion to Dismiss that she is shielded by the State's immunity from suit, to hypothetically
admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint. Such hypothetical admission has to be
deemed a concession on her part that she had performed the tortious or damaging acts against
the petitioners, which if true, would hold her liable for damages. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside and the RTC is ordered to try the case on its merits.

2. Republic v. Sandoval

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL 220 SCRA 124 (1993)

FACTS: By reason of the Mendiola massacre, wherein 12 rallyists died in their quest for “genuine
agrarian reform”, President Aquino issued Administrative Order No.11 which created the Citizen’s
Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation for the disorders, death and
casualties that took place. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the
deceased and other victims of Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. Due to
the recommendation, petitioners filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the
government to which the latter did not take heed. The group then instituted an action for
damages against the Republic of the Philippines together with military officers and personnel
involved in Mendiola incident. Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed the complaint as against
the Republic of the Philippines on the basis that there was no waver by the state. Hence, the
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the State by virtue of the administrative order waived its immunity from suit?

HELD: NO. Firstly, recommendation made by the commission does not in any way mean that
liability automatically attaches to the state. In effect, the same shall only serve as a cause of
action on the event that any party decides to litigate his or her claim. The commission is merely
a preliminary venue. Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have
said or done, the same are not tantamount to the state having waived its immunity from suit.
The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply in this case, as when the relief
demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the state nor the
affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the state in its political capacity, even
though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a
title of the state and as its agents and servants.

3. USA v. Guinto

FACTS: In the first case, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force
stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for
barber services in the base. In the second case, private respondents filed a complaint for
damages against private petitioners for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation
Center at the John Hay Air Station. In the third case, private respondent, who was employed as
a barracks boy in a U.S. Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the
individual petitioners, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of
Special Investigators. He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners
claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed. In the fourth case, a complaint
for damages was filed by the private respondents against the private petitioners, for injuries
allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. According to the
plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit
them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. These cases have
been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of
America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that
they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of
its motions by the respondent judges.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of State Immunity is not applicable thereby making the
State liable

HELD: NO. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim
for damages cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence, which have been carefully
examined. The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are
not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them - between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive
application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other
states in Western Europe. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes. There is no question that the United States of America, like
any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a
contract in its proprietary or private capacity, as in the cases at bar. It is only when the contract
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. A State
may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. The private
respondents invoke Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts
through a special agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the
officers are designated "special agents," the United States government should be liable for their
torts. There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a
misconception that the two terms are synonymous. Suability depends on the consent of the state
to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state
is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held
liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the
state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only
giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. The said article
establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under this rule
only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent. Moreover,
the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as
in the case at bar. No less important, the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of
the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not
to foreign governments impleaded in our courts. The complaints against the petitioners in the
court below were aptly dismissed.
 4. Sanders v. Veridiano

FACTS: Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S.Naval Station. Petitioner
Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is
an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and
Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the special services department of the
NAVSTA.

On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been
converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance
proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer
recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.

However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's
report. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-
workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their
immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the
grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in
public places where others not involved in the case could hear."

Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief
of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So,
private respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and
that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and
proprietary rights.

However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them
under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion was denied on the main ground that
the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?

RULING: Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly
had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character
of the letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States
government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their
authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for
their acts.

It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued
in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of
public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere
invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act
imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-
settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the
person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.

Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the
payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal
capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that
government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the
necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that
government without its consent.

The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right
against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign
states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely
admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly
vex the peace of nations."

Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution,
where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED.

5. Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation

https://www.scribd.com/document/394503145/Vinzons-Chato-v-Fortune-Tobacco-Corp
6. DOH v. Philippine Pharmawealth

FACTS: On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C which provided for a list
and category of sanctions to be imposed on accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical
products in case of adverse findings regarding their products (e.g. substandard, fake, or
misbranded) or violations committed by them during their accreditation.

In line with Memorandum No. 171-C, the DOH, through former Undersecretary Ma. Margarita M.
Galon(Galon), issued Memorandum No. 209 series of 2000,inviting representatives of 24
accredited drug companies, including herein respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a
meeting on October 27, 2000. During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them copies of
a document entitled "Report on Violative Products"issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs
(BFAD), which detailed violations or adverse findings relative to these accredited drug companies
products. Specifically, the BFAD found that PPI products which were being sold to the public were
unfit for human consumption.

During the October 27, 2000 meeting, the 24 drug companies were directed to submit within 10
days, or until November 6, 2000, their respective explanations on the adverse findings covering
their respective products contained in the Report on Violative Products.

Instead of submitting its written explanation within the 10-day period as required, PPI belatedly
sent a letter dated November 13, 2000 addressed to Undersecretary Galon, informing her that
PPI has referred the Report on Violative Products to its lawyers with instructions to prepare the
corresponding reply. However, PPI did not indicate when its reply would be submitted; nor did it
seek an extension of the 10-day period, which had previously expired on November 6, 2000,
much less offer any explanation for its failure to timely submit its reply.

In a letter-reply dated November 23, 2000 Undersecretary Galon found "untenable" PPI
November 13, 2000 letter and therein informed PPI that, effective immediately, its accreditation
has been suspended for two years pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C.

In another December 14, 2000 letter addressed to Undersecretary Galon, PPI through counsel
questioned the suspension of its accreditation, saying that the same was made pursuant to
Section VII of AO 10 which it claimed was patently illegal and null and void because it arrogated
unto the DOH Accreditation Committee powers and functions which were granted to the BFAD
under Republic Act (RA) No. 3720 and Executive Order (EO) No. 175. PPI added that its
accreditation was suspended without the benefit of notice and hearing, in violation of its right to
substantive and administrative due process. It thus demanded that the DOH desist from
implementing the suspension of its accreditation, under pain of legal redress.

On December 28, 2000, PPI filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a Complaint
seeking to declare null and void certain DOH administrative issuances, with prayer for damages
and injunction against the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez and DOH Undersecretary Galon.

In their Amended Answer,the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez, then Secretary Dayrit, and
Undersecretary Galon sought the dismissal of the Complaint, stressing that PPI accreditation was
suspended because most of the drugs it was importing and distributing/selling to the public were
found by the BFAD to be substandard for human consumption. They added that the DOH is
primarily responsible for the formulation, planning, implementation, and coordination of policies
and programs in the field of health; it is vested with the comprehensive power to make essential
health services and goods available to the people, including accreditation of drug suppliers and
regulation of importation and distribution of basic medicines for the public.

In a January 8, 2001 Order, the trial court partially granted PPI prayer for a temporary
restraining order, but only covering PPI products which were not included in the list of violative
products or drugs as found by the BFAD.

In a Manifestation and Motion dated July 8, 2003, petitioners moved for the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 68200, claiming that the case was one against the State; that the Complaint was
improperly verified; and lack of authority of the corporate officer to commence the suit, as the
requisite resolution of PPI board of directors granting to the commencing officer PPI Vice
President for Legal and Administrative Affairs, Alan Alambra, the authority to file Civil Case No.
68200 was lacking. The trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 68200, declaring the case to be one
instituted against the State, in which case the principle of state immunity from suit is applicable.

On appeal, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision, reversed the trial court ruling and ordered the
remand of the case for the conduct of further proceedings. The CA concluded that it was
premature for the trial court to have dismissed the Complaint. The CA further held that instead
of dismissing the case, the trial court should have deferred the hearing and resolution of the
motion to dismiss and proceeded to trial. It added that it was apparent from the Complaint that
petitioners were being sued in their private and personal capacities for acts done beyond the
scope of their official functions. Thus, the issue of whether the suit is against the State could
best be threshed out during trial on the merits, rather than in proceedings covering a motion to
dismiss.

ISSUE: Should Civil Case No. 68200 be dismissed for being a suit against the State?

HELD: The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that t)he State may not be sued without
its consent reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an
express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It
is based on the very essence of sovereignty. x x x [A] sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called the royal prerogative of
dishonesty because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it
by simply invoking its nonsuability. We have had occasion to explain in its defense, however,
that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would
be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such
fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to be
accordingly restricted.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued
under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, the
state may not be sued without its consent; it's clear import then is that the State may at times
be sued. The State consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through a general law or a special law. x xx Implied consent, on the other hand, is
conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or
when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to
the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This
rule, x x x is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one
which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its
proprietary capacity.

As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly,
then it may be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or
general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state "enters into a
contract or it itself commences litigation." However, it must be clarified that when a state enters
into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State
"will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract
in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity[,] x x x no such waiver may be implied.""Statutory provisions waiving
[s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of
sovereignty."

The DOH can validly invoke state immunity. The DOH is an unincorporated agency which
performs sovereign or governmental functions because it has not consented, either expressly or
impliedly, to be sued. Significantly, the DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs
functions of governmental character.

As regards the other petitioners, to wit, Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, and Undersecretary
Galon, it must be stressed that the doctrine of state immunity extends its protective mantle also
to complaints filed against state officials for acts done in the discharge and performance of their
duties. "The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was
acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance
of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government." Otherwise
stated, "public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is
showing of bad faith."

It is beyond doubt that the acts imputed against Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, as well as
Undersecretary Galon, were done while in the performance and discharge of their official
functions or in their official capacities, and not in their personal or individual capacities.
Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit were being charged with the issuance of the assailed orders.
On the other hand, Undersecretary Galon was being charged with implementing the assailed
issuances. By no stretch of imagination could the same be categorized as ultra vires simply
because the said acts are well within the scope of their authority. Section 4 of RA 3720
specifically provides that the BFAD is an office under the Office of the Health Secretary. Also, the
Health Secretary is authorized to issue rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively
enforce the provisions of RA 3720. As regards Undersecretary Galon, she is authorized by law to
supervise the offices under the DOH authority, such as the BFAD. Moreover, there was also no
showing of bad faith on their part. The assailed issuances were not directed only against PPI. The
suspension of PPI accreditation only came about after it failed to submit its comment as directed
by Undersecretary Galon. It is also beyond dispute that if found wanting, a financial charge will
be imposed upon them which will require an appropriation from the state of the needed amount.
Thus, based on the foregoing considerations, the Complaint against them should likewise be
dismissed for being a suit against the state which absolutely did not give its consent to be sued.
Based on the foregoing considerations, and regardless of the merits of PPI case, this case
deserves a dismissal. Evidently, the very foundation of Civil Case No. 68200 has crumbled at this
initial juncture.

7. Shauf v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US
Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark
Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified.

By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment
opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and
Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and
sex.

Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-
day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill
the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to
fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary
Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended
thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was
extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed
against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management &
it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.

Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service
Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.

RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of
such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.

Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected
from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are
immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official
governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that
the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive
jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to
the CA, defendants are immune from suit.

Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit
against the US government which would require consent.

Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing
suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the
Philippines & is not part of international law.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces

HELD: No. They are not immune.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.  Private respondents are hereby ORDERED,
jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00
as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

RATIO: They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. 
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity.  This situation usually arises where the public
official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. 

It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith,
or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction

Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the State authorizes only
legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the
State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit.  In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law
or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not
have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be
sued without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity
cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular or
abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents
committed acts of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable.

There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused
appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color and origin.

She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and
has completed 34 semester hours in psychology? Guidance and 25 quarter hours in human
behavioral science.  She has also completed all course work in human behavior and counselling
psychology for a doctoral degree.  She is a civil service eligible.  More important, she had
functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for
approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976.

In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not even consider the
application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed
Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position.

Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full protection
to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.  This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of
the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed.

There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the acts complained
of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a
living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life.  For this, they should be held
accountable

Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her remedy under
the United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees, which is
allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a foreign
court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.

SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as a matter of plain
and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will best advance and
protect her interests.  There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine
courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive representations
of private respondents on that score.

8. Wylie v. Rarang

FACTS: Petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner Capt.
James Williams was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City.

Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an employee in the office of the Provost Marshal
assigned as merchandise control guard.

M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station
supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was published daily by the US
Naval Base station.

The POD featured important announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of
interest to military personnel.

One of the regular features of the POD was the "action line inquiry."

On February 3, 1978, the POD made a publication, under the "NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY"
which mentioned a certain person named “Auring” who is described as a disgrace to her division
and to the Office of the Provost Marshal.

The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the Office of the Provost
Marshal and was subsequently proven that it was her being referred to when petitioner M. H.
Wylie wrote her a letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication.

The private respondent the filed an action for damages alleging that the article constituted false,
injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and
reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published
and circulated in the English language and read by almost all the U. S. Naval Base personnel.

The defendants however contended by filing a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that the
defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted in the performance of their official
functions as officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore, immune from suit; and the
United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued
without its consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the officials of the United States Naval Base are immune from suit.

HELD: The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978 mentions a certain
"Auring" as " a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal."

The same article explicitly implies that Auring was consuming and appropriating for herself
confiscated items like cigarettes and foodstuffs.

There is no question that the Auring alluded to in the Article was the private respondent as she
was the only Auring in the Office of the Provost Marshal.

Moreover, as a result of this article, the private respondent was investigated by her supervisor.
Before the article came out, the private respondent had been the recipient of commendations by
her superiors for honesty in the performance of her duties.

It may be argued that Captain James Williams as commanding officer of the naval base is far
removed in the chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be asking too
much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base.

This may be true as a general rule.

In this particular case, however, the records show that the offensive publication was sent to the
commanding officer for approval and he approved it.

The factual findings of the two courts below are based on the records.

The petitioners have shown no convincing reasons why our usual respect for the findings of the
trial court and the respondent court should be withheld in this particular case and why their
decisions should be reversed.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person's act or
omission constituting fault or negligence, to wit:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

"Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent."

Moreover, Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in
case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation.

In effect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty party
moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or exemplary
damages.

Indeed, the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation
against the character and reputation of the private respondent.

Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended
the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published.

The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the
publication without deleting the name "Auring."

Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty.

It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent.

As a result of the petitioners' act, the private respondent, according to the record, suffered
besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially so,
since the article was baseless and false.

The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the
private respondent.

9. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages against private respondents Bienvenido Tantoco and
Dominador Santiago, et al. Private respondents jointly moved “to strike out some portions of the
complaint and for bill of particulars of other portions”, which motion was opposed by the PCGG.
The Sandiganbayan gave the PCGG 45 days to expand its complaint to make more specific
certain allegations. Private respondents then presented a “Motion to leave to file interrogatories
under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court”. The Sandiganbayan denied private respondents’ motions.
Private respondents filed an Answer to with Compulsory Counterclaim. In response, the PCGG
presented a “Reply to Counterclaim with Motion to Dismiss compulsory counterclaim.” Private
respondents filed a pleading denominated “Interrogatories to Plaintiff”, and “Amended
Interrogatories to Plaintiff” as well as a motion for production and inspection of documents. The
Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production
and inspection of documents respectively. The PCGG moved for reconsideration, arguing that the
documents are privileged in character since they are intended to be used against the PCGG
and/or its Commission in violation of Sec.4 of EO No. 1, V12: a) No civil action shall lie against
the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task
contemplated by this Order. b) No member or staff by the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceedings concerning
matter within its official cognizance. The Sandiganbayan promulgated two Resolutions. The first,
denying reconsideration of the Resolution allowing production of the documents, and the second,
reiterating, by implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff.

ISSUE: Is the PCGG immune from suit?

HELD: NO. The state is of course immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be
sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its
sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary
litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while assuming
of an act for the State. The suggestion that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by
filing a suit except when in doing so it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-
governmental capacity, is unacceptable. It attempts a distinction without support in principle or
precedent. On the contrary, “the consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or
impliedly.” Express consent may be manifested either through a general law or a special law.
Implied consent is given when the State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a
contract.

10. USA v. Reyes

FACTS: Nelia T. Montoya, an American citizen employed as an identification checker at the U.S.

Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters in Quezon City, filed a complaint against Maxine Bradford, also an American citizen
working as a manager at JUSMAG Headquarter’s activity exchange, for damages due to the
oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as store
manager of the NEX JUSMAG. This was due to the incident on January 22, 1987 when Bradford
searched Montoya’s body and belongings while the latter was already in the parking area after
buying some items NEX JUSMAG’s retail store, where she had purchasing privileges. To support
the motion, the petitioners claimed that checking of purchases is a routine procedure observed at
base retail outlets to protect and safeguard merchandise, cash, and equipment pursuant to
paragraphs 2 and 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. 7. Therefore, Bradford’s order to
check all employee purchases was done in the exercise of her duties as Manager of the NEX-
JUSMAG. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity.

HELD: No. Under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG,
“only the Chief of the Military Adviser Group and not more than six other senior members thereof
designated under by him will be accorded diplomatic immunity”. The court also ruled that Art. 31
of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provided an exception; stating that even
diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform any professional or commercial
activity outside his official functions. Therefore, since Bradford works as NEX-JUSMAG’s Manager,
she is not among those officers granted diplomatic immunity.

11. DOH Secretary v. Philippine Pharmawealth

https://www.scribd.com/doc/279093116/DOH-v-Philippine-Pharmawealth-Inc