THE KOREAN WAR NIGEL THOMAS, PETER ABBOTT, MIKE CHAPPELL,EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW ANETTA S174 THE KOREAN WAR 1950-53 Text by NIGEL THOMAS and PETER ABBOTT Colour plates by MIKE CHAPPELLFirst published in Great Britain in 1986 by Osprey, an imprint of Reed Consumer Books Limited Michelin House, 81 Fulham Road London SW3 6RB and Auckland, Melbourne, Singapore and Toronto © 1986 Reed International Books Limited Reprinted 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993 All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Nigel Thomas and Abbott, Peter ‘The Korean War 1950-53.—(Men-at-arms seri 1, Korean War, 1950-1953 I. Title II. Thomas, Nigel. 1946 951.9'042 DSg18 ILL, Series ISBN o. 5045-685-1 Filmset in Great Britain Printed through Bookbuilders Lid, Hong Kong Acknowledgements A work such as this would not have been possible without the generous help of others. Special thanks are due to Mike Cox, Shelby Stanton, Y. C. Choe (Korean Veterans’ Association), Lee Russell, and Gol. Amott (DLI, Ret.). We would also like to thank Lt.Col. (Ret.) L. Turcott (Royal 22° Regt.), Ted Zuber, W. A. B. Douglass (Canadian Defense HQ), John Scurr, P. J. Burness (Australan War Memorial), Shaun Bland, Lt.Col. H. L. Zwitzer (Royal Neth- erlands Army), Pierre ©. T. Verheye, J. Ludriksen (R.No.A.F,), Capt, Togas (Hellenic Navy), Col. M. S. Okcay (Turkish Army), Office of Military History USMG, J. Anker Nielsen (Royal Danish Embassy) and Capt. H. Stradiot (Belgian Navy).The Korean War 1950-53 Lhe Course of the Har Korean sula, miles ‘The peni 450 averaging 160 miles wide, is about the size of Great Britain or Southern California, Some 3,000 small islands ring the coast; and the Yalu and Tumen Rivers separate it from the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. ‘The countryside is mostly forest, and the Tacback mountain range forms a central spine close to the east coast. In summer there is blinding heat, choking dust and monsoon thunderstorms; in winter, bitter cold. Korea, the isolated ‘hermit kingdom’ inhabited by a Buddhist people related racially to the Japanese and Manchurians, was occupied by Imperial Japan after August 1910. In 1943 the Allies promised Korea independence; and in August 1945 Japanese troops north of the arbitrarily chosen 38th Parallel surrendered to Soviet occupying forces, and those in the south to the US Army. Thereafter the Soviet-American ‘Cold War’ intensified; in August 1948 President Syngman Rhee proclaimed the ‘Republic of Korea’ (‘ROK’) on behalf of 21 million South Koreans, long and followed in September by the declaration of President Kim Il-Sung’s Communist ‘Democratic Republic of Korea’ for nine million North Koreans. Both states claimed sole legitimacy over all Korea, leading to considerable mutual suspicion and border tension At 4.am (Korean time) on Sunday 25 June 1950 powerful North Korean forces invaded South Korea, advancing down the Uijongbu Corridor, the historic invasion route, towards the Southern capital of Seoul, in a determined attempt to reunite Korea by force. ROK troops resisted bravely, but were crushed by overwhelming Northern superi- ority. Later that day the United Nations Security Council condemned the aggression, and on 7 July appointed US General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to command UN forces which would be sent to save South Korea. The Soviet Union, which ings, missed the had been boycotting UN mee chance to veto the decision. Meanwhile, the North Koreans advanced relent- lessly southwards; a mob of refugees and disorien- tated ROK troops fled before them, choking roads already turned into quagmires by the monsoon. On 27 June the invaders took Seoul; on 5 July they ‘The cotton summer uniform of a North Korean KPA corporal modelled by a Japanese employee of the US Army in July 1953: ‘compare with Plate Ax, This is the earlier style, with two pockets and wrist bands. The detachable shoulder boards are blive green, piped red, with gold bars. Note the interesting canvas-and-leather personal equipment. (US Army via Lee Russell)brushed aside a token force of US troops at Osan; and on 20 July they crushed a more determined stand at Taejon. US reinforcements were now pouring in and, with ROK troops, they established a 200-mile defensive line in south-eastern Korea, around the port of Pusan The Battle of the Pusan Perimeter began on 1 Augustas US forces (now designated the 8th Army) and ROK troops defended an area 80 miles long by 50 miles wide. The North Koreans mistakenly deployed their forces along the entire perimeter instead of concentrating them for a definitive breakthrough. Although they did make some advances, they were always repulsed. On 28 August British troops—the first of many UN contingents- arrived in the perimeter; North Korean pressure cased as UN aircraft bombed their supply-lines, and local peasants withheld food. By 14 September the UN had won the battle, and the initiative now lay with the 8th Army. On 15 September 1950 a US amphibious force from Japan stormed ashore on the west coast at Inchon, and 11 days later recaptured Scoul against heavy North Korean resistance. Meanwhile, on 16 September, US/ROK troops burst out of the Pusan Perimeter in several directions; a mobile force stormed north-westwards and linked up with US forces at Seoul on the 26th, thereby trapping considerable numbers of enemy troops in the South. By 30 September organised North Korean re- sistance in South Korea was practically over. Now the UN, after initial hesitation, mandated MacArthur to invade North Korea. UN troops advanced in the west, capturing the North Korean — Chogadionya none ka a \ capital of P'yongyang on 19 October, while ROK forces pressed forward in the east, actually reaching the Chinese border on 26 October. Just as North Korea, her territory now reduced to frontier enclaves in the north-west and north-east, seemed doomed, Chinese forces intervened on 14 October; they counter-attacked strongly in the north-west, forcing the UN advance to a standstill as the cruel North Korean winter began to break. On 24 November MacArthur launched the final offensive against North Korea; but the very next day his central front collapsed, as massive Chinese forces broke through and advanced southwards Now UN forces began a fighting retreat through blizzards and across frozen rivers out of North Korea; and it was not until mid-December that they were able to organise a defensive line roughly on the 38th Parallel, where they braced themselves for the expected offensive by Chinese and new North Korean divisions. Meanwhile, UN troops marooned in north-eastern North Korea executed a classic fighting retreat to the coast at Hingnam, whence the US Navy evacuated them to South Korea. The end of 1950 saw the conclusion of this first phase of the war: mobile warfare characterised by spectacular offensives alternating with apparently hopeless retreats. Chinese involvement meant that outright victory was now unattainable for either side, but the prospect of defeat was also unthink- able. As the vast manpower of China confronted the almost unlimited firepower of the United Nations, the conflict degenerated into a static war of attrition centred on the 38th Parallel.the At dawn on New Year's Day 1951 Communists attacked all along the front, forcing UN troops back. Scoul was abandoned once more: but on 15 January the front stabilised, in appalling snowstorms, 40 miles south of the capital. On 25 January UN forces began a cautious advance; repelled a Chinese counter-attack on 11 February; and pushed forward relentlessly until 21 April, as exhausted Communist units retreated before them. By late February the thaw had transformed the of mud, but on 15 March ad the border into countryside into a se ‘oul was retaken once again, : North Korea was crossed. Then, on 11 April, President Truman abruptly dismissed Gen. MacArthur over ‘political differences’ and appoin- ted Gen, Ridgway as UN/ROK Commander. On 22 April 1951 the Communists began their ‘First Spring Offensive’, breaching UN lines in the central sector, and forcing a retreat to a new line north of Seoul. By 30 April the attack was spent, and the UN edged forward before taking the full force of the ‘Second Spring Offensive’ on 16 May, which again ruptured the central sector, but which was contained after a limited retreat in the east. Now the UN advanced, determined on astrategy to carry the battle into North Korea, but not to attempt another full-scale invasion. By 10 June they had established a line 20 miles above the 38th Parallel, astride the crucial enemy supply and communications centre called the ‘Iron Triangle’. On 23 June Jacob Malik, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, proposed a ceasefire; and on 10 July talks opened at Kaesong, in ‘No Man’s Land” just north of Seoul. In anticipation of an imminent agreement, fighting was restricted to patrolling and local skirmishes; but when talks broke down at the end of August the UN recommenced the offensive, making valuable gains before discussions resumed on 25 October at Panmunjom, near Kaesong. In November 1951 the war reached its third and final phase—stalemate. While talks continued the UN ceased active operations and maintained a static defence line with minimum casualties, while continuing air attacks on enemy communications and naval bombardment of North Korean ports. On the ground, action was limited to patrolling, gimental-size engagements, and artillery bar- rages. This continued until May 1952, when the Chinese became more aggressive, escalating their own artillery fire and in June launching an tral sector. unsuccessful attempt to breach the ce By July 1952 both armies had constructed such strong defensive lines that undertake a major offensiv unacceptable losses. The Communists therefore sent infantry supported by artillery and tanks against tactically important hills along the UN line in the so-called ‘Battle of the Outposts’. These attacks often succeeded initially, but the UN usually retook the hills, although not without ignificant losses. UN and ROK forces retaliated with surprise raids, and these skirmishes intensified into heavy fighting until the onset of winter brought, them to a halt. In March 1953 the ‘Final Battles’ commenced with a Chinese attack in the west, followed by heavy pressure on the central sector in June and July, forcing UN lines back three miles. neither side could without incurring ‘Socialist realism’ in war art: a North Korean painting showing ‘valiant KPA soldiers’ in hand-to-hand combat with Sbrutal imperialists’ of the US 7th Division.Finally, on 27 July 1953, the long-awaited Armistice was signed at Panmunjom, and the three- year-old Korean War was over. ‘The Armistice left the Western democracies with a sense of anticlimax. North and South Korea were utterly devastated, totally dependent on the USSR or the United economic survival. Casualties had been unexpectedly high: 84,000 N/ROK, 140,000 Chinese and North Koreans, and two million civilians, all dead. And yet the war had brought real achievements and changes. ‘The People’s Republic of China took its place as a world States for power, China and the other Communist states were exposed as aggressive, ruthless, formidable, but not invincible, opponents, breeding in the West a sense of insecurity that led to a strengthening of the NATO alliance (and a reliance on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons which many believe to be excessive). South Korean independence had been success- fully defended; but this achievement, and the heroism and sacrifice of the UN/ROK forces, now seem to pale before the shining triumphs of the Second World War and the stark tragedy of Vietnam. This continuing sense of anticlimax is preserved today at Panmunjom where, 22 years after the Armistice, the opposing sides still argue about the agenda of the fature Peace Conference. North Korea One of the guerrilla leaders opposing the 1931 Japanese invasion of China was the young Korean Communist Kim Il-Sung (formerly Kim Sung Chu), who in 1930 had formed the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army in China. On 25 April 1932 this combined with other nationalist groups in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Amy operating on the Manchuria-Korea border. Captured in 1940, Kim escaped to the Soviet Union in 1941, returning in 1945 as a Soviet Army Major to the Soviet Zone of Korea (already under local nationalist control). By February 1946 Kim and his 150,000-strong People’s Militia had taken power; and in Septem- ber 1948 he became President of the new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea The KPA—Korean People’s Army (Cho-sin In- Lt.Gen. Nam Il (centre) leading the delegation of North Korean and Chinese generals at the Armistice Talks in July 19521 of Plate Ag for general characteristics of KPA officers uniform, As ‘volunteers’ the green-clad Chinese follows normal P.L.A. practice in Korea in wearing no military insignia. Min Kun)—was established on 8 February 1948 from former guerrilla units and the Korean Volunteer Corps—Korean Communists in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. By December 1948 Soviet troops had officially left, but ‘advisers’ remained; while the Maoist guerrilla model was rejected in favour of Soviet military organisation, subversion and border raids continued against South Kor In June 1950 the 223,080-strong KPA was organised into ten Infantry Divisions, each with three three-battalion regiments, an artillery regi- ment (three 12-gun battalions), a self-propelled gun battalion (12 SU-76s) and services, totalling 12,092 men, Some 102,000 served in other units. The KPA order of battle was: 1st Div. (HQ Sinmak) . . (one regt. ex-PLA) end Div. (HQ Wonsan) ... 4, 6,1 jrd Guards Div. (HQ.Wonsan) ... 7 4th Div. (HQ Changnyon) (one regt. ex-PLA) 5th Div. (HQ Namhung) . (ex-PLA 164th Div.) 6th Div. (HQ Sariwon) .. . (ex-PLA 166th Div.) 7th Div. (HQ Hagju) ... 1, 2,3 InfRegts. (ex-PLA 139, 140, 141, 156 Div.) L 20, 22, 24 InfRegws. 7 InfRegts. 8,9 Inf Regts. 8 Inf.Regts. 0, 11, 12 InfRegts 14, 15 InfRegts.| =a) roth Div. (HQ Unsanni) . . . 25, 27, 29 InfRegts. (formed March 1950) 13th Div. (HQ Chonju) . . (formed June 1950) 15th Div. (HQ Yongdaeri) (formed March 1950) 105th Armd.Bde. . . . 107, 109, 203 Regts. 206 Mech.Inf. (each with 4o T-34/85 tanks) 19, 21, 23 InfRegts 45-48, 50 InfRegts Other units were the 122 mm Artillery Regt. (1,300 men); Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regts. (1,200); 603rd Motorcycle Reconnaissance Regt. (3,500); the Engineer Brigade (2,500); Signal Regt. (1,000); Ist and end Military Academies (4,000); Guerrilla and Commando Forces (2,500); Internal Security (34,000); and other forces (15,700). There was also a Navy (13,700), Air Force (2,000) and Marines (9,000). The Ministry of the Interior controlled the 19,000-strong Border Constabulary (Bo An Dae) with five brigades (1-3, 5, 7) each with six to seven battalions, formed from Koreans originally living in the Soviet Union. ‘The KPA commander was Gen. Choi Yung Kun under the Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Kim Il-Sung. KPA generals were battle-hardened China veterans, skilled in Soviet-style mobile leading well-armed, disciplined and ated troops who were initially more than a match for the lightly-armed South Korea For the invasion, seven combat-ready divisions were grouped into a ‘Front’ (equivalent to a Western Army) under Gen. Kim Chack, control- ling two ‘Armies’ (Army Corps): rst Army (1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th Divs. rosth Armd.Bde.), and 2nd Army (ond, 5th, 7th Divs.). 1st Army swiftly overran the warfare moti exposed Ongjin Peninsula and sent 3rd and 4th Divs. and 105th Bde. to occupy Seoul; while and Army advanced in the cast, reinforced by 886th Commando and 549th Marine units, and 766th Commando unit landed on the coast behind ROK lines. Afier the fall of Seoul the formations were reorganised. grd and 4th Divs. each received the honour-title ‘Scoul Division’, and roth Brigade became the 105th ‘Seoul’ Armoured Division, adding the 3o8th SPG Bn. to its strength. On 2 July 7th Div. was redesignated 12th ‘Antung’ Div.; 7th Border Bde. was expanded to become the new 7th Div.; 8th Div. was activated; gth Div. (rst-grd Border Regts.) was raised from 3rd Border Bde., and roth, 13th and 15th Divs. were mobilised When the seemingly irresistible KPA was finally stopped on the Pusan Perimeter, time began to work against the North Koreans; their over- stretched supply-lines were vulnerable, and their best units were committed on the Perimeter, leaving their homeland dangerously exposed. The 1st Army in the west (24th, 6th, 7th, gth, roth, 105th Divs.) and 2nd Army in the north (1st, 5th, 8th, 12th, 13th, 15th Divs.) battered the UN lines, but by mid- September their offensive had run out of steam. ‘The oth Div. rushed from Pusan to join the 18th Div. and 549th Marines in opposing the Inchon landing; but Seoul soon fell, cutting off supplies to the south. The 1st Army was smashed by US Divs. advancing westwards, while 2nd Army managed to retreat northwards before collapsing. Some units jued to operate as guerrillas in northern South Korea; and 30,000 demoralised stragglers fled into North Korea with US/ROK forces in hot pursuit. A 7 conWeary ROK troops—note extreme youth of soldier at left centre—making their way into British lines after the Chinese breakthrough in the offensive of late 1950. See Plate B, (Imperial War Museum) temporary defensive line was established to cover P’yongyang with seven divisions including some newly designated formations (gth, 14th, 17th, 18th, gist, 32nd, 42nd and one other), while three (1st, 24gth, and one other) fought in the east; but on 19 October the capital fell, and Kim Il-Sung fled to Sinuiju on the Yalu. The KPA had lost 335,000 men, and the survivors were sheltering on the Chinese border Now the Chinese PLA intervened to save North Korea. A Combined Headquarters was established at Mukden, Manchuria, with Kim Il-Sung nominal Commander-in-Chief but with the Chin- ese holding the real power. The KPA was re-organised with amazing speed, and by early December there were four armies: in the west 1st Army (105th Armd., 17th, 47th Divs.) and 5th Army (3rd, 4th 7th, gth 42nd); and in the east ond Army (2nd, 6th, 10th, 31st Divs.) and grd Army (8th, 18th). Appearances were deceptive, however, for 1st Army, with only 19,800 men, was equivalent to a division. As the rebuilt KPA pushed southwards with the Chinese, 20,000 former and 8 as Army troops operated behind UN lines, disrupting the UN retreat. By the end of 1950 all North Korea had returned to Communist control. In the 1951 New Year offensive 1st Army (8th, r7th Mech., 47th Divs.) and 5th Army (6th, 7th, rth, 32nd, 43rd) helped retake Seoul; but the main effort was in the east, opposing less formidable ROK forces. grd Army (1st, grd, 5th Divs.) stayed in reserve, but end Army (2nd, 3rd, gth, roth, 27th, gist) and rath Div. broke through, infiltrating guerrillas behind UN lines. roth Div. penetrated deep into South Korea, and in March, under constant attack by US Marines, staged an epic fighting retreat back to KPA lines, In the face of the UN counter-attack, however, 1st Army abandoned Seoul, and the other armies also suffered heavily. In the two 1951 Spring Offensives rst Army , but the and, grd and 5th Armies made little progress against ROK forces. In May 6th Army and 7th Army were hastily organised to defend P’yongyang and Wonsan respectively; but the expected UN offensive never materialised, and in July Lt.Gen. Nam I], the KPA Commander and a former Soviet citizen, opened Armistice talks. Stalemate set in, and Scoul now permanenily unattainable; so 1st Army (8th, th, advanced with the Chinese in the w seemed47th Divs.) transferred in December 1951 to join and Army (2nd, 13th, 27th) and grd Army (1st, 15th, 45th) in the east. Meanwhile 4th Army (4th, ath, 105th Armd, Divs., 26th Bde.), 5th Army (6th, rath, 32nd), 6th Army (gth, 17th Mech., 18th, agrd) and 7th Army (3rd, 24th, 37th, 46th Divs., 63rd Bde.) remained in reserve behind the line. The KPA was short of manpower, and war-weary; butit continued to patrol, mount local probing attacks, and infiltrate guerrillas. The July 1953 Order of Battle was: ast Army: 8th Div. . . . 81, 82, 83 Inf.Regts. a7th Div... . 113, 123, 124 InfRegts. and Army: and Div... . 4,6, 17 InfRegts. 1gth Div. . . . 19, 21, 2g, InfRegts. a7th Div... 172, 173, 174 Inf.Regts. agth Bde ‘grd Army: . 3. 14, InfRegts. 45, 48, 50 InfRegts. 70, 71, 76 Inf Regts. 8, 90, 91 InfRegis. ath Army. gth Div... . 5, 18, 29 InfRegts. 5th Div... . 10, 11, 12 InfRegts. roth Div... . 25, 27, 33 InfRegts. th Army. 6th Div... . 1, 13, 15 InfRegts 2th Di 30, 31, 32 InfRegts. 46th Div. . . . 158, 159, 160 Inf-Regts. goth, 22nd and 25th Bdes. qth Army: grd Div... . 7, 8, 9 InfReg 7th Div... . 51, 53, 54 InfRegts. gth Div. . . . 85, 86, 87 InfRegts. Also 17th Div. (8, 28 and an unidentified InRegt.), 21st, 23rd, 26th Bdes., 16th AA Div. (19, 20, 23, 33: 34, 36, 37 AA Regts.), four AA regis. (21, 24, 32, 38), seven tanks regts. (104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 206 and 208), two artillery regts. (29, 30) and 18 and 21 mortar regiments. The North Korean soldier in captivity showed the same tenacity as in the field. Most PoWs, more than 100,000, were held at Koje-do (Koje Island) near Pusan, and in June 1952 they staged riots which were eventually suppressed only by the of US. infantry and paratroops. intervention Infantry of the ROK gth Division, well equipped by the USA (mostly with Mq3 fatigues, in this case), assemble for an assault in 1953. The improvement in appearance since 1950 is noticeable. (US Army) Activity at the front, however, remained low-key, although KPA units did support the June 1953, offensive by making marginal gains against ROK forces before the July Armistice. With the Armistice, Kim Il-Sung’s dreams of a united Communist Korea evaporated. North Korea was in ruins, its southern border areas shrunk, one million civilians dead, and the mighty KPA crippled by the loss of 320,000 men. But Kim has survived to this day. His army is now the fifth, an impossible burden for such a relatively small country, comprising 520,000 soldiers, 23,000 marines, 32,600 airmen, 40,000 Border Constabulary and almost three million Workers’ Militia. These aggressive troops still line the southern border, raid South Korean offshore islands, infiltrate gue labyrinthine tunnels under the Armistice Line, and assault UN officials at Panmunjom. largest in the world 25,000 sailors, South Korea During the Japanese occupation Korean nation- alism was brutally suppressed, and Koreans were conscripted into the Japanese forces. Politicans such as Dr Syngman Rhee operated governments-in- exile in Nationalist China and the United States, and returned to South Korea after 8 September 1945, when US troops accepted the Japanese 9‘A variety of fatigue clothing (cf, Plates B and C) can be made ‘out in this group photo of Col. Walter B. Richardson, CO of Camp 1 on Roje-Do, posing with ROK officers, They are (lef to Fight) two Hiearenant-colonels, a colonel, licutenant-colonel and a major. Note ROK collar rank insignia; and (left and centre) US-atyle green ‘combat leader’ loops worn on the shoulder straps by the battalion commander and regimental commander. Goll Richardsgn wars, the imgnin ot he Previous posting-the znd Division's "Indian Hendon Fight shoulder. The picture was taken in August 1953. (US ‘Army via Lee Russell) surrender and established a temporary military government. The Korean Constabulary was form- ed from ex-Japanese Army veterans, and on 15 January 1946 the first battalion-size regiment was ready. On 15 August 1948 Rhee became president of an independent Republic of Korea and the 15,000-strong Constabulary became the ROK Army (Tae-Han Min-Guk Yuk-Kun). In May/June 1948 the six Constabulary Brigades (1st-3rd and 5th-7th: after 1948 the locally unlucky number ‘ was avoided by the South, but not the North Koreans) became divisions, and the 8th and Capital Security Command were added. By 1949 the army had expanded to 60,000 men, by dint of massive United States aid, and was kept. busy preventing North Korcan border raids and internal subversion. In June 1950 the 98,000-strong ROK Army under Maj. Gen. Chae Pyongdok had seven weak infantry divisions and the Capital Secur mand (after 5 July the ‘Capitol Division’). Each division should have had three three-battalion regiments (each of 2,938 men); a_ battalion comprised a heavy weapons company (with one mortar and two heavy machine gun platoons) and three rifle companies, each rifle company having three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon with a 10 mortar and a light machine gun squad, In reality, most divisions had only two two-battalion. re ments. There should have been divisional services, tank company and an artillery battalion (15, x 105 mm light howitzers in three batteries); but there were only three artillery battalions in the entire army supporting the 7th and 8th Divs. and the élite 17th Independent Regiment. The Capital Security Command was a parade unit, with the dismounted Cavalry Regt. acting as Honour Guard, but in wartime it performed well. There were no tanks, heavy mortars, mines, medium artillery or recoilless rifles; little ammunition; and only 27 M8 armoured cars in the 1st Cavalry Regiment. Only ist, 6th, 7th and Capitol Divs. were at full strength (10,948 men), and they, together with the 8th Div, were the best units. There was also the élite Marine Corps (KMC) founded April 1949, comprising the 1st Regt. (1st-grd Bn: and the independent 5th Bn., modelled on the US Marine Corps. The ROK Coastguard and Air Force were insignificant; but the National Police provided Internal Sccurity Battalions to fight guerrillas. ROK soldiers were tough and cour- ageous, and were often likened to the Gurkhas; but they were inexperienced, and the senior officers were too young and rarely qualified to command above battalion level. ROK troops fought tenaciously against the initial North Korean invasion, but were no match anani for superior weapons, and were soon in full retreat. The 17th Regt, isolated on the Ongjin Peninsula, was evacuated by sea, abandoning its precious supporting artillery. The ist, and, grd, 5th, 7th and Capitol Divs. withdrew south after the fall of Seoul, and the 6th and 8th retreated in the east. Some 44,000 men, almost half the army, were trapped north of the Han River when its bridges were prematurely demolished, and their units disinte- grated. On 14 July, in desperation President Rhee placed all ROK troops (now under Lt.Gen. Chung Tl Kwon) under the American Gen. Walker. After an unsuccessful stand at Taejon with the US 24th Diy. the shattered remnants of the ROK Army reached the northern Pusan Perimeter. There, on 24 July, the end, 5th and 7th Divs. were disbanded; 8th and Capitol formed 1 Corps; 1st and 6th, IT Corps; and 3rd guarded Army Headquarters. ‘These five remaining divisions clung desperatelyto the northern perimeter throughout August 1950. I Corps was under intense pressure along the coast, and had to withdraw, evacuating the marooned 3rd Div. by sea; but the line held. In the west, Il Corps fought alongside the US 1st Cav.Div. to hold Taegu insome of the worst fighting of the war. Meanwhile, 7th Div. was reactivated, and ROK conscripts were temporarily integrated into United States and British units as auxiliaries. ‘The four KMC battalions fought at Inchon and Seoul, and earned a fearsome reputation as streetfighters. I Corps (grd and Capitol Divs., KMAG) sped from Pusan up the east coast; 11 Corps (6th, 7th, 8th) pushed through the central mountains; and 1st Div. joined US I Corps at Seoul By 10 October I Corps had reached Wonsan en route for Hingnam. U1 Corps (formed & October) remained in South Korea on security duties with ith Division (also formed in October) and 5th Division. In that same month the st Anti-Guerrilla Group (1st-grd, 5th-7th Bns.) was formed. On 19 October 1st Div. took P'yongyang, and joined TT Corps further north. On 24 October 7th Regt. (6th Div.) reached the Yalu River; but the next day this division was smashed by an overwhelming Chinese attack, and only the arrival of 7th Div. prevented the total collapse of II Corps and stabilised the line. By 24 November Capitol Div. had reached Chongjin, 60 miles from the Soviet border; but on the next day the Chinese, taking advantage of the low firepower of ROK divisions and the primitive fear the Chinese inspired among Koreans, attacked 11 Corps again. The corps cracked, necessitating a general 8th Army retreat to the 38th Parallel Meanwhile the exposed Capitol and 3rd Divs. fell back to Songjin and Hiingnam respectively, and were evacuated to South Korea. By mid-December 1950 1st Div. (US T Corps) was manning the line in the west; in the centre, IIT Corps (2nd Div. reformed 7th November, 5th and 11th Divs.); then the weakened II Corps (6th, 7th, 8th Divs.); and on the coast I Corps (9th Div., formed 25 October; 3rd, Capitol Divs.). When the 1951 New Year offensive struck, 6th Div. was promptly attached to US IX Corps, and I Corps was disbanded. On 2 January and, 5th and 8th Diys. joined US X Corps, which took over most of the vulnerable central sector from TIT Corps (now with 7th and 11th Divs.). In the UN retreat and and ‘The commander of the US 1st Marine Division, Maj.Gen. Oliver P. Smith (left, in the Marines’ characteristic HBT sutilities’ and camouflaged helmet cover), talks to US X Corps commander Maj.Gen. Edward M. Almond (right, in M43 fatigues). Photographed at Seoul in September 1950, Smith would within two months be leading the famous fighting retreat of his division from Chosin Reservoir. Just visible at far right is tat Marine Air Wing commander Maj.Gen, Field Harris, whose Corsair squadrons provided valuable support. (usmc) gth Divs, virtually distintegrated, and Communist troops poured through gaps in ROK lines. In the January UN counter-offensive III Corps had difficulty keeping up; and, on 11 February north of Hocngsan, the 3rd (with 1st KMG Regt. attached), 5th and 8th Divs, took the brunt ofa heavy Chinese attack, which destroyed the 8th Div. (it later reformed). However, by mid-April 1951 I and IIT Corps were safely in position on ‘Line Utah’ just inside North Korea. In the 1951 First Spring Offensive the Chinese concentrated their attack on the st and 6th Divs. in the west, and both formations fell back; but a determined stand by 5th KMC Bn, on the Kimpo Peninsula prevented an attack on Seoul. Gen, Van Fleet moved 2nd Div. to join the 6th in US IX Corps, leaving US X Corps with 5th and 7th Divs In the Second Spring Offensive these last two divisions and III Corps all collapsed, and even I Corps retreated; but by 20 May the line had stabilised. Now III Corps was disbanded, leaving only I Corps (rd, 11th, Capitol Divs.) in the line. T Corps subsequently attacked, together with 5th, 7th, 8th and gth Divs., now all in US X Corps. 11Despite catastrophic setbacks the ROK Army, now under Maj.Gen, Yi Chongchan, still fielded ten visions; and in August. 195 Koreans, the largest UNG co arms. ‘The ROK Army took advantage of the stalemate period to build up its forces. Four 1 105 mm Artillery Battalions, authorised in Septem- her 1951, ensured that by mid-1952 ROK divisions at last had their own organic artillery. There were also ten Field Artillery Groups (1st-3rd, 5th—1 1th), gent, were under mm and six cach with two 105 mm_ battalions; and 11 Independent Field Artillery Bns. (88th-ogrd. agth goth. Other units included cight’ Tank Companies (51st-5grd, 55th-ggth); 13 Security Bns. (1st-grd, 5th—1gth, 15th) on anti-guerrilla duties; five Security Guard Bns. (31st-33rd, 35th, 36th) guarding PoW camps; and Korean Service Corps Regis. (each with four battalions) on labouring duties with UN units. On 1 May 1952 the order of battle at the front was: US I Corps (1st Diy.); US 1X Corps (2nd, gth); a re-formed II Corps (3rd, 6th, Capitol); US X Corps (7th, 8th) and I Corps (5th, 11th) ‘The revitalised army, now under Lt.Gen. Paik Sun Yup, performed very effectively in the 1952 ‘Outpost’ battles, and could now be trusted with three-quarters of the line. More units were raised rath and 15th Divs., 53rd and 55th-5gth Inde- pendent Regts. (November 1952); 20th and 21st Divs. (February 1953); 22nd and 25th Divs. (April and 26th and 27th Divs. (June 1953). In the attacks of June 1953 II Corps fell back had to be rescued. ss Cas 12 assault in July: 1st Div. (US I Corps); 2nd, gth, Capitol (US TX Corps); 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 11th (II Corps); 7th, rath, 20th (US X Corps); 15th and aust (I Corps). The concentrated pressure on II Corps smashed the redoubtable Capitol Div., and the Corps fell back: but subsequently counter attacked, and reached a viable defence line before the Armistice. In its comparatively short life the ROK Army had withstood the most punishing ordeal imagin- able; had lost about 47,000 killed; and had emerged as the determined guarantor of the independence of the South Korean people. The ROK Army order of battle, September July 1953, was: I ist Div... . rith, 12th, 15th Regts. and Div. ... 17th, gist, gand Regts. 3rd Div... . 2and, agrd, 26th, (later 18th, 22nd, agrd Regts.) sth Div. .. . 27th, 35th, 36th Regts. 6th Div. ... and, 7th, igth, Regts. 7th Div, 3rd, 5th, 8th Regts. 8th Div. ... roth, 16th, 21st Regts. gth Div. ... 28th, 29th, goth Regts. Capitol Div... 1st, 17th, 18th, (later rst Cav., 26th Regis.) 1ith Div. . . . oth, 13th, 2oth Regts. rath Div. . . . 37th, 51st, 52nd Regts 15th Div. ... 38th, 39th, 5oth Regts, zoth Div. . . . Goth, Grst, Gand Regts. 2ist Div... . 63rd, 65th, 66th Regts. gend Div. . . . 67th, 68th, 69th Regts. a5th Div. ... goth, 71st, 72nd Regts. 26th Div... . 73rd, 75th, 76th Regts. 27th Div. ... 77th, 78th, 79th Regts. United States of America After 1945 the United States decided to rely on the United States Air Force to deter any future aggressor with its nuclear capability. There thus seemed to be no necessity for a large standing army, and the bulk of the US Army was hastily demobilised. By mid-1950 it had shrunk to 591,487 men, seven per cent of its peak wartime strength, with what some have judged to be a disastrous effecton unit efficiency and morale. ‘There were only ten ist, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 24th and 25th Infaniry, 1st Cavalry (Dismounted), and Ar- moured, 11th and 82nd Airborne—plus the 1st and and US Marine Corps Divisions, Occupation duty in Germany and Japan proved the biggest drain on resources, and only one division, the 1st Infantry in Germany, was main « full strength, power was the main defence against potential North Korean aggression, and after June 1949 the only US forces were the 500-strong Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) training the fledgling ROK Army. Meanwhile, the United States Government ignored rumours of an imminent North Korean invasion with a complacency that ultimately proved disastrous. At any one time seven United States divisions Infantry, Cavalry and Marine Corps Korea, all in the infantry réle. This commitment while modest by World War II standards, was a major burden on the diminished US Army. Each division contained three infantry regiments (cach with three battalions); and an artillery regiment with three 105 mm battalions and one heavy 155 mm battalion, each with three batteries. (The strength of the US artillery was to prove decisive.) There were also a combat engineer battalion, reconnaissance troops, and services; and later a combat divisions ained In South Korea, too, U: served in tank, a tank-destroyer and an anti-aircraft bat- talion were added. Apart from the three rifle battalions (each with one heavy weapons and three rifle companies) a US infantry regiment also ficlded a tank company with 22 tanks. A rifle company comprised one weapons and three rifle platoons; a rifle platoon, one weapons squad and three rifle squads, each with nine men. All divisions (except the Marines) were 30 per cent under strength. All regiments (except. the Negro 24th Infantry) had only two battalions: artillery battalions had only two batteries, and most infantry’ battalions were a rifle company short, although from August 1950 all regiments in Korea received a third battalion. Many tanks were obsolescent, or too light to meet the T-34/85 on equal terms. Nevertheless, these di sions did boast ‘For an account of the USMC's condition at this time see Elite 2, The US Marine Conps since 1945 the US Army's 51st Signals Bn. Personnel Section, ina soldier's typical snapshot. The sergeant at far left wears on his HBT fatigues the new chevrons officially introduced the following month; the miniature “combat ‘chevrons’ are worn by the young sergeant in the pile winter ‘cap, right centre. (Shelby Stanton) an awesome firepower, especially in artillery, which outclassed comparable enemy units! For special missions a regiment could become a ‘regimental combat team (equivalent to a British “brigade group’) by attaching a divisional 105 mm artillery battalion, a signals detachment, and engineer and medical companies. At least 12 infantry regiments (7th, 15th, 19th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 31st, 32nd, 34th, 35th, 65th, r6oth) operated at some time as RCTS, as well as the independent sth and 29th, and the famous 187th Airborne (detached from 11th Airborne Division), Other élite units were the 1st~5th and 8th Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne), each with five officers and 107 men, including the all-black 2nd Co., in Korea from October 1950 to August 1951; and the mixed American-British-Korean ‘United Nations Par- tisan Infantry Korea’ (UNPIK). These units all operated clandestinely behind enemy lines and on the offshore islands. The scattered KMAG advisers retreated help- lessly with the ROK divisions before the North Korean advance, an advance which immediate USAF air strikes were unable to halt. United States Army intervention was necessary, and four of the five divisions of Lt.Gen. Walton H. Walker's 8th Army (7th, 24th, 25th Infantry, 1st Cavalry), then For a derailed account of UN tank operations in Korea, see Vanguard 7, Armour of te Buran War 15US Army rifle squad leader inautumn 1950: Cpl. The extra bandoliers are typical enough—but one suspects of the g5th RCT, based on the 35th Infantry that the grenades, rather precariously attached by slipping from 25th Division. No unit or rank insignia are worn in the their spoons into pockets, were the photographer's idea - field. He carries the Mr riffe, and a triple-pocket grenade combat they would be rather more securely attached to the pouch (left) and first aid pouch are attached to his +i equipment. (US Army via Shelby Stanton) 4on occupation duty in Japan, were put on alert. On 1 July 1950 ‘Task Force Smith’—two rifle companies from 21st InfRegt. (24th Div. forced by 105, mm howitzer, mortar, bazooka and recoilless rifle teams—raced to the front, and managed to delay the enemy advance on Osan before retreating to meet the rest of the division. The 24th made a heroic stand at Taejon abandoned the town on 20 July, having lost their commander, Maj.Gen. Dean. They had bought time for the safe arrival of the 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divs., and the 29th RCT from Okinawa. On 13 July Gen. Walker established ‘EUSAK’ (Eighth United States Army in Korea) within the Pusan perimeter, where he also commanded five ROK divisions. All forces in Korea came under Gen. MacArthur, since 7 July the Supreme Commander of United Nations Command (UNC By the end of July the perimeter line had stabilised along the Naktong River, to be defended atall costs. In August reinforcements arrived in the form of divisional tank battalions, the 5th RCT from Hawaii, the and Inf.Div. and 1st ional Marine Bde, (built around 5th Marine Regt.) from the USA, and the 27th British Brigade. South Korean conscripts, designated “Katusas’ (Koreans attached to the US Army), were integrated into the US Army and unofficially into USMC units, with too per company, a total of between 1,000 and 3,000 per division. Wearing US uniforms (but rarely attaining NCO rank) these enthusiastic, fearless, but virtually untrained Koreans provided a vital stopgap in manpower. Walker's nine divisions and two brigades were insufficient for a continuous defensive line; but he deployed them so skilfully in anticipation of enemy attacks that he was able to win the fierce six-week ‘Perimeter Battle ) rein- but ‘ov and by mid-September he was ready to counter-attack On 15 September, United States X Corps (activated in Japan on 26 August) stormed ashore at Inchon with 1st Marine Div, (the expanded Provisional Bde.), 7th Inf.Div. (including ROK 17th Regt. and 8,000 Katusas), 5th ROT and, later, 187 ARCT. On 28 September Scoul was re- captured after fierce fighting, Meanwhile, on 16 September, EUSAK forces broke out of the Pusan perimeter. ROK forces thrust northwards, US 1X Corps (activated on 23 September with and and 25th Divs.) attacked westwards, and US I Corps (activated 13 September with 1st Cav., 24th Inf and 1st ROK Divs. and 27th Bde.) pushed north- westwards, linking up with X Corps on 26 September. On 1 tober Walker began the advance into North Korea. I Corps (later joined by IX Corps) attacked along the west coast, taking P’yongyang on the 19th, while the ROKs advanced in the east, joined by X Corps (now with 3rd Inf.Div. from the USA), which landed at Wonsan on 26 October. However, this triumphant progress ground toa halt in November with the intervention of the Chinese The furthest UN penetration northwards was by the 17th Regt., which reached the Chinese-North Korean border at Hyesanjin. On 24 November MacArthur ordered the final push to the Yalu River frontier; but after 24 hours’ steady advance a powerful Chinese counter-attack ruptured the line sector, forcing I and IX Corps to in the cent retreat southwards to avoid encirclement. By 15 December they and three ROK Corps, now out of reach of the Chinese advance, had established a defensive line on the 38th Parallel. Meanwhile, on 27 November, X Corps, marooned in north-eastern Korea, began an epic fighting retreat to Hiingnam, December 1951—n US Marine squad retura from patrol, They wear their helmets stuffed down over pile cape and-in the Save of the foreground man, carrying the olded” Ma 95 i. rocket Iauncher-over the hood of the parka. (The hood was Supposed to accommedate the helmet, but was seldem worn hat way.) The parka is kdentiGed ss the light tan-coloured World War If model by the ekirt pockets: the Migr model, issued towards the end of the war, had only the slanting pockets on the ibs. (USMC)where ships, under a massive air umbrella, successfully evacuated them. By Christmas Day 105,000 troops had embarked for Pusan in the biggest sea evacuation in American history. Then, on 23 December, Gen, Walker was killed in a traflie accident, to be replaced as EUSAK Commander on the 26th by Lt.Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway Ridgway had 365,000 troops—from west to cast, US I Corps (25th, 3rd Inf, 1st ROK Divs.); IX Corps (1st Cav., rst Ma ine, 24th Inf, 6th ROK Divs.); three ROK Corps; and X Corps (and, 7th Inf., and, 5th, 8th ROK) in reserve. ‘The Chinese New Year offensive brought X Corps into the central sector, and forced I and IX Corps to abandon Seoul on 4,January 1951, However, by 15 January the offensive had run out of steam, and on the 25th EUSAK, now just south of Osan, counter- attacked strongly northwards against determined Chinese opposition, Meanwhile the 1st Marine Div. fought the North Korean oth Div., cut off deep in South Korea, before joining the IX Corps advance February. On 14 March I Corps recaptured Seoul, and by mid-April Ridgway’s forces had reached ‘Line Utah’, just inside North Korea. On 11 April, after a dramatic disagreement over the issue of widening the scope of operations against China, President Truman replaced the legendary Gen. MacArthur with Gen. Ridgway, who in turn passed EUSAK command to Lt.Gen. James Van Fleet. In the First Spring Offensive I and IX Corps— defending the approaches to Scoul—were attacked, but held firm. By 29 April the offensive was spent, and Van Fleet pushed forward gingerly with armoured patrols. Order of battle was now I Corps (ast Cay., grd and 25th Inf-Divs.), IX Corps (7th and 24th Inf, and and 6th ROK Divs., 187th ARCT), and X Corps (1st Marine, end Inf., 5th and 7th ROK Divs.). The Second Spring Offensive on 16 May smashed ROK divisions in X Corps, but other units plugged the gap as the Corps fell back, and attacks on I and IX Corps were similarly contained. Now Van Fleet counter-attacked strongly; and on 21 May advanced against light resistance to ‘Line Wyoming’ back in North Korea, which he fortified with trenches, wire, mines and artillery. The truce talks reduced activity to local level, but X Corps fought successfully to improve its position. Meanwhile, on 6 April the 65th (Puerto 16 Gol, Frederick B. Alexander, CO of the 21st Infantry, 2 Division, early 1953. Note combat boots fitted with «appa and regimental crest worn on ‘combat leader's’ igre shoulder strap loop, above the divisional shoulder sles insignia. (US Army) Rico) Inf.Regt. replaced the goth in 3rd Div, an on 1 August (the day Van Fleet was promoted fu general) the 14th Inf, joined 25th Div, replacin the black 24th Regt., which was disbanded. Now stalemate set in, as Ridgway ordere EUSAK tostop advancing but actively to defend i forward positions in North Korea. In Decembe 1951 the ist Cav.Div. was replaced in T Corps b 45th (Oklahoma) Div., one of four National Guan divisions called into Federal service in August 1950 In late January 1952 a sister division, the 4otl (California), replaced the veteran 24th Div. it IX Corps. Throughout January massive air ang artillery strikes rained down on Chinese positions but thereafter activity was light, despite a major but unsuccessful enemy offensive in May against | Corps. On 12 May the veteran World War II commander Gen, Mark Clark replaced Ridgway at UNC Commander. In June the 187th ARCT was used to crush the revolt on Koje Island off Pusan. July 1952 saw the ‘Battle of the Outposts’. In October and Div. (I Corps) repelled a strong Chinese attack, while IX Corps advanced grad-‘Iron Tr inflic ually into. the ngle ing huge casualties. By January 1953 Van Fleet had 768,000 troops disposed (from west to east) in I Corps (2nd, 7th, later 25th, Inf.; rst Marine; ist, and, 15th ROK Divs.); IX Corps (grd Inf.; gth ROK, ROK Capitol); ROK II Corps; X Corps (goth, 45th Inf: 7th rath, 20th ROK); and ROK I Corps. On 11 February 1953 Van Fleet retired after nearly two years as EUSAK Commander, and was replaced by Lt.Gen, (from 23 June, Gen.) Maxwell D, In March and May I Corps withstood heavy enemy attacks, and were reinforced in June by 187th ARCT and gqth RCT (24th Diy.) from Japan. On 10 June a powerful Chinese offensive against ROK II Corps forced the neighbouring X Corps back three miles. Then, on 13 July, IX Corps contained with difficulty the last major Chinese penetration before the Armistice of 27 July. ‘The United States emerged from the Korean War as undeniably the principal Western power in succession to Great Britain and France, accepting world-wide obligations, especially in the contain- ment of Communism, The 1945 concept of total war, waged by aircraft carrying atomic weapons, gave way to the concept of limited war, requiring a standing army which must never again decline to aylor the dangerously low levels of the late 1940s. ‘Tactically, the infantry reasserted its traditional position as the key arm, which it had apparently lost Field Marshal Lord Alexander of Tunis, the British Defence Minister, inspects an Honor Guard from the US 3rd Infantry ‘wearing fatigues much dressed up for the 1a with the division's blue and white insignia, matcl scarves, polished and badgedl helmet liners, and other typical parade features. (Imperial War Museum) to armour. The importance of artillery firepower was re-emphasised; Ranger and Airhorne units had been so successfull that their training methods were extended to all infantry officers; and the growth of Army (especially helicopter) aviation presaged the birth of the ‘airmobile’ concept. ‘The United States divisional order of battle in Korea was: and Inf.Div. . 15th, 37th, 38th Arty.Bns.; Eng.Bn.; 82nd AA Bn. grd InftDiv. . . 7th, 15th Puerto Rico) Inf.Regts. Arty.Bns.; 64th Tk.Bn.; Bn. 7th Inf.Div. ... 17th, 31st, g2nd InfRegts.; 31st*, 48th, ggth, 57th Arty.Bns.; 73rd 'Tk.Bn.; 13th oth, agrd, 38th InfRegts.: 12th* jend Tk.Bn.; 2nd 3oth (replaced by 65th gth*, roth, 3th, 58th roth Eng.Bn.; 3rd AA Eng.Bn.; 15th AA Bn. 24th Inf.Div.... 19th, 21st, 34th InfRegts.; 11th*, 1gth, 52nd, 6rd Arty.Bns.: Eng.Bn.; 26th AA Bn. a5th Inf.Div..... 24th (replaced by 14th), 27th, 35th InfRegts.; 8th, 64th, 69th, goth* Arty.Bns.; 8gth Bn.; 65th Eng.Bn.; 21st AA Bn. goth InfDiv roth, 23rd, 224th Inf-Regts.; rd, 625th, g8oth, g81st* Arty.Bns.; 1goth 578th Eng.Bn.; r4oth AA Bn. 45th Inf.Div. . . . 179th, 180th, 279th InfRegts.; 158th, 160th, 171sSt, 189th* Arty.Bns.; 245th ; 10th Eng-Bn.; 145th AA Bn. 5th, 7th, 8th Cav.Regts.; 61st, 77th ond*, goth, Arty.Bns.; 6th Tk.Bn.; 8th Eng.Bn.; 2gth AA Bn. 1st Mar.Div. ... 1st, 5th, 7th Mar.Regts.; 1st, 2nd, grd, 4th Bns.; 11th Arty.Regt.; ist Tk.Bn.; rst Eng.Bn.; 1st Amph.Bn. (#denotes 155 mm artillery battalion goth Tk.Bn.; 3rd British Commonwealth After 1945 the British Army began to demobilise; but the British government recognised the neces of a credible peacetime army, and so conscription (in 1948 renamed ‘National Service’) was retained for men aged 18-20, Britain had traditional Imperial commitments to which were now added new international obligations—occupation forces 7Bugle-Major Martin, Durham Light Infantry, ‘warms up’ his bbuglers for a fanfare. They wear the regimental eap badge on the midnight blue beret which was (and remains) the general issue for British troops, though now replaced in the LI by dark green. The field jacket and trousers are the type later designated Mg8 combat dress; note Commonwealth Di shield and regimental title om right shoulders. The bug major’s four chevrons are worn on the upper, rather than the lower sleeve as was regulation. (The Light Infantry) in Germany and Japan, and NATO requirements for troops to defend Western Europe. Similarly, in Canada, Australia and New Zealand membership of Western military alliances was accepted as essential to the security of national independence. The North Korean invasion, so soon after the Communist victory in China, was seen as a further step towards Communist world domi Im- mediately 17 ships and 7,000 men of the Royal, Royal Australian and Royal New Zealand Navies were sent to Korea. They were followed on 29 June by 77 (Fighter) Sqn. RAAF, flying Mustangs, and subsequently by 0 (Transport) Unit RAAF, 426 (Transport) Sqn. RCAF, and, in November, the Mustangs of 2 Sqn. SAAF, the ‘Flying Cheetahs’ In August 27th Infantry Brigade, the United Kingdom Strategic Reserve then stationed with 4oth Div. in Hong Kong, was earmarked for Korea. A British or Commonwealth infantry brigade (equivalent to a US. regiment) headquarters, services, and three rifle battalions cach 909 men strong. A rifle battalion had an HQ company (with signals and administration plat- cons); a support company (mortar, machine gun, anti-tank and assault pioneer platoons); and four ion. consisted of 18 ifle companies (A-D) cach with three rifle platoot (1st-9th within the company). A platoon had thr rifle sections, each with a corporal and eight me In peacetime most battalions had only three rif companies, and so for Korea a fourth was raise from neighbouring battalions. During this peric there was a high incidence of ‘cross posting’ to brit units up to strength for tours in Korea. The troo} were a mixture of long-service regulars, wartim reservists recalled to the colours, and nation: service conscripts, Some of the latter were given th option of volunteering, but this was not general. On 28 August 1950 27th Bde. (really a ‘brigad group’, as it operated with organic supportin arms) disembarked at Pusan with only tw battalions—1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlande and 1st Middlesex Regt—and immediately mar ned the western perimeter, supported by two U artillery batter and some US tanks. On 1 September they broke out, and advanced north westwards with US 24th Div., meeting fierce enem opposition (against which Maj. Muir of the Argyll earned a posthumous Victoria Cross). On October the brigade was renamed 27th Com monwealth Inf:Bde., being brought up to strengt by the arrival of grd Bn., Royal Australian Regt. formidable all-regular unit. During the rapi advance up the west coast the Australians killed 27 North Koreans in a bayonet charge north ¢ P’yongyang. On 30 October the brigade ha reached Chongju, 40 miles from the Manchuriai border, when the Chinese intervention forced withdrawal to Sinanju; here the brigade beat off determined Chinese attack. Meanwhile, the 250 strong 41st (Independent) Commando, Roya Marines, formed in Japan in September 1950 fo Korean service, mounted two raids against the eas coast in early October, and in November joined US 1st Marine Div. (X Corps) isolated in NE Korea Following the Chinese attack of 25 Novembe 27th Bde., now in US IX Corps reserve, supporte the general retreat south, meeting the British 291 Independent Brigade Group, which had disem barked at Pusan on 3 November and was nov advancing north. On 14 December 27th Bde., now on the 38th Parallel defence line, was joined by 6otl (Parachute) Indian Field Ambulance, India’s only but distinguished contribution to the war-effort The 29th Brigade—which as well as three infantry— battalions fielded tank!, artillery and engineer units] coul before moving up to P’yongyang, only to retreat again to the 38th Parallel in mid-December. Meanwhile, 41 Commando performed a magnificent fighting withdrawal with US 1st Marine Div. from the Chosin Reservoir to Himgnam for evacuation to South Korea. In December 1950 all ground, sea and air forces became the British Commonwealth Forces in Korea (BCFK), HQ Japan, under Lt.Gen. Sir Horace Robertson, the first of three Australians to hold the command. The 27th Bde. (US IX Corps: retreated in good order before the 1951 New Year offensive; 2gth Bde. (US I Corps), covering Seoul, fought fiercely at Chungghung Dong, and crossed the Han River after suffering heavy casualties. By mid-January the two brigades were entrenched well south of Seoul. Then the slow UN winter counter- offensive northwards began, 27th Brigade at last received its own organic artillery battalion—16th Field Regt., Royal New Zealand Artillery; and on 18 February and Bn., Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry became its fourth infantry battalion. By 19 April both brigades had halted well north of Seoul, 2th Bde. on the Imjin River. The First Spring Offensive struck 2gth Bde. with massive force and they fell back, leaving rst Gloucesters cut off on Point 235 (‘Gloucester Hill’) toconduct a heroic last stand which bought time for other units, and ultimately blunted the offensive. Afier two and a half days just 39 Gloucesters reached UN lines; LtCol. Garne, the battalion commander, and Lt. Curtis were both awarded the Victoria Cross, The battle of the Imjin River was the Commonwealth’s finest hour in Korea. 27th Bde. fought its way southwards, and on 26 April 1951 became 28th Commonwealth Bde. (the only brigade to be ‘relieved’). In early May, 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group arrived with three infantry battalions (including 2nd PPCLI transferred from 28th Bde.), an artillery regiment, a field ambulance (both battalion equivalents), and tank and engineer squadrons. In the May UN counter-offensive 25th Bde. (US I Corps), 28th and agth Bdes. (US IX Corps) all advanced to a new ad been fighting North Korean guerrillas near $ For detailed accounts of British tank operations, see Vanguards The Centurion Tank in Battle, and 25, Armour of the Korean Wer, ‘Two British soldiers of the DLI pose with a ‘Katcom’ before going out on patrol, 1952.59. They wear eap comforters Healt EXper rolled from a tube of wook US Msgr (left) and Mags SIM jackets’; and. carry Stene and grenades. (The Light Tnfaniry) defensive line inside North Korea. There, on 28 July 1951, the rst Commonwealth Division was formed from the existing three infantry brigades, a tank regiment and squadron, three artillery regiments and two batteries, an engineer regiment and two squadrons, and three field ambulances. The division defended Seoul under US I Corps; and in October advanced northwards in Operation ‘Commando’, during which 1st KOSB (28th Bde.) suffered heavily in Chinese counter-attacks. It was during this battle that Pte. Speakman won his ve The stalemate period allowed the division's British, padian, Australian, New Zealand and Indian units to reach a level of efficient co- operation, spiced with friendly rivalry, which still stands as a model for multi-national military formations. The intense winter cold of 1951-2 brought welfare problems not encountered since the Crimean War, but military activity was restricted to patrols and raids. In late May 1952. two companies served on Koje-co PoW Camp as prison guards. Meanwhile 41 Gdo. RM, after coastal 19raiding throughout 1951, left Ko disbanded at Plymouth in February 1952 Static warfare continued throughout the winter of 1952-3, but improved Chinese defensive fire made local raiding increasingly unattractive. The front was quiet, although in late October divisional artillery did support the neighbouring rst US Marine Div. when they came under attack. 1,000 ROK conscripts were integrated as ‘Katcoms’ (Koreans Attached Commonwealth Division’), with two Katcoms per infantry section. They wore the relevant unit uniform; could be promoted to NCO rank; and were liked and respected. During November 1952 1st Black Watch repelled a determined Chinese attack against the hill known as “The Hook’. The division spent two months in reserve from February 1953; and in late May the rst Duke of Wellington’s Regt., supported by artillery of ist RTR, again defended a, and was and the Centurio A Scottish soldier serving in Korea being fitted with the second type of winter warfare clothing issued in response to the sufferings of British troops during the appallingly cold winter of 1950. (Imperial War Museum) 20 The Hook in the last sizeable Commonwealt engagement of the war—although infantry an artillery did help the US Marines in the la desperate fighting before the Armistice. Commonwealth losses, at 1,263 dead of whor 686 were British, were considered moderate; an the division stayed in South Korea until 1956, whe it was replaced by a 2,000-strong Contingen which was steadily reduced over the years whic followed. ‘The unique experiment of the mult national division, although successful, is unlikel ever to be repeated in the entirely different strategi conditions which now face the separate nations « the Old Commonwealth, The order of battle of Commonwealth groun forces (excluding 41 Cdo. Royal Marines) follow below. Diagonal strokes represent successive de ployments: e.g. the initial infantry units of 29th Bd were 1st Bn., Royal Northumberland Fusiliers; 1 Bn., The Gloucestershire Regt.; and 1st Bn., Royz Ulster Rifles. (In the lists below, titles have be greatly abbreviated.) Canadian and British unit ted (very approximately) every India and New Zealand rotated personnel oc casionally; Australia did both 12 months 27th|28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade ist Middx./ist KSLI/ist DLI/1st Warwicks st Argylls/1st KOSB/1st R. Fusiliers/tst Essex grd_R. Australians/ist R. Australiansj/2nd R Australians and PPCLI 16th Fd.Regt. RNZA 6oth Indian (Para) Amb. 2gth British Infantry Brigade Group nds/ 1st Leicesters/ist. Blac! Watch/ist R. Scots 1st Gloucesters/1st Welch/1st Dk of Wellington's rst Ulsters/ rst Norfolks/1st Liverpool ‘C’ Sqn. 7th Royal ‘Tank Regt 8th Trish Hussars/5th Inniskillings RTR 45th/14th/2oth Fd.Regt. RA 17oth/120th Lt. Battery RA (Mortars)/61st Lt Regt. RA th/gznd Lt. AA Bn. RA sath & rand Fd.SqnRE, 64th Fd.Pk.Sqn.RE 2bth Fd.Eng.Regt.RE 26th Fd.Amb. Jist RTR/stl_— 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group and/ist/3rd R. Canadians and/1st/3rd R.22° Regt. and/1st/3rd PPCLI ‘C/'BY'A’ Sqn. Lord Strathcona’s Horse andJist R.Can, Horse Arty./B1st Fd.Regt. RCA agrd Fd.Sqn. RCE/28th Fd.Eng.Regt. RE 57th Indep.Fd.Sqn. RCE a5th/37th/38th Gan.Fd.Amb. a5th Can.Fd. Dressing Stat, ist Comm. Div. Sigs. Regt igogrd Indep.AOP Flight Other United Nations Contingents Three days after the North Korean invasion the United Nations called on all member states to help South Korea. monwealth, sent armed units, and four sent medical Ten countries, besides the Com- teams. The soldiers, all volunteers, were idealists, adventurers, or regulars hoping for accelerated promotion through recent combat experience. In all cases (except the Philippines) special units were raised and they, or their personnel, were regularly rotated First came the Philippines. The army, re- organised in early 1950 into ten US-style “battalion combat teams’ to fight the Huk Communists, sent the experienced roth BC and a Medium Tank Company. With 1,367 men in three rifle companies, light tank and_ reconnaissance (jeep) companies, a self-propelled artillery battery and supporting services, the unit could operate (Motorised independently. Troops wore uniforms identical to the US Army with the Philippine cap badge, and US rank insignia including pre-1948 chevrons. ‘They disembarked at Pusan on 20 September 1954 and operated with US 25th Div. on anti-guerrilla duties—their speciality. From January 1951 the unit served with US 3rd Div., and in April its tanks tried unsuccessfully to relieve the Gloucesters at the Imjin River. The 20th BCT took over in September 1951, serving from April 1952 with US 45th Div.; in June 1952 it was relieved by roth BCT (‘Blood- An MP of the Canadian Provost Corps, 25th Bde. rst Commonwealth Division. Note sleeve insignia worn on two brassards: on his left arm the divisional sign, on his right the red ‘Canada’ shield with a gold-yellow maple leaf and wreath, hoth under regimental titles. (Public Archives Canada) hounds’); in April 1953 by 14th BCT (‘Avenger and finally, in April 1954, by 2nd BCT After World War II Turkey was driven by fear of its Soviet neighbour into the Western camp. Although at peace since 1923, Turkish troops were generally considered the best of the smaller UN contingents; they fought well, especially in close combat; were steadfast PoWs; and were well Brigade an artillery battalion, signals platoon, and engi n defence, and resolute as led. ‘The 1st Turkish with 24ist Inf.Regt. (three battalions), cer, transport, medical and ordnance companies disembarked at Pusan 5,455 strong, on 18-20 October 1950, and advanced with 25th US Div. into North Korea, They met the Chinese in- tervention head on, fighting desperately but being beaten back at innimini with heavy losses. They fought doggedly near Osan in February 1951, and on 15 May foiled another direct Chinese assault, On 1 September 1951 2nd Bde. took over; on 30 July 1952, grd Bde.; and on 4 September 1953, 4th Bde.; which left Korea in May 1954 21ing the black beret and badge illustrated in Plate F1—note large eyelets in hheret. French and American decorations are worn on US fatigues, including the battalion's lanyard for four collective citations, in the colours—yellow flecked with grcen—of the Médaille Miliaire ribbon. Three gold bars pinned to the chest indicate his rank. (E.C-P. Armées) Thailand sent the ‘Royal Thai Forces in Koréa’—air and naval forces and the ist Inf.Regt., formed 22 September 1950 with HQ and 1st Bn. only, It reached Korea on 22 October, and advanced with the US 187th ARCT to P’yongyang. In January 1951 the unit retreated with the British agth Bde. under Chinese pressure: and, with ist US Cav.Div., fought guerrillas and faced the Spring Offensives. In December 1951 they patrolled with US gth Inf, (and Div.), fighting gallantly at Pork Chop Hill. The regiment returned home on 31 March 19, 5, leaving a company-sized contingent which remained until 1972, by which time 19,000 Thais had served tours in Korea; wartime service cost them 125 dead. The 21st Regt. is now HM Queen Sirikit’s dU In spite of the heavy burden of her war in Indochina France sent the UN French Forces 22 e under Lt.Gen, (temporary Lt.Coll) Monel commanding an HQ and the French Battalio (Bataillon Frangais), with HQ company (includin, an élite assault pioneer platoon), support compan and three rifle companies (1st-3rd), each with on support and thrce rifle platoons. Thi at Pusan on 29 November 1950, and joined the 2r RCT (2nd US Division). The battalion distin guished itself in a bayonet charge at Wonju on 1 January 1951, and in an epic defence of Chip’ yong ni village from 13 to 17 February, which turned th Chinese offensive. At Putchaetul (17 May) th pioncers fought to the death, Heartbreak Ridge wa captured in October 1951, and Arrow Head Hi held in October 1952, but again at the cost of th pioneers. On 22 October 1953 the French set sail fo the Indochina War, leaving 261 dead in Korea. Netherlands naval forces reached Korea in Jul 1950; but the Dutch Army, seriously depleted afte their recent war in Indonesia, could offer only a understrength infantry battalion from the recent! formed Regiment Van Heutsz. ‘The 636-stron unit—with headquarters, HQ company, on support and two rifle companies and some nurses all under Major den Quden—reached Pusan on 2 November 1950, and joined US 38th Inf, (US anc .) in a particularly successful partnership. On 1 February 1951 the headquarters and HQ Co. wer overrun by Chinese disguised as ROK troops, an den Ouden was killed. In May a third rifl company arrived, and in April to July 1952 i helped quell the PoW revolt on Koje-do. September 1954 the battalion left Korea, havin; lost 120 dead Exhausted after a long civil Greee nevertheless sent a reinforced battalion formed fron volunteers from the Greck Army’s 1st, 8th and ott Divs.; there was also the 13th Transport Flight 0 the RHAF, which helped evacuate US X Corp from Hiingnam. The 849-strong battalion, wit headquarters, HQ company, and three rifl companies each with one MG mortar and three rifl platoons, reached Pusan on g December 1950, ar joined US 7th Cav.Regt. (US 1st Cav.Div.). On 2 January 1951 the battalion captured Hill 4o2, an disembarke war "The World War II nom de guere of L.Col. Magrin-Vernerey, who le the Foreign Legion's 15° Demi-Br « Narvik and in Bast Afric Like many of De Gaulle iers from the years of exile jen, Leclerecotch Hill) losing 28 dead. In January 1952 they patrolled with igth Inf. (US grd Div guard Koje-do camp. Finally, in June 1953, they held ‘Harry Hill’ against determined Chinese assaults, On 13 January 1954 the arrival of 1,667 reinforcements enabled expansion to the two- battalion Hellenic Regiment. By the end of 1955 almost all had left Korea, having lost 182 dead. On 31 January 1951 the Belgium Luxemburg, contribution—the ist’ Belgian Bn. (Bataillon Belge) —arrived at Pusan, comprising a headquar- ters, HQ company, and heavy weapons company all mixed Walloon/Flemish); A and B (rifle on 5 October occupied Hill 31 ; and in May they helped pose cheerfully with Communist propaganda placards. All Wear the Canadian summer-weight field caps; the (wo foreground veterans both display Canadian parachute wings; the corporal (left front) has chevrons stencilled in miniature beside his cap badge, imitating US practice; the man at right rear has a Canadian-issued US-made olive brown sweater. The Corporal’s battledress blow tish 1946 issue, worn with winter overtrousers; the man at right front wears Canadian ‘nd US combat boots. His .303 Lee Enfield was the ‘throughout Commonwealth contingents. (Pub- lic Archives Canada) Companies (Walloon), and G Co, (Flemish). The Luxemburg Detachment of 48 men formed the 1st Pin. of A Co. and wore the Grand-Ducal monogram on the collar patches of their Belgian uniforms. The battalion fought magnificently at the Imjin River, supporting British 2gth Bai 5 it was 23relieved on 21 August by the end Bn., which was then assigned to US 7th InfRegt. (grd Div.). In October this unit defended a forward position at Haktang-ni for three days against a heavy Chinese attack, From 26 March 1952 to 20 January 1953 the and Luxemburg Ptn. served with the battalion. In April 1953 the unit fought off Chinese attacks at Chatkol. In June 1955 the last Belgians left Korea, having lost 103 dead (including two Luxemburgers). mperor Haile Selassie, eager to involve Ethiopia in the internationalised conflict, sent the 1st Kagnew (‘Conquerors’) Bn., formed in August 1950 with three rifle companies (1st, and and 4th Gos.) drawn from te Imperial Guard. They arrived at Pusan on 7 May 1951, and joined US gend InfRegt. (7th Div.) on ‘Line Kai rom 16 to 22 September they were engaged in furious hand-to-hand fighting at Sam-Hyon. On 2g March 1952 2nd Kagnew Bn. took over, to be relieved in its turn on 16 April 1953 by 3rd Kagnew Bn., which drove off at bayonet-point a Chinese attack at Tokan-ni on 20 May. This unit was fighting at Pork Chop Hill at the time of the Armistice. The last Ethiopian soldier left Korea on 3 January 1965, In 1950 Colombia sent the frigate Almirante Men of the grd Turkish Bde. arrive in the Panbudong sector to take over from the 3,7th US Marines in May 1953. By this date the Turks were entirely clothed and equipped with US items, incl the US Army's nylon aluminium ‘Armor, Vest, Miz’. (US Army courtesy Simon Dunstan) Padilla, followed on 15 June 1951 by the 19 Colombia Bn. (Batallén Colombia), the only Latir American ground unit ever to fight in Asia Colombians were fined five dollars for not shaving daily or writing home weekly, and a nine-picce Latin band accompanied them; but this was nq ‘operetta. army’, for they earned a fighting reputation surpassed only by the Turks. The 1,060. strong reinforced battalion joined US 24th Div. and first saw combat on 7 August, later mounting an epic defence of Kumsong from 13 to 23 October. In early 1952 they transferred to the US 31st Inf. (US jth Diy.); and fought on ‘Old Baldy” before being relieved by the end Bn. on 4 July. After the fight for “T-Bone Hill in late 1952 the grd Bn. took over, alse fighting at ‘Old Baldy’ before relief by 4th Bn. on 2: June 1953. By the time this battalion left Korea in October 1954, 131 Colombians had died in action. ‘The first foreign medical team to arrive in Korea was from the Swedish Red Cross, operating a field hospital at Pusan from 23 September 1950 until r¢ April 1957. On 7 March 1951 the Danish Red Cross ship Jutlandia anchored in Pusan harbour. and operated there and at Inchon with 100 medical personnel until 16 August 1957. From May 1951 until 1954 the Norwegian Red Cross (after 1 November 1951, the Norwegian Army) operated ‘Normash’, a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (‘Mash’), the 106 personnel wearing at firs Norwegian and later US Army uniforms. Finally. 24aaa oN 1; Sergeant, summer field dress, 1950 2: Private, winter field dress, 1950 3: Colonel, service dress, 1952United States Army: 1: Major, summer ‘khakis’, 1950 2: Private, summer field dress, 1950 ‘3: Corporal, summer field dress, 1952ca TELE SE wo \ st Bn,, The Gloucestershire Regt. (UK), 1951 8: Sgt., Royal 22° Régiment (Canada), 1951/— es >) 2: Kp. I°KL, Regt, Van Heutsz (Netherlands), 1951 3: Capt., Bataillon Belge, 1950i Ll ~ 2: Lt,, Ist Kagnew Bn. (Ethiopia), 1951 3: L/Cpl., 21st Inf. Regt. (Thailand), 1951e. cos . 1: Infantryman, winter field dress, 1950 2: Infantryman, summer field dress, 1951 3: Officer, service dress, 1952from 16 November 1951 until 2 January 1955, the Italian Red Cross built and ran a hospital at Yongdungpo. Peoples Republic of China In 1950 the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Chung-Kuo Jen-Min Chich-Fang Chiin—hereatter PLA), comprising the Army, Navy, Air Force and Militia of the year-old People’s Republic, was commanded by the Minister of Defence, Chu-Teh, Army commander since June 1930. There were between two and three million troops in four Field Armies (numbered 1st-gth) and GHQ units (sometimes called 5th Field Army); and one to two million in the second-line Garrison Armies. A Field Army (130,000-160,000 strong, equivalent to a weak US or British ‘army’) contained about three Group Armies (1st-2grd). A Group Army (30,000-80,000 strong, equivalent to a Western ‘corps’) usually contained two to six Armies (1st-about 77th). The Army (21,000-30,000 strong, or half again the size of a US or British Division) was the principal self-sufficient tactical formation. Each comprised three, sometimes four, Divisions (numbered 1st-about 2goth); artillery, special duty, training and lorry transport regi- ments; and engineer, sance, com munications and anti-aircraft battalions. A division (7,000-10,000 strong, equivalent to a US ‘light division’) had three infantry regiments (1st-about jooth), an artillery regiment, and engineer, transport, and signals companies. A regiment theory 3,242 men, but usually understrength) had three infantry battalions (cach with three three-platoon companies), an artillery battery, and guard, mortar, transport, signals, medical and stretcher companies. There were also some artillery divisions (with artillery and rocket- projector regiments), and Inner Mongolian moun- ted cavalry divisions, but apparently no armoured divisions at this time, although the PLA did operate some ex-Nationalist tanks. Army organisation was ted to divisions in numerical sequence, as were divisions reconnai medical (in strictly triangular, and all regiments were allo’ to armics. Although 3,000 recently arrived Soviet military Ouden, the first CO of the Netherlands Bn, decorates men of his command with the US Bronze Star. Note the Ussstyle green ‘combat leader loops worn om Shoulder ‘straps: Den Ouden wae killed In action near Hungvong on 12 February 195%. (Millis. Sec, Royal Dutch Army) advisers. were training the PLA in modern mechanised warfare, it was still at this stage a mass experience of guerrilla warfare. The Army was multi-racial, with a cadre of dedicated Communists controlling ex nationalist deserters and PoWs, and troops from the compromised Chinese, Manchukuo and Mongol collaborationist armies. To prevent élitism “pos- tional titles’ (or appointments’) were substituted for the usual military ranks (see table). Equipment was poor, and logistical services rudimentary, but the calibre of the ordinary soldier made the PLA a formidable fighting machine The North Korean invasion of the South had come as a surprise to Peking, but the Chinese were unwilling to see the destruction of a fellow Communist state when the tide of war began to turn against it. By 14 October 1950 the first regular PLA troops—designated “Chinese People’s Volunteers’, to disguise official Chinese entry into the war, and commanded by ‘General’ P’eng Teh-huai—had crossed the Yalu River secretly into North Korea. By early November these comprised 200,000 men in the 13th Group Army (38th, 39th, oth Armies); gand, 5oth and 66th Armies; 8th Artillery and 1st 33 infantry force unsurpassed in iand 2nd Motorised Artillery Divisions; a cavalry regiment, and the 42nd Motor Transport Regi- ment They promptly smashed ROK forces at the Chosin Reservoir, but 38th and 4oth sustained heavy losses at Ch'ongch'on ag IX Corps before attacking the weaker ROK II Corps. On 27 November gth Group Army (20th, 26th, 27th Armies) was so badly mauled in its unsuccessful attempt to prevent US X Corps fighting retreat to Hiingnam that it was withdrawn to Manchuria for re-organisation. Meanwhile the main Chinese force (8th, 39th, goth, 42nd, 5oth, 66th Armies) chased the remaining US/ROK forces out of North Korea, pausing in December at the 38th Parallel. Then, on 1 January 1951, they surged southwards, and occupied Seoul before halting for resupply. The crude logistical ‘tail? was Belgian and Greek troops attached to US grd Infantry Di 2951, with Gls wearing that division's insignia on thei helmets. The Greeks have a national flag insignia on thei helmets; the beret-wearing Belgians are armed with the Mg FN automatic rifle. (Royal Belgian Embassy) Appointments in the Chinese PLA Title Literal Translation British Equivalent Yen-chan-chiin Ssu-ling-yian Field Army Commanding Officer General Ping-t’uan Ssu-ling yiian Group Army Commanding Officer Lieut. General Chiin Ssu-ling-yiian Army Commanding Officer Major General Divisional Commanding Officer Brigadier Deputy Divisional Commanding Officer Brigadier ‘Tuan-chang Regimental Commander Colonel Fu T'uan-chang Deputy Regimental Commander Licut. Colonel Ying. Battalion Commander Lien-chang Company Commander Captain Fu Lien-chang Deputy Company Commander Lieutenant P'ai-chang Platoon Commander and Lieutenant Fu P’ai-chang Deputy Platoon Commander Sergeant Pan-chang Section Commander Corporal Fu Pan-chang Deputy Section Commander Lance-Corporal Chan-shih Fighter Private On 16 September 1955 (with effect 1 January 1956) this system was replaced by Sovict-style ranks. Under the Cultural Revolution it was reinstated, with the addition of ‘Chieh-fang Chiin Tsung-ssu- ling’—Commander-in-Chiefof the PLA—equivalent to Field Marshal. On 1 August 1983 a return to Soviet-style ranks was announced. 34quite unable to supply even the modest 40 tons of supplies needed by a Chinese division (a US Division needed 600!) after so rapid an advance. On u1 February goth, 66th and KPA 5th Armies pressed on towards Wonju, using massed ‘human wave’ tactics for the first time; but these caused appalling casualties in the face of the deadly UN firepower, and the Chinese were forced to retreat back over the 38th Parallel, having lost Seoul. Now seven more armies (12th, 15th, 47th, Goth, 63rd, 64th, 65th) arrived for the First Spring Offensive, which was to be the PLA’s greatest (if ultimately unsuccessful) effort of the war. In the west, the grd and rth Group Armies would take Scoul; the 13th and reconstituted 1gth Group Armies would attack in the central sector, backed up by independent Mongolian cavalry—a total of go divisions (250,000 men) with about 4o divisions in reserve. ‘The offensive began on 22 April, but had already been halted by the goth, with 70,000 casualties, Seoul still out of reach, and the blunted after 4o miles by the stand of 29th British Bde. at the Imjin. On 17 May pressure switched to the cast in the Second Spring Offensive, with 21 Chinese divisions and two North Korean armies, led by grd and gth Group Armies; but after four days and 90,000 casualties the advance petered out. The Chinese were shattered, and realised that even their virtually unlimited human resources could not overcome the murderous UN firepower. They retreated as the UN counter-attacked, to a secure line just inside North Korea, saved from humiliat- ing defeat by UN reluctance to invade North Korea again, and by the hope of an armistice as peace talks opened. The 1951 ese troops manning static forti an enemy who no longer feared them as invincible, but who did not wish to waste lives by attacking. Now the Chinese constructed a 14-mile-deep system of trenches, earthworks, deep tunnels and Armies and n some ivance in the central sector November stalemate found the cations against underground bases as shelter against artillery barrages, air strikes, and even nuclear attack. Using their unrivalled skills in concealment and camouflage, they moved only unde: darkness, and attacked in battalion or company strength, supported by increased artillery, mortars and tanks. The Chinese now manned exclusively cover of Dr E. Sandaa, commander of NouMAsH, carries out an operation. Note US rank insignia, and national shoulder patch—‘Norcr’ over the Norwegian flag. (Royal Norwegian Embassy) the western and central sectors, facing UN/ROK forces, leaving the relatively peaceful eastern sector to their weaker North Korean allies. Their probing attacks, usually against vulnerable ROK units, were localised but stil lost 4,000 men in a single frenzied battle. In May 1952 they escalated attacks against ist ROK Di backed by artille 5 vicious: in January 1952 they and mortar barrage, but were once again unsuccessful. In July 1952 the CPV, now with 14 armies (12th, 15th, zoth, 26th, 27th, 38th, 39th, goth, 42nd, 47th Goth, 6grd-G5th), began the ‘Outpost Battles’, but were usually repulsed, often with significant losses. In October they launched a major US IX Corps, but lost 2,000 men from 38th Army in two days. Activity declined over the winter months, and more armies arrived as reinforcements (16th, 24th, 54th, 67th and 68th). Now there were seven Chinese and two North Korean armiesin the line, 270,000 men, and 11 armies with a further 31,000 in reserve. In March 1953 the Chinese attacked hard in the west towards Scoul; and in or mid-June a major assault in the central seChinese troops cross the Yalu River in October 1950 to drive back the vietorious United Nations troops. pushed ROK II Corps back three miles. On 13 July the Chinese attacked in the centre again, but lost a staggering 72,000 men—equivalent to. two armies—before the Armistice brought fighting to a close. P'eng Teh-huai’s Chinese People’s Volunteers returned home in triumph; in October 1954 Peng was promoted Minister of Defence, and in ptember 1955 he became one of ten newly- created ‘Marshals of the People’s Republic of China’. (In September 1959 he was dismi a quarrel with Mac loss em| ved after The PLA, in spite of 900,000 Was now Asia’s most powerful army, and it irked on a massive modernisation programme to match the firepower of the now pathologically hated Americans, The order of battle of the CPV was as follows “indicates formations present in July 1953; u/i means unidentified) ist Army* (1, 2, 7 Divs.) from 13th Gr. Army Fd. Army 1ath Army* (34 [later 31 ], 35, 36 Divs.) from grd Gr, Army; end Fd. Army 15th Army* (29, 44, 45 Divs.) from 3rd Gr. Army; and Fd. Army 16th Army* (46, 47, 48 [later 46, 47, wf, 9 from gth Gr. Army zoth Army (58, 59. 60, 89 Divs.) from oth Gr. Fd. Army 1 Army* (67, 69, 73 Divs.) from gth Gr. Army 24th Army* (70, 72, 77 [later 74] Divs.) from gth Gr, Army 36 end | Divs.) 26th Army (76, 77, 78, 88 Divs.) from gth Army; 3rd Fd. Army 27th Army (79, 80, 81, 90 Divs.) from gth Army; grd Fd. Army 38th Army* (112, 113 Army; 4th Fd. Army ggth Army* (115, 116, 117 Divs.) from 13th Army; 4th Fd. Army goth Army* (118, 119, 120 Divs.) from 13th Gr Army; qth Fd. Army 41st Army (121, 122, 123 Divs.) gend Army (124, 125, 126 Divs Army; 4th Fd. Army 46th Army* (133, 136, 137, Divs.) from 13th Gr. Amy 47th Army* (139, 140, 141 Di Army; 4th Fd. Army soth Army* (148, 149, 150 Divs.) Army; 4th Fd. Army sath Army* (160, 161, 162 [later 130, 132, 13] Divs.) from goth Gr. Army Goth Army* (178 [later 33, 181], 179, 180 Divs.) from 3rd Gr. Army; and Fd. Army 63rd Army* (187, 188, 189 Divs.) from rgth Gr, Army; ist Fd, Army 64th Army* (190, 191, 192 Divs.) from rgth Gr. Army; rst Fd, Army 65th Army" (193, 194, 195 Divs.) from rgth Gr. Army; ist Fd. Army 66th Army (196, 197, 198 Divs.) from 1st Fd. Army 114 Divs.) from 13th G from 14th Gr from 1th Gr, rom 13th Gr A Chinese defensive position—note elderly Maxim-type machine gun, and botte-shaped stick grenade.67th Army* (19 my 68th Army* (202, 203, 204 Di Army joth Army (208, 209, 210 Divs.) , 200, 201 Divs.) from 2oth Gr. ) from goth Gr. Also present in July 1953: four motorised artillery diys,, 1st (25, 26, 27 Regis.), and (28, 29, 30 Regts.), jth (11, 20, 21 Regts.), 8th (31, 44, 45. 47, 48 Regts.); 21st Rocket Launcher Div. (201, 202, 203 Regts.); six anti-tank regts. (401-406); five hor drawn artillery regts. (9, 10, 40, 41, u/i); four AA regts. (1, 2, 3, 9) and four tank regts. (1, 6 and two nfi) Lhe Plates A: North Korean KPA Ar: Sergeant, summer field dress, 1950 The Russian-style shirt/blouse was often worn inside the trousers, with the collar unfastened and the opening filled by a separate triangular ‘gas flap” troduced later of blue cloth. A simplified version in the war had plain cuffs, and only one flapless pocket on the lefi breast. The baggy trousers were fastened with tapes at the ankle and worn with rubbe khaki shade faded rapidly to a light yellowish hue. ‘The detachable shoulder boards were made of a superior material which retained its dark olive green colour better and contrasted markedly with : some, at least, could be reversed to act as red or green full dress insignia, led canvas ankle boots. The original olive the rest of the unifor The uniform had reinforcing patches on the elbows, t and knees, and frequently single or double rows of horizontal ‘zigzag’ stitching around nd upper h were used to hold leaf camouflage. trouser se the cap and across the shoulders, chest a sleeves, wh ‘The Soviet-style steel helmet had the national badge painted on the front, but seems to have been little worn in the field. Tank crews appear to have worn Russian-style one-piece overalls in black or khaki, with high boots and padded canvas helmets. Aa: Private, winter dress, 1950 This quilted cotton uniform was padded wi Japanese employees of the US Army model the Chinese People's Volunteers’ cotton summer combat uniform—cf. Plate H. The fabric tube slung around the body is for carrying rations; the mixed leather and fabric pouch rig is that also shown in the posed photo on page 3. (US Army via Lee Russell) cotton wool or kapok. The style followed that of the summer uniform, except that the s Ja low standing collar. The field cap, which was made pirt/blouse h: from the same material, had larger side flaps which could be fastened under the chin but were otherwise tied over the crown, The uniform was worn with padded mittens which had separate thumbs and trigger fingers, and rubber-soled ankle boots with quilted cotton tops. Some officers wore high boots of white felt which had a strip of dark leather all the way up the front. There was also a double-breasted parka with slanting side pockets; and officers had with blouse was conventional double-breasted _ greatcoats pviet-style collar tabs. Later the replaced by a five-button double-breasted jacket ; some, indeed, may have been of Chinese origin, for the North similar to that of the Chinese PLA 37Korean supply position must have been severely affected by the UN’s 1950 advance. Equipment resembled the Soviet World War II pattern, with leather waist belis and ammunition pouches, and a plain canvas rucksack and haversack. ment was id consisted of he arma- ntical to the current Soviet issue, and KS carbines or PPSh41 SMGs. A3: Colonel, service dress, 1952 This smart, Russian-style uniform seems to date from 1948 at least. The tunic was very similar to the 1943 Soviet fittel except in having pointed cuffs. ‘The piping was red for the Army and green for the Border Constabulary. The tunic was almost always worn with Russian-style breeches and high black boots, though long trousers seem to have been authorised for undress. The North Koreans appear to have followed the Soviet practice whereby both wore dark blue for parade and walking-out dress and khaki for field service. Generals had broad double arm-of-service colour stripes, and other officers narrow piping. All ranks wore the distinctive North Korean cap, but only officers had the piping around the crown and the two diagonal lines on either side of the badge. The badge itself clearly reflected Soviet influence, as did the shoulder boards. The officers’ field uniform was imilar except that it was made of cotton drill and lacked the piping. There was also a white summer tunic in the same style, which was worn with the peaked cap and blue or khaki trousers. The dress tunic was worn without a belt, the field version with im Browne’ with a plain frame buckle. B: Army of the Republic of Korea Br: Major, service dress, 1950 The Republic of Korea’s Army was organised under American auspices, and received surplus US arms, equipment and uniforms from 1947 onwards. ROK officers wore the US Army’s olive drab tunic and trousers; its summer service dress of light khaki sin this case, the battledress- shirt and trousers; or, NORTH KOREAN ARMY INSIGNLA: (3) Cap badge—red & gold. (2) Wonsu, field marshal—Kim M-Sung only. (3) Ch'a-su, deputy field marshal—rank not held at this date. (4) ‘Sang-jang, lieutenant-general. NB, the four-star rank of Taevjang, general, is not shown here. (5) Chung-j major-general. (6) So-jang, seheles() Tees estos olonel—here, Armour. (9) ‘Chang, liewtenant- colonel—Artillery. (10) So wa, raajor—Engincers. (11) Taccni, senior captain— Medical. (12) Sag-wi, captain—Signals. (13) Chung- wi, Keutenant—Judge Advocates Dept. (14) So- second lieutenant, (15) ‘mu Sang-sa, warrant officer, sergeant-major. (16) Samg-sa, stall sergeant. (x7) Chung-sa, sergeant, (18) Ha-sa, corporal. (19) Sang-aling, lance-corporal. (20) China, private. Officers’ shoulder boards were in broad gold (combat arms) or narrow silver lace (services), with contrasting stars; the piping was red in the Army and green in the Border Constabulary. NCOs’ straps were olive green with gold bars and Fed or green piping. (P. Abou) Le UY 38Set. 1st Class Frank R. Oakes, Lt.Col. Francis Deisher and Lt. Roc Byong Heon supervising repatriation of Communist PoWs at Panmunjom in August 1953—thus the supervisor's arm brassards. Note minor differences in the fatigue patterns (see commentaries to Plates C, D); and methods of wearing rank and branch insignia, USA and ROK. (US Army via Lee Russell) style ‘Eisenhower jacket’ which had become the standard US temperate climate service dress garment during the immediate post-war period. US officers could combine it with light-coloured slacks on the same basis as the pre-war ‘pinks and greens’, and this officer has obviously followed their example. A closed-collar version, worn with olive drab trousers and peaked cap, was authorised for enlisted men. The cap badge featured the traditional yang and yin symbol. While generals wore US-style stars, field and company grade officers wore their devices mounted on gilt backing bars in a fashion reminiscent of World War IL Japanese practice, and the service dress tunic sometimes bore Japanese-style cuff braiding. US- style arm-of-service devices existed by the end of the war, and were supposed to be worn on the left hand side of the shirt collar after the US fashion, but few photographs actually show them in use. These branch devices were only worn by officers Be: Lieutenant, field dress, 1950 ‘The North Korean invasion disrupted the ROK Army’s supply system, and in the period before US material started to flood in, South Korean soldiers presented a very motley appearance. Old Japanese Arisaka rifles and even some steel helmets were brought out ofstore, and many troops had to make do with canvas ‘tennis shoes’ instead of combat boots. The surplus US Army material supplied was not necessarily of the most up-to-date pattern. This officer, for instance, wears the US Mqr field jacket, which had long been superseded in the US Army by the much improved M43 combat clothing. With it, he wears US-style olive drab woollen trousers, combat boots, and the peaked field cap of the summer fatigue uniform. Many ROK soldiers seem to have been issued with US Army greatcoats at the beginning of winter 1950-51, even though these were really obsolete as a field garment. By mid- 1951, however, the South Koreans had been fully equipped with US-pattern field clothing. US influence extended to the development of a system of divisional patches, which were often painted on the helmet sides, and to parade embellishments such as chromed helmet liners, decorative cravats, and white ladder-lacing in the combat boots. Bg: Private, trained, winter field dress, 1950 Although the South Koreans wore what were essentially US uniforms, there were certain differences. The US M42 HBT summer fatigues sometimes had the same ‘zigzag’ stitching across the upper part of the blouse as appeared on North Korean uniforms and which were apparently designed to hold foliage camouflage. This NCO is wearing an indigenous winter outfit made of the same quilted cotton material as the North Korean and Chinese models (which seems sometimes to have led to cases of mistaken identity, with ROK stragglers being taken for Communists by their UN allies); it differed in that the material was olive green in colour, generally with a criss-cross quilting pattern, and in having two large breast pockets like the M42 HBT fatigue jacket. It was often worn with a US-pattern pile cap instead of the steel helmet. Like the belt, web pouches and combat boots, this was of the standard US World War II pattern. Rank chevrons were supposed to be worn on the upper arms, but this seems to have been rare on the ficld clothing; they more commonly appeared on the helmet front, sometimes with miniature versions on the left hand breast pocket flap. 39C: United States Army Major, summer khakis, 1950 The term ‘khaki? can cause confusion because Americans use it to mean a light tan, whereas to the British and others it means a darker shade more to the American olive drab. During the 1930s the practice of wearing khaki shirts and privately purchased trousers developed; and these became issue garments for enlisted men in 1938-40, along with the ‘overseas cap’, until then not authorised for wear in the United States. This practical and comfortable hot-weather uniform was also widely ROK ARMY INSIGNIAG (1) Infantry. (2) Artillery. (3) Medic foregoing, gold. (5) Engincers—silver, gold star. (6) Cap badge—red blue centre with silver petals, gold wreath, (7) 1 Corps—dark blue and white, (8) Capitol Division—ereen shield, white rim, yellow tiger's head. (9) rst Division—dark blue rims, yellow shield, red numeral. (10) 3rd Division—dark bblue and white. (11) Chung-jang, ieutenant-general. (12) So-jang, major-general. (13) Chumjang, brigadier—all the foregoing, silver. (14). Tue-y0ng, colonel. (15) Chung-rvong, Weutenant. colonel (16) Se-rydng, major—all foregoing, gold bars, ight and dark silver roundels; one US source gives red and blue roundels, possibly full dress. (17) Tae-wi, eaptain, (x8) Chungewi, (4) Armour—all the worn by officers; it continued to be the main summer service dress after 1945, and was worn in rear areas, such as Japan, throughout the Korean War. Officers and warrant officers were also authorised to purchase a khaki tunic as an optional item for wear on more formal occasions. The style was similar to that of the olive drab tunic, except that the lower pocket flaps were pointed, and it lacked a cloth belt. After World War II some officers began to wear a khaki version of the ‘Ike jacket’ instead of the tunic, though this garment seems to have been less common than its olive drab fieutenant, (19) Sow, second lieutenant—all foregoing, silver ‘bars on gold. (20) Tiing-mu Sang-sa, warrant officer, sergeant: major. (21) L-diing Sang-sa, sergeant. (22) Iltiing Chung-sa, lance- sergeant. (23) /-diing corporal. (24) Ha-sa, lance- corporal. (25) Il-ting Pyong, trained private. All chevrons, white on green. Not shown are the ranks of Tae-jang, four-star general, mot held at that period; Chui, senior warrant ofticer, who worea plain gold bar on che shoulder straps I ing ‘Sang-sa, 2 senior NCO rank junior to (20) and lacking the star; and I-diing Ryong (Recruit), no insignia. From 15 May 1954 field’ and company officers’ insignia changed from the illustrated April 1946 models to sequences of silver blossoms and diamonds. (P. Abbott) 40nia were the same on all uniforms: Corps, Japan equivalent. Tnsi here, Quartermaster Command Logistical Soldier, summer field dress, 1950 Among the most important of the US Army’s innovations during World War II was the use of fatigue clothing as hot-weather combat dress. ‘The first fatigues used in this way were the My1 HBT Herring Bone Twill) work suits, which could be recognised by thei hip-length jackets and shi type cuffs. These were occasionally to be seen in Korea; but were largely superseded by the two- piece Mq2 fatigues, which differed in having a longer coat with tab closures at the cufls, a gas flap across the neck opening (almost always removed in practice), and unusually large ‘bellows’ pockets on the chest and high on the hips of the trousers. With these fatigues went a peaked field cap, whose short visor was lengthened after 1945. The HBT material was tough and hardwearing, but it was also heavy and slow to dry when wet. It pi ‘striped’ appearance, though this was only v close up. The original colour was a dark green (Army Shade 7) which quickly faded to a pale US troops advance on Taegu during the offensive following the inchon landings in autumn 1950; apart from the hessian helmet covers—and the ‘brewed’ T-34/85 tank of the KPA’s 105th Armd.Bde—there is nothing (o distinguish this scene from many taken in the latter stages of the Pacific War against Japan. greenish grey. These garments became the basis for the Army’s post-war summer combat dress, and were widely worn in Korea by the US Army, ROK and other UN troops. C3: Conporal, summer field dress, 1952 During the second year of the war the M42 HBT fatigues began to be replaced by a newer pattern. These appear to have been designed in 1947 but not manufactured until the early 1950s. ‘The coat resembled that of the M42 set and had the same gas flap (again, almost invariably removed), but the cuffs were plain, and the pockets were of the normal patch type with squared-off flaps and ‘docked’ bottoms. The trousers had normal side and back pockets, and the buttons were of plain plastic instead of being the earlier ‘1g star’ black metal pattern. The first batches of these new fatigues were made of the old HBT cloth, but later ones were of dark olive green (OG 107) cotton twill. Like all 41‘Chow’ in the snow: members of HQ Co., and Bn., Sth Cavalry display various types of fatigues, mainly M43 pattern, and pile caps worn on top of fatigue caps. (US Army) Korean War fatigues, they were baggy and shapeless. Those worn in the field seldom bore formation patches or even rank chevrons, though smartened-up ve erchiefs, highly polished or chromed helmet liners and white ladder-laced combat boots began to appear behind the lines. Like many line NCOs, this corporal has retained the older World War I-style chevrons instead of the unpopular 1948-pattern ns worn with decorative neck- miniatures (blue on gold for combatant arms, gold on blue for services) which were discontinued early in 1951. D1: Sergeant, US Army, field dress, 1951 The US Army retained its su M43 field uniform after World War II. The material was windproof cotton sateen in a distinctly greenish shade of olive drab. In summer the jacket could be worn over the HBT fatigues. In winter the jacket and trousers were worn over a woollen shirt, sweater and ‘liner’ (a woollen cardigan-style garment) in a browner shade of olive drab. The M43 peaked field cap had ear flaps, but the pile cap more commonly accompanied this uniform during the Korean winter. The World War IT ‘double- buckle’ combat boots were progressively replaced by plain lace-up ones, all in russet leather. This M43 uniform equipped the majority of US troops in Korea, as well as the re-equipped ROK troops and many of the UN contingents. However, it began to give way toan improved version known as the M51. The jacket differed only in having snap pocket closures instead of buttons; but the trousers had the 42 side ‘cargo’ pockets previously used only by paratroops, and the shirt and sweater were dark green. The practice of adding a rigid liner to the M5r field cap produced the fashionable, képiclike ‘Walker’ or ‘Ridgway’ cap typical of the later 1950s and °6os. This NGO wears the 1948-pattern miniature chevrons, just visible on the right. De: US Marine, winter dress, 1953 ‘The US Marines wore their own HBT ‘utilit peaked field cap and camouflaged helmet cover, and retained the early World War [1-pattern ankle boots and canvas leggings, which led the North Koreans to nickname them ‘yellowlegs’. ‘Their winter uniforms approximated more to the Army pattern, however, and included M4g_ jackets, trousers and pile caps, together with World War I] parkas, and the unsatisfactory canvas and rubber ‘shoepaks’. The M51 winter outfit was issued to both arms, although not until relatively late in the war. Itwas based on the same ‘layering’ principleas the Mqg. The field jacket and trousers were worn over frieze liners, which were white and dark green respectively; a green flannel shirt; and a loose-fitting white undershirt and drawers. For really cold weather a parka and overtrousers could be added. The parka resembled the World War II pattern except that it lacked a belt, had only the slanting upper pockets, and was olive green instead of the earlier light tan. The boots were of double-thickne: rubber with a layer of felt between: perspiration was prevented from evaporating, but the insulation supposedly keptit from freezing. There were leather gloves with woollen inserts, or Arctic mittens which had pile backs for rubbing frostbitten noses and faces. Dg: Teniente Coronel, Colombian contingent, 1953 This is a good example of the ‘smartened-up* fatigues worn by most senior officers during the Korean War. Non-Commonwealth UN tingents normally wore standard US field clothing with the addition of their own national and rank insignia (this did not apply to the Filipino troops, who were still using US-style rank insignia at this period), usually with the patch of the US Division to which they were attached on their left shoulders. This lieutenant-colonel wears the M47-pattern fatigue blouse with M4z-pattern trousers, a mixture con-of styles which was entirely characteristic of the period. For some reason he has the Colombian national badge under the title ‘co.ommus’ in gold on red in place of a divisional patch. The same badge has been sewn to his neckerchief (a post-war US Army fashion) whose light blue could stand both for the United Nations or infantry in the US service. Colombian company officers wore one to three gilt stars, and field officers similar stars with a gilt bar: since the fatigue jackets lacked shoulder straps this, officer has presumably pinmed his insignia (two stars divided by a bar) to the collar in the US, fashion, adding the conventional crossed rifles of his, arm-of-service device on the left. Er: Australia: Corporal, 3rd Bn., Royal Australian Regiment, 1950 ‘The Australian contingent was initially equipped with the familiar loosely fitting tunic, trousers and ‘Digger’ hat worn in two world wars, and a summer uniform of khaki drill shirt and trousers. Black boots had replaced brown in 1948. The canvas gaiters resembled the American pattern but were fastened, with straps, while other web equipment followed British models. White-on-red ‘Roya. aUsTRALIAN nncimenr’ shoulder titles replaced the discontinued battalion patches, but the RAR’s regimental badge did not supplant the well-known ‘Rising Sun’ until 1954. The Australians were the first Com- monwealth troops to receive US winter clothing. This included pile caps, on which they were ordered to wear ‘Rising Sun’ collar badges. In_ practice, many retained their distinctive wide-brimmed headgear—as one said, ‘They can take away my strides, but not my hat. Steel helmets were conspicuous by their absence. Subsequently, British-pattern proofed combat dress and steel helmets and US flak jackets were adopted for field wear. The original service dress uniform was replaced by 1948-pattern Australian battledress, which differed little from the British model except that the lapels were rather wider. The distinctive hat and gaiters were retained, and 2nd RAR initiated the Australian practice of blackening the latter in 1952 E2: Great Britain: Private, 1st Bn., The Gloucestershire Regiment, 1951 The British arrived wearing 1950-pattern jungle Pfc. David W. Jackson of Co.L, 5th RCT, wearing the early ‘Vest, Armored, M-1951” in late September 1952. By this date the US Army had received some 20,000 examples of this USMC- procured vest; the first shipment of the Army’s own ‘Armor, Vest, M-1952° did not arrive until that December. Early reports indicated that the use of body armour reduced the casualties by about 3o per cent. For full details see MAA 157, Flak Jackets. (US Army courtesy Simon Dunsi green bush shirts, trousers and floppy bush hats. At the onset of winter they donned standard khaki serge battledress and cap comforters, later ‘acquir- ing’ US M43 combat clothing. Meanwhile, supplies of British World War I-pattern cold weather clothing were rushed out. This included string vests, long underwear, ribbed sweaters, oiled socks, felt- lined boots, visored field caps with neck and ear flaps, gloves, gauntlets and the 1942 windproof outer suit consisting of a hooded smock and overtrousers in a green, brown and khaki “brushed” camouflage pattern. For the second winter they were issued with a newly designed field uniform of greenish grey gaberdine, consisting of combat jacket, trousers, peaked field cap, inner and outer parkas and rubber-soled boots. The cap (dubbed “Hat, Horrible’) was not a success, but the jacket and trousers went on to become the M58 combat 4310 THE =. =< our Chef de bataitlon (Major) Barthelemy, adjutant of the French battalion, newly awarded the US Legion of Merit, Like many ‘initially worn by 27th Bde. veterans of Free French service with the British, he retains the ‘Commonwealth Division, (5) British right-hand beret ‘pull’. He wears American shirt and trousers, a French 1946 brown leather belt, cloth French shoulder strap ranking, and a mixture of French, US and ROK decorations and insignia. Note the NATIONS UNIES shield badge worn on the collar. (E. C. P. Armées) dress. This private wears the Gloucesters’ famous “back badge’ on his bush hat, The ribbed sweater was often worn as an outer garment, with the regimental title, d al patch and rank chevrons on a drab brassard, and officers’ pips sewn to the shoulders (and note this unit’s US Citation clasp). The 1944 pattern Mk. 4 steel helmet became mandatory as enemy artillery strength increased, and US-supplied body armour made its ap- pearance. F3: Canada: Sergeant, Royal 22° Regiment, 1951 In 1950 the Canadian Army wore its own version of battledress, differing slightly from the British and made of a better-quality, rather greener material. Most units wore khaki berets, but the paratroop- trained 1st Battalions had and the armoured squadrons black, Summer wear consisted of a khaki flannel shirt or olive green bush jacket together with plain olive green ‘bush pants’ Equipment followed the British pattern except that the web anklets were replaced by short puttees. Initially, the Canadians received US M43 jackets, overtrousers and US combat boots. Subsequently they introduced their own olive green nylon parka (in fact a hooded Myg-style field jacket) and maroon, 44 agth Canadian Bde. (6) Colombian Ba. () Ethiopian Kagnew Br, () French Ba.—heret. (a) Greek Bn. (0) Luxemburg Bin pocket patch. (11) Netherlands Ba. (2) 10th Philippines BOT, (1) Thai contingent. (14) Turkish Bae overtrousers, together with a distinctively Can- ian peaked field cap, which was manufactured in both wool and cotton. The earlier British Mk. 3 steel helmet was superseded by the later Mk. 4, with some US Mr helmets appearing towards the end. The Canadians wore their red brigade patch on both sleeves hey part of the Commonwealth Division, after which they wore the latter's light blue shield on their left sleeve or brassard and their own patch on the right. Each regiment and corps had its own distinctively embroidered shoulder title. Rank insignia followed the standard British pattern at this period. until became Fr: France: Lieutenant, 1951 The Bataillon de Corée was raised in September 1950 from volunteers of all branches of the French ny—Metropolitan, — Color and Foreign Legion—and was commanded by Lt.Col. Olivier e Mire, a former paratroop officer of the "RCP, The mixed nature of the unit prompted him to organise the companies on ‘tribal’ lines: 1st Co. was largely composed of Colonials, 2nd of Metros’, and 3rd of paratroopers from all three categories. The problem of distinctive headgear and insignia was solved by issuing the black beret of the para- ies_ Bataillon de Choc. The enamelled beret and lapel (as opposed to pocke fob) unit badges was a break with French tradition; the latter consisted of a tricolour shield with the inscription ‘Nations usuus’. The beret badge astrated elsewhere in detail —was usually, though not invariably, worn on the right; some berets also had two very prominent brass ventilation eyelets on the right side. Ranks were indicated on shoulder strap slides or chest tabs in the usual French manner, Onarrival in Korea the troops received US arms, equipment, combat clothing and steel helmets. The US 2nd Division’s ‘Indian Head’ patch was worn; but they retained their French berets, and the lapel device occasionally appeared on fatigue dress collars. Ex-paras of the 3rd and HQ companies sometimes pinned their wings, or the French para beret badge, to the front flap of their pile caps; and some old North Africa hands sported the character- istic ‘chetch’ or desert scarf, Some paras kept their camouflaged smocks, often of ex-British stock, of the 1942 windproof winter suit, which was very popular for its lightness among French parasin Indochina at this period, and was nicknamed ‘sausage skin’. The same smock was also issued to Commonwealth troops in Korea. Afier returning to Indochina in October 1953, the unit formed the cadre for the two-battalion Régiment de Corée. (In June-July 1954 this was virtually wiped out in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, around An Khe and Pleiku, while serving commando use of with the famous Groupe Mobile 100.) Fe: Netherlands: Korporaal 1'Klasse, 1951 The volunteers were issued with the Dutch army’s British-style battledress. Most wore standard khaki berets, but ex-paratroopers, Marines and cavalry- men retained their red, blue or black ones, bearing the brass badge of Regiment Van Heutsz (an eight- point star on a stylised ‘W’), worn in the Dutch fashion on a distinctive ribbon backing, in this case black with orange edges. In Korea the volunteers received US fatigues for field wear and ‘Ike’ jackets and trousers for walking out; but the beret was commonly worn in preference to US headgear such as peaked fatigue caps or pile hats. The national patch was worn on the right shoulder, with a miniature enamelled version on the left collar point; Mr F. J. Kranenburg, State Secretary for Defence, visits the Netherlands Bn. in Korea, August 1953: at left, the battalion commander, Lt.Col. C. Knulst. (MilHfist.Sec., Royal Dutch ‘Areay) the US 2nd Infantry Division’s large ‘Indian Head” patch was worn on the left shoulder, with a similar miniature on the right collar point; and the US 38th Infantry Regiment’s enamelled badge was worn on the left breast (occasionally on the beret or fatigue cap, too). These devices frequently appeared on the fatigue dress, either separately or in combination. Officers wore their own Dutch stars and bars of rank on collar or shoulder strap loops, but NCOs adopted US rank chevrons. Since this NGO's rank had no US equivalent, the Dutch improvised by cutting the upper chevron off the US sergeant’s insignia, F53: Belgium: Capitaine, 1950 ‘The volunteers initially received standard Belgian battledress, which resembled the British model except that it was greener and had longer collar points. They also received British Denison Smocks (some officers wore these privately bought versions similar in style but with a more distinct, ‘wavy edged’ camouflage pattern). Web equipment and boots followed the British pattern. They adopted a distinctive brown beret; and a gilt badge in- corporating the Belgian lion on a shield with a helmet above, backed by the Walloon battleaxe and Flemish ‘goedendag’ or ball-and-chain mace, the The collar whole over a scroll lettered ‘seni’. 45patches were brown edged with yellow. Normal Belgian rank insignia were worn; when in shirtsleeve order officers wore miniature ve the collar patch on the straps. In Korea the Belgians were issued with US steel helmets, winter clothing such as Mqg jackets, parkas and pile caps, and US fatigues for use as summer field dress. However, they continued to wear their distinctive berets and camouflage jackets, together with ‘British’ items such as knitted ‘cap comforters’ and olive khaki shirts with pleated breast pockets. The national shield patch was worn on the left shoulder, that of the US grd Infantry Division on the right, with gold-on-brown ‘weLc1w’ shoulder titles above. oy: Major, 1950 ‘The Turks arrived in Korea wi ing their recently adopted battledress uniforms with US-pattern field caps made of the same material, British Mk. 2 steel helmets, leather waist belts and German-pattern ammunition pouches. NCOs and men wore no insignia other than a rough disc in arm-of-service colour (green for infantry, blue for artillery) on the side cap, but officers had collar patches in the s colours (Staff wore red), There was only time to issue them with US weapons and some US M1g43 combat clothing before they were thrown into action in November 1950, and most were still wearing their battledress, leather equipment and heavy double-breasted greatcoats when they first met the enemy. Subsequently their field clothing, steel helmets and combat equipment became entirely US in style, but they retained their own insignia’. The brigade device (a red spearhead decorated with white stars, worn on the right side of the helmet), and the national badge (the white star and crescent on a red circle worn at the top of the right sleeve) seem to have been introduced during 1951. Generals wore their gilt-and-red rank devices on both shoulder straps and helmet fronts, and had gorget patches on their field uniforms as well. me Ge: Ethiopia: Lieutenant, 1951 The Ethiopians arrived wearing 1946-pattern British battledress with US-style canvas gaiters; Imperial Guard collar badges; and pith helmets, on the right side of which was a rectangular patch bearing a green, yellow and red cockade. They were 'See Plate C1, MAA 157 Flak Faces 46 soon issued with US field uniforms, wearing the US 7th Division’s ‘diabolo’ patch on their left shoulders a curved ‘erioria’ shoulder title in red on buff edged with red, yellow and green on the right; and, for parade purposes, a large version of the cockade on the right side of the US steel helmet. Towards the end of the period a rather ornate patch bearing the Lion of Judah was introduced: this was worn beneath the ‘ertoria’ sleeve title, and on the left side of the steel helmet with the US 7th Division's insignia on the right. The Guard badge continued to be worn on the collar. The Ethiopians retained their own British-style rank insignia. Usually officers wore their gilt Imperial crowns or six- pointed stars on buff-coloured shoulder loops, but appear to have pinned them to the right hand collars of the strapless US summer fatigues, with the Guard badge on the left. NCOs wore British-style chevrons; WOs, wreathed lions or crowns in brass. G3: Thailand: Lance-Corporal, 1951 This NCO is wearing a ‘variant’ version of the US M42 HBT fatigues with single pleated breast and hip pockets. These fatigues were made in relatively small numbers, and worn interchangeably with the normal type in both the US and allied armies. His helmet (soon superseded by the US model) looks very much like the French ‘Adrian’ pattern, which the Thais had certainly worn up to and during World War IT, but itis possible that it was in fact an early Japanese model. It bore a national roundel crest which also formed the basis of the cap badge. Junior NCOs’ rank chevrons followed the British system, but were embroidered in yellow or gold ona dark blue-green backing, with the roundel sur- mounted by a pagoda-like Thai crown above, and worn on the left sleeve only. Senior NCOs wore a gilt bar below one to three upward-pointing chevrons on their shoulder straps; company officers, one to three gold stars; field officers the same, but with the upper star surmounted by a Thai crown Gilt arm-of-service devices were worn on the right collar, with the unit indicated by combinations of Thai lettering and ordinary numerals on the left The infantry device was crossed rifles with a four- cartridge clip superimposed. H: Chinese People’s Liberation Army Hi: Soldier, winter dress, 1950The PLA’s quilted cotton winter uniform was both light and warm, though the material was difficult to dry when it became wet. The summer uniform was normally worn underneath for additional in- sulation. Officers seem sometimes to have worn single-breasted version. The colour was generally an olive khaki, with a white lining which could be reversed to act as snow camouflage. The cap was made from the same material and faced with fur or pile; it had ear flaps which tied under the chin with tapes. Padded mittens with separate trigger fingers were supposed to form part of this uniform, but many soldiers had either lost or never been issued with these, and tucked their hands inside their sleeves instead. The winter boots were made of stout, fur-lined leather and worn with felt leggings, though many troops seem to have continued to wear the canvas summer shoes. This style of uniform, with its external quilting, was replaced from 1952 onwards by one which had the padding on the inside and looked like a bulkier version of the summer uniform. Equipment was usually restricted toa waist belt with two or three stick grenades and two cotton bandoliers, one containing ammunition, the other rice. Ho: Soldier, summer dress, 1951 The PLA’s ‘official’ summer uniform ftom about 1949 to 1952 seems to have been a Russian-style blouse with a turn-down collar, three-button chest opening, breast pockets and shirt-type cufls, worn with long trousers and a peaked cap. However, this only appears to have been issued to selected units; and the summer uniform worn in Korea did not differ very much from that worn by the Chinese Nationalists, except that the older field cap had developed into the shapeless ‘Mao cap’, and puttees seem to have become obsolete. The footwear consisted of canvas shoes with rope or rubber soles. Although there were no official rank insignia, ‘leaders’ sometimes wore red or red-and-blue armbands, and some were reported to have had red piping diagonally across their cufs and on their collars, tunic fronts and trouser seams. After 1952 these uniforms were superseded by a plain single- breasted tunic, trousers and Mao cap in ‘Yenan green’. The PLA had inherited large stocks of Japanese steel helmets, but few if any seem to have been issued in Korea. Most of the original Chinese Li.Col. Vivaro, CO of the Belgian Bn. February 1952 February 1959 (and in 1968 Belgian Armed Forces Commander), mects the commanding general of the US 45th Infantry Division, the ‘Thunderbirds’ (Belgian National Befence Ministry), volunteers carried old Chinese or Japanese bolt action rifles or, like this ‘tommy gunner’, captured US weapons of World War IT vintage. Hy: Officer, service dress, 1952 The Chinese People’s Liberation Army prided itself on its egalitarianism, and officers and men were all supposed to wear the same simple and austere uniform. In practice differences of style, cut and material continued to exist. In particular, the officers’ tunics commonly had four instead of two pockets, and were made of wool or even silk material as opposed to the men’s cotton. The colour continued to vary, but tended towards the harsh, yellowish ‘Yenan green’ derived from the dyes available in the PLA’s home province. In the early days the Chinese Communists had worn cloth red star cap badges: after their victory in the civil war they adopted an enamelled version with gold edging, bearing the Chinese characters for ‘8-1" (commemorating the PLA’s date of formation) in the centre. This does not seem to have been worn in Korea, presumably in order to support the fiction that the Chinese were volunteers rather than a national force. The absence of rank insignia was acceptable in a guerrilla force, but re-equipment with Soviet material led to a steady increase in the professionalism of the officer corps; in 1955 new Soviet-style uniforms and insignia were introduced, only to be abolished again during Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’ ten years later. 47‘Notes sur les planches en couleur a a acarvin ere polite ppmebnnieaya meagre gamete See tere eat oe poke ee na ena eer oe ens i a a re er as ee eee ee Seer renee ee eee Bee ae GW RU oie pass aioe wc ac ras rc oa pepe Dgectely ret ertgrg erie eae eee Se Bente eta lasts name ee Cte aaah ee ce eo, ee ete ae eee ee meena are See ee ae eee a eee ata slang aes eee Poe essere saa ae Seen orien omen arate eee ene ce oe ter eee Sparano Se eee SEIS er ee Soi Siecitnodt te eaeitaks Mines, ea ativan Witoaaoe is Sa en ee oe eee at ee eg org gece pram rere Sie aoa Gs tee tack einai ivearac tee aan ee Hi Cet iorme était reversible—vert dun eet bane de Fautre. H fat Templacé vers 1952 par une fenue matlance A Vnicricur qui yewemblaic une ‘veto pls volminease de is tenue dla Apart ace Maa plapart Acs chino portaient des tenves de campagne qa ressemblaiene um pewa fancien snore nationaat eins cara lesdebted a guerre. Ele ut uteseurement emplacee par un unifrme de vert Yenan’. Des armes chins, japonaien, ‘oases et des armes prey sur le amicaie aint ses. Hg Les oliiee tlequabidsupeicar er posskdaent des petites dierencede deal, quatre poches par exemple Farbtafeln see ee eee eae Seer te pee Me eee eee Soe ats ae oes eee oe ee Seema eee te tes On ae fata amen Se eho em Sl yo fae aren os reece Gees ee Srilgen uate ue case eles eae potion a ar Stn rae nee Ae eee wis bi medi times An '6. A were rte he at aes re ee ae paca eo ae Pr EE ed en Pe crema eet Te ee ae eerste era rt Dee Mis nsec ey ae Ap te de nies dacs Sean Sons a ee nae vce eee ete Dare aren ee ent sa er et SES Near 2 cit we epee sect ate ees care oe a eee re ee Sentinal SO al Gx Zunichst trogen. die Turken cine bumte Mischung aus brischen, amerikanicien und deutchen Bekleidungs- und Ausristungavegeostanden, Spiter “wurden mehr US Artikel ausgegeben. Ea Eine Machung aus Amerikanischer und byitischer Bebleidung und Ausrastung mit athiopischen Abueichen, wurde spaterdarch US Kamplunilormen algelont, die Abreichen det US ih Distsiontugen. Gg Fine thailandische Variante des ranzosischen Ade" alin: wurde ster dre den 8 Helm ene ie Cniorm waren ale us. ‘Hx Die Uniform konnte umgekehrt werden, mit griner Innen- und seeiser ‘Atmensite Ca. 1952 wurde de durch eine Ausfuhrung mit gesteppter fnnensete fratst, die wie eine Mlobigere Ausfubrong der Sommmerunilorm suseah Ha Abgeschen von der Mao-Mutz” tragen die meisten Chinesen Feldusitorme ‘die der alten natcnalchinesichen Ausuhrung der Anfangueeit nicht undhnlich ‘var, Diese Ausfuhrung wurde ster durch ine Uniform i Yenan grin’ ert Chinesische,japanische, rusdsehe und erbewtete amerikanisehe Wallen wurden Dbenutat Hy Oziresollen nur mininale miitarische Abzeichen tragen, dale ‘waren die Cniformen von hoherer Qualitat und halen Kleine Unterschiee im Detail, 2B, ver Taschen