Roman history

Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator

Although his patrilineal background is contested, Quintus Fabius Maximus (c. 280BCE-

203BCE) was born in Rome to a patrician Fabii gens. 1 Just like his predecessors, Q. Fabius

Maximus’ career revolved around being a Roman general and politician. 2 However, the advent of

the Second Punic War and Fabius’ military strategy of being cunctator “delayer” situates him as

somewhat an atypical military and political figure in Roman history at the cusp of its war with

Carthage.3 That being said, besides modern scholarly views, Fabius emerges as a rather

controversial figure due to primary sources such as Livy, Plutarch, Polybius, and the poet Ennius

that characterize him in different ways. This, then, begs the question of the plausibility and

reliability of the sources.4 Yet still, I argue that a triangulation of the major sources: Polybius,

Livy, and Plutarch provides a useful approach to establish the validity of their assertions on Q.

Fabius Maximus.5 I propose, therefore, that among these triune sources none should be primarily

considered as more superior than the other despite their inherent biases or weaknesses.

The physical and intellectual features of Q. Fabius Maximus somewhat foreshadowed the

unique abilities that earned him a relatively successful career. First, his cognomen Verrucosus

“warty” was from a birthmark on his upper lip to distinguish him from other family members.
1
Livy identifies Verrucosus as the son of Gurges and grandson of Rullianus, but Pliny the Elder and Plutarch call him the great-grandson of
Rullianus (Elliot, 2009). According to Jackie Elliott (2009:533): “modern scholarship supposes that he was probably the grandson of Gurges,
although in this case his father's identity is uncertain. He was probably the son of either the Quintus Fabius Maximus Gurges who was consul in
265 BC, or of the Quintus Fabius who was curule aedile in 267. Traditionally the Gurges who was consul in 265 has been regarded as the same
man who had been consul for the first time in 292, and again in 276, in which case Livy may be correct; but some scholars think that the Gurges
who was consul in 265 was the son of the consul of 292 and 276; the aedile of 267 may have been his brother or another kinsman.”
2
Livy 22.53: “…from the first legion Quintus Fabius Maximus, whose father had been dictator the previous year…” trans. J. C. Yardley
(2006:122). Thus, His grand/father was Quintus Fabius Gurges (3x consul& princeps senatus), and (great) grandfather was Quintus Fabius
Maximus Rullianus who was hero of the Samnite wars and held 5x consul, dictator and censor.
3
During this time Q. Fabius was censor in 230BCE, Consul in 233, 228, 215, 214 and 209 BCE; and dictator in 221 and 217 BCE. Cf. Sophia A.
Xenophontos (2012:160) says: “The Life of Fabius Maximus might at first sight seem flat or even unattractive in comparison to other more
popular Lives. There is no Pericles here establishing his ambitious political plans, nor a Cleopatra seducing a powerful man like Antony.”
4
Paul Erdkamp (1992)127 says: “[A] comparison of the accounts in Polybius and Livy of the actual war- fare during the Second Punic War up
until Cannae presents serious discrepancies.”
5
For brevity, I will occasionally refer to Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator as Fabius Maximus or Fabius.

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Roman history

This on its own was symbolic of how he turned out differently from his gens, let alone the

traditional Roman military ideals. Moreover, Plutarch (1.3) says: Fabius possessed a mild

temper, slowness of speech, and a slow learner. As a child he played sports, he was rather

passive and too cautious.6 As such he was perceived to suffer from an inferiority complex.

Ironically, Plutarch assesses Q. Fabius’ “disabilities” as indicative “signs of stability and

greatness of mind.”

Only a few discerned the inexorable firmness in the depth of his soul, and the
magnanimous and leonine qualities of his nature.  But soon, as time went on and he was
roused by the demands of active life, he made it clear even to the multitude that his
seeming lack of energy was only lack of passion, that his caution was prudence, and that
his never being quick nor even easy to move made him always steadfast and sure.
[Parallel Lives, Vol. III., p121)7.
The ambivalent delineation of Fabius’ character might be Plutarch’s “clever strategy to attract

the attention of his audience” since his biographical approach is moralizing.8

In 221 BCE Q. Fabius Maximus was appointed dictator for the first time in fifty years. 9

After that, the Roman senate declared war on Hannibal for capturing Saguntum 10 in 219 BCE

following an eight month siege. As noted by Polybius (3.6):

Some historians of the Hannibalian war, when they wish to point out to us the causes of
this contest between Rome and Carthage, allege first the siege of Saguntum by the
Carthaginians…11
Polybius does not say much on whether Saguntum belonged to Rome. To Polybius, the siege of

Saguntum was more of a pretext rather than a real cause for the 2 nd Punic war. Thus he says:

“though I should call these the first actions in the war, I cannot admit them to be its causes.” 12
6
William McLaughlin (2018).
7
Ad loc: http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Fabius_Maximus*.html
8
Sophia A. Xenophontos (2012) 163.
9
McLaughlin (2018).
10
See Polybius, 3.6:
11
Polybius, Histories Ad loc. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter
%3D6 . Accessed January 25, 2020; 02:00 AM
12
Polybius, Histories Book 3.6.

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But Livy seems to suggest that the siege of Saguntum by Carthage was a major reason for the

outbreak of the 2nd Punic war. Evidence for this is attested to basing on the fact that Hannibal did

not take heed when the consuls P. Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius Longus at the time

sent delegates “… to warn Hannibal not to interfere with the Saguntines, who were allies of

Rome”, (Livy, XXI.6). Therefore, with the difference of opinion insinuated by Livy, it appears

he is justifying Rome for declaring war on Carthage because of their siege on Saguntum. The

question then becomes: who is a reliable source, Livy or Polybius? I suggest Livy could be more

biased in his account.13 Although in a slightly different context, H. Tränkle (2009:477) questions

Livy’s reliability as a historian by saying: “…at the end of his account of the battle of

Cynoscephalae (33.10), Livy remarks that he has here followed Polybius, ‘a thoroughly reliable

authority for Roman history, especially for events in Greece’.” After the attack at Saguntum,

Hannibal in 218BCE proceeded to vanquish the Roman military forces at the battle at the

Trebbia River and the Ticino River. Hannibal and his troops took many small cities and villages

to the point that the Roman senate feared he would attack Rome since he had rapidly overrun

most of northern Italy.14

Modern scholars have talked about “Fabian tactics” as an important military strategy. But

the question is: what are they? And more significantly, why did they frustrate the Romans? To

address these, one can date back to Q. Fabius Maximus’ confrontation with the consul Gaius

Flaminius. Thus the two men disagree on matters of military strategy: Fabius favors a delaying

tactical approach, whereas G. Flaminius seeks a more offensive attack on Hannibal. As noted by

Plutarch 2.4:

13
Class Notes: February 6, 2020. We talked about the obvious biases that Livy has in selectively using source material from Polybius’ Histories
that may in some accounts of the 2nd Punic War render him an unreliable source.
14
 Joshua J. Mark (2011) https://www.ancient.eu/Battle_of_Cannae/

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Roman history

The consul, Gaius Flaminius, was daunted by none of these things, for he was a man of a
fiery and ambitious nature...Fabius also was less disturbed by the signs and portents,
because he thought it would be absurd…15
In as much as Flaminius and Fabius were not moved by the ominous signs that befell Rome, it is

striking that Plutarch (Ad loc) presents them in contrast militarily. First, G. Flaminius is

described as θυμοειδής ‘fiery’ and φιλότιμος ‘loving honor’ or ‘ambitious’. While Plutarch does

concede the military success of Flaminius in some pitched battles, Livy (XXII.3) provides a

more extensive portrayal of his military aptitude in stark contrast to Q. Fabius Maximus. One

may agree that the impression given by Livy is to establish the traditional Roman military

prowess encapsulated by Flaminius. Hence, Xenophontos argues that Livy’s lengthy narrative on

Flaminius' military aptitude shows that he approves his coolness, order, and the way he inspires

his soldiers on the battlefield. 16 On the contrary, it can be noted that Q. Fabius Maximus emerges

as unpopular because of his military approach-so called the “Fabian strategy”. It is against this

backdrop, that Q. Fabius first earned his agnomen “Cunctator” as a token of an insult. This is

because the Roman people considered his method of avoiding/delaying battle to be against the

very fiber of being Roman as was demonstrated by generals such as Gaius Flaminius –proud and

aggressive. Essentially, what is also worth noting is that Plutarch’s presentation of the

antithetical military policies of Fabius and Flaminius in Plutarch serve a moralizing idea

encapsulated in the concept of φιλοτιμία. Plutarch could be suggesting that Flaminius’ has a

flawed φιλοτιμία which counts as detrimental seeing that he eventually dies at the battle of Lake

Trasimene in 217BCE.17

After the Roman army was defeated at the battle of Lake Trasimene, there was great

panic in Rome. To this end, the Roman Assembly appointed Q. Fabius Maximus as dictator the

15
Ad loc. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0043%3Achapter%3D2%3Asection%3D4
16
Xenophontos (2012)164.
17
Xenophontos (2012)164-5.

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second time because of his experience in the conduct war.18 However, Marcus Minucius Rufus 19

was appointed Master of the Horse by the senate. The reason for this was that the Roman senate

sought direct military aggression or confrontation, which Q. Fabius Maximus had not being

doing much of because of his “war of attrition”-that of fighting in the shadows than in open

confrontation.20 According to Livy (XXII.11.8ff), after the disastrous campaign at Trasimine

Fabius had a strategy of avoiding hostile confrontation to Hannibal. Because of this, Fabius was

met with scathing criticism from Minucius as evidenced in Livy (XXII.11):

However, Fabius found no more hostility to this sound strategy in Hannibal than he did in
his master of horse, and this man’s subordinate command was all that held him back from
destroying the republic… Talking first to a few men, then openly before the ranks, he
began to call Fabius’ deliberate hesitation idleness, and his caution cowardice, and he
pinned on him faults that bore some relation to his real virtues. (Yardley 2006:80).

Also at book XXII.14 in Livy, Minucius Rufus further makes a speech castigating

Fabius campaign of delay as a “turn towards otium which is at odds with his legacy in Latin

epic”21 tarnishing the afterlife of exemplary gallant Roman ancestors. Minucius casts Fabius

Maximus like a pastoral shepherd who avoids battle: nos hic pecorum modo per aestiuos saltus

deuiasque calles exercitum ducimus, conditi nubibus siluisque (XXII.14) “And here we are,

hidden in clouds and forests, leading our army like a flock of sheep through summer pastures and

along remote trails.”22 This was clearly the case during the skirmish at the ager Falernus which

turned out disastrous. Polybius says: “though Fabius meanwhile was in great disrepute among

the common people, for having let his enemy escape from such a trap, he nevertheless refused to

18
Raymond D. Marks (2014:139) provides a foreshadowing exposition on the dictatorship of Fabius Maximus drawing from an early scene in
book 7 of the Punic: “Hannibal asks a prisoner-of-war from Arretium, named Cilnius, about the Romans’ newly appointed dictator, Quintus
Fabius Maximus (7.20–32). Cilnius tells him that Fabius will be a formidable adversary (33–37) and, to illustrate his point, recounts a tale that
testifies to the greatness of Fabius’ family and, by extension, to Fabius himself (38–61).”
19
For brevity I will refer to Marcus Minucius Rufus as Minucius/Minucius Rufus.
20
McLaughlin (2018)
21
Biggs (2016)281.
22
Yardley, trans. (2006)82

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Roman history

abandon his policy.”(Plb.3.94). Following this, Q. Fabius Maximus was recalled to Rome to

perform religious rites while he advised Minucius as the magister equitum to stay the course and

to avoid conflict in the forthcoming skirmish which was to follow after Hannibal had settled at

Gereonium.23 Thus as noted in Livy XXII.18:

inde sacrorum causa Romam reuocatus, non imperio modo sed consilio etiam ac prope
precibus agens cum magistro equitum, ut plus consilio quam fortunae confidat et se
potius ducem quam Sempronium Flaminiumque imitetur:
Fabius was then recalled to Rome for religious duties… he not only brought the authority
of his command to bear on his master of horse, but offered personal advice, too, almost
pleading with him, as he tried to persuade him to trust more to planning than, luck, and to
follow his strategy rather than that of Sempronius and Flaminius.24
Minucius did not take heed to Fabius Maximus’ advice but, in 216BCE, he directly confronted

and defeated Hannibal at Gereonium, in Apulia. Donathan Taylor (2017) says that when the

Roman senate learned the success achieved by the army’s magister equitum Minucius Rufus they

divided the imperium between him and Fabius Maximus. 25 Thus each of them now had equal

authority. This is a clear indication that Fabius Maximus’ popularity had declined in Rome due

to his military strategy of delay and non-confrontation. After a while, Hannibal challenged

Minucius in what led to the 2nd Gereonium skirmish. And this time, Minucius Rufus and

Hannibal Barca’s forces reached a stalemate. The stalemate seemed to work much to the

disadvantage of Minucius Rufus because as the fighting intensified he lost several of his soldiers.

Consequently, Minucius Rufus after deeming the situation volatile and that he had failed to cope,

he requested reinforcements which Fabius Maximus could provide.26 Hence, by successfully

attending to the desperate battle scene in the 2nd Gereonium skirmish, Fabius Maximus

essentially won fresh popularity in Rome. With the failure of Minucius Rufus to contain
23
Polybius (3.94).
24
Yardley, trans. (2006)86. Also the idea of imitatio and amulatio seem to be highlighted in this passage inferring that Livy in important scenes
tries to illustrate or provide moral lessons, (Class notes, February 11, 2020).
25
Taylor (2017)137.
26
Taylor (2017)137-8.

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Hannibal, Rome mobilized another force to deal with Hannibal question decisively. Thus two

consuls Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Caius Terentius Varro led a force of over 50,000 against

Hannibal’s less than 40,000 and met him in battle at Cannae.27Again, Rome suffered a disastrous

defeat at Cannea due to the tactical strategies28 employed by Hannibal and his troops.

Reflecting once again at the Fabian strategy by the time of the battle at Cannae in 216

BCE, Hannibal’s hold over southern Italy had steadily whittled down much to the extent that

Hannibal was confined to a small portion (further south) of Italy (see Appendix 2) which

Mclaughlin (2018) refers to as a “toe”. To this end, Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator was

given credit in Rome for his military strategy of delaying even by Epic poets such as Ennius (239

BCE-c.169BCE). Ennius writes: unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem “one man by delaying

restored our state/fortune” (Ann. 363.2). According to Elliot (2009) through the ablative gerund

“cunctando”, Ennius was addressing Fabius Maximus’ detractors and inserting it into a heroizing

description of the man's resilience and right-mindedness, Ennius was effectively converting the

term into one of approbation and using it to reproach Fabius' critics.” In this regard, Livy

borrows the same line in summarizing the life of Fabius Maximus:

eodem anno Q. Fabius Maximus moritur, exactae aetatis si quidem uerum est augurem
duos et sexaginta annos fuisse, quod quidam auctores sunt. uir certe fuit dignus tanto
cognomine uel si nouum ab eo inciperet. superauit paternos honores, auitos aequauit.
pluribus uictoriis et maioribus proeliis auus insignis Rullus; sed omnia aequare unus
hostis Hannibal potest. cautior tamen quam promptior hic habitus; et sicut dubites utrum
ingenio cunctator fuerit an quia ita bello proprie quod tum gerebatur aptum erat, sic nihil
certius est quam unum hominem nobis cunctando rem restituisse, sicut Ennius ait.29
It is worth noting that Fabius Maximus’ ‘delaying’ strategy was subsequently adopted by

the Romans. Erdkamp, citing Livy (XXII.32), acknowledges that the Romans subsequently

seemed unanimous on adopting the Fabian strategy, and after his abdication and his magister
27
J. J. Mark (2011) https://www.ancient.eu/Battle_of_Cannae/
28
See Appendix 1.
29
Ennius’ line in bold.

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equitum, “the consuls for the year 217 continued to follow the rules set by Fabius.” 30 Hence as

noted in Livy (XXII), Hannibal and his troops encountered severe problems because of the

scorched earth policy which was a Fabian strategy of destroying the natural habitat, and any

external material aid- thus depriving the enemy access to supplies such difficulties in providing

for his troops.

In conclusion, the three primary major sources used to explicate the political and military

career of Q. Fabius Maximus in this paper are fundamentally complementary despite their

occasional or stark differences. As noted, however, Fabius decided to avoid open battle or direct

confrontation after the heavy defeat of Rome at the battle at Trasimene (Livy XXII.22.8ff).

Fabius faced bitter criticisms much to the point of earning the cognomen Cunctator which at first

was an insult, but later one of approbation as noted in Ennius’ Annales.

Appendix 1: Tactical defeat of Rome at Cannae

30
Erdkamp (1992)128.

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Source: https://www.ancient.eu/Battle_of_Cannae/

Appendix 2: Map showing the battle fronts in the Second Punic War

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Source: http://dcc.dickinson.edu/sites/all/files/1250px-Western-Mediterranean-Hannibal-1_2.jpg

Works Cited:

Biggs, T. 2016. “Contesting Cunctatio: Livy 22.14, Fabius Maximus, and the Problem of

Pastoral,” The Classical Journal, 111 (30), pp. 281-301.

Elliott, J. 2009. “Ennius' 'Cunctator' and the History of a Gerund in the Roman Historiographical

Tradition”, The Classical Quarterly,  59 (2), pp. 532-542.

Erdkamp, P. 1992. “Polybius, Livy and the 'Fabian Strategy',” Ancient Society, 23, pp. 127-147

Marks, D. R. 2014. “Nosces Fabios certamine ab uno: The Tale of the Three Hundred Fabii in

Punica 7,” Illinois Classical Studies (39), pp. 139-169.

McLaughlin, W. 2018. “The Shield of Rome: Fabius Cunctator”

https://www.warhistoryonline.com/?s=quintus+fabius+maximus+ Accessed: January 25, 2020;
02:58AM.
Taylor, D. 2017. Roman Republic at War: A Compendium of Roman Battles from 502 to 31 BC.

South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military.

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Tränkle, H. 2009. “Livy and Polybius,” in Livy: Oxford Readings in Classical Studies, pp 476-

495.

Yardley, C. J. (Trans) 2006. Hannibal’s War: Livy 21-30, (Oxford World Classics) Oxford:

OUP

Xenophontos, A. S. 2012. “Πeρὶ ἀγaθοῦ stρatηγοῦ: Plutarch's Fabius Maximus and the Ethics Of

Generalship,” Hermes, 140. (2), pp. 160-183.

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