HO 15 Criminal Law Chairs Cases

2020 BAR REVIEW CRIMINAL LAW
CHAIR’S CASES Handout No. 15

Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Republic Act (RA) No. 10951 sought, among others, to help indigent prisoners and individuals
accused of committing petty crimes. It also increased the fines for treason and the publication
of false news; and likewise increased the baseline amounts and values of property and damage
to make them commensurate to the penalties meted on the offenses committed in relation to
them.
This Court modifies the penalty to be imposed upon accused-appellant pursuant to Republic Act
No. 10951, in view of the other details of the case, as established during trial. xxx Basic wisdom
underlies the adjustments made by Republic Act No. 10951. Imperative to maintaining an
effective and progressive penal system is the consideration of exigencies borne by the passage
of time. This includes the basic economic fact that property values are not constant. To insist on
basing penalties on values identified in the 1930s is not only anachronistic and archaic; it is unjust
and legally absurd to a moral fault. People vs. Mejares, 850 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 225735 January
10, 2018
Republic Act (RA) No. 10951 specifically stipulates that its provisions shall have retroactive
effect.
Republic Act No. 10951 has since come into effect during the pendency of this case. It likewise
specifically stipulates that its provisions shall have retroactive effect. Section 100 adds that this
retroactivity applies not only to persons accused of crimes but have yet to be meted their final
sentence, but also to those already “serving sentence by final judgment.” This retroactivity is in
keeping with the principle already contained in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that “[p]enal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony.” Given
these circumstances, it is proper for this Court to adjust the penalty to be imposed on accused-
appellant. Since the penalty in cases of theft is dependent on the value of stolen personal
properties, it is critical to ensure that the penalty is based on the value proven during trial, and
not merely on the Information or uncorroborated testimonies presented by the prosecution.
Here, a perusal of the records leads to the conclusion that while the Regional Trial Court reduced
the value of the stolen jewelry from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 on the basis of the
complainant’s social standing, such determination is devoid of evidentiary basis. People vs.
Mejares, 850 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 225735 January 10, 2018
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The prime purpose of a criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others
from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
Crimes are punished as retribution so that society would understand that the act punished was
wrong. Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a message
that one experience of rape is relatively trivial or less serious than another. It attaches different
levels of wrongfulness to equally degrading acts. Rape, in whatever manner, is a desecration of a
person’s will and body. In terms of penalties, treating one manner of committing rape as greater
or less in heinousness than another may be of doubtful constitutionality. People vs. Quintos, 740
SCRA 179, G.R. No. 199402 November 12, 2014
Crimes mala in se presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to
do so, while crimes mala prohibita do not require knowledge or criminal intent.
“Implicit in the concept of mala in se is that of mens rea.” Mens rea is defined as “the non-physical
element which, combined with the act of the accused, makes up the crime charged. Most
frequently it is the criminal intent, or the guilty mind[.]” Crimes mala in se presuppose that the
person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to do so, while crimes mala prohibita do not
require knowledge or criminal intent: In the case of mala in se it is necessary, to constitute a
punishable offense, for the person doing the act to have knowledge of the nature of his act and
to have a criminal intent; in the case of mala prohibita, unless such words as “knowingly” and
“willfully” are contained in the statute, neither knowledge nor criminal intent is necessary. In
other words, a person morally quite innocent and with every intention of being a law-abiding
citizen becomes a criminal, and liable to criminal penalties, if he does an act prohibited by these
statutes. ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon, 753 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015
All that accused-appellant had offered in defense were denial and alibi — defenses that
jurisprudence has long considered weak and unreliable.
It is hardly a relief to accused-appellant that two (2) witnesses have testified in his defense. Even
their testimonies failed to definitively establish that accused-appellant neither raped nor killed
AAA. Defense witness Flordeliza Baron even admitted that during the critical time between 5:00
and 6:00 p.m. of May 4, 1999, when the rape and killing most likely took place, she was never
really aware of accused-appellant’s whereabouts. People vs. Baron, 779 SCRA 110, G.R. No.
213215 January 11, 2016

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JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
A person invoking self-defense (or defense of a relative) admits to having inflicted harm upon
another person — a potential criminal act under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
However, he or she makes the additional, defensive contention that even as he or she may have
inflicted harm, he or she nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming danger upon
his or her own person (or that of his or her relative) justified the infliction of protective harm to
an erstwhile aggressor.
The accused’s admission enables the prosecution to dispense with discharging its burden of
proving that the accused performed acts, which would otherwise be the basis of criminal liability.
All that remains to be established is whether the accused were justified in acting as he or she did.
Velasquez vs. People, 820 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 195021 March 15, 2017
Matters that Must be Established by the Accused In Order to Successfully Invoke Self-defense.
To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: “(1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-
defense.”
Defense of a relative under Article 11(2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the same first two
(2) requisites as self-defense and, in lieu of the third, “in case the provocation was given by the
person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein.” Velasquez vs. People,
820 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 195021 March 15, 2017
Justifying circumstance of defense of stranger
To properly invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, it must be shown that
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, that the means employed to repel the
victim were reasonably necessary, and that the accused was not induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive. Mariano vs. People, 833 SCRA 301, G.R. No. 224102 July 26,
2017

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Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying
circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present.
The first requisite — unlawful aggression — is the condition sine qua non of self-defense and
defense of a relative: At the heart of the claim of self-defense is the presence of an unlawful
aggression committed against appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have
a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the
other elements are present. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack amounting to actual or
imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense. Velasquez vs. People,
820 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 195021 March 15, 2017
An attack showing the aggressor’s intention is enough to consider that unlawful aggression
was committed.
Thus, the attack on Pamela should have been considered as unlawful aggression for purposes of
invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger. Mariano vs. People, 833 SCRA 301,
G.R. No. 224102 July 26, 2017
Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression — requires a
reasonable proportionality between the unlawful aggression and the defensive response: “[t]he
means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence
between the means of attack and the defense.” This is a matter that depends on the
circumstances: Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the
imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the
reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend
upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury . . . As WE stated in the
case of People v. Lara, 48 Phil. 153 (1925), in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not
act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and
when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the
courts to sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the consequences. Velasquez
vs. People, 820 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 195021 March 15, 2017

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The state of mind of the accused during the alleged act of self-defense or defense of a stranger
must be considered in determining whether a person’s means of repelling an aggressor were
reasonable.
In Jayme v. Repe, 314 SCRA 117 (1999), this Court explained: Consequently, we rule that
petitioner employed reasonable means to repel the sudden unprovoked attack of which he was
the victim. “Reasonable necessity does not mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that
one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make
comparisons which can easily be made in the calmness of the home. It is not the indispensable
need but the rational necessity which the law requires. In each particular case, it is necessary to
judge the relative necessity, whether more or less imperative, in accordance with the rules of
rational logic. The defendant may be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether he
employed rational means to repel the aggression.” “The rule of reasonable necessity is not
ironclad in its application; it depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. One who is
assaulted does not have the time nor sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose
the weapon to be used. The reason is obvious, in emergencies of this kind, human nature does
not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and
when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the
courts to sanction the act and to hold the actor irresponsible in law for the consequences.”
Mariano vs. People, 833 SCRA 301, G.R. No. 224102 July 26, 2017
Lack of Sufficient Provocation
Lack of sufficient provocation — requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably

blameless. He or she must not have antagonized or incited the attacker into launching an assault.
This also requires a consideration of proportionality. As explained in People v. Boholst-Caballero,
61 SCRA 180 (1974), “[p]rovocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that
is, adequate enough to impel one to attack the person claiming self-defense.” Velasquez vs.
People, 820 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 195021 March 15, 2017
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Elements of Passion and Obfuscation
To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the
accused must be able to prove the following elements: 1. that there be an act, both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and 2. that said act which produced the obfuscation

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was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. In People v. Lobino: It has been held
that “[T]here is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason.” “The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The
turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with
the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to
deprive him of his sanity and self-control, because the cause of this condition of mind must
necessarily have preceded the commission of the offense.” Moreover, “the act producing the
obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length
of time, during which the accused might have recovered his normal equanimity.” People vs.
Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 211159 March 18, 2015
The provocation and the commission of the crime should not be so far apart that a reasonable
length of time has passed during which the accused would have calmed down and be able to
reflect on the consequences of his or her actions.
There is no uniform rule on what constitutes “a considerable length of time.” xxx What is
important is that the accused has not yet “recovered his normal equanimity” when he committed
the crime. To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the facts must be
examined on a case-to-case basis. People vs. Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 211159 March 18,
2015
This court has ruled that acts done in the spirit of revenge cannot be considered acts done with
passion and obfuscation.
In People v. Caber, 346 SCRA 166 (2000), Francisco Caber was seen chasing Teodoro Ramirez with
a bladed weapon, locally known as a pisao, and stabbing Ramirez twice, which resulted in his
death. Caber tried to argue that he stabbed Ramirez in a fit of passion and obfuscation and
alleged that Ramirez raped his wife three (3) days before the incident. This court rejected the
claim: Even assuming, however, that he really killed Ramirez because of passion or obfuscation
in order to avenge the wrong done to his wife by the victim, still he cannot be credited with this
circumstance as he would then have acted “in the spirit of revenge.” Furthermore, although
accused-appellant’s wife was allegedly raped by Ramirez on November 17, 1994, the stabbing
incident in question took place three days later or on November 20, 1994. Thus, the act which
was supposed to have caused passion or obfuscation on the part of the accused-appellant was
so far removed from the date of the stabbing. In United States v. Sarikala, the Court ruled that

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the lapse of more than 24 hours, reckoned from the commission of the act which produced the
passion or obfuscation up to the time of the commission of the felony, constituted a considerable
period of time after which such circumstance would no longer be deemed present. People vs.
Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 211159 March 18, 2015
Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of spontaneity.
The accused’s act of surrendering to the authorities must have been impelled by the
acknowledgment of guilt or a desire to “save the authorities the trouble and expense that may
be incurred for his [or her] search and capture.” Based on the evidence on record, there is no
showing that petitioner’s act of submitting his person to the authorities was motivated by an
acknowledgement of his guilt. Bacerra vs. People, 828 SCVRA 525, G.R. No. 204544 July 3, 2017
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in
the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not
be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for
all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. People vs. Feliciano,
Jr., 724 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused
were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an
aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance
is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the
information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of
the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity. People vs.
Feliciano, Jr., 724 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014

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The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded
by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
As to evident premeditation, the following must concur to ascertain its presence: (1) [T]he time
when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination
and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. xxx In this case, the
prosecution failed to present any evidence showing that the acts of the assailants “were
preceded by a reflection that led to a determined plan to kill [Diego] after sufficient time had
passed from the [inception] of the plan.” “In the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere
presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are
insufficient.” People vs. Dimapilit, 836 SCRA 514, G.R. No. 210802 August 9, 2017; see also
People vs. Ordona, 840 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 227863 September 20, 2017
There is abuse of superior strength “whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor/s
and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.”
Abuse of superior strength means “to purposely use force excessively out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked.” Thus, in considering this aggravating
circumstance, this Court looks into “the age, size and strength of the parties.” Diego was 72 years
old when he was killed. His assailants, namely, Pastor, Rene Boy, and Junnel were respectively
50, 27, and 18 years old. Given the disparity in their ages, the assailants were physically stronger
than the victim. Additionally, the manner by which the assailants killed Diego reflects how they
“took advantage of their superior strength to weaken the defense and guarantee execution of
the offense.” It is, therefore, apparent that the victim “was besieged by [their] concerted acts.”
People vs. Dimapilit, 836 SCRA 514, G.R. No. 210802 August 9, 2017; see also Marasigan vs.
Fuentes, 778 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 201310 January 11, 2016
Treachery exists “when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.”
For treachery to be appreciated, two (2) elements should be proven: (1) [T]he employment of
means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or

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retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Diego went
to Pastor’s house, believing in good faith that Pastor would just borrow his tricycle. Diego was
never forewarned that danger awaits his destination. He even assured Magdalena that he would
immediately return since he would be sending off his brother to Mindoro. Not expecting any peril
for his life, he proceeded to Pastor’s house “unarmed and alone.” People vs. Dimapilit, 836 SCRA
514, G.R. No. 210802 August 9, 2017; see also People vs. Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 211159
March 18, 2015; People vs. Ordona, 840 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 227863 September 20, 2017; People
vs. Ambatang, 822 SCRA 118, G.R. No. 205855 March 29, 2017
When treachery and abuse of superior strength coincides, abuse of superior strength is
absorbed in treachery.
Given that there was neither any aggravating nor any mitigating circumstances that attended
Diego’s killing, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. People vs. Dimapilit, 836 SCRA 514, G.R. No. 210802
August 9, 2017
The mere suddenness of an attack should not be the sole basis in finding treachery. There must
be evidence to show that the accused deliberately or consciously adopted the means of
execution to ensure its success.
At the time of the incident, Gulane was already 83 years old. Accused-appellant was standing
behind him. He already had the advantage of surprise with Gulane’s back turned. Gulane’s
advanced age and position would have ensured his death as it would have prevented him from
being able to retaliate. People vs. Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 211159 March 18, 2015; see
also People vs. Feliciano, Jr., 724 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014; People vs. Magallano,
Jr., G.R. No. 220721 December 10, 2018
The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery even if the
attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position was merely accidental.
A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on “clear and convincing evidence.” Such
evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. Its existence “cannot be presumed.”
As with the finding of guilt of the accused, “[a]ny doubt as to [its] existence . . . [should] be
resolved in favor of the accused.” The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a

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finding of treachery even if the attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position
was merely accidental. The means adopted must have been a result of a determination to ensure
success in committing the crime. In this case, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner
consciously adopted or reflected on the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair
advantage. The attack might “have been done on impulse [or] as a reaction to an actual or
imagined provocation offered by the victim.” Cirera vs. People, 730 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 181843
July 14, 2014
A frontal attack, when made suddenly, leaving the victim without any means of defense, is
treacherous.
Hubay, who was then unarmed, was casually outside of his residence when accused-appellant
suddenly stabbed him. There was no opportunity for Hubay to retaliate or to parry accused-
appellant’s attack. The facts also establish that accused-appellant consciously and deliberately
adopted the mode of attack. Accused-appellant lurked outside Hubay’s residence and waited for
him to appear. When Hubay emerged from the house, accused-appellant called him “Pare” while
walking towards him with a bladed weapon and immediately stabbed him. Although the attack
was frontal, it was done suddenly and unexpectedly. A frontal attack, when made suddenly,
leaving the victim without any means of defense, is treacherous. The second stabbing also
indicates treachery. At that time, Hubay was already wounded and was unprepared to put up a
defense. People vs. Ordona, 840 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 227863 September 20, 2017
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the intoxication of the accused

must neither be “habitual nor subsequent to the plan to commit a felony.”
Moreover, it must be shown that the mental faculties and willpower of the accused were
impaired in such a way that would diminish the accused’s capacity to understand the wrongful
nature of his or her acts. The bare assertion that one is inebriated at the time of the commission
of the crime is insufficient. There must be proof of the fact of intoxication and the effect of
intoxication on the accused. There is no sufficient evidence in this case that would show that
petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime. A considerable amount of
time had lapsed from petitioner’s drinking spree up to the burning of the nipa hut within which
he could have regained control of his actions. Hence, intoxication cannot be appreciated as a
mitigating circumstance in this case. Bacerra vs. People, 828 SCVRA 525, G.R. No. 204544 July 3,
2017

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CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of one is the act of all.”
This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there
was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so. In any case, the
accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted
murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime
have been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved
in the offense. People vs. Feliciano, Jr., 724 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of
their degree of participation.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission
of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of
law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that
“when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical
volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
performed by himself alone.” Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his
own, “when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all
the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy.” The imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held
that ... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view
of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the
act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible. Verily, the moment
it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony
proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and
the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each
of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. xxx People vs. Feliciano, Jr., 724 SCRA 148,
G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014; see also Marasigan vs. Fuentes, 778 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 201310
January 11, 2016

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So long as the evidence presented show a “common design or purpose” to commit the crime,
all of the accused shall be held equally liable as co-principals even if one (1) or more of them
did not participate in all the details of the execution of the crime.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, “a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” Proof of
conspiracy may be direct or circumstantial. So long as the evidence presented show a “common
design or purpose” to commit the crime, all of the accused shall be held equally liable as
coprincipals even if one or more of them did not participate in all the details of the execution of
the crime. For this reason, the fact of conspiracy “must be proven on the same quantum of
evidence as the felony subject of the agreement of the parties,” that is, proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Benito vs. People, 750 SCRA 450, G.R. No. 204644 February 11, 2015
Conspiracy does not have to be established by direct evidence since it may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused taken collectively.
Conspiracy happens “when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” Furthermore, conspiracy does not have to be
established by direct evidence since it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused taken
collectively. However, it is necessary that a conspirator directly or indirectly contributes to the
execution of the crime committed through the performance of an overt act. The Sandiganbayan
found that there was a common design among the petitioners to make it appear that bidding
took place to effect the release of funds for the purchase of overpriced construction supplies and
materials. Granada vs. People, 818 SCRA 381, G.R. No. 184092, G.R. No. 186084, G.R. No.
186272, G.R. No. 186488, G.R. No. 18657 February 22, 2017
It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred.
The conspiracy among petitioners Alzate, Maglinte, and co-accused Zoleta to commit the crime
was also sufficiently established. Under the Revised Penal Code, there is a conspiracy “when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.” It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred. In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 406
SCRA 311 (2003): Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the
parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design. The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and from
the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some

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complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiments, then a conspiracy may be inferred though
no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Thus, the proof of conspiracy, which
is essentially hatched under cover and out of view of others than those directly concerned, is
perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only. Escobar vs. People,
845 SCRA 86, G.R. No. 205576 November 20, 2017; see also People vs. Saunar, 836 SCRA 471,
G.R. No. 207396 August 9, 2017
Conspiracy does not require that all persons charged in the information be found guilty.
It only requires that those who were found guilty conspired in committing the crime. The
acquittal of some of the accused does not necessarily preclude the presence of conspiracy.
People vs. Feliciano, Jr., 799 SCRA 375, G.R. No. 196735 August 3, 2016
PENALTIES
Penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the individual, with due
regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the social order.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the basic goal is “to uplift and redeem valuable human
material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness[.]” However, it has also been held that “penalties shall not be standardized but fitted
as far as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting
the social order.” Matalam vs. People, 788 SCRA 217, G.R. Nos. 221849-50 April 4, 2016
With the effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, the imposition of death was prohibited, and
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should be imposed instead.
With all the elements of qualified rape duly alleged and proven, the Court of Appeals was correct
in modifying the trial court’s decision. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the proper
penalty to be imposed is death. However, with the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346, the
imposition of death was prohibited, and the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for

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parole should be imposed instead. People vs. Buclao, 726 SCRA 365, G.R. No. 208173 June 11,
2014
In People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), the Supreme Court (SC) took occasion to require an
increase in the minimum award of damages where the death penalty would have been
imposed, were it not for a law preventing it.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages, where, as in this
case, the penalty for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed because
of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346: 1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; 2. P100,000.00 as moral
damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and 3.
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. These amounts shall
be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the penalty warranted by the facts but
is not imposable under present law. Thus, for the sheer heinousness and depravity of accused-
appellant’s acts of raping and drowning a seven-year-old girl to death and in accordance with
People v. Gambao, we exercise our judicial prerogative and increase the award of damages to
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages. People vs. Baron, 779 SCRA 110, G.R. No. 213215 January 11, 2016
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), the maximum term of the penalty that may be
imposed on petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). On the other hand, the minimum term of the
penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for
the offense.
The court then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty
next lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances
are considered. The imposable penalty for bigamy is prisión mayor. The penalty next lower to
that is prisión correccional. Prisión correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years; hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range. As for the maximum
penalty, it should be within the range of prisión mayor in its medium period, there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prisión mayor in its medium period ranges from eight
(8) years and one (1) day to 10 years. Vitangcol vs. People, 780 SCRA 598, G.R. No. 207406
January 13, 2016

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Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that “in all cases in which the law prescribes
a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.”
Simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Even if the aggravating circumstances of

minority and relationship were present, the appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua
under the law. xxx In view of the depravity of the acts committed by accused-appellant against
his daughter, we increase the amounts awarded to AAA, in accordance with jurisprudence.
People vs. Armodia, 826 SCRA 585, G.R. No. 210654 June 7, 2017
EXECUTION AND SERVICE
Preventive Imprisonment
In accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the time undergone by accused-
appellant under preventive imprisonment shall be credited to his service of sentence, provided
that he has given his written conformity to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners. People vs. Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 211159 March 18, 2015
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A compromise is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the
extinction of criminal liability.
Despite paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Compromise Agreement, Solar Team cannot be deemed to
have violated it for failing to cause the dismissal of the criminal cases for estafa Tieng filed against
Co. It is settled that criminal liability cannot be the subject of a compromise. “[A] criminal case is
committed against the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal
liability that the law imposes for its commission.” This explains why “a compromise is not one of
the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinction of criminal liability.” Chavez
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744 (1998), and Benedicto v. Board
of Administrators, 207 SCRA 659 (1992), ironically cited by Team Image, are both clear that
compromise is encouraged only in civil cases. Chavez explicitly stated that “[w]hile a compromise
in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal
liability.” Team Image confused the Presidential Commission on Good Government’s power to
grant criminal immunity with the act of compromising criminal liability. Granting criminal
immunity is allowed because no criminal case has yet been filed in court, and therefore, there is

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no criminal liability to compromise. On the other hand, compromising criminal liability

presupposes that a criminal case has already been filed in court, the dismissal of which is already
based on the sound discretion of the trial court. In other words, the dismissal cannot be
automatic, regardless of the agreement between the private complainant and the accused to
dismiss the case. As discussed, the real offended party in a criminal case is the State and the
outcome of the criminal case cannot be based on the will of the private complainant who is a
mere witness for the prosecution. Team Image Entertainment, Inc. vs. Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc., 839 SCRA 501, G.R. No. 191652, G.R. No. 191658 September 13, 2017
Parameters of prescription
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, 470 SCRA 754 (2005), this Court defined the parameters of
prescription: [I]n resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should
be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. With regard
to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense
charged under City Ordinance 003-2000. Jadewell Parking System Corporation vs. Lidua, Sr., 706
SCRA 724, G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013
The commencement of the prescription period of offenses is governed by Article 91 of the

Revised Penal Code.
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.—The period of prescription shall commence

to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted
or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The offense was
committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same
day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period. Jadewell
Parking System Corporation vs. Lidua, Sr., 706 SCRA 724, G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013

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The death of accused extinguishes his criminal liability; Likewise, the civil liability of the accused
arising from his criminal liability is extinguished upon his death.
Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.] Likewise, the civil liability of the accused
arising from his criminal liability is extinguished upon his death. In People v. Bayotas, 236 SCRA
239 (1994): 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability
ex delicto in senso strictiore.” 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-
contracts d) . . . . e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate
of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above. Tuano vs. People, 804 SCRA 319, G.R. No. 205871 September 28, 2016
CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL CASES
Civil indemnity ex delicto
Civil indemnity ex delicto, as a form of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim,

attaches upon a finding of criminal liability because “[e]very person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable.” People vs. Divinagracia, Sr., 833 SCRA 53, G.R. No. 207765 July 26, 2017

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"Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the criminal." This notion is rooted in
the fundamental theory that when a criminal act is committed, two (2) different entities are
offended: (1) the State, whose law has been violated; and (2) the person directly injured by the
offender's act or omission.
As explained in Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.: Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100,
The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a
person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the
political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that
society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. . . . While an act or omission is felonious
because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what
gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words,
criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in
damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to
another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for,
to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable,
regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. Guy vs. Tulfo, G.R. No.
213023 April 10, 2019
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
In falsification of public documents under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code, the
prosecution must prove that these elements exist:
(1) That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.

(2) That he takes advantage of his official position.
(3) That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any
act or proceeding.
(4) That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding. Constantino
vs. People, G.R. No. 225696 April 8, 2019

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Before one can be held criminally liable for falsification of public documents, it is essential that
the document allegedly falsified is a public document. For a notary public to be found guilty of
falsifying a notarial will, the prosecution must prove that he or she has falsified or simulated
the signatures of the testator or the instrumental witnesses to make it appear that they
participated in the execution of the document when they did not.
Public documents are defined in Cacnio v. Baens as "those instruments authorized by a notary
public or by a competent public official with all the solemnities required by law[.]" By this
definition, any notarized document is considered a public document.
A last will and testament is a "species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate after his
death." A notarial will is one that is "acknowledged before a notary public by a testator and the
attesting witnesses[.]"
This acknowledgment is embodied in an attestation clause at the end of the instrument. By this
definition, the formalities required by law to prove a notarial will's authenticity do not pertain to
the notarization, but to the attestation and subscription of the testator and the attesting
witnesses.
Hence, an authentic attestation clause must not only contain the names of the instrumental
witnesses. Mere mention of their names in the attestation clause will not accurately represent
the fact of their attestation and subscription. Instead, the instrumental witnesses must also sign
the instrument before it is notarized by the notary public.
When a notary public falsifies a public document, his or her act effectively undermines the
public's trust and reliance on notarized documents as evidence. Thus, he or she is held criminally
liable for the offense when the falsity committed leads others to believe the document was
authentic when it is not. Constantino vs. People, G.R. No. 225696 April 8, 2019
Usurpation of Official Functions
Under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the elements of the crime of
usurpation of official functions are when a person: (1) performs any act pertaining to any person
in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any
agency thereof; (2) acts under pretense of official position; and (3) acts without being lawfully
entitled to do so.

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The crime of usurpation of official functions punishes any person who, under pretense of official
position, performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being
lawfully entitled to do so.
The assailed act is the private respondent's withdrawal of the Special Allotment Release Order
through the June 19, 2012 letter-advice. This constitutes the first element, that a person
performs an act pertaining to a person in authority or public officer.
As discussed, the public respondent found that private respondent signed the letter in his own
name as the Undersecretary for Operations, and under the words, "By Authority of the
Secretary." Petitioner did not dispute this finding. However, he argues that respondent acted
without legal authority and usurped the Executive Secretary's function, as the latter is the only
one who can write and speak for and on behalf of the President.
At the onset, private respondent did not claim to write for and on behalf of the President in the
letter. This Court fails to see how he usurped the Executive Secretary's function when there was
no attempt to represent the President in the letter. xxx It appears that private respondent was
acting on behalf of Abad, upon the instructions of the President. Under the doctrine of qualified
political agency, department secretaries may act for and on behalf of the President on matters
where the President is required to exercise authority in their respective departments. Thus, this
Court rules that private respondent, under Abad's authority, may exercise the power to withdraw
the Special Allotment Release Order through the letter-advice sent to petitioner. Degamo vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212416 December 5, 2018
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
Elements of Parricide
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Article 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill
his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court appreciated the evidence presented by the parties,
considered the credibility of their respective witnesses, and found that all the elements of the
crime of parricide were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. There was no dispute as to the
relationship between the accused-appellant and the victim. As for the act of killing, the trial court
held: With respect to the killing by the accused of his wife, their daughter Joanne clearly testified
that she suddenly saw her father hit the head of her mother with a small mallet. Joanne’s
straightforward and candid narration of the incident is regarded as positive and credible

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evidence, sufficient to convict the accused. Well-settled is the rule that it is unnatural for a
relative, in this case the accused’s own child, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse
somebody else other than the real culprit. For her to do so is to let the guilty go free. Where there
is nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness stand,
their positive declarations made under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence. People vs.
Brusola, 833 SCRA 141, G.R. No. 210615 July 26, 2017
Elements of Murder
To be able to sustain a conviction for murder, the prosecution must prove the following elements:
1. That a person was killed. 2. That the accused killed him. 3. That the killing was attended by any
of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248. 4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
For murder or homicide, the prosecution must also be able to prove the accused had the intent
to kill.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that murder is committed by a person who kills,
under certain circumstances, another person that is not his or her father, mother, child,
ascendant, descendant, or spouse.
It provides: ARTICLE 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1.
With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. 2. In
consideration of a price, reward or promise. 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an
airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste
and ruin. 4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of
an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation. 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. If these qualifying
circumstances are not present or cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the accused may
only be convicted with homicide, defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Cirera vs.
People, 730 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 181843 July 14, 2014; see also People vs. Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1,
G.R. No. 211159 March 18, 2015; People vs. Dimapilit, 836 SCRA 514, G.R. No. 210802 August
9, 2017; People vs. Ordona, 840 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 227863 September 20, 2017; People vs.
Castro, 847 SCRA 232, G.R. No. 211053 November 29, 2017; People vs. Magallano, Jr., G.R. No.
220721 December 10, 2018

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In murder or homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill. If there is no intent to kill on
the part of the offender, he or she is liable only for physical injuries.
“Intent to kill . . . must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” “It should not be drawn in
the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.” Cirera
vs. People, 730 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 181843 July 14, 2014
The fact that petitioner was successful in blocking the blow with his hand does not, in and of
itself, mean that respondents could not have possibly killed him.
In Rivera v. People, 480 SCRA 188 (2006), this court noted that the fact that the wounds sustained
by the victim were merely superficial and not fatal did not negate the liability of the accused for
attempted murder. The attack on the victim in Rivera was described as follows: In the present
case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the intent of
petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as
Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained assault of
petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the
head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated
wound and cerebral contusions. The circumstances in Rivera are starkly similar with (though not
entirely the same as) those in this case. As in Rivera, several assailants took part in pummeling
petitioner, and efforts were made to hit his head with stones or pieces of hollow blocks. A
difference is that, in this case, petitioner managed to parry an attempted blow, thereby causing
a fracture in his right hand, instead of a more serious and, possibly fatal, injury on his head. In
any case, the fact that petitioner was successful in blocking the blow with his hand does not, in
and of itself, mean that respondents could not have possibly killed him. It does not negate any
homicidal intent. It remains that respondent Fuentes attempted to hit petitioner on the head
with a hollow block while respondents Calilan and Lindo made efforts to restrain petitioner.
Marasigan vs. Fuentes, 778 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 201310 January 11, 2016
The act of killing becomes frustrated when an offender “performs all the acts of execution
which could produce the crime” but did not produce it for reasons independent of his or her
will.
In convicting petitioner of frustrated murder, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
petitioner intentionally tried to kill private complainants. He was the author of the stab wounds
obtained by private complainants. However, for reasons independent of his will, he was unable
to fully execute the crime. Cirera vs. People, 730 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 181843 July 14, 2014

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Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that a penalty lower by one degree than
that which should be imposed for homicide may be imposed upon a person guilty of frustrated
homicide.
Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a penalty lower by one degree than that
which should be imposed for homicide may be imposed upon a person guilty of frustrated
homicide. The imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Article 50 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that the penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime shall
be the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated crimes.
The penalty next lower in degree is prisión mayor. Cirera vs. People, 730 SCRA 27, G.R. No.
181843 July 14, 2014
Fraternity Rumble
Death or injuries caused by fraternity rumbles are not treated as separate or distinct crimes,
unlike deaths or injuries as a result of hazing. They are punishable as ordinary crimes of murder,
homicide, or physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. People vs. Feliciano, Jr., 799 SCRA
375, G.R. No. 196735 August 3, 2016
Rape through Sexual Intercourse
To be convicted of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, it only needs to be shown
that a man had carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually assaulted another, under
any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) The victim is
deprived of reason; c) The victim is unconscious; d) By means of fraudulent machination; e) By
means of grave abuse of authority; f) When the victim is under 12 years of age; or g) When the
victim is demented. People vs. Quintos, 740 SCRA 179, G.R. No. 199402 November 12, 2014; see
also People vs. Divinagracia, Sr., 833 SCRA 53, G.R. No. 207765 July 26, 2017; People vs. Corpuz,
828 SCRA 565, G.R. No. 208013 July 3, 2017; People vs. Francica, 839 SCRA 113, G.R. No. 208625
September 6, 2017
The presence of lacerations is not an element of the crime of rape.
This court previously characterized the presence or absence of lacerations as a “trivial or

inconsequential [matter] that does not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.” The

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presence of lacerations is, therefore, not necessary to sustain a conviction. An accused may be
found guilty of rape regardless of the existence or inexistence of lacerations. The absence of
lacerations is not a sufficient defense. People vs. Quintos, 740 SCRA 179, G.R. No. 199402
November 12, 2014
Regardless of the relationship between two individuals, forcing carnal knowledge upon
another is considered rape, more so when the victim is incapable of giving consent due to her
mental capacity.
Accused’s argument that he and AAA were sweethearts is irrelevant in rape cases wherein the
main element is “lack of consent.” xxx Even married couples, upon whom the law imposes the
duty to cohabitate, are protected from forced sexual congress. People vs. Quintos, 740 SCRA 179,
G.R. No. 199402 November 12, 2014
Sexual congress with a person who expressed her resistance by words or deeds constitutes force
either physically or psychologically through threat or intimidation.
When a person resists another’s sexual advances, it would not be presumptuous to say that, that
person does not consent to any sexual activity with the other. That resistance may establish lack
of consent. Sexual congress with a person who expressed her resistance by words or deeds
constitutes force either physically or psychologically through threat or intimidation. It is rape.
Lack of resistance may sometimes imply consent. However, that is not always the case. While it
may imply consent, there are circumstances that may render a person unable to express her
resistance to another’s sexual advances. Thus, when a person has carnal knowledge with another
person who does not show any resistance, it does not always mean that that person consented
to such act. Lack of resistance does not negate rape. People vs. Quintos, 740 SCRA 179, G.R. No.
199402 November 12, 2014
Article 266-A recognizes that rape can happen even in circumstances when there is no
resistance from the victim.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code does not simply say that rape is committed when a man
has carnal knowledge with or sexually assaults another by means of force, threat, or intimidation.
It enumerates at least four other circumstances under which rape may be committed: (1) by
taking advantage of a person’s deprived reason or unconscious state; (2) through fraudulent

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machination; (3) by taking advantage of a person’s age (12 years of age) or demented status; and
(4) through grave abuse of authority. Article 266-A recognizes that rape can happen even in
circumstances when there is no resistance from the victim. People vs. Quintos, 740 SCRA 179,
G.R. No. 199402 November 12, 2014
Rape through Sexual Assault
The issue before us for resolution is whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
petitioner Richard Ricalde’s guilt for the crime of rape through sexual assault. We affirm
petitioner’s conviction with modification on the penalty imposed. The Anti-Rape Law of 1997
classified rape as a crime against persons and amended the Revised Penal Code to include Article
266-A on rape through sexual assault: Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.—Rape is
Committed — xxx By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth
or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Ricalde vs. People, 747 SCRA 542, G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015; see also People vs.
Francica, 839 SCRA 113, G.R. No. 208625 September 6, 2017
Instrument or Object Rape; Gender-Free Rape; Homosexual Rape
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as “instrument or object rape,”
“gender-free rape,” or “homosexual rape.” The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is “the
insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into another person’s genital or anal orifice.” Ricalde vs. People, 747 SCRA 542, G.R. No. 211002
January 21, 2015
In People v. Soria, 685 SCRA 483 (2012), the Supreme Court (SC) discussed that a victim need
not identify what was inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that
rape through sexual assault was committed.
We find it inconsequential that “AAA” could not specifically identify the particular instrument or
object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed something
was inserted into her vagina. To require “AAA” to identify the instrument or object that was
inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process. Second,
petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or

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any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not
negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This result does not contradict the positive
testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and consistent with human
nature. Ricalde vs. People, 747 SCRA 542, G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015
People v. Bonaagua, 650 SCRA 620 (2011), considers a woman’s private organ since most if not
all existing jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation
can apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victim’s
anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is
not important. Rape is an “assault on human dignity.” Ricalde vs. People, 747 SCRA 542, G.R. No.
211002 January 21, 2015
Elements of Statutory Rape
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the
accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was
done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven
and that there was sexual intercourse. People vs. Gutierez, 720 SCRA 607, G.R. No. 208007 April
2, 2014; see also People vs. Francica, 839 SCRA 113, G.R. No. 208625 September 6, 2017
The child victim’s consent in statutory rape is immaterial because the law presumes that her
young age makes her incapable of discerning good from evil.
Rape by sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge by a man of a woman under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 266-A(1)(a-d). Rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) is also called
statutory rape “as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape.” The child victim’s
consent in statutory rape is immaterial because the law presumes that her young age makes her
incapable of discerning good from evil. People v. Gutierez, 720 SCRA 607 (2014), explained the
elements of statutory rape: Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12
years of age and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was
force, threat or intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or
whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the

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victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. People vs. Austria, 844 SCRA 523, G.R.
No. 210568 November 8, 2017
Sexual congress with a girl under twelve (12) years old is always rape.
The defense did not dispute AAA’s claim that she was 10 years old at the time she was first raped
in 1997 at their house and at the kaingin. Her birth certificate was presented into evidence before
the trial court and was not questioned by the defense. Therefore, what only needs to be proven
is whether or not AAA and the accused had sexual intercourse because “sexual congress with a
girl under 12 years old is always rape.” People vs. Austria, 844 SCRA 523, G.R. No. 210568
November 8, 2017
In any case, whether a victim cried for help is immaterial in a charge of statutory rape since
“[t]he law presumes that such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have
a will of her own.”
In any case, whether she cried for help is immaterial in a charge of statutory rape since “[t]he law
presumes that such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of
her own.” Beyond reasonable doubt, Rodrigo Gutierez raped AAA, a minor who was only 10 years
of age, on November 29, 2005. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code requires that the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed in cases of rape stated in the first paragraph of Article
266-A where there are no aggravating or qualifying circumstances present. The lower courts
correctly imposed this penalty. People vs. Gutierez, 720 SCRA 607, G.R. No. 208007 April 2, 2014
If a woman above twelve (12) years old has a mental age of a child below 12, the accused
remains liable for rape even if the victim acceded to the sordid acts.
The reason behind the rule “is simply that if sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve years
of age is rape, it must thereby follow that carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental age is that
of a child below twelve years should likewise be constitutive of rape.” People vs. Corpuz, 828
SCRA 565, G.R. No. 208013 July 3, 2017; see also People vs. Entrampas, 822 SCRA 142, G.R. No.
212161 March 29, 2017

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Rape is qualified when “the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.”
The elements of qualified rape are: “(1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) [done] by force
and without consent; . . . (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape; and
(5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.” People
vs. Buclao, 726 SCRA 365, G.R. No. 208173 June 11, 2014; see also People vs. Divinagracia, Sr.,
833 SCRA 53, G.R. No. 207765 July 26, 2017; People vs. Entrampas, 822 SCRA 142, G.R. No.
212161 March 29, 2017; People vs. Austria, 844 SCRA 523, G.R. No. 210568 November 8, 2017
The crime of qualified rape under Article 266-B(1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) consists of
the twin circumstances of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the perpetrator, both of
which must concur and must be alleged in the information.
It is immaterial whether the relationship was proven during trial if that was not specifically
pleaded for in the information. The Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found that
accused-appellant’s relationship with AAA was not duly alleged in the informations. Thus, his
relationship with the victim cannot qualify the crimes of rape. Ruling otherwise would deprive
him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
People vs. Armodia, 826 SCRA 585, G.R. No. 210654 June 7, 2017
In cases of qualified rape, moral ascendancy or influence supplants the element of violence or
intimidation.
To this court’s mind, there can be no greater source of fear or intimidation than your own father
— one who, generally, has exercised authority over your person since birth. Delay brought by
fear for one’s life cannot be deemed unreasonable. This court has recognized the moral
ascendancy and influence the father has over his child. In cases of qualified rape, moral
ascendancy or influence supplants the element of violence or intimidation. It is not only an
element of the crime, but it is also a factor in evaluating whether the delay in reporting the
incident was unreasonable. People vs. Buclao, 726 SCRA 365, G.R. No. 208173 June 11, 2014;
see also People vs. Armodia, 826 SCRA 585, G.R. No. 210654 June 7, 2017

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Under Article 266(10) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), rape is qualified “when the offender
knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended
party at the time of the commission of the crime.”
This qualifying circumstance should be particularly alleged in the Information. A mere assertion
of the victim’s mental deficiency is not enough. For this reason, Allan can only be convicted of
four (4) counts of rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. People
vs. Corpuz, 828 SCRA 565, G.R. No. 208013 July 3, 2017
Presence of other family members is not a valid defense in rape cases since rape may be carried
out in the same room where the family members are staying.
This court has held before that “mere denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.” It is settled that
the defense of alibi and denial cannot overcome the victim’s positive and categorical testimony
and identification of the accused-appellant. People vs. Buclao, 726 SCRA 365, G.R. No. 208173
June 11, 2014
The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not being an element of the
crime of rape.
As to accused-appellant’s argument that the absence of hymenal lacerations admits the

possibility that there was never any sexual abuse, we find our disquisition in People v. Araojo,
600 SCRA 295 (2009), applicable: The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the
complainant’s body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not
being, to repeat, an element of the crime of rape. A healed or fresh laceration would of course
be a compelling proof of defloration. [However,] the foremost consideration in the prosecution
of rape is the victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. People vs.
Buclao, 726 SCRA 365, G.R. No. 208173 June 11, 2014

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Delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken
against the victim.
We also disagree with accused-appellant’s argument that private complainant AAA’s delay in
reporting the alleged rape incidents, together with the prodding of AAA’s grandmother, signals
the falsity of the rape allegations. In People v. Delos Reyes, 684 SCRA 260 (2012), this court ruled
that: The failure to immediately report the dastardly acts to her family or to the authorities at
the soonest possible time or her failure to immediately change her clothes is not enough reason
to cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of [accused]. This Court has repeatedly held that delay in
reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the
victim. Further, it has been written that a rape victim’s actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by
fear rather than by reason. It is this fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator
hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim
into silence and submissiveness. People vs. Buclao, 726 SCRA 365, G.R. No. 208173 June 11, 2014
The testimonies of child rape victims are generally entitled to full faith and credence.
Testimonies of child victims may not always be the absolute truth. Nevertheless, the testimonies
of child rape victims are generally entitled to full faith and credence. A girl who would willingly
cause the examination of her private parts, allow the invasion of her privacy via an open trial,
and recall the harrowing experiences she suffered in the hands of her own father must have been
impelled by the desire to have the perpetrator caught and punished. More significantly, she must
have been motivated by the need to be physically and psychologically protected from her
assailant. After a child rape victim gives a credible testimony, the defense carries the burden of
evidence to rebut it. Certainly, the defense that a child would wish to cause the arrest,
imprisonment, and embarrassment of her own father only because he was strict strains logic and
common sense. It is a narrative that has no basis on any fact proven on record. People vs.
Armodia, 826 SCRA 585, G.R. No. 210654 June 7, 2017
A child would not concoct a story of incest especially if it would result in losing one’s father to
prison.
In People v. Baun, 562 SCRA 584 (2008), where the father was convicted for raping his 14-year-
old daughter four (4) times: No sane girl would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not in
truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. It is against
human nature for a girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself and her family to a lifetime

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of dishonor, especially where her charges would mean the death or the long-term imprisonment
of her own father. People vs. Armodia, 826 SCRA 585, G.R. No. 210654 June 7, 2017
Rape victims are not expected to cherish in their memories an accurate account of the dates,
number of times, and manner they were violated.
The alleged inconsistencies “are collateral and minor matters which do not at all touch upon the
commission of the crime nor affect [the minor victim]’s credibility.” AAA’s inability to recall the
precise date and time of the rape is immaterial as these are not elements of the crime. People
vs. Entrampas, 822 SCRA 142, G.R. No. 212161 March 29, 2017
The silence of the rape victim does not negate her sexual molestation or make her charge
baseless, untrue, or fabricated.
Her failures to resist the sexual aggression and to immediately report the incident to the
authorities or to her mother do not undermine her credibility. The silence of the rape victim does
not negate her sexual molestation or make her charge baseless, untrue, or fabricated. A minor
“cannot be expected to act like an adult or a mature experienced woman who would have the
courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and complain immediately that she
had been sexually assaulted.” People vs. Entrampas, 822 SCRA 142, G.R. No. 212161 March 29,
2017
Recantations are viewed unfavorably especially in rape cases. Circumstances in which the
recantation was made are thoroughly examined before the evidence of retraction can be given
any weight.
As a rule, affidavits of desistance are viewed with skepticism and reservation because they can
be "easily obtained for monetary consideration or through intimidation."
Based on the circumstances here, this Court cannot give any weight to AAA's Affidavit of
Recantation and Desistance. If the crime did not really happen, AAA would have made the
Affidavit at the earliest instance—but she did not. Instead, she executed it more than two (2)
years after the crime had been committed. If the crime did not really happen, she would not have
submitted herself to physical examination or hours of questioning—but she did. People vs. ZZZ,
G.R. No. 229862, June 19, 2019

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In rape cases, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of the commission of rape,
whereas moral damages are automatically awarded without the need to prove mental and
physical suffering.
Exemplary damages are also imposed, as example for the public good and to protect minors from
all forms of sexual abuse. People vs. Buclao, 726 SCRA 365, G.R. No. 208173 June 11, 2014; see
also People vs. Gutierez, 720 SCRA 607, G.R. No. 208007 April 2, 2014
Under Section 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), when the offender committed the crime,
knowing of the intellectual disability of the offended party, the death penalty shall be imposed.
Considering that the imposition of the death penalty is prohibited, the Court of Appeals (CA)
properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole instead.
However, in line with current jurisprudence, P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as

moral damages, and P100,000,00 as exemplary damages shall be awarded to the victim. People
vs. Tayaban, 846 SCRA 209, G.R. No. 207666 November 22, 2017
To qualify the crime of rape and increase the penalty of accused from reclusion perpetua to
death under Article 266-B in relation to Article 266(A)(1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), an
allegation of the victim’s intellectual disability must be alleged in the information.
If not alleged in the information, such mental incapacity may prove lack of consent but it cannot
increase the penalty to death. Neither can it be the basis of conviction for statutory rape. People
vs. Quintos, 740 SCRA 179, G.R. No. 199402 November 12, 2014
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL SECURITY AND LIBERTY
Elements of Serious Illegal Detention
A conviction for the crime of kidnapping or serious illegal detention requires the concurrence of
the following elements: 1. The offender is a private individual; 2. That individual kidnaps or
detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of liberty; 3. The act of detention or
kidnapping is illegal; 4. In the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is
present: a. The kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days. b. It is committed by one
who simulates public authority. c. Any serious physical injury is inflicted upon the person

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kidnapped or detained, or any threat to kill that person is made. d. The person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, a female or a public officer. People vs. Borja, 834 SCRA 192, G.R. No. 199710
August 2, 2017
Elements of Kidnapping for Ransom
In kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution must be able to establish the following elements:
“[first,] the accused was a private person; [second,] he [or she] kidnapped or detained or in any
manner deprived another of his or her liberty; [third,] the kidnapping or detention was illegal;
and [fourth,] the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.” People vs. Avancena, 826 SCRA
414, G.R. No. 200512 June 7, 2017
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is “the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled
with the intent of the accused to effect it”; It is not always necessary that the victim be
imprisoned.
The second element of the crime of kidnapping is met as long as there is a showing that the
victim’s liberty of movement is restricted. In this case, Ronalyn was clearly deprived of her liberty.
She was forcibly taken inside a vehicle by accused-appellant and his cohorts and was driven
around Quezon City for at least five (5) hours. People vs. Borja, 834 SCRA 192, G.R. No. 199710
August 2, 2017
Elements of Slight Illegal Detention
The felony of slight illegal detention has four (4) elements: 1. That the offender is a private
individual. 2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him of his
liberty. 3. That the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal. 4. That the crime is committed without
the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in Art. 267. The elements of slight illegal
detention are all present here. Accused-appellant is a private individual. The Court of Appeals
found that after raping AAA, accused-appellant continued to detain her and to deprive her of her
liberty. It also appreciated AAA’s testimony that accused-appellant placed electrical wires around
the room to electrocute anyone who might attempt to enter it. He refused to release AAA even
after his supposed demands were met. The detention was illegal and not attended by the
circumstances that would render it serious illegal detention. Thus, this Court finds accused-

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appellant guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention. People vs. Conception, 860 SCRA 476, G.R.
No. 214886 April 4, 2018
Although the initial abduction of AAA may have been absorbed by the crime of rape, the
continued detention of AAA after the rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it.
The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals show that after raping
AAA, accused-appellant continued to detain her and refused to release her even after raping her.
Thus, although the initial abduction of AAA may have been absorbed by the crime of rape, the
continued detention of AAA after the rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it. Likewise, since the
detention continued after the rape had been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary means
for the crime of rape. People vs. Conception, 860 SCRA 476, G.R. No. 214886 April 4, 2018
Even if they were employed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), detaining any
private person for the purpose of extorting any amount of money could not, in any way, be
construed as within their official functions. If proven, they can be guilty of serious illegal
detention.
Accused-appellants claim that they were agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency’s
Task Force Hunter but were unable to present any evidence to substantiate their claim. The
prosecution, however, was able to present Police Inspector Nabor of the Human Resource Service
of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, who testified that accused-appellants “[were] not in any
manner connected with [Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency].” It also submitted to the trial
court a letter sent by P/Supt. Edwin Nemenzo of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency to
Philippine National Police P/Sr. Supt. Allan Purisima stating that the accused-appellants were not
agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. People vs. Avancena, 826 SCRA 414, G.R. No.
200512 June 7, 2017
The fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused does not remove the element of
deprivation of liberty if the victim went with the accused on a false inducement without which
the victim would not have done so.
In order to prove kidnapping, the prosecution must establish that the victim was “forcefully
transported, locked up or restrained.” It must be proven that the accused intended “to deprive
the victim of his liberty.” The act of handcuffing Rizaldo and physically harming him to prevent

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escape falls under this definition. Accused-appellants, however, claim that Rizaldo was not
kidnapped because he voluntarily went with the accused-appellants. “[T]he fact that the victim
voluntarily went with the accused [does] not remove the element of deprivation of liberty [if] the
victim went with the accused on a false inducement without which the victim would not have
done so.” Rizaldo would not have gone with the accused-appellants had they not misrepresented
themselves as Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency agents who allegedly caught him selling
illegal drugs. People vs. Avancena, 826 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 200512 June 7, 2017
Although the crime of kidnapping can only be committed by a private individual, the fact that
the accused is a public official does not automatically preclude the filing of an information for
kidnapping against him.
A public officer who detains a person for the purpose of extorting ransom cannot be said to be
acting in an official capacity. In People v. Santiano, 299 SCRA 583 (1998), this Court explained that
public officials may be prosecuted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if they act in their
private capacity: The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is “an organic member of the NARCOM”
and appellant Sandigan [is] “a regular member of the PNP” would not exempt them from the
criminal liability for kidnapping. It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim,
appellants did so neither in furtherance of official function nor in the pursuit of authority vested
in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to their office, but in purely private capacity, that they have
acted in concert with their co-appellants Santiano and Chanco. People vs. Borja, 834 SCRA 192,
G.R. No. 199710 August 2, 2017
Accused-appellant’s membership in the Philippine National Police (PNP) does not automatically
preclude the filing of an information for kidnapping or serious illegal detention against him. He
may be prosecuted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) if it is shown that he
committed acts unrelated to the functions of his office.
The burden is on the accused to prove that he or she acted in furtherance of his or her official
functions. In People v. Trestiza, 660 SCRA 407 (2011), this Court noted: Before the present case
was tried by the trial court, there was a significant amount of time spent in determining whether
kidnapping for ransom was the proper crime charged against the accused, especially since
Trestiza and Manrique were both police officers. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code specifically
stated that the crime should be committed by a private individual. The trial court settled the
matter by citing our ruling in People v. Santiano, 299 SCRA 583 (1998)[.] . . . . In the same order,
the trial court asked for further evidence which support the defense’s claim of holding a
legitimate police operation. However, the trial court found as unreliable the Pre-

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Operation/Coordination Sheet presented by the defense. The sheet was not authenticated, and
the signatories were not presented to attest to its existence and authenticity. People vs. Borja,
834 SCRA 192, G.R. No. 199710 August 2, 2017
A violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 bears no direct or indirect relation to the crime of
kidnapping.
Ronalyn’s apprehension for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not automatically negate the
criminal liability of accused-appellant. It also does not exclude the possibility of the commission
of the crime with which accused-appellant is charged. The buy-bust operation carried out against
Ronalyn and her kidnapping are events that can reasonably coexist. Furthermore, a violation of
Republic Act No. 9165 bears no direct or indirect relation to the crime of kidnapping. Ronalyn’s
arrest and conviction are immaterial to the determination of accused-appellant’s criminal
liability. In other words, Ronalyn’s innocence or guilt would neither affirm nor negate the
commission of the crime of kidnapping against her. Therefore, the resolution of this case will
depend solely on whether the prosecution has established all the elements of kidnapping under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. People vs. Borja, 834 SCRA 192, G.R. No. 199710 August
2, 2017
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Elements of Robbery
The elements of simple robbery are “a) that there is personal property belonging to another; b)
that there is unlawful taking of that property; c) that the taking is with intent to gain; and d) that
there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.” People vs. Avancena,
826 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 200512 June 7, 2017
Taking is considered complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing,
even if the offender has no opportunity to dispose of the thing.
During the entrapment operation, accused-appellants arrived in the designated place in a white
Toyota Revo. Accused-appellant Avancena approached Alfonso and received the marked money
from him. When they drove away, NAKTAF agents followed them and were able to apprehend
them. NAKTAF was able to recover the marked money from them. In this instance, there was a

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taking of personal property belonging to Alfonso by means of intimidation. “Taking is considered

complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if [the offender] has
no opportunity to dispose of the [thing].” The marked money was recovered from the accused-
appellants when they were arrested, which proves that they were able to gain possession of
Alfonso’s money. People vs. Avancena, 826 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 200512 June 7, 2017
Under Article 294(5) in relation to Article 295, and Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
robbery in band is committed when four (4) or more malefactors take part in the robbery.
Robbery is the taking, with the intent to gain, of personal property belonging to another by use
of force, violence or intimidation. Under Article 294(5) in relation to Article 295, and Article
296 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery in band is committed when four (4) or more malefactors
take part in the robbery. All members are punished as principals for any assault committed by
the band, unless it can be proven that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the
crime. Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public
highway, the crime is still classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery or brigandage under
Presidential Decree No. 532. It is highway robbery only when it can be proven that the
malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose of committing that crime. Amparo
vs. People, 818 SCRA 431, G.R. No. 204990 February 22, 2017
Under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the imposable penalty for
robbery is prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its medium period.
Article 295 of the same Code, however, qualifies the penalty to its maximum period if the robbery
is committed by a band. Thus, the proper penalty is prisión mayor in its maximum period.
Amparo vs. People, 818 SCRA 431, G.R. No. 204990 February 22, 2017
Elements of Theft
The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property taken
belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the owner’s consent; (4) there was intent to
gain; and (5) the taking was done without violence against or intimidation of the person or force
upon things. Ligtas vs. People, 767 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 200751 August 17, 2015

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Elements of Qualified Theft
For qualified theft to be committed, the following elements must concur: 1. Taking of personal
property; 2. That the said property belongs to another; 3. That the said taking be done with intent
to gain; 4. That it be done without the owner’s consent; 5. That it be accomplished without the
use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; 6. That it be done with
grave abuse of confidence. People vs. Mejares, 850 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 225735 January 10, 2018
When a person has possession of a stolen property, he can be disputably presumed as the
author of the theft.
There is a disputable presumption that “a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing
of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a
person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.” People vs. Chavez,
735 SCRA 728, G.R. No. 207950 September 22, 2014
The penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value of the stolen items.
The lower court made no factual findings on the value of the missing items enumerated in the
information — one Nokia cell phone unit, one Motorola cell phone unit, six pieces ladies ring,
two pieces necklace, and one bracelet. People vs. Chavez, 735 SCRA 728, G.R. No. 207950
September 22, 2014
The Supreme Court (SC) has been consistent in holding that “intent to gain or animus lucrandi
is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject
of asportation. [Thus,] [a]ctual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to
gain.”
In this case, it is clear from the established facts that it was accused-appellant who opened the
drawer in the masters’ bedroom and took away the cash and valuables it contained. Therefore,
the burden is on the defense to prove that intent to gain was absent despite accused-appellant’s
actual taking of her employer’s valuables. It is precisely this burden that the defense failed to
discharge. People vs. Mejares, 850 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 225735 January 10, 2018

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Normal human experience, as well as the consistency in and confluence of the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses lead to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant, taking
advantage of her being a domestic helper of private complainant for approximately a year,
committed the crime of qualified theft.
If she honestly believed that her employer had met an accident and was genuinely worried for
her, she could have easily sought the help of any of her co-workers in the household. When
warned about the dugo-dugo gang, accused-appellant could have paused to reassess the
situation. She failed to do all these security measures with no convincing justification. Indeed,
accused-appellant’s persistence to leave the condominium with the valuables and her refusal to
let the security guard talk to her employer further belie her position. To make matters worse,
accused-appellant was a domestic helper who had been working for the Spouses Gavino for at
least one (1) year when she committed the crime. By this fact alone, the offense committed is
qualified and warrants graver penalties, pursuant to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. People vs. Mejares, 850 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 225735 January 10, 2018
The Supreme Court (SC) has explained that while grave abuse of trust and confidence per se
does not produce the felony as an effect, it is a “circumstance which aggravates and qualifies
the commission of the crime of theft”; hence, the imposition of a higher penalty is necessary.
It is not difficult to understand why the character of accused-appellant’s work as a domestic

helper qualifies the offense she committed. As explained in Corpuz v. People of the Philippines,
724 SCRA 1 (2014): [T]he rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic
servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse
the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the
helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and
safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is
so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of
such wrongful acts. People vs. Mejares, 850 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 225735 January 10, 2018
Elements of Estafa by Means of Deceit
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are: a. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means. b. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must
be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. c. That the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that
is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent

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act, or fraudulent means. d. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
Escobar vs. People, 845 SCRA 86, G.R. No. 205576 November 20, 2017
In estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
element of deceit consisting of the false pretense or representation must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Otherwise, criminal liability will not attach. In Aricheta v. People, 533 SCRA 695 (2007), the
accused was charged of estafa for selling property that she had previously sold to a third party.
She allegedly misrepresented to the buyer that she was still the owner at the time of the sale.
Osorio vs. People, 869 SCRA 274, G.R. No. 207711 July 2, 2018
Petitioner, in soliciting private complainant’s money, falsely represented that it would be

invested in Philam Life and that its proceeds would be used to pay for private complainant’s
insurance premiums. This false representation is what induced private complainant to part with
her funds and disregard the payment of her insurance premiums. Since petitioner deviated from
what was originally agreed upon by placing the investment in another company, private
complainant’s insurance policies lapsed.
The present case is different from money market transactions where dealers are usually given
full discretion on where to place their client’s investments. In MERALCO v. Atilano, 675 SCRA 112
(2012), this Court explained the nature of money market transactions and the corresponding
liabilities that dealers may face when dealing with their clients’ investments: [I]n money market
transactions, the dealer is given discretion on where investments are to be placed, absent any
agreement with or instruction from the investor to place the investments in specific securities.
Money market transactions may be conducted in various ways. One instance is when an investor
enters into an investment contract with a dealer under terms that oblige the dealer to place
investments only in designated securities. Another is when there is no stipulation for placement
on designated securities; thus, the dealer is given discretion to choose the placement of the
investment made. Under the first situation, a dealer who deviates from the specified instruction
may be exposed to civil and criminal prosecution; in contrast, the second situation may only give
rise to a civil action for recovery of the amount invested. Osorio vs. People, 869 SCRA 274, G.R.
No. 207711 July 2, 2018

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Under the principle of ejusdem generis, “other similar deceits” cannot be construed in the
broadest sense to include all kinds of deceit.
In this case, although there is no proof that petitioner used a fictitious name or pretended to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business in soliciting private
complainant’s money, petitioner should nevertheless be held criminally liable for
misrepresenting to private complainant that the latter’s money would be invested in Philam Life
Fund Management and that its proceeds may be utilized to pay for private complainant’s
insurance premiums. Private complainant accepted the investment opportunity offered by
petitioner due to the promise that her money would be invested in Philam Life, a company with
which she had existing insurance policies. She parted with her funds because of the
representation that her investment’s earnings would be conveniently channeled to the payment
of her insurance premiums. As a result of petitioner’s representations, private complainant no
longer saw the need to pay for the succeeding insurance premiums as they fell due. Moreover,
petitioner’s issuance of Philam Life receipts led private complainant to believe that her money
was already as good as invested in the company. The false representations committed by
petitioner in this case fall beyond the scope of “other similar deceits” under Article 315(2)(a) of
the Revised Penal Code. The phrase “other similar deceits” in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code has been interpreted in Guinhawa v. People, 468 SCRA 278 (2005), as limited to acts
of the same nature as those specifically enumerated. Osorio vs. People, 869 SCRA 274, G.R. No.
207711 July 2, 2018
Elements of Estafa through Misappropriation
To prove estafa through misappropriation, the prosecution must establish the following
elements: (1) the offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or
to return, the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property
received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (3) the misappropriation, conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) demand by the offended party that the offender
return the money or property received. Benito vs. People, 750 SCRA 450, G.R. No. 204644
February 11, 2015

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Generally, demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust is necessary before an accused
is convicted of estafa. However, if there is an agreed period for the accused to return the thing
received in trust and the accused fails to return it within the agreed period, demand is
unnecessary.
Failure to return the thing within the agreed period consummates the crime of estafa, i.e., the
misappropriation of the thing received in trust. Benito vs. People, 750 SCRA 450, G.R. No. 204644
February 11, 2015
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is broad in application. It is intended as a catch-all
provision to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the
RPC.
Petitioner may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code. Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in application. It is intended as a catch-all
provision to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the
Revised Penal Code. For an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code, the following elements must exist: (a) [The accused makes a] false pretense,
fraudulent act or pretense other than those in [Articles 315, 316, and 317]; (b) such false
pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.
x x x x All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case. Osorio
vs. People, 869 SCRA 274, G.R. No. 207711 July 2, 2018
The crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is necessarily
included in the crime of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. Therefore,
petitioner may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the RPC.
The imposable penalty for other deceits under paragraph 1 of Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code has been retained by Republic Act No. 10951. Accordingly, petitioner should suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor and pay a fine, which should neither be less than nor more than twice
the amount of the damage caused. The amount of damage caused against private complainant
in this case is P200,000.00. Osorio vs. People, 869 SCRA 274, G.R. No. 207711 July 2, 2018

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CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
Elements of Bigamy
The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings. For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the
following elements: [first,] that the offender has been legally married; [second,] that the first
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; [third,] that he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage; and [lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. Vitangcol vs. People, 780 SCRA 598, G.R. No. 207406 January 13, 2016
To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, “the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties.”
The fourth requisite — the marriage license — is issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides. The marriage license represents
the state’s “involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.” To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, “the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar
that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.” Vitangcol vs. People, 780 SCRA 598,
G.R. No. 207406 January 13, 2016
Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime
of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code (RPC) becomes useless.
“[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape
a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first.” Further, “[a]
party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite — usually the marriage
license — and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration

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of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.” Vitangcol vs. People, 780
SCRA 598, G.R. No. 207406 January 13, 2016
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2012
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
The elements that must be established to sustain convictions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs
are settled. In People v. Morales, 616 SCRA 223 (2010), this court stated: In actions involving the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that
the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the
illicit drug as evidence. People vs. Holgado, 732 SCRA 554, G.R. No. 207992 August 11, 2014; see
also People vs. Dela Cruz, 737 SCRA 486, G.R. No. 205821 October 1, 2014; Lescano vs. People,
781 SCRA 73, G.R. No. 214490 January 13, 2016; People vs. Caiz, 797 SCRA 26, G.R. No. 215340
July 13, 2016; People vs. Sagana, 834 SCRA 225, G.R. No. 208471 August 2, 2017; People vs.
Cabellon, 840 SCRA 311, G.R. No. 207229 September 20, 2017; People vs. Segundo, 833 SCRA
16, G.R. No. 205614 July 26, 2017; People vs. Saunar, 836 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 207396 August 9,
2017; People vs. Que, 853 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 212994 January 31, 2018; People vs. Sanchez, 859
SCRA 175, G.R. No. 216014 March 14, 2018; People vs. Turemutsa, G.R. No. 227497 April 10,
2019; People vs. Ameril, G.R. No. 222192 March 13, 2019
Illegal Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
To transport a dangerous drug is to “carry or convey [it] from one place to another.” For an
accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove its essential element: the
movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another.
We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempting to transport dangerous drugs. The prosecution proved the
essential element of the crime; accused-appellant would have successfully moved 13.96 grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride from Manila to Cebu had she not been apprehended at the
initial check-in area at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal 1. The prosecution need not present
the airline ticket to prove accused-appellant’s intention to board an aircraft; she submitted
herself to body frisking at the airport when 13.96 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride was
found in her person. People vs. Dimaano, 783 SCRA 449, G.R. No. 174481 February 10, 2016

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Visiting Drug Den
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon: (a) Any employee of a den, dive or resort, who is
aware of the nature of the place as such; and (b) Any person who, not being included in the
provisions of the next preceding paragraph, is aware of the nature of the place as such and shall
knowingly visit the same. Before a person may be convicted under the foregoing provision, it
must be shown that he or she knew that the place visited was a drug den, and still visited the
place despite this knowledge. Coronel vs. People, 820 SCRA 174, G.R. No. 214536 March 13, 2017
Assuming that persons who test positive for drugs used them at the place of arrest is not
sufficient to show that they were aware of the nature of the suspected drug den before visiting
it, absent any other circumstantial evidence.
True, the drug test results sufficiently proved that petitioners had used drugs some time before
their arrest. However, assuming that petitioners were, in fact, at the alleged drug den before
their arrest, there was no showing how long petitioners were at the alleged drug den, or how
long the drugs had been in their system. In other words, there is no basis to assume that
petitioners used drugs at the moment immediately before arrest, and thus, at the location of the
arrest. Coronel vs. People, 820 SCRA 174, G.R. No. 214536 March 13, 2017
The crime of knowingly visiting a drug den under Article II, Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No.
9165 carries with it a minimum penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day,
and a maximum of twenty (20) years.
The crime of knowingly visiting a drug den under Article II, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9165
carries with it a minimum penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and one (1) day, and a maximum
of 20 years. It is not to be taken so lightly that its elements can be presumed to exist without any
effort to show them. Given the dearth of evidence in this case, we are constrained to acquit
petitioners of this particular charge. Coronel vs. People, 820 SCRA 174, G.R. No. 214536 March
13, 2017

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Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
In prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused
was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such
possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of
being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be
established beyond reasonable doubt. People vs. Dela Cruz, 737 SCRA 486, G.R. No. 205821
October 1, 2014; see also People vs. Sagana, 834 SCRA 225, G.R. No. 208471 August 2, 2017;
People vs. Pangan, 847 SCRA 176, G.R. No. 206965 November 29, 2017; People vs. Que, 853
SCRA 487, G.R. No. 212994 January 31, 2018; People vs. Sanchez, 859 SCRA 175, G.R. No. 216014
March 14, 2018; Veriño vs. People, G.R. No. 225710 June 19, 2019
In crimes involving dangerous drugs, the State has the burden of proving not only the elements
of the offense but also the corpus delicti of the charge.
Prosecutions involving illegal possession of dangerous drugs demand that the elemental act of
possession be proven with moral certainty and not allowed by law. The illicit drugs, itself,
comprise the corpus delicti of the charge and its existence is necessary to obtain a judgment of
conviction. Therefore, it is important in these cases that the identity of the illegal drugs be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must establish the existence of the illicit drugs. It
must also prove that the integrity of the corpus delicti has been maintained because the
confiscated drug, being the proof involved, is not promptly recognizable through sight and can
be tampered or replaced. People vs. Pangan, 847 SCRA 176, G.R. No. 206965 November 29, 2017
In dangerous drugs cases, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself. In illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction actually happened and that “the
[procured] object is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs
seized from the accused.”
For a plausible conviction under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 or illegal sale of
prohibited drugs, the prosecution must ascertain the following: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor. In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction
actually happened and that “the [procured] object is properly presented as evidence in court and
is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused.” People vs. Sagana, 834 SCRA 225, G.R.
No. 208471 August 2, 2017; see also People vs. Casacop, 752 SCRA 151, G.R. No. 208685 March
9, 2015

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“Chain of custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plants sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment at each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction.
While the definition of chain of custody was not expressly provided for under Republic Act No.
9165, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defined it as
follows: b. “Chain of custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plants sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment at each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements
and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody w[as]
made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. People
vs. Sagana, 834 SCRA 225, G.R. No. 208471 August 2, 2017
It is imperative that the drugs allegedly seized from the accused are the very same objects
tested in the laboratory and offered in court as evidence.
In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous
drug itself. Its existence is essential to a judgment of conviction. Hence, the identity of the
dangerous drug must be clearly established. Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To
determine their composition and nature, they must undergo scientific testing and analysis.
Narcotic substances are also highly susceptible to alteration, tampering, or contamination. It is
imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized from the accused are the very same objects
tested in the laboratory and offered in court as evidence. The chain of custody, as a method of
authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts involving the identity of seized drugs are
removed. People vs. Jaafar, 815 SCRA 19, G.R. No. 219829 January 18, 2017
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, noncompliance with Section 21 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9165 indicates a failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures
the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four
(4) respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight)
of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the

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incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized
to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this
requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in
any manner. By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, noncompliance with Section 21
indicates a failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It
follows that this noncompliance suffices as a ground for acquittal. People vs. Holgado, 732 SCRA
554, G.R. No. 207992 August 11, 2014; see also Lescano vs. People, 781 SCRA 73, G.R. No.
214490 January 13, 2016; People vs. Caiz, 797 SCRA 26, G.R. No. 215340 July 13, 2016
This Court has already recognized the numerous "orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related
cases" that have been languishing in the clogged dockets of our lower courts. Thus, in People
v. Lim, this Court mandated the policy that must be followed in prosecuting drugs cases.
To weed out early on from the courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built
up drug-related cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:
(1) In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its
IRR.
(2) In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state
the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.
(3) If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or
affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court.
Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to
determine the (non) existence of probable cause.
(4) If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its
discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss
the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule 112, Rules
of Court.
Lim serves as a clarion call to law enforcement officers and those involved in the prosecution of
drugs cases to be more circumspect in the performance of their duties. Because the prosecution
was unable to establish accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of
innocence must prevail. Accused-appellant must, thus, be acquitted. People vs. Turemutsa, G.R.
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It is essential that the chain of custody is established in buy-bust operations.
People v. Remigio, 687 SCRA 336 (2012), restated the chain of custody required in buy-bust
operations as follows: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
The arguments of the parties in this case show that from the start of the buy-bust operation,
there was failure to observe the chain of custody.
It is essential that the chain of custody is established in buy-bust operations. This includes: First,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to
the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. People vs. Sagana, 834 SCRA 225,
G.R. No. 208471 August 2, 2017; see also People vs. Casacop, 752 SCRA 151, G.R. No. 208685
March 9, 2015; People vs. Segundo, 833 SCRA 16, G.R. No. 205614 July 26, 2017; People vs.
Ternida, G.R. No. 212626, June 3, 2019
Applying People v. Holgado, 732 SCRA 554 (2014), the buy-bust team in this case should have
been more meticulous in complying with Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 to preserve
the integrity of the seized shabu.
Applying People v. Holgado, 732 SCRA 554 (2014), the buy-bust team in this case should have
been more meticulous in complying with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 to preserve the
integrity of the seized shabu. There is a greater possibility of tampering or contaminating the
corpus delicti, since 0.04 grams of shabu is a miniscule amount. Worse, the buy-bust team did
not even try to explain the reason for noncompliance with Section 21. Nonpresentation of the
poseur-buyer also defeats the case of the plaintiff-appellee. The testimony of the poseur-buyer
is not “merely corroborative of the apprehending officers-eyewitnesses’ testimonies[,]” as
plaintiff-appellee alleges. The poseur-buyer had personal knowledge of the transaction since he
conducted the actual transaction. PO1 Bautista was merely an observer from several meters
away. Further, the amount involved is so small that the reason for not presenting the poseur-
buyer does not square with such a miniscule amount. Other requirements provided under
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not complied with. No inventory was conducted, and
the records of this case do not show that the seized items were photographed. People vs.

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Casacop, 752 SCRA 151, G.R. No. 208685 March 9, 2015; see also People vs. Saragena, 837 SCRA
529, G.R. No. 210677 August 23, 2017; People vs. Ternida, G.R. No. 212626, June 3, 2019
To establish “whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were
undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure
that the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material
and competent evidence.”
To establish “whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were
undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure
that the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material
and competent evidence.” More so, as in this case where the seized quantities of shabu are
merely 0.12 grams and 0.59 grams, it is important that all details are clear. Hence, the miniscule
quantities of dangerous drugs allegedly confiscated magnify the uncertainties with regard their
integrity. People vs. Sagana, 834 SCRA 225, G.R. No. 208471 August 2, 2017
Requirements under Section 21(1)
Lescano v. People summarized the requirements under Section 21(1): As regards the items seized
and subjected to marking, Section 21 (1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended, requires the performance of two (2) actions: physical inventory and photographing.
Section 21 (1) is specific as to when and where these actions must be done. As to when, it must
be "immediately after seizure and confiscation." As to where, it depends on whether the seizure
was supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and
photographing must be done at the exact same place that the search warrant is served. In case
of warrantless seizures, these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable."
Moreover, Section 21 (1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the physical
inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s from whom
the items were seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a representative of the
National Prosecution Service. There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the
first (i.e., the accused or the person/s from whom items were seized), there are two (2)
alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to the
representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the media may be present
in his or her place. People vs. Royol, G.R. No. 224297 February 13, 2019; see also Regalado vs.
People, G. R. No. 216632 March 13, 2019

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The physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures.
The exactitude which the state requires in handling seized narcotics and drug paraphernalia is
bolstered by the amendments made to Section 21 by Republic Act No. 10640. Section 21(1), as
amended, now includes the following proviso, thereby making it even more stringent than as
originally worded: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures:
In People v. Nandi, 625 SCRA 123 (2010), this court explained that four (4) links “should be
established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second,
the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court.” People vs. Holgado, 732 SCRA 554, G.R. No.
207992 August 11, 2014; see also People vs. Saragena, 837 SCRA 529, G.R. No. 210677 August
23, 2017; People vs. Royol, G.R. No. 224297 February 13, 2019; People vs. Noah, G.R. No.
228880 March 6, 2019
As amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 10640, Section 21(1) uses the disjunctive “or,” i.e., “with
an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the
media.” Thus, a representative from the media and a representative from the National
Prosecution Service are now alternatives to each other.
Section 21(1) was simultaneously relaxed and made more specific by Republic Act No. 10640. It
was relaxed with respect to the persons required to be present during the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized items. Originally under Republic Act No. 9165, the use of the
conjunctive “and” indicated that Section 21 required the presence of all of the following, in
addition to “the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel”: First, a representative from the media; Second, a
representative from the Department of Justice; and Third, any elected public official. As amended
by Republic Act No. 10640, Section 21(1) uses the disjunctive “or,” i.e., “with an elected public
official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media.” Thus, a
representative from the media and a representative from the National Prosecution Service are
now alternatives to each other. People vs. Que, 853 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 212994 January 31, 2018;
see also Regalado vs. People, G. R. No. 216632 March 13, 2019

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Conducting the inventory and photographing immediately after seizure, exactly where the
seizure was done, or at a location as practicably close to it, minimizes, if not eliminates, room
for adulteration or the planting of evidence.
What is critical in drug cases is not the bare conduct of inventory, marking, and photographing.
Instead, it is the certainty that the items allegedly taken from the accused retain their integrity,
even as they make their way from the accused to an officer effecting the seizure, to an
investigating officer, to a forensic chemist, and ultimately, to courts where they are introduced
as evidence. Hence, the four (4) links were underscored in People v. Nandi, 625 SCRA 123 (2010):
first, from the accused to the apprehending officers; second, from the apprehending officers to
the investigating officers; third, from the investigating officers to the forensic chemists; and
fourth, from the forensic chemists to the courts. The endpoints of each link (e.g., the accused and
the apprehending officer in the first link, the forensic chemist and the court in the fourth link) are
preordained, their respective existences not being in question. What is prone to danger is not
any of these end points but the intervening transitions or transfers from one point to another.
Section 21(1)’s requirements are designed to make the first and second links foolproof.
Conducting the inventory and photographing immediately after seizure, exactly where the
seizure was done, or at a location as practicably close to it, minimizes, if not eliminates, room for
adulteration or the planting of evidence. The presence of the accused, or a representative, and
of third-party witnesses, coupled with their attestations on the written inventory, ensures that
the items delivered to the investigating officer are the items which have actually been
inventoried. People vs. Que, 853 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 212994 January 31, 2018
The presence of third-party witnesses is imperative, not only during the physical inventory and
taking of pictures, but also during the actual seizure of items.
The requirement of conducting the inventory and taking of photographs “immediately after
seizure and confiscation” necessarily means that the required witnesses must also be present
during the seizure or confiscation. This is confirmed in People v. Mendoza, 727 SCRA 113 (2014),
where the presence of these witnesses was characterized as an “insulating presence [against] the
evils of switching, ‘planting’ or contamination.” People vs. Que, 853 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 212994
January 31, 2018

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In order that there may be conscionable noncompliance, two (2) requisites must be satisfied:
first, the prosecution must specifically allege, identify, and prove “justifiable grounds”; second,
it must establish that despite noncompliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
drugs and/or drug paraphernalia were properly preserved.
Section 21(1), as amended by Republic Act No. 10640, now includes a proviso that sanctions
noncompliance under “justifiable grounds”: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items. In order that there may be conscionable
noncompliance, two (2) requisites must be satisfied: first, the prosecution must specifically
allege, identify, and prove “justifiable grounds”; second, it must establish that despite
noncompliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs and/or drug paraphernalia
were properly preserved. Satisfying the second requisite demands a showing of positive steps
taken to ensure such preservation. Broad justifications and sweeping guarantees will not suffice.
People vs. Que, 853 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 212994 January 31, 2018
In People v. Garcia, 580 SCRA 259 (2009), the Supreme Court (SC) noted that the mere marking
of seized paraphernalia, unsupported by a physical inventory and taking of photographs, and
in the absence of the persons required by Section 21 to be present, does not suffice.
As People v. Holgado, 732 SCRA 554 (2014), emphasized, “[e]ven the doing of acts which
ostensibly approximate compliance but do not actually comply with the requirements of Section
21 does not suffice.” In People v. Garcia, 580 SCRA 259 (2009), this court noted that the mere
marking of seized paraphernalia, unsupported by a physical inventory and taking of photographs,
and in the absence of the persons required by Section 21 to be present, does not suffice: Thus,
other than the markings made by PO1 Garcia and the police investigator (whose identity was not
disclosed), no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was
taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules. We observe
that while there was testimony with respect to the marking of the seized items at the police
station, no mention whatsoever was made on whether the marking had been done in the
presence of Ruiz or his representatives. There was likewise no mention that any representative
from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected official had been present during
this inventory, or that any of these people had been required to sign the copies of the inventory.
People vs. Dela Cruz, 737 SCRA 486, G.R. No. 205821 October 1, 2014; see also People vs.
Saragena, 837 SCRA 529, G.R. No. 210677 August 23, 2017

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Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, leaves room for
deviating from its own requirements.
It includes a proviso stating that “noncompliance of [sic] these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and
custody over said items.” However, the prosecution failed to establish the existence of any such
justifiable grounds. If at all, its own claims that the buy-bust operation was carefully conceived
of and carried out make its position even more dubious. These claims are all the more reason to
expect that Section 21(1) shall be complied with meticulously. Lescano vs. People, 781 SCRA 73,
G.R. No. 214490 January 13, 2016; see also People vs. Saragena, 837 SCRA 529, G.R. No. 210677
August 23, 2017; People vs. Acub, G.R. No. 220456 June 10, 2019
The step-by-step process under Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 is “a matter of substantive law,
which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.”
The prosecution’s initial witness, SPO1 Balsamo, admitted that no pictures of the alleged
confiscated items were taken. Contrary to this assertion, PO2 Yumul testified differently. While
he insisted that he took photographs of the seized items, which he also inventoried, the photos
purportedly got lost. Apparently, these were the only testimonies that comprise the entirety of
the prosecution’s evidence on the inventory and photographs of the confiscated items. To
underscore, the step-by-step process under Republic Act No. 9165 is “a matter of substantive
law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.” The law has been
“crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially
considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment.” People vs. Segundo, 833 SCRA
16, G.R. No. 205614 July 26, 2017
Although the requirement of “marking” is not found in Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, its
significance lies in ensuring the authenticity of the corpus delicti.
Although the requirement of “marking” is not found in Republic Act No. 9165, its significance lies
in ensuring the authenticity of the corpus delicti. In People v. Dahil, 745 SCRA 221 (2015): Crucial
in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they have been seized from the accused. “Marking” means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized
contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the

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markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching,
planting or contamination of evidence. It must be noted that marking is not found in R.A. No.
9165 and is different from, the inventory-taking and photography under Section 21 of the said
law. Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, however, this Court had consistently held that
failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast reasonable doubt on
the authenticity of the corpus delicti. People vs. Saunar, 836 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 207396 August
9, 2017
Courts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs.
Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations of
Republic Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced
narrative must be scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent
with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule
amounts of drugs. These can be readily planted and tampered. Also, doubt normally follows in
cases where an accused has been discharged from other simultaneous offenses due to
mishandling of evidence. Had the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals been so judicious
in this case, a speedier resolution would have been handed to Holgado and Misarez whose guilt
beyond reasonable doubt was not established. People vs. Holgado, 732 SCRA 554, G.R. No.
207992 August 11, 2014; see also People vs. Sagana, 834 SCRA 225, G.R. No. 208471 August 2,
2017
The prosecution “has the positive duty to establish that earnest efforts were employed in
contacting the representatives enumerated under Section 21 . . . or that there was a justifiable
ground for failing to do so.”
In this case, the records were bereft of any explanation why the third-party representatives were
present only during the belated photographing of the confiscated articles. Hence, the very
purpose of their mandated presence is defeated. While simple procedural irregularities in buy-
bust operations are not ipso facto prejudicial to the claim of the prosecution, provided, that the
integrity and evidentiary worth of the confiscated articles were maintained, courts should still
carefully assess and distinguish this kind of errors from those amounting to “gross, systematic,
or deliberate disregard” of the protections set by law. Considering that the law enforcers in this
case conducted a briefing before the operation, they had ample time to secure the presence of

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the needed third-party representatives before proceeding to Sagana’s residence. Section 21

identifies “matters that are imperative.” Carrying out acts which are seemingly compliant but do
not actually conform to the prerequisites laid down in Section 21 is insufficient. “This is especially
so when the prosecution claims that the seizure of drugs and drug paraphernalia is the result of
carefully planned operations, as is the case here.” People vs. Sagana, 834 SCRA 225, G.R. No.
208471 August 2, 2017
In a number of drug cases, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the failure of the prosecution to
offer the testimonies of the persons who had direct contact with the confiscated items without
ample explanation casts doubt on whether the allegedly seized shabu were the very same ones
presented in court.
“Every person who takes possession of seized drugs must show how it was handled and
preserved while in his or her custody to prevent any switching or replacement.” In a number of
drug cases, this Court ruled that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimonies of the
persons who had direct contact with the confiscated items without ample explanation casts
doubt on whether the allegedly seized shabu were the very same ones presented in court. The
prosecution has the “burden of establishing the identity of the seized items.” Considering the
sequence of the people who have dealt with the confiscated articles, the prosecution failed to
justify why three (3) other significant persons were not presented as witnesses. These persons
were the desk officer who supposedly recorded the incident in the police blotter, the investigator
who prepared the request for examination, and the police officer who received the articles in the
laboratory. “In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch
as it failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its
own detriment.” People vs. Sagana, 834 SCRA 225, G.R. No. 208471 August 2, 2017
Recent cases have highlighted the need to ensure the integrity of seized drugs in the chain of
custody when only a miniscule amount of drugs had been allegedly seized from the accused.
The prosecution established during trial and on appeal that the buy-bust operation had been
carefully planned by narrating the events with intricate detail. However, at the same time, the
prosecution relied heavily on the exception to the chain of custody rule. Worse, the prosecution
did not even offer any explanation on why they failed to comply with what was mandated under
the law. Indeed, if the police authorities had carefully planned the buy-bust operation, then there
was no reason for them to neglect such important requirements. They cannot feign ignorance of
the exacting standards under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Police officers are presumed
and are required to know the laws they are charged with executing. This Court cannot merely

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gloss over the glaring procedural lapses committed by the police officers, especially when what
had been allegedly seized from accused-appellant was only 0.0604 grams of shabu. People vs.
Jaafar, 815 SCRA 19, G.R. No. 219829 January 18, 2017; see also People vs. Saunar, 836 SCRA
471, G.R. No. 207396 August 9, 2017; Aparente vs. People, 841 SCRA 89, G.R. No. 205695
September 27, 2017
Recent jurisprudence emphasize that law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement
to ensure the integrity in the chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug
paraphernalia.
This is especially true when only a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs is alleged to have been
taken from the accused.” Tuano vs. People, 794 SCRA 551, G.R. No. 205871 June 27, 2016; see
also Aparente vs. People, 841 SCRA 89, G.R. No. 205695 September 27, 2017
There should be stricter compliance with the rule on the chain of custody when the amount of
the dangerous drug is minute due to the possibility that the seized item was tampered.
People v. Garry dela Cruz, 737 SCRA 486 (2014), acquitted the accused as the prosecution failed
to establish the corpus delicti due to noncompliance with the rule on the chain of custody:
Noncompliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential
element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to
establish an element of these offenses, noncompliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an
accused. Courts are reminded to exercise a higher level of scrutiny when deciding cases involving
miniscule amounts of dangerous drugs. People vs. Caiz, 797 SCRA 26, G.R. No. 215340 July 13,
2016
Noncompliance with the requirements under Section 21 creates uncertainty on the identity and
integrity of the confiscated substance. It casts doubt on the guilt of the accused.
Sweeping statements on lack of significant lapse of time from apprehension of the accused to
submission of the confiscated sachet for testing should not be considered sufficient to secure a
conviction. Neither should prosecution rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties. This Court has held that “[m]arking of the seized drugs alone by the law
enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and unequivocal procedures prescribed in

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Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.” Tuano vs. People, 794 SCRA 551, G.R. No. 205871 June 27,
2016
While it may be true that noncompliance with Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 is not
fatal to the prosecution’s case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered
by the existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule.
This Court finds that the prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason that would warrant
noncompliance with the mandatory requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Although the buy-bust team marked and conducted a physical inventory of the seized sachet of
shabu, the records do not show that the seized sachet had been photographed. Furthermore,
there is absolutely no evidence to show that the physical inventory was done in the presence of
accused-appellant or his representative, representatives from the media and the Department of
Justice, and an elected public official. People vs. Jaafar, 815 SCRA 19, G.R. No. 219829 January
18, 2017; see also People vs. Pangan, 847 SCRA 176, G.R. No. 206965 November 29, 2017
The significance of complying with Section 21’s requirements cannot be overemphasized.
Noncompliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential

element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to
establish an element of these offenses, noncompliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an
accused. People vs. Dela Cruz, 737 SCRA 486, G.R. No. 205821 October 1, 2014; see also People
vs. Acub, G.R. No. 220456 June 10, 2019
Noncompliance with the requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
Section 21, paragraph 1, of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, includes a proviso
to the effect that “noncompliance of (sic) these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said
items.” Plainly, the prosecution has not shown that — on September 14, 2004, when dela Cruz
was arrested and the sachets supposedly seized and marked — there were “justifiable grounds”

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for dispensing with compliance with Section 21. All that the prosecution has done is insist on its
self-serving assertion that the integrity of the seized sachets has, despite all its lapses,
nevertheless been preserved. People vs. Dela Cruz, 737 SCRA 486, G.R. No. 205821 October 1,
2014
The alleged non-coordination of the police officers with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) did not render the buy-bust operation invalid.
People v. Rebotazo, 698 SCRA 452 (2013), has discussed that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165
does not state any consequence in case a buy-bust operation is not coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, thus: It is a well-established rule of statutory construction
that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests
would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided,
or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law,
unless required by clear and unequivocal words. As we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying
that the PDEA shall be the “lead agency” in the investigations and prosecutions of drug-related
cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar
functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter.
Additionally, the same provision states that PDEA, serving as the implementing arm of the
Dangerous Drugs Board, “shall be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of
all the provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical as
provided in the Act.” We find much logic in the Solicitor General’s interpretation that it is only
appropriate that drugs cases being handled by other law enforcement authorities be transferred
or referred to the PDEA as the “lead agency” in the campaign against the menace of dangerous
drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative provision. By having a centralized law enforcement
body, i.e., the PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board can enhance the efficacy of the law against
dangerous drugs. People vs. Caiz, 797 SCRA 26, G.R. No. 215340 July 13, 2016
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted and if found guilty, be
held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.
This supports the “policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike [which constitute] graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.”
Granada vs. People, 818 SCRA 381, G.R. No. 184092, G.R. No. 186084, G.R. No. 186272, G.R. No.
186488, G.R. No. 18657 February 22, 2017

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In Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, it is clear that the party that is penalized is the public officer who
commits any of the corrupt practices enumerated under Section 3.
A “public officer” includes “elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation,
even nominal, from the government.” In this particular case, the offense charged is against public
officers who, on behalf of the government, allegedly entered into a contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to te government. Thus, it does not distinguish whether
the public officer is a director or a mere employee. Canlas vs. Bongolan, 864 SCRA 335, G.R. No.
199625 June 6, 2018
Giving Unwarranted Benefits, Advantage or Preference
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 punishes a public officer who causes “any undue injury to
any party, including the Government” or gives “any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.” A conviction
under this provision requires the concurrence of the following elements: 1. The accused must be
a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He [or she] must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or [gross] inexcusable negligence; 3. That his [or
her] action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Abubakar
vs. People, 868 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 202408 June 27, 2018
An accused is said to have caused undue injury to the government or any party when the latter
sustains actual loss or damage, which must exist as a fact and cannot be based on speculations
or conjectures.
Thus, in a situation where the government could have been defrauded, the law would be
inapplicable, there being no actual loss or damage sustained. Abubakar vs. People, 868 SCRA
489, G.R. No. 202408 June 27, 2018

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There is no justifiable reason why contractors should be allowed to deploy their equipment in
advance considering that it would defeat the very purpose of competitive public bidding.
Although petitioner Baraguir concedes that contractors can only commence work after they
receive a notice to proceed, he justifies the irregularity on an alleged “risk-taking strategy’
employed by some contractors. This appears to be a flimsy excuse. There is no justifiable reason
why contractors should be allowed to deploy their equipment in advance considering that it
would defeat the very purpose of competitive public bidding. Benefits derived from this practice,
if any, would certainly not redound to the government. Aside from this, the alleged purpose of
the contractors in mobilizing their equipment ahead of public bidding is speculative. Prospective
contractors are required to possess the technical capability to execute the implementation of a
given project. Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1594 lists as a condition for all bidders the
“[a]vailability and commitment of the contractor’s equipment to be used for the subject project.”
The Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee is mandated under the implementing rules and
regulations to look into the “suitability of [the contractor’s] available construction equipment” in
assessing technical capability. Abubakar vs. People, 868 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 202408 June 27,
2018
Co-conspirators are liable collectively and equally for the common design of their criminal acts.
When a contract that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government is entered
into, the persons involved—whether public officers or private persons—may be charged for
violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and suffer the same penalty if found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
The reason that private persons may be charged with public officers under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act is "to avoid repeated and unnecessary presentation of witnesses and
exhibits against conspirators in different venues, especially if the issues involved are the same. It
follows, therefore, that if a private person may be tried jointly with public officers, he or she may
also be convicted jointly with them."
Thus, when an information alleges that a public officer "conspires," "confederates," "connives,"
or "colludes" with a private person, or when the "allegation of basic facts constituting conspiracy
[between the public officer and the private person is made] in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended," then a private person may be convicted under
Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information against the private person
will be sufficient in form and substance and, contrary to Garcia-Diaz's argument, there is no
"impossible crime" against the private person. Florencia Garcia-Diaz vs, Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 193236 September 17, 2018; Jose G. Solis vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 193248-49
September 17, 2018

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ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT OF 2003, AS AMENDED
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded.
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to
include the following acts: (1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders”; (2) The means used include
“by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person”; and (3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs.” People vs. Casio, 744 SCRA 113, G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014
As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be
committed even if the victim gives consent.
Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even before May 2, 2008. She
concludes that AAA was predisposed to having sex with “customers” for money. For liability
under our law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208,
trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent. People vs. Casio,
744 SCRA 113, G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014
Republic Act (RA) No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of trafficking in
persons is qualified.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The following are considered as qualified trafficking: a.
When the trafficked person is a child; b. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No.
8043, otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995” and said adoption is for the
purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage; c. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale.
Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group; d. When the offender is
an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercise authority over the trafficked
person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee; e. When the trafficked

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person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the military or law enforcement
agencies; f. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and g.
When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies,
becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or
the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). People vs. Casio, 744 SCRA 113, G.R. No.
211465 December 3, 2014
The crime is still considered trafficking if it involves the "recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harboring, or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation" even if it does not involve any
of the means stated under the law. Trafficking is considered qualified when "the trafficked
person is a child."
Republic Act No. 9208 defines trafficking in persons as: SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — As
used in this Act: (a) Trafficking in Persons — refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum,
the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor
or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs. People vs. Ramirez, G.R. No.
217978 January 30, 2019
Republic Act No. 9208 has since been amended by Republic Act No. 10364 on February 6, 2013.
In recognition of the amendments to the law, People v. Casio clarifies that crimes prosecuted
under Republic Act No. 10364 must have the following elements:
1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,

maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders";
2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another person";
3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs." People vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. 217978 January 30, 2019

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ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004
Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 recognizes that wives, former wives, co-parents, and sweethearts
may be raped by their husbands, former husbands, co-parents, or sweethearts by stating that
committing acts of rape against these persons are considered violence against women.
Rape, as now defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, does not make a distinction
with regard to an accused’s relationship with the victim. It only requires that sexual congress be
forced by a man upon another person. People vs. Quintos, 740 SCRA 179, G.R. No. 199402
November 12, 2014
The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly given
personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order by Section 9(b) of the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (Anti-VAWC Law).
However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file such a petition
is suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in this case,
respondent Mendenilla filed her petition after her daughter’s complaint-affidavit had already
been dismissed. Pavlow vs. Mendenilla, 823 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 181489 April 19, 2017
Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 specifies three (3) distinct remedies available to victims of acts of
“violence against women and their children”
Republic Act No. 9262 specifies three (3) distinct remedies available to victims of acts of “violence
against women and their children”: first, a criminal complaint; second, a civil action for damages;
and finally, a civil action for the issuance of a protection order. Pavlow vs. Mendenilla, 823 SCRA
499, G.R. No. 181489 April 19, 2017
Protection Orders
A protection order is issued “for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a
woman or her child . . . and granting other necessary relief”; thereby “safeguarding the victim
from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily life, and facilitating the
opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life.” Pavlow vs.
Mendenilla, 823 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 181489 April 19, 2017

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Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 allows for the issuance of three (3) kinds of protection orders: a
Barangay Protection Order, a Temporary Protection Order, and a Permanent Protection Order.
A Barangay Protection Order is issued by a Punong Barangay or by a Barangay Kagawad.

Temporary protection orders and permanent protection orders are judicial issuances obtained
through trial courts. Pavlow vs. Mendenilla, 823 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 181489 April 19, 2017
Temporary Protection Orders
As its name denotes, a temporary protection order is a provisional relief. It shall be effective for
30 days, following a court’s “ex parte determination that such order should be issued.” Within
these 30 days, a hearing to determine the propriety of issuing permanent protection order must
be conducted. The temporary protection order itself “shall include notice of the date of the
hearing on the merits of the issuance of a [permanent protection order].” Following the conduct
of a hearing, a permanent protection order may be issued and “shall be effective until revoked
by a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was issued.” Pavlow vs.
Mendenilla, 823 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 181489 April 19, 2017
A petition for the issuance of protection order is not limited to the alleged victim herself. The
victim’s mother — as is the case with respondent Mendenilla — is explicitly given the capacity
to apply for a protection order for the benefit of her child.
By this clear statutory provision, Mendenilla had the requisite personality to file a petition for the
issuance of a protection order in favor of Maria Sheila. Pavlow vs. Mendenilla, 823 SCRA 499,
G.R. No. 181489 April 19, 2017
The right of persons other than the victim to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order
therefore persists; albeit, they may not exercise such right for as long as the petition filed by
the victim subsists.
The word used by Section 8 is “suspend.” To suspend is to momentarily, temporarily, or

provisionally hold in abeyance. It is not to perpetually negate, absolutely cancel, or otherwise
obliterate. The right of persons other than the victim to file a petition for the issuance of a
protection order therefore persists; albeit, they may not exercise such right for as long as the
petition filed by the victim subsists. Mendenilla’s petition for the issuance of a protection order

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was filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court after Assistant City Prosecutor Odronia had
already dismissed Maria Sheila’s complaint for slight physical injuries and maltreatment under
the Anti-VAWC Law. Thus, even if Maria Sheila’s Complaint came with a petition for the issuance
of a protection order and even as Section 8 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC stipulates the suspension of
other people’s right to file petitions for the issuance of a protection order, this suspension is
rendered inefficacious by the remission of Maria Sheila’s prior petition. Stated otherwise, there
was no longer a prior petition to compel a suspension. Pavlow vs. Mendenilla, 823 SCRA 499,
G.R. No. 181489 April 19, 2017
The nature and purpose of summons is markedly different from those of a protection order.
This prevents the latter from being a substitute for the former. Summons is a procedural tool. It
is a writ by which the defendant is notified that an action was brought against him or her. In an
action in personam, brought to enforce personal rights and obligations, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is mandatory. In such actions, therefore, summonses serve not only to
notify the defendant of the filing of an action, but also to enable acquisition of jurisdiction over
his person. A protection order is not a procedural mechanism, which is imperative for the
progression of an initiated action. Rather, it is itself a substantive relief which “prevent[s] further
acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of [the Anti-VAWC Law] and
granting other necessary relief.” Protection orders issued by courts come in two (2) forms:
temporary and permanent. The distinction, as their respective names denote, is their duration.
A temporary protection order is provisional, whereas a permanent protection order is lasting or
final. Pavlow vs. Mendenilla, 823 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 181489 April 19, 2017
When a case is of particular urgency, a trial court may ex parte issue a temporary protection
order, granting the reliefs under Section 8 of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004 (Anti-VAWC Law) in the interim, that is, for a thirty (30)-day period.
Precisely because the case is of such particular urgency that a temporary protection order is
deemed necessary. Section 15 of the Anti-VAWC Law includes a stipulation that the temporary
protection order must be immediately personally served on the respondent. It provides, “The
court shall order the immediate personal service of the [temporary protection order] on the
respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for
the service.” Pavlow vs. Mendenilla, 823 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 181489 April 19, 2017

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Permanent Protection Orders
To determine whether the temporary protection order should be made permanent and a
complete, substantive relief extended to the alleged victim, Section 15 of the Anti-VAWC Law
mandates the conduct of hearing within the 30-day effectivity of the temporary protection order.
The clear and specific singular purpose of the hearing is manifest in Section 15: “[t]he court shall
schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [permanent protection order] prior to or on the date of
the expiration of the [temporary protection order].” Because a hearing is to be conducted, the
respondent must necessarily be informed. Thus, Section 15 further states that, “[t]he [temporary
protection order] shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of
a [permanent protection order].” Pavlow vs. Mendenilla, 823 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 181489 April
19, 2017
Section 1 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly states that while it governs petitions for the
issuance of protection orders under the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004 (Anti-VAWC Law), “[t]he Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
In the silence of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, service of summons — the means established by the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure for informing defendants and/or respondents of the filing of adverse
actions, and for the acquisition of jurisdiction over their persons — remains efficacious.
Petitioner, though an American citizen, was admittedly a resident of the Philippines as of
September 7, 2005, the date when Deputy Sheriff Velasco attempted to personally serve
summons on him. On September 7, 2005, however, he was not in the Philippines. It was this
circumstance which, according to the Sheriff’s Report, impelled substituted service of summons
through Tolentino. Pavlow vs. Mendenilla, 823 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 181489 April 19, 2017
SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST ABUSE, EXPLOITATION,

AND DISCRIMINATION ACT
The courts must stay true to its mandate of protecting the welfare of children. In Araneta v.
People, this Court emphasized: Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the
implementation of a national comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable
members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate
under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children
to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."

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This piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed
against children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child
and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence
against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their
commission, and a means by which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized.
Also, the definition of child abuse is expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of child
abuse under existing laws but includes also "other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to the child's development.” Fernandez vs. People, G.R. No.
217542 November 21, 2018
In enacting Republic Act (RA) No. 7610, the legislature intended to impose a higher penalty
when the victim is a child.
Thus, “for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, [the accused Chingh
was] sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and
twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months,
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.” The imposable penalty under Republic
Act No. 7610, Section 5(b) “for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.” This penalty is higher than the imposable
penalty of prisión correccional for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code. In enacting Republic Act No. 7610, the legislature intended to impose a higher penalty
when the victim is a child. Ricalde vs. People, 747 SCRA 542, G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015
As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether it is habitual or
not.
Article I, Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse as the maltreatment of a child,
whether habitual or not, including any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse,
neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3)
Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure
to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death. As defined in the law, child
abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether it is habitual or not. Petitioner’s acts fall
squarely within this definition. Lucido vs. People, 834 SCRA 545, G.R. No. 217764 August 7, 2017

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Elements of Sexual Abuse
Under Section 5(b), the elements of sexual abuse are: (1) The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct[;] (2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse[; and] (3) The child, whether male or female, is
below 18 years of age. The presence of the first and third elements is already established.
Petitioner admits in the pretrial that AAA was only 12 years old at the commission of the crime.
He also concedes that if ever he is liable, he is liable only for acts of lasciviousness. However,
petitioner claims that the second element is wanting. For petitioner, the prosecution must show
that AAA was “exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.” A thorough review
of the records reveals that the second element is present in this case. Perez vs. People, 861 SCRA
626, G.R. No. 201414 April 18, 2018; see also People vs. Udang, Sr., 850 SCRA 426, G.R. No.
210161 January 10, 2018
In Quimvel v. People, the Supreme Court (SC) held that the fact that a child is under the coercion
and influence of an adult is sufficient to satisfy this second element and will classify the child
victim as one subjected to other sexual abuse.
This Court in People v. Villacampa, 850 SCRA 75 (2018), explained: [T]he second element is that
the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. To
meet this element, the child victim must either be exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse. In Quimvel v. People, the Court held that the fact that a child is under the coercion
and influence of an adult is sufficient to satisfy this second element and will classify the child
victim as one subjected to other sexual abuse. The Court held: To the mind of the Court, the
allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one “exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse.” This is anchored on the very definition of the phrase in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which
encompasses children who indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money,
profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group. Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution wherein the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b)
punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to other sexual
abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a
child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct. Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse
against children. Perez vs. People, 861 SCRA 626, G.R. No. 201414 April 18, 2018

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When petitioner inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA, a minor, with the use of threat and
coercion, he is already liable for sexual abuse.
In Ricalde v. People, 747 SCRA 542 (2015), this Court clarified: The first paragraph of Article III,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 clearly provides that “children. . . who. . . due to the
coercion. . . of any adult. . . indulge in sexual intercourse . . . are deemed to be children exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse.” The label “children exploited in. . . other sexual abuse”
inheres in a child who has been the subject of coercion and sexual intercourse. Thus, paragraph
(b) refers to a specification only as to who is liable and the penalty to be imposed. The person
who engages in sexual intercourse with a child already coerced is liable. x x x x By analogy with
the ruling in Ricalde, children who are likewise coerced in lascivious conduct are “deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.” When petitioner inserted his finger
into the vagina of AAA, a minor, with the use of threat and coercion, he is already liable for sexual
abuse. Perez vs. People, 861 SCRA 626, G.R. No. 201414 April 18, 2018
Consent is immaterial in the crime of sexual abuse because “the mere act of having sexual
intercourse. . . with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to. . . sexual abuse” is already
punishable by law.
The provisions show that rape and sexual abuse are two (2) separate crimes with distinct
elements. The “force, threat, or intimidation” or deprivation of reason or unconsciousness
required in Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not the same as the “coercion or
influence” required in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. Consent is immaterial in the crime
of sexual abuse because “the [mere] act of [having] sexual intercourse . . . with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to . . . sexual abuse” is already punishable by law. However, consent
exonerates an accused from a rape charge as exhaustively explained in Malto v. People, 533 SCRA
643 (2007). People vs. Udang, Sr., 850 SCRA 426, G.R. No. 210161 January 10, 2018
“Child abuse,” is defined in Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610 as “the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of [a] child” and includes “any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.”
Contrary to the trial court’s determination, the Informations actually charged Udang with sexual
abuse, under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, and not with rape, under Article 266-A(1) of
the Revised Penal Code. Based on the Informations, the charge against Udang was “child abuse,”
defined in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 as “the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of
[a] child” and includes “any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the

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intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.” The allegations in the Informations stated
that Udang “sexually abuse[d]” AAA by having sexual intercourse with her while she was
intoxicated, thus, “debas[ing], degrad[ing], or demean[ing] the intrinsic worth of AAA.” While the
Informations stated that the acts were “[c]ontrary to and in [v]iolation of Article 266-A in relation
to Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 7610,” the factual allegations in the Informations determine the crime being
charged. Given that the charges against Udang were for sexual abuse, this Court examines
whether or not the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 are
present in this case. People vs. Udang, Sr., 850 SCRA 426, G.R. No. 210161 January 10, 2018
Having sex with a ten (10)-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law (Republic Act
[RA] No. 7610).
Justice Velasco suggests that this is not so. He anchors his view on his interpretation that Republic
Act No. 7610 requires a showing that apart from the actual coerced sexual act on the 10-year-
old, the child must also be exploited by prostitution or by other sexual acts. This view is inaccurate
on grounds of verba legis and ratione legis. Ricalde vs. People, 747 SCRA 542, G.R. No. 211002
January 21, 2015
A person who commits an act that debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the child as a human being, whether habitual or not, can be held liable for violation
of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610.
Although it is true that not every instance of laying of hands on the child constitutes child abuse,
petitioner’s intention to debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
can be inferred from the manner in which he committed the act complained of. To note,
petitioner used a wet t-shirt to whip the child not just once but three (3) times. Common sense
and human experience would suggest that hitting a sensitive body part, such as the neck, with a
wet t-shirt would cause an extreme amount of pain, especially so if it was done several times.
There is also reason to believe that petitioner used excessive force. Otherwise, AAA would not
have fallen down the stairs at the third strike. AAA would likewise not have sustained a contusion.
Torres vs. People, 814 SCRA 547, G.R. No. 206627 January 18, 2017

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Section 10(a) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610 punishes four (4) distinct offenses, i.e., (a) child
abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation, and (d) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development.
Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes four (4) distinct offenses, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b)
child cruelty, (c) child exploitation, and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the
child’s development. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the element that the acts must
be prejudicial to the child’s development pertains only to the fourth offense. Lucido vs. People,
834 SCRA 545, G.R. No. 217764 August 7, 2017
Strangulating, severely pinching, and beating an eight (8)-year-old child to cause her to limp
are intrinsically cruel and excessive.
Strangulating, severely pinching, and beating an eight (8)-year-old child to cause her to limp are
intrinsically cruel and excessive. These acts of abuse impair the child’s dignity and worth as a
human being and infringe upon her right to grow up in a safe, wholesome, and harmonious place.
It is not difficult to perceive that this experience of repeated physical abuse from petitioner would
prejudice the child’s social, moral, and emotional development. Lucido vs. People, 834 SCRA 545,
G.R. No. 217764 August 7, 2017
Republic Act (RA) No. 7610 is a measure geared to provide a strong deterrence against child
abuse and exploitation and to give a special protection to children from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
It must be stressed that the crime under Republic Act No. 7610 is malum prohibitum. Hence, the
intent to debase, degrade, or demean the minor is not the defining mark. Any act of punishment
that debases, degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child constitutes the
offense. Lucido vs. People, 834 SCRA 545, G.R. No. 217764 August 7, 2017
Petitioner’s act of whipping AAA on the neck with a wet t-shirt is an act that debases, degrades,
and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child.
Being smacked several times in a public place is a humiliating and traumatizing experience for all
persons regardless of age. Petitioner, as an adult, should have exercised restraint and self-control

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rather than retaliate against a 14-year-old child. Torres vs. People, 814 SCRA 547, G.R. No.
206627 January 18, 2017
Definition of lascivious conduct under Republic Act (RA) No. 7610
On the charge of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, Article 2(h) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as: [T]he
intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a person[.] As with the rape case, the parties in the case for acts
of lasciviousness also affirmed BBB’s minority at the time of the assault and her relationship with
Divinagracia. People vs. Divinagracia, Sr., 833 SCRA 53, G.R. No. 207765 July 26, 2017
MISCELLANEOUS
CATTLE-RUSTLING
Elements of Cattle-Rustling, under PD 533
The elements of cattle-rustling are: (1) large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the
taking is done without the consent of the owner or raiser; (4) the taking is done by any means,
method or scheme; (5) the taking is done with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is
accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.
Lopez vs. People, 795 SCRA 364, G.R. No. 212186 June 29, 2016
While the date of commission of the offense is not an element of cattle-rustling, the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses with regards the date of
commission of the offense affected petitioner’s right to prepare his defense intelligently.
The prosecution was unable to establish the date when the carabao was lost. Perez stated that
the carabao was lost on July 17, 2002. According to Teresita, the carabao was lost on July 27,
without stating any year. The written entry in the police blotter stated that the carabao was lost
on July 15, 2002. Lopez vs. People, 795 SCRA 364, G.R. No. 212186 June 29, 2016

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OFFENSES UNDER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Infringement under the Intellectual Property Code (IPC) is malum prohibitum.
The Intellectual Property Code is a special law. Copyright is a statutory creation: Copyright, in the
strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or independent right granted by
the statute, and not simply a preexisting right regulated by the statute. Being a statutory grant,
the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with
respect to the subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute.
The general rule is that acts punished under a special law are malum prohibitum. “An act which
is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.” ABS-CBN
Corporation vs. Gozon, 753 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015
Unlike other jurisdictions that require intent for a criminal prosecution of copyright
infringement, the Philippines does not statutorily support good faith as a defense.
Other jurisdictions provide in their intellectual property codes or relevant laws that mens rea,
whether express or implied, is an element of criminal copyright infringement. ABS-CBN
In the Philippines, the Intellectual Property Code (IPC), as amended, provides for the
prosecution of criminal actions for violations of intellectual property rights.
Repetition of Infringement of Patent (Section 84); Utility Model (Section 108); Industrial Design
(Section 119); Trademark Infringement (Section 155 in relation to Section 170); Unfair
Competition (Section 168 in relation to Section 170); False Designations of Origin, False
Description or Representation (Section 169.1 in relation to Section 170); infringement of
copyright, moral rights, performers’ rights, producers’ rights, and broadcasting rights (Sections
177, 193, 203, 208 and 211 in relation to Section 217); and other violations of intellectual
property rights as may be defined by law. The Intellectual Property Code requires strict liability
for copyright infringement whether for a civil action or a criminal prosecution; it does not require
mens rea or culpa. ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon, 753 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015

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The Supreme Court (SC) in Habana, et al. v. Robles, 310 SCRA 511 (1999), reiterating the ruling
in Columbia Pictures v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 144 (1996), ruled that lack of knowledge of
infringement is not a valid defense.
Habana and Columbia Pictures may have different factual scenarios from this case, but their
rulings on copyright infringement are analogous. In Habana, petitioners were the authors and
copyright owners of English textbooks and workbooks. The case was anchored on the protection
of literary and artistic creations such as books. In Columbia Pictures, video tapes of copyrighted
films were the subject of the copyright infringement suit. ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon, 753
SCRA 1, G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015
Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner
of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy,
which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the
consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by
statute on the owner of the copyright.
We look at the purpose of copyright in relation to criminal prosecutions requiring willfulness:

Most importantly, in defining the contours of what it means to willfully infringe copyright for
purposes of criminal liability, the courts should remember the ultimate aim of copyright.
Copyright is not primarily about providing the strongest possible protection for copyright owners
so that they have the highest possible incentive to create more works. The control given to
copyright owners is only a means to an end: the promotion of knowledge and learning. Achieving
that underlying goal of copyright law also requires access to copyrighted works and it requires
permitting certain kinds of uses of copyrighted works without the permission of the copyright
owner. While a particular defendant may appear to be deserving of criminal sanctions, the
standard for determining willfulness should be set with reference to the larger goals of copyright
embodied in the Constitution and the history of copyright in this country. In addition, “[t]he
essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in order to underscore its
gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof. xxx” ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon, 753 SCRA
1, G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015
The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that corporate officersl and/or agents may be held
individually liable for a crime committed under the Intellectual Property Code (IPC).
Petitioners, being corporate officers and/or directors, through whose act, default or omission the
corporation commits a crime, may themselves be individually held answerable for the crime. . . .

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The existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who
knowingly and intentionally caused the corporation to commit a crime. Thus, petitioners cannot
hide behind the cloak of the separate corporate personality of the corporation to escape criminal
liability. A corporate officer cannot protect himself behind a corporation where he is the actual,
present and efficient actor. However, the criminal liability of a corporation’s officers or
employees stems from their active participation in the commission of the wrongful act. ABS-CBN
An accused’s participation in criminal acts involving violations of intellectual property rights is

the subject of allegation and proof.
The showing that the accused did the acts or contributed in a meaningful way in the commission
of the infringements is certainly different from the argument of lack of intent or good faith. Active
participation requires a showing of overt physical acts or intention to commit such acts. Intent or
good faith, on the other hand, are inferences from acts proven to have been or not been
committed. ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon, 753 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015
Mere membership in the Board or being President per se does not mean knowledge, approval,
and participation in the act alleged as criminal. There must be a showing of active participation,
not simply a constructive one.
Under principles of criminal law, the principals of a crime are those “who take a direct part in the
execution of the act; [t]hose who directly force or induce others to commit it; [or] [t]hose who
cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.” There is conspiracy “when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” ABS-CBN Corporation vs.
Gozon, 753 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015
Good faith, lack of knowledge of the copyright, or lack of intent to infringe is not a defense
against copyright infringement.
In its current form, the Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum and prescribes a strict
liability for copyright infringement. Good faith, lack of knowledge of the copyright, or lack of
intent to infringe is not a defense against copyright infringement. Copyright, however, is subject
to the rules of fair use and will be judged on a case-to-case basis. Finding probable cause includes

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a determination of the defendant’s active participation, particularly when the corporate veil is
pierced in cases involving a corporation’s criminal liability. ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon, 753
SCRA 1, G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015
ELECTION OFFENSES
Elements of Gun Ban as an Election Offense
In Abenes v. Court of Appeals, 515 SCRA 690 (2007), this court enumerated the elements for a
violation of the Gun Ban: “1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other
deadly weapons; 2) such possession occurs during the election period; and 3) the weapon is
carried in a public place.” This court also ruled that under the Omnibus Election Code, the burden
to show that he or she has a written authority to possess a firearm is on the accused. We find
that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for violation of the Gun Ban. The
firearms were found inside petitioner’s bag. Petitioner did not present any valid authorization to
carry the firearms outside his residence during the period designated by the Commission on
Elections. He was carrying the firearms in the Cebu Domestic Port, which was a public place. Dela
Cruz vs. People, 779 SCRA 34, G.R. No. 209387 January 11, 2016
Under Section 264 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, persons found guilty of an election offense
“shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6)
years and shall not be subject to probation.”
The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to offenses punished by both the Revised Penal Code
and special laws. The penalty to be imposed is a matter of law that courts must follow. The trial
court should have provided minimum and maximum terms for petitioner’s penalty of
imprisonment as required by the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Accordingly, we modify the
penalty imposed by the trial court. Based on the facts, we deem it reasonable that petitioner be
penalized with imprisonment of one (1) year as minimum to two (2) years as maximum. Dela
Cruz vs. People, 779 SCRA 34, G.R. No. 209387 January 11, 2016

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OFFENSES UNDER THE GSIS ACT
Republic Act (RA) No. 8291, Section 52(g) clearly provides that heads of agencies or branches
of government shall be criminally liable for the failure, refusal, or delay in the payment,
turnover, and remittance or delivery of such accounts to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS).
Similarly, the refusal or failure without lawful cause or with fraudulent intent to comply with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7742, with respect to the collection and remittance of employee
savings as well as the required employer contributions to the Pag-IBIG Fund, subjects the
employer to criminal liabilities such as the payment of a fine, imprisonment, or both. Matalam
vs. People, 788 SCRA 217, G.R. Nos. 221849-50 April 4, 2016
The non-remittance of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Pag-IBIG Fund
premiums is malum prohibitum.
What the relevant laws punish is the failure, refusal, or delay without lawful or justifiable cause
in remitting or paying the required contributions or accounts. In Saguin v. People, 775 SCRA 547
(2015), we have said that non-remittance of Pag-IBIG Fund premiums without lawful cause or
with fraudulent intent is punishable under the penal clause of Section 23 of Presidential Decree
No. 1752. However, the petitioners in Saguin were justified in not remitting the premiums on
time as the hospital they were working in devolved to the provincial government and there was
confusion as to who had the duty to remit. In this case, however, petitioner failed to prove a
justifiable cause for his failure to remit the premiums. We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s
defense that the funds for the remittances were not directly credited to DAR-ARMM but to the
account of the Office of the Regional Governor of ARMM. Matalam vs. People, 788 SCRA 217,
G.R. Nos. 221849-50 April 4, 2016
ACCESS DEVICES REGULATION ACT
Under Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8484, the possession and use of an access
device is not illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is the possession and use of a counterfeit access
device.
Section 9(a) and (e) make the possession and use of a counterfeit access device as “access device
fraud” that is punishable by law: SECTION 9. Prohibited Acts. The following acts shall constitute
access device fraud and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (a) producing, using, trafficking in

0917 – 894 53 56
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one or more counterfeit access devices; xxx (e) possessing one or more counterfeit access devices
or access devices fraudulently applied for[.] A counterfeit access device is “any access device that
is counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged, or an identifiable component of an access device or
counterfeit access device.” Under Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484, the possession
and use of an access device is not illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is the possession and use of
a counterfeit access device. Therefore, the corpus delicti of the crime is not merely the access
device, but also any evidence that proves that it is counterfeit. Cruz vs. People, 826 SCRA 561,
G.R. No. 210266 June 7, 2017
Possession of a Counterfeit Access Device & Use of a Counterfeit Access Device
Possession of a counterfeit access device is punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6)
years and not more than 10 years and a fine of P10,000.00 or twice the value obtained by the
offense, whichever is higher. On the other hand, use of a counterfeit access device is punishable
by imprisonment of not less than 10 years but not more than 12 years and a fine of P10,000.00
or twice the value obtained by the offense, whichever is higher. Cruz vs. People, 826 SCRA 561,
G.R. No. 210266 June 7, 2017

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2020 BAR REVIEW CRIMINAL LAW

CHAIR’S CASES Handout No. 15

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Justifying circumstance of defense of stranger

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Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed

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Lack of Sufficient Provocation

Lack of sufficient provocation — requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably

Elements of Passion and Obfuscation

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Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of spontaneity.

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For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the intoxication of the accused

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CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL

Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of one is the act of all.”

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It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred.

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Simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Even if the aggravating circumstances of

EXECUTION AND SERVICE

EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

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no criminal liability to compromise. On the other hand, compromising criminal liability

The commencement of the prescription period of offenses is governed by Article 91 of the

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.—The period of prescription shall commence

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CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL CASES

Civil indemnity ex delicto

Civil indemnity ex delicto, as a form of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim,

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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST

(1) That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.

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Usurpation of Official Functions

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CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

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Rape through Sexual Intercourse

The presence of lacerations is not an element of the crime of rape.

This court previously characterized the presence or absence of lacerations as a “trivial or

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Rape through Sexual Assault

Instrument or Object Rape; Gender-Free Rape; Homosexual Rape

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Elements of Statutory Rape

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As to accused-appellant’s argument that the absence of hymenal lacerations admits the

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