Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics 2019 PDF

MAGIC AREAS IN
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

By: DEAN ED VINCENT S. ALBANO
Bar Review Director
PRACTICE OF LAW
Lawyer’s Oath
I_______, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Nature of the practice of law.

The practice of law is imbued with public interest and that “a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,
but also to the brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State – the administration of justice – as an officer of the court.” Accordingly, “lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.” (Tenoso v.
Atty. Echavez, A.C. No. 8384, April 11, 2013, 696 SCRA 1, Leonen, J).
Only the court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar. This disciplinary authority is granted by the
Constitution and canot be relinquished by the Court. (In re Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562,
601 [Per J. Castro, En Banc). The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its
findings and recommendations should not be equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by the Court. (Bernardino
v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No. 10583; Atty. Jose Caringal v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10583 & 10584, February 18, 2015).
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who continue to meet its exacting qualifications. Verily,
for all the prestige and opportunity which the profession brings lies the greater responsibility to uphold its integrity and
honor. Towards this purpose, it is quintessential that its members continuously and unwaveringly exhibit, preserve and
protect moral uprightness in their activities, both in their legal practice as well as in their personal lives. Truth be told, the
Bar holds no place for the deceitful, immoral and corrupt. (Abella v. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 7332, June 18, 2013).
Nature of the legal profession.

All those in legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their dealings.
Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and to delay no man for money or malice. These mandates apply
especially to dealings of lawyers with their client considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege
and right to practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or
right, and attorney’s right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. In disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof (Taday v. Atty. Dionisio Apoya, Jr.,
A.C. No. 11981, July 3, 2018).
Meaning of practice of law.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. Generally, to practice law is torender any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge (Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210, Sept. 3, 1991).
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be
pending in a court (Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378, June 17, 1993).
Malpractice a ground for suspension; legal profession is not a business.

The practice of law is a profession and not a business. Lawyers are reminded to avoid at all times any act that
would tend to lessen the confidence of the public in the legal profession as a noble calling, including, among others, the
manner by which he makes known his legal services.
A lawyer in making known his legal services must do so in a dignified manner. They are prohibited from soliciting
cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. The CPR explicitly states that “a lawyer
shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.” Corollary to this duty is for lawyers
not to encourage any suit or proceeding for any corrupt motive or interest. Thus, “ambulance chasing,” or the solicitation
of almost any kind of business by an attorney, personally or through an agent, in order to gain employment, is proscribed.
In employing paralegals to encourage complainant to file a lawsuit against his employers, respondents indirectly
solicited legal business and encouraged the filing of suit. These constitute malpractice which calls for the exercise of the
court’s disciplinary powers and warrants serious sanctions (Palencia v. Atty. Pedro Linsangan, et al., A.C. No. 10557, July
10, 2018).
Conduct unbecoming of judge; practice of law of judge.
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During the hearing of an administrative case against the wife of a judge, he seated beside his daughter, the lawyer
of his wife and assisted his daughter in the hearing. He is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge since he unabashedly
introduced himself as counsel for the counsel.
He ought to have restrained himself from sitting at that hearing, being all too aware that his sitting would have
him cross the line beyond which was the private practice of law.
Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges from engaging in the private
practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11, Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law or giving
professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights,
duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions,
duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and
attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the public
of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and
desire to promote the public interest (Omico Mining And Industrial Corporation v. Vallejos, 63 SCRA 285, 299; also, Carual
v. Brusola, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500, October 20, 1999, 317 SCRA 54, 66).
The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but
extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or
persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the
preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings (Ziga v. Arejola, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203, June 10, 2003,
403 SCRA 361, 368). To the Court, then, the judge engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his
wife’s administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to the hearing officer
(Decena v. Judge Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217, April 8, 2013, Bersamin, J).
No dichotomy of morality.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.
There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in
order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times. A judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion (Castillo v. Calanog, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-90-447, July 12, 1991, 199 SCRA 75).
Lawyer not to decline engagement even if he believes accused is guilty.

Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.
Rule 14.01 states: A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person due to the latter’s race, sex, creed or status in life, or
because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person. It must be noted that it is the judge, not the lawyer, who
should decide the guilt or the innocence of the accused based on the evidence presented before the court and the merits of
the case. More importantly, under the Constitution, the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Bar passer who did not sign the Roll of Attorneys engage in the practice of law; effect.
That petitioner who had been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,
without signing in the Roll of Attorneys, cannot justify his behavior by characterizing his acts “as neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment”. While an honest mistake of fact could be used
to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be
utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. Ignorantia facti
excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
He may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought what he had signed at the PICC
entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he
chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the
Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in the unauthorized practice of law transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Turning
now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law. As he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, the Court suspended him from the practice of law. However, the SC saw it fit
to impose on him the penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt
of the Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against unauthorized practice of law, he was fined him in the
amount of P32,000.00. During the one year period, petitioner was warned that he was not allowed to engage in the
practice of law, and was sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll
of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by the Court. (IN RE Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys, Michael A. Medado,
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013).
Important role of attorney in the administration of justice.

One to the particular nature of an attorney’s function it is essential that they should act with fairness, honesty and
candor towards the courts and his clients. Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead,
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
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This flows out from the lawyer’s oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the law and court processes
in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in
general as agents of the judicial system.
BAR MATTER 1153
Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school may be admitted to the Philippine Bar Examination.
Section 5 of B.M. 1153 provides that a Filipino citizen “who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted
to the bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses
leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the
proper authority; and (c) completion of all fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school
duly recognized by the Philippine Government” (Bar Matter No. 1153, Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing
Reforms in the Bar Examinations through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9, 2010).
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her degree in Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent in a foreign
law school must also present proof of completion of a separate bachelor’s degree.
Appearance of the Solicitor General for one government agency if in so doing his representation run against the
interest of another government agency.
The Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or
agents. When confronted with a situation where one government office takes an adverse position against another
government agency, the Solicitor General should not refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is
incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government
although it may run counter to a client’s position. In such instance, the government office adversely affected by the position
taken by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the merit of its case, may appear in its own behalf through its legal
personnel or representative (Orbos v. CSC, 189 SCRA 458, September 12, 1990).
When Lawyer in government may be disciplined as member of the Bar.

As a rule, a lawyer who holds government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in
the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer, he may be disciplined by the Supreme Court as a member of the Bar. In the case at bar, the acts of Atty. Pedro were
not abusive and not arbitrary, befitting the moral character required of members of the bar. A Local Government Unit
(LGU) is endowed with governmental functions which concern the health, safety and the advancement of the public good
or welfare as affecting the public generally. As Vice-Mayor, his actions were pursuant to the diligent performance of his
sworn duties and responsibilities as duly elected official. As such, Atty. Pedro may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for acts done in his capacity as Vice-Mayor (Pheschem Industrial Corporation v. Atty. Lloyd P. Surigao and Atty. Jesus A.
Villardo III,A.C. No. 8269, December 11, 2013).
Law student appearing in court.

Section 34, Rule 138 provides that in the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party without the supervision of a member of the bar (Cruz v. Hon. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007).
Nature of the “Revolving Door Doctrine.”

It is an area of concern in the United States involving ethical considerations applicable to former government
lawyers. It is the process by which lawyers temporarily enter government service from private life then leave it for large
fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service. To
address this, the disqualification of a former government lawyer who has entered private practice may be sought based
either on "adverse-interest conflict" or "congruent-interest representation conflict" (PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
15180912, April 12, 2005).
How disqualification sought by “adverse-interest conflict.”

In the "adverse-interest conflict," a former government lawyer is enjoined from representing a client in private
practice if the matter is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and
if the interests of the current and former clients are adverse. It must be observed that the "adverse-interest conflict"
applies to all lawyers in that they are generally disqualified from accepting employment in a subsequent representation if
the interests of the former client and the present client are adverse and the matters involved are the same or substantially
related (PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005).
How disqualification sought by “congruent-interest representation conflict.”

In "congruent-interest representation conflict," the disqualification does not really involve a conflict at all,
because it prohibits the lawyer from representing a private practice client even if the interests of the former government
client and the new client are entirely parallel. The "congruent-interest representation conflict," unlike the "adverse-
interest conflict," is unique to former government lawyers (PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005).
Duties of an attorney. (CC-AA-RREED)

a. To Counsel and maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as
he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
b. To maintain inviolate the Confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets in connection with his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client’s business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval;

c. To maintain Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the
Philippines;
d. To Abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party
or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;
e. To observe and maintain the Respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
f. Never to Reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
g. To Employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact
or law;
h. Not to Encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man’s
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
i. In the Defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as
to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, tothe end that no person may be
deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law (RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 20).
Lawyer-client relationship.
A lawyer-client relationship is established the moment they sign a retainership agreement and he received an
acceptance fee. It is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent
to his profession. (Toledo v. Kallos, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1900, January 28, 2005, 449 SCRA 446, 457). Further, acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship. (Amaya v. Atty. Tecson, 491 Phil. 111, 117 [2005]; Michael
Ruby v. Atty. Espejo, et al., A.C. No. 10558, February 23, 2015, Reyes, J, citing Canons 16 & 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility).
Duties of lawyer the moment there is a lawyer-client relationship.

The lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of the complainant and is obliged to keep the latter informed of the status of
his case. He is likewise bound to account for all money or property collected or received from the complainant. He may be
held administratively liable for any inaptitude or negligence he may have had committed in his dealing with the
complainant.
In Del Mundo v. Capistrano, A.C. No. 6903, 669 SCRA 462, it was emphasized that indeed, when a lawyer takes a
client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on
him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.
His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as
much as he can efficiently handle.
Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of
such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose
such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return
gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of
funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. (Michael Ruby v. Atty. Espejo, et al., A.C. No. 10558, February 23, 2015, Reyes, J; Pedro Ramos v. Atty. Ma.
Nympha Mandagan, A.C. No. 11128, April 6, 2016).
Lawyers are officers of the court; expected to act with honesty.

Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of
our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their
dealings, especially with the court. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or
consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to
observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. (Plus Builders, Inc. v. Revilla, Jr., 533
Phil. 250 (2006)).
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed upon by the State upon those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of
those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a
practitioner’s honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties,
the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to
the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients (Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. v.
Atty. Chua, A.C. No. 6942, July 17, 2013).
Lawyer’s to exhaust all legal remedies to protect the interest of his client.
While it is true that lawyers owe “entire devotion” to the cause of their clients, it cannot be emphasized enough
that their first and primary duty is “not to the client but to the administration of justice” (Valencia v. Cabanting, A.C. Nos.
1302, 1391 & 1543, April 26, 1991, 196 SCRA 302, 308). Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “A
lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.” Thus,
in the use of Court processes, the lawyer’s zeal to win must be tempered by the paramount consideration that justice be
done to all parties involved, and the lawyer for the losing party should not stand in the way of the execution of a valid
judgment. This is a fundamental principle in legal ethics and professional responsibility that has iterations in various
forms. It is his duty not to delay no man for money or malice.
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice, any act of a lawyer
that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action
against him (Cantorne v. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23, 25 [1933; Salabao v. Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr., A.C. No. 8084, August 24,
2015, Del Castillo, J).
The lawyer has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing Court processes, employing dilatory tactics to
frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning ignorance of his duties as an officer of the court. He has breached

his sworn duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and violated the Lawyer’s Oath, Rules 10.03
and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g) of the Rules of Court. In so doing, he
is administratively liable for his actions. He was suspended.
Primary duty of a lawyer.

A lawyer's primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay,
impede, or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation (Teodoro III v. Gonzales, 702 Phil. 422, 431
[2013]). Indeed, a lawyer must champion his client's cause with competence and diligence, but he cannot invoke this as an
excuse for his failure to exhibit courtesy and fairness to his fellow lawyers and to respect legal processes designed to
afford due process to all stakeholders (Festin v. Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri, A.C. No. 11600, June 19, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Relationship is highly fiduciary.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary. This relationship holds a lawyer to a great
degree of fidelity and good faith especially in handling money or property of his clients. Thus, Canon 16 and its rules
remind a lawyer to: (1) hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession; (2) deliver
the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand subject to his retaining lien; and (3) account for all money
or property collected or received for or from his client.
Money collected by a lawyer on a judgment rendered in favor of his client constitutes trust funds and must be
immediately paid over to the client. As he holds such funds as agent or trustee, his failure to pay or deliver the same to the
client after demand constitutes conversion. Thus, whenever a lawyer collects money as a result of a favorable judgment, he
must promptly report and account the money collected to his client (Palencia v. Atty. Pedro Linsangan, et al., A.C. No.
10557, July 10, 2018).
Defense.
Here, respondents claim that they promptly accounted for the total award of US$95,000.00, and after deducting
their fees, tendered the amount of US$20,756.05. Complainant, however, refused to accept the amount because he
contested both the expenses and the separate deduction of attorney's fees by respondents and Gurbani & Co.
The Court found that while respondents gave prompt notice to complainant of their receipt of money collected in
the latter's favor, they were remiss in their duties to give accurate accounting of the amounts due to complainant, and to
return the money due to client upon demand.
Since a claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had
been rendered, or in a separate action, respondents, instead of forcibly deducting their share, should have moved for the
judicial determination and collection of their attorney's fees. The fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees
on money in his hands collected for his client does not entitle him to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for
himself.
Even if the Court gives credence to this explanation, it is improper for the lawyer to put his client's funds in his
personal safe deposit vault. Funds belonging to the client should be deposited in a separate trust account in a bank or trust
company of good repute for safekeeping.
It is apparent from the foregoing that respondents failed to handle their client's money with great degree of
fidelity. Respondents also showed their lack of good faith when they appropriated for themselves more than what is
allowed under their contract. They have demonstrated that the payment of their attorney's fees is more important than
their fiduciary and faithful duty of accounting and returning what is rightfully due to their client. More, they also failed to
observe proper safekeeping of their client's money. Respondents violated the trust reposed in them, and demonstrated
their lack of integrity and moral soundness. Respondents' flagrant and malicious refusal to comply with the CPR amounts
to gross misconduct. This warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions (Palencia v. Atty. Pedro Linsangan, et al., A.C.
No. 10557, July 10, 2018).
Practice of law, a form of public trust.

The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are
qualified and who possess good moral character. Thus, the violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or breach of the ethics of the
legal profession embodied in the CPR may, depending on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts, result in the suspension or disbarment of a member of the Bar.
For his violation of the proscription on ambulance chasing, the Court have previously imposed the penalty of
suspension of one year. It found no reason not to impose the same penalty here (Palencia v. Atty. Pedro Linsangan, et al.,
A.C. No. 10557, July 10, 2018).
Suspension of Lawyer
Effect of lawyer’s failure to file answer to complaint against client.

A lawyer was suspended for failure to file an answer to a complaint filed against a client, resulting in default and
judgment against the client which was likewise executed. This act constitutes inexcusable negligence.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code. However, once he
agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege
to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.
A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the

ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession (Santiago v.
Atty. Fojas, 318 Phil. 79, 86-87 [1995]).
Respondent's conduct constitutes inexcusable negligence. He grossly neglected his duty as counsel to the extreme
detriment of his client. He willingly and knowingly allowed the default order to attain finality and he allowed judgment to
be rendered against his client on the basis of ex parte evidence. He also willingly and knowingly allowed said judgment to
become final and executory. He failed to assert any of the defenses and remedies available to his client under the
applicable laws. This constitutes inexcusable negligence warranting an exercise by this Court of its power to discipline him
(United Planters Bank v. Atty. Lauro G. Noel, A.M. No. 3951, June 19, 2018, Gesmundo, J).
Willful disregard of processes of the Court.

Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is underscored by the
fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions
as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to
show respect to their processes.
Respondent's failure to comply with the Court's directive to file a Rejoinder and to file a Comment also constitutes
gross misconduct. Gross misconduct is 'any inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person
concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a
cause.' It is a 'conduct that is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose.'
Undoubtedly, respondent's gross misconduct and willful disobedience have resulted in the extreme and
inordinate delay of the instant proceedings. In doing so, he violated Canon 12 of the Code, which provides that "[a] lawyer
shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice" (Code of
Professional Responsibility, Canon 12). He also violated Rule 12.03, Canon 12 of the Code, which states that "[a] lawyer
shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure
to do so" (UCPB v. Atty. Lauro G. Noel, A.M No. 3951, June 18, 2018, Gesmundo, J).
Lawyer owes fidelity to client.

Respondent’s failure to return the money to complainants despite failure to use the same for the intended
purpose is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety and a violation of the trust reposed on him. His unjustified
withholding of money belonging to the complainants warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
A license to practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that the licensee possesses sufficient skill,
knowledge and diligence to manage their cases. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied
representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has the
duty to exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and
ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of the case (Parias v. Paguinto, 478 Phil. 239, 245 [2004]).
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
An attorney's duty to safeguard the client's interests commences from his retainer until his effective release from the case
or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation. During that period, he is expected to take such
reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his client's interests may require. In other words, acceptance of money from a
client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money. was spent for the intended purpose. Conversely, if the lawyer does not
use the money for the intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to the client (Meneses v. Atty. Macalino,
518 Phil. 378, 385 [2006]; Segovia, et al. v. Atty. Rolando S. Javier, A.C. No. 10244, March 12, 2018, Peralta, J).
Relationship between lawyer and client; fiduciary.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary; it demands great fidelity and good faith on
the part of the lawyer. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) requires lawyers to account for all
money and property collected or received for and from their clients. In addition, Rule 16.03 mandates that a lawyer shall
deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
He was guilty of abused of his client’s trust and confidence. Canon 17 of the CPR directs a lawyer to be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him (Gonzales v. Atty. Frisco B. Santos, A.C. No. 10178, June 19, 2018, Jardeleza, J).
Effect of misappropriation of client’s money.

Jurisprudence is instructive that a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the monies he/she holds for his/her
client gives rise to the presumption that he/she has appropriated the said monies for his/her own use, to the prejudice
and in violation of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her client (Punla v. Maravilla-Ona, A.C. No. 11149, August 15,
2017).
Proceeding from the premise that indeed Atty. Agleron merely wanted to help another client who is going
through financial woes, he, nevertheless, acted in disagreed of his duty as a lawyer with respect to Iluminada. Such act is a
gross violation of general morality, as well as professional ethics (Yuzon v. Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, A.C. No. 106684,
January 24, 2018, Peralta, J).
Neglect of client’s cause.

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and
continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society,
the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code.“Lawyers
may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their
private capacity.”
Undeniably, “when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting
the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the

lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to client but also to the legal
profession, the court and society” (Jinon v. Atty. Jiz, A.C. No. 9615, March 5, 2013).
Lawyer is duty-bound to prevent unauthorized practice of law.

Pursuant to Canon 9 of the Code of Professional responsibility, a lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in
the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, 178 Phil. 378 (2004) where it was held:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client,
and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to
the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus,
the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to
be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman
in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 529 Phil. 876 (2006), it was held that the preparation and signing
of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing
of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s
signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief
there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is
counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document. (Tapay, et al. v.
Atty. Bancolo, et al., A.C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013).
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Ambulance Chasing
A solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by laymen employed by an attorney for the purpose or by an
attorney himself.
Barratry
A lawyer’s act of fomenting suits among individuals and offering his legal services to one of them for monetary
motives or purposes.
Distinguish a contingent contract from a champertous contract.

A contingent contract is an agreement whereby the fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered, is
made to depend on the success of the action. Such contract is valid in this jurisdiction. On the other hand, a champertous
contract is one where the lawyer agrees to conduct the litigation on his own account and to pay the expenses thereof, and
to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment. It is contrary to public policy and invalid because it violates
the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client (Bautista v. Gonzales, 182 SCRA 15, [1990]).
Doctrine of imputed knowledge.

The knowledge acquired by an attorney during the time that he is acting within the scope of his authority is
imputed to the client. An attorney, who has notice of matter affecting his client, has communicated the same to his
principal in the course of professional dealings. The doctrine applies whether or not the lawyer actually communicated to
the client whatever he learned in his professional capacity since the attorney and his client, being in legal contemplation,
one juridical person.
.
Concept of gross misconduct.
Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned
with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the
cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose (OCA v. Atty. Liangco,
A.C. No. 5355, December 13, 2011).
Nature of an attorney-client relationship.

a. Strictly Personal;
b. Highly Confidential; and
c. Fiduciary.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Tests to determine conflict of interest.

a. When a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose
that claim for the other client;
b. When the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty;
and

c. When the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment.
Conflict of interest.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall observed candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. Furthermore, a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers must
treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to encourage client to fully inform
their counsels of the facts of their case. (Samson v. Atty. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013, 701 SCRA 241, 252 [Per J.
Bensamin, En Banc]). In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, 453 Phil. 108 [2003] [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division], the court
explained what conflict of interest means:
“There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.”
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily refute Mariano
Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano
Turla was not the only heir. (Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No. 10583; Atty. Jose Caringal v. Atty. Santos, A.C.
No. 10583 & 10584, February 18, 2015).
Rules in case of conflict of interest.

In Generosa Buted, et al. v. Atty. Harold M. Hernando, Adm. Case No. 1359, October 17, 1991, the Supreme Court
laid down rules on conflict of interest of lawyers in handling cases, thus:
a) In cases where a conflict of interest may exist, full disclosure of the facts and express consent of all the parties
concerned are necessary. (In re Dela Rosa, 27 Phil. 258).
The present Code of Professional Responsibility is stricter on this matter considering that consent of the parties is
now required to be in written form. (Canon 15, Rule 15.03).
b) In San Jose v. Cruz, 57 Phil. 794, it was said that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which
he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated and it is not a good
practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the
pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case.
c) In Maria Tinia v. Atty. Amado Ocampo, A.C. No. 2285 and other companion cases, August 12, 1991, it was said that
the prohibition against conflict of interest in representation of clients is prohibited because the relation of lawyer
and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, and because of the principles of public policy and
good taste. An attorney has the duty to preserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers. (In re: De la Rosa).
Rule against prohibition of representing conflicting interest not absolute.

Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, “by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.” Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to
obtain their written consent. (Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No. 10583; Atty. Jose Caringal v. Atty. Santos, A.C.
No. 10583 & 10584, February 18, 2015, Leonen, J).
ATTORNEY’S FEES
50% stipulated attorney’s fees is excessive.
Generally, the amount of attorney’s fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is conclusive as to
the amount of the lawyers compensation. In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney’s fees is fixed on the basis of
quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney’s services. Courts may ascertain also if the attorney’s fees are
found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to
recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable
fees.” Rule 20.01 of the same canon enumerates the following factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c) The importance of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer (Cortez v. Atty. Hernando Cortez, A.C. No. 9119, March 12, 2018,
Tijam, J).

SUSPENSION OF LAWYERS
Failure to uphold integrity of legal profession; suspended; immorality; effect of death of complainant.
The case can proceed in spite of complainant’s death and the apparent lack of interest on the part of
complainant’s heirs. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in nature: they are intended and undertaken
primarily to look into the conduct of behavior of lawyers, to determine whether they are still fit to exercise the privileges
of the legal profession, and to hold them accountable for any misconduct or misbehavior which deviates from the
mandated norms and standards of the Code of Professional Responsibility, all of which are needful and necessary to the
preservation of the integrity of the legal profession. Because not chiefly or primarily intended to administer punishment,
such proceedings do not call for the active service of prosecutors (Gonzales v. Atty. Alcaraz, 534 Phil. 471, 482 [2006]; See
also Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, 374 Phil. 1, 10-11 [1999]; Fabugais v. Atty. Bernardo C.
Faundo, Jr., A.C. No. 10145, June 11, 2018, Del Castillo, J).
Concept of immorality.
"Immoral conduct" has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. The Court has held that for such conduct
to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
Lawyers are mandated to do honor to the bar at all times and to help maintain the respect of the community for
the legal profession under all circumstances. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 of the Code or Professional Responsibility fu1ther provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private lite, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit or the legal profession.
"There is perhaps no profession alter that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more
imperative than that of the law." As officers of the court, lawyers must in fact and in truth be of good moral character. They
must moreover also be seen or appear to be of good moral character; and be seen or appear to - live a lite in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. Members of the bar can ill-afford to exhibit any conduct which tends
to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and the integrity of the legal profession. The
Courts require adherence to these lofty precepts because any thoughtless or ill-considered actions and actuations by any
member of the Bar can irreversibly undermine public confidence in the law and, consequently, those who practice it.
Respondent lawyer’s defense that he was a “respectable father with three children” and that he was a “respected
civil leader” to boot, flies in the face of a young girl’s perception of his diminished deportment (Fabugais v. Atty. Bernardo
C. Faundo, Jr., A.C. No. 10145, June 11, 2018, Del Castillo, J).
Purpose of disciplinary proceedings.

Administrative disciplinary proceedings are essentially designed to protect the administration of justice and that
this lofty ideal can be attained by requiring that those who are honored by the title “Attorney” and counsel or at law are
men and women of undoubted competence. Unimpeachable integrity and undiminished professionalism, men and women
in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The Court moreover realizes only too well that the power to disbar or
suspend members of the bar ought always to be exercised not in a spirit of spite, hostility or vindictiveness, but on the
preservative and corrective principle, with view to safeguarding the purity of the legal profession. Hence, that power can
be summoned only in the service of the most compelling duty, which must be performed, in light of incontrovertible
evidence of grave misconduct, which seriously taints the reputation and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and as a member of the Bar. It goes without saying moreover that it should not be exercised or asserted when a lesser
penalty or sanction would accomplish the end desired.
Basic purpose of administrative proceedings against lawyers.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice
law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain
as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s
misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the
privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty
lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions. (Atty. Umaguing v. Atty. Wallen R. De Vera, A.C. No. 10451, February 4, 2015, Perlas-
Bernabe, J).
Nature of Disciplinary Proceedings

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in that they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal;
they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers, (Pena v. Aparicio, A.C. No. 7298, June 25,
2007, 525 SCRA 444), not the trial of an action or a suit.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise
of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations
as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and

responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
The complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court. Flowing from its sui generis character, it is not mandatory to have a formal hearing in which the
complainant must adduce evidence. (Ylaya v. Atty. Gacott, A.C. No. 6475, January 30, 2013, Brion, J).
Failure to maintain standard efficiency; lawyer was suspended did not inform client of decision.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is imbued with utmost trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected
to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them. They commit not only to review
cases or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their ability without the need to be reminded by
either the client or the court.
Clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required
degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases
entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any
court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting
the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to
prod him or her to do so. Therefore, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action (De
Leon v. Atty. Antonio A. Geronimo, A.C. No. 10441, February 14, 2018, Peralta, J).
Neglect of duties; a ground for suspension; failure to appear; delay.

A member of the legal profession owes his/her client entire devotion to the latter’s genuine interest, and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his/her rights (Camara v. Atty. Reyes, 612 Phil. 1, 7 [2009]). An attorney is
expected to exert his/her best efforts and ability to preserve his/her client’s cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to
his/her client, likewise, serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.
Camara v. Atty. Reyes, held:
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and the for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an office of the court. The complainant is in
no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome of the case. This is also the reason why
this Court may investigate charges against lawyers regardless of complainant’s standing (Cabuello v.
Atty. Editha Talaboc, A.C. No. 10532, November 7, 2017, Peralta, J).
Lawyer was suspended; failure to pay obligation.

As a lawyer, an enduring high sense of responsibility and good fidelity in all her dealings and emphasize
the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of her, not only in the practice of the legal profession, but in her
personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond
reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with
the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth
and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good
faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in
their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court
(Ong v. Atty. Delos Santos, 728 Phil. 332, 339 [2014]; Yap v. Atty. Grace Buri, A.C. No. 11156, March 19, 2018, Peralta, J).
Son of a lawyer may purchase a property subject of litigation.

In Pena v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 202223, March 2, 2016, 785 SCRA 440, 452, it was held that:
The rationale advanced for the prohibition in Article 1491(5) is that public policy disallows
the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence
and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of
his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly
enrich himself at the expense of his client.
xxx
Undeniably, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code prohibits the purchase by lawyers of any interest in the subject
matter of the litigation in which they participated by reason of their profession. Here, however, respondent lawyer was not
the purchaser or buyer of the property or rights in litigation. For, in point of fact, it was his son Julius, and not respondent
lawyer, who purchased the subject property.
Concededly, Article 1491 provides that "[t]he following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another xx x." However, perusal of the records would show
that complainant failed to adduce any shred of evidence that Julius acted or mediated on behalf of respondent lawyer, or
that respondent lawyer was the ultimate beneficiary of the sale transaction. The mere fact that it was Julius, son of
respondent lawyer, who purchased the property, will not support the allegation that respondent lawyer violated Article
1491(5) of the Civil Code.
The "prohibition which rests on considerations of public policy and interests is intended to curtail any undue
influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and confidential relationship with him" (Zalamea v. De
Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7387, November 7, 2016, 807 SCRA 1, 6-7; Santos v. Atty. Joseph Arrojado, A.C. No. 8502, June 27,
2018, Del Castillo, J).
DISBARMENT

Grounds for disbarment.
a. Deceit;
b. Malpractice and other gross misconduct;
c. Grossly Immoral Conduct;
d. Conviction of crime involving moral turpitude;
e. Violation of oath of office;
f. Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
g. Corrupt or willful appearance for a client without authority to do so (RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec.27).
Other statutory grounds:

a. Acquisition of an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, either through purchase or assignment (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 1491);
b. Breach of professional duty, inexcusable negligence, or ignorance, or for the revelation of the client’s secrets (RPC,
Art. 208); and
c. Representing conflicting interests (RPC, Art. 209).
Power to discipline members of the Bar.

The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested under the 1987 Constitution in the Supreme Court. It is
provided that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated
bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No. 10583; Atty. Jose Caringal
v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10583 & 10584, February 18, 2015, Leonen, J).
Plenary power of the SC over attorneys.

The Supreme Court has the power to discipline officers of the court and members of the court and members of
the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the
practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional
mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the
proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions.
The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to
share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. (Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey
Santos, A.C. No. 10583; Atty. Jose Caringal v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10583 & 10584, February 18, 2015, Leonen, J citing
Zaldivar v. SB, 248 Phil. 542 [1988]).
Constitution not the only basis of the power to discipline members of the Bar.
The Court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides that a member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Sec. 27).
Role of the Integrated Bar of the Phils. in the SC’s power to discipline lawyers.
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo, A.C. No. 10537 p. 8 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], the Court emphasized the authority
of the court to impose disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law, where it ruled that parenthetically, it is
the SC that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. (Constitution [1987], Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). Under
the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of
the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional power of the SC. Its
recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. (A.C. No. 10537, p. 8 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]).
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that “proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines … upon the verified complaint of any person.”
However, this authority is only to assist the Court with the investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to
recommend, at best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer. (Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No.
10583; Atty. Jose Caringal v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10583 & 10584, February 18, 2015).
Lawyer was disbarred due to immoral conduct.

Marriage is an inviolable institution. Inviolable because anyone who breaches the marriage is bound to be
punished. In this case, a lawyer was disbarred for making a mockery of marriage, having contracted marriage twice
especially so during the existence of his first and valid marriage.
This case is about a lawyer, and a law professor who got married to his first wife, claiming that he married her
because she got pregnant and he was afraid that she would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry
her and which would jeopardize his scholarship in the Harvard Law School. While married to his first wife, he met his best
friend since the mid-1960s and started to court her. He told her that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce decree
from the Dominican Republic from his wife and that he would marry her once the divorce decree was obtained. In 1984, he
was able to obtain a decree of divorce and assured her that it was lawful and valid and there was no longer any
impediment for them to marry. So, they got married in the USA.s she came to know later on that the divorce decree is not
recognized in the Philippines. When confronted about it, he assured her that he would legalize their marriage once he
obtained a declaration of nullity of his marriage with his first wife. Then, she received an anonymous letter that he was
maintaining a scandalous affair with another woman and later on, she came upon a lone letter signed by him addressed to
the other woman. Ultimately, he abandoned her and their son, hence, she filed a Disbarment case against him.

In his comment, he claimed that his second wife knew that their marriage was not valid because of his previous
existing marriage and that he married her because he loved her and was afraid of losing her. He merely desired to lend a
modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.
On the part of the alleged relationship with another woman who happened to be a lawyer, the latter denied it. She
admitted having been employed in his law firm and that he courted her but she rejected him because he was already
married and too old for her. She later on resigned from the law firm.
The basic issue is whether the lawyer committed gross immorality which would warrant his disbarment.
In ordering the disbarment of the lawyer, the Supreme Court said that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility. Citing Armobit v. Armobit, 590
Phil. 207[2008] the Court ruled:
The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public
is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s
good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the
absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because “vast interests
are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his
client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.” (Cordon v. Balicanta, 439 Phil. 95 [2002]).
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended
from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” (Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Sr., 468 Phil. 329, 335 [2004]). Immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. (See Garrido v. Attys.
Garrido and Valencia, 625 Phil. 347, 358 [2010]).
From his own admission, he knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic
was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and his wife were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still
validly married to his first wife; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity.
Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married his best friend. The foregoing
circumstances seriously tainted his sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of
our laws on marriage. (Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig et al., A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015).
Suspension; authority to appear as consel terminates after death of client.

A lawyer was suspended for having appeared for a client even after he has already passed away. Worst, he did not
inform the court of the client’s death, instead, he filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. He is liable for the
misconduct.
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of
his client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized
to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize
him to appear in court for his client, but the presidingjudge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear
in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as
justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by
leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official transactions (Villanueva, Sr. v. Atty. Isidro Caracol, A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015)
Lawyer need not prove right to represent client; exception.

While a lawyer is not required to present proof of his representation, when a court requires that he show such
authorization, it is imperative that he show his authority to act. Thus:
A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the
absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in
his client’s name. However, [a] court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party may require a
lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without being retained nor
may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court. If an attorney appears on a client’s behalf without
a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be
bound or affected by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority. If a

lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction. (Villahermosa, Sr. v. Atty.
Isidro Caracol, A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015, Villarama, J; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Dev’t. Co., 510 Phil.
839 [2005]).
Suspension; lawyer appeared as counsel while serving suspension.

A lawyer serving suspension when she represented her husband in a pending case may be suspended again
because of willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
of a party without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
She would have deserved a harsher penalty, but the Court recognized the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture
that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to
a spouse. Thus, considering that her actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was
not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty. (Feliciano v.
Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada, A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015).
Effect if a misconduct committed outside Philippine jurisdiction.

If he commits misconduct outside Philippine jurisdiction, which is also a ground for disciplinary action under
Philippine law, he may be suspended or disbarred in this country. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Supreme Court Resolution
dated February 21, 1992 amending RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 27).
Effect of suspension from practice of law abroad.

The suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law in another country automatically does not result in his
suspension or disbarment in the Philippines.
The acts which led to his suspension in another country, are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction, and only if the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in
this jurisdiction (In re: Suspension from the practice of law in the territory of Guam of Atty. Maquera, A.M. No. 793, July 30,
2004).
Requirements in a complaint for disbarment.

a. It must be verified;
b. It must state clearly and concisely the facts complained of;
c. It must be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of facts therein alleged, or documents
which may substantiate it; and
d. It must be filed with six (6) copies furnished the Secretary of the IBP or any of its chapter.
Material misrepresentation by a Bar Candidate.

A, who filed his application to take the Bar Examination and stated that he is single when in truth he is married,
committed a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith. That false statement, if it had been known,
would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibited a lack of good moral
character (Leda v.Tabang, 206 SCRA 395).
Disbarment proceeding confidential as a rule; exception.

The publicizing of the disbarment case of a lawyer is not a violation of the confidentiality rule. As a general rule,
disbarment proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution and the final decision of the Supreme Court.
However, if there is a legitimate public interest, the media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate report of
a disbarment complaint. The filing of a disbarment complaint against a lawyer is itself a matter of public concern
considering that it arose from a massacre case that is a high-profile case. The interest of the public is not on Atty. Santos
himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the said case (Fortun v.Quinsayas, G.R. No.
194578, February 13, 2013).
Confidentiality of disbarment proceedings.

Generally, court proceedings are often matters of public discussion, and the mere fact of publicity does not, in and
of itself, influence or interfere with them (Webb v. De Leon, 317 Phil. 758 [1995]).
Proceedings against lawyers however are treated differently, for several reasons.
Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the confidentiality rule. This is laid down by Sec. 18,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.
However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.
The confidentiality rule is intended, in part, to prevent the use of disbarment proceedings as a tool to damage a
lawyer's reputation in the public sphere.
Thus, the general rule is that publicly disclosing disbarment proceedings may be punished with contempt (Atty.
Harry Roque, Jr. v. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang, et al., G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017, Leonen, J).
Confidentiality is not absolute.

The confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is not to be applied under any
circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature.
As a general principle, speech on matters of public interest should not be restricted. The Court recognizes the
fundamental right to information, which is essential to allow the citizenry to form intelligent opinions and hold people
accountable for their actions. Accordingly, matters of public interest should not be censured for the sake of an
unreasonably strict application of the confidentiality rule. Thus, in Palad v. Solis, G.R. No. 206691, October 3, 2016, the

Court dismissed claims that the confidentiality rule had been violated, considering that the lawyer therein represented a
matter of public interest:
A person, even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, could validly be the
subject of a public comment as long as he was involved in a public issue. Petitioner has become a public
figure because he is representing a public concern. We explained it, thus:
But even assuming ... that [the person] would not qualify as a public figure, it
does not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment
even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as
he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it
cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or
because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved.
The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the
participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's
prior anonymity or notoriety.
As a general rule, disciplinary proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution
and the final decision of this Court. However, in this case, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner
became a matter of public concern considering that it arose from his representation of his client on the
issue of video voyeurism on the internet. The interest of the public is not in himself but primarily in his
involvement and participation as counsel of Halili in the scandal. Indeed, the disciplinary proceeding
against petitioner related to his supposed conduct and statements made before the media in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility involving the controversy (Atty. Harry Roque, Jr. v. AFP Chief of
Staff Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang, et al., G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017, Leonen, J).
Disbarment due to conviction of crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as
attorney by the Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Disbarment is the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude (Re. SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in G.R.
No. 161455 Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, 24 April 2012, 670 SCRA
366). Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men
or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals (Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, A.C. No. 7360, 24 July
2012, 677 SCRA 352).
The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was discussed by this Court in
International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC where it ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude.1âwphi1 Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but
not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot
always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in
se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral
turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows
therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be
left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached (G.R. No. No. 97239, May 12,
1993, 221 SCRA 760; Garcia v. Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño, A.C. Nos. 7973 and 10457, February 3, 2015).
Conviction for bribery, disbarment.

A prosecutor was convicted of the crime of direct bribery can be disbarred because the crime of direct bribery is a
crime involving moral turpitude. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for the suspension or
disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the same must have been “done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It must involve an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” (Re: SC
Decision dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, A.C. No.
7940, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 366, 371; Catalan, Jr. v. Sivosa, A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 352).
Disbarment case, effect if complainant decided to forgive the respondent lawyer.

The disbarment proceeding would continue. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers
should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the
public’s faith in the legal profession.
The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated to guide the members of the bar by informing them of
the deportment expected of them in leading both their professional and private lives. Primarily, it aims to protect the
integrity and nobility of the legal profession, to breed honest and principled lawyers and prune the association of the
unworthy.
The Court cannot simply yield to complainants’ change of heart by refuting their own statements against the
respondents and praying that the complaint for disbarment they filed be dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any
misconduct on the part of the lawyer not only hurts the client’s cause but is even more disparaging on the integrity of the
legal profession itself. Thus, for tarnishing the reputation of the profession, a lawyer may still be disciplined
notwithstanding the complainant’s pardon or withdrawal from the case for as long as there is evidence to support any

finding of culpability. A case for suspension or disbarment may proceed.” It followed that the withdrawal of the
complainant from the case, or even the filing of an affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the administrative case
against an erring lawyer.
This is so because the misconduct of a lawyer is deemed a violation of his oath to keep sacred the integrity of the
profession for which he must be disciplined. “The power to discipline lawyers who are officers of the court may not be cut
short by compromise and withdrawal of the charges. This is as it should be, especially when it considered that the law
profession and its exercise is one impressed with public interest. Proceedings to discipline erring members of the bar are
not instituted to protect and promote the public good only but also to maintain the dignity of the profession by weeding
out of those who have proven themselves unworthy thereof.” (Sps. Amatorio v. Atty. Francisco Dy Yap, et al., A.C. No. 5914,
March 11, 2015).
Nature of disbarment case; sui generis; complainant has burden of proof.

A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by
the court into the conduct of its officers. The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an
officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite
the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of
respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
However, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. As in this case, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty (Zarcilla, et al. v. Atty. Jose C.
Quisada, Jr., A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018).
Integrated Bar of the Philippines has no power to investigate government lawyers who are charged with
administrative offenses in relation to their official duties.
The 1987 Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman with the administrative disciplinary authority to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any government official when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient (Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 13, par. [1]). The Office of the Ombudsman is the government
agency responsible for enforcing administrative, civil, and criminal liability of government officials "in every case where
the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people" (Sec. 13, R.A. No. 6770).
In Samson v. Restrivera, A.C. No. 8168, October 12, 2016 the Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses 11 kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance committed by any public officer or employee during
his or her tenure. Consequently, acts or missions of public officials relating to the performance of their function as
government officials are within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman (Alicias, Sr. v.
Atty. Myrna Macatangay, et al., A.C. No. 7478, Januar 11, 2017, Carpio, J).
Effect of desistance in Disbarment Cases.

Desistance of the complainant or withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily warrant the dismissal of an
administrative proceeding. In Bautista v. Bernabe, 517 Phil. 236 [2006], the Court wrote:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to
the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice (Loberers-Pintal v. Atty.
Ramoncito B. Baylosis, A.C. No. 11545, January 24, 2017).
Effect of lack of interest of complainant in disciplinary cases against lawyers.

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.
The lawyer was found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court. (Atty. Umaguing v. Atty. Wallen R. De Vera, A.C. No.
10451, February 4, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Immoral conduct of a lawyer may result in suspension.

The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their application for admission
to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:

Rule 1.0 I - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
It is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good moral character, but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic
ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives,
accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning (Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004,
438 SCRA 582, 588-589; Advincula v. Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula, A.C. No. 9226, June 14, 2016, Bersamin, J).
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency (Narag v. Narag, A.C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 451, 464).
Membership in the bar is a privilege.

Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their dealings.
Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and to delay no man for money or malice. These mandates apply
especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship (Luna v.
Atty. Gal arr it a, 763 Phil. 175, 184 (2015)).
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice
law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court
after opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, and attorney's right
to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a
license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. However, in consideration of the gravity of the
consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the bar, the Court have consistently held that a lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to satisfactorily prove the
allegations in his complaint through substantial evidence (Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta, et al., v. Atty. Marie Frances E.
Ramon, A.C. No. 12415, March 5, 2018).
Duty to support the Constitution.

The Lawyer's Oath requires every lawyer to "support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein" and to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court." To
the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law, and to avoid any act or omission that is
contrary thereto. A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and
obedience to the law on the part of the public.
Respondent's acts constituted grave misconduct. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law,
or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of
grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others (Justice
Fernanda Lampas-Peralta, et al., v. Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon, A.C. No. 12415, March 5, 2018).
Breach of ethics of the legal profession; lawyer disbarred.

His acts resulted in complainant’s injuries and has tarnished the noble image of the legal profession.
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation
of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code. For the practice of law
is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess
good moral character. The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.
In Krursel v. Atty. Abion, 789 Phil. 584 [2016], the lawyer therein drafted a fake order from the Court in order to
deceive her client. She made a mockery of the judicial system. Her conduct degraded the administration of justice and
weakened the people's faith in the judicial system. She inexorably besmirched the entire legal profession. The penalty of
disbarment was imposed against the lawyer.
Similarly, in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, 374 Phil. 1 [1999], the penalty of disbarment
was imposed against the lawyer who falsified an official receipt from the Court to cover up his misdeeds. Since the lawyer
clearly failed the standards of his noble profession, he did not deserve to continue as a member of the bar.
In this case, respondent committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct, and lessened the
confidence of the public in the legal system. Instead of being an advocate of justice, he became a perpetrator of injustice.
His reprehensible acts do not merit him to remain in the rolls of the legal profession. Thus, the ultimate penalty of
disbarment must be imposed upon him (Taday v. Atty. Dionisio Apoya, Jr., A.C. No. 11981, July 3, 2018).
Demand letters to enforce right of client; not ground for disbarment.

These demands were based on a legitimate cause or issue. The lawyer was merely acting in compliance with his
lawyer’s oath to protect and preserve the rights of his client. There is nothing in the demand letters to show that the same
was maliciously made with intent to extort money from him since it was based on a valid and justifiable cause. Indeed, the
writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to
the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the
lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of
demand requiring payment within a specified period (Malvar v. Atty. Freddie B. Fiez, A.C. No. 11871, March 5, 2018,
Peralta, J).
Lawyer not liable for inattention to a case after termination; no indefinite engagement as counsel.
As a rule, a lawyer’s basic duties are the following:
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
The complainants engaged the services of the lawyer as their counsel in a case. He served as such counsel and
with assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the
property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his legal fees.
He could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters subsequent to the termination of the
case. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between them at any time during the engagement, the complainants had no
right to assume that his legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in the LRA. The Law
Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the rendition of
professional services depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client. His alleged failure to respond to the
complainants’ calls or visits, or to provide them with his whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the
termination of his engagement in the case did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he continued
to come under the professional obligation towards them after the termination of the case. (Campugan, et al. v. Atty.
Tolentino, Jr., et al., A.C. No. 8261; Campugan, et al. v. Atty. Caluya, et al., A.C. No. 8725, March 11, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Dismissal of criminal case, does not preclude disbarment case.

The acquittal of a lawyer has no effect on the disbarment case.
The criminal case of estafa from which she was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, is
different from the administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each
case. Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil
cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. (Freeman v. Reyes, A.C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011).
Freeman v. Reyes, A.C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011, held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude
the continuance of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to
establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. An administrative case can proceed independently, even if there
was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a
judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, or that no crime was committed.
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court
and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The burden of proof rests
upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. (Pena v. Atty. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191, June 10, 2013).
Judge can be dismissed from the service for making a false statement in his Personal Data Sheet.
The judge’s act of making an obviously false statement in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) was reprehensible. It was
not mere inadvertence on his part when he answered “NO” to that very simple question in the PDS. He knew exactly what
the question called for and what it meant, and that he was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway.
Whether or not the charges were dismissed was immaterial, given the phraseology of the question “Have you ever been
formally charged?” meaning charged at any time, in the past or present.
A judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that the making of a false statement in his PDS could subject
him to dismissal. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that all laws and rules of the
land are followed to the letter. His being a judge makes it all the more unacceptable. There was an obvious lack of integrity,
the most fundamental qualification of a member of the judiciary. (Samson vs Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, RTC Br. 30,
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. RTJ- 08-2138, Aug. 5, 2009).
Doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in disciplinary cases.

This principle which means the thing speaks for itself, applies to both judges and lawyers. Judges had been
dismissed from the service without the need of a formal investigation because based on the records the gross misconduct
or inefficacy of the judges clearly appears (Uy v. Mercado[1987]). There’s no need of a trial-type proceeding (Prudential
Bank v. Castro [1986]).
Effect of lack of interest of complainant in disciplinary cases against lawyers.

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or

disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.
The lawyer was found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court. (Atty. Umaguing v. Atty. Wallen R. De Vera, A.C. No.
10451, February 4, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Payment of IBP dues; no exemption.

There are no exemptions from payment of IBP membership dues. A lawyer can engage in the practice of law only
by paying his dues, and it does not matter if his practice is limited. Moreover, senior citizens are not exempted (Santos v.
Llamas, (2000)).
A lawyer staying abroad should informthe Secretary of the Integrated bar of his intention to stay abroad before
he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued (Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo, (2005)).
READMISSION
Nature of reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer.

It is an inherent power of the Court grant reinstatement. The Court should see to it that only those who establish
their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice
of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the
general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as a matter of justice.
Qualifications in case of readmission as a lawyer.

The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of
membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment,
the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement (Que v. Atty.
Revilla, Jr., A.C. No.7054, November 11, 2014).
Guidelines in deciding request for judicial clemency.

The Court has laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency: 1) there must be
proof of remorse and reformation; 2) sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure
reformation; 3) the age of the person must show that he still has productive years ahead of him; 4) there must be a
showing of promise and potential for public service; and 5) other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency. Given the gravity of dela Cruz’s transgressions, it becomes imperative to require factual support for his
allegations of remorse and reform. However, his petition is not supported by any single proof of his professed repentance
and no independent evidence or relevant circumstances to justify clemency (Mamasaw Sultan Aliv. Hon. Baguinda-Ali
Pacalna, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505, November 27, 2013).
Requirements in case a dual citizen wants to practice law in the Philippines.

A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the right to resume the practice of law is not
automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are
the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law (In re:
Petition to Re-acquire the Privilege to Practice law in the Philippines, Epifanio B. Muneses, B.M. No. 2112, July 24, 2012).
THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Lawyer who refuses to pay debt; effect.

The Court may hold a lawyer as having violated Canon 7 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar. In unduly
borrowing money from his clients and by blatantly refusing to pay the same, he abused the trust and confidence reposed
in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he should be
equally held administratively liable on this score (Spouses Concepcion v. Atty.dela Rosa A.C. No. 10681, February 3, 2015).
A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross
misconduct outside of his professional capacity.
Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients.
The fact that a lawyer obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of a
person is of no moment. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for
gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for
misconduct committed in his non-professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing
him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross in character as to show
him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.

Further, the misconduct of the lawyer is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP
directing her to file an answer to the complaint and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes
blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer.
Undoubtedly, a lawyer’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon
City Prosecutor’s Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. (Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlina Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J)
Lawyer must take care of concerns.

A retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and diligence. This duty includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care and giving the client sound legal advice, but also properly representing
the client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases
with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do
so. The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of uncertainty. The failure to file a
brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. This default translates to a violation of the
injunction of Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Antonio Conlu v. Atty. Ireneo
Aredonio, Jr., A.C. No. 4955, September 12, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J)
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the courts order and
processes.
A lawyer is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 16 of the CPR which provides that
“money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the profession of the lawyer should be
reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by
him.”
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the courts order and
processes. A lawyer miserably fell short of his duties as such officer. He trifled with the writ of attachment the court issued.
He was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by
persons who had no business using it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car.
What is worse is that he took custody of them without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority.
For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars, the Court found him guilty of infidelity in the custody
of the attached cars and grave misconduct. We must mention, at this juncture, that the victorious parties in the case are not
without legal recourse in recovering the Volvo's value from him should they desire to do so. (Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon, Jr.
v. Atty. Joselito Frial, A.C. No. 7820, September 12, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J)
Notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons
who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally appeared before the notaries public to attest
to the truth of what are stated therein.
Notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons
who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally appeared before the notaries public to attest to the
truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question,
notaries public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain
that the document is the party’s free act or deed. Furthermore, notaries public are required by the Notarial Law to certify
that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented before the notaries public the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place, and date of issue as part of
certification.
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice now requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence of
identity: (a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature
of the individual; (b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction
who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses
neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows
to the notary public documentary identification. For failing to meet such requirements, Atty. Dimaano’s notarial
commission was revoked. He was disqualified from being commission for 2 years and was suspended from the practice of
law for 1 year. (Dolores I. Dela Cruz, et al. v. Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., A.C. No. 7781, September 12, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J)
Gross negligence of lawyer; failure to appeal case.

A lawyer is liable of gross negligence, gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law for failing to appeal the
Decision of the trial court. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides, “A lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence.” Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Atty. Mejica should have kept himself
abreast of Lindo v. COMELEC which states that notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation.
Thus, respondent is guilty of gross negligence, gross incompetence, and gross ignorance of the law for failing to appeal the
trial court's decision in the quo warranto case before the COMELEC within 5 days (Augusto P. Baldado v. Atty. Aquilino A.
Mejica A.C. No. 9120, March 11, 2013).
Lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed in his professional or private affairs.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either
in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
Court(Tan, Jr. v. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 527, 532; Roa v. Moreno, A.C. No. 8382, April 21, 2010, 618
SCRA 693, 699). Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not
to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of
Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, viz.:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice(Campuganv. Atty. Tolentino, Jr., A.C. No. 8261; Campugan v.
Atty. Caluya, A.C. No. 8725, March 11, 2015, Bersamin).
Negligence of lawyer, binding upon client.

Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence and mistakes of the counsel are binding on the client.
However, in this case, Atty. Corpuz cannot entirely be faulted for the conviction of Pedro and Juan. The facts of the case
show that Juan and Pedro were also negligent in attending their hearing and causing several postponement. Truly, a
litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in
the hands of his lawyer. It is the client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of
the progress and developments of his case. Hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is
being taken cared of is not enough. As clients, it is the petitioners' correlative duty to be in contact with Atty. Corpuz from
time to time to inform themselves of the status of their case. "Diligence is required not only from lawyers but also from
their clients" (Resurreccion v. People, G.R. No. 192866, July 9, 2014).
Duties of lawyer the moment there is a lawyer-client relationship.

The lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of the complainant and is obliged to keep the latter informed of the status of
his case. He is likewise bound to account for all money or property collected or received from the complainant. He may be
held administratively liable for any inaptitude or negligence he may have had committed in his dealing with the
complainant.
In Del Mundo v. Capistrano, A.C. No. 6903, 669 SCRA 462, it was emphasized that indeed, when a lawyer takes a
client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on
him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.
His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as
much as he can efficiently handle.
Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of
such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose
such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return
gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of
funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. (Michael Ruby v. Atty. Espejo, et al., A.C. No. 10558, February 23, 2015, Reyes, J).
Effect of termination of relationship.

The termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or
in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once given should not be
stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should
not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the
client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this
regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: “A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.”
WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE
Rules on withdrawal of appearance.
A lawyer may withdraw from a case he was handling. but he had to comply with the rules governing withdrawal
of counsel.
Under the Rules, an attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent
of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his
client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to
retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place
of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party (Rule 138, Sec. 26, Rules of Court;
Chang v. Atty. Jose Hidalgo, A.C. No. 6934, April 6, 2016, Leonen, J).
ATTORNEY’S FEES
Kinds of attorney’s lien.
a. Charging Lien - is an equitable right to have the fees and lawful disbursements due a lawyer for his services in a
suit secured to him out of the judgment for the payment of money and executions issued in pursuance thereof in
the particular suit; and
b. Retaining Lien - a right merely to retain the funds, documents, and papers as against the client until the attorney is
fully paid his fees.
Lawyer not to represent conflicting interest.

It is almost a cliché to say that a lawyer is forbidden “from representing conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy
and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers are
expected not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.”

The alleged “non-payment of professional [fees, even if true, would] not exculpate respondent [lawyer] from
liability. The absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition against
pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is
established and extends even beyond the duration of the professional relationship (Yumang, et al. v. Atty. Edwin
Alaestante, A.C. No. 10992, June 19, 2018, Del Castillo, J).
Tests to determine conflict of interest.

a. When a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to
oppose that claim for the other client;
b. When the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of
that duty; and
c. When the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment.
Conflict of interest; basis.

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall observed candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. Furthermore, a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers must
treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to encourage client to fully inform
their counsels of the facts of their case. (Samson v. Atty. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013, 701 SCRA 241, 252 [Per J.
Bensamin, En Banc]). In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, 453 Phil. 108 [2003] [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division], the court
explained what conflict of interest means:
“There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.”
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily refute Mariano
Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano
Turla was not the only heir. (Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No. 10583; Atty. Jose Caringal v. Atty. Santos, A.C.
No. 10583 & 10584, February 18, 2015).
Rules in case of conflict of interest.

In Generosa Buted, et al. v. Atty. Harold M. Hernando, Adm. Case No. 1359, October 17, 1991, the Supreme Court
laid down rules on conflict of interest of lawyers in handling cases, thus:
a) In cases where a conflict of interest may exist, full disclosure of the facts and express consent of all the parties
concerned are necessary. (In re Dela Rosa, 27 Phil. 258).
The present Code of Professional Responsibility is stricter on this matter considering that consent of the parties is
now required to be in written form. (Canon 15, Rule 15.03).
b) In San Jose v. Cruz, 57 Phil. 794, it was said that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which
he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated and it is not a good
practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the
pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case.
c) In Maria Tinia v. Atty. Amado Ocampo, A.C. No. 2285 and other companion cases, August 12, 1991, it was said that
the prohibition against conflict of interest in representation of clients is prohibited because the relation of lawyer
and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, and because of the principles of public policy and
good taste. An attorney has the duty to preserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers. (In re: De la Rosa).
Test in determining whether there is conflicting interest.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The
test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose
it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
Champertous contract.
There is a champertous contract if a lawyer defrayed all the litigation expenses without providing for
reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. The agreement is contrary to
public policy. The contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and,
impliedly, the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not
properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation. The questioned attorney’s fee

should be declared void for being excessive and unconscionable. The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was
allegedly agreed to secure the services of Atty. Lacaya. A large fee is only allowed in the showing that special skills and
additional work had been involved. The issue involved in that case was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya
extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the sale of a homestead lot within
five years from its acquisition(Cadavedo v. Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014).
Valid retaining lien.

A valid retaining lien has the following elements: An attorney’s retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of
the following elements concur: (1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and
papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. In the case at bar, the enumeration of cases Atty. John worked on for
Peter must be substantiated. When there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot validly retain their
client’s funds or properties (Spouses San Pedro v. Atty. Mendoza, A.C. no. 5440, December 10, 2014).
Even assuming that Atty. Mendoza had proven all the requisites for a valid retaining lien, he cannot appropriate
for himself his client’s funds without the proper accounting and notice to the client. The rule is that when there is "a
disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer, the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the
funds in his possession to the payment of his fees (Spouses San Pedro v. Atty.Mendoza, A.C. No. 5440, December 10, 2014).
Recovery of attorney’s fees.

How attorney’s fees for professional services be recovered.
It is well settled that a claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a
lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action. With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s
fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot be
determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the
court. The issue over attorney’s fees only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.
While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the
propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the
lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will
be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or
the proceeds thereof delivered to the client. (Rosario, Jr. v. de Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013).
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for
professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality
of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award’s complete resolution. To declare that a
lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would
deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.
Practice of law is not a business, but the services of a lawyer should be paid.
It is beyond question that considerable amount of time was exerted by the lawyer in ensuring the successful
defense of the client’s cause. He deserves to be awarded attorney’s fees.
The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of justice
underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and
respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or
fraud on the part of his client as the client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see
that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see to it that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his
capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time
and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape
payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client he
himself would not get his due. (Rosario, Jr. v. de Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013).
Effect if attorney’s fees being charged is unreasonable.

Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees that would legally give him the right to retain the property of
his client until he receives what is allegedly due him has been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid. In collecting from
complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates
that ―a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional
professional fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his
services (Miranda v.Carpio, A.C. No. 6281, September 26, 2011).
Effect of failure to indicate in all pleadings filed the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance
or Certificate of Exemption.
The Court En Banc issued a Resolution dated January 14, 2014, which reads as follows: B.M. No. 1922 (Re:
Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education [MCLE] Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the
Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption). - The Court Resolved, upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to: (a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase
"Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings
from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to
appropriate penalty and disciplinary action."
MCLE
Who are exempted from MCLE?
The Executive
a. The President, Vice-President, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of executive departments;
b. The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Justice;
c. The Solicitor-General and the Assistant Solicitor-General;

d. The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
e. Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions; and
f. Governors and Mayors.
The Legislative
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
The Judiciary
The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the SC, incumbent and retired justices of the judiciary, incumbent members
of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy Program of
Continuing Legal Education;
The Constitutional Bodies

a. The Chairman and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
b. The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman;
The Academe
a. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least
10 years in accredited law schools;
b. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professional Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial
Academy; and
Non-practicing lawyers
a. Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
b. Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.
Other exemptions
A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post
graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the
requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be established by the
MCLE Committee.
NOTARIAL PRACTICE RULE
Duties of a Notary Public.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be unable
to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free
act or deed.
As aptly observed by the Court in Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan:
The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary public to
authenticate documents without requiring the physical presence of affiants. However, the adverse
consequences of this practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the absent affiants.
Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of the affiant does not take into account
the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport to
be. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party’s free act and deed.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized in a number of cases the important role a notary public performs, to wit:
x x x [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive
public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law,
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in
the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by
the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of
notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. The
responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more
pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility
to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are
mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest. (Agbulos v. Atty. Viray, A.C. No. 7350, February 18, 2013).
Functions of notary public.

A notary public who notarizes a document even without the presence of the party may he be suspended.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated
therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have personal
knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in the said documents
as the ones who executed the same.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. By affixing
his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public
document. In doing so, Atty. Salve, as borne from the records of this case, effectively proclaimed to the world that: (a) all
the parties therein personally appeared before him; (b) they are all personally known to him; (c) they were the same
persons who executed the instruments; (d) he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (e) they
acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same. As a lawyer commissioned to be a
notary public, Atty. Salve is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with faithful observance and utmost respect for the
legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat. Having failed in this regard, he must now accept the
commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. His act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of
Absolute Sale without requiring the personal appearance of the persons executing the same constitutes gross negligence in
the performance of duty as a notary public. (Salita v. Atty. Reynaldo Salve, A.C. No. 8101, February 4, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe,
J).
Community tax certificate not a competent evidence of identity.

A notary public can no longer accept a cedula or a community tax certificate (CTC), the successor document to the
residence certificate originally required by the Notarial Law as proof of identity. Such does not even contain a photograph
of the person to whom it is issued. Further, CTC may be easily obtained by anyone, without any supporting papers, thereby
debasing its value as an identity document.
Notarization is imbued with public interest.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It is imbued with public interest and only those who
are qualified and authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document to a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
signatory to the document personally appeared before the notary public at the time of the notarization, and personally
known to the notary public or otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity. At the time of notarization, the
signatory shall sign or affix with a thumb or other mark in the notary public's notarial register. The purpose of these
requirements is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature and to ascertain that the document
is the signatory's free act and deed. If the signatory is not acting on his or her own free will, a notary public is mandated to
refuse to perform a notarial act. A notary public is also prohibited from affixing an official signature or seal on a notarial
certificate that is incomplete (Taday v. Atty. Dionisio Apoya, Jr., A.C. No. 11981, July 3, 2018).
In Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos, the Court held that when a lawyer affixes his signature and notarial seal on a deed of
sale, he leads the public to believe that the parties personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of
the contents thereof The act of notarizing a document without the presence of the parties is fraught with dangerous
possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that the courts and the public accord to
notarized documents (Almario v. Atty. Dominica Llera-Agno, A.C. No. 10689, January 8, 2018, Del Castillo, J).
The provisions of the law mandate the notary public to require the physical or personal presence of the person/s
who executed a document, before notarizing the same. In other words, a document should not be notarized unless the
person/s who is/are executing it is/are personally or physically present before the notary public. The personal and
physical presence of the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature/s of the affiant/s therein and the due execution of the document.
Notaries public are absolutely prohibited or forbidden from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. They
are the law's vanguards and sentinels against illegal deeds. The confidence of the public in the integrity of notarial acts
would be undermined and impaired if notaries public do not observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties spelled out in the notarial law.
The Court, in Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos, A.C. No. 9209, April 18, 2017, held that "notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routinary act; it is imbued with public interest x x x" (Almario v. Atty. Dominica Llera-Agno, A.C. No.
10689, January 8, 2018, Del Castillo, J).
Notarization of document; party already dead; effect.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be unable
to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free
act or deed. Here, Atty. Quesada's act of notarizing the deed of sale appeared to have been done to perpetuate a fraud. This
is more evident when he certified in the acknowledgment thereof that he knew the vendors and knew them to be the same
persons who executed the document. When he then solemnly declared that such appeared before him and acknowledged
to him that the document was the vendor's free act and deed · despite the fact that the vendors cannot do so as they were
already deceased, the lawyer deliberately made false representations, and was not merely negligent.
Thus, by his actuations, the lawyer violated not only the notarial law but also his oath as a lawyer when he
notarized the deed of sale without all the affiant's personal appearance. His failure to perform his duty as a
notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the
integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. The responsibility to faithfully observe and
respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a
lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood
or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the

duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest (Zarcilla, et al. v. Atty.
Jose Quesada, Jr., A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018).
Notary public can notarize document belonging to his wife.

A notary public may notarize his wife’s affidavit of loss as there is no law that prohibits him from notarizing his
wife’s affidavit. It is a truism that the duties performed by a Notary Public are not just plain ministerial acts. They are so
impressed with public interest and dictated by public policy. Such is the case since notarization makes a private document
into a public one; and as a public document, it enjoys full credit on its face. However, a lawyer cannot be held liable for a
violation of his duties as Notary Public when the law in effect at the time of his complained act does not provide any
prohibition to the same, as in the case at bench (Mabini v. Atty. Vitto A. Kintanar, A.C. No. 9512, February 5, 2018, Del
Castillo, J).
MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE (BM 2012)

Mandatory legal aid service.
The mandatory legal aid service mandates every practicing lawyer to render a minimum of 60 hours of free legal
aid services to indigent litigants yearly. Said 60 hours shall be spread within the period of 12 months, with a minimum of 5
hours of free legal aid services each month. However, where it is necessary for the practicing lawyer to render legal aid
service for more than 5 hours in one month, the excess hours may be credited to the said lawyer for the succeeding
periods (B.M. 2012, Sec. 5[a], par. 1).
Indigent and pauper litigants.

They are those whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amountdouble the
monthly minimum wage of an employee and who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the
current tax declaration of more than three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00).
Practicing lawyer covered by this bar matter.

They are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial
agencies. The term "practicing lawyers" shall EXCLUDE:
a. Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice;
b. Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;
c. Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in duly accredited legal clinics of law schools and
lawyers of NGOs and peoples organizations (POs) who by the nature of their work already render free legal aid to
indigent and pauper litigants; and
d. Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including those who are employed in the private sector but
do not appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.
FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE ACT (RA 9999)
R.A. 9999.
This law will allow indigent litigants to acquire the services of renowned lawyers and law firms for free.
A lawyer or professional partnerships rendering actual free legal services, as defined by the Supreme Court, shall
be entitled to an allowable deduction from the gross income, the amount that could have been collected for the actual free
legal services rendered or up to ten percent (10%) of the gross income derived from the actual performance of the legal
profession, whichever is lower: Provided, That the actual free legal services herein contemplated shall be exclusive of the
minimum sixty (60)hour mandatory legal aid services rendered to indigent litigants as required under the Rule on
Mandatory Legal Aid Services for Practicing Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012, issued by the Supreme Court (R.A. 9999,
Sec. 5).
The PAO, Department of Justice (DOJ) and other legal aid clinics accredited by the Supreme Court shall refer
pauper litigants to identified lawyers and professional partnerships. It shall issue a certification that services were
rendered by the lawyer or the professional partnership under this act.
The certification shall include the cost of the actual services given.
JUDICIAL ETHICS
Principles that govern the Bangalore Draft.
The Bangalore Draft is founded upon a universal recognition that:
1. A competent, independent and impartial judiciary is essential if the courts are to fulfill their role in upholding
constitutionalism and the rule of law;
2. Public confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of utmost
importance in a modern democratic society; and
3. It is essential that judges, individually and collectively, respect and honor judicial office as a public trust and
strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system (New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, June 1, 2004).
Justice guilty for acts unbecoming of a member of the judiciary.

In Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, CA, A.M. No. 17-11-06-
OCA, March 13, 2018, Martires, J, there was an anonymous letter-complaint' charging Associate Justice Normandie B.
Pizarro (Justice Pizarro) of the Court of Appeals (CA) of habitually gambling in casinos, "selling" decisions, and immorally
engaging in an illicit relationship. The subject letter-complaint was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.
The anonymous letter-complaint accused Justice Pizarro of being a gambling addict who would allegedly lose
millions of pesos in the casinos daily, and insinuated that Justice Pizarro resorted to "selling" his cases in order to support
his gambling addiction.
The anonymous complainant further accused Justice Pizarro of having an illicit relationship, claiming that Justice
Pizarro bought his mistress a house and lot in Antipolo City, a condominium unit in Manila, and brand new vehicles such

as Toyota Vios and Ford Everest worth millions of pesos. Lastly, the anonymous complainant alleged that Justice Pizarro,
together with his mistress and her whole family, made several travels abroad to shop and to gamble in casinos.
Attached to the anonymous letter-complaint are four (4) sheets of photographs3 showing Justice Pizarro sitting
at the casino tables allegedly at the Midori Hotel and Casino in Clark, Pampanga.
He was required to file a comment.
He explained that the photographs were taken when he was accompanying a balikbayan friend; and that they
only played a little in a parlor game fashion without big stakes and without their identities introduced or made known.
Justice Pizarro averred that the photographs may have been taken by people with ulterior motives considering his plan for
early retirement.
He further confessed that sometime in 2009 he also played at the casino in what he termed, again, a parlor game
concept. He maintained, however, that such was an indiscretion committed by a dying man because, prior to this, he had
learned that he had terminal cancer.
In holding Justice Pizarro guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, and fined him in the amount
of P100,000.00, the SC
Held: Justice Pizarro also violated Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which
pertinently provides:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. l. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of
the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
xx xx
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office.
Judges must conduct themselves irreproachably, not only while in the discharge of official duties but also in their
personal behavior every day (Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Gedorio, 551 Phil. 174, 180 [2007]). No position
demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in particular
must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court
and its proceedings. Judges should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. A judge's personal
behaviour outside the court, and not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is
perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he
represents (Anonymous v. Achas, 705 Phil. 17, 24-25 [201] citing City Government of Tagbilarran v. Judge Agapito
Hontanosas, Jr., 425 Phil. 592 [2002]).
Judge issued resolutions in the exercise of his adjudicative functions. If he committed errors, such acts cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings.
Such acts must be corrected through judicial remedies (Maquirare v. Grageda, 491 Phil. 205 [2005]).
A party’s recourse, if prejudiced by a judge’s orders in the course of a trial, is with proper reviewing court and not
with the OCA, through an administrative complaint (Biado v. Brawner-Cualing, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891, February 15, 2017;
Atty. Eddie Tamondong v. Judge Emmanuel Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, October 18, 2017, Leonardo-De Castro, J).
An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular
where a judicial remedy exists and is available. The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action. A judge cannot be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous,
provided he acts in good faith (Biado v. Brawner-Cualing, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891, February 15, 2017; Atty. Eddie
Tamondong v. Judge Emmanuel Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, October 18, 2017, Leonardo-De Castro, J).
Administrative complaints against judges are viewed with utmost care.

An administrative case against respondent RTC judge may be also considered as a disciplinary case against him as
a member of the bar in accordance with A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, a Resolution entitled “RE: Automatic Conversion of Some
Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts
and Court Officials who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as such Officials and Members of the
Philippine Bar.”
Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the Bench, the moral fitness of a judge
also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath as
a lawyer. In this particular case, respondent’s dishonest act was against the Lawyer’s Oath to “do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court”.

Administrative complaints against members of the judiciary are viewed by the Court with utmost care, for
proceedings of this nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents concerned, but the integrity of the entire
judiciary as well. (Aquino v. Acosta, 429 Phil. 498 [2002]). Considering that the complainants failed to present substantial
evidence to prove the alleged sexual advances committed against them by respondent, elementary justice dictates that he
be exonerated from the said charge. (Samahan ng mga Babae sa Hudikatura (Samabahu) v. Judge Cesar O. Untalan, A.M. No.
RTC-13-2363, February 25, 2015, Villarama, J).
When work-related sexual harassment committed.

Under Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and
Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary), work-related sexual harassment is committed by an official or
employee in the judiciary who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favour from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the latter. It is committed when “the sexual favour is made as a condition in the
hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favourable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favour results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.” (Samahan ng mga Babae sa Hudikatura (Samabahu) v. Judge
Cesar O. Untalan, A.M. No. RTC-13-2363, February 25, 2015, Villarama, J).
Judge should avoid impropriety.

A judge may be penalized due to impropriety if during the hearing of a case, where a party stepped out of the
courtroom to take a call and exited through the door used by the judge and the employees of the court, and the judge
suddenly explained that the party ha to excuse himself for an important appointment.
Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. (Canon 4).
The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety, but even acts that have
the appearance of impropriety. This is because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial
functions. A judge — like Ceasar's wife — must not only be pure and faithful, but must also be above suspicion. (Dionisio v.
Escaño, 362 Phil. 46 [1999]).
In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s permission to leave while the
trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the former’s advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the
abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the latter had an important appointment to attend. Respondent does not
deny this in his Comment. It was the Mayor’s lawyer, and not respondent judge, who had the duty of explaining why the
mayor left the courtroom without asking for the court’s permission.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may
erode the people's faith in the Judiciary. (Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692
[Antonio Rosete v. Securities and Exchange Commission], 586 Phil. 321 [2008]). Members of the Judiciary should be
beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge
of their official duties, as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life. (Ladignon v. Garong, 584 Phil. 352 [2008]).
The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a judge. He gave
petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality. Petitioners cannot be blamed for thinking that respondent must
have directly communicated with Mayor Villarosa. Otherwise, he would not have been able to explain that the Mayor could
no longer return to attend the hearing after leaving, when not even the latter’s own lawyers knew that. (Ascano, Jr., et al. v.
Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015).
Judge in political partisan activity.

If during the election period, a judge took a leave of absence to help his brother conceptualize the campaign
strategy and contributed a modest amount to the campaign kitty and hosted lunches and dinners incurred administrative
liability. Rule 5.18 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which applies suppletorily to the New Code of Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, provides that “[A] Judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions, but to avoid
suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse
candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities.”
He may also be held criminally liable for violation of Sec. 26 (I) of the Omnibus Election Code, which penalizes any
officer or employee in the civil service who, directly or indirectly, intervenes, in any election campaign or engages in any
partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order.
Judges of the first and second level courts are allowed to receive assistance from the local government units
where they are stationed.
The Supreme Court has upheld the grant of allowances by local government units to “judges, prosecutors, public
elementary and high school techers, and other national government officials” stationed in or assigned to the locality
pursuant to Sections 447(a)(1)(xi), 458(a)(1)(xi) and 468(a)(1)(xi) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code. “To rule against the power of the LGUs to grant allowances to judges… will subvert the principle
of local autonomy zealously guaranteed by the Constitution.” Hence, it is not improper for judges and justices to receive
allowances from local government units, since it is allowed by law for LGUs to give the same (Dadole v. Commission on
Audit (393 SCRA 262 [2002]), and Leynes v. Commission on Audit (418 SCRA 180 [2003]).
Unethical for a judge to influence outcome of a case.

The conduct of a Judge may be considered unethical if he influences the outcome of a case. Rule 2.04 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct (now Sec. 3, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Judiciary) provides that “a judge
should refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency.” Although Judge A did not suggest to Judge C in whose favor the case should be decided, the fact
that he introduced B as his cousin is enough suggestion as to how the case should be decided. Canon 2 of the Code (now

Sec. 1, Canon 4 of the New Code) explicitly provides that “a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.”
No financial or business dealings of a judge.

Judge is guilty of violating Canon 5, Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for his act of transacting with
complainant in facilitating the transfer of the titles of the properties from complainant's mother to complainant and her
siblings during the conference in respondent judge's chamber. Canon 5, Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
provides, “A judge shall refrain from financial or business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court's partiality,
interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to
come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of
cases giving ground for disqualification” (Florence Ebersole Del Mar- Schuchman v. Judge Efren M. Cacatian, A.M. No. RTJ-11-
2279, April 6, 2011).
A judge as a witness in a document; not practice of law.

A judge who merely acted as a witness to a document and who explained to the party waiving his rights of
redemption over mortgaged properties and the consequences thereof, does not engage himself in the practice of law. This
appears to be more applicable to the case of Judge Maawain. He did not give professional advice in anticipation of
litigation. He was just asked to review the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate. He signed merely as an instrumental
witness and not as a legal counsel. Besides, his act was an isolated act (De Castro v. Capulong, 118 SCRA 5 (1982)).
Act of judge of asking questions during trial is proper.

The judge can justify his intervention on any of the grounds mentioned by the rule, namely, to promote justice,
avoid waste of time, or clear up some obscurity. Thus, if in asking four questions alternately with counsel for the
defendant, Judge Mausisa was only trying to clear up some obscurity, he cannot be accused of undue interference. But if his
“searching questions” were such as to give the impression that he was already acting as a counsel for the defendant, his
conduct is improper.
Burden of proof in administrative complaints against judges.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his complaint with
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. Further, it is settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function primarily lodged in the
Investigating Justice. The finding of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of
the unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. The rule which concedes due respect,
and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to
administrative cases. However, there are some exceptions to the rule according finality to the trial judge’s assessment of a
witness’ testimony, such as when his evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would affect the result of the
case(Samahan ng mga Babae sa Hudikatura (Samabahu) v. Judge Cesar O. Untalan, A.M. No. RTC-13-2363, February 25,
2015, Villarama).
Nature of the “Extra-Judicial Source Rule.”

The said rules state that to warrant disqualification, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from
an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case (Dipatuan v Mangotara, A.C. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010).
Distinctions between disqualification and inhibition of a judge.

Disqualification, compared to inhibition, is mandatory. The judge has no discretion. Further, the grounds for the
disqualification of a judge are enumerated in the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the basis for inhibition is broad enough
to leave the matter to the judge’s sound judgment.
Remittal of disqualification of a judge.

A judge disqualified may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of
disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's participation, all agree
in writing that the reason for inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding.
The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings (1989 Code, Canon
3, Rule 3.13).
Meaning of remittal of disqualification of a judge.

Remittal of disqualification is the process by which a judge who is disqualified to sit on a case on any of the
grounds enumerated in Section 5, Canon 3, may purge himself of such a disqualification so that he may act upon the case.
This process is allowed under Section 6 of the same Canon which provides:
A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose
on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers,
independently of the judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition is immaterial
or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all the
parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.
Conducting judicial proceedings in a manner and with an attitude that affirms the dignity of such proceedings is
crucial to maintaining public confidence in the judiciary. Judges should not yield to first impression, reach hasty
conclusions or prejudge matters. They have a duty to ensure that the minority status of the accused plays no part in their
decisions. Neither should judges insult witnesses in the hallway or in pleadings filed before the Supreme Court. Likewise,
judges may not use derogatory or condescending language in their judgment when dealing with a rape complaint. Due

process cannot be satisfied in the absence of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants that the
judicial system is fair and just.
A judge may not stay at his house to make some research, resolve motions and make decisions during days when
he does not have scheduled hearings.
A judge must report to his office even if he has no hearing on regular days. Pursuant to Circular No. 13, dated July
1, 1987, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for punctuality and the faithful observance of office hours with Judges
being enjoined to strictly observe the requirement of eight (8) hours of service a day. This was reiterated in Administrative
Circular No. 1 of January 28, 1988. In a decided case, it was said that the law regulating court sessions does not permit any
“day off” from regular office hours to enable a judge to engage exclusively in research or decision-writing, no matter how
important (Lacuron v.Atienza, A.M. No. RTJ-90-456, January 14, 1992).
When judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may perform the function of notaries
public ex officio.
MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities of circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in their
capacity as notary public ex officio perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provide that (1) all
notarial fees charged be for the account of the government and turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena vs Marcos,
A.M. No. 1969-MJ), and (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in such municipality or circuit (Abadilla vs Tabiliran, A.M. MTC-92-716).
When a judge may serve as an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian and a fiduciary.
When the estate, trust, ward or person for whom he will act is a member of the immediate family – which is
limited to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity – provided that the judge’s services as
fiduciary shall not interfere with the performance of his judicial functions.
Concept of “duty to sit.”

It is the duty of the judge to ensure that they would not be unnecessarily disqualified from a case. The majority
view is that the rule of disqualification of judges must yield to the demands of necessity. A judge is not disqualified to sit in
a case if there is no other judge available to hear and decide the case. The doctrine operates on the principle that a basic
judge is better than no judge at all. Under such circumstances, it is the duty of the disqualified judge to hear and decide the
controversy, however disagreeable it may be (Parayno v. Menese, G.R. No. 112684, April 26, 1994).
Judge may not be subjected to disciplinary action for mere errors of judgment.
For the liability to attach for gross negligence of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of a judge must
not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that the judge was moved by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive (Dela Cruz v. Concepcion, 235 SCRA 597).
When a judge is liable for rendering an unjust judgment.

A judge may be held liable for rendering an unjust judgment when he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some
other like motive (Heirs of the late Nassir Yasin v. Felix, 250 SCRA 545).
Judge may not grant bail motu proprio.

The judge’s act of fixing the accused’s bail and reducing the same motu proprio is not merely a deficiency in
prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of the said judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an
error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of
the law. Thus, the judge is administratively liable (Jorda v. Judge Bitas, RTJ-14-2376, March 5, 2014).
Judge may be held liable on the basis of the anonymous letter-complaint.

Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed against judges, but they
must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no
corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in
administrative proceedings which usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records
and by what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under
no obligation to prove his defense (Anonymous v. Achas, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013).
If a judge has already retired when an administrative case was filed against him, he is no longer within the court’s
jurisdiction.
In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed during the
incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of respondent’s cessation from office.
Administrative cases against judges instituted after tenure in office effectively barred the Court from pursuing the
administrative proceedings. Even if there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit, the absence of such
rules should not serve as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their
incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial audit (Office of the
Court Administrator v. Andaya, A.M. NO. RTJ-09-2181, June 25, 2013).
Effect if judge delays the disposition of cases of his sala.

A judge’s delay in acting on pending cases clearly demonstrated his inefficiency. He failed to control the
proceedings or course of the cases; to impose deadlines in the submission of documents or performance of acts incident to
the disposition of cases; and to resolve pending incidents on time; and take appropriate action on incidents arising in the
course of proceedings. A judge should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in his sala. Court management
is ultimately his responsibility.
The court has always considered the failure of a judge to decide a case within ninety (90) days as gross
inefficiency and imposed either fine or suspension from service without pay for such. The fines imposed vary in each case,

depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, to wit: the
presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances – the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the
health and age of the judge, etc. (Bernardo v. Judge Peter Montojo, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1754, October 20, 2010, Leonardo-de
Castro, J).
Effect if a judge failed to decide 23 cases already submitted for decision within the reglementary period.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months within which to
decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period. In addition,
under SC Administrative Circular No. 13 “judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section
15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases
or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while
all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so.” The Court has reiterated this admonition in SC
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the
Constitution for deciding cases and the failure to comply therewith is considered a serious violation of the constitutional
right of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases. (Re: Submitted for Decision Before Judge Baluma, A.M. No. RTJ-13-
2355, September 2, 2013, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Reason for the need to decide cases promptly.

The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the
time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be
careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith
and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case
within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of
administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. (Re: Submitted for Decision Before Judge Baluma, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355,
September 2, 2013, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
At the same time, however, the Court is also aware of the heavy case load of trial courts. The Court has allowed
reasonable extensions of time need to decide cases, but such extensions must first be requested from the Court. A judge
cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law.
Effect if there is delay in the rendition of judgments.

Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to speedy
disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and confidence
in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it to disrepute.
A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement; he/she should instead persevere
in its implementation. Heavy caseload and demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period
for disposition of cases. The Court usually allows reasonably extensions of time to decide cases in view of the heavy
caseload of the trial courts. If a judge is unable to comply with the 90-day reglementary period for deciding cases or
matters, he/she can, for good reasons, ask for an extension and such request is generally granted. But the judge did not ask
for an extension in any of these cases. Having failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of
extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante is liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction. (OCA v.
Judge Bustamante, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806, April 7, 2014, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Abusive judge,
A judge cited a person in contempt and ordered his detention for an inadvertent usurpation of his parking lot on
the theory that there was improper conduct on his part in doing so may be penalized. Under the Rules, after a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed
by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
x x x.
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice.
The phrase “improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice” is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that could constitute indirect contempt.
However, the act of complainant in parking his car in a slot allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this
category. There was no showing that he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated to delay
the proceedings of the court by making use of the parking slot supposedly reserved for respondent judge. It cannot also be
said that act of complainant constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy and
inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding. (Inonong v. Judge Francisco Ibay, A.M. No. RTC-09-
2175, July 28, 2009, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Fusing disbarment and disciplinary action against a judge,

In disbarment cases, a lawyer is entitled to due process. The rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with
disbarment does not in any way dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process. As such, her disbarment
as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring her to comment on the disbarment would be violative of her right
to due process. To accord due process to her, therefore, she should first be afforded the opportunity to defend her
professional standing as a lawyer before the Court would determine whether or not to disbar her (In fact, she was made to
show cause why she should not be disbarred).
The Court further said that it will not hesitate to impose the extreme penalty on any judicial officer who has fallen
short of the responsibilities of her worthy office. Any conduct that violates the norms of public accountability and
diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system must be condemned (Dagudag v. Paderanga, A.M. RTJ-06-2017,
June 19, 2008, 555 SCRA 217, 237). No act or omission by a Judge or Justice that falls short of the exacting norms of

holding the public office of dispensing justice can be condoned, for the most important thing for every Judge or Justice is to
preserve the people's faith and confidence in the Judiciary as well as in the individuals who dispense justice. The image of
the Judiciary must remain unsullied by the misconduct of its officials. The Court will not shirk from its duty of removing
from the Bench any Judge or Justice who has stained the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary. This is what must be done
now in these consolidated cases (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Eliza B. Yu, MTC, Branch 47, Pasay City, A.M.
No. MTJ-12-1813, & companion cases, November 22, 2016).
Charges of insubordination.
Judge Yu refused to comply with A.O. No. 19-2011 requiring judges of the MTC, Pasay City to perform night court
duties. Her ground in not complying with the Order was that, she filed a protest and that for her to comply would render
her protest moot.
Her resistance to the implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011 was unexpected. She was quiet aware that A.O. No. 19-
2011 was not a mere request for her to comply with only partially, inadequately or selectively, or for her to altogether
disregard. At the very least, her resistance to A.O. No. 19-2011 manifested an uncommon arrogance on the part of a Judge
of a court of the first-level towards the Court itself. Such attitude smacked of her unbecoming condescension towards the
Court and her judicial superiors. The Court cannot tolerate her attitude lest it needlessly sows the seeds of arrogance in
others that can ultimately destroy the faith and trust in the hierarchy of courts so essential in the effective functioning of
the administration of justice.
Moreover, Judge Yu's resistance to the implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011 disrupted the orderliness of the other
Pasay City MeTCs to the prejudice of public interest. This effect became unavoidable, for Executive Judge Colasito
necessarily required the other courts to render additional night court duties to cope with her refusal to render night court
duties.
Effect if a municipal court judge prepared and notarized an “Extrajudicial Partition with Sale.”
SC Circular No. 1-90 prohibits judges from undertaking the preparation and acknowledgment of private
documents, contracts and other deeds of conveyance which have no direct relation to the discharge of their official
functions. In this case, respondent judge admitted that he prepared both the document itself, entitled “Extra-Judicial
Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale” and the acknowledgment of the said document, which had no relation
at all to the performance of his function as a judge. These acts of respondent judge are clearly proscribed by the aforesaid
Circular.
While it may be true that no notary public was available or residing within respondent judge’s territorial
jurisdiction, as shown by the certifications issued by the RTC Clerk of Court and the Municipal Mayor of Talibon, Bohol, SC
Circular No. 1-90 specifically requires that a certification attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in the said
municipality or circuit be made in the notarized document. Here, no such certification was made in the Extra-Judicial
Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale. Respondent judge also failed to indicate in his answer as to whether or
not any notarial fee was charged for that transaction, and if so, whether the same was turned over to the Municipal
Treasurer of Talibon, Bohol. Clearly, then, respondent judge, who was the sitting judge of the MCTC, Talibon-Getafe, Bohol,
failed to comply with the aforesaid conditions prescribed by SC Circular No. 1-90, even if he could have acted as notary
public ex-officio in the absence of any lawyer or notary public in the municipality or circuit to which he was assigned.
(Fuentes v. Judge Buno, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1204, July 28, 2008, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Qualities should a judge possess should possess to render justice.

To be able to render justice and maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges should be embodiments of
competence, integrity and independence.” Judges are also “expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules and to apply them properly in all good faith.” Judges are “likewise expected to demonstrate
mastery and the principles of law, keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence, and discharge their duties in accordance
therewith.”
It has been previously held that when a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law.
“Anything less is gross ignorance of the law.” There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge
was “gross patent, deliberate or malicious.” It may also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply
settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. (Chua Keng Sin v. Judge Mangente, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1851,
February 11, 2015, Leonen, J).
Attributes and singularities of a judge.

The Constitution states: “A member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity,
and independence.” (Art. VII, Sec. 7(3)).
He is a judge who is a man of learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight acquainting himself
with the great body of traditions and the learning of the law. He bears himself in the community with friends but without
familiars; almost lonely, evoking himself exclusively to the most exacting mistress that man ever had, the law as a
profession in its highest reaches where he not only interprets the law but applies it, fearing neither friend nor foe, fearing
only one thing in the world — that in a moment of abstraction, or due to human weakness, he may in fact commit some
error and fail to do justice. (Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, A.M. RTJ-91-758, September 26, 1994, 237 SCRA 1).
Judges are not common men and women, whose errors men and women forgive and time forgets. Judges sit as
embodiment of the people’s sense of justice, their least recourse where all institutions have failed. (Dela Cruz v. Pascua,
A.M. RTJ-99-1461, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 569).
Relationship between the judge on the one hand and media and public opinion on the other.
Media, as an institution, is undisputedly a pillar of a democratic polity. It is the main engine in the formulation of
public opinion. It can indeed influence in large measure all instrumentalities of government — sometimes, even the
judiciary. This reality sometimes clashes with the doctrine of judicial independence — and this happens when media
intrudes into the domain of judicial adjudication. In such a case, judges are advised that, in furtherance of the canon of
judicial independence, they should ignore public opinion, disregard intrusive editorials and columns and brush aside the
horn in arguments and opinions of TV and radio commentators.

In Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, the SC said:
It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the
detriment of the impartial administration of justice. The petitioner as portrayed by media is not exactly
a popular person. Nevertheless, the trial court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant
consideration, remembering instead that its only guide was the mandate of the law.
Corollary, a judge should not be afraid to render unpopular decisions. He is not supposed to
seek popularity but to render justice. If a judge believes that his decision is supported by the evidence
and the applicable law, he should render it even if he has a reasonable apprehension that he would be
pillored by media or the public for his judgment. Justice commands that in such a situation, the judge
should be willing to bite the bullet — that is what moral courage is all about! (Libarios v. Dabalos, A.M.
RTJ-89-1286, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48).
Judges and their relationship with society

Section 6, Canon 1 provides:
SECTION 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the
particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it
is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in
social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members of the
bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action
as may reasonably tend to weaken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element
in determining his judicial course. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 30).
It is desirable that the judge should, as far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally
tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp his judgment and prevent an impartial attitude of mind in the
administration of judicial duties. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 25 (Personal investment and relations), paragraph 1, 2
sentence).
Judges are not required to live a hermit’s life. They should socialize and be sensitive to social concerns and
developments. Judges may join civil, religious or professional organizations but their membership in these organizations
should not interfere with their judicial tasks. There is nothing more regrettable and probably unbearable for a judge than
to suffer an ignominious dismissal from the service due to slothfulness and inefficiency and failure to render services that
could have been fully rendered were it not for the extrajudicial activities, which distracted the judge’s time and efforts
from his or her official duties. (E. Pineda, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 1994 ed., p. 392).
More importantly, judges should not fraternize with litigants and their counsel. In fact, they should make a
conscious effort to avoid them in order to avoid the perception that their independence has been compromised. Under the
1989 Code, a judge must refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to ‘increase involvement with lawyers or
persons likely to come before the court. (CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5, Rule 5.02).
Meaning of impartiality of a judge.

Impartiality is the capacity of a judge to apply the law and render justice fairly, without favor, bias or prejudice.
A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to his fairness and integrity. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and
the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice. (Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-04-1538, March 12,
2004, 425 SCRA 413).
While a judge should profess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce it, it is
more important that he should act and behave in a manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his
impartiality. (Fernandez v. Presbitero, A.M. No. 486-MJ, September 13, 1977, 79 SCRA 60; Tan v. Gallardo, Nos. L-41213-14,
October 5, 1976, 73 SCRA 306). Verily, a judge should always exhibit the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. (Cojuangco v.
PCGG, G.R. No. 92319-20, October 2, 1990, 190 SCRA 226; Javier v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986,
144 SCRA 194; Villapando v. Quitain, G.R. No. L-41333, January 20, 1977, 75 SCRA 25; Castillo v. Juan, G.R. Nos. 39516-17,
January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 124).
Impermissible conduct and comment of a Judge

The manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the
accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to
first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays
himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own
sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties, as well as the public, that he follows the traditional mode
of adjudication requiring that he hears both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust
decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to
hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality.
What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics; it is impressed with constitutional significance. (Castillo v.
Juan, 62 SCRA 1245 (1975)).
IMPARTIALITY
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.
The judge raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to party litigants or witnesses may be
penalized due to partiality. Respondent failed to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, (A.M. NO. 03-05-01-SC [2004]) which reads:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge
deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and
others subject to their influence, direction or control.
A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court, (De la Cruz v. Carretas,
559 Phil. 5 (2007) citing Retuya v. Equipilag, 180 Phil. 335 [1979]), viz:
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of
patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must
choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is
esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness. (Ascano, Jr., et al. v. Judge
Jose Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015).
Serious misconduct, a ground for dismissal of judge.

In OCA v. Judge Hector Salise, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2514, January 30, 2018, after a judicial audit in the court where
the judge was assigned, the following were found:
1) The judge indiscriminately dismissed criminal case despite finding probable cause and even if they were
already set for pre-trial;
2) He decided actions for nullity of marriages prematurely;
3) He granted bail in non-bailable cases without hearing on petition for bail.
The judge in the administrative case never denied such acts and even apologized for the procedural lapses. In
finding him guilty of serious misconduct, the SC
Held: It is settled that, unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may not be administratively liable for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law, or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the
adjudication of cases (Andrada v. Judge Banzon, 592 Phil. 229, 233-234 [2008]). However, when the inefficiency springs
from a failure to recognize such a basic and fundamental rule, law, or principle, the judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and title vested upon him, or he is too vicious that he deliberately committed the oversight or
omission in bad faith and in grave abuse of authority (DOJ v. Judge Mislang, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 and A.M. No. RTJ-14-
2372, July 26, 2016, 798 SCRA 225, 235). Here, the attendant circumstances would reveal that Judge Salise's acts
contradict any claim of good faith.
Although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary actions for every erroneous order or decision he
issues, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory
prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers granted to them by the law, there will be, not only confusion in the
administration of justice, but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements under the law and established rules. For
repeatedly and deliberately committing irregularities in the disposition of his cases, thereby manifesting corrupt
inclinations, Judge Salise can be said to have misused said powers.
When judge may be adjudged liable for serious misconduct.

To hold a judge administratively liable for serious misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official
acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption, malice or ill will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice. The Court has repeatedly and consistently
held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties
that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are
violated they can go to a judge who shall give them impartial justice. They must trust the judge; otherwise, they will not go
to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness; otherwise, they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect. Judge Salise's acts indubitably
violated said trust and confidence, seriously impairing the image of the judiciary to which he owes the duty of loyalty and
obligation to keep it at all times above reproach and worthy of the people's trust.
Gross ignorance and misconduct of judge; grounds for dismissal.

A judge can be charged with gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct for rendering judgment without citing
the required factual and legal bases in violation of the Constitution. In a murder case, he downgraded it to homicide even
without evidence of mitigating circumstances; he also appreciated the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of incomplete self-defense even if there was no evidence.
It is settled that, unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may not be administratively liable for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law, or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the
adjudication of cases (Andrada v. Judge Banzon, 592 Phil. 229, 233-234 [2008]). However, when the inefficiency springs
from a failure to recognize such a basic and fundamental rule, law, or principle, the judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and title vested upon him, or he is too vicious that he deliberately committed the oversight or
omission in bad faith and in grave abuse of authority (DOJ v. Judge Mislang, 798 Phil. 225, 235 [2016]). Here, the attendant
circumstances would reveal that the acts of Judge Dumayas contradict any claim of good faith. And since the violated
constitutional provision is so elementary, failure to abide by it constitutes gross ignorance of the law, without even a need
for the complainant to prove any malice or bad faith on the part of the judge (OCA v. Judge Winlove Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-
15-2435, March 6, 2018).
Evidence to prove gross misconduct, ignorance of the law.

To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts
in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice. The judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants arc

entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give
them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the
Justice they expect (Lai v. People, 762 Phil. 434, 443 [2015]; See also: OCA v. Judge Hector Salise, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2514,
January 30, 2018).
Dismissal of judge due to ignorance of the law.

A judge was dismissed for ignorance of the law by recalling warrants of arrest allegedly issued inadvertently
without any explanation.
In the judicial determination of probable cause, no less than the Constitution mandates a judge to personally
determine the existence of probable case before issuing a warrant of arrest (Section 2, Article III of the Philippine
Constitution and Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure).
The judge is mandated to personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existing of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, to issue a warrant of arrest. Though she was
not required to personally examine the complainant or his witnesses, she was obliged to personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor before ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
As the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused (Baltazar v. People, 582 Phil. 275, 290 (2008)). It
was incumbent upon her to assess the resolution, affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
to satisfy herself that probable cause existed and before a warrant of arrest could be issued against the accused (People of
the Philippines v. Grey, 639 Phil. 535, 549 (2010)). If she did find the evidence submitted by the prosecutor to be
insufficient, she could order the dismissal of the case, or direct the investigating prosecutor either to submit more
evidence or to submit the entire records of the preliminary investigation, or she could even call the complainant and the
witness to answer the courts probing questions to enable her to discharge her duty.
Most probably, she did her duty to examine and analyze the attached documents but because she took pity on the
young accused (never mind the victim), she chose to ignore or disregard them. Nonetheless, "when the inefficiency
springs from failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, law or principle in the discharge of duties, the judge
is either insufferably incompetent and undeserving of the position she holds or is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority" (Atty. Causing, et al. v. Judge
Jose Lorenzo Dela Rosa, OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ, March 7, 2018, Caguioa, J).
On the hasty dismissal of criminal cases.

A Judge was held administratively accountable for hastily dismissing the criminal cases. There was lack of
prudence.
Once a complaint or information is filed before the trial court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court (Crespo v. Mogul, 235
Phil. 465 (1987)) is not absolute. Although a motion to dismiss the case or withdraw the Information is addressed to the
court, its grant or denial must always be in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative (Auto Prominence
Corporation v. Winterkorn, 597 Phil. 47, 58 (2009); Bago v. Judge Pagayatan, 602 Phil. 459, 469 (2009)). For the judge's
action must neither impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the State and the offended party to
due process of law (Dimatulac v. Judge Villon, 358 Phil. 328, 365 (1998); People v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 401
[1999]).
The judge dismissed the cases saying that there was no probable cause. This was done despite the admission that
there was hazing. She brushed aside the admission.
A judge must be reminded that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged (Paredes v. Calilung, 546 Phil. 198, 224 (2007)) for it would be unfair to require the
prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused upon the filing of the information
against the latter (People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 401, 415 (1999); Atty. Causing, et al. v. Judge Jose
Lorenzo Dela Rosa, OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ, March 7, 2018, Caguioa, J).
Gross ignorance of the law; order recalling a judgment of acquittal.

A judge was sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law for recalling a judgment of acquittal. The reason given was
that the judgment of acquittal was rendered without all the facts and circumstances being brought to her attention.
Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to
correct errors which are clerical in· nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive
portion or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial. A final decision is the law of the case
and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness. In criminal cases, a judgment of
acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases
already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a
court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.
Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent in a decision. Applying the aforestated rule,
the decision became final and immutable on the same day. As a member of the bench who is always admonished to be
conversant with the latest legal and judicial developments, more so of elementary rules, respondent should have known
that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but
also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law (Argel v. Judge Pascua, 415 Phil. 608 [2001]; People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 223099, January 11,
2018, Tijam, J).
Member of SC warned for violating sub judice rule.

In Re: Show Cause Order in The Decision dated May 11, 2018, in G.R. No. 237428 (Rep. v. Sereno, A.M. No.
18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018, Tijam, J), respondent was subjected to a quo warranto proceeding before the SC basically
questioning her eligibility for the position of Chief Justice. She refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the SC but opted to

defend herself in public through speeches and interviews, discussing the merits of the case making comments thereon to
vilify the members of Congress, cast aspersions of the impartialit of the SC, degrade the faith of the people in the judiciary
and falsely impute ill motives against the government that it was orchestrating the charges against her. In her answer, she
argued among others:
(1) Respondent contends that she should not be judged on the stringent standards set forth
in the CPR and the NCJC, emphasizing that her participation in the quo warranto case is
not as counsel or a judge but as a party-litigant.
(2) The imputed acts against respondent did not create any serious and imminent threat to
the administration of justice to warrant the Court's exercise of its power of contempt in
accordance with the "clear and present danger" rule. Respondent avers that she cannot be
faulted for the attention that the quo warranto case gained from the public considering
that it is a controversial case, which involves issues of transcendental importance.
(3) Assuming arguendo that the CPR and the NCJC apply, respondent argues that in
addressing the matters of impeachment and quo warranto to the public, she was in fact
discharging her duty as a Justice and a lawyer to uphold the Constitution and promote
respect for the law and legal processes pursuant to the said Codes.
(4) Assuming arguendo that respondent violated some provisions of the CPR and the NCJC in
her public statements, the same does not warrant the exercise of the Court's power to
discipline in view of the attendant circumstances, to wit: (a) no less than the Solicitor
General repeatedly made personal attacks against her and publicly discussed the merits
of the case, hence, she had to respond to such accusations against her; and (b) she was not
given her right to due process despite her repeated demand.
May respondent be held administratively liable for her actions and public statements as regards the quo warranto
case against her during its pendency?
Held: Yes. First. The Court cannot subscribe to respondent's position that she was merely a party-litigant in the quo
warranto case, not a counsel nor a judge, hence, should not be judged on the exacting standards expected of a member of
the Bar or of the Court.
The high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing are expected and required of members of the Bar. Lawyers
must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times,
whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large. Lawyers may be disciplined for acts committed even in
their private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion
of the public. There can be no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in lawyers' private lives or in their
professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
"Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be
tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in
which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law" (Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera, 392 Phil. 1, 17 [2000]).
For the same reasons, judges or Justices are held to a higher standard for they should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence, hence, their conduct should be above reproach (Barrios v. Atty. Martinez, 485
Phil. 1, 14 [2004]).
She cannot be treated as ordinary litigant.

That she should be treated as an ordinary litigant in judging her actions cannot be accepted. The fact that
respondent was not the judge nor the counsel but a litigant in the subject case does not strip her off of her membership in
the Bar, as well as her being a Member and the head of the highest court of the land at that time. Her being a litigant does
not mean that she was free to conduct herself in less honorable manner than that expected of a lawyer or a judge.
Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer and/or a judge, be it in their public or private activities,
which tends to show said lawyer/judge deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to
warrant suspension or disbarment. Respondent should be reminded:
Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws, as he is
their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample
them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and
sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards
of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules
of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar
and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession,
has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a
right but a bounden duty as well x x x. That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its
members.
Sub judice rule violated; effect.

Respondent argued that the public statements attributed to her must have created a serious and imminent threat
to the administration of justice to warrant punishment.
According to respondent, the public utterances in question did not create such effect of a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice; did not, in any way, prevent or delay the Court from rendering its judgment; and
criticism and public reaction remained within the bounds of proper debate and despite widespread dissent, no violent
protest erupted after the decision was promulgated. Further, respondent averred that considering that the quo warranto
case in itself was already controversial and of transcendental importance, her public statements and actions cannot be
blamed for the natural attention that it gained from the public.
Did she violate the sub judice rule?
Held: Yes. Sub Judice is a Latin term which refers to matters under or before a judge or court; or matters under judicial
consideration. In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial

proceedings. The restriction applies to litigants and witnesses, the public in general, and most especially to members of the
Bar and the Bench.
Discussions regarding sub Judice often relates to contempt of court. In this regard, respondent correctly pointed
out that the "clear and present danger" rule should be applied in determining whether, in a particular situation, the court's
contempt power should be exercised to maintain the independence and integrity of the Judiciary, or the Constitutionally-
protected freedom of speech should be upheld. Indeed, in P/Supt. Marantan v. Atty. Diokno, et al., 726 Phil. 642 [2014], the
Court explained:
The sub Judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings
in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, xx x.
xx xx
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of
contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be
punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does
impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to be
protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case.
The specific rationale for the sub Judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice
or sympathies.
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their
business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their
decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of
freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present
danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two
rights.
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be
"extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished.
There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice.
Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court
unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat.
From the foregoing, respondent may be correct in arguing that there must exist a "clear and present danger" to
the administration of justice for statements or utterances covered by the sub Judice rule to be considered punishable under
the rules of contempt.
Sub judice rule may be dealt with in administrative actions.

Actions in violation of the sub Judice rule may be dealt with not only through contempt proceedings but also
through administrative actions. This is because a lawyer’s speech is subject to greater regulation for two significant
reasons: one, because of the lawyer's relationship to the judicial process; and two, the significant dangers that a lawyer's
speech poses to the trial process (Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida v. Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018, citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)). Hence,
the Court En Banc resolved to treat this matter in this separate administrative action. Indeed, the Court has the plenary
power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceeding, aimed to purge the law profession of unworthy
members of the Bar and to preserve the nobility
and honor of the legal profession.
Clear and present danger inapplicable.

Thus, contrary to respondent's argument, the "clear and present danger" rule does not find application in this
case. What applies in this administrative matter is the CPR and NCJC, which mandate the strict observance of the sub Judice
rule both upon members of the Bar and the Bench, specifically:
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
In the quo warranto case decision, the Court took judicial notice of the undeniably manifest detrimental effect of
this open and blatant disregard of the sub judice rule, which is a clear manifestation of the evil sought to be prevented by
the said rule, i.e., "to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.”
Respondent made public utterances on several occasions regarding the quo warranto case.
These public utterances did not only tend to arouse public opinion on the matter but as can be clearly gleaned
from the tenor of the statements, such comments, speeches, and interviews given by the respondent in
different forums indisputably tend to tarnish the Court's integrity and unfairly attributed false motives against its
Members. Particularly, in several occasions, respondent insinuated the following: (i) that the grant of the quo warranto
petition will result to dictatorship; (ii) in filing the quo warranto petition, the livelihood and safety of others are likewise in
danger; (iii) that the people could no longer rely on the Court's impartiality; and (iv) that she could not expect fairness
from the Court in resolving the quo warranto petition against her.
Thus, while it may be true that the quo warranto case was controversial and naturally invited public attention to
itself without necessity of respondent's statements, the fact remains that respondent, who is a lawyer and who was then

asserting right to the highest position in the Judiciary, succumbed to and participated in the affray that diverted the quo
warranto proceeding from its primary purpose and created a great deal of antipathy from the public to the Court and its
Members.
Contention that statements did not influence outcome of the case.

She claimed that she merely echoed her arguments in her pleadings submitted before the Court and that the same
could not have influenced the outcome of the case nor caused obfuscation of the issues therein since the issues to which
the utterances relate are the very same issues raised by the parties in their pleadings invoking P/Supt. Marantan, 726 Phil.
624 [2014], wherein the Court ruled that therein respondents' statement of their opinion were mere reiterations of their
position in a related case, which according to the Court was not malicious and does not even tend to influence the court.
Respondent's reliance thereon, however, was misplaced and found no application in the present case. In P/Supt.
Marantan, the subject public statements were indeed a reiteration of therein respondent's position in the related criminal
case. A reading of the questioned public utterances in the said case would show that they were merely expressions of the
victims' families and their counsel's opinion and position in the criminal case that P/Supt. Marantan perpetrated the
murder of the victims.
In the case at hand, she directed her statements to the merits of the quo warranto case, to influence the public and
the Members of the Court, and to attack the dignity and authority of the institution.
She cannot justify her attacks against the Court under the guise of merely discharging her duties as a Justice and a member
of the Bar. No matter how passionate a lawyer is towards defending his cause or what he believes in, he must not forget to
display the appropriate decorum expected of him, being a member of the legal profession, and to continue to afford proper
and utmost respect due to the courts (Ret. Judge Virgilio Alpajora v. Atty. Rona/do Antonio V. Calayan, A.C. No. 8208,
January 10, 2018). As the nation's then highest-ranking judicial official, it is with more reason that respondent is expected
to have exercised extreme caution in giving her opinions and observed genuine confidence to the Court's processes.
As aptly and eloquently concluded by Justice Marvic M. V.F. Leonen in his Dissenting Opinion in the quo warranto
case, respondent, not only as a member of the Bar, but more importantly, as Chief Justice of the Court, must exemplify the
highest degree of leadership, and must refrain from activities that will tend to cause unwarranted attacks against the
Court.
Effect of OSG’s statements to the media.

It was respondent's position that her act of speaking in public was justified since there was a series of onslaught
on her integrity over the media coming from no less than the Solicitor General himself. Further, respondent insisted that
newsman, Jomar Canlas, publicized information to condition the minds of the public that she should be removed from
office. Is the contention correct? Why?
Held: No. The tenor of the statements made by the Solicitor General, as well as the newsman, was never made to challenge
the Court's authority or to undermine its ability to pass judgment with impartiality. Neither were those statements aimed
at criticizing the professional competence and responsibility of the magistrates as well as the Court as a collegial body.
Those statements had nothing to do with assailing the capacity of the Court to render justice according to law, which is
what the respondent has been doing through her public speeches.
At most, the Solicitor General's statements are the harmless statements contemplated in the case of P/Supt.
Marantan, i.e., mere reiterations of the Republic's position in the quo warranto case.
On the other hand, the newsman's questioned statements are nothing but a publication of reports on the status of
the case, whether true or not, which on its face notably comes within the purview of the freedom of the press. An ordinary
citizen's action cannot be judged with the same standard on this matter as that of a member of the Bar and Bench. Also,
whether or not the Solicitor General or any newsman attacked respondent finds no relevance to her liability for her
violative actions and statements. At the risk of being repetitive, it bears stressing that lawyers, as first and foremost
officers of the court, must never behave in such a way that would diminish the sanctity and dignity of the courts even
when confronted with rudeness and insolence.
Respondent merely warned.

"Lawyer discipline x x x is not meant to punish; rather, its purpose is to protect clients, the public, the courts, and
the legal profession. Conviction, punishment, retribution, much less, denigration have no place in administrative
proceedings against lawyers.
Guided by the foregoing, despite the severity of the offenses committed by respondent, the SC was constrained to
suspend the application of the full force of the law and impose a lighter penalty. Mindful of the fact that respondent was
removed and disqualified as Chief Justice as a result of quo warranto proceedings, suspending her further from law
practice would be too severe to ruin the career and future of respondent. We are also not inclined to merely disregard
respondent's length of service in the government, specifically, when she was teaching in the University of the Philippines,
as well as during her incumbency in this Court. Further, the fact that, per available record, respondent has not been
previously found administratively liable is significant in determining the imposable penalty. These factors have always
been considered by the Court in the determination of proper sanctions in such administrative cases. The Court is not
merciless and opts to dispense judicial clemency even if not sought by respondent.
To be clear, however, this accommodation is not a condonation of respondent's wrongdoings but a second chance
for respondent to mend her ways, express remorse for her disgraceful conduct, and be forthright to set an example for all
law-abiding members of the legal profession. The legal profession is a noble profession: as a former Member of this Court,
it is incumbent upon respondent to exemplify respect, obedience, and adherence to this institution. This judicial
temperance is not unprecedented as the Court has in several cases reduced the imposable penalties so that erring lawyers
are encouraged to repent, reform, and be rehabilitated.
Undue interference of a Judge in the conduct of trial

A judge who ordered the presentation of specific documentary evidence without a corresponding motion from
any party or without the participation of the parties committed an act of undue interference in the conduct of the trial
which tended to build or bolster the case of one of the parties. The judge’s act violates the canon of impartiality. (Ty v.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. Nos. 149797-98, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 649).

Certainly, a judge can ask questions from witnesses but this should be limited to clarifying vague points in the
narration of witnesses. Questions designed to disentangle obscurity in the testimony and to elicit additional relevant
evidence to fill in the gaps in a testimony are not improper. (Paco v. Quilala, et. al., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1699, October 15, 2003,
413 SCRA 364). In other words, what is prohibited is the asking of adversarial or impeaching questions.
In disposing of a criminal case, a judge should avoid appearing like an advocate for either party. It is also
improper for a judge to push actively for amicable settlement against the wishes of a party. A judge’s unwelcome
persistence makes the judge vulnerable to suspicions of favoritism. (Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-04-1535,
March 12, 2004, 425 SCRA 40).
Not sufficient basis for inhibition of a Judge for bias or prejudice

Bare allegations of partially and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his role to dispense justice according to law and evidence
without fear or favor. (Heirs of Juaban v. Boncale, et. al., G.R. No. 156011, July 6, 2008, 557 SCRA 1; Law Firm of Tungcol &
Tibayan v. CA, G.R. No. 169298, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 451).
Inhibition must be for just and valid causes: mere impression of bias and partiality is not ground for a judge to
inhibit, especially when the charge is without sufficient basis. (City of Naga v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 174042, July 9, 2008, 528
SCRA 528).
Judge’s knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts

In Umale v. Villaluz, G.R. No. 33508, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 84, the Supreme Court commended a judge who
voluntarily inhibited himself on the ground that he had personal knowledge of the case.
When a judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings, he should recuse
from the case.
The purpose of this ground for disqualification is to avoid a situation where a judge may factor into the decisional
process facts which are not borne out by evidence duly presented in and admitted by the court in the course of trial. Thus,
any kind of knowledge of a judge which he obtains extrajudicially about a case before him should be sufficient reason for
him to recuse from the case. For example, if a judge witnessed the killing of a person, he should disqualify himself from
trying a criminal case involving such incident which is filed and raffled to his court.
Partiality of a judge; disqualification.

A Municipal Trial Court judge took cognizance of a criminal complaint lodged by his brother, and issued a warrant
of arrest, may be disciplined for his act. The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the
instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the
salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to his fairness and integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or
impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the
absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the
court’s justice. (Garcia v. Dela Pena, A.M. No. MTJ-92-637, February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA 766).
Voluntary inhibition
A judge is allowed under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, to voluntary inhibit
from a case for just or valid reasons other than those grounds of disqualification. The judge should always remind himself
to hear or decide cases filed or raffled to his court. In inhibition of judges, a judge may motu proprio or on motion of a
party voluntarily recuse from a case if he has good or valid reasons which render him incapable of acting objectively on the
case.
Absent any ground for disqualification, a judge should not inhibit and if a motion to that effect is filed, he should
deny it if, despite the circumstances cited by the movant, he honestly believes that he can act on the case objectively. That
notwithstanding, it may be helpful for a judge, faced with a motion to inhibit, to consider the counsel of the Supreme Court:
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made
of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts
of justice is not impaired.
One factor that a judge should consider in resolving a motion for voluntary inhibition is the availability of a judge
to take over the case should he decide to recuse from it. Parayno v. Meneses, G.R. No. 112684, April 26, 1994, 231 SCRA
807, suggests that under the circumstances, the judge should not inhibit in order that justice may not be delayed.
Administrative complaint against justices pending petition with SC is not proper; judicial remedies should be
availed.
The acts complained of in an administrative case against justices of the CA relate to the validity of the proceedings
before the CA which were done in the exercise of their judicial functions. Resort to administrative charges against them is
not proper.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through
available judicial remedies. (Maylas, Jr. v. Sese, 529 Phil. 594, 597 (2006); Bautista v. Abdulwahid, A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-
CA-J, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 428, 434). Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or
substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties
aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments. (Monticalbo v. Maraya, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197, April 13, 2011, 648
SCRA 573, 583, citing Flores v. Abesamis, 341 Phil. 299, 313 (1997)).
In Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. Laviña, 530 Phil. 441 (2006), it was ruled that resort to and exhaustion of judicial
remedies and a final ruling on the matter, are prerequisites for the taking of appropriate measures against the judges

concerned, whether of criminal, civil or administrative nature. If the assailed act is subsequently found and declared to be
correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all.
Resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the judicial issues involved constitutes
an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice and further
clog the courts’ dockets. Those who seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and abuse
court processes in their efforts to vindicate their rights. (Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land Inc. against Hon. Bueser, et
al., A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-202-CA-J, January 5, 2013; See also: Fernandez, et al. v. CA Associate Justice Bato, et al., A.M. OCA
IPI No. 12-201-CA-J, February 19, 2013).
IMPEACHMENT
No disbarment of SC Chief Justice.
Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine
Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for
disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to ran
afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and
conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution (Cuenco v.Fernan, A.M. No. 3135, February 17, 1988).
RULE 137 – DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Grounds for Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges under the Rules of Court:
1. Mandatory or Compulsory Disqualification (RULES OF COURT, Rule 137)(PREP)
a. When he, or his wife, or child is Pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise;
b. When he is Related to either party within the sixth (6th) degree of consanguinity or affinity or to counsel
within the fourth (4th) civil degree;
c. When he has been an Executor, guardian, administrator, trustee or counsel; or
d. When he has Presided in an inferior court where his ruling or decision is subject to review.
2. Voluntary Inhibition: A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself, for just and valid
reasons other than those mentioned above (Rule 137, Sec. 1).
Rationale: No judge should handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to
bias and partiality (Ubanes v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 72, 1994).
Party litigant related to judge; inhibition.

The judge is not justified in not inhibiting himself if a party litigant is related to him. It is mandatory for him to
inhibit if he is related to any of the parties bv consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil. Judge A, being the stepfather
of Rebecca, is related to her by affinity by just one degree. “Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any
proceeding in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer
that they are unable to decide the matter impartially”. The fact that Rebecca is a daughter of Judge A’s wife is enough to
make a reasonable observer doubt him impartiality.
Related within the 6th degree of consanguinity/affinity.

Under Rule 137, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, a judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing,
signed by them, and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which he acts by resolving motions
and issuing orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent
not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part
in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned (Canon 3, Rule 3.12) and he should administer
justice impartially and without delay (Canon 1, Rule 1.02; Lazo v. Judge Antonio Tiong, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173, December 15,
1998, 101 SCAD 692).
Effect if judge and a party litigant belong to the same religious sect.
The fact that a judge and Litigant R both belong to the INK while Litigant S belongs to the El Shaddai group, is not
a mandatory ground for disqualifying Judge Q from presiding over the case. The motion for his inhibition is addressed to
his sound discretion and he should exercise the same in a way the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. He
should reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the Judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him (Dimacuha v. Concepcion, 117 SCRA 630).
Effect if judge gives advise to party to settle.

The act of a judge, in order to ease his clogged docket, would exert efforts to compel the accused in criminal cases
to plead guilty to a lesser offense and advise party litigants in civil cases, whose petitions appear weak, to accept the
compromise offered by the opposing party is legally acceptable.
The practice is legally acceptable as long as the judge does not exert pressure on the parties and takes care that he
does not appear to have prejudged the case. Where a judge has told a party that his case is weak before the latter was fully
heard, such was considered as a ground for his disqualification (Castillo v. Juan, 62 SCRA 124).
Good Luck to All 2019 Bar Examinees

We Are Praying for Your Success.
God Bless You!
From: ABRC Family

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MAGIC AREAS IN

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

Nature of the practice of law.

Nature of the legal profession.

Meaning of practice of law.

Malpractice a ground for suspension; legal profession is not a business.

Conduct unbecoming of judge; practice of law of judge.

1 | ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics (NEW) revised/EVSA/crys

Lawyer not to decline engagement even if he believes accused is guilty.

Important role of attorney in the administration of justice.

2 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics (NEW) revised/EVSA/crys

BAR MATTER 1153

When Lawyer in government may be disciplined as member of the Bar.

Law student appearing in court.

Nature of the “Revolving Door Doctrine.”

How disqualification sought by “adverse-interest conflict.”

How disqualification sought by “congruent-interest representation conflict.”

Duties of an attorney. (CC-AA-RREED)

3 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics (NEW) revised/EVSA/crys

Duties of lawyer the moment there is a lawyer-client relationship.

Lawyers are officers of the court; expected to act with honesty.

4 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics (NEW) revised/EVSA/crys

Primary duty of a lawyer.

Relationship is highly fiduciary.

Practice of law, a form of public trust.

Effect of lawyer’s failure to file answer to complaint against client.

5 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics (NEW) revised/EVSA/crys

Willful disregard of processes of the Court.

Lawyer owes fidelity to client.

Relationship between lawyer and client; fiduciary.

Effect of misappropriation of client’s money.

Neglect of client’s cause.

6 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics (NEW) revised/EVSA/crys

Lawyer is duty-bound to prevent unauthorized practice of law.

Distinguish a contingent contract from a champertous contract.

Doctrine of imputed knowledge.

Nature of an attorney-client relationship.

Tests to determine conflict of interest.

7 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics (NEW) revised/EVSA/crys

Rules in case of conflict of interest.

Rule against prohibition of representing conflicting interest not absolute.

8 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics (NEW) revised/EVSA/crys

Purpose of disciplinary proceedings.

Basic purpose of administrative proceedings against lawyers.

Nature of Disciplinary Proceedings

9 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics (NEW) revised/EVSA/crys

Neglect of duties; a ground for suspension; failure to appear; delay.

Lawyer was suspended; failure to pay obligation.

Son of a lawyer may purchase a property subject of litigation.

10 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics (NEW) revised/EVSA/crys

Other statutory grounds:

Power to discipline members of the Bar.

Plenary power of the SC over attorneys.

Lawyer was disbarred due to immoral conduct.

11 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics (NEW) revised/EVSA/crys

Suspension; authority to appear as consel terminates after death of client.

Lawyer need not prove right to represent client; exception.

12 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Legal and Judicial Ethics (NEW) revised/EVSA/crys

Suspension; lawyer appeared as counsel while serving suspension.

Effect if a misconduct committed outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Effect of suspension from practice of law abroad.

Requirements in a complaint for disbarment.

Material misrepresentation by a Bar Candidate.