Primicias vs Ocampo, G.R. No.
L-6120 On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ASSESSORS; TRIAL WITH
AID OF ASSESSORS, A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. — The
right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense that it
must be created and defined by express enactment as opposed to
a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress
therefor. The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section
154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old
Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are
not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
This is so because in said section 154 this matter is referred to as
a right given by law to a party litigant. Section 1477 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such a manner that a
similar right is implied when invoked by a party litigant. It says
that the aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code
of Civil Procedure. And this right has been declared absolute
and substantial by the Supreme Court in several cases where the
aid of assessors had been invoked (Berbari v. Concepcion Et.
Al., 40 Phil., 320; Colegio de San Jose v. Sison, 56 Phil., 344).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIVE MATTER, DISTINGUISHED
FROM PROCEDURAL. — A substantive law creates, defines
or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the
powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of
public affairs, whereas rules of procedure are provisions
prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be
enforced in courts of justice. (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1952 ed., p. 4; Bustos v. Lucero, 46 Off. Gaz., Jan.
supp., pp. 445, 448.)
3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ASSESSORS; TRIAL;
RIGHT TO ASSESSORS STILL EXISTS IN MANILA AND
IN PROVINCES. — The promulgation of the Rules of Court
did not have the effect of repealing the provisions on assessors
embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure. These provisions have
not been incorporated by the Supreme Court in the present Rules
of Court because they are substantive in nature. This remedy
may be invoked not only in Manila but in all other places where
it existed prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Court. The
provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil
Procedure are still in force and the same may still be invoked in
the light of the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No.
409.
Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of
Manila with two statutory offenses, namely, (1) with a violation
of Commonwealth Act No. 606... in that he knowingly chartered
a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien... without the approval
of the President of the Philippines and (2) with a violation of
section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised
Administrative Code... in that he failed to submit to the
Collector of Customs the manifests... and certain authenticated
documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the
necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the
departure of said vessel for a foreign port.
On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases,
petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be appointed to
assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in
said cases... as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No.
409... which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any
civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of
First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure."  FACTS:
This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who appeared for
the People of the Philippines.
holding in effect that with the promulgation of the Rules of
Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1,
1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts of the Philippines... previously existing were not only
superseded but expressly repealed... that the Supreme Court,
having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly
omitted the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding
assessors in said Rules of Court
Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to
this court imputing abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.
Issues:
I. The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is
an absolute substantive right, and the duty of the court to
provide assessors is mandatory.
"II. The right to trial with the aid of assessors, being a
substantive right, cannot be impaired by this court in the
exercise of its rule-making power.
"III. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section
2477 of the Old Charter of Manila, creating the right to trial
with the aid of assessors, are substantive law and were not
repealed by Rules of Court.
"IV. Granting without admitting that the provisions on assessors
of the Code of Civil Procedure and the old Charter of Manila
were impliedly repealed, nevertheless, the same provisions were
later reenacted by reference in section 49 of the Revised Charter
of Manila which is now... the source of the right to trial with the
aid of assessors and which refers to the Code of Civil Procedure
merely to indicate the procedure for appointing assessors.
"V. Section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila is not invalid
class legislation and does not violate the constitutional provision
that the rules of pleading, practice and procedure 'shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade.' "
Ruling:
The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter
of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not
embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
It says that the aid may be invoked in... the manner provided in
the Code of Civil Procedure.  And this right has been declared
absolute and substantial by this Court in several cases where the
aid of assessors had been invoked... the intervention of the
assessors is not an empty formality which may be disregarded
without violating either the letter or the spirit of the law.  It is...
another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it
is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without
vitiating all the proceedings.
The contention of respondents we reckon is predicated on the
assumption that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil
Procedure had been impliedly repealed.  Such is not the case. 
We have already pointed out that the basic provisions on the
matter partake of... the nature of substantive law and as such
they were left intact by the Supreme Court.
It is therefore our opinion that the... respondent Judge acted with
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner his right to the aid of
assessors in the trial of the two criminal cases now pending in
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Bustos vs Lucero, G.R. No. 2068
The petitioner in the case appeared at the preliminary
investigation before the Justice of Peace of Masantol,
Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges
against him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon
which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel
moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and
her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the
manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private
prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel
announced his intention to renounce his right to present
evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the
court of first instance.
The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the
CFI praying that the record of the case be remanded to the
justice of peace of Masantol, on order that the petitioner might
cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection
with their testimony. The motion was denied and for that reason
the present special civil action of mandamus was instituted.
Petitioner squarely attacks the validity of the provision of
section 11 or Rule 108, on the ground that it deprives him of the
right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for
the prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is an
infringement to the provision of section 13, Article VIII, of the
Constitution hence the decision of the majority is judicial
legislation that diminishes the right of the accused.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108, like
its predecessors is an adjective law and not a substantive law or
substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and
the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rights are a term which includes those rights which
one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of
normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the
rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of
the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. As applied
to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts
are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them,
as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or
regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be
punished Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially
remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural.
Evidence — which is the "the mode and manner of proving the
competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to
establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" — is
identified with and forms part of the method by which, in
private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in
criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure
refers to pleading, evidence and practice. The entire rules of
evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We
cannot tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional
grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence
embodied in these Rules. We do not believe that the curtailment
of the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-
examine the witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is
of such importance as to offend against the constitutional
inhibition. As we have said in the beginning, preliminary
investigation is not an essential part of due process of law. It
may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere
restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder cannot
be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to
cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right
to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his
constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him
both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the
latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the
guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the
full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine
the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a
preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the
fact that this formality is frequently waived. It is inevitable that
the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive
rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not
to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh
and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates
only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage.
For the Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify
the rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's
approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a
power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system
of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to
their source.
Araullo vs Aquino, G.R. No. 209287
Facts:
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the
constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related
issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
implementing the DAP.
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that
firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
Used constitutional powers under Sec. 25(5) as a guise to use
money out of the treasury without an appropriation made by
law... indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by
allowing the Executive to allocate public money pooled from
programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in
the guise of the President exercising his... constitutional
authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to
transfer funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of
offices within the Executive Branch of the Government.
Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada... had been allotted an additional
P50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona.
Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration
Program,[1] explaining that the funds released to the Senators
had been part of... the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to
ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion.
He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators
based on their letters of request for funding
He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken
from (1) unreleased appropriations under
Personnel Services;[2] (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over
appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4)
budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been
realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website[3] that the DAP
releases had been sourced from savings generated by the
Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the
savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased
appropriations, like... unreleased Personnel Services[4]
appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year,
unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and
discontinued projects per zero-based budgeting findings;[5] and
(2) the withdrawal of... unobligated allotments also for slow-
moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to
the agencies of the National Government.
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP's
use of savings,[
Why DAP is legal according to DBM
(1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his
office in the general appropriations... law; (2) Section 49
(Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38
(Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book
VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of
2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use
of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c)
priority in the use of savings.
Issues:
Procedural Issue:... whether there is a controversy ripe for
judicial determination, and the standing of petitioners.
Substantive Issues:
B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law."
Issue pertinent to Sec. 25
C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other
executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate
Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution insofar as:
(a) They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated
allotments withdrawn from government agencies as "savings" as
the term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the
GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013;
(b) They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or
programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive
Department; and
(c) They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in
the GAAs
D. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection
Clause, (2) the system of checks and balances, and (3) the
principle of public accountability enshrined in the 1987
Constitution considering that it authorizes the release of funds
upon the request of... legislators.
E. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a
temporary restraining order to restrain the implementation of the
DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly
implementing the DAP.
F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the
DAP was in accord with the GAAs.
Ruling:
Procedural Issue:... a) The petitions under Rule 65 are... proper
remedies
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the... part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
b) Requisites for the exercise of the power... of judicial review
were complied with
(1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before
the Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a...
proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the
case
Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has
established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy
as to confer locus standi on each of them.
Zulueta vs Asia Brewery, GR. No. 138137
When two or more cases involve the same parties and affect
closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated
and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the
parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved.
Consolidation, when appropriate, also contributes to the
declogging of court dockets.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the August 4, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
45020; as well as the February 23, 1999 Resolution[2]
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The
decretal portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is given due course.
The assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 142 dated 13 February 1997 and 19 May 1997
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED."
The Facts
Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged in the
manufacture, the distribution and sale of beer; while
Petitioner Perla Zulueta is a dealer and an operator of an
outlet selling the former's beer products. A Dealership
Agreement governed their contractual relations.
On March 30, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo, Branch 22, a Complaint against
respondent for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance
and Damages. The Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
20341 (hereafter referred to as the "Iloilo case"), was
grounded on the alleged violation of the Dealership
Agreement.
On July 7, 1994, during the pendency of the Iloilo case,
respondent filed with the Makati Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2110
(hereafter referred to as the "Makati case"). The Complaint
was for the collection of a sum of money in the amount of
P463,107.75 representing the value of beer products, which
respondent had delivered to petitioner.
In view of the pendency of the Iloilo case, petitioner moved
to dismiss the Makati case on the ground that it had split the
cause of action and violated the rule against the multiplicity
of suits. The Motion was denied by the Makati RTC through
Judge Eriberto U. Rosario.
Upon petitioner's Motion, however, Judge Rosario inhibited
himself. The case was raffled again and thereafter assigned
to Branch 142 of the Makati RTC, presided by Judge Jose
Parentala Jr.
On January 3, 1997, petitioner moved for the consolidation
of the Makati case with the Iloilo case. Granting the Motion,
Judge Parentala ordered on February 13, 1997, the
consolidation of the two cases. Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated May
19, 1997.
On August 18, 1997, respondent filed before the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailing Judge Parentala's
February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997 Orders.
(Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery G.R. No. 138137 March 08, 2001)
This decision, and more, can be found at
https://www.digest.ph/decisions/zulueta-vs-asia-brewery
The Issues
In her Memorandum,[5] petitioner interposes the following issues
for the consideration of this Court:
"a. Were the Orders of February 13, 1997 and
May 19, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 142 in Makati City (ordering
consolidation of Makati Civil Case No. 94-
2110 with the Iloilo Civil Case No. 20341)
already final and executory when respondent
filed its petition for certiorari with the Hon.
Court of Appeals such that said Court could
no longer acquire jurisdiction over the case
and should have dismissed it outright (as it
originally did) x x x, instead of due giving
course to the petition?; and
"b. Independent of the first issue, did the
Makati RTC, Branch 142, correctly order the
consolidation of the Makati case (which was
filed later) with the Iloilo Case (which was
filed earlier) for the reason that the obligation
sought to be collected in the Makati case is
the same obligation that is also one of the
subject matters of the Iloilo case, x x x?"[6]
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue
Propriety of Petition with the CA
Petitioner avers that the Makati RTC's February 13, 1997 and
May 19, 1997 Orders consolidating the two cases could no
longer be assailed. Allegedly, respondent's Petition for
Certiorari was filed with the CA beyond the reglementary sixty-
day period prescribed in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Hence, the CA
should have dismissed it outright.
The records show that respondent received on May 23, 1997, the
Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration. It had, according
to petitioner, only sixty days or until July 22, 1997, within
which to file the Petition for Certiorari. It did so, however, only
on August 21, 1997.
On the other hand, respondent insists that its Petition was filed
on time, because the reglementary period before the effectivity
of the 1997 Rules was ninety days. It theorizes that the sixty-day
period under the 1997 Rules does not apply.
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are
certain recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial
or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in
the following language:
"It is true that under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided.' But
there are settled exceptions to this general
rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE
or REMEDIAL in nature or when it
CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
xxxxxxxxx
"On the other hand, remedial or procedural
laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies
or modes of procedure, which do not create
new or take away vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not
come within the legal meaning of a
retrospective law, nor within the general rule
against the retrospective operation of
statutes."[7] (emphasis supplied)
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending
proceedings even without express provision to that effect.
[8]
 Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at
the time of their enactment. [9] In fact, statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined
at the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective
in that sense and to that extent.[10]
Clearly, the designation of a specific period of sixty days for the
filing of an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is purely
remedial or procedural in nature. It does not alter or modify any
substantive right of respondent, particularly with respect to the
filing of petitions for certiorari. Although the period for filing
the same may have been effectively shortened, respondent had
not been unduly prejudiced thereby considering that he was not
at all deprived of that right.
It is a well-established doctrine that rules of procedure may be
modified at any time to become effective at once, so long as the
change does not affect vested rights.[11] Moreover, it is equally
axiomatic that there are no vested rights to rules of procedure. [12]
It also bears noting that the ninety-day limit established by
jurisprudence cannot be deemed a vested right. It is merely a
discretionary prerogative of the courts that may be exercised
depending on the peculiar circumstances of each case. Hence,
respondent was not entitled, as a matter of right, to the 90-day
period for filing a petition for certiorari; neither can it
imperiously demand that the same period be extended to it.
Upon the effectivity of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure on July 1, 1997, respondent's lawyers still had 21
days or until July 22, 1997 to file a petition for certiorari and to
comply with the sixty-day reglementary period. Had they been
more prudent and circumspect in regard to the implications of
these procedural changes, respondent's right of action would not
have been foreclosed. After all, the 1997 amendments to the
Rules of Court were well-publicized prior to their date of
effectivity. At the very least counsel should have asked for as
extension of time to file the petition.
Certification of Non-forum
Shopping Defective
Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the sworn certification
against forum-shopping, arguing that the same was signed by
counsel and not by petitioner as required by Supreme Court
Circular No. 28-91. For his part, respondent claims that even if
it was its counsel who signed the certification, there was still
substantial compliance with Circular No. 28-91 because, a
corporation acts through its authorized officers or agents, and its
counsel is an agent having personal knowledge of other pending
cases.
The requirement that the petitioner should sign the certificate of
non-forum shopping applies even to corporations, considering
that the mandatory directives of the Circular and the Rules of
Court make no distinction between natural and juridical persons.
In this case, the Certification should have been signed "by a
duly authorized director or officer of the corporation,"[13] who
has knowledge of the matter being certified. [14] In Robern
Development Corporation v. Quitain,[15]in which the
Certification was signed by Atty. Nemesio S. Cañete who was
the acting regional legal counsel of the National Power
Corporation in Mindanao, the Court held that "he was not
merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel and
officer, whose basic function was to prepare legal pleadings and
to represent NPC-Mindanao in legal cases. As regional legal
counsel for the Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in
the best position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of
the allegations in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City.
As internal legal counsel, he was also in the best position to
know and to certify if an action for expropriation had already
been filed and pending with the courts."
Verily, the signatory in the Certification of the Petition before
the CA should not have been respondent's retained counsel, who
would not know whether there were other similar cases of the
corporation.[16] Otherwise, this requirement would easily be
circumvented by the signature of every counsel representing
corporate parties.
No Explanation for
Non-Filing by Personal Service
Citing Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules, petitioner also
faults respondent for the absence of a written explanation why
the Petition with the Court of Appeals was served on her
counsel by registered mail. In reply, respondent points out that
such explanation was not necessary, because its counsel held
office in Makati City while petitioner and her counsel were in
Iloilo City.
We agree with petitioner. Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules, personal service of petitions and other pleadings is the
general rule, while a resort to other modes of service and filing
is the exception. Where recourse is made to the exception,
a written explanation why the service and the filing were not
done personally is indispensable, even when such explanation
by its nature is acceptable and manifest. Where no explanation
is offered to justify the resort to other modes, the discretionary
power of the court to expunge the pleading becomes mandatory.
[17]
Thus, the CA should have considered the Petition as not
having been filed, in view of the failure of respondent to present
a written explanation of its failure to effect personal service.
In sum, the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA by herein
respondent, questioning the orders of consolidation by the
Makati RTC, should not have been given due course. Not only
was the Petition filed beyond the sixty-day reglementary period;
it likewise failed to observe the requirements of non-forum
shopping and personal service or filing. All or any of these acts
ought to have been sufficient cause for its outright denial.
Second Issue:
Propriety of Consolidation
Apart from procedural problems, respondent's cause is also
afflicted with substantial defects. The CA ruled that there was
no common issue in law or in fact between the Makati case and
the Iloilo case. The former involved petitioner's indebtedness to
respondent for unpaid beer products, while the latter pertained to
an alleged breach of the Dealership Agreement between the
parties. We disagree.
True, petitioner's obligation to pay for the beer products
delivered by respondent can exist regardless of an alleged
breach in the Dealership Agreement. Undeniably, however, this
obligation and the relationship between respondent and
petitioner, as supplier and distributor respectively, arose from
the Dealership Agreement which is now the subject of inquiry in
the Iloilo case. In fact, petitioner herself claims that her
obligation to pay was negated by respondent's contractual
breach. In other words, the non-payment -- the res of the Makati
case -- is an incident of the Iloilo case.
Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement was
put in question, it would be more practical and convenient to
submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents and their
consequences. The issues in both civil cases pertain to the
respective obligations of the same parties under the Dealership
Agreement. Thus, every transaction as well as liability arising
from it must be resolved in the judicial forum where it is put in
issue. The consolidation of the two cases then becomes
imperative to a complete, comprehensive and consistent
determination of all these related issues.
Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely
related subject matters must be ordered consolidated and jointly
tried in court, where the earlier case was filed. [18] The
consolidation of cases is proper when they involve the
resolution of common questions of law or facts.[19]
Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of both
parties in the two civil cases will best be served and the issues
involved therein expeditiously settled. After all, there is no
question on the propriety of the venue in the Iloilo case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of
the Makati RTC (Br. 142) dated February 13, 1997 and May 19,
1997 are hereby REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED
Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. vs Homena-Valencia, G.R. No.
173942
FACTS:
In 1998, NAVAL et. al. filed a case against FIL-ESTATE. The
RTC rendered a decision in favor of NAVAL of which FIL-
ESTATE moved for reconsideration filed on 10 May 2000,
thirteen (13) days after petitioners received their copy of the
RTC’s decision. On 26 July 2000, the RTC issued an order
denying the motion. Petitioners alleged in their petition that they
received the order denying the motion for reconsideration on 11
August 2005. They filed a Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2005,
or beyond the reglementary period to perfect the appeal which is
15 days from receipt of the RTC’s Decision (this is because the
15 day fresh period from the denial of the Motion for
Recosideration or Neypes Doctrine was promulgated on
September 14, 2005). Consequently, the RTC denied the appeal
and such denial was sustained by the Supreme Court in its
Decision dated October 15, 2007.
FIL-ESTATE filed a Motion for Reconsideration on November
19, 2007 questioning the October 15, 2007 Decision of the
Supreme Court. It argued that following the Court’s 2005
decision in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, their Notice of Appeal
was perfected on time, that is, within fifteen (15) days from their
receipt of the RTC’s order denying their motion for
reconsideration. Neypes has established a new rule whereby an
appellant is granted a fresh 15-day period, reckoned from receipt
of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, within
which to perfect the appeal.
FIL-ESTATE argued that since they received the RTC’s order
denying their motion for reconsideration on 11 August 2005,
following Neypes, they were entitled to a new 15-day period,
i.e., until 26 August 2005 or one (1) day after they had posted
the full appellate docket fees, to perfect the appeal on August
25, 2005.
ISSUE: Whether the “fresh period” rule announced in Neypes
could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal
had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was
promulgated.
RULING:
Yes. Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there
being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they
do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already
existing.
——————————————————–
THINGS DECIDED:
A) Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there
being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
B) Procedural rules are remedial in character as they do not
create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already
existing.
Tan, Jr. vs CA, G.R. No. 136368
FACTS:
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200
executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in question in
favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal.
Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same
contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder
Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or
repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the property until
his death on January 4, 1988.
On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City
a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument
alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their
agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to
conclude an equitable mortgage.
RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:
1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true
intention of the parties, hereby declared and reformed an
equitable mortgage;
2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days
after the finality of this decision P59,200 plus interest at the rate
of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint
was filed, until paid;
3)xxx.
On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
Both parties received the decision of the appellate court on Oct.
5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate
court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision
xxx and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on
its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct. 21, 1995
become final and executory.
Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and
Writ of Possession alleging that the 120-day period of
redemption of the petitioner has expired.
On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the
lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day redemption period
should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the
CA or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was
deposited on April 17, 1996.
ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably
obtained in the trial court by the petitioner?
HELD:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule
that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal
or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time
provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of
judgments. The date when the judgments or final resolution
becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The
record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final
resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that
such judgment or final resolution has become final and
executory.
SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or
final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be
immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be
filed in the proper court after its entry.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended
the rule on finality of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule
39 as follows:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution
shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or
order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on
motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified
true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the
adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the
interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue
the writ of execution.
SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it
would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is
a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then
existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the
reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed
the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was
changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if
applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to
redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive
application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness.
Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot
when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period
of redemption when he made the redemption.  Ratio:
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601
Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y
Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death
penalty for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first
time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659
and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of
execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal
injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE
METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the
lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted
cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due
process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under
international covenants,  an undue delegation of legislative
power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent
Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation
of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent
Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as
a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has
already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law,
and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal
injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned
rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern,
more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than
electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177
properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and
that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the
implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of
Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the
attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae.
They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The
court gave due course to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its
implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a)
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our
international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of
legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
Held:
No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes
cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment considering that (1)
R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in
carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be
administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s
into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules
are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification,
the court which will fix the date of execution, which
uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the
convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or
mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection
inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per
se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution.  It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life."  Would
the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the
execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading
or inhuman"?  The Court believes not.  For reasons discussed,
the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are
properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative
officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as
to which "court" will fix the time and date of execution, and the
date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. 
As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the
date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. 
The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days
after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are
remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the
judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to
the date of execution nor the time of notification.  As to the date
of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read
in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No.
8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out
"not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months
from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became
final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the
President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence,
the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months
from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became
final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and
attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in
case of possible complications in the intravenous injection that
respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar
as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned,
renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment.  This is unsubstantiated.
First.  Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that
lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists and
not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are
unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the
United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly
resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict,
without any other evidence whatsoever.
Second.  Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of
R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in the
execution proceedings should be trained prior to the
performance of such task.  We must presume that the public
officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty
will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third.  Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely
incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and
does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment.  "In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and
since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may
be said that all punishments are cruel.  But of course the
Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method
employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  This penalty can
only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed
for the "most serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by
the General Assembly on December 15, 1989.  The Philippines
neither signed nor ratified said document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define
the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries,
and specify the public agencies which will apply it.  It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be
carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death
sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during
the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be
administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the
convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel
involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained
prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot see
that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater
detail. The question raised is not the definition of what
constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the
penalty already imposed by the Courts.  In this sense, R.A. No.
8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the
administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act
No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked.  To
begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of
the implementing rules which provides a manual for the
execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the
implementing rules a vacuum.  The Secretary of Justice has
practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the
execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and
approval.  Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of
Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative
superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority
under R.A. No. 8177.  Such apparent abdication of departmental
responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.
4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules
is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being
an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Secretary.  Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the
instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an
express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17.  SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE
DEATH SENTENCE.  Execution by lethal injection shall not be
inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the
date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any
person over seventy (70) years of age.  In this latter case, the
death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of
the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the
power to legislate by respondent Secretary.  Petitioner insists
that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may
be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No.
7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a
woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after
delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the
implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant
or within  one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the
implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following
delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended,
and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found
under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which
is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced.  This
addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based
discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an
impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must
not override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with
the law it seeks to apply and implement. 
Neypes vs CA, G.R. No. 141524
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles
of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary
injunction before the RTC against the private respondents.
Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on
March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18,
1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the
trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998.
Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal,
holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by
petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of
appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed
that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to
run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received
the final order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July
27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within
the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the
CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the
day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the
“final order” appealable under the Rules.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of
the 15-day reglmentary period to appeal, the February 12, 1998
order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration should be deemed as the final order. In the case
of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared
petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.
Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus
motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12
days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He
later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus
motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise
dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. The court a quo
ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after
the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that
was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court
and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised
there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent
case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again
considered the order denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the
issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases,
the SC sustained petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1,
1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final
order contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh
period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and
Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether
full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22,
1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall
be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes
that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final
order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39
of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15
days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period
of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this
manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to
resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts
become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver
justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of
appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC’s decision or file
it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”)
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided
in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal
period of 15 days, as already discussed.
NOTE:
The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review
of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit)
because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It is likewise
doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.
Pinga vs Heirs of Santiago, G.R. Bo. 170354
Petitioner Eduardo Pinga was named as one of two defendants
in a complaint for injunction filed by respondent Heirs of
German Santiago, represented by Fernando Santiago. The
Complaint alleged that petitioner and co-defendant Vicente
Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the
respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits
of the coconut trees.
Petitioner and his co-defendant disputed respondents' ownership
of the properties in question, asserting that petitioner's father,
Edmundo Pinga, from whom defendants derived their interest in
the properties, had been in possession thereof since the 1930s.
They alleged that as far back as 1968, respondents had already
been ordered ejected from the properties after a complaint for
forcible entry was filed by the heirs of Edmundo Pinga.
Respondents, as plaintiffs, had failed to present their evidence
and failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of
time. On that ground, the complaint was dismissed. At the same
time, the RTC allowed defendants "to present their evidence ex-
parte."
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and prayed that
the entire action be dismissed and petitioner be disallowed from
presenting evidence ex-parte. Respondents claimed that the
order of the RTC allowing petitioner to present evidence ex-
parte was not in accord with established jurisprudence. They
cited cases, particularly City of Manila v. Ruymann and
Domingo v. Santos, which noted those instances in which a
counterclaim could not remain pending for independent
adjudication.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint necessarily
carries the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim.
HELD:
The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of
practice and procedure necessarily carries the power to overturn
judicial precedents on points of remedial law through the
amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the notable changes
introduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the explicit
proviso that if a complaint is dismissed due to fault of the
plaintiff, such dismissal is "without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action." The innovation was instituted in spite of
previous jurisprudence holding that the fact of the dismissal of
the complaint was sufficient to justify the dismissal as well of
the compulsory counterclaim.
In granting this petition, the Court recognizes that the former
jurisprudential rule can no longer stand in light of Section 3,
Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault
of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of
the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to
prosecute the counterclaim.
The doctrine that the complaint may not be dismissed if the
counterclaim cannot be independently adjudicated is not
available to, and was not intended for the benefit of, a plaintiff
who prevents or delays the prosecution of his own complaint.
Pilapil vs Heirs of Briones, G.R. No. 150175
FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-
Briones. Respondents are the heirs of the late Maximino
Briones. Maximino was married to Donata but their union did
not produce any children. In 1952, Maximino died, Donata
instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate
with the CFI Cebu City. CFI issued a Letters of Administration
in favor of Donata who submitted an inventory of Maximino’s
properties included the disputed land. In same year 1952, CFI
issued order awarding ownership to Donata. In 1960, such order
 Upon written contract;
was recorded in Register of Deeds and by virtue thereof, a new
 Upon an obligation created by law;
TCT was issued in her name. In 1977, Donata died. Her niece,
 Upon a judgment.
Erlinda, one of the Petitioners, instituted with the RTC a Petiton
for Administration of the Intestate Estate of Donata. RTC
appointed her and her husband Gregorio as Administrators of
Donatoa’s estate. In 1985, Silverio, Maximino’s nephew, one of
the Respondents, filed with the RTC for Letters of
Administration for the Intestate Estate of Maximino which
initially granted ordering him to collect rentals from
Maximino’s properties. But Gregorio filed a motion to set aside
the Order claiming that said properties were already under his
and his wife’s administration as part of intestate estate of
Donata. Hence, Silverio’s Letters of Administration was
subsequently set aside. In 1987, Respondents filed a complaint
with RTC against Petitioners for Annulment/Recovery of
possession of real property. In 1992, Respondents amended their
complaint alleging that Donata, as Administrarix of Maximino’s
Estate, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust,
and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in
registering in her name the real properties belonging to the
Intestate Estate of Maximino. RTC favored Respondents and
Ordered Petitioners to reconvey subject properties and render
Accounting to the former. Petitioners appealed to CA but the
CA affirmed the RTC, hence, they petitioned to SC.
ISSUE 1: Whether Respondents have rightful claim to recover
their share from Maximino’s Estate based on the alleged
misrepresentation of Donata that eventually resulted to her being
registered the disputed estate properties?
HELD: No. Because Respondent’s cause of action had already
been prescribed.
Assuming that Donata had employed misrepresentations that
constitute fraud on her part that resulted to her successful
registration of the estate properties under her name, such act
would necessarily result to an imposition of an implied trust
upon her provided under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code.
There are two kinds of implied trusts. One is the resulting trust
and the other one is the constructive trust. Both are created by
operation of law. But the latter  is not created by any words,
either expressly or impliedly, evidencing a direct intention to
create a trust, but only by construction of equity in order to
satisfy the demands of justice, as contradistinguished from the
former which is always presumed to have been contemplated by
the parties and their intention thereto is traceable in their
transaction but not however expressed in any deed or instrument
of conveyance and may be proven by parole evidence as
opposed to that of expressed trust (a trust relation created by
express of intention of the parties thereto).
The rule that an action to compel a trustee to convey property
registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the cestui que
trust does not prescribe, only applies to express trust. Basis: the
possession of the trustee is not adverse.  It may also apply to
resulting trust so long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust.
But with respect to constructive trust, the rule is different,
prescriptibility applies.
While Respondent’s right to inheritance was transferred or
vested upon them at the time of Maximino’s death, their
enforcement of said right by appropriate legal action may be
barred by prescription of action.
Art. 1144 of the Civil Code provides that actions must be
brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action
accrues:
Since implied trust is an obligation created by law (Art. 1456
CC), then, Respondents had ten (10) years within which to bring
an action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s estate.
ISSUE 2: When the ten (10) year period begins?
HELD: Reconveyance of real property based on an implied
trust prescribes in ten (10) years from registration and/or
issuance of title to the property, not only because Torrens
System is a constructive notice to title to the whole world, but
also because by registering the disputed properties exclusively
in her name, Donata in effect had already unequivocally
repudiated any other claim to the same.
Donata registered and secured TCT over disputed properties in
her name on June 27, 1960, but Respondents filed their
complaint Reconveyance and Annulment only on March 3,
1987, or almost 27 years after the registration of said properties
in the name of Donata. Hence, there actions had already been
prescribed.
While the action for partition among co-owners does not
prescribe so long as co-ownership is expressly or impliedly
recognized (Art. 494 CC), but Donata had never recognized
respondents as co-owners or co-heirs either expressly or
impliedly, as she asserted to be the sole heir of Maximino
necessarily excludes Respondents.
ISSUE 3: What is the effect if Donata has indeed employed
fraud and misrepresentation in registering the disputed property
by claiming that she was the sole and the only heir of Maximino
when in truth and in fact, she was not?
HELD: Donata’s fraud and misrepresentation may render CFI’s
Order in 1960 as voidable, but not void on its face, because, it
was rendered by the court in regular exercise of its jurisdiction,
hence, it cannot be subject to collateral attack as respondents did
in this case.
ISSUE 4: Is the action to Annul CFI’s Order based on fraud had
also been prescribed?
HELD: Yes. Action to annul an order or judgment based on
fraud must be brought within four (4) from discovery of fraud.
In this case, Respondents discovered Donata’s fraudulent acts
only in 1985, hence, their right to file an action to annul CFI’s
Order issued in 1960 likewise prescribed as they filed their
amended complaint for Annulment based on fraud only in 1992,
or 7 years from date of discovery thereof.
ISSUE 5: What is the quantum of evidence required to prove
fraud in a case where the principal actors had already been
dead?
HELD: Proof beyond reasonable doubt. Reason: Fraud in
breach of trust is not lightly imputed to the living; for the legal
presumption is the other way, as to the dead who are not here to
answer for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and
cruelty to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the
grave, unless the evidence of fraud is proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
ISSUE 6: Can Respondents validly assail the court’s decision
vesting title to the disputed property in favor of Donata to be not
binding upon them on the ground that they were not made a
party to the proceeding thereon?
HELD: No. While it is true that since the CFI was not informed
that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was
not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of
the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the
settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a
proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of
the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of
the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the
whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the
hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The
publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely
for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of
the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings,
most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors
in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was
voluntarily or involuntarily made.
Novateknika vs PNB, G.R. No. 194104
FACTS:
Petitioner Novateknika Land Corporation (NLC), together
with 9 other Corporations, entered into a Credit Agreement
with PNB for the availment of an omnibus line in the
principal amount of ₱500,000,000.00.
After 2 Renewal Agreements, their total outstanding
principal obligation went up to ₱593,449,464.79. Due to
nonpayment depsite repeated demands, PNB filed petitions
for extrajudicial foreclosure over the properties covered by
the Mortgage, which included the 4 parcels of land of NLC.
After the Extrajudicial Sale, the properties were awarded to
PNB as the sole bidder, and the bid amount was applied in
partial satisfaction of the outstanding obligation of the
borrowers.
NLC filed an action for injunction with a prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction
arguing, inter alia, that PNB’s right to bring a mortgage
action had already prescribed.
The RTC granted NLC’s application for the issuance of a
TRO, preventing PNB from consummating the public sale of
the subject properties.
The RTC denied NLC’s prayer for injunctive relief, ruling
that the mortgage action had not prescribed.
Aggrieved, NLC elevated the case to the CA via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA dismissed the petition
outright for failure of NLC to file a motion for
reconsideration before the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition
sine qua non to certiorari.
RULING:
A Motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to
certiorari.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
xxxx
Unmistakably, before a petition for certiorari can prosper,
the petitioner must be able to show, among others, that he
does not have any other “plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.” This remedy referred to in
Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the
questioned order.
Well established is the rule that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a special civil
action for certiorari, subject to certain exceptions, to wit:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the government or the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for
lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.22
None of the exceptions, however, is present in this case.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions which reiterate that
before filing a petition for certiorari in a higher court, the
attention of the lower court should be first called to its
supposed error and its correction should be sought. Failing
this, the petition for certiorari should be denied. The reason
for this is to afford the lower court the opportunity to
correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it through a
re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.
The petitioner’s disregard of this rule deprived the trial
court the right and the opportunity to rectify an error
unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act
unfairly imputed.
In the case at bench, the proper recourse of NLC was to
have filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order
denying its application for injunctive relief. Only after the
denial of such motion can it be deemed to have exhausted all
available remedies and be justified in elevating the case to
the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
De Guzman vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103276
De Guzman was charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act with the following evidence:
1) lone prosecution witness Josephine Angeles' testimony that
no such training programs were held at the designated places
and
2) petitioner's failure to present a single receipt to support due
disbursement of the P200,000.00, resulting from his former
lawyers' insistence in filing a demurrer to evidence despite prior
leave for that purpose having been denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
*Sandiganbayan: De Guzman convicted of violation of Section
3(e) of the "Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" for his
alleged failure to account for P200,000.00 received for certain
official training programs of the Department of Agriculture
Entry of judgment was ordered, to be made in due course. 5 Six
(6) years and one (1) month as minimum, to nine (9) years and
one (1) day as maximum in jail await petitioner. 
*SC: affirmed Sandiganbayan.
*SC (MR): denied motion.
Petitioner takes a novel recourse by filing the instant "Omnibus
Motion For Leave to Vacate First Motion For Reconsideration
In The Light Of The Present Developments And To Consider
Evidence Presented Herein And To Set Aside Conviction". This
was filed on petitioner's behalf by a new counsel, as shown by
the "Entry of Appearance and Motion For Leave To Submit
Attached Omnibus Motion" filed on June 27, 1994 after
petitioner's former lawyers withdrew their appearance.
petitioner, for the first time, seeks to be relieved from what he
considers as the serious and costly mistake of his former lawyers
in demurring to the prosecution evidence after court leave was
denied, the effect of which deprived him of presenting before
the Sandiganbayan the pieces of documentary evidence that
would have completely belied the accusation against him.
Annexed to the Omnibus Motion are photocopies of the list of
expenses and receipts 12 in support of the liquidation voucher
(Exhibit "E") showing due disbursement of the P200,000.00
received for training programs
actually conducted.
ISSUE:
WON De Guzman's Motion should be granted
HELD:
YES, substantial rights must ultimately reign supreme over
technicalities, thus, the Court is swayed to reconsider.
Clearly, when "transcendental matters" like life, liberty or State
security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to be
welcomed more generously.
Under the circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity
demand that petitioner be not penalized for the costly
importunings of his previous lawyers based on the same
principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it
granted new trial, excused parties from the negligence or
mistakes of counsel.
The fact that the decision . . . has become final, does not
preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even
with the finality of judgment, when its execution becomes
impossible or unjust, as in the instant case, it may be modified
or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the facts.
In resume, this is a situation where a rigid application of rules of
procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to
render justice where justice is due — to secure to every
individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a
crime of which he is charged. To borrow Justice Padilla's words
in "People v. CA, et. al.", 32 (where substantial justice was
upheld anew in allowing therein accused's appeal despite the
withdrawal of his notice of appeal and his subsequent escape
from confinement).
CASE IS REMANDED TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN FOR
RECEPTION & APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE
"if only to truly make the courts really genuine instruments in
the administration of justice", the Court believes it imperative,
in order to assure against any possible miscarriage of justice
resulting from petitioner's failure to present his crucial evidence
through no fault of his, that this case be remanded to the
Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner's
evidence.
CMTC Int'l Marketing Corp. vs Bhagis Int'l Trading Corp., G.R.
No. 170488
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolutions dated
August 19, 20051 and November 15, 20052 of the Former
Special Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 84742.
The facts of the case follow.
Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or
Copyright Infringement and Claim for Damages with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (trial court).3
On February 14, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision 4  for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief is
dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner. The fallo of said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint for Unfair
Competition and/or Copyright Infringement and Claim for
Damages is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to
cost.
SO ORDERED.5
After receiving a copy of the trial court’s Decision, petitioner
seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) on March 4, 2005.6
Thereafter, the appellate court issued a Notice to File the
Appellant’s Brief on May 20, 2005, which was received by the
law office representing petitioner on May 30, 2005, stating as
follows:
Pursuant to Rule 44, Sec. 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
you are hereby required to file with this Court within forty-five
(45) days from receipt of this notice, SEVEN (7) legibly
typewritten, mimeographed or printed copies of the Appellant’s
Brief with legible copies of the assailed decision of the Trial
Court and proof of service of two copies upon the appellee/s.7
However, despite said notice, petitioner failed to file its
appellant’s brief timely. Hence, on August 19, 2005, the
appellate court issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal filed
by petitioner. The full text of said Resolution reads:
Considering the report of the Judicial Records Division dated 17
August 2005 stating that no appellant’s brief has been filed as
per docket book entry, the Court RESOLVES to consider the
appeal as having been ABANDONED and consequently
DISMISS the same pursuant to Sec. 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.8
Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, petitioner filed its
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s
Brief,9 which was filed forty-two (42) days late from the date of
its expiration on July 15, 2005.
On November 15, 2005, the appellate court denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s
Brief. It ruled that one of the grounds by which the Court of
Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss
the appeal is the failure on the part of the appellant to serve and
file the required number of copies of his brief within the time
prescribed by the Rules of Court, viz.:
For this Court to admit the appellant’s brief after such wanton
disregard of the Rules would put a strain on the orderly
administration of justice.
As held in the case of St. Louis University vs. Cordero, 434
SCRA 575, 587, citing Don Lino Gutierres & Sons, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 61 SCRA 87:
"It is necessary to impress upon litigants and their lawyers the
necessity of strict compliance with the periods for performing
certain acts incident to the appeal and the transgressions thereof,
as a rule, would not be tolerated; otherwise, those periods could
be evaded by subterfuges and manufactured excuses and would
ultimately become inutile.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion
perforce DENIED.
SO ORDERED.10
Accordingly, petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorari before this Court questioning the August 19, 2005
and November 15, 2005 Resolutions of the appellate court.
Thus, petitioner presents the following grounds to support its
petition:
A.
 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT SACRIFICED SUBSTANTIVE
JUSTICE IN FAVOR OF PROCEDURAL
TECHNICALITIES WITH ITS DISMISSAL
OF PETITIONER’S APPEAL FOR
FAILURE TO FILE THE APPELLANT’S
BRIEF ON TIME WITHOUT
CONSIDERING AT ALL WHETHER OR
NOT PETITIONER’S APPEAL DESERVED
FULL CONSIDERATION ON THE
MERITS.
B.
IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIVE
JUSTICE, PETITIONER’S APPEAL
SHOULD BE REINSTATED
CONSIDERING THAT THE ERRORS OF
THE TRIAL COURT IN RENDERING ITS
APPEALED DECISION ARE EVIDENT ON
THE FACE OF THE SAID DECISION AND
MORE SO AFTER AN EXAMINATION OF
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
1. The trial court’s ruling that petitioner
should have established actual confusion in
the minds of buyers is contrary to
jurisprudence.
2. The trial court did not state the facts upon
which it based its conclusion that petitioner’s
trademark is strikingly different and distinct
from that of defendant’s.
3. Respondent labeled its products in a manner
confusingly similar to that of petitioner’s.
4. The trial court erred in finding that
respondent did not pass off its products as that
of petitioner’s.11
Simply, the issue to be resolved is the propriety of the dismissal
of petitioner’s appeal for its failure to file the appellant’s brief
within the reglementary period.
Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in dismissing its
appeal, since dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied
in a very technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure
substantial justice.
For its part, respondent maintains that the appellate court did not
err in dismissing petitioner’s appeal for its failure to file the
required appellant’s brief within the reglementary period. It
stresses that in the absence of persuasive reason to deviate
therefrom, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and
expeditious dispatch of judicial business.
We find merit in the instant petition.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules
should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they
are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and
in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, we
have recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for the most
compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules
would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.12
In Obut v. Court of Appeals,13 this Court reiterated that it
"cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place
the administration of justice in a straightjacket, for then the
result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at
all. Verily, judicial orders are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a
non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances
attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial
action is the principle that a party-litigant if to be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint of
defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities."
The same principle was highlighted in Philippine National Bank
and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Philippine Milling
Company, Incorporated, et al.[14 where the Court ruled that
even if an appellant failed to file a motion for extension of time
to file his brief on or before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals does not necessarily lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide the appealed case, and that the
Court of Appeals has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss
appellant’s appeal, which discretion must be a sound one to be
exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play
having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.
Ergo, where strong considerations of substantive justice are
manifest in the petition, the strict application of the rules of
procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.15 Thus, a rigid application of the rules of procedure
will not be entertained if it will obstruct rather than serve the
broader interests of justice in the light of the prevailing
circumstances in the case under consideration.
In the instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to
file an appellant’s brief on petitioner’s part.
When petitioner filed its motion attaching therewith its
appellant’s brief, there was a clear intention on the part of
petitioner not to abandon his appeal. As a matter of fact, were it
not for its counsel’s act of inadvertently misplacing the Notice
to File Brief in another file, petitioner could have seasonably
filed its appellant’s brief as its counsel had already prepared the
same even way before the receipt of the Notice to File Brief.
It bears stressing at this point then that the rule, which states that
the mistakes of counsel binds the client, may not be strictly
followed where observance of it would result in outright
deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the
interest of justice so requires. In rendering justice, procedural
infirmities take a backseat against substantive rights of litigants.
Corollarily, if the strict application of the rules would tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, this Court is not without
power to exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the rules of
procedure.16 ]
Also, it must be stressed that petitioner had no participatory
negligence in the dismissal of its appeal.1âwphi1 Hence, the
ensuing dismissal of its appeal was completely attributable to
the gross negligence of its counsel. For said reason, the Court is
not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of justice.
Where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law, or when the interests of justice so
require, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of
the lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence.17
All told, petitioner should be afforded the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.
Nevertheless, considering that this Court is not a trier of facts,
the appropriate action to take is to remand the case to the
appellate court for further proceedings, for it to thoroughly
examine the factual and legal issues that still need to be threshed
out.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED, insofar as this case is REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings, subject to the payment
of the corresponding docket fees within fifteen (15) days from
notice of this Decision.
Let the records and the CA rollo of this case be transmitted
accordingly.
SO ORDERED
Prieto vs Alpadi Dev't Corp., G.R. No. 191025
“if the party desires the court to take judicial notice of the record
of another case, he should file the necessary pleading for the
purpose and give the other party the chance to be heard on the
matter.”
Facts
Gabriel Prieto and Zeferino Arroyo are owners of parcels of
land adjoining to each other. When Arroyo died, the certificate
of title in his name was cancelled and a transfer of certificate of
title was then issued to his heirs. The heirs of Arroyo filed a
petition before the CFI claiming that the technical description in
their title does not conform to the decision of the land
registration court where the area given in their title is less than
157 sq meters than to what they are entitled and thus prayed for
the correction of the description in their title. The court directed
the Register of Deeds to change the description in the transfer
certificate of title. Prieto now filed an action against the
defendants with the petition to annul the order made by the court
claiming that a portion of his land was unjustly added to the
defendant’s title. But during the special proceeding Prieto and
his counsel failed to appear and the court issued an order
dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute.
Prieto filed an action for annulment of the special proceeding
and prayed to reconvey the 157 sq meters of lot that was taken
from him and was added to the title of the defendants.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata which the court allowed. Prieto now contends that there
is no res judicata and invoked the court to have been erred in
dismissing his first petition to annul the special proceeding even
when he did not appear in court as no parole evidence is needed
to support his petition where the matters concerning the land
registration proceeding are parts of the record of the court which
are well within the court’s judicial notice.
Issue:
Whether or not the court should have taken judicial notice on
the land registration case adjudicated in the same court instead
of dismissing the first petition to annul the special proceeding?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases
pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or
are actually pending before the same judge. If the party desires
the court to take judicial notice of the record of another case, he
should file the necessary pleading for the purpose and give the
other party the chance to be heard on the matter instead of
sending motion for postponement of the hearing.
The court finds his argument academic since no appeal was
made from the order dismissing the said petition thus the
decision has become already final. Moreover, the court finds res
judicata as operative in the case since there are similar in the
identity of the parties, subject matter and cause of action in the
two cases involved thus the order of dismissal in the first
petition now operates to bar the institution of the second
petition.
Duremdes vs Duremdes, G.R. No. 138256
The Antecedents
Shirley Duremdes was the owner of a parcel of land identified
as Lot No. 1786, Pcadm-478-D covered by Tax Declaration No.
14-033-0039. The parcel of land was located in Barangay
Tupaz, Carles, Iloilo and had an area of 50,000 square meters.
Cresenciano Duremdes and Hortencia Bataga, Shirley's parents,
and the latter's brother Nelson Duremdes administered the
property while Shirley was working abroad as a nurse. When
she came back to the Philippines for a brief respite, she asked
her parents and her brother to vacate the property because she
had decided to sell it. Her parents and her brother refused. On
May 24, 1984, Shirley sought the help of the Group Commander
of the Civil Relations Group of the Office of the Civil Affairs of
the Philippine Constabulary (PACLAP), Camp Delgado, Iloilo
City for the eviction of her kins to no avail.  [4] Nevertheless,
Shirley agreed to sell the property to her father's brother, her
uncle Agustin Duremdes. On May 31, 1989, Shirley executed a
deed of conditional sale over the property in favor of Agustin
for P40,000. Shirley acknowledged receipt of the said amount,
and again asked her parents and brother to vacate the property.
The latter adamantly refused.
In the meantime, Shirley again left for the United States of
America to work as a nurse. Cresenciano still refused to vacate
the property despite Agustin's demands for him to do so.
Agustin then sought the assistance of the Presidential Assistance
Committee, again, to no avail. Agustin also sought the
assistance of the barangay captain. This time, Cresenciano
alleged that the property was not in his possession but was
occupied by an agricultural tenant, Herminio Tara, who also
happened to be his brother-in-law. Agustin investigated the
matter and discovered that Herminio had been a tenant of
Cresenciano since February 3, 1979. This was later confirmed
by a certification from the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform. [5] Cresenciano's property was contiguous to the parcel
of land Agustin had bought from Shirley.
On October 10, 1984, Agustin filed a Complaint[6] for recovery
of possession, ownership and damages before the RTC of Iloilo
City, Branch 38, against Cresenciano and Nelson Duremdes. He
alleged that the defendants, who were only administrators of the
subject property[7] while the previous owner (Shirley) was
employed in the United States, refused to turn over the
possession of the lot, for which reason he suffered damages.
In their answer with counterclaim, the defendants denied that
they were the administrators of the land, and that they were the
possessors of the same. They alleged that it was Nelson
Duremdes who took care of the property in behalf of Shirley,
and that the present possessor was Herminio Tara, who claimed
to be a tenant of the aforesaid property. The defendants alleged
that the plaintiff knew that Herminio was in possession of the
property. In fact, prior to the filing of the case, they had a
conference regarding this controversy before the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform in Balasan, Iloilo. The defendants also claimed
that the damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiff had no
factual and legal basis, and thus prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint.
The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Despite the defendants' opposition, the trial court granted the
motion of the plaintiff and rendered a Decision dated February
11, 1985. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
1. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
2. Declaring the plaintiff as owner of the land in question;
3. Ordering the defendants to vacate the land and deliver
immediately possession of the same to the plaintiff;
4. Ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff the
produce of the land since September 21, 1984, or its
value to be computed according to prevailing market
price until fully paid;
5. Ordering the defendants to pay P1,000.00 as attorney's
fees; plus
6. Costs.
7. The counterclaim is dismissed for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The defendants thereafter appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals,[9] which rendered judgment reversing the decision of
the trial court and remanding the case to the court a quo for
further proceedings. [10] According to the appellate court:
It is true that the defendants-appellants
admitted plaintiff's ownership over subject
parcel of land. However, they have likewise
denied being in possession of said lot. A
question necessarily arises as to whether or
not defendants- appellants are really in
possession of the land in question or it is
possessed by one Herminio Tara who is
allegedly a tenant thereof. Certainly, these
questions need to be ventilated and
determined in a proper trial where parties can
present their respective evidence. Judgment
on the pleadings, even on this score alone,
would surely place defendants-appellants in a
quandary because they will be ordered to turn
over possession of the land which they deny
being in possession of in the first place. This,
plus other issues postulated by the
defendants-appellants in their Opposition to
the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
certainly pose genuine issues which require
the proper determination of the court for a
more substantive resolution of the instant
case.[11]
Dolores Duremdes, the plaintiff's wife, thereafter filed a Motion
for Substitution[12] alleging that her husband, Agustin Duremdes,
was now physically incapacitated due to a stroke. The court
granted the motion. She thereafter filed a motion to admit an
amended complaint where she reiterated the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is
most respectfully prayed of the Honorable
Court that after due notice and hearing,
judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and condemns the defendants:
1. To turn over possession and
cultivation of the parcel of land
described in paragraph 3 of the
complaint to the plaintiff and to
declare plaintiff to be the rightful
owner of the said lot;
2. To pay the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) to compensate
for the loss of produce of the land
and the deprivation and enjoyment of
the rights of the plaintiff;
3. To condemn the defendants to pay
incidental expenses of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00);
4. To condemn defendants to pay the
sum of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as attorneys fees; and
5. To pay moral damages in the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
Plaintiff prays [for] such other relief and/or
remedy as maybe just and equitable under the
premises.  [13]
The motion was granted. [14] After trial on the merits of the case,
the court a quo rendered a Decision[15] dated February 27, 1991
ordering the defendants to vacate the land and to pay damages to
the plaintiff, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is rendered ordering the defendants
(and/or any person acting for and on their
behalf) (1) to deliver to the plaintiff the 3-
hectare riceland portion of subject Lot No.
1786, Pcadm-478-D; (2) to pay plaintiff
jointly and severally, 12 cavans
of palay annually, starting from the year
1984, representing the produce of the 3-
hectare riceland portion, until said portion is
delivered to plaintiff; and (3) to pay plaintiff
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Defendants' counterclaim is ordered
dismissed for lack of merit.[16]
According to the trial court, the main issue to be resolved was
whether or not the defendants were in actual possession of the
land in question. It found that the claim of the defendant
Cresenciano, that the actual possessor of the land was Herminio
Tara, was part of a scheme to deprive the plaintiff of his right to
possess the land. The court went on to explain that if the
defendants could prove that the land was actually possessed by a
tenant, then the latter could not be so dispossessed under the
Land Reform Law. This would thereby achieve the defendant's
objective of retaining the land in his possession. The trial court
also made the following findings:
Taken together with the other circumstances
surrounding this case, the fact that Shirley
Amantillo went to the PACLAP to complain
that her father, defendant Cresenciano
Duremdes, refused to deliver the possession of
the land which she had already sold to
plaintiff has significant weight and
consideration in favor of the latter. If
defendant Cresenciano Duremdes in not in
actual possession of the land, his daughter
should not have complained against him for
his refusal to deliver to plaintiff the
 possession thereof.
There is a veiled conspiracy between
defendant Cresenciano Duremdes and his
brother-in-law, Herminio Tara, which became
all the more prominent and apparent when the
DAR issued a certification that the said
Herminio Tara is a registered tenant in a
landholding owned by defendant Cresenciano
Duremdes (Exh. "E"). Moreover, on cross-
examination, defendant Cresenciano
Duremdes confirmed that he is the
Cresenciano Duremdes who is the owner of
the land wherein Herminio Tara is a
registered tenant (TSN, hearing of March
23,1990, p. 7).
The opening of an account with the Rural
Bank of Balasan (Iloilo) Inc. by Herminio
Tara in the name of Agustin Duremdes was
merely a part of the scheme and machination
resorted to by the former in a veiled
conspiracy with defendants to make it appear
that Herminio Tara has been in actual
possession of the land in question and that
plaintiff refused to receive the rentals from his
alleged tenant, Herminio Tara.[17]
The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
trial court denied.[18]
The Case On Appeal
The defendants again elevated to the Court of Appeals [19] for the
resolution of the following issues:
A) Who actually are in possession of the property consisting of
about two (2) hectares subject matter of this litigation;
B) Since Herminio Tara admitted having been in actual
possession of the property under litigation, and the share of the
landowner Agustin Duremdes over the produce is being
deposited with the Rural Bank of Balasan, should defendants be
ordered to deliver the possession of the said land in favor of the
plaintiffs;[20]
A Who actually are in possession of the property consisting of about two (2) hectares
) 5. The Notices of harvest dated October 20, 1986,
B Since Herminio Tara admitted having been in actual possession of the property
) Agustin Duremdes over the produce is being deposited with the Rural Bankasof they Balasan,
the possession of the said land in favor of the plaintiffs; [20]
According to the defendants-appellants, the appellee was unable
to possess the entire area of the subject lot because a portion of
about two hectares was in the possession of Herminio Tara. In
fact, a violent confrontation even ensued between appellee
Agustin and Herminio when Agustin tried to take possession of
the land, and Herminio suffered physical injuries when the
incident occurred. The appellants also pointed out that despite
all this, the appellee failed to implead Herminio as party-
defendant.
It was also contended that when Shirley Duremdes complained
to the PACLAP[21] against her father, she had not yet sold the
property to the plaintiff. Her letter to the PACLAP was dated
March 24, 1984 while the sale took place on March 31, 1984.
[22]
 Aside from claiming that no meeting or conference ever
transpired between Shirley Duremdes and the appellants before
the PACLAP, the appellants also pointed out that the letter-
complaint filed with the said office was against Cresenciano and
Noel Duremdes, and not against Nelson Duremdes. Nelson
Duremdes was not one of the defendants in the case. Because no
member of the PACLAP testified regarding the letter, it
practically had no probative value; the trial court thus gravely
erred when it considered the said letter in ruling for the
defendants. Furthermore, the lower court ignored Dolores'
admission when she testified on direct and cross-examination
that it was Noel Duremdes who was in possession of the land,
and Herminio Tara's declaration that he was its present
possessor.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling with
modification in its Decision dated August 31, 1998. The
dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
with respect to Cresenciano Duremdes
is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
complaint against defendant-appellant Nelson
Duremdes in Civil Case No. 16091 is
hereby DISMISSED.[23]
According to the appellate court, the following circumstances
indicate that Herminio was Cresenciano's tenant and, as such,
was the present possessor of the subject property:
1.
In its reply to the letter-query of Agustin's counsel, the
Agrarian Reform Team No. 189 of the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform informed that "per records of this
office, Mr. Herminio Tara is a registered tenant in the
landholding owned by Mr. Cresenciano Duremdes
situated in Brgy. Bolo, Carles, Iloilo." (Exhibit "E")
2. The said letter further disputes Cresenciano's allegation
relating to Herminio's status as Agustin's tenant.
3. The aforecited letter-reply vis--vis the certification of
the Office of the Municipal Assessor (Exhibit "16")
dated November 29, 1989 stating that Cresenciano does
not own a property adjacent to Agustin's land clearly
indicates that the land leased by Cresenciano and Noel
to Herminio was Agustin's land.
4. Agustin and Herminio's alleged "violent" confrontation
took place on or before March 23, 1984 (Exh. 1) when
the former found Herminio working on the subject
land. At that time, the property was still owned by
Shirley and administered by Noel Duremdes ("Noel"),
son of subject matter of this litigation;
Cresenciano.
October 12, 1987 and September 5, 1988 (Exhibits "6",
under
"7" and "8",litigation, and the
respectively) are share of theand
irrelevant landowner
immaterial
covershould defendants
periods after thebefact
ordered to deliver
or filing of the
complaint in the court a quo.
6. The passbook purportedly showing bank deposits of
Agustin's share in the harvest was opened only on
October 1, 1984 after the institution of the instant case.
[24]
However, the court also found that except for the certificate to
file complaint issued by the Barangay Lupong Tagapamayapa,
nothing in the documents and testimonies on record implicated
appellant Nelson Duremdes although a certain "Noel," a son of
Cresenciano, was mentioned on several occasions, he was not a
party in the instant case. Hence, the court dismissed the case
with regards to appellant Nelson Duremdes.
The Issues
According to the petitioner, the appellate court's decision clearly
indicates its finding that Herminio Tara was working and
leasing the land owned by the respondent, and that the former
was working as an agricultural tenant on the subject land before
ownership thereof passed to the respondent from Shirley
Duremdes. Thus, Herminio Tara remained and should remain as
such agricultural tenant over the subject land even if its
ownership had already changed. The petitioner further contends
that it is immaterial whose agricultural tenant Herminio Tara is.
He also asserts that because a tenancy relationship is involved,
jurisdiction over the case rests with the Department of Agrarian
Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB).
The petitioner asserts that, as the records of the case will show,
he consistently raised the issue of the tenancy of Herminio Tara
in the lower court, and later in the appellate court. He insists that
the matter involving jurisdiction can still be raised before the
Court because the CA, through its decision, brought the issue to
the fore. The petitioner prays that the decision of the CA be set
aside for lack of jurisdiction, as the subject real property is
occupied and possessed by a duly registered agricultural tenant,
who was not even impleaded as a party in the case.
In her Comment, the respondent moved for the dismissal of the
complaint, on the ground that the petition for review was filed
out of time. The period within which to file the petition for
review expired on May 9, 1999; the petitioner filed the instant
petition only after the lapse of 65 days therefrom. Thus,
according to the respondent, it is clear from the facts and the
records of the case that the petition for review was filed beyond
the period allowed by the Court, and that the same was filed
merely for purposes of delay and to subvert the ends of justice.
[25]
The issues thus presented for the Court's resolution in the case at
bar involve both procedural and factual matters: (1) whether or
not the petition was filed out of time as to warrant its dismissal;
(2) whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the instant
case, and if so, whether it can still exercise its jurisdiction, in
view of an allegation of the existence of a tenancy agreement.
The Court's Ruling
A perusal of the records of the case indicates that the present
petition for review on certiorari was indeed, filed out of time.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA
Decision dated August 31, 1998 on September 24, 1998. The
CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated March 10, 1999.
Counsel for the petitioner was served with a copy of the CA
Resolution denying the motion on March 24, 1999, and
thereafter filed on April 8, 1999 a motion for extension of forty-
five (45) days within which to file a petition for review.  [26] The
Court granted the motion in its Resolution dated June 16, 1999,
but gave the petitioner only thirty (30) days from the expiration
of the reglementary period within which to file the petition for
review on certiorari, with a warning that no further extension
would be given.[27] The petitioner thus had thirty (30) days from
April 8, 1999 to file the petition for review, or until May 9,
1999. The petition was filed only on July 8, 1999. [28] On this
ground alone, the dismissal of the petition is inevitable.
Although it has been said time and again that litigation is not a
game of technicalities, that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be
properly presented and justly resolved, [29] this does not mean
that procedural rules may altogether be disregarded. Rules of
procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for
persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of
an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of
the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to
abide by the rules.[30]
In the instant case, the respondent apologized to the Court and
admitted his faux pas. In his reply, he offered the following
reasons for non- compliance with the rules: (1) due to the busy
schedule and other pending legal work, counsel for the
petitioner was erroneously of the impression that the period
granted by the Court was to start upon the receipt of the Court's
resolution which granted the thirty-day extension; (2) the
services of the said counsel were hired only when the present
petition became necessary; and (3) the said misconception was
"done in good faith."
This Court cannot countenance such flimsy and tux-worm
excuses. Counsel for the petitioner, as a member of the bar, is
presumed to know the law, particularly the rules of procedure.
He cannot feign ignorance of the said rules. If we were to allow
such lapses to go unnoticed, the administration of justice would
be derailed; incompetent, irresponsible lawyers would soon
permeate the Court.
The petitioner asserts that the issue in the present petition "is
such that the case needs to be resolved on the merits and should
not be dismissed on a mere technicality." The petitioner
questions the finding of the Court of Appeals, that no tenancy
agreement existed between the respondent and Herminio Tara.
This is, however, a factual issue which is beyond the purview of
this Court to act upon and resolve. The Court cannot be tasked
to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze,
assess and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and
appellate court were correct in regarding them superior credit.
[31] 
The issue being raised by the petitioner does not involve a
question of law, but a question of fact, not cognizable by this
Court in a petition for review under Rule 45.[32]
It is a well-settled rule that findings of fact of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded
the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed
on appeal.[33] Such findings are binding and conclusive on the
Court.[34] In Spouses Tansipek v. Philippine Bank of
Communications,[35] we had the occasion to enumerate the
exceptions to the rule, thus:
... (1) [W]hen the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
and conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when
the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners' main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.  [36]
The instant case does not fall under any of the foregoing
exceptions.
Neither can the petitioner find solace in the allegation that the
jurisdiction in the instant case properly falls with the DARAB
because of the existence of a tenancy agreement.
First. For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there
must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. [37] In order
for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is
essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:
1) [T]hat the parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the
subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) that there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) that
the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) that there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest
is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.  [38]

Second. The trial court found that no such tenancy agreement

existed between the respondent and Herminio Tara, and that
such allegation was a mere ploy to prevent the respondent from
exercising dominion and ownership over the subject property.
This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We find no cogent
reason to reverse such finding.

Third. The petitioner is barred from raising the issue of

jurisdiction. The petitioner actively participated in all stages of
the instant case, setting up a counterclaim and asking for
affirmative relief in his answer. [39] He failed, however, to
question the court's jurisdiction over the suit. After relying on
the jurisdiction of the regular courts, he cannot be permitted to
turn around and question it. It is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction.[40]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack

of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.