THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP

HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This
tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark,
or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption
of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners als o
conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the
passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of
the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not brought first
before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom
of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political
question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section
1 of the Constitution..
 The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes
upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to
choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-
justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right
may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or
in this case, organ of government before a court may come into the picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already
an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings
prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to
regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate
the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,”
“fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that
does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.”
In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner
of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from
the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present
danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it
pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and
substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of
expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their
private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property
of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary
or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process
and equal protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so
broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of
the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of
a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes
any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to
promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
 hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or instituti on’s
religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from
generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;

2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA et al, petitioners,

vs.

EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification
by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity)
and for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the
assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-
heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.

They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to
place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO
“intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine
sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the
Congress of the Philippines.
Held:

No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine sovereignty, particularly the legislative power
granted by the Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting in the proper manner when it concurred with the President’s
ratification of the agreement.

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject
to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family o f
nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In
its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all
nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is
pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken.”

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may
surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.
After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also
commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements
between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of
territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial
relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international
organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions
enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations
imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of
self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.”

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down
as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning
a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one
in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino
managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade
environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to
prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Kulayan vs. Tan

FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the
Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water
and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail
when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A
Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the
kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial
Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province
of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural
disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless
violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general
search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al .
contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and
calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Issue: Whether a governor can exercise the calling out powers of president

DECISION: Granted

RATIO DECIDENDI: It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President
of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the
President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers
as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under
Section 7, Article VII thereof. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that
civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader.
The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal
and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of
military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine
military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but
the ultimate power is his. Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at
his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers
contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

YNOT v. IAC

FACTS

Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said order decreed an absolute
ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose) and carabeef.
The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission
(NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director
of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo.
These were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his
filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos,
and as they can no longer be produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionalit y
of the executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626 -A is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed
without giving the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE

Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

HELD

YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests of the public, generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above
requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so
is a lawful subject of the order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be
achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven
if female upon issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and
prevention of their improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second
requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The
object of the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining them in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier
to kill them there. Even if assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as
it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is
prescribed and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the
government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as
summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic
drugs. However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need
to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated property
also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the
NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers
must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously,
this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997
TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the MPHC matched the
bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the
Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified
with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage
and culture.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi,
which voted for the creation of such region were later on known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Consistent
with the authority granted by Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 which authorizes the President to merge the existing regions,
President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429 providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.
Petitioners contend that Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative power
to the President by authorizing him to merge by administrative determination the existing regions or at any rate provides no
standard for the exercise of the power delegated and that the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.aw They
also challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by RA 6734 to the President is only to merge
regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional
center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President’s discretion.
HELD:
No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by administrative determination the existing regions following the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is
logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments
but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. While the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with
the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. (Abbas v. COMELEC) The
regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar to the power
to adjust municipal boundaries which has been described as "administrative in nature.” (Pelaez v. Auditor General)Thus, the
regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative
regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring
the efficient delivery of essential services

Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not
citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned
by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses
are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic
control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed a n
action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are
real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative
classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police
power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and
control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is
naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien
owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become th e
potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the
illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

IBP vs. Zamora

G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist
the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in
the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation
shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke
such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review
of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from
the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of
the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway
and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared
to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve
the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the
armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no
justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized”
in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The
real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none
of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak
of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works
and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the
following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in
pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman
of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on
August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the
rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO.
548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom
of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest
and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.
Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental
aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail
over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means
of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may
at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a
taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region
against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs
alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted
that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a ho st
of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set as ide the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental
legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The
said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation
of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all
those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave
abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the
claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme
Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare
their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause
thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power
of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield
to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

Resident marine mammals of the protected seascape Tañon strait V. Sec. Angelo Reyes
ISSUE: Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and statutes
FACTS: Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales,
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by
Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the
Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as
an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the
ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others. On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting
through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract
involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and
reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as
well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait. On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into
SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850
square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of
the project. On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and
gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with
a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.
The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987
Constitution. In La Bugal, the Court held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not
amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission
(ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts
as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the
martial law regime. In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, the Court established that paragraph 4, with the
safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court
enumerated in La Bugal: Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements: (1) The service contract
shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements,
presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country. (2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented
to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law
and can withstand public scrutiny. (3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress
to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if
any.69cralawlawlibrary. Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, the Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742,
Jul 14, 1989,
Facts:
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer
and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents.
The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and
arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his
small parcels of rice holding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution
Issue:
Whether or not CARL violates due process because landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him
in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain
Held:
NO. The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator onl y
upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other
democratic jurisdictions.
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall
"be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him
was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers'
cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably
to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 27.
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the
farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide
in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer
of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by
the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid
for must also be rejected.

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its
IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to
the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right
to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and
belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from
the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural
Resources; H. RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); R. TORRES, Executive Secretary; and
WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s
natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non -
Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the
President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under
Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which
was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared
unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop
Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to
Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian
company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed
the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals
from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial
assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of
the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment
of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian
investments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the
Philippine mineral resources. 2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract that
permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the
Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section
also states that, ―the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses,
concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission,
the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the
1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular
natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter.
The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the
mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the
1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the
nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against
their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although
the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent
provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary
to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like
the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors,
leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40%
capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of
Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial
assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a
service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and
dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement
provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over
natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are
abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims
to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

LOLOY UNDURAN, et. al., petitioners VS. RAMON ABERASTURI, et. al., respondents
G.R. No. 181284
April 18, 2017
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s En Banc Decision
dated October 20, 2015, which the petition was denied and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. In the petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration, they maintain their contention believing that it is the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
not the regular courts, which has jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICC’s) and Indigenous Peoples (IP’s) regardless of the parties involved.
In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that:
The NCIP and not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case under the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case is determined by the allegations in the complaint, and pursuant to jurisprudence allowing exemptions thereto;
The jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case rests upon the NCIP as conferred by the IPRA;
The IPRA is a social legislation that seeks to protect the IPs not so much from themselves or fellow IPs but more from non-
IPs;
The IPRA created the NCIP as the agency of government mandated to realize the rights of IPs;
In the exercise of its mandate, the NCIP was created as a quasi-judicial body with jurisdiction to resolve claims and disputes
involving the rights of IPs;
The jurisdiction of the NCIP in resolving claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs is not limited to IPs of the same tribe;
Harmonizing the related provisions of the IPRA supports the argument that the NCIP has jurisdiction over cases involving IP
rights whether or not the parties are IPs or non-ICCs/IPs;
The NCIP as quasi-judicial agency provides IPs mechanisms for access to justice in the fulfillment of the State's obligations
to respect, protect and fulfill IP's human rights;
The NCIP has the competence and skill that would greatly advance the administration of justice with respect to protection and
fulfillment of ICC/IP rights/human rights; and
(Recognition and enforcement of customary laws and indigenous justice systems fulfill the State's obligations as duty bearers
in the enforcement of human rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has the jurisdiction over the disputes and controversies involving the ancestral
domain of the ICC and IP regardless of the parties involved not the NCIP.
HELD:
Yes. It is the court of general jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and decide cases whose subject matter does
not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. In
contrast, a court of limited jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has only the jurisdiction expressly delega ted.
An administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could wield only such
powers that are specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. Limited or special jurisdiction is that which is confine d to
particular causes or which can be exercised only under limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.
Meanwhile, the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited under customary laws presents two important issues: first, whether it is
legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs with penalties under customary laws; and second, whether a member of a particular
ICC/IP could be punished in accordance with the customary laws of another ICC/IP.
Therefore, the Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a
case is not merely based on the allegations of the complaint in certain cases where the actual issues are evidenced by
subsequent pleadings. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend on the defenses raised by
the defendant in the answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on
the defendant. Suffice it also to state that the Court is unanimous in denying the petition for review on certiorari on the ground
that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the original and amended complaint based on the allegations therein is
within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law was passed creating the Public
Estate Authority which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA, several
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay were
going to be transferred to AMARI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate
the Constitution
RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands
of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands
to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates
glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object
or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void from the beginning.”
The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and
void ab initio.

Limbona vs. Mangelin

Facts: Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government and was later
elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly. Congressman Datu invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly for consulations and dialogues on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions
IX and XII hopefully resulting to chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the
President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission.
Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner addressed all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as “our
presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook
… .”
In defiance of Petitioner’s advice, After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to
preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the
affirmative.
Issue: Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject
to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous
governments of Region IX and XII?
Held: Firstly, We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his
removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most
elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish
their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion
is exercised with grave abuse.
the Decree PD 168 established “internal autonomy” in the two regions “[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,” with legislative and executive machinery to exercise
the powers and responsibilities specified therein
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments “more responsive and accountable,” “and ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises “general supervision” over them, but only to
“ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units
declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to “self-
immolation,” since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to
the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of “autonomy.” On the other hand,
an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting
through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the
internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category
only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in
which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates
that “[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.” In the second place,
the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services
Hence, we assume jurisdiction.

CASE DIGEST - AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO

Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-Europe
Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a “milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic
partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).”
JPEPA which has been referred to as a ‘mega treaty’ is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and services
as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the
WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and
Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on
JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Government’s rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the
other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country being
turned into Japan’s toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade
and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns.
Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as
taxpayers, and as members of the Congress
2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition.

3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on
transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto.
Rulings:
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of “Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs.
Thomas G. Aquino et al” (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which
sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners
the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese
offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September
2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding
this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access
to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
The Court held: “Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may
not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' –
the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is
reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic
confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with
Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.”
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future
Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty
negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of
lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.
In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said: “We are aware
that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against any abu se
of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of
executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid
even a legitimate exercise thereof.”

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and
QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork
Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet
Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal
complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to
be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of
three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the
Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and
a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently
embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null
and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued
restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute
undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification,
fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation
of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and
monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield
any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”‖
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It
gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE
ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY
FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE
AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A
―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE
SAME.

FRANCISCO ET AL v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).” On
June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,”9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with
the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District,
Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded
on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.13 Since the first impeachment complaint never made it to the floor for resolution,
respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven
Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
Opposing petitioners on the other hand interpreted the word “initiate” to mean the filing of the complaint. Since there was
already a first complaint that never got through the Committee, no impeachment complaint maybe filed until the lapse of the
1 year period.
ISSUE/S
1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. Is the second impeachment complaint valid?
HELD
1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means “to perform or facilitate th e
first action,” The Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records to ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution.
The framers really intended “initiate” to mean the filing of the verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower
House. This is also based on the procedure of the U.S. Congress where an impeachment is initiated upon filing of the
impeachment complaint.
2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.