Reliability-based DGA

Jim Dukarm (Delta-X Research)

Marcolus Sullivan (Duke Energy)

GE M&D Users Forum

August 27-30, 2017
 Overview

Abstract:
Based on statistical reliability models for fault energy indexes, a
new reliability-based approach to DGA (RDGA) was developed
by Delta-X Research. It was evaluated and adopted by Duke
Energy.

Outline:

1. Dissolved-Gas Analysis (DGA) for periodic screening of

transformers
2. Fault energy indexes: NEI-HC and NEI-CO
3. Reliability statistics and transformer DGA
4. Duke Energy experience with reliability-based DGA
 Dissolved-Gas Analysis (DGA)

Dissolved-gas analysis (DGA)

for liquid-filled power transformers
I E↵ective and relatively inexpensive
I Surveillance and investigation
I Periodic condition screening

Conventional DGA results

I OK for normal service or not
I If not,
I What seems to be wrong (fault type)
I How strong the evidence is (assessment).
 New Approach to Transformer DGA

We applied chemistry, physics, and reliability statistics to

transformer DGA...
I DGA limits not needed
I Improved DGA e↵ectiveness
I DGA outputs for engineers and asset managers
 General DGA Principles

I Transformers are designed to transfer large amounts of energy

without cooking themselves.
I Abnormal energy transfer within the transformer decomposes
oil or paper insulation, producing trace amounts of ”fault
gases” dissolved in the oil.
I A small gas increase in limited time is the result of a stressful
event such as a through fault or short-term overheating.
I A large or prolonged gas increase suggests an internal fault or
very abnormal operating conditions.
I If a problem is suspected, proportions of newly produced
amounts of hydrocarbon and carbon oxide gas indicate its
nature (electrical/thermal) and temperature (high/med/low).
 What is a Fault Energy Index?

I Easily calculated one-dimensional feature for trending &

assessment.
I Continuous increasing function of fault gas concentrations.
I Based on fault gases formed from a single insulation
component (i.e., liquid or solid) under abnormal conditions.
I The contribution of each gas is proportional to the energy
required to produce it.

How can fault energy be represented in a fault energy index? The

answer is provided by chemical thermodynamics.
 Standard Enthalpies of Formation
from n-Octane and from Cellulose

278.3
101.4

104.1
93.5
77.7 30.2

CH4 C2H6 C2H4 C2H2 CO2 CO

 NEI-HC and NEI-CO

Two fault energy indexes:

NEI-HC based on hydrocarbon gases from mineral oil
insulation

77.7[CH4 ] + 93.5[C2 H6 ] + 104.1[C2 H4 ] + 278.3[C2 H2 ]

NEI-HC =
22400
NEI-CO based on carbon oxide gases from cellulosic
insulation
101.4[CO] + 30.19[CO2 ]
NEI-CO =
22400
 Nice Properties of Fault Energy Indexes

Fault energy indexes have the following essential properties:

I Sensitive to all fault types a↵ecting that insulation component

I Respond smoothly to fault evolution
I Strongly related to transformer reliability
Example - 140 MVA GSU Gassing
 DGA and Transformer Reliability

Reliability statistics was applied to DGA using NEI-HC and

NEI-CO.

Data required: Transformer DGA histories and data about forced

outages

Result: Probability models for failure-related values of NEI-HC

and NEI-CO
Failure-Related Values of NEI-HC and NEI-CO

0.0014
0.025

0.0012
0.020

0.0010
Probability density

Probability density

0.0008
0.015

0.0006
0.010

0.0004
0.005

0.0002
0.0000
0.000

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 100 200 300 400 500

Failure−related NEI−HC (kJ/kL) Failure−related NEI−CO (kJ/kL)

 Survival Probability vs NEI-HC and NEI-CO
1.00

1.00
0.95

0.95
Survival probability

Survival probability
0.90

0.90
0.85

0.85
0.80
0.75

0.80

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

NEI_HC for Hydrocarbons (kJ/kL) NEI_CO for Carbon Oxides (kJ/kL)

 About Survival Probability

Survival probability indicates how lucky a transformer is to

still be in service.

Survival probability SHC (x) = proportion of all transformers still in

service with NEI-HC > x.

Survival probability says nothing about the likelihood of near-term

survival or time to failure.
 Severity of Gassing Events

Boxed intervals in the NEI graphs are gassing events.

The severity of a gassing event where NEI increases from a to

b = probability that a transformer in service with NEI a fails
with NEI between a and b.

Cumulative severity of several gassing events combines the

individual event severities as required to obtain another probability.
 Risk Exposure

Risk = probability of some event times a consequential cost.

Risk in this sense is forward-looking – you don’t know yet

whether the event will happen.

Gassing event severity is retrospective probability – looking

backwards to when you didn’t know what would happen.

Therefore gassing event severity times consequence is called ”risk

exposure”, not ”risk”.

Risk exposure expresses how much you should care about a

thing that could have happened but didn’t. (Russian roulette
example)

If your $5 million transformer has experienced a gassing event with

severity 5%, risk exposure = $250,000. (Justifying followup action)
 Numeric Status Codes

For classifying transformers based on DGA, consider this scheme:

1. No significant gassing ever.

2. Some significant gassing, but not recently.
3. Most recent sample is included in a gassing event.
4. Most recent sample is included in a very severe gassing event.
 How RDGA Analysis Works

1. Find gassing events (time intervals where NEI is increasing)

2. Apply the Duval Triangle to the gas increments over each
gassing event to identify the apparent fault type during that
event.
3. Calculate the severity of each event and the cumulative
severity of all the events.
4. Calculate the cumulative risk exposure using one or more
criticality factors (such as cost of forced outage, MVA, oil
capacity).
5. Assign a status code.

No DGA limits are needed for this analysis!

 Using the Results

I Prioritize transformers by status score.

I In each case, consider:
I Pattern and assessments of gassing events.
I Cumulative severity and risk exposure
I Suspicious small increases in acetylene (policy driven)
I Changes in CO2 / CO in NEI-CO gassing events
 Assessment of Gassing GSU (NEI-HC)

Event 1: 1549 days, NEI-HC increment 0.762. Severity 1.75%.

Fault type T1.
Event 2: 1483 days. Increment 0.727. Severity 1.70%. Fault type
T1.
Chronic T1 overheating. Cumulative NEI-HC severity: 3.39%.
Cumulative risk exposure (assumed $5 million cost of failure):
$169,500.
 Assessment of Gassing GSU (NEI-CO)

Event 1: 1552 days. NEI-CO increment 8.79. Severity 0.09%.

Event 2: 1175 days. Increment 4.25. Severity 0.12%.
Cumulative NEI-CO severity: 0.23%. Evidently the T1 heating is
a↵ecting the paper insulation slightly – Cumulative NEI-CO risk
exposure is ”only” $11,500.
DGA status = 3 – recent moderate severity gassing.
 Eliminating DGA Limits is Good
I Complexity of multiple limits each for multiple fault gases
I Waiting for something to exceed 90th percentile is a fallacy
I Gas loss can cause serious problems to be overlooked
I Measurement error strongly a↵ects results
I Undue importance placed on gas concentrations
I Rate of change limits are problematic
I Uneven response of condition code to fault evolution

Policy-based limits can be used where needed, e.g. for

severity and for various kinds of risk exposure.

Reliability-based DGA has been shown to reveal problems

undetected by conventional DGA and to produce fewer
”false positives.”
 Conventional DGA vs RDGA

Conventional DGA RDGA Duke Energy

Fleet 7,280 100%

Conventional 1,785 24.5%

RDGA 1,729 23.8%

C or R 2,783 38.2%

C and R 731 10.0%

C not R 1,054 14.5%

R not C 998 13.7%

Fleet
 Benefits of Eliminating False Negatives/Positives

Duke Energy
Avoiding False Positives:
Fleet 7,280 100%
• SME reviews
Conventional 1,785 24.5% • Truck rolls
• Additional DGA testing
Many different assets
RDGA 1,729 23.8%

Conventional or
RDGA
2,783 38.2% Avoiding False Negatives (Misses):
• Equipment failures
Conventional and • Catastrophic failures
731 10.0%
RDGA
 Collateral damage
Conventional not  Environmental damage & clean-up
1,054 14.5%
RDGA Primarily false positives by
Conventional DGA
 Human safety
RDGA not  SAIDI / SAIFI
998 13.7%
Conventional Primarily misses by  Increased costs
Conventional DGA  Brand damage

As of 20 Jan 17, 68 units checked  63 confirmed at-risk

transformers, 2 bad oil samples, 3 false positives
Transformer Health Surveillance Process
1 2 3 4 5
Field Oil Lab Oil RDGA SME Surveillance
Sample Analysis Filter Evaluation Lists

No Action
Taken
9 8 7 6
Field Validation:
Track & Field Repair / • Safety Plans
Trend Testing Replace • Mitigation Plans
• SPCC Containment
• Internal Inspection
• Online Monitoring Yes
• Sparing Plan
• Diagnostic Testing