READ AND DIGEST THE FOLLOWING CASES:

Rebellion

Cases:

1. People vs. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26, July 18, 1956

Facts: Defendant-appellant Amado Hernandez is a bonafide member of Congress of Labor Organizations.

CLO is an affiliate of Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, a known group performing rebellious activities.
Hernandez was charged and convicted of the crime of rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and
robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Prosecution maintains that capital punishment may be
imposed for the crime he was convicted of. Defense contends that there is no complex crime in the
crime of rebellion. It was deemed best not to disturb the course of action taken by the lower court,
which denied bail to Hernandez, hence the motion to post bail.

Issue: Whether or not equal protection was observed in the administration of justice?

Decision: Motion for bail granted. The ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence,
are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately there from. Indeed, if one act
constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense
be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to
prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately.
The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are
the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru
separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he
must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave
than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.

2. Lagman vs. Medeldea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

FACTS:

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the
whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On
May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law
declaration (as required by the Constitution).

The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According
to the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in
Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing
rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.

Proclamation 216 is now assailed by several petitioners:

LAGMAN PETITION

Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy
Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed this petition to assail the President’s declaration of Martial Law.
Its main contention is that, the president’s declaration has no sufficient and factual basis – arguing that
acts of terrorism are not equated with rebellion or invasion. Lagman also contends that the seeming
affiliation with ISIS is only mere propaganda, designed to create an appearance of capability for the
Maute group.

The petition also cited several facts in the president’s report which was refuted by several media
networks and news articles because they turned out to be false or untrue. Among these was the report
about the attack on Amai Pakpak Hospital, the ransack of the Landbank of the Philippines, and the
burning of several schools.

CULLAMAT PETITION

The Cullamat Petition on the other hand avers that the president fails to show any acts of rebellion and
invasion outside Marawi City. Hence, the declaration of Martial Law for the whole island of Mindanao
has no sufficient basis. Cullamat also reiterated the false facts in the president’s report, as pointed out in
the Lagman petition.

MOHAMAD PETITION

The Mohamad Petition also avers that the power to declare Martial Law is a remedy of last resort. It
contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the
power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law.

OSG’S CONSOLIDATED COMMENT

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the court should only review Proclamation 216
under the lens of grave abuse of discretion, and not on the correctness of facts.

The OSG also further argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined based on the
facts/information that were available to the president at the time he made the determination. Doing
otherwise will impose an impossible standard on the president’s exercise of discretion.

ISSUES:

A. WON the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18, Article VII.
B. WON the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of
the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately.
C. WON the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers
granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out powers, (2) suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (3) declaration of martial law.
D. WON there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

HELD:

1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and declaration of martial law is that the petitioner should be a citizen. He need not even
be a taxpayer.
2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court
to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is completely independent from Congress’ duty to review.

It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of
his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, such a revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the
other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events
supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve
into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition “in an appropriate
proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review mechanism is automatic in the sense that
it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.

The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the
power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does
not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.

3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s decision pertaining to
which extraordinary power should he use to avail in a given set of facts or conditions. To do so would be
tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the
prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the
Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called “graduation of powers” does not dictate or restrict the
manner by which the President decides which power to choose.

4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration.

The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and
information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.

The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending
to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a
declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet,
with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof.

As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus
without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter
asserted.
The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with
these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not,
actual rebellion exists.

3. Crispin vs. Beltran, G.R. No. 175013, June 1, 2007

Facts: These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners’
prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and prosecution of petitioners’
cases. Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76,
are members of the House of Representatives representing various party-list groups. Petitioners all face
charges for Rebellion under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two
criminal cases pending with the RTC Makati.
Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the
crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon
City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a speech
Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006, on the occasion of the 20 th
anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting
officers who claimed to have been present at the rally.
The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where he was subjected to a second
inquest, this time for Rebellion. The letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action the results of the
CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, San Juan, and several
others as “leaders and promoters” of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The
plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a “tactical alliance.”
The DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and
San Juan as “leaders/promoters” of Rebellion. The Information alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and other
individuals “conspiring and confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously form a tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong Komunista ng
Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members as Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan (KAB) with the
Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and thereby rise publicly and take up arms against the duly
constituted government.
In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that Beltran’s inquest for Rebellion
was valid and that the RTC Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such felony.

Issue: Whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b) whether there is
probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion.

Held: The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest proceedings are proper only
when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.
The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers states that the officers arrested Beltran, without
a warrant, for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have
conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when
another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they
overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw
Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to
believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that
they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.
If the arrest was not properly effected, the inquest officer should proceed under Section 9 of
Circular No. 61 which provides:
Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.— Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not
made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:
a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b) note down the disposition on the referral document;
c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and
d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial
Prosecutor for appropriate action.

For the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in
relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare Beltran’s inquest void. Beltran would
have been entitled to a preliminary investigation had he not asked the trial court to make a judicial
determination of probable cause, which effectively took the place of such proceeding.

There is No Probable Cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion. Probable cause is the “existence of such
facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.

The elements of Rebellion are:

1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and

2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either –

(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:

(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
and prerogatives

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in
furtherance of a political end.

We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are
insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. The allegations in these affidavits are far
from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the
government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas
on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the
affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion
as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a
leader of a rebellion. Beltran’s alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically
make him a leader of a rebellion. Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not
acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion. 29[29] As for the alleged funding
of the CPP’s military equipment from Beltran’s congressional funds, Cachuela’s affidavit merely
contained a general conclusion without any specific act showing such funding. Such a general
conclusion does not establish probable cause.
In his Comment to Beltran’s petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes’ affidavit, dated 25
February 2006,] as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in
his statement regarding meetings Beltran and the other petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which
plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed, among others. The claim
is untenable. Fuentes’ affidavit was not part of the attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ on 27
February 2006. Thus, the panel of inquest prosecutors did not have Fuentes’ affidavit in their possession
when they conducted the Rebellion inquest against Beltran on that day. Such belated submission, a tacit
admission of the dearth of evidence against Beltran during the inquest, does not improve the
prosecution’s case. Assuming them to be true, what the allegations in Fuentes’ affidavit make out is a
case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not
Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a
government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134.
Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based
on the evidence before it.
To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting, maintaining, or heading a
Rebellion. The Information in Criminal Case No. 06-452 itself does not make such allegation. Thus, even
assuming that the Information validly charges Beltran for taking part in a Rebellion, he is entitled to bail
as a matter of right since there is no allegation in the Information that he is a leader or promoter of the
Rebellion. However, the Information in fact merely charges Beltran for “conspiring and confederating”
with others in forming a “tactical alliance” to commit rebellion. As worded, the Information does not
charge Beltran with Rebellion but with Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, a bailable offense

Treason

4. People vs. Almazan, 37 O.G. 1932

Matias Almazan was accused before the People's Court of the crime of treason on five counts. Count 5
was not deemed by the trial court specifically proved for lack of two witnesses to the overt acts, and the
evidence on said count was considered only as proof of adhesion to the enemy. The appellant was found
guilty on the first four counts and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of
the law, to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs. The defendant appealed to this Court.

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:

Count No. 1

The appellant was formerly a member of the subversive societies known as "Ganap" and "Sakdal."
During the Japanese occupation, he became a member of the other society known as "Makabayang
Kalipunan Ng Mga Pilipino" or "Makapili" for short. This association was founded under the auspices of
the Japanese Imperial Army, its purpose having been to help the Japanese forces in their campaign
against the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and to combat the guerrilla
underground movement. The members of this society received military training from the Japanese and
actually took part in the campaign against the resistance movement of the Fil-American forces. This
charge was proved by documentary evidence and the testimony of numerous witnesses.

Count No. 2

On June 20, 1943, the appellant with one Marcelo Alatiit, accompanied several Japanese soldiers to the
barrio of Malabar, Binan, Laguna, and there arrested three guerrilla suspects, named Gregorio Corrales,
Macario Alzona, and Juan Romero, and took them to Calamba, Laguna, delivering them to the Japanese
headquarters in that town. This is proved by the testimony of four witnessses.

Count No. 3

In the evening of August 9, 1943, the appellant Matias Almazan arrested in their house in barrio De la
Paz, Binan, Laguna, Enrique Alcabasa and his sons Bernardo and Gregorio, who were members of the
guerrilla corps under the command of Colonel Hugh Straughn and delivered them to the Japanese
headquarters in Binan, where they were tortured by the Japanese, resulting in the death of Enrique two
days afterward. This charge was proved by the testimony of Bernardo and Gregorio Alcabasa.

Count No. 4

In the month of November, 1943, at midnight, the appellant, armed, went with Marcelo Alatiit and a
number of Japanese soldiers to the barrio of Malaban, Binan, Laguna, and there arrested Felipe Capili,
proceeding to the town of Siniloan where they apprehended three unknown Filipinos. All of these
arrested persons were guerrilla suspects. They were surrendered by the defendant and his companions
to the Japanese garrison in Calamba. This was proved by the testimony of Angeles Vicentina, Felipe
Capili, and Valentin del Monte.

The appellant admitted that he was a Filipino citizen.

The appellant in his defense, although he admits his membership in the Ganap Party before the war,
denies his affiliation with the Makapili. He denies having given aid or comfort to the enemy.

He admits that he was present when Corrales, Alzona, and Romero were arrested on June 20, 1943, but
denies having had any participation in said arrest having been only a curious bystander.

He admits knowing Enrique Alcabasa, but says that he was even unaware that the latter had been
arrested and learned of it only when he, the appellant, was arraigned.

The witness for the defense, Barsiliso Almazan, corroborating the defendant, testifies that he was
present when Corrales, Alzona, and Romero were arrested, but the defendant Matias Almazan was not
among those who arrested them.

Felix Kalayag, another witness for the defense, testifies that the appellant was not with the group that
arrested Felipe Capili in November, 1943, and that the only civilian present on that occasion was the
Japanese named Takama.

The membership of the appellant Matias Almazan in the Makapili association has been proved by the
testimony of Angeles Vicentina, Pacifico Alzona, Bernardo Alcabasa, Marciano Gallo, Marcial Gomez, and
Calixto Martina, who were barrio mates of the appellant and knew the latter well. They saw the
appellant, fully armed when he was with the Japanese patrol on several occasions, and when he was
drilled by the Japanese together with the members of the Makapili organization in Bifian. The appellant
acted as a pro-Japanese and a leader of the Makapilis. The evidence is sufficient to establish the fact
that he was an active member of the Makapili.

The contention of the appellant that he was a mere bystander when Corrales, Alzona, and Romero were
arrested, is disproved by the testimony of Angeles Vicentina, Faustino Parao, Juan P. Romero, and
Gregorio Corrales. There is no reason to believe that his own barrio mates would have testified against
him if in fact he did not participate actively in the arrest of those persons. They had no motive to do so;
Juana Amoranto and Barsiliso Almazan, who did not take part in the arrest, were not charged by said
witnesses. The appellant himself admits that he had no quarrel. with those witnesses.

The denial of the defendant that he took part in the arrest of Enrique Alcabasa and his sons Bernardo
and Gregorio (Count No. 3) is disproved by the victims Bernardo and Gregorio Alcabasa. Enrique
Alcabasa could not testify because he had been tortured to death by the Japanese.

With regard to the arrest of Capili (Count No. 4), the mere denial of the accused cannot prevail over the
testimony of Angeles Vicentina, Valentin del Monte, and Felipe Capili himself, all of whom clearly
identified the appellant as one of those who arrested Capili. The appellant says that Capili had a grudge
against him because he refused to lend money to Capili at a gambling game. This alleged motive is
insufficient to lead us to believe that for that reason Capili, the victim, testified falsely against him.

Furthermore, with regard to the respective credibility of the witnesses, we find no reason for
disregarding the conclusions of the trial court; on the contrary, we find them fully supported by the
evidence of record.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. It is ordered.

Coup d’etat

5. Gonzales vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 8, 2006

FACTS:

Some armed members of the AFP had abandoned their designated places of assignment with an aim to
destabilize the government. Thereafter, they entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments in Makati City, led by Navy Lt. Triplanes, disarmed the security guards, and planted
explosive devices around the building.

DOJ filed with RTC of Makati City an Information for coup d’etat against those soldiers while respondent
General Abaya issued a Letter Order creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the
propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War

The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel recommended that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those
charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation
of the Articles of War.

RTC then issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial against the accused…are
hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of
coup d’etat."
In the meantime, the AFP approved the recommendation that those involved be prosecuted before a
general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the
charge but instead they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents
be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War maintaining
that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order that the offense for violation of Article 96 of
the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the military
tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not those charged with coup d’etat before RTC shall be charged before military tribunal for
violation of Articles of War. (YES)

HELD:

1) As to the jurisdiction of the court

GENERAL RULE: Members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law who commit crimes or
offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local
ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court.

EXCEPTION: Where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-
connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial.

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: Where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs
before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn
oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly
caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing of their
professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected"
nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same (under Art. 96 of Articles of War) – dismissal
from the service –imposable only by the military court.

The RTC, in making the declaration that Art 96 of Articles of War as “not sevice-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furthenance of the crime of coup d’etat”, practically amended the law which expressly
vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." It is only the
Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject
matter or nature of an action which can do so. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

2) As to the Doctrine of Absorption of Crimes

Moreover, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to
crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the
doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offences. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055
deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of
War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Sedition

6. People vs. Cabrera, G.R. No. 17748, March 4, 1992

FACTS:

• The Phil. Constabulary (PC) vowed revenge on the Manila Police for the alleged arrest of one of
the women in the household of a PC soldier and the death of a soldier in an encounter between the two
forces.

• Seventy-seven soldiers escaped from the barracks through a window. These soldiers went on a
shooting spree that killed 2 policemen and wounded 2 civilians. It ended when the officers came to
round them up from the streets.

• Two cases were filed: one for sedition (where they pleaded guilty) and one for murder and
serious physical injuries (where they pleaded not guilty).

• They were found guilty on both cases. The defendants appealed.

ISSUES / HOLDINGS / RATIO:

• WON fraud and deceit marked the preparation of the seventy seven confessions that the court
admitted as evidence.

NO. It was alleged that some of the defendants signed the confessions under the impression that those
who had taken part in the affray would be transferred to Mindanao, and that although they did not in
fact so participate, affirmed that they did because of a desire to leave Manila; that others stepped
forward "for the good of the service"; while still other simply didn't understand what they were doing,
for the remarks of Colonel Sweet were made in English and only translated into Tagalog, and their
declarations were sometimes taken in a language which was unintelligible to them. The court, however,
believes that these confessions contain the statements that they were made freely and voluntarily
without any promise of immunity. That such was the case was corroborated by the attesting witnesses
whose credibility has not been successfully impeached.

 WON conspiracy between the accused is essential to the crime of sedition

NO. Conspiracy is not an essential element of the crime of sedition. The court, however, proceeded to
expound on this issue. Common design is required to prove conspiracy. It is incontestable that all of the
defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the police force of
the city of Manila. A common feeling of resentment animated all. A common plan evolved from their
military training was followed. Therefore, there is conspiracy among them.

 WON it is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public
functionary in order for him to have violated the Treason and Sedition Law.

NO. Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. Act No.
292 penalizes all persons inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official
or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government for the crime of sedition.
The Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies.
  WON the defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused.

NO. The prohibition against double jeopardy is against a second jeopardy for the same offense. To
entitle a defendant to plead successfully former jeopardy, the offense charge in the two prosecutions
must be the same in law and in fact. In this case it is obvious that sedition is not the same offense as
murder. Sedition is a crime not the same offense as murder. The offenses charged in the two cases for
sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in point of law however nearly they may be connected in
point of act. The gist of the information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the
constabulary in order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of
hate and revenge upon the persons of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several
places in the city of Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case is that the Constabulary,
conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons and gravely wounded three others. The
crimes of murder and serious physical injuries were not necessarily included in the information for
sedition; and the defendants could not have been convicted of these crimes under the first information.

JUDGMENT: GUILTY of sedition and murder and serious physical injuries. THEY put barricades to block
the entrance then shot at ever policemen that went to intramuros to see the barricades.

REMEMBER: Sedition does not absorb other offenses.

7. People vs. Umali, G.R. No. L-5803, November 29, 1954

Manual copy

8. People vs. Hadji, G.R. No.L-12686, October 24, 1963

Inciting to sedition Cases:

9. Espiritu vs. Lim, G.R. No. 85727, October 3, 1991

10. Espuelas vs. People, G.R. No. L-29990, December 17, 1951

FACTS:

• Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end
of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth he was merely standing on a barrel

• After securing copies of his photograph, he sent copies of the same to several newspapers and
weeklies of general circulation throughout the Philippines and abroad for their publication

• Along with the photographs, he sent a suicide letter, wherein he made to appear

that it was written by one Alberto Reveniera

• The letter, addressed to Reveniera’s supposed wife contained his displeasure towards the Roxas
administration

• Some important parts of the letter:

- “if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with
the administration of Roxas”

- “and if they asks why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation
in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about Julio Guillen and the banditry in Leyte”

- “write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our government
is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis”

- “Tell the children to burn pictures of Roxas”

- “I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people
now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self”

ISSUE: Whether or not the words contained in the letter constitute scurrilous libel (punishable under
Article 142 of the RPC- Inciting to Sedition)

HELD: YES. The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.

RATIO:

• It not only calls the government one of crooks and dishonest persons infested with Nazis and
Fascists but the communication also reveals a tendency to produce a feeling of dissatisfaction or a
feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government

• The publication suggests rebellious conspiracies or riots and tend to stir up the

people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition groups who may seek
to silence the writer

• It is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all Roxas officials (by
virtue supposedly of his mention of Juez de Cuchillo which to the layman is the Law of the Knife; that the
idea intended by Espuelas was the bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government
from the administration of Roxas and his men)

• Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to

weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace, and are criminal
not only because they tend to incite to a breach of peace but because they are conducive to the
destruction of the very government itself

• If it be argued that the letter does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only
President Roxas and his men, the reply is that the article punishes not only libels against the government
but also “libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof.”

TUASON, J., Dissenting:

• the message which the accused herein caused to be published contained no libel or criticism
against the instituted system of government as distinct from the administration
• the gist of the message was that the author was desperate and was going to kill himself because
many of the men in government were following the practices of absolute and despotic rulers in other
parts of the world

• he pretended to have decided to kill himself because he was impotent to remedy or suppress
this deplorable state of affairs

• far from advocating the throw of government or change the present scheme of polity. The
article evinced intense feeling of devotion to the welfare of the country and its institutions

• the article was but a statement of grievances against official abuses and misgovernment that
already were of common knowledge and which more influential and responsible speakers and writers
had denounced in terms and ways more dangerous and revolutionary

JUDGMENT: Conviction was affirmed.

Illegal Assemblies

Illegal Association

11. People vs. Evangelista, G.R. No. 36278, October 26, 1932

12. U.S. vs. Sadian, 1513, February 12, 1904

13. People vs. Alipio, G.R. No. 11260-R, November 29, 1956

Interruption, prohibition, or dissolution of religious worship

14. U.S. vs. Balcorta, G.R. No. 8722, September 10, 1913

FACTS:

The accused

https://www.scribd.com/document/319371140/Case-Digest-G-R-8722

15. U.S. vs. Morales, G.R. No. 12644, December 22, 1917

Offending religious feelings Cases:

16. People vs. Migallos, CA-G.R. No. 13619, August 15, 1955

17. Mondoiao, CA- G.R. No. 12114, February 25, 1955

Direct Assault Cases:

18. People vs. Recto, G.R. No. 129069, October 17, 2001

FACTS:

RTC of Romblon found Julio Recto y Robea guilty of (1) two counts of the complex crime of qualified
direct assault with frustrated homicide the complex crime of qualified direct assault with murder and (3)
homicide. accused, with intent to kill, did by means of treachery attack, assault, and shoot with a
shotgun locally called pugakang one MELCHOR RECTO, knowing that the latter is a duly appointed
barangay chief tanod of Romblon, while he was engaged in the performance of his official duties,
inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in different parts of his body.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of direct assault.

HELD:

No. The trial court erred in convicting appellant of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide

Direct assault may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any
of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties.

In the case at bar, the victim, Melchor Recto -- being then the barangay chief tanod of Ambulong,
Magdiwang, Romblon -- was clearly an agent of a person in authority. However, contrary to the findings
of the trial court, he was not engaged in the performance of his official duties at the time he was shot.
Neither was he attacked on the occasion of such performance. Thus, the attack on him did not amount
to direct assault appellants liability amounted only to attempted, not frustrated, homicide. The penalty
that is lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for consummated homicide shall be imposed
upon appellant. After applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it shall be taken from the medium
period, since there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances proven.

In Criminal Case No. 1971, the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on Percival Orbe then a
barangay captain, a person in authority.

In his other criminal case, Considering that Antonio Macalipay was a kagawad who was in the actual
performance of his duties when he was shot, the attack on him constituted direct assault. appellant
should be held liable for the complex crime of qualified direct assault with homicide. The penalty to be
imposed on him should be for homicide, which is the more serious crime, to be imposed in the
maximum period.

19. People vs. Benitez, G.R. No. 49396, September 11, 1942

20. People vs. Ablao, G.R. No. 69184, March 26, 1990
FACTS:

That on or about December 16, 1977 in the Municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping with each other, then provided with unlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, attack, assault and
shoot at one ANDRES MANAMBIT Y MENDOZA thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal and
serious gunshot wounds on the different parts of the body which immediately caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim, Andres Manambit y Mendoza.

ISSUE:

aggravating circumstance of disregard or insult of rank.

HELD:

YES. The Court finds accused MARIO ABLAO, 25 years old, of Lumban, Laguna, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER as charged in the information with aggravating circumstance of disregard
due the deceased on account of his rank as Barangay Captain and as President of the Association of
Barangay Captains of Lumban, Laguna and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme and extreme
penalty of DEATH; to pay the heirs of Andres Manambit, Sr., the sum of P30,000.00 with the accessory
penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs.

Accused ALBERTO ALMARIO, ZENON SAMONTE and HECTOR SAMONTE are acquitted of the crime of
MURDER for lack of evidence against them.

Violation of Parliamentary Immunity Cases:

21. Martinez vs. Morfe, G.R. No. L-34022, March 24, 1972

FACTS:

The question raised in this case is the scope to be accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and
representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to and
returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace.

Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista are facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was
charged for falsification of a public document before the sala of Judge Morfe. The basis of the case
against him was his statement under oath that he was born on June 20, 1945 instead of June 20, 1946.
On the other hand, Bautista was charged for violation of the Revised Election Code. Bautista was
accused to be in violation of Section 51 of the RPC when he gave and distributed free of charge food,
drinks and cigarettes at two public meetings. Thus, the petitioners, as delegates of the 1972
Constitutional Convention invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above constitutional
provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the RPC penalizing a public officer or employee
who shall, during the sessions of Congress, “arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such
member has committed a crime punishable under the RPC by a penalty higher than prision mayor.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent judges in the case at bar, disputed such a contention
on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an
exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised
Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very least
inoperative.

ISSUE: Whether Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.

HELD:

No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides that immunity from arrest does not cover any
prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war
against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. Breach of the peace covers
any offense whether defined by the RPC or any special statute.

Any person who acted against public peace is susceptible to prosecution. There is a full recognition of
necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities.

In this case, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista were arrested fall under the category of “breach
of peace,” therefore, they cannot invoke the privilege from arrest provision of the Constitution.

Evasion of Service of Sentence Cases:

22. Curiano vs. CFI, G.R. No. l-8104, April 15, 1955

23. Parulan vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-28519, February 17, 1968

Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners Cases:

24. U.S. vs. Bandino, G.R. No. L-9964, February 111, 1915

Crimes against Public Interest

Falsification of Document

25. U.S. vs. Cinco, G.R. No. 12127, October 13, 1917

26. People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 39047, October 31, 1933

Use of Falsified Document Cases:

27. Civil Service Commission vs. Sta. Ana, A.M. No. OCA-01-5, August 1, 2002

False testimony and Perjury Cases:

 28. Union Bank of the Philippines vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192565, February 28,
2012

Facts:

Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she was charged of
deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) “by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or
proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency”. The Certification was notarized in
Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and
Tomas was filed in Makati.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City
Court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati
City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury
case.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that
the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-
Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on
the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which ruled that venue and jurisdiction
should be in the place where the false document was presented.

Issue:

Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati City, where
the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was
presented to the trial court.

Held:

The SC denied the petition and held that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court
to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

The criminal charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Article 183
of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the
basis of this article which penalizes one who “makes an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.” The
constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when
the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, SC held that its ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the
RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the
guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or
her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the
crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil,
venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual
testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is
submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath
was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime
committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to
be constitutive of the crime committed.

Using fictitious name and concealing true name Law:

Article 178 of the Revised Penal Code Case:

29. U.S. vs. To Lee Piu, G.R. No. 11522, September 26, 1916

Machination in Public auctions Cases:

30. Ouano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 40203, August 21, 1990

FACTS:

1… A parcel of land with an area of about 3,710 square meters, situated in Mandawe, Cebu, in the
name of the registered owner, Rehabilitation 'Finance Corporation (RFC), now the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP). Adjoining Lot 3-A-1 are lands belonging to Francisco Echavez, private respondent
herein, and petitioner Paterno J. Ouano.

2. The property was offered for sale by public bidding by the RFC. Now, it appears that prior to the
second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid, and that if it was
accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties.

3. As expected, the highest bid submitted, and thus accepted by the RFC, was that of Francisco
Echavez.

4. that they both orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid at the second bidding called by
the RFC, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining
properties; and

5. that to ensure success of their scheme, they had also agreed to induce the only other party known
to be interested in the property a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from presenting a bid, 28 as
they did succeed in inducing Mrs. Bonsucan's group to withdraw from the sale, paying said group P2,000
as reimbursement for its expenses. 29

LEGAL ISSUE: Whether or not the "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence ... does
prescribe."
RULING:
1… The SC said No.
2. These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had promised to
share in the property in question as a consideration for Ouano's refraining from taking part in the public
auction, and they had attempted to cause and in fact succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away
from the auction.

3. In order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned. In so doing, they committed the
felony of machinations in public auctions defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code.

4. That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record, as is the fact that thereby only
one bid that of Echavez was entered for the 'land in consequence of which Echavez eventually acquired it.

5. The agreement therefore being criminal in character, the parties not only have no action against
each other but are both liable to prosecution and the things and price of their agreement subject to
disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in accordance with the so-called pari
delicto principle set out in the Civil Code.

6. Article 1409 of said Code declares as "inexistent and void from the beginning" those contracts,
among others, "whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy," or "expressly prohibited ... by law." Such contracts "cannot be ratified "the right to set up
the defense of illegality (cannot) be waived;" and, Article 1410 adds, the "action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence ... (thereof) does not prescribe." Furthermore, according to Article 1411 of
the same Code 30 —

7. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act
constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each
other, and both shall be prosecuted.

8. The dismissal of Ouano's action by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals was thus
correct, being plainly in accord with the Civil Code provisions just referred to. 31 Article 1411 also
dictates the proper disposition of the land involved, i.e., "the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and
the instruments or tools with which it was committed," as mandated by the provisions of Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code, this being obviously the provision "of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of
effects or instruments of a crime" that Article 1411 makes "applicable to the things or the price of the
contract."

9. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED, so that in addition
to affirming the Trial Court's judgment dismissing Ouano's complaint and Echavez's counterclaim in Civil
Case subject of said case is ordered FORFEITED in its entirety in favor of the Government of the
Philippines.

Monopolies and combination

31. Tatad vs. The Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

Facts:

In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through the enactment of R.A. No. 7638)
to control energy-related government activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180 (Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996) was enacted in pursuance to the deregulation of the power and energy thrust
under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180, any person or entity was allowed to import and market crude
oil and petroleum products, and to lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil
facilities.

Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 since the
imposition of tarrif violates the equal protection clause and bars the entry of others in the oil industry
business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the constitution requiring
every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title.

In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto
Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition and Sanlakas argued that R.A.
No. 8180, specifically Section 15 is unconstitutional because it: (1) gives undue delegation of legislative
power to the President and the Secretary of Energy by not providing a determinate or determinable
standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry; (2) Executive Order No. 392, an order declaring the implementation of the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry, is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due
to the alleged depletion of the Oil Price Stabilization Plan- a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180; and (3)
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among Petron,
Caltex and Shell in violation of constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint
of trade and unfair competition.

Respondents, on the other hand, declares the petitions not justiciable (cannot be settled by the court)
and that the petitioners have no locus standi since they did not sustain direct injury as a result of the
implementation of R.A. No. 8180.

Issues:

1. Whether or not R.A. no. 8180 is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not E. O. no. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable.

3. Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. no. 8180 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

4. Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.

Held:

1. No, R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It violated Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition. The deregulation act only
benefits Petron, Shell and Caltex, the three major league players in the oil industry.

2. Yes, Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore considered void. The
depletion of OFSP is not one of the factors enumerated in R.A. No. 8180 to be considered in declaring
full deregulation of the oil industry. Therefore, the executive department, in its declaration of E.O. No.
392, failed to follow faithfully the standards set in R.A. No. 8180, making it void.

3. No, section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. A law
having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions as long as
they are not inconsistent with the foreign subject. Section 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to
the subject of the deregulation of the downstream industry which is R.A. No 8180, therefore it does not
violate the one title-one subject rule.
4. No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of legislative power.
The tests to determine the validity of delegation of legislative power are the completeness test and the
sufficiency test. The completeness test demands that the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions such that when it reaches the delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The sufficiency test
demand an adequate guideline or limitation in the law to delineate the delegate’s authority. Section 15
provides for the time to start the full deregulation, which answers the completeness test. It also laid
down standard guide for the judgement of the President- he is to time it as far as practicable when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of peso to dollar is stable- which answers the sufficiency test.

Decision:

The petitions were granted. R.A. No. 8180 was declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.