NAME: SOHAIB AFSAR RAJA

MBA 1.5
ASSIGNMENT 2

SHELL IN NIGERIA: CSR is today the basic tool most multinational corporation initiates for
development in third world countries globally. The Royal Dutch Shell group of Companies, the
parent company for shell oil Nigeria commenced drilling oil in Nigeria in 1958. The company is
not only drilling crude oil for shipment overseas but also refining some in Nigeria. Nigeria's
crude oil ranks high in quality and Is a huge supply, thus climbed Shell-Oil Nigeria to the top in
1994 as the company that made more money than any company globally. However, the company
of its CSR by 1996 by getting involved in unethical practices.
This case discusses how shell abused the environment and the human right of the Nigerian
people and manipulated local government for profit. The case draws its empirical material from
the CSR reports, as it relates to Shell-Nigeria. Shell Oil Nigeria its parent company as known in
the United States, Chevron Oil Company explores for and extract crude oil in Nigeria, the Niger
Delta Region.
The restructuring has been precipitated by the realization that Shell would need to change the
way it did business if it was to retain its position as the world's largest energy and chemicals
company and offer an adequate to shareholders in an increasingly turbulent industry
environment. Shell will need to create a department especially responsible for the
implementation and follow-up, to ensure spills are clean up, monetary compensation for losses
are given to the proper individuals, groups or communities. Shell=Oil Nigeria must respect the
views of the people in the communities which it operates; this will curtail the arm struggle, and
bring peace between all stakeholders.

EXXON IN CAMEROON: Since the beginning of the 1990s, the debate on the social
responsibilities of companies has extended far beyond environmental matters. The aim of this
report is to explore ExxonMobil’s record - principles and practice - on the wider agenda of
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The report starts off with a brief overview of
ExxonMobil’s history and involvement in politically and socially `explosive’ resource-abundant
developing countries. As the largest private oil company in the world, ExxonMobil is involved in
most of these countries and is thus highly vulnerable to public scrutiny and criticism. In
comparison with other large European oil companies, however, ExxonMobil has apparently
avoided major NGO and media scrutiny on CSR. The report argues that scant negative publicity
on CSR-related matters may be either due to relatively better performance, or other reasons such
as size and low profile. In particular, ExxonMobil has kept a very low profile in it’s external
communication on CSR issues. By promising little, there is actually a high level of association
between what the company says and what it does. This conclusion is based on a measurement of
external communication and attention directed towards the company. ExxonMobil seems to have
avoided negative attention by a very cautions response to the widening CSR agenda. The report
ends with a brief discussion of how we can explain why ExxonMobil has chosen a lower profile
on CSR issues as compared to its European competitors. ExxonMobil claims that it contributes
to social welfare worldwide by efficient production of energy and chemicals, community
outreach programmes and high performance on HES. The company has not changed this policy,
but it has recently added human rights to its portfolio of corporate responsibilities. While this
new element has not led to any significant changes in corporate principles and procedures,
ExxonMobil’s involvement with the World Bank in the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project
indicates change in how to develop projects in extremely poor countries. On the other hand, that
project is perceived as quite unique and may not necessarily tell us much about any generic
changes. Whether ExxonMobil is a ‘pro-active tiger’ or a ‘re-active turtle’ on CSR is very
difficult to judge. Based on external communications, one could argue that ExxonMobil is weak
on CSR rhetoric as compared to BP and Shell. Even TotalFinaElf has adopted a CSR rhetoric
that extends well beyond ExxonMobil’s cautious strategy (Econ, 2002). Judged against the
backdrop of allegations, however, ExxonMobil appears to have received less criticism than other
major oil companies. This is particularly true as compared to TotalFinaElf and somewhat
surprising in the light of the company’s extensive involvement in developing countries. To
repeat, there may be at least two ways of explaining this relative lack of criticism: 1)
ExxonMobil actually performs better in developing countries than other companies; 2) the
company has been exposed to less attention for other reasons: a) Given ExxonMobil’s size and
power NGOs prefer to direct their attentions towards ‘softer’ targets; b) although negative
publicity on CSR leads to a “snowball” effect, ExxonMobil has so far avoided being hit, in
contrast to Shell, for example; c) its low profile on CSR attracts less attention from NGOs. But
why would ExxonMobil want to keep a lower profile on ‘macro’ CSR issues than its European
competitors? There are at least three explanatory perspectives pertaining to three levels of
analysis that could help answer the question. First, differences and changes in CSR strategy may
be due to company-specific factors such as organisational structure and learning capacity,
leadership, corporate tradition, CSR reputation and so on (see e.g. Ghobadian, et al., 1998). For
example, since ExxonMobil has not been alleged of serious CSR issues it has apparently fewer
incentives to change course, as compared to European companies. As noted, ExxonMobil’s
organisational structure and the recent organisational changes in the wake of the merger could
also have consequences for company–society relationships. Second, the political environment in
the home countries of the companies could be important (Skjærseth and Skodvin, 2001). The
confrontational relationship in the US between the green movement, the government and the oil
industry could have determined a cautions corporate strategy with regard to making voluntary
commitments. The emphasis on compliance by the US as well as by ExxonMobil points in the
same direction. Moreover, the US Foreign Corruption Practices Act has contributed to the
adoption of anti-corruption norms in large US companies. Since the Act has been in place since
the 1970s, it may also explain why ExxonMobil places such weight on the issue. Societal
pressure with consequences for consumer behavior can also vary between countries and regions.
Table 2 indicates that US national imprints overlap ExxonMobil’s market exposure in terms of
risks of negative attention and consumer campaigns directed against retail stations and petroleum
product sales. Even though ExxonMobil is vulnerable to European consumer criticism, the US
market is its most important outlet. If US consumers are less willing to link their preferences to
political campaigns targeting corporate CSR behavior, we would expect ExxonMobil to be less
exposed to a level of public scrutiny that could affect the company’s market shares, again as
compared to European oil majors. In the field of climate policy, it is quite illustrative that the
‘Stop Esso’ campaign targeting ExxonMobil`s climate strategy was initiated in Europe and not in
the US. Thirdly, evolving international regimes and processes can explain changes in corporate
strategies over time. Two cases in point are the involvement of multilateral institutions such as
the World Bank and the evolving international anti-corruption regimes. The World Bank has
played an important role in the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project in at least two ways. First, by
stimulating local stakeholder involvement in the project development. Second, by increasing
transparency and influence over oil revenues with the aim of strengthening socio-economic
development. The OECD Bribery Convention, along with a number of other similar international
efforts, is a visible sign of an emerging international regime on corruption, transparency and
good governance. Over time, international regimes may pick up momentum partly through their
own inner dynamic and affect government policies as well as corporate strategies, as has been
seen in the field of environmental protection (Miles et al., 2001 and Skjærseth and Skodvin,
forthcoming, 2003). A similar regime on corruption and transparency could bring about
important changes in corporate practice and action on ‘macro’ CSR in the future.
SINOPEC IN SUDAN: This research aims to enhance understandings of the current perceptions
and practice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) of oil companies and consortia in South
Sudan. Companies face very real challenges around community expectation management; Some
companies do not feel that conflict sensitivity falls under their remit as a private enterprise, and
so do not take ownership of conflict-related issues; Companies and Joint Operating Companies
(JOCs) in the sector have so far been unable to develop strategies and systems to implement,
robust CSR initiatives; Accountability between JOCs, companies and government is unclear and
possibly causes problems including: a lack of ownership of issues on behalf of the companies; a
lack of transparency over decisions and impact; and blurred responsibilities over community and
environmental issues; The lack of usability of global best practices, standards and guidelines
from the global CSR sector is evident and could be a barrier to learning and development in the
South Sudanese context; Very little is understood by the companies about stakeholder
engagement, prioritization, and the value of working with other organizations.
KASKY V. NIKE: Nike v. Kasky is one of the most important cases bearing on corporate social
1V responsibility ever to reach the United States Supreme Court.' The case involved an attempt
to impose liability on Nike for allegedly misleading statements made in response to Kasky's
criticisms of Nike's sourcing policies. The novel lawsuit could potentially have changed the
Constitutional status of corporate speech, which could in tum have had a significant impact on
the nature and scope of corporate social reporting. After hearing oral arguments on the case,
however, the Supreme Court declared that the writ of certiorari allowing the case to be argued
was improvidently granted and remanded the case back to the California courts. The Supreme
Court's ducking of the issue left confusion regarding firms' potential liability for social
disclosures at a time when there is increasing pressure on firms to disclose information about
their social and environmental impacts. Defining the boundaries of Constitutional protection for
corporate speech has severely challenged the doctrinal craftsmanship of the United States
Supreme Court. The Court's key criterion has been an amorphous distinction between
commercial and political speech. This "all but noneligible" distinction has resulted in
"unpredictable and confusing decisions at the state, lower federal, and Supreme Court levels".
Some corporations use their social reports to proactively defend and justify controversial
practices against the claims of critical stakeholders. Firms also respond directly to public charges
made by critics through print and television ads and letters to important stakeholders. Critics in
tum allege that companies issuing social and pohtical communications often engage in
misinformation campaigns in order to "greenwash" their unethical and harmful actions. The
resulting controversies have many ofthe characteristics of political disputes, but they also involve
firms acting in a commercial environment. The disputes and litigation surrounding Nike's
sourcing policies and practices are a defining example. After Kasky sued Nike in California for
allegedly false statements about the firm's labor practices, a wide range of stakeholders became
involved in the case. The complexity of the issues was reflected in the strange bedfellows the
litigation produced. Groups that rarely support global businesses aligned with Nike. For
example, the AFL-CIO condemned Nike's labor practices but argued in support of their free
speech rights. Major media firms and newspapers and the American Civil Liberties Union filed
amicus briefs supporting Nike. In contrast. Public Citizen, the Calfornia Labor Federation, and
the Sierra Club filed amicus briefs for Kasky. Domini Social Investments LLC, a firm whose
social screening activity are dependent on corporate social reporting, participated in an amicus
brief for Kasky. Although these briefs raised a wide variety of significant public phony issues,
the basis of Kasky's complaint was the standard commercial claim of false advertising. In this
article, our focus is on the potential impact of possible changes in the commercial/political
speech doctrine on corporate social disclosure practices. We proceed by evaluating current
practices in corporate social reporting and other forms of social disclosures. Next, we summarize
the Nike v. Kasky case that triggered the renewed controversy over corporate free speech rights.
Then we discuss the distinction between commercial and political speech and the policy reasons
behind it. With this understanding, we consider the attempts to distinguish the two. We find that
a distinction between commercial and political speech is not an appropriate or meaningful
standard for the overarching policy goal of ensuring complete and full disclosure on matters
pertaining to the social and political implications of corporate activities. As a meaningful
alternative, we present and justify a principle of optimal truthful disclosure. We then use
information economics to show that neither the limited liability standard proposed by Nike nor
the more expansive standard adopted by the California Supreme Court will result in optimal
truthful disclosure. Instead, we argue that an appropriately structured system of social reporting
will work best at achieving our policy goals. The scheme is intended to enhance stakeholder
confidence in corporate social and political commentary, while at the same time encouraging
corporations to provide information in a fair playing field of public debate.
WOOD PRODUCTS W.R.T SUSTAINALE FORESTRY: Payments for Ecosystem Services
(PES) describes the situation where the user of an environmental service, such as water
purification, pays the landowners who provide that service. For PES to exist, there must be a
clearly defined user and supplier, as well as a number of other necessary conditions, which are
defined in this document using a summary of current sources. Particular attention is paid to how
these conditions currently obtain within the UNECE region. The range of forest environment
services is explored through fourteen detailed case studies, which examine best practice in
promoting PES. Political and public relations implications of PES are discussed at length, and
recommendations include the need for clarity about where PES may be a useful tool in moving
towards a green economy and where other methods may be more appropriate. There are a
number of definitions for the term ‘Payment for Ecosystem services’ (PES), but in general it
refers to situations where a specific, usually local, agreement is made for users of an ecosystem
service to pay the providers of that service. It is distinct from environmental payments such as
taxes, subsidies, grants and penalties, because the payment is agreed in advance between the user
and provider, and the monies paid go to the provider, not into a general public purse. So, for
example, a firm needing pure drinking water, such as the Coca-Cola® bottling plant at the Tagua
Reservoir, Portugal, agrees to pay local forest owners to maintain their forests in good condition
so the plant may continue to draw pure water from the reservoir. This successful example is the
kind of ‘win/win’ solution which PES can give, whereby both parties benefit in a way which
would not have been the case if the PES option had not been available (Bulgaho, Presentation to
ThinkForest Conference, 2012). PES is generally based on a “user pays” rather than a “polluter
pays” principle. Broadly speaking: User Pays: Under this arrangement, the beneficiary of an
environmental service provides payment, whether this is directly for an environmental service
such as water purification, maintaining biodiversity, or storage of carbon. Polluter Pays: In this
situation, the parties responsible for damaging the environment are taxed or fined for doing so.
With PES, the fact that the money goes directly to the provider helps ensure that the service will
continue to be supplied. This payment can be used to strengthen that particular ecosystem against
pressures that may affect it, including climate change. As a voluntary agreement, rather than a
tax or fine, it is hoped that there is more willingness to comply from the paying party (though at
present no evidence is available to substantiate this) leading to lower transaction costs. At the
time of writing, the majority of PES schemes are unique, often innovative and do not fit easily
into subsidy/tax programmes such as the EU Common Agricultural Policy (EU CAP). PES
projects are particularly effective tools for rural development, especially where they succeed in
bringing together public and private partners. Financing through a PES scheme secures long-
term commitments to provide ecosystem services, which may otherwise be hard to achieve,
especially in an economic recession. In some situations, PES schemes may be used as an
instrument for poverty alleviation, if they provide employment and income for impoverished
populations. The local nature of agreements may also be an effective tool for raising awareness
about environmental concerns among a local community, although, as mentioned in section 5,
partnership agreements of this kind are a change from a more traditional environmental message
in which natural biomes are left untouched, so this awareness-raising will have to be carefully
managed. PES has come to prominence in the past decade as a possible solution to
environmental problems. As a relatively new cooperative tool for environmental protection, it is
important that it is used carefully, as early failures could bias the public against a useful solution.
The following sections examine what is meant by ecosystem services; how they can be valued;
what kind of PES agreements have been used so far; the conditions necessary for their success,
and possible future directions for PES.
COCA COLA COLUMBIA: Trade unions around the world have launched a boycott of Coca-
Cola products, alleging that the company's locally owned bottlers in Colombia used illegal
paramilitary groups to intimidate, threaten and kill its workers. The unions claim Coca-Cola
bottlers hired far-right militias of the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) to murder
nine union members at Colombian bottling plants in the past 13 years. Two years ago, the
Colombian food and drink union Sinaltrainal sued Coca-Cola and its Colombian bottling partners
in a US federal court in Miami over the deaths of its members.The suit alleged that the bottling
companies "contracted with or otherwise directed paramilitary security forces that utilised
extreme violence and murdered, tortured, unlawfully detained or otherwise silenced trade union
leaders", and that Coca-Cola was indirectly responsible for this. In March, the judge removed
Coca-Cola from the suit, but the process against the bottlers continues. The unions have appealed
against the court's decision. While the case continues, unions are calling on consumers to stop
drinking Coke and other Coca-Cola products. The campaign was launched simultaneously in
countries including the UK, US, Germany, Italy and Australia. Javier Correa, the president of
Sinaltrainal, said the campaign aimed to put pressure on Coca-Cola "to mitigate the pain and
suffering" that union members had suffered. Coca-Cola said in a statement on Tuesday that the
allegations against the company and its partners were "completely false", and that the campaign
was "nothing more than a shameless effort to generate publicity". But Mr Correa insisted that -
despite increased international attention - actions against union members have continued. He said
that in May, an anonymous caller to the union headquarters in Colombia warned that the offices
would be targeted for a bomb attack. In March, a worker in the city of Bucaramanga received a
notice from paramilitary groups that he had been declared a military target. While the plight of
Colombia's Coca-Cola workers has become well-known overseas, local media were making no
mention of the campaign yesterday. "In Colombia it is very difficult for this type of case to make
it into local media," Mr Correa said. "It's all part of the culture of impunity." Sinaltrainal decided
to seek international support after it became frustrated with the courts' delays in considering the
deaths of its workers. "Cases that are 13 years old still have not been cleared up - no one has
been detained and the cases end up unresolved," said Mr Correa.One of the union's accusations is
that managers at a bottling plant in the town of Carepa in northern Colombia directed
paramilitary fighters to kill two union leaders in 1994. Two years later a member of the union's
executive board was killed at the plant by paramilitary gunmen, the lawsuit says.The latest death
of a Sinaltrainal member happened last August, when Adolfo Munera was murdered in
Caribbean coastal city of Barranquilla. A week earlier, the country's highest court had ordered
the city's Coca-Cola bottler to re-employ him, after he was cleared of criminal charges filed
against him in 1997Coca Cola's Colombian bottlers have also denied the accusations. Colombia
is the world's most dangerous country in which to be a union member, with 184 of the world's
213 confirmed killings last year, according to the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions.
The GAP SAIPAN: The case involves the garment industry on the western Pacific island of
Saipan, a U.S. commonwealth exempt from some federal labor laws that apply to the rest of the
United States.Attorneys for an estimated 30,000 current and former garment workers in Saipan
accuse the retailers and owners of the island's most prominent factories of perpetuating a system
of indentured servitude among mostly poor guest workers, many of them from China.A
settlement proposal has been on the table since 1999. The most recent calls for independent
monitoring of dozens of factories on the island, a code of conduct among retailers and
manufacturers, and about $4 million in payments for workers.The landmark case has made
headlines since it was filed in January 1999. Hearings will continue this month in a federal
courtroom on Saipan.Attorneys for the plaintiffs maintain that the predominantly female
population of factory workers has had to work overtime without being paid and has been subject
to unsafe working conditions, exorbitant job-recruitment fees, illegal threats of deportation and
rules prohibiting having children or marrying.Some 50 defendants, including retailers and
factory owners, have said they have sufficiently monitored manufacturing operations to prevent
intimidation of workers, sweatshop conditions and other abuses that have been alleged.Attorneys
for Gap and other retailers have called the suit an attempt by U.S. labor unions to strike back at
overseas garment manufacturers that have taken jobs away from the United States.Gap, whose
products are made in about 50 countries, says it has a team of about 80 full-time factory monitors
working around the world. They conduct scheduled and surprise visits of factories that make Gap
products to ensure that standards of safety and human rights are being respected, said Gap
spokeswoman Tamsin Randlett."We've been there; we've checked it out," she said of Gap's
contract factories, including those on Saipan.Joining Gap in opposing the settlement are San
Francisco jeansmaker Levi Strauss & Co., the Limited, Lane Bryant, Abercrombie & Fitch,
Target, J.C. Penney, May Co., Talbots and more than a dozen Saipan factory owners.Levi
Strauss -- which like Gap has manufacturing contracts in about 50 countries -- ceased operations
on Saipan in 2000 for reasons unrelated to the lawsuit, said spokeswoman Linda Butler. One of
the first large apparel companies to write a manufacturers' code of conduct, in 1991, Levi
says its contract factories on Saipan were in full compliance with company
standards.Unlike Gap and Levi, 19 retailers have agreed to settle the case, without admitting to
wrongdoing. They include the Gymboree Corp. of Burlingame, Sears Roebuck and Co.,
Nordstrom, Tommy Hilfiger, Calvin Klein, Polo Ralph Lauren, Liz Claiborne and Brooks
Bros.Attorneys for the workers include San Francisco labor attorney Michael Rubin and
heavyweight class-action specialists Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach. They are
seeking class certification of an estimated 30,000 workers employed on the island between
1989 and now."We're alleging an overarching conspiracy, a scheme," Rubin said. "I don't mind
Gap fighting this case and taking it to trial . . . (but) what I don't understand is: Why is Gap
blocking these other companies from settling?"Rubin described the retailer defendants as
powerful multinational companies cooperating with Saipan factory owners to maintain a cheap,
controllable labor force in order to maximize profits.Gap attorney Daralyn Durie of San
Francisco argued, however, that in order to allow the settlement, the court would have to
decide that the case meets the requirements of a class action on behalf of the entire group
of workers. That requires that they experienced the same work and living conditions --
something Durie said is not the case, since the workers were employed at different factories
in different years and at varying levels of satisfaction."We don't think it's fair to lump all the
factories together, and we don't think it's fair to lump all the workers together," Durie said,
adding that workers who gave depositions told vastly different stories about their experiences on
Saipan.In February, U.S. District Judge Alex Munson heard arguments regarding class
certification but has not issued a ruling.All of the retailer and factory defendants, meanwhile,
are seeking dismissal of the case. A March 19 hearing is scheduled in consideration of those
motions. If dismissal is not granted, the defendants will probably continue to seek a
settlement.Tensions are growing among holdouts and defendants who would like to avoid further
litigation costs. David Schwarz, a Los Angeles attorney representing retailer J. Crew, which
seeks to settle, told the court in February that he supports Gap's internal efforts to improve
factory conditions. But he said he did not understand "their decision to stand in the way of a
consensual agreement" as provided in the settlement. Another case filed on behalf of Saipan
workers, the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees and the San Francisco
human rights organization Global Exchange is pending in San Francisco Superior Court. That
case alleges unfair business practices among many of the same retailers and factory owners.
THE RICO CASE: Under RICO, a person who has committed "at least two acts of racketeering
activity" drawn from a list of 35 crimes—27 federal crimes and 8 state crimes—within a 10-year
period can be charged with racketeering if such acts are related in one of four specified ways to
an "enterprise". Those found guilty of racketeering can be fined up to $25,000 and sentenced to
20 years in prison per racketeering count. In addition, the racketeer must forfeit all ill-gotten
gains and interest in any business gained through a pattern of "racketeering activity."
When the U.S. Attorney decides to indict someone under RICO, they have the option of seeking
a pre-trial restraining order or injunction to temporarily seize a defendant's assets and prevent the
transfer of potentially forfeitable property, as well as require the defendant to put up a
performance bond. This provision was placed in the law because the owners of Mafia-related
shell corporations often absconded with the assets. An injunction and/or performance bond
ensures that there is something to seize in the event of a guilty verdict. In many cases, the threat
of a RICO indictment can force defendants to plead guilty to lesser charges, in part because the
seizure of assets would make it difficult to pay a defense attorney. Despite its harsh provisions, a
RICO-related charge is considered easy to prove in court, as it focuses on patterns of behavior as
opposed to criminal acts.
RICO also permits a private individual "damaged in his business or property" by a "racketeer" to
file a civil suit. The plaintiff must prove the existence of an "enterprise". The defendant(s) are
not the enterprise; in other words, the defendant(s) and the enterprise are not one and the same.[3]
There must be one of four specified relationships between the defendant(s) and the enterprise: either the defendant(s) invested the proceeds of the pattern of

racketeering activity into the enterprise (18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)); or the defendant(s) acquired or maintained an interest in, or control of, the enterprise through the pattern

of racketeering activity (subsection (b)); or the defendant(s) conducted or participated in the affairs of the enterprise "through" the pattern of racketeering activity

(subsection (c)); or the defendant(s) conspired to do one of the above (subsection (d)). In essence, the enterprise is either the 'prize,' 'instrument,' 'victim,' or 'perpetrator'

of the racketeers. A civil RICO action can be filed in state or

federal court. Both the criminal and civil components allow
the recovery of treble damages (damages in triple the amount of actual/compensatory damages).
Although its primary intent was to deal with organized crime, Blakey said that Congress never
intended it to merely apply to the Mob. He once told Time, "We don't want one set of rules for
people whose collars are blue or whose names end in vowels, and another set for those whose
collars are white and have Ivy League diplomas.Initially, prosecutors were skeptical of using
RICO, mainly because it was unproven. The RICO Act was first used by the U.S. Attorney's
Office in the Southern District of New York on September 18, 1979, in the United States v.
Scotto. Scotto, who was convicted on charges of racketeering, accepting unlawful labor
payments, and income tax evasion, headed the International Longshoreman's Association.
During the 1980s and 1990s, federal prosecutors used the law to bring charges against several
Mafia figures. The second major success was the Mafia Commission Trial, which resulted in
several top leaders of New York City's Five Families getting what amounted to life sentences.
By the turn of the century, RICO cases resulted in virtually all of the top leaders of the New
York Mafia being sent to prison.