Journal of the Indian Ocean Region

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Repositioning the Bay of Bengal: implications of

regional change

Dennis Hardy

To cite this article: Dennis Hardy (2019): Repositioning the Bay of Bengal: implications of regional
change, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, DOI: 10.1080/19480881.2019.1640576

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Published online: 08 Sep 2019.

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JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION
https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2019.1640576

Repositioning the Bay of Bengal: implications of regional

change
Dennis Hardy
James R. Mancham Peace and Diplomacy Research Institute, University of Seychelles, Mahé, Seychelles

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The Bay of Bengal has for centuries been the scene of commercial Received 31 December 2019
and cultural interactions between the surrounding countries. In Accepted 1 July 2019
contrast, the second half of the twentieth century saw something
KEYWORDS
of a hiatus. That break in continuity has now passed and the aim Bay of Bengal; Indo–Pacific
of this paper is to demonstrate how, in response to changing region; spheres of influence;
circumstances, a new dynamic is evolving. For different reasons, China and the Indian Ocean
the region is being ‘repositioned’. One fundamental change is that
the strategic redefinition of the Indian Ocean, so that it becomes
part of the more expansive Indo–Pacific region, has effectively
shifted the Bay eastwards. China’s presence in the region
emphasizes this, while the littoral countries are all themselves on
the frontline of far-reaching change. Nothing is as it was. Yet, for
all that, the framework of governance is weak, opening the
question of how to bring it more into line with the realities of the
new situation.

Introduction
Geography matters. The location and configuration of landforms create important
impressions of place, directly shaping the way we think. Thus, from a global perspective,
the Bay of Bengal appears in physical terms as an offshoot of the Indian Ocean, a buffer
zone between South and South-East Asia. Moreover, the region in question is not itself
directly on the main shipping lanes. It lies to the north of those that connect the East
Asian nations to the Middle East and then through the Suez Canal to Europe. It is even
further from a second shipping highway that rounds southern Africa and continues
north-eastwards across the Indian Ocean to Asia. Because of its peripheral location it is
understandable if the Bay of Bengal might, erroneously, be regarded as something of a
backwater. But this ignores its important history in connecting the littoral states around
the Bay, as well as the region’s growing importance in the face of challenging new
circumstances.
The impression of being detached from the rest of the Indian Ocean was reinforced by
history as well as geography. During the colonial era, many of the ships from Europe
bypassed the Bay of Bengal in favor of more distant destinations in the Spice Islands
and East Asia. The Bay, however, was never without its own local traffic, as well as ships

CONTACT Dennis Hardy dennis.hardy@ymail.com James R. Mancham Peace and Diplomacy Research Institute,
University of Seychelles, PO Box 1348, Anse Royale Campus, Mahé, Seychelles
© 2019 Indian Ocean Research Group
2 D. HARDY

from Britain at the height of its empire, following a route northwards to Colombo and
onwards to the ports that were then known as Calcutta and Rangoon. In fact, the Bay
was of vital importance to the British Raj when, from the end of the seventeenth
century Calcutta was established as a base for the East India Company and, later, as the
capital of British India. Yet even then there was a sense of it as an offshoot, with traffic
flowing in one direction and then returning to join the main lanes, rather like a railway
branch line with only one track.
While the basic facts of geography have not changed since then – the Bay of Bengal, of
course, is where it has always been and little has changed in its inherent physical charac-
teristics – the way that it is seen now is very different. Largely as a result of geopolitical
change at a global level and a redrawing of the map of the Indian Ocean, all aspects of
past thinking can be questioned. In this context, it is timely to revisit this intriguing
region and explain the ongoing transformation. The purpose of this paper is to consider
how the main changes that are taking place are leading to a ‘repositioning’ of the Bay
of Bengal on the world map. Far from being marginal it has become an area of growing
geopolitical significance, especially important in the relationship between India and China.

Set in a wider sea

India to the west, the United States to the east. (Senior White House official, 2018)

President Trump’s adviser, on a visit to Japan in 2018, highlighted two markers that would
set his leader’s visit in context and avoid the complexities of a real map. It was easy to do
but not without an intended impact. The fact is that maps can be instantly redrawn and,
with the flourish of a cartographer’s pen, meanings themselves may change. As the Aus-
tralian geopolitical specialist, David Brewster (2014), has argued, with particular reference
to the Bay of Bengal:
… ‘mental maps’ can affect not simply one’s thinking but also strategic actions. Since the
Second World War it has been common to distinguish between the regions of South Asia
and South-East Asia, with the Bay of Bengal something of a buffer zone between the two.
This, in turn, has had ‘a profound impact on strategic behavior’ and has ‘inhibited a proper
analysis of the strategic dynamics in the area’. (Brewster, 2014, p. 151)

In recent years, this inherited view of the Bay of Bengal as little more than a residual
space between two regions has been challenged. One reason for this is that the
Indian Ocean has, effectively, been re-designated as part of what is now termed the
Indo–Pacific Region, which, in turn, locates the Bay within a wider context. This makes
good sense to oceanographers and marine biologists, who see merit in the idea of
the Indo–Pacific as a continuum. Not only is there a single ocean basin but there is a
commonality of species and other characteristics in adjacent seas, and the artificial sep-
aration of one part from another is not matched by empirical evidence (Costello et al.,
2017). But it is the strategic implications of redrawing boundaries that is more relevant
to the interests of this paper. Extending the conceptual limits of the Indian Ocean to
embrace even the western reaches of the Pacific changes everything. It is not simply
a question of scale but also of perspective. For centuries the Indian Ocean has been
viewed as largely self-contained: an area of exploration and subsequent colonization,
a throughway for the world’s main shipping lanes, and, from time to time, contemplated
 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 3

as a potential zone of peace. Joining it in a new union with the Pacific challenges all
previous assumptions.
But why has this come about? In fact, there is no single provenance but rather a number
of separate strands drawn together by common circumstances, of which the most impor-
tant is the growing influence of China. In response to recent and ongoing change, four
nations in particular have been instrumental in redrawing the ocean map in this way:
Japan, India, Australia and the United States, sometimes referred to as the ‘Quad’
(Smith, 2018). Each is seeking to support the new strategy, without in most cases actually
mentioning China by name.
To look first at Japan, in a visit to India in 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe addressed the
Indian Parliament with a speech entitled ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’. The title itself
evoked a sense of two nations coming closer together and the Japanese leader took
every opportunity to press home the point:
The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of
freedom and of prosperity. A ‘broader Asia’ that broke away geographical boundaries is
now beginning to take on a distinct form. Our two countries have the ability – and the respon-
sibility – to ensure that it broadens yet further and to nurture and enrich these seas to become
seas of clearest transparency. (Abe, 2007)

When the Japanese Prime Minister addressed his audience, more than six decades had
passed since the end of the Second World War. Many will have recalled that Japan had
then conquered all of the countries along the eastern shoreline of the Bay of Bengal
but had stopped short of entering India. It will not have escaped notice, too, that
Japan’s interest in improving relations with India will have been encouraged by a long-
standing wariness of neighboring China.
Thus, Japan made an early move to redefine the region and some years elapsed
before it was taken up by others. There was particular interest in how India would
respond, especially following the appointment in 2014 of Narendra Modi as Prime Min-
ister. Since then, Modi has made his mark on the world stage, seeking a new role not
only for his own nation but for the wider region. Under the banner of ‘Act East’, security
issues have assumed greater importance and, inevitably, China’s presence around the
Bay of Bengal is taken into account. This has led to India strengthening ties with the
ASEAN bloc and, further afield, with Japan, while at the same time seeking to achieve
a balanced relationship with China. India is the leading military power in the Indian
Ocean and will not lightly cede this to China or any other newcomer to the region.
Its primacy will be maintained through strengthening its own military capacity but
also through developing closer links with advanced industrial nations like Japan and
Australia, as well as the United States.
When Prime Minister Modi gave the keynote address to the annual meeting of the
Shangri La Dialogue in 2018, it was an opportunity to clarify India’s position. In spite of
his nation’s prime interest in the Indian Ocean, Modi embraced the idea of the more exten-
sive Indo–Pacific region. Significantly, he focused not simply on the ‘choke points’
between the two oceans but on a more expansive map that extends from Africa to the
Americas, with India positioned at a central point. His message was one of sharing
rather than dominating, one of supporting a rules-based international order instead of
unbridled competition:
4 D. HARDY

It stands for a free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of pro-
gress and prosperity. It includes all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have
a stake in it … We will promote a democratic and rules-based international order, in which all
nations, small and large, thrive as equal and sovereign. We will work with others to keep our
seas, space and airways free and open; our nations secure from terrorism; and our cyber space
free from disruption and conflict. We will keep our economy open and our engagement trans-
parent. We will share our resources, markets and prosperity with our friends and partners. We
will seek a sustainable future for our planet … . This is how we wish ourselves and our partners
to proceed in this vast region and beyond. The ancient wisdom of the region is our common
heritage. (Modi, 2018)

Stirring words and resonating well with most nations in the region without obviously
seeking to alienate China. His approach has been especially well received in the neighbor-
ing ASEAN bloc and in more distant Indian Ocean countries. Australia, for instance, with its
dual Indian and Pacific Ocean shorelines, has an obvious interest in being part of a new
partnership or, as it has been termed, a ‘geopolitical construct to guide foreign and secur-
ity policy’. High on this agenda is the opportunity to strengthen relations with India, ‘at
least in part as a counterweight to China’ (Wilkins, 2018).
But surely the prime mover in the development of the concept, and new strategies
to reflect this, is the United States. There is nothing subtle about the motivation. Amer-
ica’s main concern is to counter the rise of China as a great power and the threats this
poses to its own hegemony. Geographically, one aspect of the emergence of China is its
growing influence in the Indian Ocean and, through an element of the Belt and Road
Initiative, its expansionist interests in Africa. It has already, in effect, appropriated the
South China Sea and, apart from the narrow seaways into the Indian Ocean, the
recent development of oil and gas pipelines across Myanmar (coupled with the pro-
spect of road and rail links) gives it direct access to the Bay of Bengal and points
beyond.
America’s awareness of what is seen as a growing threat from China stems from the
period of Obama’s presidency and has since been adopted and extended by the Trump
Administration. Through a series of statements and presentations by American officials
the meaning of the Indo–Pacific region has become clearer, although one still has to
read between the lines to tease out what is really intended. When, for instance, Sec-
retary of State Mike Pompeo addressed an audience of business leaders in July 2018,
he limited the geographical extent to the expanse of sea and land between the
west coast of America and the far coast of India. Although covering a vast area it
was noteworthy that he stopped short of the western limits of the Indian Ocean,
along the eastern coastline of Africa. But more pertinent was his constant use of the
term ‘free and open’, implicitly offering an image of what is good and right about
American values but also inferring that this is in contrast to China’s more exclusive
approach.
When we say ‘free’ Indo-Pacific, it means we all want all nations, every nation, to be able to
protect their sovereignty from coercion by other countries. At the national level, ‘free’
means good governance and the assurance that citizens can enjoy their fundamental rights
and liberties. When we say ‘open’ in the Indo-Pacific, it means we want all nations to enjoy
open access to seas and airways. We want the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime
disputes. This is key for international peace and for each country’s attainment of its own
national aims. (Pompeo, 2018 )
 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 5

This kind of ‘motherhood and apple pie’ statement raises more questions than it answers –
how for instance can one reconcile it with a parallel imposition of tariffs on trade with
China – but it does serve to set the scene for a different approach to the region. For
better or for worse, this is the way things are evolving. On the geopolitical chessboard
the Bay of Bengal is now positioned in a more central location than it was. What
happens in and around this area matters to a wider constituency than before. It is of
great importance to India and the ASEAN bloc but also to all nations that subscribe to
the idea of the Indo–Pacific region. The Bay can no longer be seen as isolated or dismissed
as a backwater. It is a place with a dynamic of its own that must be taken into account as
part of a greater entity that is emerging. There are other reasons, too, why it is changing
but this redrawing of the map is something that cannot be ignored.

Currents of change
It is in the littorals where global issues such as population growth, climate change, sea level
rises, shortages of fresh water, and extremist politics … acquire a vivid geographical face.
(Kaplan, 2011, p. xii)

The points that Robert Kaplan makes are generic but they are especially relevant to con-
temporary conditions in the Bay of Bengal, where so much is at stake. Historically, as Sumil
Amrith (2013) has shown, this region has at various times been at the very heart of impor-
tant movements of people and goods– in contrast to the relative sluggishness of its record
in the second half of the twentieth century; for much of its history it was far from being
marginal to the rest of Asia and there are signs that this is once more the case:
At the turn of the twenty-first century, it is once again at the heart of international politics. A
history that seemed of little relevance in the heyday of postcolonial nation building now
seems urgent again. (Amrith, 2013, p. 5)

It is as if its time has come again;it has returned to assume a more influential role in the
Indian Ocean arena. It has a dynamic of its own that was missing in the recent past.
Currents of change are very much in evidence in the Bay, flowing in different directions
and by no means all of them bringing unquestioned benefits. Certainly, there is much
within the region that is for the good, evidenced in a better standard of living for millions
of people as well as greater sovereignty for the respective nations. But there are other cur-
rents – a combination of demographic, political, cultural and physical circumstances –
which pull in a different direction and may yet counter the positive factors of economic
growth and international standing.

Currents of growth
Most apparent now is how each of the littoral states is experiencing rapid growth and
development. This economic trend is closely, but not inextricably, linked to wider
regional and international factors and reflects a popular belief that this is Asia’s
century (Macdonald & Lemco, 2011, p. viii). If the nineteenth century was the time of
Britain’s imperial and industrial dominance, and the twentieth century marked American
hegemony, then, so it is claimed, the present century is witnessing a shift in power and
influence to Asia. It is a simplistic concept, and one that can certainly be challenged. As
an indicator, however, it correctly draws attention to the rise of Asian nations, of which
6 D. HARDY

China and India lead the field but where all other Asian nations, too, are drawn into the
process.
Of all the participants in the Bay region, India is by far the most important. Extending
along the whole of the western seaboard, simply in terms of geography it occupies a prime
position. But this is reinforced by the fact that India, with a population exceeding 1.35
billion, and aspirations to become a world power in its own right, already exercises its
own hegemonic leadership around the Bay. With a current economic growth rate exceed-
ing 7% of GDP its impact locally and internationally is fast increasing. Moreover, Indian cul-
tural and trade links in the Bay of Bengal are longstanding and influential, and current
policies build on the past, seeking to create a zone of non-aggressive collaboration. In par-
ticular, the coming to power in 2014 of Narendra Modi gave fresh impetus to the nation’s
foreign policy and traditional relations with its neighbors. Under the forthright banner of
‘neighbourhood first’, Modi has taken a firm lead in meeting his opposite numbers in the
surrounding states and looking for a more coherent economic and security architecture for
South Asia as a whole (Kaura, 2018; Singh, 2017). For instance:
By focusing a great deal of energy in the neighborhood, the Modi government is demonstrat-
ing that India has the capability to promote regional peace and economic integration. Rather
than merely complaining about external intervention in South Asia, New Delhi is developing a
regional strategy based on India’s natural geographical advantages, economic complementa-
rities, shared cultural heritage, and preeminent strategic position. (Kaura, 2018)

India’s primacy in the region cannot be in doubt, exemplified by its own rate of national
development, the dynamism of its east coast ports and its ‘neighbourhood first’ orien-
tation. But what is different now is the totality of growth across the region and the vitality
of the ‘neighbourhood’ as a whole. Barely a half-century ago, the constituent states would
have been dismissed by richer nations as developing countries, but now their respective
profiles are hardly recognizable. Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and Sri Lanka are all
recording impressive figures of economic growth, as well as providing evidence of busy
ports with international connections, and greater military capacity. Individually and
together, they have shrugged off the mantle of poor countries in a sleepy backwater, pre-
viously largely restricted to exporting raw materials to the West. Bangladesh has defied
natural as well as political obstacles to achieve a GDP growth rate in 2018 approaching
8%; Myanmar has only recently emerged from military rule to record a comparative
growth figure of around 6%; Thailand, in spite of its own political turbulence, has a
growth rate of 5%; and Sri Lanka, with the handicap of a prolonged civil war lasting
until 2009, averaged close to 6% over a fifteen-year period to 2018 (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2018). Admittedly these impressive growth rates are based on low starting
points, and per capita wealth remains limited, but they are all pointing in the same direc-
tion and embrace more diverse activities year on year.
Agriculture in all of these states is still a major source of economic activity but this is
matched now by new industries, taking advantage of lower labor costs in the region
and fewer regulations than those in the main consumer countries. The comparative advan-
tage of low wages will soon be eroded (as conditions for workers improve and vocational
skills are developed) but there is still a window of commercial opportunity which is being
vigorously pursued. Bangladesh is a case in point, where the manufacture of cheap gar-
ments for the international market owes much to the use of poorly paid female labor,
 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 7

often working in unregulated and sometimes dangerous conditions (War on Want,

2018). Neighboring Myanmar is also capitalizing on even lower labor costs (ranked
second lowest in the world) and its emergent industries are extending beyond a core
of textile and clothing factories (Oxford Business Group, 2017). There is much about
the present situation which is transient but the trajectory is clear: with further invest-
ment, each of the countries in question has the capacity to continue to increase and
diversify the role of manufacturing and, in turn, services. The contrast with the econom-
ies of the past, based on primary production and dependent on colonial markets, could
not be greater.
Nor is the economic growth of the region entirely based on what can be produced on
land. A strategy to realize the potential of the blue economy could add to the pro-
ductive capacity of the region, while beneath the shared continental shelf are rich
reserves of oil and natural gas. To the credit of the nations most directly affected,
namely, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar, a potential dispute in determining the bound-
aries of the respective EEZs was avoided through international jurisdiction (Alam 2018).
The way is now clear for each nation to develop its own marine resources without
interference.
Reflecting these various changes, there is an ongoing transformation in the region’s
ports and associated trade. Deep-water docking facilities are essential for the burgeoning
container traffic and oil tankers, requiring heavy investment not only on the waterfront but
also for access and internal communications. In spite of these requirements, and also in
spite of periods of international sanctions on certain countries, the Bay can now boast a
vibrant network of modern ports. In order to survive, traditional ports have had to
remake themselves and adjust to new political alignments. Kolkata, for instance, in the
north-east of the Indian coastline, close to the border with Bangladesh, lost a vital part
of its hinterland at the time of Partition but has since re-established its place as a national
leader, currently recording volumes of trade that increase each year (Express News Service,
2018). Chennai (formerly Madras), is another of India’s major hubs with a long history and
which now handles more traffic than Kolkata. But not all of India’s ports are rooted in the
past and Paradip, to the south of Kolkata, tells a different story; its own development dates
from the 1950s but it has emerged since then as one of the country’s major ports with
good links to the interior.
Colombo, for long a leading hub for shipping in the region, has retained its importance,
successfully making the transition from a colonial port to a modern facility serving not only
Sri Lanka but, more widely, the rest of the Bay. In contrast, Bangladesh has struggled with
insufficient deep-water facilities although major investment is gradually changing this.
Likewise, Myanmar is seeking to replace its traditional reliance on ports in Malaysia and
Singapore by developing its own modern facilities at Kyaukpyu, although plans have
been pared down to minimize dependence on Chinese loans. Further south, Thailand
has a limited coastline along the Bay but its development strategy includes a plan for a
new port at Ranong, which will improve shipping links with the rest of the Bay.
This is all a far cry from the picture of the region in colonial and early post-colonial days,
typified by paddy fields across the countryside and barges carrying timber along the wide
rivers to a limited number of ports to serve the West. Without exception now, the countries
around the Bay have emerged as economic dynamos in their own right, creating their own
trade networks in a changing world.
8 D. HARDY

Counter currents
For all the progress that has been made, however, the modern story of the Bay of Bengal is
certainly not one of inevitable growth and prosperity, nor necessarily one of universal
peace and harmony. Like any other part of the world it has its problems and in any assess-
ment of the region these cannot be ignored. Not all of the currents that run through the
Bay are necessarily for the good; there are also significant difficulties to confront. Thus,
with a rapidly growing population, per capita income levels are held down; not all of
the boundaries between nations are obviously defensible; and there are numerous cultural
differences in the region which have the capacity to create local or even more far-reaching
conflict. In addition to these, there is an overarching threat to the Bay in the form of phys-
ical factors, of which by far the most pressing is climate change.
To take the first of these counter currents, rapid population growth is evident in all of
the littoral nations. When George Orwell served in the colonial administration in Burma in
the 1920s, he expressed a concern that ‘the day will come when the riches of their country
will be insufficient for a population which is constantly growing’ (Blair, 1929). The popu-
lation of Burma at that time was no more than 10 million; now it is 55 million. It is a
similar story across most of the region, one of unprecedented growth resulting in a
present-day total of an estimated half a billion people around the Bay (Amrith, 2013,
p. 9). Political leaders rarely highlight population growth as a problem as their interests
are invariably short-term. But if one takes into account longer-term questions of sustain-
ability then surely a warning light should be flashing. For how long will the countries
around the Bay be able to resource their industries, find jobs and feed their people?
How realistic is it to suppose that the kind of lifestyle that is now demanded can be pro-
vided for all? The Bay of Bengal is undoubtedly dynamic but is it sustainable?
A second counter-current can be seen in the kaleidoscope of political boundaries
around the Bay. Although not presently a subject of contention, perhaps the most vulner-
able is the collection of provinces in the extreme north-east of India, connected tenuously
to the rest of the country by only the narrowest neck of land. If tensions were to increase in
the region it is hard to imagine a less defensible border. In contrast, although the bound-
aries of neighboring Bangladesh are compact, the tightly-packed population will be
increasingly difficult to contain. In fact, there is already evidence of illegal migration
across the border and if this were to increase it could become a matter of greater
concern for India (for example, Shamshad, 2017).
Likewise, a third counter current – the question of cultural diversity – is not presently of
more than localized import although, again, it has the capacity to spread more widely. This
is a region of enormous ethnic variety and national boundaries are in all cases no more
than the product of political compromise. From time to time, localized disputes will
occur and sometimes these become of international importance, most notably, the treat-
ment of the Muslim Rohingya by the Buddhist-dominated Myanmar government and the
spilling over of the conflict into neighboring Bangladesh. Thailand, too, has its own pro-
blems with a Muslim minority in the south of the country and one wonders whether reli-
gion could be a greater source of future tensions in other countries too. Bangladesh, for
instance, is a Muslim country and India (already with poor relations with Pakistan) will
be only too aware of the threat of a concerted Islamic movement across the region.
Although this is a speculative scenario it would be irresponsible to ignore the possibility.
 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 9

As if to make the point, while finalizing this paper news arrived of the fatal explosions in Sri
Lanka in April 2019, the full effects of which have yet to be assessed.
In less doubt as a threat to the region is its vulnerability to forces of nature; historically,
this has been a region with more than its fair share of natural disasters and, as will be
shown, these are likely to increase rather than diminish. Storms of cyclonic force form
in the Bay and, with land on three sides, they invariably strike coastal communities and
adjoining farmland. Although they are not necessarily the strongest cyclones on earth
they are prone to cause maximum damage to life and property. The problem is worsened
in the absence of effective warning systems and resistant construction techniques (Seethi,
2018). In addition to the damage inflicted by winds that originate at sea, the wide rivers
that flow through several of the countries are, historically, the cause of extensive
flooding. Bangladesh, especially, most of which is low-lying and contains the delta of
the Ganges, has over the years suffered repeated and devastating floods. As recently as
2017 it was estimated that one-third of the land area of the densely-populated country
was under water, with the loss not only of lives but also of a large proportion of the valu-
able rice crop (George, 2017). To add to its problems, the Bay of Bengal is close to one of
the world’s most complex geological zones, responsible for periodic earthquakes and vol-
canic eruptions. The 2004 tsunami, triggered outside the actual region, caused immense
damage to communities in the Bay itself, with Sri Lanka alone recording the loss of at
least 37,000 residents and tourists.
There is no doubt that resistance to natural threats can be countered through better
warning systems and more advanced construction techniques. But the situation is far
from static and with the effects of climate change (which is already evident) the region
will face a new order of problems. The likely frequency and intensity of storms is expected
to increase, while year on year sea levels will continue to rise, threatening the lives and
homes of the many people living in crowded coastal communities. Moreover, there is
increasing evidence of farmland near the coast being degraded as seawater seeps into
the soil. In the face of these natural phenomena, the prospects for the Bay of Bengal
are far from encouraging.

Spheres of influence
The days of empire and spheres of influence are over. Bigger nations must not be allowed to
bully the small, or impose their will through the barrel of a gun. (Obama, 2014)

The above view by the then president of the United States, Barack Obama, was directed to
Russia, following its annexation from Ukraine of the Crimean peninsula. His statement
reflected a dominant belief that the days of spheres of influence belong to the past,
when great powers sought to carve up the world at will. There is now a sense,
however, that the obituary was perhaps a shade premature (Ferguson & Hast, 2017).
Not only Russia’s activities but also those of China and, in the same geopolitical theater,
India too, have encouraged analysts to look again at the concept. The making of an
empire can be achieved in different ways, by ostensibly peaceful means as well as by force.
Earlier in this paper the view was put that the Bay of Bengal has assumed a more central
location on the world map as a result of the emergence of the idea of an inclusive Indo–
Pacific region. But there is another argument of no less importance to account for the
growing geopolitical importance of the Bay, and that is the challenge to traditional
10 D. HARDY

spheres of influence as a result of China’s interest and presence in the region. Historically,
India has seen itself as the natural leader of the adjoining ocean that even carries its own
name; it is a largely unwritten claim to supremacy born of longstanding trade and cultural
connections, supported by an extensive Indian diaspora. More recently, India has claimed
a protective role in the region as a ‘net security provider’ (Singh, 2018). Yet, neither histori-
cally nor now has India’s assumed dominance been to the exclusion of the part played by
other nations, most notably from outside the region. The arrival of China, however, sets
this international context in a totally different light.
Sometimes it is single events which signal wider implications, like the unannounced
presence of three Chinese warships in the harbor of Colombo and, separately, the
docking of a submarine, in spite of concerns expressed by India (Smith, 2016). It had
not been anticipated that Sri Lanka– geographically close to the south-east coast of its
larger neighbor and linked by longstanding cultural ties – would succumb so easily, and
provocatively, to China’s wishes. In fact, the above events themselves were of little conse-
quence compared with the more intrusive involvement in the affairs not only of Sri Lanka
but also other countries in the Bay of Bengal. Through a mixture of loans and grant aid,
training schemes and direct management, coupled with the use of Chinese labor in a
variety of infrastructure projects, none of India’s neighbors in the Bay is beyond this
new sphere of influence. Rejecting any criticism that its presence is little short of neo-colo-
nialism, China is rapidly changing the traditional balance of power in the region. On the
surface at least, India and China retain peaceful relations and in April 2018 the two
leaders signed an agreement at the Informal Wuhan Summit to reinforce this. It was
duly reported that the dialogue had helped in ‘forging a common understanding of the
future direction of India-China relations built upon mutual respect for each other’s devel-
opmental aspirations and prudent management of differences with mutual sensitivity’
(Ministry of External Affairs, 2018). Fine words were spoken but no-one can doubt the
reality of two nuclear powers in an increasingly competitive, if not potentially combative,
situation.
Seen from the perspective of India, the activities of China in the Bay of Bengal are unset-
tling in the least. The seduction of former President Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka in favor of
Chinese plans has already led to control by a Chinese company of the controversial Ham-
bantota port project in the south of the island, a situation that exemplifies what can
emerge in other countries too:
The case is one of the most vivid examples of China’s ambitious use of loans and aid to gain
influence around the world — and of its willingness to play hardball to collect. The debt deal
also intensified some of the harshest accusations about President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt
and Road Initiative: that the global investment and lending program amounts to a debt
trap for vulnerable countries around the world, fueling corruption and autocratic behavior
in struggling democracies. (Abi-Habib, 2018)

Elsewhere in Sri Lanka, Colombo itself is the scene of extensive port development funded
by Chinese loans, while contracts have also been awarded in Tamil-dominated territory in
the north of the country, traditionally an area with strong allegiances to India. As part of an
extensive program in communities affected by the thirty-year civil war, China is building
some 40,000 new homes and is also taking an interest in reviving neglected rubber plan-
tations that were once the mainstay of the local economy (Ramachandran, 2018).
 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 11

Meanwhile, at the head of the Bay there is undoubtedly keen interest in the potential of
the marine oil and gas reserves, in which India, Bangladesh and Myanmar all have a share.
These are potentially rich reserves and China will undoubtedly monitor their exploration
with keen interest, not wishing to miss any opportunity to supplement its own limited
energy supplies. But this is not the only attraction in this particular section of the Bay.
Thus, China has made various overtures to Bangladesh, on India’s north-east border
and, following a visit by the Chinese leader in 2016, the official relationship between
the two countries was elevated from ‘Comprehensive Partnership’ to’Strategic Partnership
of Cooperation’. China is the main supplier of military equipment and training and has
assisted, not without contention, in the modernization of Bangladesh’s armed forces(Car-
afano & Smith, 2018; Shakil Bin Mushtaq, 2018). Investment in infrastructure and an
increase in trade between the two countries represents another strand in the relationship,
which, as it is strengthened, can only be unsettling for neighboring India. From the time of
the birth of Bangladesh, India has sought to embrace the new nation within its own sphere
of influence. Not only is this now challenged but, in practical terms, India’s already tenuous
geographical link with its north-eastern provinces will become even more vulnerable.
Of more immediate importance to China as a strategic partner is Myanmar, with its
lengthy coastline (nearly 2000km.) forming much of the eastern rim of the Bay. The
country possesses a variety of natural resources, including hardwood and minerals, that
can serve China’s industries but even these are not as important as its locational opportu-
nities. Significantly, a prospective route across Myanmar offers direct access from the
Chinese interior to the Indian Ocean and it is this which accounts for present priorities:
The ultimate aim of China’s Myanmar policy is to secure access to the deep sea port at Kyauk-
pyu in southern Rakhine state, defend the oil and gas pipelines it has built across the country
and maintain Myanmar as a safe corridor for its landlocked southwestern provinces to the
Indian Ocean. That link allows China to hedge its so-called ‘Malacca dilemma’, a strategic cho-
kepoint through which as much as 80% of China’s maritime oil imports flow that Chinese stra-
tegic planners fear the United States could block in a conflict scenario. (Lintner, 2018)

Although China’s intentions are clear, they are not all necessarily in Myanmar’s best inter-
ests. When the Myanmar Government canceled a proposed Chinese project in the north of
the country to create hydro-electric power, it was believed that this was not only in
response to public concern but also to demonstrate to the West that it was interested
in better relations with the United States and others. The significance of Myanmar’s
action is that it shows that China’s partners need not be as passive and compliant as it
is sometimes assumed they have to be. They have their own political voice and, in spite
of China’s dominance in other respects, are not without their own capacity to shape
events.
To the south of Myanmar, the coastline along the Bay becomes part of Thailand. Most of
that country’s maritime access lies along its eastern flank(the Gulf of Thailand, an offshoot
of the South China Sea) and yet it is the frontage onto the Bay of Bengal that is of particular
interest to China. Indeed, in some ways this may well prove to be its most important asset
in the Bay. The reason is to be found in the fact that, after crossing the border from
Myanmar, the land between the Bay and the Gulf of Thailand to the east is at its narrowest.
Known as the Isthmus of Kra, with just 70 km. separating the two seas, it offers the poten-
tial for shipping to avoid the strategically vulnerable Strait of Malacca. The idea of cutting a
12 D. HARDY

canal through the isthmus is certainly not new, although it is fraught with difficulties to
implement, physical as well as political (Chaudhury & Basu, 2016). Difficult terrain would
represent an engineering challenge and raise costs, although that would be unlikely to
deter China if other obstacles can be overcome. Thailand is concerned that a canal
would encourage already active separatists in the south to break away from the rest of
the country, while Singapore would resist anything that would reduce its own port
traffic. Perhaps such a far-reaching change will only take place incrementally, with, as a
first step, the development of new opportunities for transshipment to take goods from
one side of the isthmus to the other. If this is to occur the name of Ranong, close to the
Myanmar border, may well feature in the future.
Ranong is presently a small port with limited facilities, in a town with a population of
only 16,000, but it has been designated by the Thai government for development as
the only modern, deepwater port along its western coastline, with the potential to
boost trade with all of the other countries surrounding the Bay. In the short term it
could become the obvious transshipment node for high-speed links across the isthmus
and onward via a second node for ships to China. If the above-mentioned canal is even-
tually built it would be in a commanding position (China Daily, 2018).
In these various ways, China is playing a key role in the ongoing transformation of the
Bay of Bengal. So, too, is India (with the active support of the United States) but it is China
which is the newcomer to the region and which, in many ways is forcing the pace. There is
a revolution underway, driven by investment rather than guns, although it would be folly
to completely separate the two. If China’s financial interests were to be threatened in any
way it is highly unlikely that this would not be resisted, by force if necessary. In the mean-
time, though, the biggest threat to the independence of nations around the Bay, with the
exception of India, is through the pressure of loan repayments and the consequence of not
honoring one’s debts: what is sometimes referred to as debt-trap diplomacy. In this way, it
is suggested that Beijing’s goal is ‘to win Asia and create a wider sphere of influence, all
without firing a shot’ (Auslin, 2018). While acknowledging that these are all trends that
cannot be ignored, a cautionary view is that China is still a long way behind India in
terms of its security hold on the region and the threat that is presently posed should
not be exaggerated (Brewster, 2015).

A question of governance
Dost thou know with how little wisdom the world is governed? (Oxenstierna, 1648)

Count Axel Oxenstierna, a seventeenth-century statesman in the government of Sweden,

wrote these timeless words of advice to his son. Whether his son took them to heart is not
known but, sadly, they are as apposite today as when they were first written. Even in the
Bay of Bengal now, as distant in time and place as one could imagine from the world of
Oxenstiema, the words have resonance.
Given the extent of change in the region it would seem that a priority might be to
strengthen its governance. Since 1997 this has largely taken the form of the grand-sound-
ing Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
(BIMSTEC). Most commentators, however, would share the view that BIMSTEC ‘has had
very little visibility even within the region in the last two decades’ (Hussain, 2018). A
 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 13

central problem of BIMSTEC has been its failure to concentrate clearly on a limited number
of priorities.
In the absence of positive action there is something of a vacuum in the region. As by far
the largest of the littoral states, this offers an opportunity for India to intervene. In the
words of one analyst, ‘there is now a need for India to take the lead in the Bay of
Bengal as it regains its place as a key geostrategic theater’ (Baruah, 2018). Establishing a
security framework for the Bay is one initiative that could benefit neighboring countries.
Unless BIMSTECaccepts its own responsibilities, India could also promote the cause of
free trade between member states, in addition to other aspects of their relations.
There is also scope to manage more effectively the shared maritime domain of the lit-
torals. A Bay of Bengal maritime authority could have a dual function: to promote econ-
omic development through a coordinated approach to oil and natural gas extraction
and the blue economy, and to organize a unified response to the natural challenges
that threaten the region. These two objectives would be of common interest to all
member states and would add value rather than take anything away. The sovereignty
of existing nations would remain intact while, at the same time, important gains would
be possible.
The example of three of the member states in settling a potential maritime boundary
dispute through peaceful negotiation (as explained in the preceding text) is an encoura-
ging sign of what is possible. If a similarly cooperative approach can be adopted for the
development of oil and natural gas extraction in the north of the Bay, that would be advan-
tageous to all parties. With the marine boundaries now settled, there will be opportunities
to share facilities and to secure the best deals with specialist companies. Likewise, the sus-
tainable use of the ocean within the framework of the blue economy (see, for instance,
Hussain, Failler, Al Karim, & Khurshed Alam, 2018) is still at an emergent stage and there
would undoubtedly be gains if the various states can agree priorities and joint develop-
ment. The preparation, for instance, of a zoning plan for the Bay would maximize yields
on a sustainable basis.
When it comes to the second objective, that of responding to climate change and other
natural hazards that afflict the region, a joint approach has obvious advantages. Perhaps a
scientific center could be established to train specialist staff and to monitor and predict
events? It would be responsible for installing the most advanced warning systems to
alert coastal communities of incoming threats. Global intelligence could be shared and
the interests of the Bay represented at international conferences. Additionally, costs can
be reduced through joint action and gains maximized.
Were the idea of a maritime authority to be accepted, thought should be given to its
most effective form of organization. Rather than a standard top-down approach,
perhaps it could be more community-based to allow for the ideas of villagers and local
fishermen, farmers who have to deal with the encroachment of the sea on a daily basis,
and women whose potential too often remains unrecognized.

Epilogue
Through these various changes in governance, the Bay of Bengal would be given a voice
that is presently lacking. Its problems could more effectively be addressed and its unrea-
lized potential as a crucial area in a rapidly changing continent achieved. The region could
14 D. HARDY

locate itself in the mainstream of ideas and enterprise, a global example of innovation that
could change the face of the region and mark the start of a new chapter in its long history.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Dennis Hardy is a founding member of the James R. Mancham Peace and Diplomacy Research Insti-
tute at the University of Seychelles. Previously vice-chancellor of the university, he now focuses on
the subject of geopolitics in the region. He is also Editor of the recently-launched Seychelles Research
Journal, which aims to publicize ongoing research in and about this small island state.

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