Case Digest: Mitra v.

COMELEC

G.R. No. 191938 : October 19, 2010

ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

ANTONIO V. GONZALES AND ORLANDO R. BALBON, JR., Respondent.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

We resolve the Motion for Reconsideration Filed by public respondent

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion for Oral Arguments led by private respondents Antonio V.
Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (private respondents), dated July 19,
2010 and July 20, 2010, respectively, addressing our Decision of July 2, 2010
(July 2, 2010 Decision or Decision).We annulled in this Decision the
February 10, 2010 and May 4, 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC, and denied
the private respondents petition to cancel the Certi cate of Candidacy (COC)
of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (Mitra).

To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that despite our limited
certiorari jurisdiction in election cases, we are not only obliged but are
constitutionally bound to intervene when the COMELEC's action on the
appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion in this case, a situation where resulting errors, arising from the
grave abuse committed by the COMELEC, mutated from being errors of
judgment to errors of jurisdiction.Based on our evaluation of the evidence
presented by both parties, we found that Mitra did not commit any
deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC.We noted, too, that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence,
leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan.We
also found that the COMELEC failed to critically consider whether Mitra
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would
otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan.

On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented his

Aborlan residence to deceive and mislead the people of the Province of
Palawan, we found that Mitra did not. In fact, Mitra adduced positive
evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents evidence
failed to su ciently controvert.Speci cally, the private respondents
evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.

In this regard, we took note of the incremental moves Mitra undertook to

establish his new domicile in Aborlan, as evidenced by the following:(1)
hisexpressed intentto transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City
to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves
starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March
2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya
Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the
construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises he
was leasing pending the completion ofhis house.Thus, we found that under
the situation prevailing when Mitra led his COC, there is no reason to infer
that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or
deliberately, in claiming residence in Aborlan.We also emphasized that the
COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis (as it used
subjective non-legal standards in its analysis) to conclude that Mitras
statement in his COC concerning his residence was indeed a
misrepresentation.In sum, we concluded that the evidence in the present
case, carefully reviewed, showed that Mitra indeed transfered his residence
from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law.

In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2010, the COMELEC,
through the O ce of the Solicitor General, asks us to reconsider our July 2,
2010 Decision. The COMELEC argues that we overstepped our review power
over its factual ndings; as a specialized constitutional body, the ndings
and conclusions of the COMELEC are generally respected and even given the
status of nality.The COMELEC also contends that the Court erred in taking
cognizance of the present petition since the issues raised therein are
essentially factual in nature.It claims that it is elementary that the
extraordinary remedy ofcertiorariis limited to correcting questions of law
and that the factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate
for a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether the SC erred when it reviewed the probative value of the
evidence presented and substituted its own factual ndings over that of the
public respondent.

HELD: We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration
We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private respondent's
arguments are mere rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the
same arguments addressing the issues we already considered and passed
upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision.Thus, both the COMELEC and private
respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument meriting
reconsideration.The denial of the motion for oral arguments proceeds from
this same reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties original submissions
on issues our Decision has su ciently covered, without more, do not merit
the time, e ort and attention that an oral argument shall require.

Having said these, we shall still proceed to discuss the aspects of the case
the motions touched upon, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the
correctness of our July 2, 2010 Decision.

REMEDIAL LAW: petition for certiorari

First, both the COMELEC and the private respondents posit that the Court
improperly exercised its limited certiorari jurisdiction; they theorize that
Mitras petition failed to allege and show errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.They also stress that the
Court should respect and consider the COMELEC's ndings of fact to be
nal and non-reviewable.

COMELEC's submission in this regard that the extraordinary remedy of

certiorari is limited to corrections of questions of law and that the factual
issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for
review on certiorari is wholly erroneous.This submission appears to have
confused the standards of the Courts power of review under Rule 65 and
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, leading the COMELEC to grossly misread the
import of Mitras petition before the Court.

To recall, Mitra brought his case before us via petition for certiorari,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of
Court.Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision, we emphasized that our review
(under the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of discretion, and not under the
Rule 45 question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground,i.e., on
the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

The basis for the Courts review of COMELEC rulings under the standards of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is Section 7 Article IX A of the Constitution
which provides that [U]nless otherwise provided by [the] Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court provide
for a separate rule (Rule 64)speci cally applicable only to decisions of the
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.This Rule expressly refers to the
application of Rule65 in the ling of a petition forcertiorari, subject to the
exception clause except as hereinafter provided.

In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections and Dario v. Mison, the Court

construed the above-cited constitutional provision as relating to the special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 (although with a di erent
reglementary period for ling)and not to an appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.Thus, Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court now
clearly speci es that the mode of review is the special civil action
ofcertiorariunder Rule 65, except as therein provided.In Ocate v.
Commission on Elections, we further held that:

The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine whether the

challenged tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.Thus,
any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of
jurisdictional issues.

POLITICAL LAW: judicial power

The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself, in

de ning judicial power, pointedly states that

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

This provision, more than anything else, identi es the power and duty of
this Court in grave abuse of discretion situations, and di erentiates this
authority from the power of review by appeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court de nes.
Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the COMELEC's position
that patently confuses the mode of review in election cases under Rules 64
and 65 of the Rules of Court, with the appellate review that Rule 45 of the
same Rules provides.

We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private respondents proposition

that the Court erred in exercising its limited certiorari jurisdiction.Although
the COMELEC is admittedly the nal arbiter of all factual issues as the
Constitution And the Rules of Court provide, we stress that in the presence
of grave abuse of discretion, our constitutional duty is to intervene and not
to shy away from intervention simply because a specialized agency has been
given the authority to resolve the factual issues.

As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in the past recognized

exceptions to the general rule that the Court ordinarily does not review in
acertioraricase the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence.One
such exception is when the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of
evidence go beyond the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable.In this situation, we are duty bound under the Constitution to
intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the attendant grave
abuse of discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction.

Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitras submissions and arguments on

grave abuse of discretion, namely, that the COMELEC failed to appreciate
that the case is a cancellation of a COC proceeding and that the critical issue
is the presence of deliberate false material representation to deceive the
electorate.In fact, Mitras petition plainly argued that the COMELECs grave
abuse of discretion was patent when it failed to consider that the ground to
deny a COC is deliberate false representation.We completely addressed this
issue and, in the process, analyzed the reasoning in the assailed COMELEC
decision. At every step, we found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence.

ELECTION LAW: residence

The private respondents fail to realize that the important considerations in

the present case relate to questions bearing on the cancellation of the COC
that they prayed for; the main critical points are the alleged deliberate
misrepresentation by Mitra and the underlying question of his residency in
Aborlan, Palawan.
While it is undisputed that Mitras domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City,
Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by
incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer
in early 2009.As our Decision discussed and as repeated elsewhere in this
Resolution, the private respondents failed to establish by su ciently
convincing evidence that Mitra did not e ectively transfer, while the
COMELEC not only grossly misread the evidence but even used the wrong
considerations in appreciating the submitted evidence.

These issues are not new issues; we extensively and thoroughly considered
and resolved them in our July 2, 2010 Decision.At this point, we only need to
address some of the private respondents misleading points in order to clear
the air:

1.The private respondents reliance on the expiration date of the lease

contract, to disprove Mitras claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is
his residence, is misplaced.This argument is imsy since the contract did
not provide that it was completely and fully time-barred and was only up to
February 28, 2010; it was renewable at the option of the parties.That a lease
is xed for a one-year term is a common practice.What is important is that
it is renewable at the option of the parties.In the absence of any objection
from the parties, the lease contract simply continues and is deemed
renewed.

2.In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto

Princesa City, the private respondents submitted in their Motion for
Reconsideration a colored certi ed true copy of Mitras alleged Puerto
Princesa City Community Tax Certi cate (CTC) dated February 3, 2009
allegedly showing Mitras signature.To recall, we found thatbased on the
records before us, the purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the
signature of Mitra.Although the private respondents have belatedly led
this evidence, we carefully examined therecently submittedcolored copy of
the February 3, 2009 CTC and saw no reason to reverse our nding; the
alleged signature appears to us to be a merehazy superimposition that does
not bear any resemblance at all to Mitras signature.We, thus, stand by our
ruling that the February 3, 2009 CTC, if at all, carries very little evidentiary
value.It did it not at all carry Mitras signature; his secretarys positive
testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without the latters
participation and knowledge, still stands unrefuted.

3.The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certi cation,

its o ce does not have any record of the supposed pineapple plantation in
Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.This late submission was made to show
that Mitra has no established business interests in Aborlan.The Certi cation
pertinently states:

This is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing

records/registration in our o ce regarding the alleged pineapple plantation
in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.However, the O ce of the Municipal
Agriculturist is on the process of gathering data on the Master list of
Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan.

We cannot give any evidentiary value to this submission for two

reasons.First, it was led only on reconsideration stage and was not an
evidence before us when the case was submitted for resolution.Second, even
if it had not been led late, the Certi cation does not prove anything; it is,
on its face, contradictory.On the one hand, it categorically states that there
are no existing records of any pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub,
Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it also expressly states that its records
are not yet complete since it is on the process of gathering data on the
Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in
Aborlan. Under what law or regulation the certifying o ce has the
obligation to prepare a list of agricultural business interests in Aborlan has
not even been alleged.

At the risk of repetition, we reiterate that Mitras business interests in

Aborlan stand undisputed in the present case.Not only was Mitra able to
present photographs of his experimental pineapple plantation; his claim of
ownership was also corroborated by the statements of Dr. Carme Caspe,
Ricardo Temple and other witnesses.

ELECTION LAW: deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC

The private respondents also claim that the Court erred in ruling that Mitra
did not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC.We
likewise see no merit in this claim.One important point in the present case
is that the private respondents failed to prove that there was deliberate
material misrepresentation in Mitras statement on his required residency
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections. This, as we stressed in our Decision, is a
glaring gap in the private respondents case:

We do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation

gi en hat he kne of his transfer as sho n b the mo es he had made to
carry it out.From the evidentiary perspective, we hold that the evidence
con rming residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts in Mitras favor; even
assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence in his favor cannot go below the
level of anequipoise, i.e.,when weighed,Mitras evidence of transfer and
residence in Aborlan cannot be overcome by the respondents evidence that
he remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.Under the situationprevailing
when Mitra led his COC, we cannot conclude that Mitra committed any
misrepresentation, much less a deliberate one, about his residence.

The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of

the case that the COMELEC completely failed to consider as it focused
mainly on the character of Mitras feedmill residence.For this reason, the
COMELEC was led into error one that goes beyond an ordinary error of
judgment.By failing to take into account whether there had been a
deliberate misrepresentation in Mitras COC, the COMELEC committed the
grave abuse of simply assuming that an error in the COC was necessarily a
deliberate falsity in a material representation.In this case, it doubly erred
because there was no falsity; as the carefully considered evidence shows,
Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the period required by
Section 74 of the OEC.

The respondents signi cantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty
approach of using subjective norms, as they now argue thatgiven his stature
as a member of the prominent Mitra clan of Palawan, and as a three term
congressman, it is highly incredible that a small room in a feed mill has
served as his residence since 2008.

We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we

condemned the COMELECs use of subjective non-legal standards. Mitras
feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately from the
circumstances of his transfer of residence, speci cally, hisexpressed
intentto transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him
eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory moves starting in
early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a
lot for his permanent home; and the construction of a house in this lot that,
parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the
completion of his house.These incremental moves do not o end reason at
all, in the way that the COMELECs highly subjective non-legal standards do.

Thus, we can only conclude, in the context of the cancellation proceeding

before us, that the respondents have not presented a convincing case
in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC,
while the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis to
conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a
misrepresentation.

To summarize, both the COMELEC and private respondents have not

shown, through their respective motions, su cient reasons to compel us to
modify or reverse our July 2, 2010 Decision.

ELECTION LAW: the private respondents failed to establish by su ciently

convincing evidence that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident

The evidence before us, properly considered and carefully reviewed, fully
supports our conclusion that the private respondents evidence failed to
show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.As discussed now
and in our Decision of July 2, 2010, Mitra adequately proved by substantial
evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning
2008, concluding his transfer in early 2009.Given this proof, the burden of
evidence lies with the private respondents to establish the contrary.

Proof to the contrary is sadly lacking, as the dissents reliance on the

Certi cation of the Punong Barangay of Sta. Monica,PuertoPrincesaCityis
misplaced. Theponenciacannot give full evidentiary weight to the
aforementioned Certi cation.

To be sure, a bare certi cation in a disputed situation cannot su ce to

conclusively establish the existence of what the certi cation alleged. The
purported CTC, on the other hand, was neither signed nor thumb-marked
by Mitra and, thus, bore no clear indication that it had been adopted and
used by Mitra as his own.In our evaluation, we in fact pointedly emphasized
that the Puerto Princesa City CTC dated February 3, 2009, if at all, carries
little evidentiary value in light of Lilia Camoras (Mitras secretary) positive
declaration that she was the one who procured it, while Mitras Aborlan CTC
dated March 18, 2009 carried Mitras own signature. Camora fully explained
the circumstances under which she secured the CTC of February 3, 2009 and
her statement was never disputed.

On the other hand, Commodore Hernandez declaration on its face did not
controvert Carme E. Caspes sworn statement which adequately proved that
Mitras transfer to Aborlan was accomplished, not in a single move, but
through an incremental process that started in early 2008 and concluded in
March 2009
ELECTION LAW: the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of the evidence and in using wrong considerations which lead
it to incorrectly conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan and that he
committed a deliberate misrepresentation in his COC

Contrary to the dissents view, the sworn statements of Maligaya Feedmills

customers and former employees that Mitra did not and could not have
resided at the mezzanine portion of the Feedmill cannot be given full
evidentiary weight, since these statements are in nature of negative
testimonies that do not deserve weight and credence in the face of contrary
positive evidence, particularly, Carme E. Caspes testimony, cited above, that
Mitra did indeed transfer residence in a process that was accomplished, not
in a single move, but through an incremental process that started in early
2008.It is well-settled in the rules of evidence that positive testimony is
stronger than negative testimony.

Additionally, we noted in our Decision that the COMELEC committed grave

abuse of discretion, as it failed to correctly appreciate that the evidence
clearly pointed to fact that Mitra e ectively transferred his residence to
Aborlan.

To buttress our nding that the COMELEC used personal and subjective
assessment standards instead of the standards prescribed by law, we cited
Coquilla v. COMELEC, which characterized the term residence as referring
to domicile or legal residence, that is the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may
be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi).

ELECTION LAW: the validity or invalidity of the lease contract is not

determinative of question of Mitras residence in Aborlan

Beyond the arguments raised about the invalidity of the lease contract, what
is signi cant for purposes of this case is the immateriality of the issue to
the present case.As we emphasized in our Decision:

The validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us; what
concerns us is the question of whether Mitra did indeed enter into an
agreement for the lease, or strictly for the use, of the Maligaya Feedmill as
his residence (while his house, on the lot he bought, was under
construction) and whether he indeed resided there.The notarys compliance
ith the notarial la like ise assumes no materialit as it is a defect not
imputable to Mitra; what is important is the parties a rmation before a
notary public of the contracts genuineness and due execution.

The dissents thesis that Mitras allegation in his Motion for Reconsideration
(dated February 13, 2010) before the COMELEC en banc that he had already
transferred to the newly constructed house in Aborlan negates the
proposition that the lease agreement is extendible from month to month -
is misleading.The signi cance of Mitras statement in his Motion for
Reconsideration that he had already transferred to his newly constructed
house in Aborlan must not be read in isolation; it must be appreciated under
the backdrop of Mitras explicit intention to make Aborlan his permanent
residence through an incremental transfer of residence, as evidenced by the
following:

(1) his initial transfer through the leased dwelling at the mezzanine portion
of the Maligaya Feedmill;

(2) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and

(3) the construction of a house on this lot which is adjacent to the premises
he was leasing pending the completion of his house.

All these should of course be read with the establishment of Mitras business
interest in Aborlan and his transfer of registration as a voter.

With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material
misrepresentation in his COC, we see no reason in this case to appeal to the
primacy of the electorates will.We cannot deny, however, that the people of
Palawan have spoken in an election where residency quali cation had been
squarely raised and their voice has erased any doubt about their verdict on
Mitras quali cations.

Under these terms, we cannot be any clearer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to

DENY with FINALITY, for lack of merit, the
motions for reconsideration and motion for oral
arguments now before us.Let entry of judgment be
made in due course.