Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (1989), The Court Declared That
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (1989), The Court Declared That
By Gefer R. Mancol
In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA (1999), citing Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (1989), the Court declared that
“[t]o the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there
is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance
with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are
deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also
a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the
title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.” (Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No.
127876, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 106, 134 [Per J. Puno, En Banc], citing Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 373-374
[Per J. Cruz, En Banc])
In the 2011 ruling of the same case, it was held that “Section 9, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution expresses the constitutional rule on eminent
domain—'Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.’ While confirming the State’s inherent power and right to
take private property for public use, this provision at the same time lays
down the limitation in the exercise of this power. When it takes property
pursuant to its inherent right and power, the State has the corresponding
obligation to pay the owner just compensation for the property taken. For
compensation to be considered ‘just,’ it must not only be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken; it must also be paid to the landowner
without delay.” (Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP, G.R. No. 164195, April 5, 2011, 647 SCRA 207,
218 [Per J. Brion, En Banc])
In Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. v. Cabungcal (2017), the Court held that the CARL
was “enacted as social legislation, pursuant to the policy of the State to pursue a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Agrarian reform is the means towards
a viable livelihood and, ultimately, a decent life for the landless farmers.” (Heirs of
Augusto Salas, Jr. v. Cabungcal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017, 822 SCRA 1, 47 [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division])
Further, in Heirs of Arcadio Castro, Sr. v. Lozada (2012), the Court reiterated its
declaration that “in the construction of laws that find its origin in the social
justice mandate of the Constitution,” the constant policy is “to assure that its
beneficient effects be enjoyed by those who have less in life.” (Heirs of Arcadio Castro, Sr.
v. Lozada, G.R. No. 163026, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 271, 289 [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Second Division],
citing Tañag v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-30223, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 806, 811 [Per J.
Fernando, En Banc])
In Lajom v. LBP (2014), the Court emphasized that “while the agrarian
reform program was undertaken primarily for the benefit of our landless
farmers, this undertaking should, however, not result in the oppression of
landowners by pegging the cheapest value for their lands. Indeed, although
the taking of properties for agrarian reform purposes is a revolutionary
kind of expropriation, it should not be carried out at the undue expense of
landowners who are also entitled to protection under the Constitution and
agrarian reform laws.” (LBP v. Lajom, G.R. No. 184982, August 20, 2014, 733 SCRA 511, 526
[Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division])
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In LBP v. Estate of J. Amado Araneta (2012), the Court ruled that
“[a]grarian reform finds context in social justice in tandem with the police
power of the State. But social justice itself is not merely granted to the
marginalized and the underprivileged. But while the concept of social
justice is intended to favor those who have less in life, it should never be
taken as a toll to justify let alone commit an injustice. The Court also
borrowed from Justice Isagani Cruz in Gelos v. CA (1992) that: “[S]ocial
justice––or any justice for that matter––is for the deserving whether he be
a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in a
case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of
the poor simply because they are poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly
extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer
the poor simply because they are poor, or to eject the rich simply because
they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike,
according to the mandate of the law.” (LBP v. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. No.
161796, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 310, 348 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division], citing Gelos v. CA,
G.R. No. 86186, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 608, 616 [Per J. Cruz, First Division])
The Court in Agabon v. NLRC (2004) has also categorically ruled that
“[s]ocial justice, as the term suggests, should be used only to correct an
injustice. (Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573, 615 [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, En Banc])
Similarly, in Jamer v. NLRC (1997), it was held that “[s]ocial justice ceases
to be an effective instrument for the ‘equalization of the social and
economic forces’ by the State when it is used to shield wrongdoing.” (Jamer
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 112630, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 632, 650 [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First
Division])
In LBP v. Nable (2012), “Section 4, Article XIII, of the Constitution has mandated
the implementation of an agrarian reform program for the distribution of
agricultural lands to landless farmers subject to the payment of just
compensation to the landowners…” (LBP v. Nable, G.R. No. 176692, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA
253, 259 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division])
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5. There are salient terms under Section 3 of the CARL. Make sure you
have understood and memorized them, for they have been utilized by
the Court in its decisions.
The Court in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the DAR (2010) has held:
Chapter II (Coverage)
In Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. v. Cabungcal (2017), it was held that the CARL
covers all public and private agricultural lands, as provided in Proclamation No.
131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced. However, a maximum of five (5) hectares of the landowner’s compact
or contiguous landholdings may not be distributed to qualified beneficiaries, as
it is within the landowner’s rights to retain this area. (Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. v.
Cabungcal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017, 822 SCRA 1, 29-30 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing RA
6657, Secs. 4 & 6-A, as amended by RA 9700)
In particular, the Court said that the CARP covers the following lands: (1) all
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture; (2) all lands of the public domain exceeding the total area of five
5
hectares and below to be retained by the landowner; (3) all government-owned
lands that are devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and (4) all private lands
devoted to or suitable for agriculture, regardless of the agricultural products
raised or can be raised on these lands. (Id. at 30-31, citing RA 6657, Sec. 4, as amended by RA
9700)
Section 4.1 of [DAR AO 02-03] gives the landowner the option to exercise
the right of retention at any time before he or she receives a [NOC]. (Id. at
301, citing DAR AO 02-03, Sec. 4.1)
6
If the area selected by the landowner for retention is tenanted, “the tenant
shall have the option to choose whether to remain . . . as lessee or be a
beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features.” Section 9 of [DAR AO 02-03] states that the tenant
must exercise this option within one (1) year from the time the landowner
manifests his or her choice of the area for retention, as follows: … (Id. at 303,
citing DAR AO 02-03, Sec. 9)
Section 6 of [the CARL] gives the landowner the option to choose the area
to be retained only if it is compact or contiguous. The Department of
Agrarian Reform, the Office of the President, and the Court of Appeals have
consistently found that the land subject of the dispute is neither compact
nor contiguous. (Id. at 310) Section 6 also provides that if the area selected
for retention is tenanted, it is for the tenant to choose whether to remain
in the area or be a beneficiary in the same or a comparable agricultural
land… (Id.) The landowner’s retention right is subject to another condition.
Under Section 3.3 of [DAR AO 02-03], the heirs of a deceased landowner
may exercise the retention right only if the landowner signified his or her
intention to exercise the right of retention before August 23, 1990. Section
3.3 states: … (Id. at 310-311) Section 6.1 provides that the landowner’s
“[f]ailure to manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain within sixty
(60) calendar days from receipt of [NOC]” is a ground for losing his or her
right of retention. (Id. at 311, citing DAR AO 02-03, Sec. 6.1)
In Vda. De Dayao v. Heirs of Robles, this Court has held that the
Department of Agrarian Reform “has no authority to decree a retention
when no application was in the first place ever filed.” (Id. at 312, citing Vda. De
Dayao v. Heirs of Robles, G.R. No. 174830, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 620 [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
Division])
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8.3. Retention limits under the CARL constitutes as statutory lien,
as held in DAR v. Robles (2015). (DAR v. Robles, G.R. No. 190482, December
9, 2015, 777 SCRA 141 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division])
In DAR v. Carriedo (2018), the Court found merit in DAR’s contention that
the objective of DAR AO 05-06 is equitable—that in order to ensure the
effective implementation of the CARL, previous sales of landholding
(without DAR clearance) should be treated as the exercise of retention
rights of the landowner, as embodied in Item No. 4 of the said
administrative order. According to the Court, “[t]he equity in this policy of
[DAR] AO 05-06 is apparent and easily discernible. By selling his
landholdings, it is reasonably presumed that the landowner already
received an amount (as purchase price) commensurate to the just
compensation conformable with the constitutional and statutory
requirement. At this point, equity dictates that he cannot claim anymore,
either in the guise of his retention area or otherwise, that which he already
received in the previous sale of his land.” The Court also applied the
principle in Delfino, Sr. v. Anasao (2014). (DAR v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, October
10, 2018 [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division]. This reversed the Court’s Decision dated January 20, 2016,
citing Delfino, Sr. v. Anasao, G.R. No. 197486, September 10, 2014, 734 SCRA 672 [Per J. Villarama,
Jr., Third Division])
The Court in DAR v. Carriedo (2018) likewise held that “[DAR] AO 05-06 is
in consonance with the Stewardship Doctrine, which has been held to be
the property concept in Section 6, Article II of the 1973 Constitution.
Under this concept, private property is supposed to be held by the
individual only as a trustee for the people in general, who are its real
owners. As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his rights to the
property not for his own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of
the entire community or nation. Property use must not only be for the
benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State, in the promotion of
social justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment,
and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits. It has been held that Presidential Decree No. 27,
one of the precursors of the CARL, embodies this policy and concept.” The
Court added that “[t]his interpretation is consistent with the objective of
the agrarian reform program, which is, of course, land distribution to the
landless farmers and farmworkers. The objective is carried out by Item No.
4 of AO 05-06 as it provides for the consequences in situations where a
landowner had sold portions of his/her land with an area more than the
statutory limitation of five hectares. In this scenario, Item No. 4 of AO 05-
06 treats the sale of the first five hectares as the exercise of the landowner's
retention rights. The reason is that, effectively, the landowner has already
chosen, and in fact has already disposed of, and has been duly
compensated for, the area he is entitled to retain under the law.” (DAR v.
Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, October 10, 2018 [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division]. This reversed the
Court’s Decision dated January 20, 2016.)
9. What are the lands exempted and excluded from the CARL?
In Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. v. Cabungcal (2017), it was held that Section 10 of
the CARL provides the types of lands that are excluded therefrom:
1. Lands that are actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife,
forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, and
watersheds and mangoes;
2. Private lands that are actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn
farms and fishponds;
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3. Lands that are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for:
a. National defense;
b. School sites and campuses including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for educational purposes;
c. Seeds and seedling research and pilot production center;
d. Church sites and convents appurtenant thereto;
e. Mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto;
f. Communal burial grounds and cemeteries;
g. Penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates; and
h. Government and private research and quarantine centers.
4. All lands where the topography is hilly, i.e., with at least eighteen percent
(18%) slope and over, and are not developed for agriculture. (Heirs of Augusto
Salas, Jr. v. Cabungcal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017, 822 SCRA 1, 31-33 [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division], citing RA 6657, Sec. 10)
In Milestone Farms, Inc. v. OP (2011), the Court ruled that “issues of Exclusion
and/or Exemption are characterized as Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases
which are well within the DAR Secretary’s competence and jurisdiction…
Precisely, it is the DAR Secretary who is vested with such jurisdiction and
authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from CARP coverage based on the
factual circumstances of each case and in accordance with law and applicable
jurisprudence.” (Milestone Farms, Inc. v. OP, G.R. No. 182332, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 217, 239-
240 [Per J. Nachura, Second Division])
Exempted from coverage are lands actually, directly, and exclusively used,
and found to be necessary for, the following purposes:
a. Parks;
b. Wildlife;
c. Forest reserves;
d. Reforestation;
e. Fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds;
f. Watersheds;
g. Mangroves;
h. National defense;
i. School sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for educational purposes;
j. Seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers;
k. Church sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto;
l. Communal burial grounds and cemeteries;
m. Penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates;
n. Government and private research and quarantine centers;
o. Fish ponds and prawn farms; and
Livestock, poultry, and swine raising since 15 June 1988. (DAR AO 07-11, Sec.
8)
9
It is the Land Use Cases Committee (LUCC), which was created under DAR
AO 06-19 (Creation of a Collegial Body on Land Use Conversion and
Exemption/Exclusion from CARP Coverage).
In the interest of the service and in line with the directive of the President
to streamline the Conversion, Exemption and Exclusion processes for
speedy resolution of the same, there is a need to create or constitute a
collegial body, which shall approve or disapprove applications for
conversion, exemption and exclusion and all other incidents or matters
related thereto. (DAR AO 06-19, Item I)
The Head of LUCS shall be responsible for the promulgation and issuance
of Notices of Decisions, Resolutions, Orders and CDOs, as well as
Certificates of Finality (COF) to all concerned applicants, oppositors,
parties and counsels, as the case may be. Likewise, the LUCS shall be
responsible for the assignment of cases to the concerned Committee,
which shall be categorized by case type (Conversion, Exemption and
Exclusion). Upon approval of the LUCC Chairperson in order manage the
caseload or for meritorious circumstances, the LUCS may assign cases to
the Committee that may be different from its designation.
The LUCC shall be assisted by the LUCS and TWG in the deliberation, as
well as in the assignment of cases. The Bureau of Agrarian Legal
10
Assistance (BALA) Land Use Cases Division (LUCD) shall act as the TWG
of LUCS.
The TWG shall be responsible, among others, for the presentation of case
briefs and OSII reports during the Committee deliberation. It shall perform
a complete staff work in the pre-evaluation of the application. It shall
conduct an OSII and prepare OSII reports, through the OSII Teams subject
to Memorandum Circular No. 07, Series of 2011 on confidentiality.
Finally, cases cognizable by A.O. No. 05, Series of 2018, the PCC shall be
responsible for the conduct of public consultation. (DAR AO 06-19, Item IV)
10.4. What is the remedy from the decision, resolution and orders of
the LUCC?
2. Any aggrieved party may file a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) within
a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision,
resolution and order of the concerned Committee.
3. The filing of the MR shall suspend the running of the fifteen (15) day
period to appeal. If denied, the aggrieved party has a non-extendible
period of fifteen (15) days within which to file an Appeal to the Office of
the President. (DAR AO 06-19, Item V)
This A.O. shall apply to all pending, as well as subsequent applications for
conversion, exemption, exclusion and to all other incidents or matters
pertaining thereto as enumerated under paragraph IV hereof. (DAR AO 06-19,
Item VI)
In Jusayan v. Sombilla (2015), citing Gabriel v. Pangilinan (1974), the Court held
that the lease of an agricultural land can be either a civil law or an agricultural
lease, thus:
11
that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, but
the leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
The sharing of the harvest in proportion to the respective
contributions of the landholder and tenant, otherwise called share
tenancy, was abolished on August 8, 1963 under Republic Act No.
3844. To date, the only permissible system of agricultural tenancy
is leasehold tenancy, a relationship wherein a fixed consideration is
paid instead of proportionately sharing the harvest as in share
tenancy. (Jusayan v. Sombilla, G.R. No. 163928, January 21, 2015, 746 SCRA 437, 445-
446 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division], citing Gabriel v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. L-27797, August
26, 1974, 58 SCRA 590, 596 [Per J. Zaldivar, Second Division])
12
threshing of said crops: Provided, however, That in case of crops yielding
more than one harvest from planting, “agricultural year” shall be the
period from the preparation of the land to the first harvest and thereafter,
from harvest to harvest. In both cases, the period may be shorter or longer
than the calendar year. (Id., Sec. 2.2, citing RA 3844, Sec. 166[4])
Tenant – A person himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed
by another, with the latter’s consent for purposes of production, sharing
the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or
paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. (DAR AO 02-06, Item III[19],
citing RA 1199, Sec. 5[a])
Cultivation is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land, but
also the advancing of the ground to forward the products of the earth by
general industry, taking care of the land and fruits grown thereon, fencing
of certain areas, and the cleaning thereof by gathering of coconuts, their
pilings, husking, and harvesting as well as the proceeding thereof go into
copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers. (DAR AO 02-06, Item IV[3])
The consideration for the lease shall not be more than the equivalent of
25% of the average normal harvest (ANH) during the three (3) agricultural
years immediately preceding the date the lease was established. If the land
has been cultivated for less than 3 years, the initial consideration shall be
based on the average normal harvest of the preceding year/s when the
land was actually cultivated. (DAR AO 02-06, Item IV[4])
If the land has been cultivated for a period of less than three (3) years, the
initial consideration shall be based on the average normal harvest during
13
the preceding years when the land was actually cultivated, or on the
harvest of the first year in the case of newly cultivated lands, if the harvest
is normal. (Id., citing RA 3844, Sec. 34, 1st proviso)
For auxiliary crops, the lease shall not be more than the equivalent of 20%
following the principles provided for principal crops on the use of average
normal harvest provided that all expenses shall be born by the tenant
pursuant to Sec. 30 of R.A. No. 1199, as amended. (Id. See Item III[8] thereof, which
defines auxiliary crop to refer to any product raised other than the crop to which the cultivation of the
land is principally devoted in each agricultural year, and excluding the produce of the homelot.)
After the laps of the first three (3) normal harvest, the final consideration
shall be based on the average normal harvest during these three (3)
preceding agricultural years. (Id., citing RA 3844, Sec. 34, 2nd proviso)
14
11.7. What are the obligations of the agricultural lessee?
15
of its productivity. Provided, That in case of disagreement as to
what proven farm practices the lessee shall adopt, the same shall
be settled by the Adjudicator or PARO according to the best
interest of the parties concerned; and
4. Mortgage expected rentals. (DAR AO 02-06, Item VI[D])
16
it falls due as embodied in the agricultural leasehold contract/PLR
pursuant to RA No. 3844 and DAR existing policies. (DAR AO 05-16, Sec. 3.1)
Litigated Case – refers to one where the subject landholding has a pending
case filed by either the agricultural lessee or the agricultural-lessor or due
to the pendency of a case filed before the Adjudicator/Board or regular
court. (Id., Sec. 2.12) Litigated landholdings under leasehold operations
involve situations wherein the agricultural-lessor refuses to accept or fails
to receive the lease rental payments of the agricultural-lessees on lands
covered by agricultural leasehold contract or PLR and there is a pending
case or resolution of the case before the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB, such as,
among others, fixing of lease rental, ejectment of agricultural-lessee, and
supervision of harvest. (Id., Sec. 1.2; See 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure, Rule II, Sec.
1[c][d][g])
Exclusively for DAR Lease Rental, as approved by the LBP, the features of
the IBCA are: (1) no required initial deposit and maintaining balance; (2)
to earn interest of 0.25% per annum (subject to 20% withholding tax) if
the average daily balance of the account is PhP20,000.00 and above; (3)
not subject to inter-branch charges; (4) non-drawing account. Withdrawal
shall be subject to presentation of Order from DAR-
PARPO/Adjudicator/Board or regular court, whichever is applicable; and
(5) not subject to dormancy fee or automatic closure. These features may
change subject to LBP guidelines. (DAR AO 05-16, Sec. 3.3)
17
Lease rental payments in kind may be deposited with a bonded warehouse
to avoid spoilage or may be sold and converted to cash by the agricultural-
lessee in order to facilitate the deposit of the lease rental payments with
the nearest LBP branch in the locality or LBP branch convenient to the
agrucultural0lessee. In case the lessee pays the fees and charges of the
warehouse, or in case of the said fees and charges are deducted from the
deposited produce, then these shall form part of the rental payments by
the lessee. The agricultural-lessee shall notify the DAR Municipal Office
(DARMO) or DAR Provincial Office (DARPO) concerned, agricultural-lessor,
and the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC)/Barangay Council,
as may be applicable. (DAR AO 05-16, Sec. 3.6)
Chapter IV (Registration)
18
Lands Under RA No. 6657, as Amended - maintains the gist of its
predecessors:…
2. his rights under the agrarian reform law - such as the right
to retain and to nominate preferred beneficiaries -
including how and until when can they be enforced; and
Under DAR AO No. 01-03 or the 2003 Rules Governing the Issuance
of Notice of Coverage and Acquisition of Agricultural Lands Under RA
6657, the issuance of a notice of coverage was recognized as the
starting point of a proceeding for compulsory land acquisition and
distribution under the agrarian reform program:…
19
It bears stressing that the issuance of a notice of coverage
only initiates a proceeding for compulsory land acquisition and
distribution. The date of issuance of such notice is, thus, useful
only in determining the date of commencement of such proceeding -
which is particularly relevant for purposes of applying Section 30 of
RA No. 9700.
In order for the DAR to proceed further and acquire jurisdiction over
the landholding identified in a notice of coverage as well as the
landowner, however, there must first be proper service and posting
of the notice of coverage in accordance with Sections 16 to 20 of
DAR AO No. 07-11. (Robustum Agricultural Corporation v. DAR, G.R. No. 221484,
November 19, 2018 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division])
1. Protest against coverage, which must be filed before the PARO and
should contain the substantial bases thereof;
2. Nominate child/ren who may qualify as preferred beneficiary/ies;
3. File a Manifestation for Exemption or Exclusion from CARP
coverage before the PARO; and
4. File a Manifestation to Exercise the Right of Retention before the
PARO.
Chapter VI (Compensation)
20
or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will
come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests
of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands
of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police
power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.” The Court added: “But
for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means
absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the
constitutional injunction that “private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation” and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved
from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper
exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.” (Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175
SCRA 343, 376 [Per J. Cruz, En Banc])
In LBP v. Rural Bank of Hermosa [Bataan], Inc. (2017), citing Alfonso v. LBP
(2016), the Court ruled:
21
For the guidance of the bench, the bar, and the
public, we reiterate the rule: Out of regard for
the DAR’s expertise as the concerned
implementing agency, courts should
henceforth consider the factors stated in
Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as
translated into the applicable DAR formulas in
their determination of just compensation for
the properties covered by the said law. If, in the
exercise of their judicial discretion, courts find
that a strict application of said formulas is not
warranted under the specific circumstances of
the case before them, they may deviate or
depart therefrom, provided that this departure
or deviation is supported by a reasoned
explanation grounded on the evidence on
record. In other words, courts of law possess
the power to make a final determination of just
compensation. (LBP v. Rural Bank of Hermosa [Bataan],
Inc., G.R. No. 181953, July 25, 2017, 832 SCRA 78, 90-91 [Per
J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc], citing Alfonso v. LBP, G.R. Nos.
181912 & 183347, November 29, 2016, 811 SCRA 27 [Per J.
Jardeleza, En Banc])
22
invalid. These were reiterated in Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Montalvan, when the Court explained:
23
G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987, 149 SCRA 305 [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc];
and LBP v. Montalvan, G.R. No. 190336, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 380, 391-392
[Per J. Sereno, Second Division])
While R.A. No. 6657 itself does not provide for a period within
which a landowner can file a petition for the determination
of just compensation before the SAC, it cannot be
imprescriptible because the parties cannot be placed in
limbo indefinitely. The Civil Code settles such conundrum.
Considering that the payment of just compensation is an
obligation created by law, it should only be ten (10) years
from the time the landowner received the notice of coverage.
The Constitution itself provides for the payment of just
compensation in eminent domain cases. Under Article 1144,
such actions must be brought within ten (10) years from the
time the right of action accrues…
No. In Santos v. LBP (2000), it was held that “… RA 6657 provides that just
compensation to landowners shall be paid in cash and bonds…” (Santos v. LBP, G.R.
No. 137431, September 7, 2000, 340 SCRA 59, 61-62 [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division])
24
specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is
a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content
and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-
quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the
constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all
this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities
and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its
enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our
people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all
these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the
said section will result in the nullification of the entire program,
killing the farmer’s hopes even as they approach realization and
resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless
countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the
Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
In DAR v. Polo Coconut Plantation Co., Inc. (2008), the Court, citing Section 22 of
the CARL, has held that the “provision enumerates who are qualified beneficiaries
of the CARP. Determining whether or not one is eligible to receive land involves
the administrative implementation of the program. For this reason, only the DAR
Secretary can identify and select CARP beneficiaries. Thus, courts cannot
substitute their judgment unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion…” The Court added that “Section 22 of the CARL does not limit
qualified beneficiaries to tenants of the landowners…” (DAR v. Polo Coconut Plantation Co.,
Inc., G.R. No. 168787, September 3, 2008, 564 SCRA 78, 90-91 [Per J. Corona, First Division])
25
Sitio Naswe, Inc. v. Tan, G.R. No. 196028, April 18, 2016, 789 SCRA 573, 586 [Per J. Brion, Second
Division])
26
annual amortizations with the landowner (LO) that
resulted to the foreclosure of mortgage on the awarded
land by the LBP or repossession by the landowners (in
the case of voluntary land transfer/direct payment
scheme or VLT/DPS) of the awarded lands except if
the non-payment of the rental is due to crop failure as
a result of fortuitous events per Section 36(6) of R.A.
No. 3844, to the extent of seventy-five percent (75%);
27
determined with finality after proper proceedings by
the appropriate tribunal or agency.
Written protests for the inclusion/exclusion from the master list must be
filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform's Regional or Provincial
Office, as the case may be, not later than 15 days from the last day of
posting of the list. The Regional Director will resolve the protest through
summary proceedings within 30 days from receiving the Beneficiary
Screening Committee’s case records or the Provincial Office’s investigation
report and recommendation. The master list becomes final and executory
after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of the Regional Director's decision
on the protest, but such finality is only for the specific purpose of
generating the certificate of land ownership award.
28
In DAR v. Berenguer (2010), it was held that “[t]he CARL has set forth in
mandatory terms in its Section 22, supra, who should be the qualified
beneficiaries.” (DAR v. Berenguer, G.R. No. 154094, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 499, 510-512 [Per
J. Bersamin, First Division])
18.4. Does the landowner have the right to choose the CARP
beneficiary?
No. In Hermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation (2006), it was held that “[d]enying
a landowner the right to choose a CARP beneficiary is, in context, only
proper. For a covered landholding does not revert back to the owner even
if the beneficiaries thus selected do not meet all necessary qualifications.
Should it be found that the beneficiaries are indeed disqualified, the land
acquired by the State for agrarian reform purposes will not be returned to
the landowner but shall go instead to other qualified beneficiaries.” (Hermoso
v. C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA 556, 564 [Per J. Garcia, Second
Division])
No. In Malabanan v. Heirs of Alfredo Restrivera (2016), it was held that the
law “does not automatically vest preferential rights upon the children of
landowners. To avail themselves of this right, claimants must show that:
(1) their parents owned the subject land; and (2) it has been determined in
the proper proceeding that the claimants are qualified beneficiaries of the
agrarian reform program.” (Malabanan v. Heirs of Alfredo Restrivera, G.R. No. 185312,
December 1, 2016, 811 SCRA 413, 430 [Per CJ. Sereno, First Division])
18.6. Does being an actual occupant or tiller of the land, which make
him a potential CARP beneficiary, give rise to a tenancy
relationship?
29
well as under DAR Administrative Order No. 02-94 in relation to Section 22,
R.A. 6657, disqualifies the beneficiary of lots awarded under P.D. No. 27
from its coverage.” The Court added that “actual cultivation of the
farmholding is a mandatory condition for the transfer of rights under the
CLT to qualify the transferee as a beneficiary under Section 22 of R.A. No.
6657.” The Court further stated that “[f]or abandonment to exist, the
following requisites must concur: (1) a clear intent to abandon; and (2) an
external act showing such intent. The term is defined as the ‘willful failure
of the ARB, together with his farm household, to cultivate, till, or develop
his land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific economic
purpose continuously for a period of two calendar years.’ It entails, among
others, the relinquishment of possession of the lot for at least two (2)
calendar years and the failure to pay the amortization for the same
period. ‘What is critical in abandonment is intent which must be shown to
be deliberate and clear.’ The intent must be established by the factual
failure to work on the landholding absent any valid reason as well as a
clear intent, which is shown as a separate element.” (Heirs of Lorenzo Buensuceso
v. Perez, G.R. No. 173926, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 491, 505-506 [Per J. Brion, Second Division])
19. Are CLOAs and EPs documents evidencing ownership of the land
granted or awarded to the beneficiary by the DAR?
Yes. In DAR v. Carriedo (2018), citing Section 24 of the CARL, as amended, the
Court declared that a “Certificate of Land Ownership Award or CLOA is a
document evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary
by the DAR, and contains the restrictions and conditions provided for in the CARL
and other applicable laws…” The Court, citing Estribillo v. DAR (2006), further
held that the “EPs themselves, like the [CLOAs] in [the CARL], are enrolled in the
Torrens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes
Chapter IX on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in
themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in
registration proceedings…” (DAR v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, October 10, 2018 [Per J. Jardeleza,
Third Division], citing Estribillo v. DAR, G.R. No. 159674, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 218 [Per J. Chico-Nazario,
First Division]. This reversed the Court’s Decision dated January 20, 2016.)
19.1. Who has jurisdiction over the cancellation of EPs and CLOAs?
In Sutton v. Lim (2012), it was held that “under the new law, R.A. No.
9700, which took effect on July 1, 2009, all cases involving the
cancellation of CLOAs and other titles issued under any agrarian reform
program are now within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary…” (Sutton v. Lim, G.R. No. 191660, December 3, 2012, 686 SCRA 745, 756 [Per J.
Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division])
30
19.1.1. Note that under DAR AO 03-17, the Regional Director
has primary jurisdiction over ALI cases, which include
the cancellation of EPs or CLOAs not yet registered
with the Register of Deeds.
In the event that a case filed before the Adjudicator shall necessitate
the determination of a prejudicial issue involving an agrarian law
implementation case, the Adjudicator shall dismiss the case
without prejudice to its re-filing, and, for purposes of expediency,
refer the same to the Office of the Secretary or his authorized
representative in the locality. (2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure, Rule II, Sec. 4)
31
2.3.1. The information required to be provided in the Application Form is
not supplied or the applicant(s) failed to sign the Application Form.
2.3.2. The requisite documents are not attached to the Application. (Id., Sec.
2.3.)
Should there be other reliefs necessary for the enforcement of rights based
on the newly issued EP, CLOA or other title issued under any Agrarian
Reform Program, the concerned party shall have recourse through the
commencement of the proper ALI case; or through the commencement of
the proper judicial action in the court of competent jurisdiction if the case
is cognizable by regular courts. (Id., Sec. 2.9.)
In Lebrudo v. Loyola (2011), it was held that “[a] Certificate of Land Ownership or
CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded to the
beneficiary by DAR, and contains the restrictions and conditions provided for in
RA 6657 and other applicable laws.” Citing Section 27 of the CARL, as amended,
the Court added: “It is clear from the provision that lands awarded to beneficiaries
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold,
transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerated four
exceptions: (1) through hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries. In short,
during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land
reform rights is void, except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a
circumvention of agrarian reform laws. (Lebrudo v. Loyola, G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011, 645
SCRA 156, 161-163 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]) The Court further stated: “In Maylem v.
Ellano, we held that the waiver of rights and interests over landholdings awarded
by the government is invalid for being violative of agrarian reform laws. Clearly,
the waiver and transfer of rights to the lot as embodied in the Sinumpaang
Salaysay executed by Loyola is void for falling under the 10-year prohibitory
period specified in RA 6657.” (Id. at 163, citing Maylem v. Ellano, G.R. No. 162721, July 13, 2009,
592 SCRA 440, 452 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division])
In Gua-an v. Quirino (2012), it was likewise held that “upon the promulgation of
P.D. 27, farmer-tenants were deemed owners of the land they were tilling and
given the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for themselves.
Thus, P.D. 27 specifically prohibited any transfer of such landholding except to
the government or by hereditary succession. Section 27 of R.A. 6657 further
allowed transfers to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and to other qualified
beneficiaries. Consequently, any other transfer constitutes a violation of the
above proscription and is null and void for being contrary to law.” (Gua-an v. Quirino,
G.R. No. 198770, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 236, 241-242 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division])
32
20.1. Mere issuance of the CLT does not vest full ownership on the
holder and does not automatically operate to divest the
landowner of all his rights over the landholding.
In Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. PARC (2011), the Court discussed the rationale for
collective ownership:
As it were, the principle of “land to the tiller” and the old pastoral
model of land ownership where non-human juridical persons, such
as corporations, were prohibited from owning agricultural lands are
no longer realistic under existing conditions. Practically, an
individual farmer will often face greater disadvantages and
difficulties than those who exercise ownership in a collective
manner through a cooperative or corporation. The former is too
often left to his own devices when faced with failing crops and bad
weather, or compelled to obtain usurious loans in order to purchase
costly fertilizers or farming equipment. The experiences learned
from failed land reform activities in various parts of the country are
lack of financing, lack of farm equipment, lack of fertilizers, lack of
guaranteed buyers of produce, lack of farm-to-market roads, among
others. Thus, at the end of the day, there is still no successful
implementation of agrarian reform to speak of in such a case.
33
22. Are voluntary land transfer and stock distribution plan options to
corporate landowners still operative?
No. Section 7 of the CARL, as amended by RA 9700, provides that “[a]fter June
30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and
compulsory acquisition…”
23. Who has primary responsibility for the determination of the land
valuation and compensation?
Under EO 405, Series of 1990, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall be primarily
responsible for the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all
private lands suitable for agriculture under either the Voluntary Offer to Sell
(VOS) or Compulsory Acquisition (CA) arrangement as governed by Republic Act
No. 6657. The Department of Agrarian Reform shall make use of the
determination of the land valuation and compensation by the Land Bank of the
Philippines, in the performance of its functions. (EO 405, s.1990, Sec. 1)
Rural women refer to women who are engaged directly or indirectly in farming
and/or fishing as their source of livelihood, whether paid or unpaid, regular or
seasonal, or in food preparation, managing the household, caring for the children,
and other similar activities. (RA 6657, Sec. 3[l] – added by RA 9700)
All qualified women members of the agricultural labor force must be guaranteed
and assured equal right to ownership of the land, equal shares of the farm’s
produce, and representation in advisory or appropriate decision-making bodies.
(RA 6657, 40[5])
The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as
well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers’ organizations to participate
in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall provide
support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and
adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services. (Const., Art.
XIII, Sec. 5, cited in RA 6657, Sec. 42)
27. What are the functions of the BARC under EO 229, s.1987?
28. What is the two-fold jurisdiction of the DAR under Sec. 50 of the
CARL?
34
Sta Rosa Realty Corporation v. Amante clarifies that Section 50 pertains to both
the Department of Agrarian Reform’s: (1) administrative function, which involves
enforcing, administering, and carrying agrarian reform laws into operation; and
(2) quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of parties’ rights and
obligations in agrarian reform matters. (Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative
v. Inson, G.R. No. 189162, January 30, 2019 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], citing Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation v. Amante, G.R. No. 112526, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 432 [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Special First
Division])
35
Rosario, we held that consistent with the DARAB Rules of
Procedure, the agrarian reform cases that fall within the
jurisdiction of the PARAD and DARAB are those that involve
agrarian disputes. Section 3(d) of the CARL defines an
“agrarian dispute” as any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture. Given the
technical legal meaning of the term “agrarian dispute,” it
follows that not all cases involving agricultural lands
automatically fall within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and
DARAB.
28.4. Will questions that are legal and constitutional in nature oust
the DAR of its jurisdiction on controversies in the
implementation of CARP?
No. In DAR v. Cuenca (2004), the Court ruled: “All controversies on the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in
nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law
has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate
agrarian matters… Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority
by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal
dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.” (DAR v. Cuenca, G.R. No. 154112,
September 23, 2004, 439 SCRA 15, 17, 33 [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division], cited in Antig v.
Antipuesto, G.R. No. 192396, January 17, 2018, 851 SCRA 342, 358 [Per J. Martires, Third Division])
36
28.5. What are the ALI cases within the primary jurisdiction of
Regional Director, per DAR AO 03-17?
The Regional Director shall exercise primary jurisdiction over all agrarian
law implementation cases except when a separate special rule vests
primary jurisdiction in a different DAR office. (DAR AO 03-17 [2017 Rules of
Procedure for ALI Cases], Rule II, Sec. 6)
37
28.6. What is the remedy from the decision of the Regional Director,
and on what grounds?
Appeal shall be given due course on the decision of the Regional Director
on the following grounds:
24.1. Serious errors in the findings of fact or conclusion of law which may
cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant; or
24.2. Coercion, fraud, or clear graft and corruption in the issuance of a
decision. (DAR AO 03-17 [2017 Rules of Procedure for ALI Cases], Rule IV, Sec. 24)
Appeals may be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the adverse
decision pursuant to Section 51 of RA 6657, as amended, which provides
that “any order or ruling or decision shall be final after the lapse of fifteen
(15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.” (Id., Rule IV, Sec. 26)
28.7. What is the remedy from the decision of the DAR Secretary?
A party may file only one (1) motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the Secretary or deciding authority, and may do so only within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Secretary’s
decision, furnishing a copy of the motion to all other parties. The filing of
the motion interrupts the running of the reglementary period within which
to appeal. Upon receipt of the resolution on the motion for reconsideration,
the losing party may elevate the matter to the Office of the President (OP).
(DAR AO 03-17 [2017 Rules of Procedure for ALI Cases], Rule V, Sec. 31)
Appeals from the decision of the Secretary may be taken to the OP within
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. The filing of an appeal within the
proper period does not stay execution of the subject decision. (Id., Rule V, Sec.
32)
The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
under R.A. No. 6657, as amended by R.A. No. 9700, E.O. Nos. 228, 229,
and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389, Presidential
Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their Implementing Rules and
Regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not limited to
cases involving the following:
a. The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical,
engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural
lands covered by R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), as amended, and
other related agrarian laws;
b. The preliminary administrative determination of reasonable and
just compensation of lands acquired under Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP);
c. Those cases involving the annulment or rescission of lease
contracts or deeds of sale or their amendments involving lands
under the administration and disposition of the DAR or Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP), and the amendment of titles pertaining to
agricultural lands under the administration and disposition of the
DAR and LBP; as well as EPs issued under PD 266, Homestead
Patents, Free Patents, and miscellaneous sales patents to settlers
in settlement and re-settlement areas under the administration and
disposition of the DAR;
d. Those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants
and/or leaseholders;
e. Those cases involving the sale, alienation, pre-emption, and
redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARL,
as amended or other agrarian laws;
38
f. Those involving the correction, partition, secondary and
subsequent issuances such as reissuance of lost/destroyed owner’s
duplicate copy and reconstitution of Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are
registered with the Land Registration Authority;
g. Those cases involving the review of leasehold rentals and fixing of
disturbance compensation;
h. Those cases involving the collection of amortization payments,
foreclosure and similar disputes concerning the functions of the
LBP, and payments for lands awarded under PD No. 27, RA No.
3844, as amended, and R.A. No. 6657, as amended by R.A. No.
9700, and other related laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules,
and regulations, as well as payment for residential, commercial,
and industrial lots within the settlement and resettlement areas
under the administration and disposition of the DAR;
i. Those cases involving boundary disputes over lands under the
administration and disposition of the DAR and the LBP, which are
transferred, distributed, and/or sold to tenant-beneficiaries and are
covered by deeds of sale, patents, and certificates of title;
j. Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under
Section 12 of PD No. 946 except those cases falling under the proper
courts or other quasi-judicial bodies; and
k. Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred
to it by the Secretary of the DAR. (2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure, Rule II, Sec.
1.)
39
other words, they contend that the property was not properly
acquired through the Operation Land Transfer Program. The
controversy involves the administrative implementation of
the agrarian reform program, which, as mentioned, is under
the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary’s jurisdiction.
(Secretary of the DAR v. Heirs of Redemptor and Elisa Abucan, G.R. No. 186432,
March 12, 2019 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc])
A pauper litigant shall be exempt from the payment of the appeal fee.
Proof of service of Notice of Appeal to the affected parties and to the Board
and payment of appeal fee shall be filed, within the reglementary period,
with the Adjudicator a quo and shall form part of the records of the case.
The aggrieved party ay appeal to the Board from a final order, resolution
or decision of the Adjudicator on any of the following grounds that:
a. Errors in the findings of fact or conclusions of law were committed
which if not corrected, would cause grave and irreparable damage
or injury to the appellant; or
b. The order, resolution or decision was obtained through fraud or
coercion. (Id., Rule XIV, Sec. 2)
No. In Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta v. LBP (2017), the Court declared that “[a]
perceived abuse cannot be cured by an abuse. Administrative agencies,
such as the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
are not courts of law exercising judicial power. The power to issue writs
of certiorari is an incident of judicial review. Thus, administrative agencies
40
may not issue writs of certiorari to annul acts of officers or state organs
even when they exercise supervisory authority over these officers or
organs.” (Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta v. LBP, G.R. No. 205128, August 9, 2017, 836 SCRA 367, 372 [Per
J. Leonen, Second Division])
Yes. In Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon (2018), the Court ruled: “In
this regard, it must be said that there is no merit in the contention of petitioner
that the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9700 cannot be applied retroactively
in the case at bar. Primarily, a cursory reading of the provision readily reveals
that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 merely highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of
the DAR to rule on agrarian cases by adding a clause which mandates the
automatic referral of cases upon the existence of the requisites therein stated.
Simply, R.A. No. 9700 does not deviate but merely reinforced the jurisdiction of
the DAR set forth under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Moreover, in the absence of
any stipulation to the contrary, as the amendment is essentially procedural in
nature it is deemed to apply to all actions pending and undetermined at the time
of its passage.” (Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon, G.R. No. 206788, February 14, 2018 [Per
J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division])
29.1. What are the requisites for automatic referral of cases by the
judge or prosecutor to the DAR?
41
has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, a pending agrarian dispute
and who has not obtained a substantially
equivalent and regular farm employment.
42
and reinstated the proceedings before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan.
In DAR v. Robles (2015), the Court explained the jurisdiction of the RTCs acting
as SACs, thus:
43
It was also determined in Dalauta that the proper
prescriptive period to file a petition for judicial determination
of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 is ten (10) years
pursuant to Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code. Considering
that payment of just compensation is an obligation created
by law, it is only proper that the ten (10)-year period start
from the time the landowner receives the notice of coverage
under the CARP. In addition, any interruption or delay
caused by the government, like proceedings in the DAR,
should toll the running of the prescriptive period. The statute
of limitations has been devised to operate against those who
slept on their rights, but not against those desirous to act
but cannot do so for causes beyond their control. (LBP v.
Herederos De Ciriaco Chunaco Distileria, Inc., G.R. No. 206992, June 11, 2018, 866
SCRA 57, 70 [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division], citing LBP v. Dalauta, G.R. No.
190004, August 8, 2017, 835 SCRA 1 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc])
A petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the remedy from
decisions of the DAR Secretary. Sebastian v. Morales (2003) is instructive:
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7902, this Court issued Circular 1-
95 dated May 16, 1995 governing appeals from all quasi-judicial
bodies to the Court of Appeals by petition for review, regardless of
the nature of the question raised. Said circular was incorporated in
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
44
opted for the wrong mode of appeal. Pursuant to the fourth
paragraph of Supreme Court Circular No. 2- 90, “an appeal taken
to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.” Therefore, we hold that the
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing CA-
G.R. SP No. 51288 for failure of petitioners to pursue the proper
mode of appeal. (Sebastian v. Morales, G.R. No. 141116, February 17, 2003, 397 SCRA
549, 559-561 [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division])
A petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the remedy from
decisions of the DARAB. Pangilinan v. Balatbat (2012) holds:
33. What is the remedy from decisions of the RTCs acting as SACs?
A petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the remedy from
decisions of the RTCs acting as SACs. LBP v. De Leon (2002) explains:
Reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural land shall be utilized for
non-agricultural uses as embodied in the land use plan of the LGU based on
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160. Conversion is the act of changing the actual use of
agricultural land into other uses as approved by the DAR in accordance with
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended. (DAR AO 01-19 [Streamlining the Processing of
Applications for Land Use Conversion Under DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2002], Sec. 7)
45
35. What is provided under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) on
reclassification?
(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten
percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided,
further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform
beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred
fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657). otherwise known as "The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by the
said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other
purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority,
authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits
set in the next preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws,
continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted
through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant
bases for the future use of land resources: Provided. That the requirements
for food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be
taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans.
46
though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural uses must still undergo the process of
conversion before they can be used for the purpose to which
they are intended. (Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 295, 319-
320 [Per J. Perez, First Division])
Also, DAR AO 01-19 provides that “[a]gricultural lands that are reclassified
to non-agricultural uses do not ipso facto allow the landowner thereof to
use the same for such purpose.” (DAR AO 01-19, Sec. 7)
It is the DAR. As held in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA (1999), cited in Ayala Land, Inc.
v. Castillo (2016):
Land use conversion refers to the act or process of changing the current
physical use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use or for
another agricultural use other than the cultivation of the soil, planting of
crops, growing of trees, including harvesting of produce therefrom, as
approved by DAR. (Id., Art. I, Sec. 2.12)
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4.1. Lands within protected areas designated under the NIPAS,
including mossy and virgin forests, riverbanks, and swamp forests
or marshlands, as determined by the DENR;
4.2. All irrigated lands, as delineated by the DA and/or the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA), where water is available to support
rice and other crop production, and all irrigated lands where water
is not available for rice and other crop production but are within
areas programmed for irrigation facility rehabilitation by the
government;
4.3. All irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects and firm
funding commitments, as delineated by the DA and/or NIA; and
4.4. All agricultural lands with irrigation facilities. (Id., Art. II, Sec. 4)
No. DAR AO 07-11 provides that “[a]bsent any final order granting
conversion, no act or attempt directed to changing the use of the land from
agricultural to non-agricultural, shall affect the land’s coverage pursuant
to the CARP.” (DAR AO 07-11, Sec. 10)
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8.3. Conversion of lands within SAFDZ, as provided in Rule 9.5.2 of DA-
AO-6-1998, shall take into account the following factors:
8.3.1. The conversion of land use is consistent with the natural
expansion of the municipality or locality, as contained in the
approved physical framework and land use plan.
8.3.2. The area to be converted in use is not the only remaining
food production area of the community.
8.3.3. The land use conversion shall not hamper the availability of
irrigation to nearby farmlands.
8.3.4. The areas with low productivity will be accorded priority for
land use conversion.
8.3.5. Sufficient disturbance compensation shall be given to
farmers whose livelihood are negatively affected by the land
use conversion as provided by existing laws and regulations.
8.4. When the agricultural land which is the subject of the application
for conversion has been acquired under RA 6657, its conversion
shall be allowed only if the applicant is the agrarian reform
beneficiary thereof, and after he has fully paid his obligation
required under Section 65 of RA 6657. (DAR AO 01-02, Art. III, Sec. 8)
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and cities: Sulu (Jolo), Batanes (Basco), Cagayan (Tuao), Basilan
(Isabela), Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Silay City, Negros
Occidental, Dapitan City and Province of Tawi-Tawi (Bongao). This
provision amends Section 10.4 of DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 2002.
(Id., Sec. 6)
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A conversion grant shall no longer be necessary if the land shall be
actually, directly and exclusively used as a resettlement area or
relocation site of persons displaced by a nationally declared
calamity provided that the Regional Director determines that the
area is not within the SAFDZ, the land is neither irrigated nor
irrigable, and that there are no tenants on the land. The concerned
Regional Director must issue a Clearance Certificate once the said
determination is made. The Regional Director shall monitor the
activity and shall render an initial report to the DAR Secretary
within ten (10) days from the commencement thereof and a final
report, not later than five (5) days form its date of completion. In no
case shall the duration of the temporary use thereof for
shelter/housing facilities exceed one (1) year from the date of
declaration of normalcy. (Id., Sec. 10)
The MARPO within three (3) days upon receipt of the application
and the supporting documents shall personally determine the
completion of the works stated under Section 14 of DAR A.O. No. 1,
Series of 2002.
Notice of OSII shall be issued within three (3) days form the date of
filing of the application for conversion.
The OSII shall be completed within three (3) days. Thereafter, the
OSII Team shall submit an electronic copy of the Field Investigation
Report, including photographs and videos through any appropriate
software platform used by the Department within two (2) days from
completion of the OSII. (Id., Sec. 13)
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The billboard shall be written in the local dialect and shall display all the
information mentioned below, to wit:
11.1. Statement that the applicant is proposing to convert the subject
landholding from agricultural to non-agricultural use;
11.2. Complete name of the landowner(s) and applicant(s) and
developer(s);
11.3. Total area and exact location of the conversion proposal;
11.4. Filing date of application for conversion;
11.5. Date of posting of billboard;
11.6. Schedule of ocular inspection;
11.7. Deadline for filing protest;
11.8. Address of the CLUPPI and RCLUPPI and PARO where oppositors
may formally file their protest;
11.9. Address of the approving authority; and
11.10. Date of approval or denial of the application, which shall be left
blank, and which the applicant shall fill up upon approval or denial
of the application. (DAR AO 01-02, Sec. 11)
The Secretary or the concerned Regional Director may call for a public
consultation before acting on an application for land use conversion
Resource persons from the public and/or the private sectors may be
invited by the Secretary or the Regional Director during the public
consultation. The holding of the public consultation is to ensure that any
interested persons may be given the opportunity to present comments or
air views or sentiments about the application for land use conversion.
Such views, comments, or sentiments may be utilized as a guide in the
processing of the application for conversion by the Secretary or the
Regional Director. The inputs derived from such public consultations do
not necessarily bind the Secretary or the Regional Director in the action
on the pending application(s) for land use conversion. (DAR AO 05-18 [Conduct
of Public Consultations in Land Use Conversion Applications], Sec. 1)
Finally, cases cognizable by A.O. No. 05, Series of 2018, the PCC shall be
responsible for the conduct of public consultation. (DAR AO 06-19, Item IV)
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36.12. Note the previous discussion regarding DAR AO 06-19
[Creation of a Collegial Body on Land Use Conversion and
Exemption/Exclusion from CARP Coverage] creating the Land
Use Cases Committee (LUCC) (Decisions, resolutions and orders of the
Committee are not appealable to the DAR Secretary.)
The term “proceeding,” in its plain and generic sense, means “any
act or step that is part of a larger whole.” Hence, when that term is
used in conjunction with the qualifying words "involving the
implementation of the [agrarian reform law],” the resulting phrase
can only denote an act or step taken by the DAR pertaining to the
implementation of the agrarian reform law. The process of land
acquisition and distribution, to no controversy, is one such step - if
not the core step - in the implementation of the agrarian reform law.
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did not intend to fix June 30, 2014 as an absolute deadline for the
completion and cessation of all land acquisition and distribution
proceedings; the law rather sets the said date as the final date when
such proceedings may be initiated by the DAR. This is the import of
Section 30 of RA No. 9700. (Robustum Agricultural Corporation v. DAR, G.R. No.
221484, November 19, 2018 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division])
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