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The Essential Can Du PDF
The Essential Can Du PDF
By
UNENE1
Editor-in-Chief: Wm. J. Garland
1
UNENE University Network of Excellence for Nuclear Engineering www.unene.ca
The Essential CANDU
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The Essential CANDU
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Copyright ©2014 by UNENE
All rights reserved. Published in Canada.
Reproduction or translation of any part of this work beyond that permitted by The Canadian
Copyright Act without the permission of the copyright owner is unlawful. Requests for permis-
sion or further information should be addressed to
UNENE,
c/o Department of Engineering Physics, Bldg. JHE A315
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario, CANADA L8S 4L7
Tel: (905) 525-9140 ext. 20168
URL: http://www.unene.ca
Email: unene@mcmaster.ca
ISBN 0-9730040
Printed in Canada
iv
Dedication
Disclaimer
UNENE assumes no liability for use or misuse of the textbook contents. While due care is taken
to ensure the contents are accurate, UNENE does not make any warranty, express or implied, or
assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any
information contained herein.
Table of Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Progogue - CANDU in Context – Dr. William J. Garland
Chapter 1 - Introduction - Dr. Robin Chaplin
Chapter 2 - Genealogy of CANDU Reactors - Dr. Robin Chaplin
Chapter 3 - Nuclear Processes and Neutron Physics - Dr. Guy Marleau
Chapter 4 - Reactor Statics - Dr. Benjamin Rouben and Dr. Eleodor Nichita
Chapter 5 - Reactor Dynamics - Dr. Eleodor Nichita and Dr. Benjamin Rouben
Chapter 6 - Thermalhydraulic Design - Dr. Nikolas K. Popov
Chapter 7 - Thermalhydraulic Analysis - Dr. Nikolas K. Popov
Chapter 8 - Plant Systems - Dr. Robin Chaplin
Chapter 9 - Plant Operations - Dr. Robin Chaplin
Chapter 10 - Instrumentation and Control - Dr. G. Alan Hepburn
Chapter 11 - Electrical Systems - Dr. Jin Jiang
Chapter 12 - Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety - Dr. Edward Waller
Chapter 13 - Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis - Dr. Victor G. Snell
Chapter 14 - Nuclear Reactor Materials and Corrosion - Dr. Derek H. Lister and Dr. William G.
Cook
Chapter 15 - Chemistry in CANDU Process Systems - Dr. William G. Cook and Dr. Derek H. Lister
Chapter 16 - Regulatory Requirements and Licensing – Dr. Victor G. Snell and Dr Nikolas K.
Popov
Chapter 17 - Fuel - Mr. Mukesh Tayal and Mr. Milan Gacesa
Chapter 18 - Fuel Cycles - Mr. Mukesh Tayal and Mr. Milan Gacesa
Chapter 19 - Interim Fuel Storage and Disposal - Mr. Milan Gacesa and Mr. Mukesh Tayal
Author Biographies
Acronyms
v
Preface
There has long been a need for a CANDU1 textbook suitable for students, educators, trainers
and working professionals at a target level of senior undergraduate year university engineering
and science. The aim is to provide a concise, and consistently told, root storyline that will enable
those new to CANDU, whether a student, a manager, a teacher / trainer, a journalist or a disci-
pline area specialist, to learn about CANDU as an overall system and to delve into any specific
area as desired. This supports the agile deployment of personnel into the industry and rede-
ployment throughout the industry. Early on it was decided that the textbook would be public
domain available online in pdf form under the UNENE banner along with associated prerequisite
material and further reading. This web material can be copied to CDs for distribution or printed
in book form, yet is easily updated and expanded. It is to be a living document appearing in the
form of editions for revision tracking purposes.
The Essential CANDU is a textbook about nuclear science and engineering pertaining to CANDU
reactors using CANDU as the reference design. This distinguishes it from comparable textbooks
based on PWR reactors. This is not a product description of CANDU per se. The book will
emphasize theory over other aspects of nuclear science.
This is a textbook about CANDU nuclear reactor and power plant engineering, not just the
reactor physics of the core. While it is true that the reactor is certainly the distinguishing
feature of the plant, it is hardly the whole story. Within the Nuclear Steam Supply System
(NSSS) there are some 225 systems, but only a few can be covered explicitly in the book. This is
a book about the nuclear and related bits that constitute the key bits that define nuclear
engineering, not the many associated disciples per se.
CANDU 6 was chosen as the reference design. Specifically it was agreed that Pt. Lepreau (post
refurbishment) would be used as the default reference design. This does not preclude refer-
ence to multi-unit designs, single-unit variants and future designs as appropriate.
It is the root story line that glues a textbook together and guides what material is to be empha-
sized or deemphasized. The steam generator (and the associated heat duty diagram) is the
central node of the station. It is the steam generator that dominates the overall plant dynamics.
The primary side temperature floats on top of the steam drum temperature with just enough ΔT
to transfer the heat from the primary side to the secondary side as discussed in Chapter 6. If
the drum pressure (hence temperature) jumps, the primary side jumps to suit, affecting primary
temps, fuel temps, margins, reactivity feedbacks, etc. But clearly the overall system behavior is
very much dependent on the characteristics and limits of the various sub-systems and compo-
nents. In short, reactor physics – the inevitable focus of typical reactor texts – is important to
be sure and is covered herein. But there is so much more to a nuclear plant than reactor
physics that we would be remiss in telling the CANDU story if we were to overlook the broader
picture.
There are a number of existing documents and products that cover significant parts of the
CANDU story. UNENE itself hosts a dozen or so graduate level courses that are significant
resources for preparing a CANDU textbook. See www.unene.ca for details on those courses.
vi
And of course there are many other existing university nuclear and nuclear related courses in
Canada and elsewhere (see for instance http://nuclearcanada.ca). The CANTEACH repository at
http://canteach.candu.org contains a large number of legacy CANDU documents, albeit largely
descriptive. Significant training, design, analysis and operation documents exist within AECL
(and now Candu Energy) , Ontario Power Generation, Bruce Power, the CNSC and other organi-
zations comprising the Canadian nuclear enterprise. The Essential CANDU, with its educational
focus is complementary to all that.
As Editor-in-Chief it has been my pleasure to work with the authors as they laboured well
beyond expectations. I have worked for years on course development with Ben Rouben and
Dorin Nichita on reactor physics, Nik Popov on thermalhydraulics, Victor Snell on safety, and
George Bereznai on plant systems and operations. It is truly satisfying to see the fruits of that
labour appearing in the form of this text. On a more administrative level I have worked with the
Robin Chaplin (thermodynamics), Derick Lister and Willy Cook (Chemistry and Corrosion), Jin
Jiang (Electrical) as they developed and delivered courses for UNENE. From its inception in
2000, UNENE has been a world class and world leading nuclear network. The aforementioned
people are part of the UNENE team. Their research and educational contributions are a big part
of that success. Guy Marleau (reactor physics), Al Hepburn (I&C), Ed Waller (Health Physics),
and Milan Gacesa and Mukesh Tayal (Fuel topics) are all well known in their areas. Although
this project is the first time I have worked closely with them we have interacted on tangential
nuclear matters over the years. Old and new colleagues and friends - it is an honour to have
worked with them all.
Of course it is not just the authors that deserve special mention. As they would readily attest, it
took many creative and hard working professionals to build our Canadian Nuclear Enterprise –
generations of them going all the way back to the early roots of CANDU. They are the past and
present colleagues, professors, managers, researchers, students and others that form our
foundation and upon whose work we are but modest reporters. Two particular subsets of those
are the reviewers of this text and the Working Group for this project. Scholars and authors in
their own right, they have overseen and guided the development of this work. It was a com-
forting ‘defense in depth’. The reviewers are acknowledged at the end of each chapter. We
wish to sincerely thank the following Working Group members for their guidance and technical
oversight:
I have worked with each of the Working Group members as colleagues on and off over the years
going back to the 70’s. George, Basma, others and I bemoaned the lack of a comprehensive
CANDU textbook from the beginning. George and I even mapped out our vast plans (with half-
vast ideas) and did manage over time to guide a number of courses through to completion, as
did other professors. The interactions and the innumerable chats with these and many other
colleagues through the years collectively set the backdrop for this textbook. But it was Basma,
when stepping in as President of UNENE as I stepped out, who said: “Come on Bill. Let’s go.”
And so, we did. Thanks Basma for that final prod.
vii
This textbook, as large and comprehensive as it is, is far from complete. Each topic is a book,
perhaps several books, on its own. I hope it at least encourages others to build on this modest
start. It is worth noting too that the written word, try as we might, does not capture well the
tacit knowledge, the working knowledge, that the working professionals have. This textbook is
but a humble complement to that. The very process of creating this textbook, however, creates
a learning environment for the authors and we found a considerable sharing of expertise as we
prepared the chapters. This will apply to future authors as well. So, “Come on, let’s go.”
Finally, what can we say of our long suffering families but a truly heartfelt thanks. We shall be
forever in your debt. Thank you all.
Bill Garland
Professor Emeritus
Department of Engineering Physics
McMaster University
viii
Acknowledgments
We wish to sincerely thank the following Steering Committee member organizations for their
financial support and access to technical information, without which this project would not
have been possible:
We wish to acknowledge and thank CANDU Owners Group Inc. (COG), especially Henry Chan
and John Sowagi, for administrative support. Thank you Henry for stepping up to the plate and
securing sponsorship.
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1
PROLOGUE
CANDU in Context
prepared by
Dr. William J. Garland, Professor Emeritus,
Department of Engineering Physics,
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
Summary:
Herein, we introduce the CANDU reactor by first looking at the broad social context to see why
we need nuclear power. Then we take a look at the Nuclear Reactor in a nutshell, giving a quick
overview to provide some context for the details found in this textbook.
Table of Contents
1 Energy in Society ..................................................................................................................... 2
2 First some basics ..................................................................................................................... 3
2.1 Fission.............................................................................................................................. 3
2.2 The fuel: the source of energy by the fission process ................................................... 4
2.3 The moderator: slowing down those speedy neutrons ................................................. 4
2.4 The coolant: to take away the heat generated by fissioning .......................................... 6
2.5 Control: staying within desired and safe limits of power ............................................... 7
2.6 Shielding: providing protection from radiation .............................................................. 8
2.7 The system that pulls it all together ............................................................................... 9
3 Textbook Organization .......................................................................................................... 10
4 Further reading ..................................................................................................................... 11
List of Figures
Figure 1 Fission................................................................................................................................ 3
Figure 2 Nuclear reactor components ............................................................................................ 5
Figure 3 A Conceptual CANDU ........................................................................................................ 6
Figure 4 Basic power reactor schematic ......................................................................................... 7
Figure 5 The overall CANDU nuclear plant...................................................................................... 9
1 Energy in Society
Let's step back to take a glimpse of the context into which CANDU must be placed. The simple
fact is that we are here. And there are a lot of us - some 7 billion in the year 2013 and our
population is destined to hit 10 billion in a few generations. On the premise that life is worth
living (and most of us think that way, otherwise our population wouldn't be growing), it follows
that we should make the best of the situation. Quality of life is, thus, a worthy and meaningful
pursuit. To achieve and maintain a reasonable quality of life requires energy. Access to energy is
an enabling force, empowering society and individuals. In short, it is fundamental to our exist-
ence. Energy is not a panacea for the strife of life, to be sure; but without it, there would be no
life at all.
One has only to reflect on early societies to appreciate the central role that access to energy has
played in our development. Food and water are essential commodities for the human race. To
supply these in adequate quantities to society has always been a challenge. Ancient civilizations
have met this challenge with remarkable feats of engineering such as those at Angkor Wat and
Machu Picchu. The Roman aqueducts such as the Pont du Gard also demonstrate significant
ingenuity to provide a single commodity. Most of these were built using human power only,
which limited the rate of implementation and hence development. This changed with the
industrial revolution when first water power and then steam power became a source of energy
to assist in the supply of food and water as well as clothing and transport. This supply of energy
enabled society to implement new ideas and advance technology at a greater rate and to
sustain an increase in population. Thus the human race became dependent upon another
essential commodity, namely energy.
It is well established that for the prosperity of any nation, a plentiful supply of cheap energy is
the key to economic growth. Countries where energy in some form or another is readily availa-
ble have become wealthy. Others have had to use their ingenuity to provide this resource.
Over time natural resources become depleted and new resources have to be found or devel-
oped. Some key resources which have sustained society are wood, coal, oil and now uranium.
Although uranium may not generally be considered an essential resource some countries
currently cannot do without it.
A suitable environment is an important factor for human survival. People are adaptable and
various sectors of humanity have managed to live in all parts of the world from the frigid Arctic
to the burning deserts. Hardships in these regions can be alleviated with a supply of energy
enabling increased development and access to more resources. In essence, an artificial envi-
ronment has been created in which to live. The human race is becoming more and more
dependent upon such an artificial environment or inner environment which includes heating
and air conditioning and promotes productivity. This requires increasing dependence on
energy. On the other hand there is the outer environment into which waste products from the
inner environment and energy production are dumped. No matter how good the inner envi-
ronment the outer environment still needs protection to sustain humanity.
The development of technology has put increasing stress on the outer environment but has also
provided the means to protect it. In the generation of power and the use of energy through
fossil fuels, various solid pollutants such as fly ash and gaseous pollutants such as sulphur
dioxide and nitrogen oxide are produced. The former have been significantly reduced by the
CANDU in Context – September 2014
CANDU in Context 3
use of electrostatic precipitators and fabric filters in coal fired plants and the latter by the
implementation of alternative fuels to eliminate smog and the development of on board diag-
nostic systems to reduce automobile emissions. Nevertheless, the outer environment is ad-
versely impacted by the extensive use of fossil fuels. The only practical and economic way that
these effects can be reduced is by burning less hydrocarbon fuel.
This problem of energy use and power production can be overcome by using electrical energy to
replace hydrocarbon fuels and generating this energy by water and wind as well as by the
nuclear fission of uranium. Most sites for hydro power have already been developed, and
future development in this area is limited by possible detrimental local environmental effects.
Wind power is intermittent and variable so that, beyond a certain capacity relative to the grid
capacity, the electrical grid becomes unstable. Moreover, reserve capacity has to be provided
for the loss of wind power. This leaves nuclear power as the only choice for long term base load
energy production with minimal impact on the environment. There are no carbon dioxide
emissions from nuclear power, and a relatively small amount of radioactive waste is produced.
By recycling this waste the very long lived transuranic products can be returned to the reactor
to be destroyed leaving only the shorter life fission products to be stored. A huge advantage of
nuclear energy is the vast amount of energy obtained from a very small amount of uranium.
Nuclear power is the only existing option for large scale power production that transcends the
limitations of nonrenewable alternatives (such as coal, oil and gas) and renewable alternatives
(wind, solar and biomass). To be sure, there are many local, national and international issues
that flavour the ultimate choice of energy source, but nuclear should not be dismissed. The
consequences would be dire.
We conclude, then, that nuclear should be part of the energy mix now and in the future, that is,
we have a functional requirement for nuclear energy.
ing more neutrons and thus sustaining a chain reaction. So the neutrons need to be slowed
down (i.e., thermalized or moderated), which is done by using a moderator such as water. The
heat generated needs to be removed. The process is controlled by controlling the number of
neutrons since the number of fissions per second (and hence the heat produced) is proportional
to the number of neutrons present to induce the fissions.
From this the basic functional requirements of a reactor are directly derived. Needed are:
• a fuel such as U-235
• a moderator to thermalize (i.e., slow down) the fast neutrons
• a coolant to remove the heat
• a control system to control the number of neutrons
• a shielding system to protect equipment and people from radiation
• a system that pulls all this together into a workable device.
In the following, these requirements are discussed in turn to gain some insight on how and why
CANDUs (and other reactor types) are built the way they are.
The probability of neutron capture leading to fission is larger for slow neutrons than for fast
neutrons. Hence, most practical reactors are "thermal" reactors, that is, they utilize the higher
thermal cross sections. Possible fuels include some of the various isotopes of uranium (U) and
plutonium (Pu). The only naturally occurring fuel with suitable properties of significant quanti-
ties is U-235, hence most reactors use this fuel.
Naturally occurring uranium is composed of 0.7% U-235. The rest is U-238. This percentage is
too low to sustain a chain reaction when combined with most practical moderators. Hence
either, the probability of fission must be enhanced or the moderator effectiveness must be
enhanced. One group of reactor types (PWR, BWR, AGR, RBMK, HTGR) enrich the fuel (a costly
task) and use a cheap moderator (ordinary water or graphite).
Alternatively, natural uranium (relatively cheap) is used with an excellent but expensive moder-
ator (heavy water). This is the CANDU approach. Which is better? There is no simple answer.
Both work. In engineered systems, there are always tradeoffs and the final design has to be
viewed in the overall context of the end-use environment.
The best moderator to slow down a speedy neutron is something that is the same size as the
neutron itself. This is true because if a neutron hit a massive target, it would just bounce off in a
different direction but with little loss in energy like a hard ball against a wall. If the neutron hit
an object much smaller that itself, it would just continue on virtually unaffected. But if it hit a
hydrogen atom, which is just a proton and an electron, that is almost exactly the mass of a
neutron, it could lose all its energy in one collision, just like in a game of billiards. However,
hydrogen does absorb neutrons as well which runs counter to the need to preserve these
precious neutrons so that they can cause fission. The deuterium isotope of hydrogen, at twice
the mass of hydrogen, is almost as good a slowing down agent but, since it already has an extra
CANDU in Context – September 2014
CANDU in Context 5
neutron in the nucleus, it has a very low absorption probability. So, overall, deuterium is a far
better moderator than hydrogen. By using deuterium in the form of heavy water, natural
uranium can be used as a fuel. If ordinary water is used, the fuel must be enriched in U-235.
Other possible moderators include graphite or beryllium and gases such as carbon dioxide and
helium. A good moderator has a high scattering cross section, a low absorption cross section
and slows down the neutron in the least number of collisions. Figure 2 illustrates the fission
and moderation processes.
Neutron from
previous generation Neutrons to
Fission next generation
Fission
The fissioning process generates energy, predominately in the form of kinetic energy of the
fission products which, after a few collisions with the immediately surrounding material matrix,
manifests itself as heat. A coolant (commonly) is passed over the fuel to remove this heat so
that it can be used productively for energy generation. So far, we have fuel, moderator and
coolant. We can conceptualize our CANDU as in the illustrations in Figure 3, below.
We typically use the 'heat engine' process to turn this heat into a more useable (that is, flexible,
transportable, convenient, etc.) form of energy. As illustrated in Figure 4, this heat is used to boil
water and the resulting steam drives a turbine which drives an electrical generator. Electricity is
a very convenient form of energy - today it is so ubiquitous that it is hard to image life without
it.
Control of the fissioning process is achieved most easily by simply adding or removing neutron
absorbers. Materials such as cadmium readily absorb neutrons and can be conveniently formed
into solid rods. So by having a number of these control rods partially inserted into the modera-
tor tank (also called the calandria) amongst the fuel and moderator in guide tubes, the neutron
population can be controlled.
Hence the fissioning process and the resultant heat output can be controlled. For safety’s sake,
in CANDUs, these control rods and the associated control system electronics and measurement
devices are built for reliable, fail-safe operation, are highly redundant, and employ additional
safety concepts such as group separation.
Uranium isotopes are not very radioactive by themselves and do not constitute a direct radia-
tion hazard. You can safely hold a fresh CANDU fuel bundle in your hands. Your biggest concern
would be dropping it on your toes since a typical bundle weighs about 20 kg or so. It is the
fissioning process that creates the nasty radioactive fission products. These ARE dangerous and
must be kept isolated from us. Radiation takes on a number of forms. Alpha and beta particles
are energetic charged particles that cannot penetrate solids to any significant degree. So as
long as the radioactive fission products are contained by a fuel sheath or some other pipe or
wall, there is no concern. Neutrons are not charged and can penetrate solid walls. We protect
ourselves from them by thick walls that slow down and absorb the neutrons. Combinations of
hydrogenous materials (like water and hydrocarbons) and absorbing materials (like boron and
cadmium) make good neutron shields. Gamma radiation, essentially very energetic photons
(ordinary light is low energy photons), are best stopped by dense material like lead and con-
crete. So constructing good shielding is not an onerous task, but it is an important one. Like in
the control systems, safety is enhanced by redundancy. In this case, this means layering the
shielding systems, one inside the other like a Russian doll set.
The various requirements related to fuel, moderation, cooling, control and shielding to conceive
a stylized CANDU are pulled together as illustrated in figure 5. At the heart of the plant is the
reactor core containing the fuel and the moderator. Heat generated there is transported away
by the cooling system to the conventional side of the plant (steam generator, turbine and
electrical generator).
Recall the layered, defense-in-depth approach wherein the radioactive fission products are kept
from the environment by multiple protective barriers, culminated by the outer containment
shell.
Obviously, a real CANDU is far more complex than the illustrations and designing a nuclear plant
is not a trivial exercise. There are many systems and sub-systems that interact.
3 Textbook Organization
Presenting educational material on a complex physical system such as a nuclear power plant is
problematic in that some knowledge of the physical plant is needed in order to give context to
the physical phenomena studied, yet some knowledge of the physical phenomena is needed to
make sense of the physical plant. So some iteration in presentation is unavoidable and, from a
learning perspective, will prove helpful.
So we begin in the introductory chapters by putting the CANDU reactor in a societal context,
give a very brief look at how the reactor functions, provide some historical context, and de-
scribe how it has evolved. From this the reader will appreciate enough of what a CANDU as a
physical system entails to give context to the more in-depth chapters that follow.
The flow of the Chapters 3 to 11 is dictated by the focus on the Process Systems and the flow of
power from the core to the grid. Subsequently Chapters 12 to 19 explore various key topics that
arise directly as a result of the energy generating process.
The very core of the subject, literally is the fuel. The process (i.e. fissioning) aspects of the fuel
and associated moderator are the subject of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 which cover the basic nuclear
processes and the reactor physics topics of statics and dynamics. This sets the nature of the
beast, as it were.
From both a process perspective and a safety perspective, cooling the reactor core and trans-
porting the heat energy generated by the core is centrally important. Thermalydraulic Design
and Analysis is covered by Chapters 6 and 7.
The overall plant dynamics are not so much determined by the dynamics of the individual
components and systems such as the reactor core or heat transport system since each of these
systems is controlled to keep each system within its own operating envelop. Overall plant
dynamics is more characterized by how these systems interact with each other and is the
subject of the chapters on Plant Systems (8) and Plant Operations (9).
Then a closer look at reactor and process system Instrumentation and Control (10) and Electrical
Systems (11) is given.
Radiation is generated and so must be understood, quantified and handled (Chapter 12 Radia-
tion Protection and Environmental Safety).
Fissioning is inherently an exponential process and entails substantial decay heat even after
shutdown. Hence Safety (13) and Regulations and Licensing (16) are central issues.
The nuclear environment can be a harsh and demanding one. Physical integrity must be main-
tained over the long life of the plant, day in, day out. Hence Materials (14) and Chemistry (14)
are key subjects.
The process characteristics of fuel as they relate to fissioning and heat transfer are treated in
the early chapters. But there is much more to say about fuel, specifically its physics characteris-
tics that enable it to perform so well under conditions that are so demanding. This is the
CANDU in Context – September 2014
CANDU in Context 11
subject of Chapter 17. The forward looking topics of Fuel cycles and storage and disposal are
the subjects of Chapters 18 and 19 and are a fitting way to end our introductory textbook on the
Essential CANDU.
4 Further reading
CHAPTER 1
Introduction to Nuclear Reactors
prepared by
Dr. Robin Chaplin
Summary:
This chapter provides a top-level introduction to nuclear reactors and surveys the world reactor
situation. The various commercial large power producing reactors are identified and described
against a brief background of nuclear reactor principles and key reactor components. The
progressive expansion of nuclear power production is put into perspective in the global context.
The operation of nuclear plants with respect to changing grid system demand is explained with
some constraints identified. The chapter concludes with a brief review of safety and risk which
are critical aspects in the design and operation of nuclear plants.
Table of Contents
1 Nuclear Reactor Principles ...................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Fission Energy...................................................................................................................... 3
1.2 Nuclear Reactor Principles .................................................................................................. 5
2 Reactor Types.......................................................................................................................... 7
2.1 Prototype Reactors ............................................................................................................. 7
2.2 Commercial Reactors .......................................................................................................... 8
3 World-Wide Commercial Power Reactors ............................................................................ 12
3.1 Reactor Development ....................................................................................................... 12
3.2 Commercial Reactors in Service........................................................................................ 13
3.3 Recent Past and Near Future ............................................................................................ 16
3.4 Status of Large Reactors.................................................................................................... 17
4 Power Production ................................................................................................................. 18
4.1 Energy Transfer ................................................................................................................. 18
4.2 Power Output.................................................................................................................... 19
4.3 Operating Constraints ....................................................................................................... 21
4.4 Fuel Burnup....................................................................................................................... 21
5 Safety and Licensing.............................................................................................................. 22
5.1 Radiation Hazards ............................................................................................................. 22
5.2 Risk Assessment ................................................................................................................ 23
5.3 Licensing Principles ........................................................................................................... 23
6 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 24
7 Acknowledgments................................................................................................................. 24
List of Figures
Figure 1 Range of stable and unstable nuclides.............................................................................. 3
Figure 2 Binding energy per nucleon .............................................................................................. 4
Figure 3 Fission and absorption characteristics of uranium ........................................................... 5
Introduction to Nuclear Reactors – September 2014
2 The Essential CANDU
List of Tables
Table 1 Nuclear reactors in service and planned .......................................................................... 14
Table 2 Nuclear reactors in service in 2012 .................................................................................. 16
Table 3 Projected reactors in service in 2022 ............................................................................... 17
Table 4 New large reactors (1000 MWe and greater)................................................................... 17
Table 5 Decommissioned large reactors (1000 MWe and greater) .............................................. 18
Should an element of high atomic mass number split, during a fission process, into two ele-
ments of lower atomic mass number, not as many neutrons will be required to create a stable
configuration, and the surplus neutrons will be released.
The nucleons (neutrons and protons) in the nucleus are bound together by nuclear forces.
When a nucleus is assembled, the binding energy attracting the individual nucleons is released.
Conversely, energy is required to separate individual nucleons from one another or from the
nucleus. This is analogous to the attraction of magnets to one another, but with a different type
of force. This binding energy is a maximum per nucleon for elements near the middle of the
range of atomic mass numbers and is somewhat less for elements with high atomic mass
numbers, as shown in Figure 2. This means that, if a heavy element fissions or splits into two
mid-range elements, the nucleons are bound together with a greater amount of binding energy
per nucleon. The surplus energy is released as the nucleons come together more strongly. This
is analogous to masses with potential energy falling into deeper holes and releasing this energy.
Because of the well-known relationship between mass and energy, the release of binding
energy is accompanied by a very slight decrease in the total mass of the constituents.
When a U-235 nucleus fissions, the release of binding energy amounts to about 200 MeV, or 32
x 10-12 J. Although a very small amount, this translates into a heat production rate of 950 MW if
1 kg of U-235 is totally consumed per day. In a typical nuclear power plant operating on a
conventional steam cycle, this could be converted into an electrical power output of about 300
MW.
100 t
U-235
10 t
U-2
38
f
U-238 f
t
t
1
1 meV 1 eV 1 keV 1 MeV
Interactions of Importance
s = Scattering
= Radiative capture
= Fission a = Absorption
f
neutrons to experience a series of non-absorbing collisions with light nuclei, which during an
elastic collision receive some of the energy from the neutrons. The resulting low energy slow
neutrons are then absorbed in U-235 nuclei to cause further fissions. Some elements that can
slow down or moderate neutrons effectively without significant absorption are hydrogen,
deuterium, helium, beryllium, and carbon. Hence, light water (H2O), heavy water (D2O), and
graphite (C) all make good moderators in nuclear reactors.
The solid lines in Figure 3 show the total probability of absorption (resulting in both fission and
capture) in U-235 and U-238. In the resonance region (where neutron and nucleus frequencies
coincide) are large spikes with very high probability of capture for U-238, so it is best to avoid
this region during the neutron slowing down process. This can be achieved to some degree by
ensuring that the moderation process is carried out away from the fuel. This leads to a reactor
consisting of a matrix of fuel elements within the moderator with a discrete distance between
fuel elements. Furthermore, to promote heat transfer from the fuel, the fuel elements them-
selves consist of bundles of small fuel rods. This is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 4.
Most of the heat from fission is generated by dissipation of the kinetic energy of the fission
products. Because this occurs in the fuel near the point of fission, it follows that the fuel
becomes the main source of heat in the reactor. To maintain a thermodynamic cycle to produce
work, this heat must be removed continuously as it is produced. A suitable coolant is therefore
required to flow over the fuel elements and remove the heat. The coolant must not readily
absorb neutrons and must have suitable thermal properties. Coolants such as light water, heavy
water, helium, and carbon dioxide meet these requirements.
Finally, to ensure steady state operation, the number of neutrons allowed to go on to produce
fission must be the same as the number in preceding generations of neutrons. To achieve the
required balance, the reactor as a whole is designed to generate excess neutrons in each
generation and to have a system for absorbing the excess so as to maintain and control the
reactor at a steady load. This also enables the number of neutrons in successive generations to
be increased when more power is required or to be decreased when power must be reduced.
Such control is usually achieved by having movable neutron-absorbing control rods partially
inserted into the reactor. By fully inserting the control rods, the reactor can be shut down.
Therefore, a typical nuclear reactor consists of the following main components as shown in
Figure 4:
Fuel in which fission occurs and heat is generated
Moderator to reduce the energy of the neutrons
Coolant to remove the heat from the fuel elements
Control rods to maintain the proper neutron balance.
2 Reactor Types
2.1 Prototype Reactors
As nuclear reactors developed around the key elements of fuel, moderator, and coolant, many
different types were proposed and constructed as demonstration models in an endeavour to
prove their technical and commercial viability. Some designs had serious technical problems,
while others had uniquely advanced features. However, due to arbitrary political decisions, one
or two good designs did not go beyond the prototype stage, while others with insurmountable
technical difficulties were abandoned. Nevertheless, some prototypes did operate successfully
for many years, providing valuable technical and operational experience while producing power.
Ultimately, the field narrowed to certain proven designs which were adopted on a commercial
basis. Currently, there are six main types, which are listed below in order of numbers in service.
The first five have proven to be commercially viable, while the sixth can be considered to be still
in the prototype stage, but to hold promise for the future as a reactor which can breed new
fissile fuel:
The liquid graphite reactor has a graphite block core similar to that of a gas cooled reactor.
Pressure tubes similar to those of the pressurized heavy water reactor pass through vertical
holes in the graphite, which serves as the moderator. Fuel elements made up of clusters of rods
are located within these vertical tubes, and light water coolant flows upwards over the fuel and
within the tubes. Boiling occurs in the fuel as in the boiling water reactor. The resulting steam
is separated from the water in an external drum and the water recirculated. As with the boiling
water reactor, saturated steam is sent to the turbine. This type of reactor of Russian design is
known as the RBMK. A simplified diagram of a liquid graphite reactor is given in Figure 9.
2.2.6 Liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR)
The liquid metal fast breeder reactor is different from the others in many ways. The coolant is a
liquid metal, usually sodium, which flows directly over the fuel rods of the vertical fuel elements
in an upward direction. The heat carried in this primary circuit is transferred to a secondary
sodium circuit in a heat exchanger. This secondary circuit then transfers the heat to the steam
circuit in a steam generator. Because sodium remains a liquid at high temperatures without
being pressurized, heavy pressure vessels are not required, and high temperature superheated
steam can be produced to provide good cycle efficiency. There is no moderator to reduce the
energy of the neutrons, hence the term “fast”, and surplus neutrons are used to convert non-
fissile material into fissile fuel, hence the term “breeder”. This type of reactor has not yet
reached the commercially viable stage, and therefore there is no typical design.
ble, as was the case in the United States, there is wider scope in the choice of a moderator
because more neutron absorption can be tolerated. Therefore, light water (hydrogen and
oxygen) can be used as a moderator. An advantage of light water as a moderator is that it is
very effective per unit distance in slowing down neutrons, leading to a smaller moderator
volume and a more compact reactor than with the other moderators. However, light water has
the inherent disadvantage of absorbing a greater fraction of neutrons than graphite or heavy
water.
Of the three moderators mentioned above, graphite is the least effective in reducing neutron
energy and requires the largest volume. Graphite moderated reactors are therefore the largest,
leading to high capital costs. Considering capital cost, moderator costs, and enriched fuel
supply and cost, all three of these became economically viable in their respective countries, and
commercial reactors for power plants subsequently evolved.
Over time, enriched uranium became more easily available, and commercial reactors were sold
to other countries which did not have fuel enrichment resources, leading to a free choice of
reactors. It is of interest to review the world use of nuclear reactors for electric power produc-
tion.
It is evident from Table 1 that certain types of reactors became dominant in certain countries,
particularly in those developing their own reactors, for example, PWRs and BWRs in the United
States, GCRs in the United Kingdom, PHWRs in Canada, and LGRs in Russia. However, in later
years, certain types of reactors have been favoured by countries without their own develop-
mental program, leading to the spread of some of these types to other countries. The PWR,
however, has become the most common type and is currently produced by various manufactur-
Table 3 shows a dramatic increase of 25% and 29% respectively in the number of reactors in
service and available capacity over the following 10 years.
Table 3 Projected reactors in service in 2022*
table shows the capacity, date taken out of service, and number of years in service.
Table 5 Decommissioned large reactors (1000 MWe and greater)*
4 Power Production
4.1 Energy Transfer
Heat, energy, and work all have the same units (joules), but somewhat different meanings, and
power is the rate of doing work (watts). What is important is that not all heat can be converted
into work. Although the first law of thermodynamics states that all work can be dissipated as
heat, the second law states that not all heat can be converted into work. In a typical water
cooled nuclear plant (CANDU, PWR and BWR) approximately 30% of the heat released by the
fuel is ultimately converted into electrical energy. The rest must be discharged as low grade
(low temperature) heat.
During the fission process, heat is generated in the fuel. This heat is removed by the reactor
coolant flowing over the fuel rods and transported in the primary circuit to the steam generator,
where it flows inside the tubes and its heat is transferred to the secondary circuit through the
walls of the tubes in the steam generator. Water in the secondary circuit outside the tubes
absorbs this heat and is converted into steam under saturated conditions. This steam is passed
to the turbine where it expands to low pressure while being directed onto the turbine blades
and in so doing transfers its energy to the turbine rotor. The rotor drives the electrical genera-
tor which produces electric power. The exhaust steam is condensed by cooling water passing
through the condenser tubes and in so doing discharges the bulk of the heat which cannot be
converted into work. The condensate is returned to the steam generator after being preheated
in the feedwater heating system. A simple flow diagram for a nuclear plant is shown in Figure
10. Note that in the BWR and RBMK, steam is generated directly in the reactor, so there is no
generators. The turbine then delivers power according to the steam flow and the generator
sends this power into the grid system regardless of the grid frequency. The grid frequency must
then be controlled by other turbine generators which feed into the grid system and operate in
the turbine leading mode.
By referring to the figure showing the two modes of operation, it can be seen that steam
generator pressure is a key control parameter in both modes. This highlights the importance of
the steam generator, where a balance of heat input and heat output must be maintained to
maintain pressure. Furthermore, the difference in temperature between the primary coolant
and the secondary working fluid determines the rate of heat transfer. Hence the reactor cool-
ant temperature is determined by saturation temperature and thus by steam generator pres-
sure.
the reactor and allowing more neutrons to be available in the fuel. After a long period of
operation, however, such changes can no longer be accommodated, and the fuel may have
become depleted in U-235 to the point where a continuous chain reaction can no longer be
sustained. At this point, the reactor has to be refueled with fresh fuel.
With reactors that are partially refueled once a year, the control rods do not provide an ade-
quate range of control, and therefore a soluble neutron absorber is added in small quantities to
the moderator. Its concentration is gradually reduced over time to compensate for fuel burnup.
Some reactors are designed for continuous on-load refueling. This is advantageous because the
effects of fuel burnup and fission product production are negligible with regard to overall
reactor conditions.
they will be subject to -radiation or -radiation emitted by these products, along with some γ-
radiation resulting from the decay process. The design of the plant has, as a key objective, the
provision of safety devices and containment barriers to ensure that radiation exposure to the
public is kept well below acceptable limits in the event of an accident.
half by component failure. Many component failures could be ascribed to human error during
component design or manufacture. Rigorous quality control, quality assurance, and quality
management procedures can minimize manufacturing and construction defects. Proper train-
ing, assessment, and licensing of plant operators can minimize human error during operation.
This all contributes to a lower risk of accident and increased safety in nuclear plants.
A further development in the nuclear industry is the concept of passive safety. This means that
in the event of a failure leading to accident conditions, the reactor will naturally revert to a safe
shutdown condition and maintain that condition with minimal operator intervention, even in
the event of the loss of key services. Some newer designs, for example, can maintain reactor
cooling after shutdown by natural coolant circulation and natural heat convection to the envi-
ronment.
6 Bibliography
[Cameron1982] I. R. Cameron, Nuclear Fission Reactors, Plenum Press, New York, 1982.
[El-Wakil1982] M. M. El-Wakil, Nuclear Energy Conversion, 3rd ed., American Nuclear Society, La
Grange Park, IL, USA, 1982.
[Foster1983] A. R. Foster and R. L. Wright, Basic Nuclear Engineering, 4th ed., Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ. USA, 1983.
[Glasstone1994] S. Glasstone and A. Sesonske, Nuclear Reactor Engineering: Volume 2, Reactor
Systems Engineering, 4th ed., Chapman & Hall, New York, NY, USA, 1994.
[Knief1992] R. A. Knief, Nuclear Engineering, 2nd ed., Hemisphere Publishing Corporation,
Washington, DC, USA.
[Lamarsh2001] J. R. Lamarsh and A. J. Baratta, Introduction to Nuclear Engineering, 3rd ed.,
Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, USA, 2001.
7 Acknowledgments
The following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and excellent com-
ments during the development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of course
the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the author.
Bob Tapping
Jeremy Whitlock
Bhaskar Sur
Terry Rogers
George Bereznai
Thanks are also extended to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
Historical Background
prepared by
Dr, Robin Chaplin
Professor of Power Plant Engineering (retired)
University of New Brunswick
Summary:
A review of the historical background for the development of nuclear energy is given to set the
scene for the discussion of CANDU reactors.
Table of Contents
1 Growth of Science and Technology......................................................................................... 2
2 Renowned Scientists ............................................................................................................... 4
3 Significant Achievements ........................................................................................................ 6
3.1 Niels Bohr........................................................................................................................ 6
3.2 James Chadwick .............................................................................................................. 6
3.3 Enrico Fermi .................................................................................................................... 6
4 Nuclear Fission ........................................................................................................................ 7
5 Nuclear Energy ........................................................................................................................ 8
6 Acknowledgments................................................................................................................... 8
List of Figures
Figure 1 Timeline of significant discoveries .................................................................................... 3
The rate of technology increase has accelerated as technology itself has increased, leading to a
sort of exponential growth. Energy growth is a good example of this phenomenon. Water power
developed relatively slowly, steam power somewhat more quickly, electrical power even more
rapidly, and nuclear power very rapidly. In the case of nuclear energy, collaboration between
scientists in different countries initially spurred the discovery of various nuclear particles. Then
the Second World War provided an incentive to harness the fission process, and later the rapid
growth in demand for new energy after the war provided the need for nuclear power. Within
the time span of roughly half a century, an entirely unknown source of energy had become a
major producer of commercial electric power. In addition, an entirely new and sophisticated
technology had been developed.
Before about 1900, most scientific work in this field was related to electricity. Then in the next
two decades following the discovery of radiation and its characteristics, various pieces of the
nuclear puzzle began to come together. Only by 1920 was the basic structure of the atom
understood, and the existence of the neutron was confirmed in 1932. This was a pivotal discov-
ery because the neutron is the key element in establishing a fission chain reaction. Just ten
years later, in 1942, the first self-sustaining chain reaction was established, and by 1956 the
technology had advanced to the point where a nuclear fission reactor could produce electric
power on a commercial scale.
In reviewing this evolution of nuclear energy, it is important to note the recognition given to the
researchers responsible for these discoveries. The Nobel Prize is the most prestigious award
given to such advances in the scientific field. Some twenty Nobel Prizes in nuclear and radiation
physics and nuclear chemistry or closely related fields were awarded over a fifty-year period
from 1901, the year of the first Nobel Prize.
2 Renowned Scientists
Many researchers in different countries around the world have contributed to this new field of
science. Several collaborated with one another or worked or were trained in another’s labora-
tory. Each contributed a piece of the puzzle. Those making a significant advancement in this
field were awarded Nobel Prizes. Some 20 prizes were awarded over a fifty-year period, demon-
strating the importance of this field of science.
The Nobel Prizes awarded in Physics and Chemistry in the nuclear field from 1901 to 1951 with
the recipients and a statement of their contribution, as obtained from the Nobel Foundation
Official Web Site, are listed below.
"For his services in the investigation of the structure of atoms and of the
radiation emanating from them"
3 Significant Achievements
Three scientists and their respective discoveries tend to stand out in the development of
nuclear physics as applied to energy production. Niels Bohr developed a model to describe the
structure of the atom, James Chadwick established the existence of neutrons, and Enrico Fermi
directed the construction of the first reactors. All these achievements were the result of exten-
sive work in analyzing the results and further developing the ideas of other researchers and
collaborators. Extracts of their biographies from the Nobel Foundation Official Web Site are
given below.
In the autumn of 1911 he made a stay at Cambridge, where he profited by following the ex-
perimental work going on in the Cavendish Laboratory under Sir J.J. Thomson's guidance, at the
same time as he pursued his own theoretical studies. In the spring of 1912 he was at work in
Professor Rutherford's laboratory in Manchester, where just in those years such an intensive
scientific life and activity prevailed as a consequence of that investigator’s fundamental inquir-
ies into the radioactive phenomena. Having there carried out a theoretical piece of work on the
absorption of alpha rays which was published in the Philosophical Magazine, 1913, he passed
on to a study of the structure of atoms on the basis of Rutherford's discovery of the atomic
nucleus. By introducing conceptions borrowed from the Quantum Theory as established by
Planck, which had gradually come to occupy a prominent position in the science of theoretical
physics, he succeeded in working out and presenting a picture of atomic structure that, with
later improvements (mainly as a result of Heisenberg's ideas in 1925), still fitly serves as an
elucidation of the physical and chemical properties of the elements.
In 1932, Chadwick made a fundamental discovery in the domain of nuclear science: he proved
the existence of neutrons—elementary particles devoid of any electrical charge. In contrast with
the helium nuclei (alpha rays) which are charged, and therefore repelled by the considerable
electrical forces present in the nuclei of heavy atoms, this new tool in atomic disintegration
need not overcome any electric barrier and is capable of penetrating and splitting the nuclei of
even the heaviest elements. Chadwick in this way prepared the way towards the fission of
uranium 235 and towards the creation of the atomic bomb. For this epoch-making discovery he
was awarded the Hughes Medal of the Royal Society in 1932, and subsequently the Nobel Prize
for physics in 1935.
In 1934, Fermi evolved the -decay theory, coalescing previous work on radiation theory with
Pauli's idea of the neutrino. Following the discovery by Curie and Joliot of artificial radioactivity
(1934), he demonstrated that nuclear transformation occurs in almost every element subjected
to neutron bombardment. This work resulted in the discovery of slow neutrons that same year,
leading to the discovery of nuclear fission and the production of elements lying beyond what
was until then the Periodic Table.
In 1938, Fermi was without doubt the greatest expert on neutrons, and he continued his work
on this topic on his arrival in the United States, where he was soon appointed Professor of
Physics at Columbia University, N.Y. (1939-1942).
Upon the discovery of fission, by Hahn and Strassmann early in 1939, he immediately saw the
possibility of emission of secondary neutrons and of a chain reaction. He proceeded to work
with tremendous enthusiasm, and directed a classical series of experiments which ultimately
led to the atomic pile and the first controlled nuclear chain reaction. This took place in Chicago
on December 2, 1942, on a squash court situated beneath Chicago's stadium. He subsequently
played an important part in solving the problems connected with the development of the first
atomic bomb. (He was one of the leaders of the team of physicists on the Manhattan Project for
the development of nuclear energy and the atomic bomb).
4 Nuclear Fission
Before 1939, there was no evidence to suggest the practical usefulness of atomic energy. In
1934, Enrico Fermi had reported that, when uranium was subjected to a stream of neutrons,
elements of higher mass number were formed. These transuranic elements attracted the
interest of other researchers, who discovered elements of unexpected mass numbers in the
products. Otto Hahn and Friedrich Strassmann noted in 1938 that the masses of two of these
products added up to the mass of the uranium atom plus a neutron. Subsequently, in early
1939, Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch were able to explain in a published report that "it seems
possible that the uranium nucleus has only small stability of form and may, after neutron
capture, divide itself into two nuclei of roughly equal size". This was called fission, the term
which was commonly used in biology to describe the division of living cells. Otto Frisch soon
after proved, as they had predicted, that the particles released had strong ionizing power. This
was also confirmed by several other researchers. Furthermore, these fission fragments were
found to be ejected at high velocity and to possess radioactive properties. Most of the confir-
matory work of this new revelation was completed within three months of the initial publication
of the theory of nuclear fission. This subsequently was generally referred to as "splitting the
atom".
Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch estimated that the amount of energy release in a single fission
process was in the order of 200 MeV, far greater than any other known nuclear reaction. This
can be shown by comparing the masses of the fission products with the masses of the original
nucleus plus a neutron and converting this difference to energy.
It soon became evident, as had been mentioned by Enrico Fermi, that neutrons should be
emitted during fission due to the general structure of the atoms of uranium and the fission
products. This was subsequently confirmed by different researchers.
5 Nuclear Energy
It had already been recognized that mass could be converted into energy and that so-called sub-
atomic particles existed within atoms. When nuclear fission by neutrons was discovered and
found to produce further neutrons along with fission fragments, the possibility of a branching
chain of fissions became a real prospect. If these occurred in a rapid sequence, given the
amount of energy released in each fission event, the result could be a catastrophic explosion. At
that time, interest became focused on the possibility of a powerful atomic bomb. Subsequently,
from 1940 on, all further work related to the use of nuclear energy to produce an atomic bomb
took place in secrecy. The limits to this possibility became evident with further research that
showed that a nuclear chain reaction could be sustained only in uranium-235 and plutonium-
239. The former could be separated by gaseous diffusion and the latter created by a controlled
neutron chain reaction. Both methods required extensive equipment to produce even small
amounts.
The production of Pu-239 required an operating nuclear reactor with suitable fuel and modera-
tor to establish a chain reaction with U-235 in which neutrons were produced, some of which
would be absorbed in U-238 to create Pu-239. To construct a reactor in which a controlled chain
reaction would occur, Enrico Fermi and Leo Szilard realized that a heterogeneous system of
lumps of uranium embedded in graphite blocks in a lattice formation would be required. The
first experimental lattice was erected in 1941 at Columbia University under the supervision of
Fermi and followed by a larger one shortly thereafter, but impurities in the materials prevented
a chain reaction from being initiated. Towards the end of 1942, sufficient amounts of pure
materials were available, and a sufficiently large pile of graphite blocks and lumps of uranium
was built at the University of Chicago to establish a continuous self-sustaining chain reaction on
December 2, 1942.
The next step was an enormous scale-up to the plutonium production plants at Hanford Works,
where sufficient plutonium was produced to enable the first atomic bomb to be tested on July
16, 1945. Concurrently, a huge gaseous diffusion plant was built at Oak Ridge to separate U-235
from U-238 and so create highly enriched uranium for a second atomic bomb.
6 Acknowledgments
The following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and excellent com-
ments during the development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of course
the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the author.
Bob Tapping
Jeremy Whitlock
Bhaskar Sur
Terry Rogers
George Bereznai
Thanks are also extended to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
CHAPTER 2
Genealogy of CANDU Reactors
prepared by
Dr. Robin Chaplin
Summary:
This chapter discusses the historical beginnings and evolution of the CANDU reactor. The
research and prototype reactors leading to the CANDU design are described with some of their
principle technical parameters. Reasons for the choice of key parameters are given. This leads
into a review of the evolution of the design of increasingly larger commercial CANDU reactors.
The CANDU 6 reactor design has been chosen as a reference and a brief description of its main
components with typical design parameters follows with a comparison with the CANDU 9
reactor. The chapter includes a note on the advantages of the CANDU reactor compared with
other water cooled reactors and a general review of reactor safety as applicable to most water
cooled reactors. It concludes with some technical details of the proposed Advanced CANDU
reactor for comparison with existing commercial CANDU reactors.
Table of Contents
1 Canadian Historical Review..................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Canadian Nuclear Beginnings ........................................................................................... 3
2 Canadian Research Reactors ................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Small Research Reactors................................................................................................... 4
2.2 The NRX Reactor ............................................................................................................... 4
2.3 The NRU Reactor .............................................................................................................. 5
3 Development of the CANDU Reactor...................................................................................... 6
3.1 The NPD Reactor............................................................................................................... 6
3.2 Douglas Point.................................................................................................................... 6
4 Commercial CANDU Reactors ................................................................................................. 7
4.1 Commercial Reactor Development .................................................................................. 7
4.2 CANDU Reactors in Service............................................................................................. 11
4.3 Direct Steam Generation ................................................................................................ 13
5 The Current CANDU Reactor Design ..................................................................................... 14
5.1 Plant Arrangement ......................................................................................................... 14
5.2 Fuel Channel Conditions................................................................................................. 16
5.3 Comparison of CANDU Reactors .................................................................................... 16
5.4 Power Density................................................................................................................. 17
6 CANDU Technical Parameters ............................................................................................... 18
6.1 Reference Plant............................................................................................................... 18
6.2 Reactor Core Arrangement............................................................................................. 19
6.3 Coolant Loop Arrangement ............................................................................................ 26
Genealogy of CANDU Reactors – September 2014
2 The Essential CANDU
List of Figures
Figure 1 Diagrammatic cross section of a typical CANDU (PHWR) ............................................... 14
Figure 2 Moderator and coolant circuits ...................................................................................... 15
Figure 3 Point Lepreau nuclear generating station....................................................................... 19
Figure 4 Reactor vault and assembly ............................................................................................ 20
Figure 5 37-element fuel bundle .................................................................................................. 21
Figure 6 CANDU 6 reactor assembly ............................................................................................. 23
Figure 7 Reactor cross section ...................................................................................................... 24
Figure 8 Reactor longitudinal section ........................................................................................... 25
Figure 9 Reactor plan view............................................................................................................ 26
Figure 10 Fuel channel end fittings on reactor face ..................................................................... 27
Figure 11 Feeder tube assembly on reactor face.......................................................................... 28
Figure 12 Steam generator for CANDU system............................................................................. 29
Figure 13 600 MW steam turbine for nuclear unit ....................................................................... 31
Figure 14 Turbine generator for nuclear unit................................................................................ 31
Figure 15 Typical capacity factors of CANDU and other reactors ................................................. 33
Figure 16 ACR 1000 nuclear systems schematic ........................................................................... 35
Figure 17 ACR CANFLEX fuel bundles............................................................................................ 36
Figure 18 Comparison of core sizes .............................................................................................. 38
List of Tables
Table 1 Technical data for NRX........................................................................................................ 5
Table 2 Canadian CANDU reactors: capacity and service date ..................................................... 12
Table 3 Foreign CANDU 6 reactors: capacity and service date ..................................................... 13
Table 4 Comparison of CANDU reactor types ............................................................................... 17
Table 5 CANDU core parameters................................................................................................... 22
Table 6 CANDU coolant system parameters ................................................................................. 28
Table 7 CANDU steam generator parameters ............................................................................... 30
Table 8 Steam turbine parameters................................................................................................ 31
Table 9 Advanced CANDU reactor parameter comparison........................................................... 37
Work in Canada was directed towards use of heavy water as a moderator, and to test the
concept, a Zero-Energy Experimental Pile known as ZEEP was built at Chalk River. It was essen-
tially an aluminum cylinder 2 m in diameter and 2.5 m in height surrounded by blocks of graph-
ite. Uranium metal rods clad in aluminum were hung vertically from the top, and heavy water
could be pumped in slowly at the bottom. ZEEP was completed and went critical on 5 Septem-
ber 1945, with almost exactly the amount of heavy water that had been predicted by theory. It
was the first nuclear reactor to operate outside the United States. This confirmed the design
parameters that would be used for the fuel rod lattice for the first functional reactor, designated
NRX. ZEEP, however, continued to be used in later years for experimental studies of neutron
behaviour.
The key technical parameters for the NRX reactor are given in Table 1. The modern CANDU
reactor has all these key elements in a similar but horizontal arrangement.
water. With a view to later commercial power applications, it was designed for on-load refuel-
ling.
magazine with slots to hold each bundle separately. A significant advantage of this arrangement
was that fuelling could take place from either end of the reactor. Such bi-directional fuelling
made it possible to balance the tendency for flux skewing in a partially refuelled channel by
fuelling in the opposite direction in an adjacent channel. In the NPD design, coolant flowed in
the direction opposite to the fuelling direction, so that the fuel bundles were held in place by
the flow of coolant. This established the characteristic bi-directional coolant flow in CANDU
reactors.
The calandria vessel and calandria tubes were of aluminum. Initially, there was no spacer
between the calandria tubes and the fuel channel pressure tube, but as the design for Douglas
Point evolved, a single spacer in the form of an Inconel wire garter spring was introduced. This
enabled the pressure tubes to withstand the effect of creep sag. The calandria had a light water
neutron reflector surrounding it in a radial direction. To bring about a shutdown, the heavy
water moderator could be rapidly drained into a dump tank, which for a small reactor was an
effective way of ensuring safe shutdown in the event of an accident.
The heat transport system which removed heat from the reactor core and generated steam in a
steam generator required pumps to circulate the coolant. Originally, completely enclosed
canned pumps were proposed, but these were later changed to conventional vertical pumps
with shaft seals. These had the advantage of being able to incorporate a flywheel to provide
increased rotational inertia, which would extend the rundown period after a power failure and
enable extra core cooling during the initial stages of high decay heat. The steam generator
design was based on those being designed for United States nuclear submarines. It consisted
essentially of a U-shaped horizontal heat exchanger in which the heavy water coolant trans-
ferred heat to the light water of the steam system. Because the latter operated at a lower
pressure, some steam was generated around the tubes. Risers and downcomers circulated the
steam and water mixture to a steam drum and returned the water to the heat exchanger. The
long circular horizontal steam drum was similar to that of a conventional fossil fuel fired boiler
and had internal cyclones for effective steam separation. The overall configuration required
inlet and outlet headers at each end of the reactor to accommodate bi-directional coolant flow.
The former were supplied by three 50% capacity pumps, and the latter delivered coolant to a
single steam generator.
The NPD reactor was followed very closely by the Douglas Point reactor, the latter being essen-
tially an enlarged version capable of operating like a commercial power plant and producing
electric power to the grid system on a commercial scale. The site chosen was on Lake Huron,
where there was an adequate supply of cooling water to sustain large scale power production.
The most significant change was an upgrade in power from 20 MW electrical to 200 MW
electrical. This naturally required a larger and more robust calandria, and therefore the struc-
tural material was changed from aluminum alloy to stainless steel and the calandria tubes from
aluminum alloy to zirconium alloy. Because stainless steel is a stronger neutron absorber than
aluminum, the calandria diameter was further enlarged to accommodate an internal heavy
water reflector instead of an external light water reflector. The axial shields were moved
inwards so that the fuel channel end fittings would be outside the shield and therefore more
easily accessible.
The increased size of the Douglas Point reactor required fuel channels with a length of 5 m. This
meant more fuel bundles per channel. The one-eighth length fuel bundle was based on a
cosine flux distribution, but with flux flattening, such short lengths were not required, and one
Genealogy of CANDU Reactors – September 2014
Genealogy of CANDU Reactors 9
third length bundles would give virtually optimum fuel burnup. Because the same standard
length fuel bundles would be used, the fuelling machines were therefore redesigned to handle
two bundles in each slot. This enabled the magazine to be smaller in diameter, but able to
accommodate 39 in (991 mm) of fuel with each fuel movement. Other changes in fuelling-
machine design provided positive control from both ends of the fuel channel during refuelling
and enabled refuelling in the same direction as coolant flow. The advantage of this was that
fresh fuel, which would give a higher local power output, would be in contact with cooler water
when only part of the fuel channel had been refuelled.
The larger output required increased steam generating capabilities. Furthermore, the longer
reactor put the inlet and outlet of each channel further apart. Therefore, it was decided to put
steam generators and circulating pumps at each end of the reactor. The same concept of
separate heat exchangers and steam drums was retained, but instead of one horizontal heat
exchanger, several vertical hairpin tube exchangers were used to feed a single steam drum in a
way similar to that in which steam is generated in the water walls of a fossil fuel fired boiler.
The multiple smaller heat exchangers could be replaced more easily than a single large one
should tube problems arise. With steam generators and circulating pumps at each end of the
reactor and with bi-directional flow, the “figure of eight” configuration for the heat transport
system was established for this and all future CANDU reactors. A further feature of Douglas
Point was the introduction of horizontal inlet and outlet headers above the highest fuel chan-
nels, but below the steam generators and circulating pumps. This would enable the system to
be partially drained for maintenance on the circulating pumps and steam generators while still
maintaining fuel cooling to remove decay heat. In normal operation, pressure was maintained
in the heat transport system by a feed-and-bleed system to minimize heavy water inventory.
Pickering was the first large scale multi-unit commercial CANDU plant. This was yet a further
scale-up from the 200 MW Douglas Point plant to a 4 x 500 MW plant. The 500 MW electrical
unit size was consistent with that of the coal fired units on the Ontario Hydro system. Signifi-
cant changes to the reactor included longer and wider fuel channels to accommodate the
increased fuel inventory. The fuel channels were 6 m in length instead of 5 m. Rather than
increasing the number of fuel channels excessively, it was decided to increase the diameter to a
nominal 4 in (102 mm) while retaining the fuel element or rod diameter. This resulted in fuel
bundles with 28 instead of 19 elements. This required a fuel channel 4.07 in (103 mm) in
diameter to maintain the standard minimum element spacing, which was maintained by pads
brazed to the element cladding. This then became the standard for all future CANDU reactors.
The end shields were redesigned, and the annular space between the pressure tube and calan-
dria tube filled with inert gas to minimize the risk of corrosion.
A further change was the adoption of a double “figure of eight” coolant loop with two hydrauli-
cally independent loops. This had the advantage of limiting the consequences of a loss of
coolant accident due to a pressure tube or feeder tube break because the fuel channels in half
the reactor would remain flooded without the need for emergency coolant injection. The
moderator dump system for emergency shutdown was retained, but due to the time needed to
drain the large calandria, it was supplemented with gravity operated shutoff rods. The latter
system was able to handle most reactor trips, and therefore a dump arrest system was added to
prevent dumping, enabling a faster reactor restart for such non-accident related trips.
The larger reactor introduced the possibility of flux oscillation, in which the peak flux wanders
from one region of the reactor to another, often induced by xenon transients. To overcome this,
Genealogy of CANDU Reactors – September 2014
10 The Essential CANDU
the reactor was divided into 14 zones, each with a neutron flux detector and a chamber in
which an appropriate amount of light water could act as a stronger neutron absorber than the
surrounding heavy water moderator and thus achieve local flux control. This regional neutron
flux control system became a standard feature of all subsequent CANDU reactors.
An innovative change was the introduction of vertical steam generators which incorporated the
vertical U-tube heat exchange surface and steam separation cyclones into a single vessel with
provision for water recirculation and feedwater preheating. This design became the standard
for CANDU reactors and many pressurized light water reactors, or PWRs.
For a multi-unit station, the concept of a containment surrounding each reactor was maintained
and extended by linking the separate containments to a common vacuum building. In the event
of a major reactor accident and release of steam inside any containment, the vacuum building
would act to suck out and condense the steam, thus establishing a negative pressure in the
containment to prevent egress of radioactive material.
Bruce was the next large multi-unit nuclear generating station to be built. This involved a
change in the heat transport system. In previous designs, the outlet conditions of the fuel
channels varied due to the different power ratings of the channels across the reactor core. To
create more uniform conditions at the channel outlets, the central core region required a
greater degree of subcooling at the inlet. This was accomplished by having separate preheaters
outside some steam generators rather than integral preheaters and passing coolant for the
central region only through these preheaters. This complicated the flow system, but obtained
better matching of coolant outlet conditions. Another change was made to the steam genera-
tors, where the large U-tube heat exchanger as used in Pickering was retained, but without the
integral upper steam separating section. Instead, a single long horizontal steam drum was
attached to the top of all steam generators at each end of the reactor. The larger water-steam
interface reduced level control problems, but introduced thermal stress problems. This design
was used on Bruce A, while Bruce B reverted to the separate integral design as used at
Pickering.
Studies had indicated that a moderator dump system was too slow for a large reactor, and
therefore this was eliminated in favour of faster acting gravity shutoff rods. Because dumped
moderator would not be available for channel cooling in the event of loss of coolant, a new
system was developed for the next generation of reactors, but applied at Bruce. This was the
injection of high pressure water into the heat transport system headers from gas pressurized
storage tanks. For Bruce, the initial supply pressure was 800 lbf/in 2 (5.52 MPa), but this was
reduced to 600 lbf/in2 (4.14 MPa) in subsequent reactors.
A further safety issue arose with regard to the shutdown system. Bearing in mind that the
CANDU design is a neatly balanced configuration of fuel and moderator, any disruption of this
configuration will render the reactor subcritical and inoperable. In the event of failure of the
shutdown system to operate in an overpower situation, the reactor would disassemble and shut
itself down. Further consideration of the core disassembly philosophy led to addition of a
second shutdown system which would remove the need to consider core disassembly for
licensing purposes. Because the shutoff rods operated in a vertical plane, a new system operat-
ing entirely independently on a horizontal plane was developed. Solid rods were considered,
but might suffer mechanical interference, so liquid rods were favoured. However, their effect
would be too localized, so liquid dispersion in the moderator was the ultimate choice. By
injecting neutron absorbing gadolinium nitrate solution into the moderator through an array of
nozzles in the reactor core, a very quick shutdown could be ensured. This system was driven by
helium in pressurized storage tanks and became standard on all CANDU reactors. Because
removal of the gadolinium nitrate from the moderator was a lengthy process, this became the
secondary shutdown system, while the shutoff rods remained the primary shutdown system
which operates first in adverse transient conditions requiring a reactor trip.
The next generation of CANDU units included Point Lepreau and Gentilly-II as well as a number
of overseas plants. A design for single unit stations was needed for these to be attractive to
small utilities. The major change was the requirement for a single large containment for the
reactor and heat transport system, including the steam generators, which would condense
released steam and contain radioactive products in the event of a large break and loss of
coolant accident. Other changes followed a natural evolution in reactor design. The fuel
bundles were modified from 28 to 37 element bundles by using smaller diameter elements.
The increased heat transfer surface thus created enabled a power increase from 500 MW to 600
MW electrical, while reducing the number of fuel channels from 390 to 380. This reactor
therefore became known as the CANDU 600. Furthermore, from 12 steam generators and 16
coolant pumps at Pickering, the design had evolved to 4 steam generators and 4 coolant pumps.
Experience in steam generator design had enabled larger components to be built. Comprehen-
sive testing had shown that some boiling could be permitted within the fuel channels, thus
increasing substantially the heat removal capability of the coolant. With the hydraulically
independent “figure of eight” heat transport system, it was perceived that oscillatory instability
could occur between the two halves of the reactor due to neutron flux variations arising from
void formation. To overcome this problem, connecting pipes were incorporated to link the
outlet headers of the two reactor halves at each end of the reactor, thus providing some hy-
draulic damping.
Darlington followed the design of the CANDU 600, but with a degree of scaling up. The heat
transport system maintained the same arrangement of two loops in a figure-of-eight configura-
tion, with each loop having a steam generator and a circulating pump at each end. For in-
creased output, the reactor was designed for 480 fuel channels instead of 380. For future
reactors of this size, a change in the figure-of-eight arrangement has been proposed. Instead of
the two loops being in separate halves of the reactor, they would be interleaved alternately
between adjacent channels throughout the reactor. The advantage of this would be to avoid a
flux tilt and power pulse in the event of a loss of coolant accident in one loop while still main-
taining the advantages of the two loop concept.
*CANDU-6 Reactor
due to other problems such as condenser corrosion. It was shut down in 1979 and eventually
decommissioned in 1984.
ductivity of the annulus gas provides the greatest resistance to heat transfer. Cooling of the
moderator is therefore required to maintain a temperature of about 70°C, which means that a
circulating and cooling system is required. This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.
over-moderation. CANDU reactors are slightly over-moderated, but while this has some disad-
vantages, it does provide additional space between the fuel channels for various control de-
vices. Over-moderation enables additional neutrons to be absorbed in the moderator, and
when voidage occurs in the fuel channels, fewer neutrons are absorbed, thus increasing the
number of neutrons and giving a positive void coefficient of reactivity which must be counter-
acted in other ways. With a separate calandria, the moderator temperature can be kept rela-
tively low compared with the fuel and coolant. This is advantageous in reducing neutron energy
and promoting the fission process due to the increased fission cross section of uranium at lower
temperatures. In all CANDU reactors, the moderator in the calandria is maintained at atmos-
pheric pressure and a temperature of about 70°C.
All CANDU reactors contain about the same amount of fuel per channel, but the major differ-
ences are in the fuel bundles themselves and in the number of channels. The total design
power output of a CANDU reactor can be fixed by selecting an appropriate number of fuel
channels for the reactor. In a CANDU 3 reactor there are 232 fuel channels, in the CANDU 6
reactor the number of channels is increased to 380, while in the CANDU 9 reactor there are 600
fuel channels.
A new development is the Advanced CANDU Reactor, known as the ACR, which uses slightly
enriched uranium as fuel and light water as coolant. This has the benefit of significantly reduc-
ing the heavy water inventory. In the proposed ACR, the power density is increased by a smaller
calandria diameter, but with an increased number of elements in the fuel bundle and a smaller
channel pitch, resulting in a more compact reactor.
The reactor core includes monitoring and control devices to measure neutron flux and to
modify the flux profile if required to obtain the best power distribution. Safety devices to bring
about rapid shutdown, such as the shutoff rods and poison injection system, are also built into
the core. The general arrangement of these is shown in Figure 6, and their locations are shown
in the three views given in Figures 7, 8, and 9.
loop. Flow in the pressure tubes is arranged to be in opposite directions in adjacent fuel chan-
nels. Thus, at each end of the reactor, there are sets of inlets and outlets to and from each fuel
channel, as shown in Figure 10. To carry the coolant to and from each of these inlets and
outlets, small diameter feeder tubes are used, as shown in Figure 11. These are linked to twin
common headers above each end of the reactor core. Coolant from the outlet headers at each
end passes to the steam generators, then through the coolant pumps and back to the inlet
headers at the same end of the reactor core. After a second pass through the fuel channels, the
coolant passes to steam generators and coolant pumps at the other end of the reactor core.
The complete coolant loop thus has a double figure-of-eight configuration. Typically, there are
two steam generators and two coolant pumps at each end of the reactor core, making a total of
four of each. Although each pair of steam generators and its associated coolant loop has a
separate figure-of-eight configuration, the headers are cross-connected so that the whole
system operates at the same pressure. Pressure is maintained by a single pressurizer connected
to one of the coolant loops. The pressurizer is a tall cylindrical vessel containing half water and
half steam and maintained at saturation conditions. By varying the temperature in the vessel
with heaters or water sprays, the pressure in the entire coolant system can be controlled.
Typical parameters for 600 MWe (electrical) and 950 MWe (electrical) CANDU coolant systems
are given in Table 6.
and facilities.
cooling systems, and engineered safeguards built into the reactor design. The CANDU reactor
has evolved to be inherently safe, with consideration given to all conceivable accidents. Acci-
dents to early reactors, as mentioned earlier, have highlighted the need for very conservative
and safe design requirements.
In case of an adverse transient which could lead to a potential accident, there are two inde-
pendent shutdown systems. The SDS1 system consists of mechanical shutoff rods which drop
into the core by gravity when a trip signal is received. The SDS2 system consists of an array of
nozzles which inject gadolinium nitrate under gas pressure into the moderator on receipt of a
trip signal.
In the event of loss of coolant from the reactor heat transport system, an emergency core
cooling system injects cooling water into the headers to ensure a water supply to maintain fuel
cooling. This is backed up by alternative systems to maintain cooling for an extended period.
Use of multiple pressure tubes instead of a single large pressure vessel permits thinner walls
and simpler manufacture to the required pressure threshold. Any leaks can be detected by
monitoring moisture content and pressure in the gap between the pressure tube and the
calandria tube, which is done on a continuous basis. When detected, a faulty pressure tube can
be readily replaced.
The heavy water moderator and reflector in the calandria surrounding the pressure tubes are at
a relatively low temperature compared with that of the coolant flowing in the pressure tubes.
Because of this lower temperature, the moderator and reflector act as an energy sink in case of
certain reactor accidents. This heat sink is an important feature in the CANDU design because it
means that if the emergency core cooling system fails, some heat can be transferred from the
fuel to the moderator. The calandria itself is surrounded by light water in the reactor vault, thus
creating an additional short term heat sink for the moderator.
Most important are the engineered safeguards that protect the public from possible release of
fission products in the event of a component failure. As in most nuclear power plants, there are
four barriers that prevent the release of significant quantities of fission products to the envi-
ronment. These barriers are: the fuel itself, the fuel cladding, the primary heat transport system
boundary, and the containment building.
The first barrier is the uranium dioxide fuel, which is chemically inert even in high temperature
water and has a high melting point. Even under high temperature conditions, about 99% of all
radioactivity is trapped in the uranium dioxide matrix. This means that almost all solid fission
products are contained in the fuel under normal non-melting conditions.
The second barrier is the fuel cladding, which is a zirconium alloy sheath. This sheath is de-
signed to withstand the stress associated with fuel expansion and buildup of trapped fission
gases. Zirconium would be subject to damage should dryout and elevated temperatures occur
in the fuel channel. Provided the fuel bundles are kept flooded with coolant during accident
conditions, this barrier will remain intact.
The third barrier is the primary heat transport system boundary. This provides containment for
the coolant, which may contain fission products in the event of fuel cladding leakage. The
primary circuit is a closed loop and does not allow any fission products to go any further unless
it in turn has a leak.
The fourth and final barrier to fission product release is the prestressed low leakage concrete
Genealogy of CANDU Reactors – September 2014
Genealogy of CANDU Reactors 35
containment building. The building is maintained under a slightly negative pressure and is lined
with a plastic coating which limits the leakage of fission products in the event of overpressure
due to an accident. In addition, air exchange filters in the ventilation system remove any fission
products in the circulating air which is discharged to the atmosphere.
neutron absorption in the coolant. The fuel bundles are of the CANFLEX 43 element design, as
shown in Figure 17, which provides increased power output per bundle and hence per channel.
This design has fuel elements of two different sizes. There are 8 central elements 13.5 mm in
diameter and 35 outer elements 11.5 mm in diameter. A quick comparison between the
CANDU 6 and Darlington Generating Station shows the general trend of the conventional
CANDU design towards larger capacities, while a comparison between Darlington and the ACR
1000 shows somewhat of a reversal of this trend with current technical changes. Table 9 shows
some key technical parameters which illustrate this trend.
The table clearly shows the evolution of the ACR 1000. The 43-element fuel bundle provides an
average channel power of 6.13 MW (12 bundles) as opposed to 5.43 MW (12 bundles) and 5.54
MW (13 bundles). This in turn enables fewer channels to be used for an equivalent output,
resulting in a smaller reactor for the same output. Furthermore, the channel pitch has been
Genealogy of CANDU Reactors – September 2014
38 The Essential CANDU
reduced by 16% resulting in an even smaller reactor. The overall result is that the ACR 1000
reactor is about the same size as the CANDU 6, as illustrated in Figure 18. The heavy water
inventory has been reduced accordingly. The light water coolant eliminates a pressurized heavy
water circuit altogether, thereby effecting a further and major saving in inventory and heavy
water support systems. The low enriched uranium increases the burnup by a factor of about 2.5
and consequently decreases the amount of spent fuel. An additional reserve water system
provides a passive safety feature, making this a Generation III+ design. Other than these
important changes, there are many small improvements in the general operating conditions of
the heat transport system and steam cycle, giving an improvement in overall efficiency from
35.3% to 36.6%, which ultimately saves on fuel consumption.
9 Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements are extended to Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and to NB Power for use
of information, diagrams and photographs to support the text of this chapter.
The following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and excellent com-
ments during the development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of course
the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the author.
Bob Tapping
Jeremy Whitlock
Bhaskar Sur
Terry Rogers
George Bereznai
Thanks are also extended to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
CHAPTER 3
Nuclear Processes and Neutron Physics
prepared by
Dr. Guy Marleau
École Polytechnique de Montréal
Summary:
In this section, we first describe the nucleus, including its composition and the fundamental
forces that affect its behaviour. Then, after introducing the concepts of radioactivity and
nuclear decay, we discuss the various interactions between radiation and matter that can take
place in and around a nuclear reactor. We finish with a presentation of neutron physics for
fission reactors.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................3
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................... 3
1.2 Learning Outcomes......................................................................................................... 4
2 Structure of the Nucleus..........................................................................................................4
2.1 Fundamental Interactions and Elementary Particles...................................................... 4
2.2 Protons, Neutrons, and the Nuclear Force ..................................................................... 6
2.3 Nuclear Chart .................................................................................................................. 7
2.4 Nuclear Mass and the Liquid Drop Model.................................................................... 11
2.5 Excitation Energy and Advanced Nuclear Models ........................................................ 13
2.6 Nuclear Fission and Fusion ........................................................................................... 16
3 Nuclear Reactions ..................................................................................................................17
3.1 Radioactivity and Nuclear Decay .................................................................................. 17
3.2 Nuclear Reactions ......................................................................................................... 21
3.3 Interactions of Charged Particles with Matter.............................................................. 23
3.4 Interactions of Photons with Matter ............................................................................ 25
3.5 Interactions of Neutrons with Matter .......................................................................... 31
4 Fission and Nuclear Chain Reaction.......................................................................................36
4.1 Fission Cross Sections ................................................................................................... 36
4.2 Fission Products and the Fission Process...................................................................... 38
4.3 Nuclear Chain Reaction and Nuclear Fission Reactors ................................................. 42
4.4 Reactor Physics and the Transport Equation ................................................................ 44
5 Bibliography ...........................................................................................................................46
6 Summary of Relationship to Other Chapters.........................................................................47
List of Figures
Figure 1 Nuclear chart, where N represents the number of neutrons and Z the number of
protons in a nucleus. The points in red and green represent respectively stable and
unstable nuclei. The nuclear stability curve is also illustrated. ..............................................9
Figure 2 Average binding energy per nucleon (MeV) as a function of the mass number (number
of nucleons in the nucleus)....................................................................................................10
Figure 3 Saxon-Wood potential seen by nucleons inside the uranium-235 nucleus. ...................14
Figure 4 Shell model and magic numbers......................................................................................15
Figure 5 Decay chain for uranium-238 (fission excluded). The type of reaction (β or α-decay)
can be identified by the changes in N and Z between the initial and final nuclides. ............21
Figure 6 Microscopic cross section of the interaction of a high-energy photon with a lead atom.26
Figure 7 Photoelectric effect..........................................................................................................27
Figure 8 Compton effect. ...............................................................................................................29
Figure 9 Photonuclear cross sections for deuterium, beryllium, and lead....................................30
Figure 10 Cross sections for hydrogen (left) and deuterium (right) as functions of energy..........34
Figure 11 Cross sections for 235
92 U (left) and 92 U (right) as functions of energy. ........................34
238
Figure 12 Effect of temperature on U 238 absorption cross section around the 6.64-eV
resonance...............................................................................................................................35
Figure 14 Relative fission yield for 235 92 U as a function of mass number........................................38
Figure 13 Capture and fission cross sections of 235 92 U (left) and 92 U (right) as functions of
238
energy.....................................................................................................................................38
Figure 15 Fission spectrum for 235 92 U ..............................................................................................41
List of Tables
Table 1 Properties of the four fundamental forces .........................................................................5
Table 2 Properties of leptons and quarks ........................................................................................6
Table 3 Main properties of protons and neutrons. .........................................................................6
Table 4 Energy states in the shell model, where g is the degeneracy level of a state...................14
Table 5 Comparison of the energy, U, required for a fission reaction in a compound nucleus
with the energy, Q, available after a neutron collision with different isotopes. ...................37
Table 6 Average numbers of neutrons produced by the fission of common heavy nuclides........39
Table 7 Distribution of kinetic energy among the particles produced by a fission reaction. ........40
Table 8 Maximum values of the elastic scattering and absorption cross sections for 11 H , 21 D ,
and 12
6 C in the energy range 0.1 eV < E <0.1 MeV.................................................................43
1 Introduction
Energy production in an operating nuclear reactor is mainly the result of fission reactions
initiated by neutrons. Following these reactions, radiation is produced in the form of alpha
particles, electrons ( -particles), photons, and neutrons, as well as a large number of unstable
nuclei (including actinides and fission products) that may decay, thereby producing additional
radiation and energy. The neutrons generated directly in the fission reaction as well as those
resulting from fission product decay are a key factor in maintaining and controlling the chain
reaction as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Radiation also has an impact on the properties of
the various materials in the core as well as on living cells. It is therefore important to under-
stand how radiation interacts with matter if one needs, for example, to evaluate the radio-
toxicity of burned fuel (Chapter 19) or to determine the kind of barrier that must be put in
place to protect the public, the environment, or the personnel in a nuclear power plant
(Chapter 12). Moreover, the energy produced by these decays contributes to heating the fuel,
whether it is still in the reactor or in the spent fuel pools. The aim of this chapter is to provide
the reader with an overview of the nuclear processes that take place in and around a reactor.
1.1 Overview
Several very important processes take place simultaneously in a nuclear reactor, including
neutron slowdown as a result of collisions with nuclei, nuclear fission, and decay of radioactive
nuclei with radiation emissions that subsequently lose energy or are absorbed.
To understand how all these physical processes take place, it is important to possess a general
knowledge of the physics of the nucleus, including its composition and the fundamental forces
that affect its behaviour. Although one rarely uses a description of the nucleus in terms of
elementary particles and their interaction in power-reactor applications, such a description
provides a practical background for a study of nuclear structure. In fact, the nucleus is such a
complex object that it can be described only through simplified models that provide useful
information. For example, the liquid drop model (Section 2.4) gives an empirical description of
how one can extract energy from a nucleus by breaking it into smaller components (fission or
decay) or by combining nuclei (fusion). These models are also used to predict the stability of a
nucleus under various decay processes, the energy associated with its excited states, and the
associated gamma-ray spectrum. In Section 2, an overview of the structure of the nucleus is
provided, starting from a fundamental description and progressing to more practical models.
We will also introduce some language specific to nuclear physics that will be useful throughout
this book.
The majority of the fission reactions taking place in a reactor are initiated following the
absorption of a neutron by a heavy nucleus. Radioprotection also involves the interaction
between radiation, in the form of alpha particles, electrons, photons, and neutrons, and
matter. Two important points must then be addressed before describing the physics of
neutrons in a nuclear reactor: the source of this radiation and its behaviour over time, and the
interaction of the emitted particles with matter. Therefore, Section 3 is divided into three
parts: it starts with a description of radioactivity and the decay of nuclei, continues with a
description of the interaction of ionizing radiation with matter (everything but neutrons),
which is a very important topic for radiation protection studies, and ends with a brief discus-
sion of the interaction of neutrons with matter.
The last section of this chapter is dedicated to the nuclear chain reaction. It starts by giving an
extensive description of the fission reaction and discusses the need to slow down neutrons.
This is followed by a description of the neutron transport equation that can be used to charac-
terize the behaviour of neutrons inside a reactor.
e 2 zZ zZ
()
| F r |= 2 = (a e c) 2 ,
4pe0 r |r|
(1)
Gravitational Mass ≈ 10
In the standard model of particle physics [Halzen1984, Le Sech2010], these forces are repre-
sented by 12 virtual particles of spin 1 called “gauge bosons”:
the massless photon that carries the electromagnetic interaction;
eight massless gluons that carry the strong (colour) force;
three massive bosons (W± and Z ) that mediate the weak interaction.
These bosons are exchanged between the 12 “physical fermions” (spin 1/2 particles) that
make up all the matter in the universe:
six light fermions or leptons that have a weak charge. Three of these have no electric
charge (the neutrinos), while three are charged (electron, muon, and tau);
six heavy fermions or quarks that have colour, weak, and electric charges. These fermions
cannot exist freely in nature because of colour confinement and must be combined in trip-
lets of quarks or quark-antiquark pairs to form respectively baryons (protons, neutrons)
and mesons (pion, kaon) that have no net colour charge.
Leptons Quarks
Particle Mass (GeV/c2) Charge Particle Mass (GeV/c2) Charge
0.000511 −1 ≈ 0.003 2/3
< 2.5 × 10 0 ≈ 0.006 − 1/3
0.1057 −1 ≈ 1.2 2/3
< 0.000170 0 ≈ 0.1 − 1/3
1.7777 −1 ≈ 173 2/3
< 0.018 0 ≈ 4.1 − 1/3
Table 2 provides a description of the main properties of leptons and quarks with the masses
given in GeV/c2, with 1 GeV/c2≈ 1.782661 × 10 kg, and the charges in terms of the charge
of one electron [Le Sech2010].
pion. As a result, the nuclear force is much weaker than the strong force in the same way that
the Van der Waals force between neutral atoms is weaker than the electromagnetic force.
Moreover, in contrast to the strong colour force, the magnitude of the nuclear force decreases
rapidly with distance, the nuclear interaction being given approximately by the Yukawa poten-
tial:
mp cr
−
e
VYukawa (r) = −a N c , (2)
r
where is the mass of the pion (140 MeV/c2) and ≈ 14.5 is a constant that controls the
strength of the nuclear interactions between baryons (protons or neutrons). The minus sign
here indicates that the resulting force ( = − ∇ ) is always attractive. This potential is identi-
cal for proton-proton, proton-neutron, and neutron-neutron interactions.
The strength of this force at short distances is so intense that it can compensate for the
repulsive electromagnetic force between protons, leading to the formation of bonded nuclei
as well as inhibiting neutron decay. For example, the helium nucleus, which is composed of
two protons and two neutrons, is stable. Similarly, the stable deuteron is composed of one
proton and one neutron. The absence in nature of a nucleus composed of two protons is not a
result of the fact that the electromagnetic force is greater than the strong force, but rather
due to the exact structure of the nuclear force. In addition to having a spatial behaviour
provided by the Yukawa potential, this potential is also spin-dependent and repulsive between
particles with anti-parallel spins (a nucleus with two protons having parallel spins is not
permitted because of Pauli’s exclusion principle). This also explains why stable nuclei contain-
ing only neutrons are not seen in nature.
Two other terms are less frequently used: isobars, corresponding to nuclei having the same
mass numbers, but different values for and ; and isotones, corresponding to nuclei
having the same number of neutrons, but a different number of protons.
Several conclusions can be reached from Figure 1:
Isotopes containing a small number of protons ( < 20) will generally be stable only if
and are nearly equal. If the difference | − | is slightly too large, the nucleus becomes
unstable. For combination of protons and neutrons with large values of | − |, no nuclei
can be formed.
For nuclei with values of ranging from 20 to 82, the number of excess neutrons ( − )
required to create bonded nuclei increases steadily. One can also observe that for a spe-
cific value of , several stable nuclei can be produced with different numbers of neutrons.
No stable nucleus exists with > 83, although some radioactive nuclides with < 93 can
still be found in nature because they decay at a very slow rate. No isotope with above 92
remains in nature.
Approximately 3200 bonded nuclei have been identified, out of which 266 are stable. The
stability of a nucleus is ensured by the presence of a sufficient number of neutrons to com-
pensate for the effect of the Coulomb force between protons. Because the nuclear force acts
only at short distances, while the Coulomb force has a longer range, additional neutrons are
required when the radius of the nucleus increases because of the presence of more nucle-
ons (protons and neutrons):
R A1/3 R0 , (3)
where is the average radius of a single nucleon.
Figure 1 Nuclear chart, where N represents the number of neutrons and Z the number of
protons in a nucleus. The points in red and green represent respectively stable and unstable
nuclei. The nuclear stability curve is also illustrated.
The stability of a nucleus does not only depend on the number of nucleons it contains but also
on how these protons and neutrons are paired. For example, out of the 266 stable nuclei:
159 contain an even number of protons and of neutrons,
53 have an even number of protons, but an odd number of neutrons,
50 have an odd number of protons and an even number of neutrons, and
only 4 are made up of an odd number of protons and of neutrons.
In addition, for values of or equal to 8, 20, 50, 82, and 126, the number of stable nuclei is
very high. These numbers are known as “magic numbers”. They suggest that the neutrons
and protons, just like electrons in atoms, are more tightly bonded when they fill a quantum
energy shell (see Section 2.5).
The mass X of a nucleus produced by combining protons and neutrons is less than
the sum of the masses of its constituents:
m N Z X Z m p Nmn AB /c 2 , (4)
where 0, the average binding energy per nucleon, is the result of the negative potential
that binds the nucleons inside the nuclei. As can be seen in Figure 2, where a plot of as a
function of is provided for stable nuclei, first increases rapidly for low mass numbers,
reaching a maximum around 60, and then decreases slowly with . This means that, on
the average, nucleons are more tightly bonded inside nuclei having intermediate values of
(20 < 120) than for very low or very high values.
Figure 2 Average binding energy per nucleon (MeV) as a function of the mass number
(number of nucleons in the nucleus).
Information on the atomic mass of over 3000 isotopes is available in [Livermore2013]. Note
that the atomic mass is different from the nuclear mass of an isotope because it includes both
the mass and the binding energy of the electrons gravitating around the nucleus. One
simple way to compute the atomic mass is using
M N Z X Z M 1 H Nmn AB / c 2 , (5)
where the mass of the proton has been replaced by that of the hydrogen atom, which includes
the electron mass as well as its binding energy. The approximation sign comes from the fact
that the binding energy of each of the electrons around a heavy nucleus is different from
that of a single electron attached to a proton in the hydrogen atom.
Finally, the natural composition of a given element will include stable as well as some radioac-
tive isotopes. Assuming that the relative atomic abundance of isotope of atomic mass in
the natural element is , then the mass of the natural element is given by:
M X i M i . (6)
i
In reactor physics, one often works with the mass (or weight) fraction for the abundance of an
isotope, defined as:
iMi
wi . (7)
MX
For completeness, one can compute the isotopic concentration X of an element (atoms/cm3)
with atomic mass X (g/moles) and density (g/cm3) using:
Nuclear Physics - September 2014
Nuclear Processes and Neutron Physics 11
NX A , (8)
MX
where ℕA = 6.022 × 10 atoms/moles is the Avogadro number. The concentration of
isotope is then given by:
Ni i A iN X . (9)
MX
More information related to the isotopic contents of natural elements can be found in
[KAERI2013, WebElements2013].
1/ / ), each of the protons will interact with the remaining − 1 protons, leading to a
contribution of the form:
Z ( Z 1) Z2
ΔmC c aC
2
aC 1/3 , (13)
A1/3 A
where only the dominant term in has been preserved, and ≈ 0.7103 MeV.
It can be observed in the nuclear chart that stable nuclei with a low mass number generally
contain an equal number of protons and neutrons. As the number of excess neutrons or
protons in a nucleus increases, it becomes more and more unstable until no bonded state can
be produced. This means that nuclear binding should decrease as a function of | − | =
| − 2 |, the form of the contribution being
( A 2Z )2
Δm Ac 2 a A , (14)
A
where ≈ 23.69 MeV is known as the asymmetry term. The nuclear chart also shows that
few stable nuclei with an odd number of neutrons and protons (odd-odd nuclei) can be found
in nature, while the number of isotopes with an even number of protons and neutrons (even-
even nuclei) dominates. This means that the binding energy should be large for even-even
and small for odd-odd nuclei. Assuming that the contribution to the missing mass presented
previously remains valid only for odd-even or even-odd nuclei ( odd), an additional empirical
correction of the form
(1 1 )
A
ΔmP c ( 1) aP
2 Z
(15)
2 A3/4
is required. Here, ≈ 33.6 MeV is known as the pairing term.
The final formula for the missing mass is therefore
(1 1 )
A
2
Z2 ( A 2 Z )2
Δm X c 2 aV A aS A 3 aC 1
aA ( 1) Z a P , (16)
3
A 2 A3/4
A
which is known as the Bethe-Weizsäcker or semi-empirical mass formula (SEMF). Even if this
mechanistic model is relatively simple, it provides a very good approximation to the mass of
the nuclei found in nature. It can also be used to determine the value of that minimizes the
mass of a nucleus for a specific value of , thereby maximizing the probability that it is stable.
Neglecting the pairing term, one then obtains
4 Aa A A mn m p c 2
Z A 2
. (17)
8a A 2aC A 3
This equation, which is also illustrated in Figure 1 (the nuclear stability curve), closely follows
the nuclear stability profile.
The main weakness of the liquid drop model is its lack of predictive power. For example, it
neither explains the presence of “magic numbers”, nor the gamma-ray absorption spectrum,
nor the decay characteristics of different nuclei. These explanations can be obtained only by
looking at the interactions between protons and neutrons using quantum theory, as explained
in the next section.
/
where ≈ 30 MeV is the potential depth and ∝ is the radius of the nucleus in fm.
2V0 3
EN = N + , (19)
R mn 2
0 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
0 1 2 0 3 1 4 2 0
2 6 10 2 14 6 16 10 2
orbital 1s 1p 1d 2s 1f 2p 1g 2d 3s
EJ = 2
(
J J +1 ), (22)
2I
with 0,1,2, ⋯. For nucleus having an ellipsoid shape, only even values of are allowed,
and the energies satisfy the following relation:
3 1 1
E2 E4 E6 E8 , (23)
10 17 12
with
15 2
E2 = , (24)
2MR 2
where and are respectively the mass and radius of the nucleus. These energy levels are
generally much smaller than those associated with the shell model.
is larger than that of two identical nuclides containing /2 protons and neutrons:
A
2 E A/2 AB E A . (26)
2
In physical terms, this means that two lighter nuclides generally represent a lower energy state
than a heavier nucleus. Accordingly, a spontaneous reaction where the heavy nuclide, ,
breaks down into two smaller components ( and ) is permitted from an energy-
conservation point of view, with the energy released by the reaction given by + − .
This spontaneous reaction, called fission, has been observed experimentally for long-lived
actinides such as Th, U, and U, even though this is not their preferential decay
9
mode (seven in 10 decays of U follow this path). For example, the spontaneous fission
reaction
235
92
U ⇒ 2 10n + 133
50
Sn + 100
42
Mo, (27)
which releases 116 MeV, has been observed.
A second observation is that, even if a spontaneous fission reaction is very improbable, the
fission process can be initiated externally by an absorption collision between a projectile and a
heavy nuclide. For example, the neutron-induced reaction,
1
0 n 23592U 31 n0 133Sn
50
100
Mo
42 , (28)
is possible even with very low-energy neutrons and produces the same amount of energy as
the spontaneous fission reaction above. This reaction is facilitated by the fact that the main
interaction between the neutron and a nucleus is the attractive nuclear force. The fact that
several neutrons are generally produced following such reactions finally leads to the concept
of a controlled chain reaction, if sufficient neutrons are produced following a fission reaction
to initiate another fission reaction. The conditions required to achieve and maintain such a
chain reaction are discussed in Section 4.
Figure 2 also indicates that the nucleons inside very light nuclides are loosely bonded com-
pared to intermediate-mass nuclei. Combining two such nuclides could therefore result in a
nucleus that is more strongly bonded, again releasing energy. This process is called nuclear
fusion. Examples of such exothermal fusion reactions are
2
1 H 13 H 10n 42 He , (29)
Nuclear Physics - September 2014
Nuclear Processes and Neutron Physics 17
2
1 H 32 He 11 H 42 He , (30)
which release respectively 17.6 and 18.3 MeV in the form of kinetic energy for the final fusion
products. Producing such reactions is much more difficult than neutron-induced fission
because the two initial nuclides have positive charges and must overcome the Coulomb force
to come into close contact. This can be achieved by providing sufficient kinetic energy (plasma
temperature) for a sufficient long time (confinement) to ensure that the energy released by
fusion is greater than the energy required to reach these conditions (the break-even point).
The two main technologies that are currently able to attain the conditions necessary for
controlled nuclear fusion are based respectively on confinement by magnetic fields (Tokamak)
and inertial confinement (fusion by laser).
3 Nuclear Reactions
From the nuclear chart (Figure 1), it is clear that only 266 nuclides are stable. This means that
most of the bonded nuclei that can be created will decay. This raises two questions:
How do they decay?
How are they created?
Another observation is that if one succeeds in creating a nucleus (stable or not), it may not
necessarily be in its fundamental (ground) energy state (see Section 2.5). These are the main
questions to answer in the first part of this section. We start by discussing the decay process
before continuing with a description of nuclear reactions. The second topic involves the
interaction of particles with matter, with most of these particles being produced during the
decay process.
or equivalently have a lower mass). In fact, if one considers a nucleus at rest that decays
according to the following reaction:
N
A
Z X WB Y VCii b , (31)
i 1
N
m A X c m B Y c TB Y mCi bc 2 TCi b ,
2 2
(32)
Z W W Vi Vi
i 1
where is the kinetic energy of the different decay products. This reaction can take place
spontaneously only if
N N
TB Y TCi b m A X c m B Y c mCi bc 2 0,
2 2
(33)
W Vi Z W Vi
i 1 i 1
N
Z W Vi , (34)
i 1
N
A B Ci ,
i 1
(35)
that is, when the energy balance is favourable (the last two equations are for mass number
and charge conservation). For a nucleus in an excited state, the daughter nucleus will often be
the same as the parent nucleus, but at a different energy level (ground or lower-lying excited
state), the secondary particle being a photon (a -ray because the photon is produced follow-
ing a nuclear reaction).
Nuclear decay is characterized by a constant defined according to [Smith2000, Nikjoo2012]:
ΔN (t )
N (t )
lim , (36)
Δt 0 Δt
where is the number of nuclei present at time , Δ ( ) is the change (negative because
of the decay process) in the number of nuclei after time Δ , and is known as the decay
constant. This definition leads to the Bateman equation [Bell1982]:
dN (t )
N t S (t ), (37)
dt
where ( ) represents the net rate of production of nuclei (from the decay of other nuclei or
from nuclear reactions). One can also define
At N t , (38)
the activity of a radionuclide that represents the number of decays per second taking place at
time . This activity is generally stated in Becquerels (Bq), where 1 Bq corresponds to one
decay per second. For the case where = 0, the solution to the Bateman equation has the
form
Y
j 1
j 1. (43)
The decay constant associated with each channel is given by = . For example, potas-
sium-40 ( K), which has a mean life of 1.805 × 10 years, decays 89.28% of the time into
calcium-40 ( Ca = 0.8928) and 10.72% of the time into argon-40 ( Ar = 0.1072).
Note that the decay constant, , associated with a reaction can be evaluated using Fermi’s
second golden rule [Schiff1968]:
2
2
f |H ' |i ( f , Ξ) dΞ, (44)
f
where | is the wave function associated with the initial state, | is the wave function associ-
ated with a final state, and is the interaction potential associated with the reaction. The
integral is over phase space Ξ, with the term , Ξ being the density of state for the final
wave function.
The most common decay reactions are the following:
-ray emission for an excited nucleus:
X ∗ ⇒ X+ . (45)
This process corresponds to the direct ejection of an orbital electron leaving the nu-
cleus in an ionized state ( X ).
Neutron emission (nuclear interaction) for a nucleus having a very large neutron ex-
cess:
X⇒ X+ . (48)
Orbital electron capture (weak interaction) for a nucleus containing too many protons:
X⇒ Y+ . (50)
Proton emission (nuclear interaction) for a nucleus having a very large proton
excess:
X⇒ Y + = Y+ H . (51)
This process corresponds to the ejection of an atom of hydrogen.
Figure 5 Decay chain for uranium-238 (fission excluded). The type of reaction (β or α-decay)
can be identified by the changes in N and Z between the initial and final nuclides.
The main nuclear reactions of photons, electrons, neutrons, and charged heavy particles with
nuclei are often the inverses of the decay reactions presented earlier:
ray absorption:
ZA X ZA X .
*
(54)
electron capture:
e ZA X Z 1AY γ. (56)
positron capture:
e ZA X Z 1AY (57)
proton capture:
p11 ZA X ZA11Y . (58)
capture:
2
24 ZA X ZA42 Y . (59)
neutron capture:
A1
0n Z X Z X (60)
1 A
.
photon-induced fission:
ZA X C 10n YB F A BZCY G . (62)
neutron-induced fission:
A1 B C
0n Z X C 0n Y F Z Y G (63)
1 A 1 B
.
These reactions must obey the same conservation laws as those described earlier for the
decay reaction. For most reactions (except elastic scattering), the final nucleus will be in a
highly excited state and will decay rapidly by -ray emission (prompt photons).
The probability that any given reaction will take place between a nucleus and a particle is
represented by the microscopic cross section . Much like the decay constant, the cross
sections have a quantum mechanical interpretation and can be expressed in terms of the wave
function | associated with the initial state (the product of the wave functions of the projec-
tile and the nucleus), the wave function | associated with the final state, and , the interac-
tion potential. The differential cross section is then given by Fermi’s first golden rule, which
can be written as:
d 2V 2
f |H ' |i ( f ), (64)
dΞ vi
where is the volume of the system, is the velocity of the projectile (assuming that the
initial nucleus is at rest), and ( ) is again the density of states in the phase space Ξ for final
particles. The cross section, which is then the integration over the final phase space of the
differential cross section, has units of surface. The most common unit used for the micro-
scopic cross section is the barn (b), with 1 b = 10 cm = 10 m .
These cross sections are very difficult to evaluate explicitly because of the complexity of the
wave functions (the wave function for a nucleus is the product of the wave functions of all the
nucleons in the nucleus bonded by the nuclear potential) and the interaction potential. These
are generally evaluated experimentally, and the results are stored in evaluated nuclear data
files. A software package such as Janis can be used to retrieve and analyze these cross sec-
tions [OECD-NEA2013]. For computational reactor physics, the NJOY program is generally
used to process the cross-section databases for neutron-induced reactions [MacFarlane2010].
nZ A. (65)
M
The energy loss per unit distance traveled by the particle inside the material (− / ),
known as the stopping power, is then given by the Bethe-Block formula [Smith2000,
Leroy2009]:
( )
2
dE za e c
−
dx collision
= 4pn
mv 2
()
(L v − F v ), () (66)
where is the speed of the particle and ( ) the stopping number, which can be written as
2mv 2
L = ln − (v / c) 2 , (67)
I (1− (v / c) )
2
where is the mean excitation potential for the atomic electrons in this material. The correc-
tion term, , takes into account the fact that the atomic electrons are bonded as well as
other quantum effects. For electrons, one must also consider the energy lost by synchrotron
radiation, which is given approximately by [Leroy2009]:
dE a e3 2
− ≈ Zn , (68)
dx radiation me
where is the mass of the electron. Here, it is assumed that the kinetic energy of the
electrons ≪ .
For heavy particles (protons, -particles), nuclear slowing-down, − / nuclear , becomes
important when they reach a low energy.
The CSDA range of a particle is defined as the distance (path of flight) that it must travel to
lose all its kinetic energy. It is computed as
T
1
R= ∫ dE
dE, (69)
0
−
dx total
where is the initial kinetic energy of the particle and
dE dE dE dE
. (70)
dx total dx collision dx radiation dx nuclear
These CSDA expressions are helpful to understand the general behaviour of particles slowing
down in a material. However, for practical applications, tabulated values for − / and
are more useful. This type of information for electrons, protons, and -particles can be found
on-line for various elements and different material compositions on the National Institute of
Standard and Technology Web sites [Berger2013a]. The databases available are:
ESTAR, for electrons;
PSTAR, for protons;
ASTAR, for -particles.
For heavy particles, this site also provides information on nuclear stopping power. Also note
that the stopping power and range are defined in a somewhat different way from the notation
above. The following expressions are used instead:
1
dE / dx (MeV cm 2 / g ) dE /dx (MeV / cm) (71)
and
R(g / cm2 ) R (cm) (72)
because these are the conventional units used in radiation shielding studies. Note that the
number of electron/ion pairs produced per unit distance in a material is given approximately
by
dn pairs 1 dE
= − , (73)
dx W dx total
where is the average energy required to ionize an atom in this material.
Figure 6 Microscopic cross section of the interaction of a high-energy photon with a lead
atom.
The five main reactions taking place between high-energy photons and matter that are of
interest in nuclear reactor-related studies are:
Photoelectric effect;
Rayleigh scattering;
Compton scattering;
Pair production; and
Photonuclear reactions.
With each such reaction is associated a macroscopic cross section Σ , representing the
probability per unit distance travelled by a photon of energy that an interaction of type
has taken place in material . The macroscopic cross section takes into account the probabili-
ties of interaction both between single photons and between particles and the fact that the
material contains , particles of type per unit volume:
where , is the microscopic cross section of the interaction of a photon of energy with
a particle of type through reaction (see Section 3.2). The total microscopic photon cross
section can be expressed as:
( E ) Photoelectric ( E ) Rayleigh ( E ) Compton ( E ) Pair production ( E ) Photonuclear ( E ). (75)
Nuclear Physics - September 2014
Nuclear Processes and Neutron Physics 27
Examples of microscopic cross sections for the interaction of photons with a lead atom are
presented in Figure 6.
Let us now describe in detail the five reactions contributing to and discuss their respec-
tive dependences on the energy of the incident photon.
( ) (c) ,
3
32 2pZ a me c
5 6 2 2
( ) e 2
s Photoelectric,K E ≈ 7
(78)
( )
3 E 2
which is valid, within 2%, for photon with energies ranging from 100 keV to 200 MeV. The
total photoelectric cross section (the sum over all energy shells) is given approximately by
[Leroy2009]:
Photoelectric E Photoelectric, K E 1 0.01481 ln Z 0.000788 ln Z
2 3
. (79)
Clearly, this cross section decreases rapidly with photon energy. It is dominant only for pho-
tons of energies less than a few tenths of an MeV.
Several processes can take place after this reaction. If the electron ejected from the atom was
initially in the valence band, the ionized atom is in its ground state, and no further radiation
emission is observed. When electrons coming from more tightly bonded energy levels are
ejected, the ionized atom is left in an excited state. This excited ion can then decay to its
ground state by two different means. First, an electron in a much higher energy state (i.e., a
valence electron) can emit a photon and fill the vacant energy level. The electron can also
come from a slightly higher energy level, leaving the ion in a less excited state that will further
decay before reaching its ground state. When the photons emitted in these successive decays
are absorbed by less-bonded electrons, so-called soft Auger electrons are ejected from the
atom, producing an Auger electron cascade.
where ( , , ) is the atomic form factor that represents the effect of the electrons sur-
rounding the nucleus on the scattering of a photon at an angle with respect to the initial
photon direction. Several theoretical expressions for ( , , ) are available in the literature
for different values of and various energy ranges. For example, when the photon energy is
greater than 100 keV, the main contributors to Rayleigh scattering are the electrons in the K-
shell, and the relativistic Bethe-Levinger form factor is used [Hubbell1975]:
(
F E,q,Z = ) sin(2gatan(Q))
, (81)
( )
g
gQ 1+ Q 2
with
(
Q E,q,Z = ) 2E sin(q / 2)
a e Zme c 2
, (82)
( ) ( )
2
g Z = 1+ a e Z . (83)
Because Rayleigh scattering is never the dominant photon reaction (see Figure 6) for the
photon energy range considered in nuclear reactors, its contribution to the total cross section
is often neglected.
with E / (mec 2 ) This cross section decreases with energy, but much more slowly than for
the photoelectric effect. It dominates the photoelectric reaction for energies above approxi-
mately 0.5 MeV.
energies in the range found in nuclear reactors, the cross section for this reaction is given
approximately by [Leroy2009]:
2
c 28 218 129
Pair production E e Z e 2 ln 2
2
, (86)
mec 9 17 20
with E / (mec 2 ). This cross section vanishes for 1.02 MeV and is larger than the
Compton cross section above a few MeV.
( )
3
E − 2.226
s 2 D,Photonuclear (E) ≈ C 2 D (87)
E 3
is often used, where , the photon energy, is given in MeV, D varies between 0.061 and
0.0624, and D is in barns. The end result of such a photonuclear reaction is a hydrogen
atom and a fast neutron that can initiate a fission reaction (see Section 2.6).
Tabulated values for Rayleigh scattering (coherent scattering), photoelectric effect, Compton
scattering (incoherent scattering), and pair production cross sections with different atoms or
materials and for energies ranging from 1 keV to 100 GeV are available on-line on the Web site
of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [Berger2013b]. For photonuclear
reactions, the energy-dependent cross sections for various isotopes can be obtained using the
OECD-NEA Janis software [OECD-NEA2013].
For each reaction presented above, the photons first transfer all their energy to an electron or
a nucleus following a collision. As a result, starting with ( , , Ω) photons of energy and
direction Ω incident at point on a material of uniform macroscopic cross section ( ), the
number of initial photons ( , + Ω, Ω) still present after a distance has been crossed is
given by [Basdevant2005]:
E s
n E , r sΩ,Ω n E , r , Ω e . (88)
The number of photons therefore decreases exponentially with distance. This behaviour is
similar to what is observed when light is attenuated by passing through a material with a
linear attenuation coefficient ( ) = ( ). Secondary photons produced with energy and
direction Ω following the absorption of photons of energy ′ and direction Ω′ will also
contribute to the total population of photons at point + Ω. The equation that describes the
photon population in a material, assuming a constant neutron incident population, is the static
photon transport equation, which takes the form [Pomraning1991]:
Ω n E , Ω, r E n E , Ω, r dE ' dΩ' s E ' E , Ω ' Ω n E ' , Ω ' , r , (89)
small, or simply included in the absorption cross section. The probability that the neutron
interacts with a nucleus is then given by the total cross section, σ, where
σ( En ,i ) σ absorption ( En ,i ) σ scattering ( En,i ) , (90)
Elastic potential scattering is an interaction in which kinetic energy is conserved and the
neutron does not penetrate the nucleus. As a result, the neutron is slowed down, transferring
part of its energy to the nucleus. For a collision between a neutron with an initial kinetic
energy , and a nucleus of mass X at rest, the final neutron kinetic energy , (momentum
and energy conservation) will be given by [Bell1982]:
A 1 2 A cos ,
En ,i
En , f 2
(92)
1 A
2
where = X / and , the scattering angle for the final neutron in the centre of mass
system, is related to the scattering angle in the laboratory system by
A cos 1
cos . (93)
A2 1 2 A cos
On average, the neutron will lose an energy Δ :
E
1 E
n ,i , (94)
2
A 1 ,
2
α (95)
A 1
2
after each collision. Because Δ decreases as increases, neutron slowing-down (also called
moderation) is more efficient when scattering collisions with light rather than heavy nuclei are
involved.
For low-energy neutrons, the potential scattering cross section in the centre of mass system is
nearly constant and has the form [Bell1982]:
s = 4pR 2 , (96)
where is the nuclear radius for this material. At higher energy, one can use Fermi’s golden
rules to obtain an approximation for of the form
2 sin 2 d
s (E) = 4p , (97)
2mn E
where represents the phase shift of the neutron wave function in isotropic scattering.
Inelastic scattering and absorption reactions generally proceed by creation of a compound
nucleus:
n ZA X AZ1 X n' ZA X ,
* *
(98)
The creation of the compound nucleus is a resonant reaction because the resulting weakly
bonded nucleus can exist only if it corresponds to an excitation state of X. The lifetime of
this excited nucleus is generally very short ( ≈ 10 s), and with each decay channel ,
including inelastic scattering, is associated a resonance width given by [Bell1982]:
Γk , (100)
k
with being the mean life for decay through this channel. The total resonance width for the
creation of the excited nucleus Γ is then given by
Γ Γk . (101)
For light nuclei, Γinelastic ≫ Γabsorption , and the inelastic scattering process dominates. For
heavy nuclei, the reverse is true (absorption dominates). The resonance widths for inelastic
scattering also increase with energy, the explicit dependence being
inelastic E n E 0 E , (102)
E E0
2
2
where is the orbital-angular-momentum quantum number. For a nucleus that decays
through channel , the cross section is
k
k E A 1 X E . (104)
Z
Note that at low energy ( ≪ ), Γ = Γ √ ,
2 0 k 0
k E 2l 1 , (105)
2m E v
and the cross section is a function of 1/ , with being the incoming neutron velocity.
Figure 10 Cross sections for hydrogen (left) and deuterium (right) as functions of energy.
Examples of cross sections for light (hydrogen and deuterium) and heavy nuclei ( U and
U) are presented in Figure 10 and Figure 11. For light nuclides, the scattering process
clearly dominates. One can also observe that the total cross section of hydrogen is about ten
times larger than that of deuterium (better scattering nucleus for neutron moderation). With
absorption representing 10% of the total cross section of hydrogen, one out of ten collisions
will lead to neutron capture. For deuterium, the ratio of neutron absorptions to collisions is
closer to 1%, making this isotope a better neutron moderator overall. For heavy nuclides, the
absorption reaction is the most prevalent and exhibits a very large number of resonances. At
very high energy, these resonances do not disappear, but are so closely packed that they
produce a nearly continuous cross section.
(
s k E,T =) 1
2mE
∫ ( ) ( )
vn − v X s k vn − v X p E X dE X , (106)
where and X are the velocity of the neutron and the nucleus respectively. Here, X X
is the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, which represents the probability of finding a nucleus
with energy in the range X < < X + X due to thermal motion:
2
p E X dE X E X e E X /( k BT )dE X , (107)
k BT
3/2
where is the Boltzmann constant. This thermal motion of nuclei has no impact on cross
sections exhibiting 1/ behaviour (i.e., absorption cross sections of hydrogen at low energy).
At low neutron energies, the scattering cross section for light nuclides also exhibits 1/
behaviour and is not affected by this transformation, although the energy distribution of the
final neutrons resulting from these collisions will be such that they end up in thermal equilib-
rium with the nuclides in the medium [Bell1982].
The thermal motion of atoms also changes the form of resonant cross sections by reducing the
height of the resonance while increasing its width (see Figure 12). This widening of the
resonance is known as the Doppler effect.
Figure 12 Effect of temperature on U 238 absorption cross section around the 6.64-eV reso-
nance.
The neutron-nucleus interaction cross sections are very complex and in most cases are evalu-
ated using a combination of theory and experiment. They are generally tabulated in evaluated
nuclear data files that can be read by nuclear calculation software (NJOY, for example)
[MacFarlane2010]. They can also be extracted on-line from nuclear databases or off-line using
the Janis software [KAERI2013, Livermore2013, OECD-NEA2013].
Once the energy-dependent cross sections are known, one can easily evaluate the number of
reactions of type per second (the reaction rate , ( )) taking place inside a region of
3
volume V containing nuclei per cm of a material (cross section σ , ) with a
3
population of ( ) neutrons per cm having a velocity = 2 / :
N m m , x v n v
Rm, x v V V m, x v v , (108)
v
Nuclear Physics - September 2014
36 The Essential CANDU
with part of the energy carried by the neutrons and the lighter nuclei. These lighter nuclei
rapidly lose their energy in matter (see Section 3.3), thereby producing heat that is removed
by the coolant and transformed to electricity.
Not all the neutrons produced after this reaction initiate a fission reaction. A number of them
are absorbed by material without producing a fission reaction. Others simply leave the system
(with or without collisions). Provided that on average a single neutron per fission reaction can
initiate a new fission, a controlled exothermal chain reaction can be established. Establishing
such a chain reaction looks relatively simple; however, this is far from the case, as shown in
the following subsections.
Table 5 Comparison of the energy, U, required for a fission reaction in a compound nucleus
with the energy, Q, available after a neutron collision with different isotopes.
Th 5.1 5.9
U 6.6 5.5
U 6.4 5.8
U 4.9 5.9
Pu 6.4 5.5
As shown in Figure 13, the energy dependence of the fission cross sections for U and U
reflects the behaviour described above. The probability that a neutron of energy < 1.0
MeV will collide with U and result in a fission reaction is very low. For U, there is no
lower limit on the neutron energy, and the fission probability increases as the energy of the
neutron decreases. The neutron capture cross section (neutron absorption followed by
photon emission) for U dominates at low energy, while for U, it remains relatively small
compared to the fission cross section (approximately 10%) over the full energy range. As a
result, most neutron absorption in U will lead to fission followed by production of new
neutrons (neutrons are regenerated). For U, a collision with a neutron having energy below
the fission threshold will lead to a net neutron loss. As a result, the natural uranium fuels used
in CANDU reactors (0.72 atomic% of U) will be much less reactive (prone to fission) than
the enriched fuels (enrichment factors ranging from 2.5 to 5 atomic% of U) used in light
water reactors (LWR).
Y
I
I 2, (111)
assuming that only two nuclei are produced by each fission reaction. As one can see in Figure
14, where the fission yields of all the nuclei resulting from the fission of U are plotted as a
function of their mass number, the fission process favours the production of relatively light
nuclides (90 A 105) combined with heavier isotopes (130 A 145).
The average number of neutrons emitted by the fission process (see Table 6) is relatively
small compared to the neutron excess − > 40 required for heavy isotopes to exist. The
value of for a given reaction depends on the nature of the fissile nuclides, the fission prod-
ucts released, and the energy of the neutrons. Most fission products are therefore very
neutron-rich and unstable. They will reach stability through two main processes: decay
and neutron emission. All the transformations that take place within 10 s of the fission
reaction are generally included in the so-called prompt contribution (prompt neutrons,
prompt electrons, and prompt photons). Particles produced on a longer time scale (from
milliseconds to minutes) due to decay of isotopes with longer mean lifetimes are called
delayed.
Table 6 Average numbers of neutrons produced by the fission of common heavy nuclides.
Th 0 2.2
U 2.50 2.6
U 2.43 2.6
U 0 2.6
Pu 2.89 3.1
The fission reaction (see Section 2.6) also releases a large amount of kinetic energy (on the
order of 200 MeV) that is distributed between fission products, neutrons, -rays, etc. (see
Table 7). Clearly, the fission products carry most of the energy, and because of their very short
range in matter, this energy heats the nuclear fuel. Similarly, the charged electrons (
particles) also lose most of their energy in the fuel. The highly penetrating -rays will end up
depositing their energy in the reactor structures, while the weakly interacting neutrinos will
generally be lost to the environment. Finally, for LWR and CANDU reactors, only a very small
part of the neutron energy will be transferred to the fuel in the form of heat, with most of it
being lost to the environment (mostly through slowing-down in the moderator).
Table 7 Distribution of kinetic energy among the particles produced by a fission reaction.
Prompt -rays 7
Delayed -rays 7
Electrons 8
Neutrinos 12
Neutrons 7
Total 207
Note that the data presented in Table 7 represent average values, meaning that the neutrons
produced in the fission process have an energy distribution. The probability that a neutron of
energy is produced in the fission process, which is known as the fission spectrum, ( ), is
often approximated by the Watt relationship [Watt1952]:
En Ce aEn sinh
bEn , (112)
where and are constants associated with the isotope undergoing fission and depend
weakly on the incident neutron energy. The normalization factor is defined so that
E dE
0
n n 1 (113)
capture cross sections and thereby can have a considerable negative impact on the neutron
population in the fuel where they are produced. For this reason, they are often called neutron
poisons. Examples of poisons that have a large impact on nuclear-reactor operation are Xe
( = 3.1 × 10 b) and Sm ( = 6.1 × 10 b). A second observation is that most of these
nuclides are unstable and decay naturally through one of the reactions described in Section
3.1. These reactions produce both particles, including delayed neutrons, and energy that is
often deposited in the fuel. These delayed neutrons play an important role in the control of
nuclear reactors, as will be explained in Chapter 5. Moreover, energy will still be produced in
the fuel for a long time after the controlled fission reaction has been stopped, due to the
decay of fission products. This is the main source of the heat produced in neutron-irradiated
nuclear fuels (some energy is also produced through photonuclear fission). This residual heat
is removed from shut-down reactors and irradiated fuel pools by continuously circulating the
coolant.
where is the neutron flux. The production term has two contributions: decay from other
nuclei, and transformation of a different nucleus into following a neutron-induced nuclear
reaction:
Nuclear Physics - September 2014
42 The Essential CANDU
PI t Y J N J t Y N J t σ J , x E E dE ,
d
J ,I
x
J ,I (117)
J J x 0
where , is the yield for the production of isotope from the decay of isotope , while , is
the isotope production yield from a reaction of type (fission, capture, etc.) between a
neutron and isotope .
by leaving the reactor. A neutron slowing-down material, the moderator, must therefore be
introduced into the reactor to serve this purpose.
Table 8 Maximum values of the elastic scattering and absorption cross sections for 11 H , 21 D ,
and 12
6 C in the energy range 0.1 eV < E <0.1 MeV.
H 18 0.17
D 3.4 0.00025
C 4.6 0.0016
For this moderator, two questions are of prime importance: what should be its composition,
and where should it be located? The first question is easily answered by combining the kinet-
ics of the neutron-nucleus collision and a survey of the scattering and absorption cross sec-
tions of the most promising candidates. In Section 3.5, we concluded that the slowing-down
efficiency of a nucleus increases as its mass number decreases, which points to the use of light
nuclides as moderators. The most promising candidates are the isotopes of hydrogen and
carbon that are readily available in water and graphite. Table 8 provides the maximum values
of the elastic scattering and absorption cross sections for H, D, and C in the energy range
0.1 eV < < 0.1 MeV. As one can see, H is the best moderator if one does not take into
account its absorption cross section. However, up to one in ten collisions of a neutron with H
could lead to absorption (for 1eV neutrons). On the other hand, even if the number of colli-
sions required to slow down neutrons using D and C is significantly higher (the distance the
neutron will travel between collisions is longer), less than 0.007% of the collisions with D and
0.03% of the collisions with C (1 eV neutron) lead to capture. Accordingly, if one wants to
build a core that is compact, a H-based moderator is a requirement (light water, for example
in LWR); otherwise the best candidate is a moderator that contains large concentrations of D
(heavy water in CANDU).
Now let us try to answer the question of the spatial distribution of this moderator. Two very
different options can be considered: a homogeneous mixture of fuel and moderator, and small
isolated fuel elements placed strategically in the moderator. Again, the answer to this ques-
tion can be inferred from Figure 13. The neutrons in a homogeneous mixture of fuel and
moderator materials have a large chance of colliding with fuel isotopes as they are slowing
down. This means that neutrons with energies in the “resonance” range (4 eV < < 10 keV)
will be in direct contact with fuel nuclides. Because their capture cross sections at resonance
energies increase, often by several orders of magnitude with respect to the background value,
neutron capture will have a detrimental effect on the number of neutrons that can reach
energies below 1 eV. On the other hand, by separating different fuel elements by a sufficient
amount of moderating materials to ensure that a maximum number of neutrons escape the
resonance energy range, one decreases neutron loss by capture and increases the probability
of fission.
These are the general physics considerations that led to current reactor designs, including the
pressurized water (PWR) and CANDU reactors. In the next section, we conclude this chapter
Nuclear Physics - September 2014
44 The Essential CANDU
by introducing the neutron transport equation, which provides a means to evaluate numeri-
cally the neutron population in the reactor and to determine whether a given reactor concept
can lead to a sustained chain reaction. This equation also provides the neutron flux that is
required to follow the evolution of the fuel and the fission products in the reactor using the
Bateman equation.
where is the reactor volume, ( , , , Ω) is the flux of neutrons with energy and direc-
tion Ω at a point in space and a time , and Σ , ( , , ) is the macroscopic fission cross
section for isotope given by
f ,J r , t, E N J r , t f ,J E , (119)
where Σ is the total cross section and ( , , , Ω) the rate of collision per unit volume of
neutrons with energy and direction Ω at point and time . This term includes both
absorbed and scattered neutrons. Some neutrons will be lost to migration when the net flow
of neutrons reaching a region in space of volume is different from that leaving this same
region. This rate of neutron loss due to migration is given by
( ) (
LM r,t, E, Ω dt = −Ω ⋅ ∇f r ,t, E, Ω dt, ) (121)
meaning that neutrons, which can be considered to form a gas, tend to move towards regions
of low neutron population (the kinetic theory of gas). Neutron with energy and direction Ω
can also be produced in this region of space due to scattering of neutrons with different
directions and energies:
SS
r , t , E , Ω dt dE' d 2 Ω' s r , t , E ' E , Ω ' Ω r , t , E ' , Ω ' dt , (122)
0 4
where ( ) is the fission spectrum and the average number of neutrons produced by
fission of isotope . Neutron productions from other sources , , , Ω can also be added
to the balance, for example, sources for other types of nuclear reactions (photonuclear fission
and photoneutron production in D) or flux-independent contributions from the decay of
radioactive isotopes.
The global neutron population will then satisfy the following balance equation:
(
1 df r ,t, E, Ω )
v dt
( ) ( ) ( )
= LC r ,t, E, Ω + LM r,t, E, Ω + S S r ,t, E, Ω + S F r ,t, E, Ω + S E r,t, E, Ω , (124)( ) ( )
which is known as the Boltzmann transport equation. If one assumes that the cross sections
are nearly constant over time (the change in the composition of the materials in the reactor
varies substantially only over long time periods) and that the core is at static equilibrium (the
flux remains constant), one obtains the following time-independent neutron transport equa-
tion [Lewis1993]:
Ω r , E , Ω r , E r , E , Ω
' ' ' ' 1
' ' '
0 4
dE'
d Ω 2
s
'
r ,
E E , Ω Ω r , E , Ω j
k j
E
dE '
j f ,J r , E d 2 '
Ω r , E ,Ω ,
0 4
(125)
where is known as the multiplication factor. It is inserted in the transport equation to
modify the fission rate in such a way as to reach this static equilibrium. When = 1, equilib-
rium is achieved, and the reactor is critical. For < 1, the reactor is sub-critical, and neutron
generation is insufficient to compensate for losses, whereas for > 1, the reactor is super-
critical, and neutron production exceeds losses.
For reactor calculations, where fission reactions take place only inside the core, boundary
conditions of the form
f rB , E, Ω = 0 for Ω ⋅ N < 0 ( ) (126)
are generally imposed on the transport equation. Here, the point is on the outer boundary
of the reactor, with being a unit vector normal to this boundary and directed outwards. This
condition simply means that no neutrons will enter the reactor from the outside.
The static transport equation is an eigenvalue equation, with being the inverse of the
eigenvalue. Therefore, the neutron flux is the eigenvector for this equation and is only defined
to within a normalization constant. Therefore, if , , Ω is a solution, so is , ,Ω ,
with an arbitrary constant. For reactor calculations, the normalization constant is directly
related to the power produced in the core.
Solving the transport problem is not trivial, even for very simple cases (static, one velocity
neutrons in one dimension). In Chapters 4 (static) and 5 (time-dependent), approximation to
and simplification of the transport equation commonly used in reactor simulations will be
discussed. One should then be able to extract, from the solutions of the resulting simplified
equations, information useful for the design, operation, and control of nuclear reactors.
5 Bibliography
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Springer, New York, 2005.
[Bell1982] G. I. Bell, S. Glasstone, Nuclear Reactor Theory. Robert E. Krieger, Malabar, 1982.
[Berger2013a] M. J. Berger, J. S. Coursey, M. A. Zucker, J. Chang, J., ESTAR, PSTAR, and ASTAR:
Computer Programs for Calculating Stopping-Power and Range Tables for Electrons,
Protons, and Helium Ions, http://physics.nist.gov/Star, visited April 2013.
[Berger2013b] M. J. Berger, J. H. Hubbel, S. M. Seltzer, J. Chang, J. S. Coursey, R. Sukumar, D. S.
Zucker, K. Olsen, XCOM: Photon Cross Section Database,
http://www.nist.gov/pml/data/xcom, visited April 2013.
[Bjorken1964] J. D. Bjorken, S. D. Drell, Relativistic Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill, New
York, 1964.
[Brookhaven2013] National Nuclear Data Center at Brookhaven National Laboratory:
http://www.nndc.bnl.gov/chart/, visited April 2013.
[Griffiths2005] D. J. Griffiths, Introduction to Quantum Mechanics, Pearson Canada, Toronto,
2005.
[Duderstadt1979] J. J. Duderstadt, W. R. Martin, Transport Theory. Wiley, New York, 1979.
[Halzen1984] F. Halzen, A. Martin, Quarks and Leptons: An Introductory Course in Modern
Particle Physics. Wiley, New York, 1984.
[Hébert2009] A. Hébert, Applied Reactor Physics. Presses Internationales Polytechnique,
Montréal, QC, 2009.
[Hubbell1975] J. H. Hubbell, W. J. Veigele, E. A. Briggs, R. T. Brown, D. T. Cromer, and R. J.
Howerton, “Atomic form factors, incoherent scattering functions, and photon scatter-
ing cross sections”, J. Phys. Chem. Ref. Data, 4, 471-538, 1975.
[Jauch1976] J. M. Jauch, F. Rohrlich, The Theory of Photons and Electrons. Springer-Verlag,
New York, 1976.
[KAERI2013] Nuclear Data Center at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute:
http://atom.kaeri.re.kr/ton/, visited April 2013.
[Leroy2009] C. Leroy, P.-G. Rancoita, Principle of Radiation Interaction in Matter and Detection,
2nd edition. World Scientific, Singapore, 2009.
[Le Sech2010] C. Le Sech, C. Ngô, Physique nucléaire : Des quarks aux applications. Dunod,
Paris, 2010.
[Lewis1993] E. E. Lewis and W. F. Miller, Jr., Computational Methods of Neutron Transport, 2nd
edition. Wiley, New York, 1993.
[Livermore2013] Isotope Evaluation at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory:
http://ie.lbl.gov/toi2003/MassSearch.asp, visited April 2013.
[MacFarlane2010] R. E. MacFarlane, A. C. Kahler, “Methods for Processing ENDF/B-VII with
NJOY”, Nuclear Data Sheets, 111, 2739-2890, 2010.
[Magill2005] J. Magill and J. Galy, Radioactivity, Radionuclides, Radiation. Springer: Heidelberg,
2005.
[Nikjoo2012] H. Nikjoo, S. Uehara, D. Emfietzoglou, Interaction of Radiation with Matter. CRC
Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2012.
[OECD-NEA2013] OECD-NEA Janis 3.0, Java-Based Nuclear Data Display Program.
https://www.oecd-nea.org/janis, visited April 2013.
[Pomraning1991] G. C. Pomraning, Linear Kinetic Theory and Particle Transport in Stochastic
Mixtures. World Scientific, London, 1991.
[Schiff1968] L. I. Schiff, Quantum Mechanics. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1968.
[Smith2000] F. A. Smith, A Primer of Applied Radiation Physics. World Scientific, Singapore,
2000.
[Watt1952] B. E. Watt, “Energy spectrum of neutrons from thermal fission of U”, Phys. Rev.
87, 1037-1041, 1952.
[WebElements2013] WebElements: The Periodic Table on the Web.
http://www.webelements.com/isotopes.html, visited April 2013.
[Wong2004] S. S. M. Wong, Introductory Nuclear Physics. Wiley-VCH, Weinheim, 2004.
Chapter 5 covers the time-dependent neutron-diffusion equations and studies the phenomena
of fast-neutron kinetics, fission-product poisoning, reactivity coefficients, etc., in reactors.
Chapter 12 deals with radioprotection and uses the concept defined in the present chapter for
the interactions of charged particles, photons, and neutrons with matter with the goal of
reducing the damage to living tissues.
Chapter 19 examines the behaviour of fuel after irradiation in a nuclear reactor, particularly its
composition and the residual energy that it produces.
7 Acknowledgments
The following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and excellent com-
ments during the development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of
course the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the author.
Marv Gold
Esam Hussein
Thanks are also extended to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final
copy.
CHAPTER 4
Reactor Statics
Prepared by
Dr. Benjamin Rouben, 12 & 1 Consulting, Adjunct Professor, McMaster University & University
of Ontario Institute of Technology (UOIT)
and
Dr. Eleodor Nichita, Associate Professor, UOIT
Summary:
This chapter is devoted to the calculation of the neutron flux in a nuclear reactor under special
steady-state conditions in which all parameters, including neutron flux, are constant in time.
The main calculation method explored in this chapter is the neutron-diffusion equation. Analyti-
cal solutions are derived for simple neutron-diffusion problems in one neutron energy group in
systems of simple geometry. Two-group diffusion theory and the approximate representation of
the diffusion equation using finite differences applied to a discrete spatial mesh are introduced.
The rudimentary reactor-physics design of CANDU reactors is presented. The two-step approach
to neutronics calculations is presented: multi-group lattice transport calculations, followed by
full-core, few-group diffusion calculations. Finally, the chapter covers fuel-property evolution
with fuel burnup and specific features of CANDU neutronics resulting from on-line refueling.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3
1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 Learning Outcomes ............................................................................................................. 3
2 Neutron Diffusion Theory ....................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Time-Independent Neutron Transport ............................................................................... 4
2.2 Fick’s Law and Time-Independent Neutron Diffusion......................................................... 7
2.3 Diffusion Boundary Condition with Vacuum at a Plane Boundary ..................................... 9
2.4 Energy Discretization: The Multi-Group Diffusion Equation............................................. 12
3 One-Group Diffusion in a Uniform Non-Multiplying Medium.............................................. 12
3.1 Plane Source...................................................................................................................... 13
3.2 Point Source ...................................................................................................................... 14
3.3 Flux Curvature in Source-Sink Problems and Neutron In-Leakage ................................... 16
4 One-Group Diffusion in a Uniform Multiplying Medium with No External Source .............. 16
4.1 Uniform Infinite Reactor in One Energy Group................................................................. 17
4.2 Uniform Finite Reactors in One Energy Group.................................................................. 18
4.3 Uniform Finite Reactors in Various Geometries ............................................................... 21
4.4 Flux Curvature and Neutron Out-Leakage ........................................................................ 30
5 Reactors in Two Neutron-Energy Groups with No External Source...................................... 31
5.1 The Neutron Cycle and the Four-Factor Formula ............................................................. 31
5.2 The Two-Energy-Group Model.......................................................................................... 34
5.3 Neutron Diffusion Equation in Two Energy Groups .......................................................... 34
5.4 Uniform Infinite Medium in Two Energy Groups .............................................................. 34
5.5 Uniform Finite Reactors in Two Energy Groups ................................................................ 36
List of Figures
Figure 1 Negative flux curvature in homogeneous reactor .......................................................... 19
Figure 2 Infinite-slab reactor......................................................................................................... 22
Figure 3 Flux with physical and unphysical values of buckling ..................................................... 23
Figure 4 Infinite-cylinder reactor .................................................................................................. 24
Figure 5 Ordinary Bessel functions of first and second kind ........................................................ 25
Figure 6 Rectangular-parallelepiped reactor ................................................................................ 26
Figure 7 Finite-cylinder reactor..................................................................................................... 28
Figure 8 Energies of fission neutrons............................................................................................ 31
Figure 9 Sketch of cross section versus neutron energy............................................................... 32
Figure 10 Neutron cycle in thermal reactor.................................................................................. 33
Figure 11 Face view of very simple reactor model ....................................................................... 38
Figure 12 Flux in a cell and in immediate neighbours .................................................................. 39
Figure 13 Linear treatment of flux in central cell and one neighbour .......................................... 40
Figure 14 Flux in cell at reactor boundary .................................................................................... 42
Figure 15 Energy distribution of fission neutrons......................................................................... 44
Figure 16 Variation of flux with energy if absorption is smooth .................................................. 46
Figure 17 Variation of flux with energy in the presence of resonances ....................................... 46
Figure 18 Sketch of flux variation over full energy range ............................................................. 47
Figure 19 CANDU basic lattice cell ................................................................................................ 51
Figure 20 Supercell for calculating device incremental cross sections ......................................... 52
Figure 21 Simple model with superimposed reactivity device ..................................................... 53
Figure 22 Evolution of fuel isotopic densities ............................................................................... 54
Figure 23 Infinite-lattice reactivity vs. irradiation......................................................................... 55
Figure 24 Finite-reactor reactivity vs. irradiation.......................................................................... 55
Figure 25 Averaging reactivity with daily refueling....................................................................... 56
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
This chapter is devoted to the calculation of the neutron flux 1 in a nuclear reactor under special
steady-state conditions in which all parameters, including neutron flux, are constant in time.
The position-, energy-, and angle-dependent steady-state neutron-transport equation is derived
by writing the detailed neutron-balance equation. This is done in Chapter 3 of the book.
However, it is also done here for completeness. The steady-state diffusion equation is subse-
quently derived using a linear approximation of the angular dependence of the neutron flux.
Multi-group neutron-energy discretization is also introduced.
Analytical solutions are derived for simple neutron diffusion problems. First, the one-group
diffusion equation is solved for a uniform non-multiplying medium in simple geometries.
Subsequently, the one-group diffusion equation is solved for a uniform multiplying medium (a
homogeneous “nuclear reactor”) in simple geometries. The importance of neutron leakage and
the concepts of criticality and the neutron cycle are introduced.
Of course, real reactors are almost never homogeneous, and rarely can neutron energies be
accurately represented by a single energy group. However, two energy groups are often suffi-
cient to represent neutron diffusion in a thermal reactor because most of the fissions are
induced by thermal neutrons. This chapter therefore proceeds to introduce two-group diffusion
theory and the approximate representation of the diffusion equation using finite differences
applied to a discrete spatial mesh. The latter enables the treatment of non-uniform reactor
cores.
Following this treatment of the basic theory of neutron transport and diffusion, the rudimen-
tary reactor-physics design of CANDU reactors is presented, and the associated neutron energy
spectrum is discussed. Subsequently, more general core modelling concepts are presented,
including the two-step approach to neutronics calculations: multi-group lattice transport
calculations, followed by full-core, few-group diffusion calculations. The final section in the
chapter concentrates on fuel-property evolution with fuel burnup and specific features of
CANDU neutronics resulting from on-line refueling.
1 In this document, the term “neutron flux” is used to denote the quantity = n, where n is neutron density and
-2 -1 -2 -1
is neutron speed. The units of flux are 1cm s or 1m s . Some newer texts use the term flux density or
fluence rate. All three terms refer to the same physical quantity.
where
f r , E ' is the neutron-yield cross section at position r for fissions induced by
neutrons of energy E’;
ˆ
r,
' , E ' is the angular flux of neutrons at position, of energy E’, and moving in di-
rection ' ; and
(E) is the fraction of all fission neutrons born with energy E. Note: In this chapter,
for simplicity, a single fission spectrum (E) is used for fissions induced in all nu-
clides, whereas in reality the fission spectrum should be taken as different for differ-
ent nuclides. This fully correct treatment is what is done in Chapter 3.
Note: In the above equation, delayed neutrons are not referred to separately. The neutron
production rate includes both prompt and delayed neutrons. This is acceptable because it can
be shown that in (true) steady state, accounting separately for delayed-neutron production
reduces in any case to the above expression.
The rate of production of neutrons from an “external” source (not related to fissions in the
reactor fuel) is given by:
S r, E , (2)
where S r , E is the external source strength for neutrons of energy E at position r .
Note: We will assume that the source is isotropic.
The rate of neutron gain from neutrons entering the differential volume by scattering from
other neutron directions of motion or other neutron energies is given by:
s r , E ' E , ˆ ' ˆ r , ˆ ', E ' d ˆ ' dE ', (3)
E ' '
where s r , E ' E ,
ˆ '
ˆ is the cross section for scattering neutrons from energy E’ to
energy E and from direction ' to direction ̂ .
The rate of neutron loss from absorption and from neutrons exiting the differential volume by
scattering is given by:
ˆ
t r , E r , ,E , (4)
where t r , E , the total cross section at position r for neutrons of energy E,
=
a r , E s r , E E ',
ˆ
ˆ ' d
ˆ ' dE ',
where a r , E is the absorption cross section.
The net rate of neutron spatial leakage (i.e., diffusion) out of the differential volume is given by:
ˆ ,E ,
J r, (5)
ˆ , E is the angular current at position r of neutrons moving in direction ̂ with
where J r ,
energy E.
ˆ , E r ,
Note: Because J r ,
ˆ , the neutron leakage [Eq. (5)] can also be written as:
ˆ ,E
ˆ r ,
ˆ ,E . (6)
Taking into account all the above rates, the neutron balance can then be expressed in the time-
independent neutron-transport equation as follows:
E
1
4
S r, E
4 E ' ˆ '
ˆ
f r , E ' r ,
', E ' d
ˆ ' dE ' r, E ' E,
s
ˆ '
ˆ r,
ˆ ', E ' d
ˆ ' dE '
E'
ˆ' (7)
ˆ
t r , E r , , E J r ,
ˆ , E 0.
Note again that for simplicity a single fission spectrum (E) has been used here. See Chapter 3
for the fully correct treatment. The second term of the equation can be simplified because the
fission cross section does not depend on ̂' , so that the integral over ̂' in the second term
reduces to the angle-integrated flux, and Eq. (7) becomes:
E
1
4
S r, E
4 E '
f r , E ' r , E ' dE ' s r , E ' E,
ˆ '
ˆ r,
ˆ ', E ' d
ˆ ' dE '
E'
ˆ'
ˆ
t r , E r , , E J r , ˆ , E 0,
(7)’
ˆ
where r , E ' r ,
' , E ' d
ˆ ' is the total (angle-integrated) flux of neutrons with energy E
ˆ'
at position r .
The neutron-transport equation (7) or (7)’ is an exact statement of the general steady-state
neutron-balance problem. However, it can immediately be seen that it is very complex: in
addition to its dependence on six independent variables, it is an integrodifferential equation.
Because of its complexity, this equation cannot be solved analytically except for problems in the
very simplest geometries, and real problems require numerical solution by computer.
Note that when there is no external source S, the equation appears to be a linear homogeneous
equation, which does not generally have a solution (except a trivial zero solution for the flux) for
arbitrary values of the nuclear properties. In this case, a solution can be found by modifying the
nuclear properties. Mathematically, this can be done by modifying the yield cross section f by
dividing it by a quantity, keff, which can be selected to ensure a non-trivial solution. This quan-
tity keff is called the multiplication constant.
Two general categories of codes exist to solve the neutron-transport equation: deterministic
codes (which solve the equation directly by numerical means) and Monte Carlo codes (where
stochastic methods are used to model a very large number—typically millions or even hundreds
of millions—of neutron births and their travel and event histories, from which the multiplication
constant and flux and power distributions can be evaluated using appropriate statistics of these
histories). Although the application of either type of transport computer code to full-core
reactor models requires very significant computer resources and execution time to achieve a
high degree of accuracy, both methods, especially Monte Carlo codes, have seen much greater
application in whole-reactor analysis in the last decade or so. While core-wide pin-power
reconstruction and time-dependent kinetics calculations are still beyond reach, static eigenvalue
calculations and global flux and power distributions can now be carried out routinely using
Monte Carlo codes. However, detailed discussion of either type of transport code will not be
covered in the present work.
The traditional way of attacking neutronics problems in reactors has been to solve the transport
Reactor Statics – September 2014
Reactor Statics 7
equation numerically in relatively small regions (such as a basic lattice cell or a small collection
of cells) to compute region-averaged properties, and then to use these to solve the full-core
reactor problem with a simplified version of the transport equation, the neutron-diffusion
equation. This computational scheme is discussed in greater detail in Section 9.
Similarly, integrating the fourth term gives a result that depends on the integral flux only:
ˆ ˆ r, E r, E .
T4 t r , E r ,
, E d t (10)
ˆ
We can, however, simplify T3 by noting that, because no absolute direction in space is “special”,
the scattering cross section s cannot depend on the absolute directions ̂ and ̂ ' , but only on
the scattering angle between the directions of the incoming and scattered neutrons, or even
more specifically on the cosine of that angle, i.e., on ˆ . Using this fact, we can then
ˆ '
simplify the integral in Eq. (11) by integrating over ̂ first (actually over , because s does not
depend on the “azimuthal” angle of scattering, and integrating over that azimuthal angle simply
gives 2). The result is then a product of two integrals:
ˆ ' 2 r, E ' E , d dE '
T3 r , E ' E ,
ˆ ' d
s
E'
ˆ'
(12)
r , E ' s r , E ' E dE ',
E'
s r , E ' E 2 s r , E ' E , d . (13)
Equation (12) is a useful result because it depends on the integral flux r , E' only.
For the fifth term, we get:
T5 J r , E , ˆ
ˆ r , E , ˆ
ˆ d
ˆ d
(14)
ˆ ˆ
J r, E ,
where
J r , E J r , E,
ˆ d
ˆ (15)
is the current of neutrons of energy E at position r .
Unfortunately, this result is not at all of the form we would like, i.e., it is not at all expressible in
terms of the integral flux, because it is clear that integrating a function of the vector quantity
J r , E , ̂ over ̂ will obviously give in general a result totally unrelated to the integral flux
r, E !
In summary, integrating Eq. (7) over ̂ gives:
S r , E E f r , E ' r , E ' dE ' s r , E ' E r , E ' dE '
E' E'
t r , E r , E J r , E 0 , (16)
but the last term on the left-hand side (the leakage term) has thwarted our efforts to achieve an
equation in the integral flux only.
However, one approximation which is often used in diffusion problems (diffusion of one mate-
rial through another) can help us here. This approximation, called Fick’s Law, applies in low-
absorption media if the angular flux varies at most linearly with angle and if the neutron source
is isotropic [already assumed in writing Eq. (7)]. Under these conditions it states that the
current J r , E is in the direction in which the integral flux r, E decreases most rapidly, i.e.,
it is proportional to the negative gradient of r, E :
J r , E D r , E r , E , (17)
where the quantity Dr , E is called the diffusion coefficient and can be written as 1/(3tr),
with tr being the neutron transport cross section.
The reader is referred to Appendix A (Reactor Statics) of this chapter for the derivation of Fick’s
Law. Here, we will continue to derive the final form of the neutron-diffusion equation.
Equation (17), when substituted into Eq. (16), finally gives an equation in the integral flux only,
the time-independent neutron-diffusion equation:
S r , E E f r , E ' r , E ' dE ' s r , E ' E r , E ' dE '
E' E'
. (18)
t r , E r , E D r , E r , E 0
ˆ ab b b ,
x x y y z z
(20)
where a, bx, by, bz are constants which can be determined in terms of the integral flux and
current.
Let us first consider the integral flux ˆ dˆ .
From Eq. (20),
a d x
ˆ b d
x y
ˆ b d
y z
ˆ b d
z
ˆ. (21)
The first integral in Eq. (21) has value 4, whereas the others have value 0 (it is clear that in
Reactor Statics – September 2014
10 The Essential CANDU
integrating a single component of the angle over all solid angles, the + and – components cancel
out). This means that = 4a, which implies that
a . (22)
4
Now let us consider the current:
J ˆ ˆ d ˆ .
(23)
It is clear that the first integral in Eq. (24) is zero, for the same reason that the + and – compo-
nents cancel out. Consider the other integrals in Eq. (24), for instance, x ˆ . This is a
ˆ d
vector integral, and only the x-component will survive because x y or z d
ˆ 0 , for the
ˆ 2 1 2 d 2 3 1 4 ].
4/3 [by symmetry, it must be equal to
2z d 1 3 1 3
Therefore, we can conclude that
4
J
3
bxiˆ by ˆj bz kˆ , (25)
i.e.,
3
bx Jx (26)
4
(and similarly for y and z).
Now, substituting Eqs. (22) and (26) into Eq. (20),
ˆ 3 J J J 3 J
ˆ. (27)
4 4 4 4
x x y y z z
Let us now apply Eq. (27) at a plane boundary with vacuum. Assume that the boundary plane is
perpendicular to the z-axis and the polar axis is the outward normal to the boundary, i.e., the
unit vector k̂ in the positive z-direction. The total rate of incoming neutrons is:
J
ˆ kd
ˆ ˆ, (28)
where the integral over the “half-space” - means integrating over the entire azimuthal angle
(i.e., over 2), but only over half the polar angle , i.e., over from /2 to (or over cos
from -1 to 0).
Using Eq. (27), the total rate of incoming neutrons is:
3 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ kd
ˆ ˆ
4 4 J kd .
(29)
Because ˆ k̂ , then, in the integral of the second term, only the part involving z will
z
survive (for the same reason stated before), and:
3 J kˆ
* 2 * d * 2 * J kˆ * d
0 0
Total rate of incoming neutrons = 2
.
4 1 4 1 4 2
Applying Fick’s Law and setting the total rate of incoming neutrons to 0 gives:
D ˆ D d
k 0, i.e., 0 (30)
4 2 2 dz 4
1 d 1
,
dz boundary 2D
which can be written as
1
,
d extr
which leads to
2
d extr 2 D , (31)
3 tr
2
d extr 2 D , (32)
3 tr
where tr is the transport cross section.
Actually, a more advanced analysis gives a slightly higher, more correct value for dextr:
2.1312 0.7104
d extr 2.1312 D . (33)
3 tr tr
Equations (30)-(33) result in a zero net incoming current at the physical boundary.
The geometric interpretation of Eq. (30) is that the relative neutron flux near the plane bound-
ary has a slope of -1/dextr, i.e., the flux would extrapolate linearly to 0 at a distance dextr beyond
the boundary. This is often stated as “the flux goes to 0 at an extrapolation distance dextr
beyond the boundary”. Such an interpretation is not literally correct: the flux cannot go to zero
in a vacuum, because there are no absorbers to remove the neutrons; the flux only appears to
be heading to the zero value at the extrapolation point. In fact, instead of using the “slope”
version (30), the boundary condition is often applied by “extending” the reactor model to the
extrapolation point and demanding a zero flux at that point.
Now, typical values for the diffusion coefficients D in CANDU reactors are 1 cm, and therefore
the extrapolation distance dextr is of the order of 2–3 cm. For systems of large dimension, e.g.,
large power reactors which are several metres in size, the extrapolation distance is sometimes
neglected if a slightly approximate answer is sufficient.
[Note: Equation (33) applies in principle to plane boundaries only. Slightly different formulas for
Reactor Statics – September 2014
12 The Essential CANDU
the extrapolation distance would apply to curved boundaries; however, the difference is small
unless the radius of curvature of the boundary is of the same order of magnitude as dextr.]
The nuclear cross sections in each group are assumed to have been appropriately averaged over
the corresponding energy intervals. In multi-group notation, the cross sections and variables
are written as follows:
S r , E Sg r
E g
f r , E f , g r
s r , E ' E s , g ' g r
t r , E t ,g r
D r , E Dg r .
G
g ' 1
s , g ' g r g ' r t ,g r g r Dg r g r 0, g 1,..., G.
S r a r D r 0,
(34)
or S r a r D2 r 0.
dx
The diffusion equation outside the source, i.e., for any x different from 0, becomes:
d 2 x
D a x 0. (35)
dx 2
We can simplify this equation by dividing by D. If we define
D
L2 , (36)
a
called the diffusion area (and L called the diffusion length), the equation becomes:
d 2 x 1
2 x 0. (37)
dx 2 L
For x > 0, Eq. (37) has mathematical solutions exp(x/L) and exp(-x/L), which give a general
solution:
x Ae x / L Ce x / L .
However, the term ex/L goes to as x and therefore cannot be part of a physically accept-
able solution for x > 0. The solution for x > 0 must then be x Ce x / L .
By left-right symmetry, we can see that the full solution for any x must be
x Ce
x /L
, (38)
with C being a constant which we can determine from the boundary condition at x = 0.
If S is the source strength per unit area of the plane, then the number of neutrons crossing
outwards per unit area in the positive x-direction must tend to S /2 as x 0. Therefore,
S
lim J x
x 0 2
d x S
lim D
x 0
dx 2
CD x / L S
lim e
x 0
L 2
CD S SL
, i.e., C .
L 2 2D
Reactor Statics – September 2014
14 The Essential CANDU
x dx
2
a
x2 0
dx a
0 .
With the form (39) for the flux, we can evaluate the integrals and show that
x 2 2L2 ,
i.e., we can interpret L2 as one-half the square of the average distance (in one dimension)
between the neutron’s birth point and its absorption point.
d 2 r 2 d r 1
2 r 0. (43)
dr 2 r dr L
r
To solve this equation, we can write in the form r . Then, in terms of , Eq. (43)
r
Reactor Statics – September 2014
Reactor Statics 15
becomes:
d r
dr r ,
r r2
d 2 r d r d r
d r
2
2 2 r
2
dr dr2 dr2 .
dr r r r r3
.
Substituting these forms into Eq. (43) results in the simpler form:
d 2 r 1
2 r 0. (44)
dr 2 L
Equation (44) has mathematical solutions exp(r/L) and exp(-r/L), which give a general solution:
r Ae r / L C e r / L
er/ L e r/ L
r A C .
r r
er / L
Now, the term as r and therefore cannot be part of a physically acceptable
r
solution. The solution must then be
e r / L
r C , (45)
r
with C being a constant which remains to be determined. To determine C, we can use the
continuity condition at the origin.
If S is the source strength, then the number of neutrons crossing the surface of a small sphere
outwards must tend to S as the sphere’s radius tends to 0, and therefore:
lim 4 r 2 J r S
r 0
d
lim 4 r 2 D S
r 0
dr
r r / L r / L
e e
lim 4 r 2 CD L 2 S
r 0 r
S
4 CD S , i.e., C .
4 D
The neutron flux outside the source is then, finally:
S e r / L
r . (46)
4 D r
Again, it is interesting to interpret the physical meaning of the diffusion area L2. Let us calculate
Reactor Statics – September 2014
16 The Essential CANDU
the mean square distance that a neutron travels outwards from the source (at r = 0) to its
absorption point. We can do this by averaging r2 with the absorption rate a as a weighting
function:
r 4 r dr
2 2
__ a
r
2 0
.
4 r dr
2
a
0
With the form (46) for the flux, we can evaluate the integrals and show that
r 2 6 L2 , (47)
i.e., we can interpret L2 as one-sixth of the square of the average distance outwards between
the neutron’s birth point and its absorption point.
one, we will start by assuming that all neutrons are lumped into a single energy group, i.e., G =
1. There is then, again, no need for the subscript g. Also, as explained in Section 3, we can drop
the term in s and replace t by a.
The neutron-diffusion equation in this case is:
f r a r D 2 r 0. (48)
A very important point to note is that without the external source, this is a linear homogeneous
equation in the flux (if the properties are truly constant and independent of the flux). This
means that if we find one solution of the equation, then any multiple is also a solution. There-
fore, the absolute value of the flux cannot possibly be deduced from the diffusion equation
(incidentally, not from the transport equation either). This is totally different from problems
with external sources, which drive the absolute value of the flux.
This equation is interesting. The only solution is a trivial solution, i.e., a null flux, = 0, unless
f a . (50)
In other words, unless the composition of the medium is exactly balanced so that Eq. (50) is
satisfied, the uniform infinite reactor cannot really operate in steady state (except in a trivial
zero-flux situation). We can call Eq. (50) the criticality condition for a uniform infinite reactor.
What happens if the criticality condition in Eq. (50) is not satisfied? Then there is no non-trivial
solution, but is this all that we can say? Actually, we can ensure that there is always a non-trivial
solution if we modify Eq. (49) by “tuning” the neutron-yield cross section by dividing it by a new
“modifying factor” which we call k∞, as in:
f
a 0. (51)
k
A non-trivial solution of Eq. (51) can always be guaranteed by selecting the value of k∞ as:
f
k . (52)
a
What this means is that if the composition of the uniform infinite reactor is modified from the
original composition by dividing the neutron-yield cross section by k∞ defined as in Eq. (52), the
modified uniform infinite reactor can then be operated in steady state with a non-zero flux; this
modified reactor is now critical. What is the value of the flux? We can see from Eq. (51) that
with the modified neutron-yield cross section, the flux can have any value; in other words, the
critical uniform infinite reactor can operate at any flux (and therefore power) value! This is a
Reactor Statics – September 2014
18 The Essential CANDU
direct consequence of the (apparent) homogeneity of the equation (i.e., the equation is of the
form F = 0, with F an arbitrary operator independent of the flux).
Comparing Eqs. (50) and (51), the criticality condition for a uniform infinite reactor can be seen
to be:
f
k 1 (53)
a
for criticality. The deviation of k∞ from 1 tells us how far the reactor with the original composi-
tion ( f , a ) is from criticality. k∞ is called the infinite reactor multiplication constant and can
have the following values:
k∞ < 1: the infinite reactor is said to be subcritical;
k∞ = 1: the infinite reactor is critical;
k∞ > 1: the infinite reactor is said to be supercritical.
The physical interpretation of k∞ can be stated as follows:
f f neutron production rate
k . (54)
a a neutron loss rate
A quantity related to k∞, but “centred” at 0 instead of at 1, is the “reactivity”, ∞, defined as:
1
1 . (55)
k
Therefore:
k∞ < 1 < 0: the infinite reactor is subcritical
k∞ = 1 = 0: the infinite reactor is critical
k∞ > 1 > 0: the infinite reactor is supercritical.
Real-life reactors are designed to be operated at critical or very close to critical. Therefore, in
most situations, we would expect k∞ to be very close to 1 and ∞ to be very close to 0. As a
result, while ∞ (and k∞) are absolute, dimensionless numbers, a new fractional “unit” of 1
milli-k (or mk) is defined for reactivity, where:
1 mk 0.001. (56)
For example, ∞ = + 2 mk (or – 1 mk) means that ∞ = +0.002 (or – 0.001). Another reactivity
unit, “pcm” 0.01 mk, is commonly used in Europe.
D2 r f r a r . (57)
The left-hand side of Eq. (57) is the leakage out of the “point” r . If we integrate Eq. (57) over
the volume V of the reactor:
D 2 r dr f a r dr . (58)
V V
The left-hand side of Eq. (58) is the total leakage out of the reactor. This of course must be
positive: neutrons can only go out of the reactor, not into it, because there are no sources of
neutrons outside which can “feed” neutrons into the reactor. Therefore, if Eq. (58) is true as is,
the right-hand side must be positive, and because the integral of the flux must also be positive,
so must the quantity ( f a ) . We can therefore write Eq. (57) as:
a
2 r f r
D (59)
i.e., 2 r Bg2 r ,
In other words, the geometrical buckling is the negative relative curvature of the neutron flux.
Because we have established that B g2 is definitely positive, this means that the flux curvature is
negative (see Figure 1), and in fact, in view of Eq. (59), the relative curvature is uniform (and
negative) in a homogeneous finite reactor. Note that this statement is strictly true for homo-
geneous reactors only. In real reactors, the relative flux curvature (and the buckling) can vary
and even change sign.
Because the neutron flux curvature/geometrical buckling must “bend” the flux to bring it to 0
almost at the reactor boundary (actually, at an extrapolation distance dextr beyond the physical
boundary), it is clear that the flux curvature will be large for reactors of small dimensions and
small if the reactor dimensions are large. Therefore, B g2 in Eq. (59) is purely a geometrical
quantity.
Returning now to Eq. (57) and using the definition of geometrical buckling, the diffusion equa-
tion for homogeneous reactors can be rewritten as:
f r a r DBg2 r 0. (62)
This equation has the same characteristics as Eq. (49). The only solution is a null flux, r 0 ,
unless
f a DBg2 . (63)
In other words, unless the composition of the reactor is exactly balanced so that Eq. (63) is
satisfied, the uniform reactor cannot really operate in steady state (except in a trivial zero-flux
situation). We can call Eq. (63) the criticality condition for a uniform finite reactor.
What happens if the criticality condition Eq. (63) is not satisfied? Then there is no non-trivial
solution. However, just as we did for the infinite medium, we can ensure that there is always a
non-trivial solution if we modify Eq. (62) by tuning the neutron-yield cross section by dividing it
by a similar parameter, called keff, as in:
f
r a r DBg2 r 0. (64)
keff
A non-trivial solution of Eq. (64) can always be guaranteed by selecting the value of keff as:
f
keff , (65)
a DBg2
which can also be written as:
f
a
keff
Bg2 . (66)
D
This means that if the composition of the uniform reactor is modified from the original compo-
sition by dividing the neutron-yield cross section by keff defined as in Eq. (65), the modified
uniform reactor can then operate in steady state (i.e., as a critical reactor) with a non-zero flux.
Again, as in the infinite medium, the flux in the modified critical reactor can have any value, that
is, the critical uniform reactor can operate at any flux (and therefore power) value!
In summary, the criticality condition for a uniform finite reactor is:
f
keff 1 (67)
a DBg2
or
f
1
f a a k 1
Bg
2
2 . (68)
D D L
a
Equation (67) is clearly a generalization of the criticality condition Eq. (53) for the infinite
medium, where the buckling was 0, i.e., B g2 0 (flat flux). The deviation of keff from 1 tells us
how far the reactor with the original composition ( f , a , D ) is from criticality.
Equation (68) is intriguing. The left-hand side, B g2 , is a geometrical quantity, as already noted.
The right-hand side, on the other hand, is a function of the nuclear properties only and is not a
geometrical quantity. It is nonetheless called a “buckling”, the material buckling:
k 1
Bm2 . (69)
L2
In view of this, the criticality condition for a uniform reactor in one neutron-energy group can
be expressed as:
Geometrical Buckling Material Buckling, Bg2 Bm2 . (70)
This ratio of production to loss is the same at any point in a homogeneous reactor and is of
course then also the same as the ratio of the reactor-integrated production and loss.
Incidentally, Eq. (64), a linear equation with a boundary condition (zero flux at the extrapolation
distance beyond the boundary), is mathematically an eigenvector problem, which can best be
seen by rewriting the equation in the form:
where
1
(73)
keff
can therefore also derive the value of the buckling). We will do this by showing how to solve
the diffusion equation in the following form [rewritten from Eq. (59)]:
2 r Bg2 r 0. (74)
become negative for some values of x before returning to 0 at aex (see Figure 3). Therefore, the
final solution for the flux distribution in an infinite slab reactor is
x
x A cos , (76)
aex
and the buckling is
2
B
2
g . (77)
aex
a /2 a /2
x
P Eff x dx E f f A1 cos dx
a /2 a /2 ex
a
a /2
a x a a
i.e., P ex E f f A sin 2 A ex E f f sin
aex a /2 2aex
P
A ,
a
2aex E f f sin
2aex
and the absolute flux in the slab is
P x
x cos . (78)
a aex
2aex E f f sin
2aex
If the extrapolation distance is ignored, i.e., aex = a, this reduces to:
P x
x cos . (79)
2aE f f a
1 d d r
Bg r 0
2
r
r dr dr
(80)
d r 1 d r
2
i.e., 2
Bg2 r 0.
dr r dr
This differential equation is actually well known to mathematicians: it is called Bessel’s equation
of order 0, and its mathematical solutions are the ordinary Bessel functions of the first and
second kind, J (Br) and Y (Br) respectively; see Figure 5.
0 0
The flux must go to 0 at the extrapolated radial boundary Rex, i.e., we must have:
J 0 Bg Rex 0. (82)
Figure 5 shows that J0(r) has several zeroes, called ri: the first is at r1 2.405, and the second at
r2 5.6. However, because the neutron flux cannot have regions of negative values, the only
physically acceptable value for Bg is
2.405
Bg . (83)
Rex
As a result, the flux in the infinite cylinder is given by:
2.405r
r AJ 0 , (84)
Rex
and the buckling for the infinite cylinder is
2
2.405
B
2
g . (85)
Rex
If we use the reactor power P per unit axial height to determine A and neglect the extrapolation
distance, the following value is obtained:
0.738P
A , (86)
E f f R2
where f, g, and h are functions to be determined. Substituting form (89) into Eq. (88), we get:
d 2 f x d 2g y d 2h z
2
g ( y ) h ( z ) f ( x ) 2
h ( z ) f ( x ) g ( y ) 2
Bg2 f x g ( y )h ( z ) 0. (90)
dx dy dz
Dividing the equation by f(x)g(y)h(z):
1 d f x 1 d g y 1 d h z
2 2 2
Bg2 . (91)
f x dx 2
g y dy 2
h z dz 2
The left-hand side of Eq. (91) is a sum of three terms which are functions only of x, y, and z
respectively. The right-hand side is a constant. The only way in which this can happen is if each
of the three terms on the left-hand side is a constant on its own, i.e., if we can write:
1 d f x 1 d g y 1 d h z
2 2 2
Bx ,
2
By ,
2
Bz2 , (92)
f x dx 2
g y dy 2
h z dz 2
is exactly the same equation as for the slab reactor, with the same solution
f x cos Bx x , (95)
where
Bx . (96)
aex
The full solution for the neutron flux in the parallelepiped reactor is therefore:
x y z
x, y, z A cos cos cos . (97)
aex bex cex
The quantities
2 2 2
B , By2 , Bz2 ,
2
x (98)
aex bex cex
are called the “partial bucklings” in the three directions, and the total buckling is
2 2 2
B .
2
g (99)
aex bex cex
If we normalize the flux to the total fission power P of the reactor and neglect the extrapolation
distance, we can show that the normalization constant, A, is given by
3P
A . (100)
8abcE f f
d2 1 d d2
2 , (101)
dr 2 r dr dz 2
and the diffusion equation becomes
d 2 r, z 1 d r, z d 2 r, z
2
2
Bg2 r, z 0. (102)
dr r dr dz
where f and g are functions to be determined. Substituting Eq. (103) into Eq. (102), we get:
d 2 f r 1 df r d 2g z
2
g z f r 2
Bg2 f r g z 0. (104)
dr r dr dz
Let us divide this equation by f(r)g(z):
1 d f r 1 1 df r 1 d g z
2 2
Bg2 . (105)
f r dr 2 f r r dr g z dz 2
The left-hand side of Eq. (105) is the sum of a function of r and a function of z. The right-hand
side is a constant. The only way in which this can happen is if the parts in r and z are each
individually equal to a constant, i.e., if we can write:
1 d f r 1 1 df r 1 d g z
2 2
B 2
, Bz2 , (106)
f r dr f r r dr g z dz
2 r 2
The equations in (106) have been seen before; they are the same equations as for the infinite
cylinder and the slab reactor respectively and therefore have the same solutions:
f r J 0 Br r , g z cos Bz z , (108)
where
2.405
Br and Bz , (109)
Rex H ex
where Rex and Hex are the extrapolated radius and the extrapolated axial dimension of the
reactor. The full solution for the neutron flux in the finite-cylinder reactor is therefore:
2.405r z
r, z AJ 0 cos , (110)
Rex H ex
2 2
2.405
B
2
r , Bz
2
(111)
Rex H ex
are called the radial and axial bucklings respectively, and the total buckling is
2 2
2.405
B 2
g . (112)
Rex H ex
If we normalize the flux to the total fission power P of the reactor and neglect the extrapolation
distance, we can show that the normalization constant is:
3.63P
A . (113)
R 2 HE f f
r
r , (116)
r
where the function r is to be determined. Equation (115) then reduces to:
1 d 2 1 1 d r 2 r
r 2 r Bg 0
r2 dr r r dr r
1 d d r 2 r
i.e., r r Bg 0
r2 dr dr r
1 d r d r d 2 r 2 r
i.e, r Bg 0,
r2 dr dr dr 2
r
d 2 r
which finally reduces to 2
Bg2 r 0. (117)
dr
The general solution of this equation is:
r A sin Bg r C cos Bg r ,
which gives
sin Bg r cos Bg r
r A C . (118)
r r
However, the cosine term goes to as r → 0, which is physically not acceptable, whereas the
sine term is acceptable because it has a finite limit as r → 0 (as can be verified using L’Hôpital’s
rule). Therefore, the final solution for the spherical reactor is
sin Bg r
r A ,
r
where, for the same reason as in the other geometries (to guarantee no negative flux), Bg must
take the lowest allowable value, i.e.,
Bg , (119)
Rex
so that finally
r
sin
r A Rex
. (120)
R
If we normalize the flux by imposing a value P for the total fission power of the reactor and
neglect the extrapolation distance, we find that:
P 4 AR 2 E f f
P (121)
A .
4R E f f
2
age per differential physical volume dr J D r r . Applying this to the flux in a
uniform slab reactor (Eq. 76) gives, for x > 0:
2
x x
Leakout D A cos
2
DA cos 0.
aex aex aex 0
We can similarly show for all other uniform reactors that Leakout > 0. This can actually be seen
in the general case from f r a r D2 r 0 (presented earlier as Eq. (48)), which
for any point in the uniform reactor gives D 2 r f a r DB 2 r 0 . This
means that we can say that any point in a uniform reactor sees neutron out-leakage (i.e., any
differential volume is a source of neutrons).
Note again that the above finding applies to uniform reactors, not to all reactors in general.
Real reactors may have regions which are net sinks of neutrons, where the flux curvature is
positive and where there is a net in-leakage of neutrons. The general rule that we can infer
from the above and also from what we learned in source-sink problems is that:
Positive flux curvature Net neutron in-leakage, while
Negative flux curvature Net neutron out-leakage.
It can be seen that the peak in their energy distribution is ~0.73 MeV. A 1-MeV neutron has a
speed of ~13,800 km/s: fission neutrons are fast neutrons. There are essentially no fission
neutrons born with thermal energies ~1 eV; the reference thermal energy is 0.025 eV, speed
2,200 m/s, T = 293.6 K.
Now, this system can have a non-trivial flux solution if and only if the determinant of the flux
coefficients is zero, i.e.:
f 1 a1 12 a 2 21 f 2 21 12 0. (127)
Satisfying the criticality condition, Eq. (127), requires a very fine balance between the nuclear
properties. What if that balance is not achieved and Eq. (127) is not satisfied? Then there is no
non-trivial solution, i.e., we do not have a real operating infinite-medium reactor. However, we
can ensure that there is always a non-trivial solution if we “tune” the neutron-yield cross
sections by dividing them by a parameter, k∞ (to be determined). The diffusion equations then
become:
f 1
a1 12 1 f 2 21 2 0 (128)
k k
121 a 2 21 2 0, (129)
The difference of k∞ from unity (or of ∞ from 0) tells us how far from critical the original
uniform medium is.
When the fast-fission and up-scattering cross sections are neglected, the form obtained for k∞ is
simpler and instructive:
f 2 12
k , no up scattering & no fast . (132)
a 2 a1 12
fission
energies, which is simply the resonance-escape probability p in Eq. (122). The first factor in Eq.
(132) is the number of fission neutrons produced per thermal absorption, i.e., it is the repro-
duction factor .
Another important quantity to determine in the two-group model, which has no meaning in the
one-group treatment, is the ratio of group fluxes. In the uniform infinite medium, this can be
obtained most simply from Eq. (129):
2 1 2
. (133)
1 a 2 21
Note that the criticality condition (130) ensures that the same value would be obtained from Eq.
(128).
We can try to find a solution for the flux which is separable in space and energy, i.e., where the
two-row flux vector
1 r
r
r
2
can be written as a group-dependent amplitude times a group-independent flux shape. If we
can solve the equation with such a solution, then it is a good solution:
1 r A1 r
. (136)
2 r A
2 r
Substituting Eq. (136) into Eq. (135), we get:
12 A1 a 2 A2 21 A2 r D2 A22 r 0, (137)
and if we divide by r :
2 r 12 A1 a 2 A2 21 A2
. (138)
r D2 A2
The right-hand side of Eq. (138) is a single number, independent of space, which we can write as
–B2. [Note: We would have reached a similar conclusion if we had substituted Eq. (136) into Eq.
(134).] Equation (138) is analogous to Eq. (61), i.e., B2 is a group-independent geometric
buckling that is applicable to both the fast and the thermal groups:
2g r B 2g r , g 1, 2. (139)
Because this is exactly the same equation as we found with one energy group, the flux distribu-
tion in two groups is exactly the same as in one energy group: i.e., a product of cosines in a
parallelepiped reactor, an axial cosine times a radial Bessel function in a cylindrical reactor, and
a sine-over-r function in a spherical reactor. The only new quantity is the ratio of the group
fluxes!
Let us now return to the criticality conditions for a finite reactor. Substituting Eq. (139) into Eqs.
(134) and (135) gives a linear homogeneous system, and therefore we can divide the yield cross
sections by keff as usual to ensure a non-trivial solution:
f 1
a1 12 D1B 2 1 r f 2 21 2 r 0 (140)
k
keff eff
121 r ( a 2 21 D2 B 2 )2 r 0. (141)
The criticality condition for finite reactors in two energy groups is found by equating the deter-
minant of this system to zero, which yields:
f 1 a 2 21 D2 B 2 f 21 2
k eff . (142)
a1 D1 B 2 a 2 21 D2 B 2 1 2 a 2 D2 B 2
If we consider the simpler case obtained by neglecting up-scattering and fast fission, as we did
following Eq. (131), we get:
f 212
keff , no up scattering & no fast fission
a1 D1B 2 a 2 D2 B 2 12 a 2 D2 B 2
(143)
f 212
.
a1 1 2 D1 B a 2 D2 B
2 2
The ratio of Eq. (143) to Eq. (132) gives the effect of leakage:
f 212
keff
a1 12 D1B 2 a 2 D2 B 2
a1 12 a 2
. (144)
k f 212 a1 12 D1B a 2 D2 B 2
2
a 2 a1 12
The first factor is the ratio of (fast absorption + down-scattering) to (fast absorption + down-
scattering + fast leakage). Therefore, the first factor represents the fast non-leakage probability,
which we can call P1NL. In the same way, the second factor represents the thermal non-leakage
probability, P2NL. Therefore, Eq. (144) is equivalent to
keff k P1NL P2 NL , (145)
All cross sections in a lattice cell are homogenized (averaged spatially within the cell) and
condensed to two groups using a multi-group transport code for each lattice cell, but in a real
reactor, they must also incorporate the effects of reactivity devices superimposed upon the
basic lattice.
Let us look at one of these cells (which we label with a superscript C for Central) and its six
nearest neighbours in the three directions, labelled with a superscript n = 1 to 6 (1 to 4 in x-y
geometry). We get the finite-difference form of the diffusion equation if we integrate Eqs. (148)
and (149) over the volume of cell C:
Cf11 r Cf 22 r C
C
C
21 2 r C
a1 C
12 1
r D11 r dr 0 (150)
keff
1C 21 r Ca 2 C21 2 r D2C 2 r dr 0. (151)
C
where we have dropped the dependence on r for the properties because the cells are homo-
geneous.
There are two types of integrals in Eqs. (150) and (151). The first type does not involve the
divergence operator "". In these integrals, the (homogeneous) cross sections can be taken
out of the integral sign, for example:
Ca 22 r Ca 2 2 r dr.
C C
For the integral on the right-hand side, the approximation is made that the integral is equal to
the value of the flux at the centre of the cell multiplied by the volume V C x C y C z C of the
cell ( x C , y C , z C being the dimensions of the cell in x, y, and z). Then:
Ca 22 r Ca 22CV C . (152)
C
The second type of integral has the divergence operator in the integrand. This type of integral
simply represents the leakage out of cell C to its neighbours. By Gauss’s theorem, the volume
integral over the divergence is equal to a surface integral, for example,
D1C 1 r dr D1C 1 r nds
ˆ J 1 nds
ˆ , (153)
C S S
where S is the surface of the cell, n̂ is the outer normal to the surface, and by Fick’s Law, J 1 is
the net outward current at a point on the surface of the cell.
d1C C 1C1
C 1
J 1,C 1 D C
1 D1 . (154)
dx 1 C
x
2
Similarly, the group-1 current from cell 1 to cell C is:
1C1 11
J 1,1C D 1
1 . (155)
1 1
x
2
However, the current must be continuous at the face, i.e.,
J1,1C J1,C1. (156)
Then by equating Eqs. (154) and (155) and solving for the interface flux, we find that:
D1C x11C D11x C11
1C1 . (157)
D1C x1 D11x C
We can then substitute this into Eq. (155) and calculate the current at the centre of the face:
1C 1C1 2 D1C D11 1C 11
J 1,C 1 DC
C 1 . (158)
D1 x D11x C
1
1 C
x
2
Reactor Statics – September 2014
Reactor Statics 41
If we assume that the average current over the face is equal to the current at the centre of the
face, the total current over face C1 is:
2 D1C D11y C z C C
C1 1
J ˆ
nds
D1C x1 D11x C
1 11 A1C1 1C 11 , (159)
2 D1C D11y C z C
A C 1
C1
. (160)
D1 x D11x C
1
A very similar process can of course be performed for all six faces between cell C and its
neighbours. The total outward current in Eq. (153) is then:
ˆ A1Cn 1C 1n .
6
S
J 1 nds
n 1
(161)
Using all the above results, the finite-difference neutron-diffusion Eqs. (150) and (151) then
become:
Cf 11C f 22C
V C C212CV C Ca1 1C2 1CV C A1Cn 1C 1n 0
6
(162)
keff n 1
These equations couple cell C to its closest neighbours. These and similar equations for all the
other cells in the model make up a coupled system of linear homogeneous equations for the
fluxes at the centres of the cells. If there are N cells in the model, the system is composed of 2N
equations. To solve this coupled system, we need also the boundary conditions at the model
edges, which we look at now.
The edge cells have neighbour cells only towards the “interior” of the model. In directions
outward from the model, the diffusion boundary condition with vacuum is that the flux goes to
zero at the extrapolation distance beyond the boundary.
However, we can express the boundary condition in the same form as Eqs. (162) and (163) by
creating a “dummy” neighbour cell of width 2 dextr, where dextr is the extrapolation length =
2.1312 DC [see Eq. (33)] and forcing the flux to be zero at the extrapolation distance (see Figure
14).
Neutron Production
keff
Neutron Absorption Neutron Leakage
r [ f 1 r 1 r f 2 r 2 r ]dr
,
a1 1
r r a2 r 2 r J 1 r J 2 r
dr
r
where the latest fluxes from the latest iteration are used and the integrals are evaluated as
sums over the cells.
One iteration is not sufficient to obtain a self-consistent solution of the entire system of finite-
difference equations. We must repeat the iterations until the fluxes converge, i.e., until the
relative difference in flux in each cell from one iteration to the next is very small, smaller than
an accepted tolerance, typically ~10-5. A convergence criterion is also needed for keff; typically, a
difference of 0.001 or 0.01 mk from one iteration to the next is used. Once convergence has
been reached, we have the sought-after solution for the flux shape, i.e., we have the unnormal-
ized (relative) flux distribution. To find the absolute values for the flux, we can normalize the
flux distribution to the total reactor fission power, for example.
where E is in MeV (see Figure 15). [Note: In Chapter 3, the Watt spectrum is used.]
Note that this is a distribution of the number of neutrons, but the flux can be obtained simply
by multiplying by the neutron speed (not to be confused with , the fission neutron yield).
Room temperature is by convention taken as T = 293.6 K = 20.4oC, which gives kT = 0.0253 eV.
The energy value E = kT is the most probable neutron energy in a Maxwellian flux distribution,
and the corresponding “thermal neutron” speed is:
v kT 0.0253 eV 2200 m / s. (166)
collisions with hydrogen nuclei, the slowing-down flux (E) in hydrogen can be derived. It can
be shown that below the lower boundary Es of the fission-neutron energy range and neglecting
neutron absorption relative to scattering (a fairly good approximation), the slowing-down flux is
inversely proportional to energy E:
S
E , (167)
E s
where S is the fission source and s is the scattering cross section (assumed to be independent
of energy).
This provides an important, simple, basic formula for the slowing-down spectrum, even if it is
somewhat of an approximation. Another way of interpreting this relationship is that the prod-
uct E(E) is nearly constant with energy below Es.
S Es E ' dE '
E exp a . (170)
Et E E ' E '
E t
The exponential factor in Eq. (170) represents the probability that the neutron survives slowing
down to energy E; i.e., it is the resonance-escape probability to energy E, which we can denote
as p(E).
From the general form of the slowing-down flux, the following simplified statements about the
product E(E) can be deduced:
If absorption is neglected, and under the assumption that the scattering cross sec-
tion does not depend on energy, E(E) is constant (flat) with E.
If absorption is included, and assuming a smooth variation of the absorption cross
section with E, then E(E) will decrease smoothly for decreasing E.
These statements are shown in graphical form in Figure 16.
the slowing-down spectrum to about 0.625 eV. [Note that in the thermal energy
range, neutrons can gain as well as lose energy in collisions. To be consistent with
the approximation of no up-scattering in the derivation of the slowing-down spec-
trum, the “boundary” between thermal and epithermal energies should be selected
sufficiently high to ensure negligible up-scattering from the thermal region to the
epithermal region. This is one reason for the typical choice of 0.625 eV, which is
about 25 times the most probable energy of 0.025 eV at room temperature, as the
lower energy boundary of the epithermal range.]
the Maxwellian spectrum at thermal energies. [Note that it is not a perfect Maxwel-
lian, being distorted somewhat by neutron absorption].
The piecing together of the neutron-flux portions in the various energy regions is shown in the
sketch in Figure 18.
shutdown-system action to avoid overheating the fuel. In fact, the postulated large-
loss-of-coolant accident (LLOCA) scenario is the reason for the adoption of redun-
dancy in CANDU shutdown capability design. CANDU reactors have two fast shut-
down systems, which are physically and logically independent of one another and
each fully capable of shutting the reactor down from any credible configuration.
Shutdown system 1 consists of cadmium shut-off rods which fall under gravity (ini-
tially spring-assisted) into the reactor from above. Shutdown system 2 consists of
the injection of a solution of neutron-absorbing gadolinium (a high neutron ab-
sorber) under high pressure through nozzles directly into the moderator.
The lattice pitch (distance between the centres of neighbouring tubes) in all operat-
ing CANDU reactors is 28.575 cm. This is not the optimum value in the sense of
maximizing the lattice reactivity (therefore minimizing the refueling rate and maxi-
mizing the average fuel discharge burnup), which is closer to 34 cm or so. However,
the larger volume of D2O moderator would result in a higher capital cost; the shorter
pitch was selected to minimize the levellized unit-energy cost. A shorter lattice pitch
of 24 cm was selected for the ACR (to reduce moderator cost, among other reasons),
but the reduced moderation would not allow the chain reaction to be self-sustaining
with natural-uranium fuel, and the ACR would need to use enriched fuel.
The “workhorse” control devices in all operating CANDU reactors are “liquid” zone
controllers. These control 14 compartments in which amounts of light water (used
for its much higher neutron-absorption cross section than heavy water) can be var-
ied uniformly across all compartments to control reactivity or to shape the power
distribution differentially.
A full, 3-D reactor model constructed in this way is used to calculate the three-dimensional flux
and power distributions in the core. Because homogenized properties are used, few-group
diffusion theory can be applied to the full-core reactor model.
The fresh-fuel infinite lattice (where the fuel has not yet received any irradiation) has
a high reactivity (~78 mk when the 135Xe and other saturating fission products have
built up). To achieve a steady state in the infinite lattice with fresh fuel, a corre-
sponding amount of negative reactivity must be added to the lattice [e.g., by dissolv-
ing a neutron poison (i.e., a material with a large neutron absorption cross section)
in the moderator] to suppress the initial supercriticality.
The reactivity starts to decrease immediately on account of 235U depletion.
It then starts to increase for a while, on account of production of 239Pu, which is
slightly more effective than 235U. Note the slight delay due to the 239Np ~2-day half-
life.
However the rate of increase of reactivity slows (because the net rate of plutonium
production decreases), and the reactivity proceeds through a maximum, called the
plutonium peak, with increasing burnup (note that this is not a peak in 239Pu concen-
tration, but in lattice-cell reactivity!).
Following the plutonium peak, the reactivity decreases monotonically on account of
the continuing depletion of 235U and the continuing accumulation of fission products.
The infinite lattice reaches zero reactivity at an irradiation corresponding to a burnup
of ~6,700 MW.d/Mg(U).
A homogeneous infinite lattice with fuel beyond that burnup would be subcritical.
However, CANDU reactors are refueled on-power, and therefore there is always (except near
start of life) a mixture of fresh fuel and fuel with high irradiation. The fuel with high irradiation
has negative “local reactivity”, but this is compensated for by the positive local reactivity of low-
irradiation fuel. The proper mixture of fuel in this inhomogeneous reactor (obtained by the
proper rate of daily refueling) maintains the reactor critical day-to-day. Physically, the older fuel
does the job of reducing the high reactivity of the young fuel, a job which moderator poison
does in the batch-refueled reactor. The difference is that whereas the poison is just a “parasitic”
absorber, the older fuel does provide fissions and therefore additional energy.
The mixture of new and old fuel makes it possible to drive the discharge burnup to a much
higher value than that deduced from the “homogeneous” reactivity curve. We can guess (or
calculate) approximately how far we can drive the exit burnup by determining what value gives
equal “positive” and “negative” areas “under” the reactivity curve [this tells us where the
average eff would be 0]; see Figure 25.
From the figure, we can see that positive and negative areas are equal when the average exit (or
discharge) burnup to which we can take the fuel with daily refueling is ~7,500 MW.d/Mg(U).
This is almost twice the discharge-to-burnup value attainable in the “batch-refueled” reactor
and represents quite a benefit provided by on-power refueling!
12 Problems
Problem 1
There is an infinite homogeneous non-multiplying medium with diffusion length 8 cm and
diffusion coefficient 2 cm. There are four isotropic point sources of neutrons on the x-y plane:
Source S1 = 108 s-1 at (x, y) = (10 cm, 0)
Source S2 = 108 s-1 at (x, y) = (-10 cm, 0)
Source S3 = 1010 s-1 at (x, y) = (0, 20 cm)
Source S4 = 1010 s-1 at (x, y) = (0, -20 cm)
Problem 2
An isotropic point source of strength S n.s-1 is located at the origin of axes in a homogeneous
non-multiplying material. The material is characterized by an absorption cross section a and a
diffusion constant D.
(a) Imagine a sphere of arbitrary radius R centred at the origin of axes. Calculate the integrated
absorption rate of neutrons (per s) within the sphere.
(b) What is happening to the remaining neutrons (the difference between the number emitted
and the number absorbed per s)? Prove this by calculation.
Problem 3
Suppose that you have an infinite plane source of neutrons in the y-z plane (i.e., at x = 0), which
emits a total of N neutrons per cm2 per s (half in the positive and half in the negative x-
direction).
Of course, we can think of the plane source as an infinite number of point sources, one at each
point of the plane. Let us take the emission from each point source as isotropic. If the point
source actually has differential area dA (which can be as small as we want), then the point-
source strength will be NdA neutrons per s.
Calculate the flux at any point x in space by integrating the flux from all point sources (by
symmetry, this will of course be the same for any values of y and z). Show that you get the
formula for the flux from the infinite plane source.
Problem 4
This is an exercise on the quantitative aspects of the neutron cycle.
Refer to the figure below which pertains to a critical reactor. Refer also to the notes in the
figure. You are asked to calculate how many thermal neutrons escape from the reactor per unit
time.
Remember that the two main things that can happen when a neutron is absorbed in the fuel
are capture (when the neutron is absorbed and a gamma ray is emitted) and fission (when the
neutron is absorbed and fission is induced). Therefore, the ratio of capture to fission, /f, is
an important parameter. To solve the problem, use the data given and find the right sequence
(up and/or down) for filling numbers into the boxes.
Note that numbers need not be exact integers. In each box, retain non-integer numbers to 3
decimal places.
Thermal
Leakage
Non-Fuel Thermal
Absorption
Thermal
Absorptions
in Fuel
Thermal
Captures in
Fuel
Thermal
Fissions
Problem 5
A homogeneous, bare cylindrical reactor with extrapolated axial length 5.8 m is critical. It is
operated at a fission power of 900 MW. In one energy group, the reactor material is known to
have = 2.38, f = 0.0042 cm-1, and D = 1.14 cm a = 0.0099 cm-1.
The leakage is 9.6 mk. [Note: neglect the extrapolation distance.]
(a) Calculate the reactor buckling and the material’s absorption cross section.
(b) Determine the reactor’s extrapolated diameter.
(c) What is the average flux in the reactor?
(d) What is the ratio of the flux on the cylindrical reactor axis at 50 cm from the reactor face to
the maximum flux in the reactor?
Problem 6
Reactor Statics – September 2014
60 The Essential CANDU
Design the proportions of a cylindrical reactor which minimize leakage [neglect the extrapola-
tion distance].
Problem 7
A research reactor is in the shape of a parallelepiped with a square base of side 5.2 m and a
height of 6.8 m. The reactor is filled uniformly with a fuel of one-group properties f = 0.0072
cm-1 (and = 2.45) and a = 0.0070 cm-1. The reactor operates steadily at a fission power of 15
MW. The average value of energy per fission Ef = 200 MeV, and 1 eV =1.6*10-19 J. [Neglect the
extrapolation distance.]
(a) What is the value of the diffusion coefficient?
(b) What is the average value of the neutron flux?
(c) What is the maximum value of the neutron flux?
(d) At what rate is the fuel consumed in the entire reactor (in nuclides.s-1) and at the centre of
the reactor (in nuclides.cm-3.s-1)?
Problem 8
A critical homogeneous reactor in the shape of a cube loses 4% of produced neutrons through
leakage.
a) Calculate k for an infinite reactor made of the same material.
b) The initial reactor is re-shaped into a sphere. Calculate the new keff .
NOTE: Use one-group diffusion theory and ignore the extrapolation length.
Problem 9
A reactor is made in the shape of a cone, with the base radius equal to the height and both
equal to 3 m. The reactor is homogeneous, with the following properties:
f = 0.002 cm-1
a = 0.0018 cm-1
Calculate the number of neutrons leaking out of the reactor per second knowing that the
reactor is critical and that the average flux in the reactor is 1013 n/cm2/s.
Problem 10
Imagine we have nuclear material with the following properties in two energy groups:
a1 = 0.0011 cm-1, 12 = 0.0068 cm-1, a2 = 0.0043 cm-1, f2 = 0.00528 cm-1
D1 = 1.07 cm, D2 = 0.92 cm.
t r , E r , E J r , E 0
(presented earlier as Eq. (16)). Our overall objective is to rewrite the last term (the leakage
term) in terms of the total flux r, E only.
We first try to obtain an equation for the total current J r , E by multiplying the transport
equation (7), which depends on angle, by ̂ and integrating over it, yielding Eq. (A.1):
1
S r, E ˆ E ˆ
f r , E ' r ,
4
ˆ d
4 ', E ' d
ˆ ' dE ' ˆ d
ˆ
ˆ E'
ˆ'
ˆ
s r , E ' E , ˆ ' ˆ r , ˆ ', E ' ˆ dE ' d ˆ ' d ˆ (A.1)
ˆ
ˆ ' E'
ˆ
t r , E r , ˆ J r ,
,E
ˆ d
ˆ ,E
ˆ d
ˆ 0
ˆ
ˆ
In the first two terms, which we can call T1 and T2, we used the assumption of isotropy in the
external and fission sources, so that these terms are proportional to the integral
ˆ d
ˆ . This is
ˆ
similarly for the other components) must have a zero value because there are as many positive
ˆ ' s as there are negative. Therefore, the first two terms drop out of the equation:
x
T1 T2 0.
(A.2)
Let us jump to the fourth term, which by definition is:
ˆ
ˆ J r ,
ˆ J r , E .
r , , E
ˆ d
ˆ , E d
ˆ
ˆ
1 (A.4)
and
ˆ
T3 sa r , E ' E r , ˆ ' d ' dE ' r, E ' E J r, E ' dE '.
', E ' sa
E'
ˆ' E (A.5)
Note that if the scattering cross section were isotropic, s would not depend on , and there-
fore sa would be 0. Although this is not a good approximation, one that is more reasonable is
to neglect the energy change in anisotropic scattering, i.e., to assume that sa r , E ' E is a
delta function E' - E sa r , E , which leads to
T3 sa r , E J r , E ,
(A.6)
where
1
sa r , E 2 s r , E , d s r , E
1 (A.7)
and is the average cosine of the scattering angle.
Moving on to the fifth term, T5:
T5 J r , ˆ r ,
ˆ ,E
ˆ d
ˆ , E
ˆ ˆ d
ˆ.
ˆ
ˆ
(A.8)
To calculate the integral, we adopt again the assumption of weak angular dependence of the
angular flux, which leads to the following approximate expression [Eq. (27)] for the angular flux
in terms of the total flux and the total current expression; see derivation in Section 2.3:
3J
ˆ
ˆ .
4 4 (27)
Substituting this expression into Eq. (A.8), we get
r, E 3
T5 J
ˆ
ˆ ˆ d
ˆ.
4 4
ˆ
(A.9)
Now it can be shown (a reasonable result) that the integral of the product of two components
of ̂ , e.g., ij, is equal to 4/3 if i = j, but 0 if i j. Similarly, the integral of the product of
three components is 0.
Using these two results, Eq. (A.9) becomes
1
T5 r , E .
3 (A.10)
Incorporating all these results for the various terms [Eqs. (A.2), (A.3), (A.6), (A.10)], Eq. (A.1)
becomes:
1
0 0 sa r , E J r , E t r , E J r , E r 0,
3 (A.11)
which yields the final approximation for the total current:
1
J r, E r , E ,
3 t r , E sa r , E
(A.12)
which is Fick’s Law, giving for the diffusion coefficient,
1
D r, E .
3 t r , E sa r , E
(A.13)
The quantity in parentheses in Eq. (A.13) is defined as the transport cross section, tr r .
14 Acknowledgements
The following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and excellent com-
ments during the development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of course
the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the authors.
Marv Gold
Ken Kozier
Guy Marleau
Bruce Wilkin
Thanks are also extended to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
CHAPTER 5
Reactor Dynamics
prepared by
Eleodor Nichita, UOIT
and
Benjamin Rouben, 12 & 1 Consulting, Adjunct Professor, McMaster & UOIT
Summary:
This chapter addresses the time-dependent behaviour of nuclear reactors. This chapter is
concerned with short- and medium-time phenomena. Long-time phenomena are studied in the
context of fuel and fuel cycles and are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. The chapter starts with an
introduction to delayed neutrons because they play an important role in reactor dynamics.
Subsequent sections present the time-dependent neutron-balance equation, starting with
“point” kinetics and progressing to detailed space-energy-time methods. Effects of Xe and Sm
“poisoning” are studied in Section 7, and feedback effects are presented in Section 8. Section 9
is identifies and presents the specific features of CANDU reactors as they relate to kinetics and
dynamics.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3
1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 Learning Outcomes ............................................................................................................. 3
2 Delayed Neutrons ................................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Production of Prompt and Delayed Neutrons: Precursors and Emitters ............................ 4
2.2 Prompt, Delayed, and Total Neutron Yields ........................................................................ 5
2.3 Delayed-Neutron Groups .................................................................................................... 5
3 Simple Point-Kinetics Equation (Homogeneous Reactor) ....................................................... 6
3.1 Neutron-Balance Equation without Delayed Neutrons ...................................................... 6
3.2 Average Neutron-Generation Time, Lifetime, and Reactivity ............................................. 8
3.3 Point-Kinetics Equation without Delayed Neutrons ........................................................... 9
3.4 Neutron-Balance Equation with Delayed Neutrons.......................................................... 11
4 Solutions of the Point-Kinetics Equations ............................................................................. 13
4.1 Stationary Solution: Source Multiplication Formula ......................................................... 13
4.2 Kinetics with One Group of Delayed Neutrons ................................................................. 15
4.3 Kinetics with Multiple Groups of Delayed Neutrons ........................................................ 17
4.4 Inhour Equation, Asymptotic Behaviour, and Reactor Period .......................................... 18
4.5 Approximate Solution of the Point-Kinetics Equations: The Prompt Jump Approximation21
5 Space-Time Kinetics using Flux Factorization ....................................................................... 24
5.1 Time-, Energy-, and Space-Dependent Multigroup Diffusion Equation ........................... 24
5.2 Flux Factorization .............................................................................................................. 25
5.3 Effective Generation Time, Effective Delayed-Neutron Fraction, and Dynamic Reactivity27
List of Figures
Figure 1 Graphical representation of the Inhour equation........................................................... 19
Figure 2 135Xe production and destruction mechanisms .............................................................. 34
Figure 3 Simplified 135Xe production and destruction mechanisms ............................................. 34
Figure 4 135Xe reactivity worth after shutdown ............................................................................ 37
Figure 5 CANDU fuel-temperature effect ..................................................................................... 40
Figure 6 CANDU coolant-temperature effect................................................................................ 41
Figure 7 CANDU moderator-temperature effect .......................................................................... 41
Figure 8 CANDU coolant-density effect ........................................................................................ 42
List of Tables
Table 1 Delayed-neutron data for thermal fission in 235U ([Rose1991]) ......................................... 6
Table 2 CANDU reactivity device worth ........................................................................................ 43
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
The previous chapter was devoted to predicting the neutron flux in a nuclear reactor under
special steady-state conditions in which all parameters, including the neutron flux, are constant
over time. During steady-state operation, the rate of neutron production must equal the rate of
neutron loss. To ensure this equality, the effective multiplication factor, keff, was introduced as a
divisor of the neutron production rate. This chapter addresses the time-dependent behaviour
of nuclear reactors. In the general time-dependent case, the neutron production rate is not
necessarily equal to the neutron loss rate, and consequently an overall increase or decrease in
the neutron population will occur over time.
The study of the time-dependence of the neutron flux for postulated changes in the macro-
scopic cross sections is usually referred to as reactor kinetics, or reactor kinetics without feed-
back. If the macroscopic cross sections are allowed to depend in turn on the neutron flux level,
the resulting analysis is called reactor dynamics or reactor kinetics with feedback.
Time-dependent phenomena are also classified by the time scale over which they occur:
Short-time phenomena are phenomena in which significant changes in reactor prop-
erties occur over times shorter than a few seconds. Most accidents fall into this
category.
Medium-time phenomena are phenomena in which significant changes in reactor
properties occur over the course of several hours to a few days. Xe poisoning is an
example of a medium-time phenomenon.
Long-time phenomena are phenomena in which significant changes in reactor prop-
erties occur over months or even years. An example of a long-time phenomenon is
the change in fuel composition as a result of burn-up.
This chapter is concerned with short- and medium-time phenomena. Long-time phenomena
are studied in the context of fuel and fuel cycles and are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. The
chapter starts with an introduction to delayed neutrons because they play an important role in
reactor dynamics. Subsequent sections present the time-dependent neutron-balance equation,
starting with “point” kinetics and progressing to detailed space-energy-time methods. Effects
of Xe and Sm “poisoning” are studied in Section 7, and feedback effects are presented in
Section 8. Section 9 is identifies and presents the specific features of CANDU reactors as they
relate to kinetics and dynamics.
2 Delayed Neutrons
2.1 Production of Prompt and Delayed Neutrons: Precursors and Emitters
AX
Binary fission of a target nucleus ZX X occurs through formation of a compound nucleus
AX 1
ZX X which subsequently decays very rapidly (promptly) into two (hence the name “binary”)
fission products Am and Bm, accompanied by the emission of (prompt) gamma photons and
(prompt) neutrons:
AX 1
1
0 n ZAXX X ZX X, (1)
AX 1
ZX X Am Bm + pm n
(2)
The exact species of fission products Am and Bm, as well as the exact number of prompt neu-
trons emitted, pm , and the number and energy of emitted gamma photons depend on the
mode m according to which the compound nucleus decays. Several hundred decay modes are
possible, each characterized by its probability of occurrence pm. On average, p prompt
neutrons are emitted per fission. The average number of prompt neutrons can be expressed as:
p pm pm . (3)
m
Obviously, although the number of prompt neutrons emitted in each decay mode, pm , is a
positive integer (1, 2, 3…), the average number of neutrons emitted per fission, p , is a frac-
tional number. pm as well as p depend on the target nucleus species and on the energy of
the incident neutron.
The initial fission products Am and Bm can be stable or can further decay in several possible
modes, as shown below for Am (a similar scheme exists for Bm):
Am1 (mode 1)
Am 2 10 HE (mode 2)
Am A 'm 3 1 LE
0
(mode 3)
(fast)
Am 3 n (delayed neutron)
.
Fission products Am that decay according to mode 3, by emitting a low-energy beta particle, are
called precursors, and the intermediate nuclides A'm3 are called emitters. Emitters are daugh-
ters of precursors which are born in a highly excited state. Because their excitation energy is
higher than the separation energy for one neutron, emitters can de-excite by promptly emitting
a neutron. The delay in the appearance of the neutron is not caused by its emission, but rather
by the delay in the beta decay of the precursor. If a high-energy beta particle rather than a low-
energy one is emitted, the excitation energy of the daughter nuclide is not high enough to emit
a neutron, and hence decay mode 2 does not result in emission of delayed neutrons.
n X A B p np d nd . (4)
The total neutron yield is defined as the sum of the prompt and delayed neutron yields:
d p . (5)
The delayed-neutron fraction is defined as the ratio between delayed-neutron yield and total
neutron yield:
d
. (6)
For neutron energies typical of those found in a nuclear reactor, most of the energy dependence
of the delayed-neutron fraction is due to the energy dependence of the prompt-neutron yield
and not to that of the delayed-neutron yield. This is the case because the latter is essentially
independent of energy for incident neutrons with energies below 4 MeV.
kmax
k 1
k . (8)
235
Values of delayed-group constants for U are shown in Table 1, which uses data from
[Rose1991].
Table 1 Delayed-neutron data for thermal fission in 235U ([Rose1991])
To maintain the static form of the diffusion equation even when the fission source does not
exactly equal the sinks, the practice in reactor statics is to divide the fission source artificially by
the effective multiplication constant, keff, resulting in the static balance equation for a non-
critical reactor:
1
D 2 s (r ) a s (r ) f s (r )
keff
. (12)
Using the expression for geometric buckling:
f
a
keff
Bg2
D , (13)
Eq. (12) becomes:
2 s (r ) Bg2 s (r ) 0
. (14)
Note that geometrical buckling is determined solely by reactor shape and size and is independ-
ent of the production or absorption macroscopic cross sections. It follows that changes in the
macroscopic cross sections do not influence buckling; they influence only the effective multipli-
cation constant, which can be calculated as:
f
keff
a DBg2
. (15)
Because the value of geometrical buckling is independent of the macroscopic cross section, the
shape of the static flux is independent of whether or not the reactor is critical.
To progress to the derivation of the point-kinetics equation, the assumption is made that the
shape of the time-dependent flux does not change with time and is equal to the shape of the
static flux. In mathematical form:
(r , t ) T (t ) s (r )
, (16)
where T(t) is a function depending only on time.
It follows that the time-dependent flux (r , t ) satisfies Eq. (14), and hence:
2(r , t ) Bg2(r , t )
. (17)
Substituting this expression for the leakage term into the time-dependent neutron-balance
equation (9) the following is obtained:
n(r , t )
f (r , t ) DBg2 (r , t ) a (r , t )
t . (18)
The one-group flux is the product of the neutron density and the average neutron speed, with
the latter assumed independent of time:
( r , t ) n( r , t )v . (19)
ˆ (t ) (r , t )dV n(r , t )vdV nˆ (t )v
V V . (24)
With the notations just introduced, the balance equation for the total neutron population can
be written as:
dnˆ (t )
f vnˆ (t ) DBg2 vnˆ (t ) a vnˆ (t )
dt . (25)
Equation (25) is a first-order linear differential equation, and its solution gives a full description
of the time dependence of the neutron population and implicitly of the neutron flux in a homo-
geneous reactor without delayed neutrons. However, to highlight certain important quantities
which describe dynamic reactor behaviour, it is customary to process its right-hand side (RHS) as
follows:
dnˆ (t )
dt
f DBg2 a vnˆ (t )
. (26)
as the ratio of the difference between the production rate and the loss rate to the production
rate.
ˆ
production rate - loss rate f ˆ DB 2
ˆ
a g
production rate ˆ
f
f a DBg2 a DBg2 loss rate 1
1 1 1
f f production rate keff
. (27)
Average neutron-generation time
The average neutron-generation time is the ratio between the total neutron population and the
neutron production rate.
neutron population nˆ nˆ 1
production rate ˆ f nˆv f v
f
. (28)
The average generation time can be interpreted as the time it would take to attain the current
neutron population at the current neutron-generation rate. It can also be interpreted as the
average age of neutrons in the reactor.
Average neutron lifetime
The average neutron lifetime is the ratio between the total neutron population and the neutron
loss rate:
neutron population nˆ nˆ 1
loss rate a DBg a DBg nˆv a DBg2 v
2 ˆ 2
. (29)
The average neutron lifetime can be interpreted as the time it would take to lose all neutrons in
the reactor at the current loss rate. It can also be interpreted as the average life expectancy of
neutrons in the reactor.
The ratio of the average neutron-generation time and the average neutron lifetime equals the
effective multiplication constant:
1
a DBg2 v
f
keff
1 a DBg2
f v
. (30)
It follows that for a critical reactor, the neutron-generation time and the lifetime are equal. It
also follows that, for a supercritical reactor, the lifetime is longer than the generation time and
that, for a sub-critical reactor, the lifetime is shorter than the generation time.
DBg2 a
f DB a
2
g vnˆ (t )
f
f
v nˆ(t ) nˆ(t )
f
(31)
or
DBg2 a
DB2
g a vnˆ (t ) nˆ(t )
. (32)
The neutron-balance equation can therefore be written either as:
dnˆ (t )
nˆ (t )
dt (33)
or as:
dnˆ (t ) keff 1
nˆ (t )
dt . (34)
Equations (33) and (34) are referred to as the point-kinetics equation without delayed neutrons.
The name point kinetics is used because, in this simplified formalism, the shape of the neutron
flux and the neutron density distribution are ignored. The reactor is therefore reduced to a
point, in the same way that an object is reduced to a point mass in simple kinematics.
Both forms of the point-kinetics equation are valid. However, because most transients are
induced by changes in the absorption cross section rather than in the fission cross section, the
form expressed by Eq. (33) has the mild advantage that the generation time remains constant
during a transient (whereas the lifetime does not). Consequently, this text will express the
neutron-balance equation using generation time. However, the reader should be advised that
other texts use the lifetime. Results obtained in the two formalisms can be shown to be equiva-
lent.
If the reactivity and generation time remain constant during a transient, the obvious solution to
the point-kinetics equation (33) is:
t
nˆ (t ) nˆ (0)e .
(35)
If the reactivity and generation time are not constant over time, that is, if the balance equation
is written as:
dnˆ (t ) (t )
nˆ (t )
dt (t ) , (36)
the solution becomes slightly more involved and usually proceeds either by using the Laplace
transform or by time discretization.
Before advancing to accounting for delayed neutrons, one last remark will be made regarding
the relationship between the neutron population and reactor power. Because the reactor
power is the product of total fission rate and energy liberated per fission, it can be expressed as:
ˆ (t ) E nˆ (t )v
P (t ) E fiss f fiss f
. (37)
Reactor Dynamics - November 2014
Reactor Dynamics 11
It can therefore be seen that the power has the same time dependence as the total neutron
population.
C (r , t )dV Cˆ (t ) C (t )V
V . (38)
It follows that the delayed-neutron production rate S d ( r , t ) , which equals the precursor decay
rate, is:
S d (r , t ) C (r , t )
. (39)
The corresponding volume-integrated quantities satisfy a similar relationship:
Sˆd (t ) Cˆ (t )
. (40)
The core-integrated neutron-balance equation now must account explicitly for both the prompt
ˆ (t ) , and the delayed-neutron source:
neutron source, p f
dnˆ (t )
p f vnˆ (t ) Sˆd (t ) DBg2 vnˆ (t ) a vnˆ (t )
dt
p f vnˆ (t ) Cˆ (t ) DBg2 vnˆ (t ) a vnˆ (t )
. (41)
Of course, to be able to evaluate the delayed-neutron source, a balance equation for the
precursors must be written as well. Precursors are produced from fission and are lost as a result
of decay. It follows that the precursor-balance equation can be written as:
dCˆ (t ) ˆ (t ) Cˆ (t )
d f
dt
d f vnˆ (t ) Cˆ (t )
. (42)
Reactor Dynamics - November 2014
12 The Essential CANDU
The system of equations (41) and (42) completely describes the time dependence of the neu-
tron and precursor populations. Just as in the case without delayed neutrons, they have been
processed to highlight neutron-generation time and reactivity. Because reactivity is based on
total neutron yield rather than prompt neutron yield, the prompt neutron source is expressed
as the difference between the total neutron source and the delayed-neutron source:
dnˆ (t )
f vnˆ (t ) d f vnˆ (t ) Cˆ (t ) DBg2 vnˆ (t ) a vnˆ (t )
dt
a
DB 2 vnˆ (t ) vnˆ (t ) Cˆ (t )
f g d f
. (43)
The RHS is subsequently processed in a similar way to the no-delayed-neutron case:
DB
2
v nˆ (t ) Cˆ (t )
f g a d f
f
f f
nˆ (t ) Cˆ (t )
. (44)
The neutron-balance equation can hence be written as:
dnˆ (t )
nˆ (t ) Cˆ (t )
dt . (45)
The RHS of the precursor-balance equation can be similarly processed:
d f
d f vnˆ (t ) Cˆ (t ) f vnˆ (t ) Cˆ (t ) nˆ(t ) Cˆ (t )
f
, (46)
leading to the following form of the precursor-balance equation:
dCˆ (t )
nˆ (t ) Cˆ (t )
dt . (47)
Combining Eqs. (45) and (47), the system of point-kinetics equations for the case of one de-
layed-neutron group is obtained:
dnˆ (t )
nˆ (t ) Cˆ (t )
dt
dCˆ (t )
nˆ (t ) Cˆ (t )
dt . (48)
kmax
Sˆd (t ) k Cˆ k (t )
k 1 , (49)
dCˆ k (t ) k
nˆ (t ) k Cˆ k (t ) (k 1...kmax )
dt , (54)
representing the point-kinetics equations for the case with multiple delayed-neutron groups.
critical rector with an external neutron source, that is, a source that is independent of the
neutron flux. The strength of the external source is assumed constant over time. If the total
strength of the source is Ŝ (n/s), the neutron-balance equation needs to be modified to include
this additional source of neutrons. The precursor-balance equations remain unchanged by the
presence of the external neutron source. Because a steady-state solution is sought, the time
derivatives on the left-hand side (LHS) of the point-kinetics equations vanish. The steady-state
point-kinetics equations in the presence of an external source can therefore be written as:
k
nˆ k Cˆ k Sˆ
max
0
k 1
0 k nˆ k Cˆ k (k 1...kmax )
. (55)
Equation (55) is a system of linear algebraic equations where the unknowns are the neutron and
precursor populations. This can be easily seen by rearranging as follows:
k
ˆn k Cˆ k Sˆ
max
k 1
k
nˆ k Cˆ k 0 (k 1...kmax )
. (56)
The system can be easily solved by substitution, by formally solving for the precursor popula-
tions in the precursor-balance equations:
Cˆ k k nˆ (k 1...kmax )
k (57)
and substituting the resulting expression into the neutron-balance equation to obtain:
kmax
k
nˆ nˆ Sˆ
k 1 . (58)
Noting that the sum of the partial delayed-neutron fractions equals the total delayed-neutron
fraction, as expressed by Eq. (58), the neutron-balance equation can be processed to yield:
1 kmax
nˆ nˆ k nˆ nˆ nˆ nˆ nˆ Sˆ
k 1
. (59)
The neutron population is hence equal to:
n̂ Sˆ
. (60)
Note that the reactivity is negative, and therefore the neutron population is positive. Equation
(60) is called the source multiplication formula. It shows that the neutron population can be
obtained by multiplying the external source strength by the inverse of the reactivity, hence the
name. The closer the reactor is to criticality, the larger will be the source multiplication value
and hence the neutron population. Substituting Eq. (60) into Eq. (57), the individual precursor
concentrations are:
Reactor Dynamics - November 2014
Reactor Dynamics 15
Sˆ k
Cˆ k (k 1...kmax )
k . (61)
The source multiplication formula finds applications in describing the approach to critical during
reactor start-up and in measuring reactivity device worth.
nˆ (t ) n0 t n1 t
ˆ a0 e 0 a1 e 1
C (t ) C0 C1 . (65)
Coefficients a0 and a1 are found by applying the initial conditions.
To find the fundamental solutions, expression (64) is substituted into Eq. (63) to obtain:
n
d n t
e et
dt C
C
, (66)
and subsequently:
Reactor Dynamics - November 2014
16 The Essential CANDU
n
n
et et
C
C
. (67)
Dividing both sides by the exponential term and rearranging the terms, the following homoge-
neous linear system is obtained, called the characteristic system:
n 0
C 0
. (68)
This represents an eigenvalue-eigenvector problem, for which a solution is presented below.
First, the system is rearranged so that the unknowns are each isolated on one side, and the
system is rewritten as a regular system of two equations:
n C
n C
. (69)
Dividing the two equations side by side, an equation for the eigenvalues k is obtained:
. (70)
This is a quadratic equation in , as can easily be seen after rearranging to:
2 0
. (71)
The two solutions to this quadratic equation are simply:
2
4
0,1
2 . (72)
Once the eigenvalues are known, either the first or the second of equations (69) can be used to
find the relationship between n and C . In doing so, care must be taken that the right eigen-
value (correct subscript) is used for the right n - C combination. Note that only the ratio of n
and C can be determined. It follows that either n or C can have an arbitrary value, which is
Reactor Dynamics - November 2014
Reactor Dynamics 17
usually chosen to be unity. For example, if the second equation (69) is used, and if n0 and n1 are
chosen to be unity, the two fundamental solutions are:
1
e0t
0
1
e1t
1
. (73)
The general solution is then:
1 1
nˆ (t ) 0t e1t
ˆ a0 e a1
C (t ) 0 1
. (74)
dCˆ k (t ) k
nˆ (t ) k Cˆ k (t ) (k 1,..., kmax )
dt . (75)
As long as the coefficients are constant, this is simply a system of first-order linear differential
equations, whose general solution is a linear combination of exponential fundamental solutions
of the type:
n
C
1 et
Ckmax . (76)
There are kmax+1 such solutions, and the general solution can be expressed as:
nˆ (t ) nl
ˆ k l
C1 (t ) max C1 l t
al
e
l 0
l
Cˆ kmax (t ) Ckmax . (77)
kmax
n n k Ck
k 1
Ck n k Ck (k 1,..., kmax )
. (78)
The components Ck can be expressed using the precursor equations in (78) as:
k
Ck n (k 1,..., kmax )
k
. (79)
Substituting this into the neutron-balance equation in (78) yields:
kmax
k
n n k n
k 1 k
. (80)
Note that the component n can be simplified out of the above and that by rearranging terms,
the following expression for reactivity is obtained:
kmax
k
k
k 1 k . (81)
Equation (81) is known as the Inhour equation. Its kmax+1 solutions determine the exponents of
the kmax+1 fundamental solutions. To understand the nature of those solutions, it is useful to
attempt a graphical solution of the Inhour equation by plotting its RHS as a function of and
observing its intersection with a horizontal line at y . Such a plot is shown in Fig. 1 for the
case of six delayed-neutron groups.
6 5 4 3 2 1
generation time is usually less than 1 ms, and often less than 0.1 ms, the slope of the
oblique asymptote is very small. Consequently, min is very far to the left of k , max
and hence kmax kmax kmax 1 . The importance of this fact will become clearer
later, when the prompt-jump approximation will be discussed.
Overall, the solutions are ordered as follows:
min k k max 1
..... 0 max
max . (83)
Reactor Dynamics - November 2014
20 The Essential CANDU
It is worth separating out the largest exponent in the general solution described by Eq. (77) by
writing:
nˆ (t ) n0 nl
ˆ 0
C1 (t ) C1 0t kmax C1l l t
a0 e al e
0
l 1
l
Cˆ kmax (t ) kmax
C Ckmax . (84)
Furthermore, it is worth factoring out the first exponential term:
nˆ (t ) n0 nl
ˆ 0 k l
C1 (t ) 0t C1 max C1 l 0 t
e a0
al e
0 l 1
l
Cˆ kmax (t ) Ck
max kmax
C
. (85)
Note that because 0 is the largest solution, all exponents l 0 are negative. It follows
l 0 t
that for large values of t, all exponentials of the type e nearly vanish, and hence the
solution can be approximated by a single exponential term:
nˆ (t ) n0
ˆ 0
C1 (t ) C1 e0t
0a
0
Cˆ kmax (t ) Ckmax
. (86)
This expression describes the asymptotic transient behaviour.
The inverse of 0 max is called the asymptotic period:
1
T
max . (87)
With this new notation, the asymptotic behaviour can be written as:
nˆ (t ) n0
ˆ 0 t
C1 (t ) C1 e T
a0
0
Cˆ kmax (t ) Ckmax
. (88)
Before ending this sub-section, a few more comments are warranted. In particular, it is worth
considering the solution to the point-kinetics equation (PKE) for three separate cases: negative
reactivity, zero reactivity, and positive reactivity.
Negative reactivity
In the case of negative reactivity, all exponents in the general solution are negative. It follows
that over time, both the neutron population and the precursor concentrations will drop to zero.
Of course, after a long time, asymptotic behaviour applies, and it also has a negative exponent.
Zero reactivity
In the case of zero reactivity, max vanishes, and all other l are negative. The general solution
can be written as:
nˆ (t ) n0 nl
ˆ 0 kmax l
C1 (t ) C1 a C1 el t
a0 l
0
l 1
l
Cˆ kmax (t ) Ckmax Ckmax
. (89)
After a sufficiently long time, all the exponential terms die out, and the neutron and precursor
populations stabilize at a constant value. Note that these populations do not need to remain
constant from the beginning of the transient, but only to stabilize at a constant value.
Positive reactivity
In the case of positive reactivity, max is positive, and all other l are negative. Hence, after
sufficient time has elapsed, all but the first exponential term vanish, and the asymptotic behav-
iour is described by a single exponential which increases indefinitely.
nˆ (t ) n0 n kmax 1 nl
ˆ 0 kmax 1 kmax 2 l
C1 (t ) kmax 1t C1 ekmax kmax 1 t a C1 C1 l kmax 1 t
e akmax al e
kmax 1
l 0
0 kmax 1 l
Cˆ kmax (t )
kmax
C kmax
C kmax
C
. (93)
According to Eq. (92), for l kmax 2 , all exponents of the type l kmax 1 t are positive. The
only negative exponent is kmax kmax 1 t , which is also much larger in absolute value than all
other exponents. It follows that after a very short time, t, the first term of the RHS of Eq. (93)
becomes negligible, and the solution of the point-kinetics equations can then be approximated
by:
nˆ (t ) n kmax 1 nl nl
ˆ kmax 1 kmax 2 l k 1 l
C1 (t ) kmax 1t C
1 1 e l kmax 1
C C1 el t
max
t
e a
max a a
k 1
l 0 l
l
kmax 1 l l 0 l
Cˆ kmax (t ) Ckmax Ckmax Ckmax
. (94)
Concentrating on the neutron population, its expression is:
kmax 1
nˆ (t ) a n e
l 0
l
l lt
. (95)
Substituting this into the neutron-balance equation of the point-kinetics system, the following is
obtained:
kmax 1 kmax 1
l t k
ane al n e k Cˆ k
max
l l t
l
l l
l 1 l 1 k 1 . (96)
Noting that the following inequality holds true:
l l 0,...kmax 1
, (97)
the LHS of Eq. (96) can be approximated to vanish, and hence the equation can be approxi-
mated by:
kmax 1
l t k
al n e k Cˆ k
max
0 l
l 1 k 1 , (98)
which is equivalent to:
kmax
0 nˆ (t ) k Cˆ k (t )
k 1 . (99)
By adding the precursor-balance equations, the following approximate point-kinetics equations
have been obtained:
kmax
0 nˆ (t ) k Cˆ k (t )
k 1
dCˆ k (t ) k
nˆ (t ) k Cˆ k (t ) (k 1,..., kmax )
dt . (100)
This system of kmax differential equations and one algebraic equation is known as the prompt
jump approximation of the point-kinetics equations. The name comes from the fact that
whenever a step reactivity change occurs, the prompt jump approximation results in a step
change, a prompt jump, in the neutron population. To demonstrate this behaviour, let the
reactivity change from 1 to 2 at time t0. The neutron-balance equation before and after t0
can be written as:
1 kmax
nˆ (t ) k Cˆ k (t ) (t t0 )
k 1
2 kmax
nˆ (t ) k Cˆ k (t ) (t t0 )
k 1 . (101)
The limit of the neutron population as t approaches t0 from the left, symbolically denoted as
nˆ (t0 ) , is found from the first equation (101) to be equal to:
kmax
nˆ (t0 )
1
Cˆ (t )
k 1
k k 0
. (102)
Similarly, the limit of the neutron population as t approaches t0 from the right, symbolically
denoted as nˆ (t0 ) , is found from the second equation (101) to be equal to:
kmax
nˆ (t0 )
2
Cˆ (t )
k 1
k k 0
. (103)
Taking the ratio of the preceding two equations side by side, the following is obtained:
nˆ (t0 ) 1
nˆ (t0 ) 2 . (104)
There is therefore a jump, with nˆ (t0 ) equal to:
1 2
nˆ (t0 ) nˆ (t0 ) nˆ (t0 ) nˆ (t0 ) nˆ (t0 ) 1 nˆ (t )
2 2 0 . (105)
Of course, the actual neutron population does not display such a jump; it is continuous at t0.
Nonetheless, a very short time t after t0 (at t0 t ), the approximate and exact neutron
populations become almost equal. Note also that Eq. (105) is valid only if both reactivities 1
and 2 are less than the effective delayed-neutron fraction .
Loss operator
Using these definitions, the time-dependent multigroup diffusion equation can be written in
compact form as:
1 k max
v Φr , t M(r , t )Φr , t Fp (r , t )Φr , t k ξ k (r , t )
t k 1 . (114)
The precursor-balance equations can be written as:
ξ k (r , t ) Fdk (r , t )Φ r , t k ξ k ( r , t ) ( k 1,..., k max )
t . (115)
As a last definition, for two arbitrary vectors Φ(r , t ) and Ψ (r , t ) , the inner product is defined
as:
Φ, Ψ g (r , t )g (r , t )dV
g Vcore
. (116)
Such a factorization is always possible, regardless of the definition of the function p(t). In this
case, the function p(t) is defined as follows:
p(t ) w(r ), v 1Φ(r , t )
, (118)
where w (r ) is an arbitrary weight vector dependent only on energy and position:
w r wg r
. (119)
According to its definition, p(t) can be interpreted as a generalized neutron population. Indeed,
if the weight function were chosen to be unity, p(t) would be exactly equal to the neutron
population.
From the definition of factorization, it follows that the shape vector Ψ (r , t ) satisfies the follow-
ing normalization condition:
w(r ), v 1Ψ(r , t ) 1
. (120)
Substituting the factorized form of the flux into the space-, energy-, and time-dependent
diffusion equation, the following equations (representing respectively the neutron and precur-
sor balance) result:
dp(t ) 1
v Ψ r , t p (t ) v 1Ψ r , t p (t )M (r , t )Ψ r , t
dt t
kmax
p (t )Fp (r , t )Ψ r , t k ξ k (r , t )
k 1 . (121)
ξ k (r , t ) p(t )Fdk ( r , t ) Ψ r , t k ξ k ( r , t ) ( k 1,..., k max )
t . (122)
The precursor-balance equation can be solved formally to give:
t
ξ k (r , t ) ξ k (r , 0)e k t e k (t t ') p(t ')Fdk (r , t ')Ψ(r , t ')dt '
0 . (123)
By taking the inner product with the weight vector w (r ) on both sides of the neutron-balance
equation and the precursor-balance equation, the following is obtained:
w r ; v 1Ψr , t p(t ) w r ; v 1Ψr , t
dp(t ) d
dt dt
p(t ) w r ; M(r , t )Ψr , t
k max
p(t ) w r ; Fp (r , t )Ψr , t k w r ; ξ k (r , t )
k 1 . (124)
w (r ); ξ k (r , t ) p(t ) w (r ); Fdk (r , t )Ψ r , t
t
k w (r ); ξ k (r , t ) (k 1,..., kmax )
. (125)
Equations (124) and (125) can be processed into more elegant forms akin to the point-kinetics
equations. To do this, some quantities must be defined first which will prove to be generaliza-
tions of the same quantities defined for the point-kinetics equations.
ˆ (t )
Ck (t ) p(t ) k k Cˆ k (t ) (k 1,..., k max )
t (t ) . (132)
Of course, to be able to define quantities such as dynamic reactivity, the shape vector Ψ (r , t )
must be known or approximated at each time t. Different shape representations Ψ (r , t ) lead to
different space-time kinetics models. All flux-factorization models alternate between calculat-
ing the shape vector Ψ (r , t ) and solving the point-kinetics-like equations (132) for the ampli-
tude function and the precursor populations. The detailed energy- and space-dependent flux
shape at each time t can subsequently be reconstructed by multiplying the amplitude function
k 1 0 . (133)
The IQS model alternates between solving the point-kinetics-like equations (132) and the shape
equation (133). The corresponding IQS numerical method uses two sizes of time interval.
Because the amplitude function varies much more rapidly with time than the shape vector, the
time interval used to solve the point-kinetics-like equations is much smaller than that used to
solve for the shape vector. Note that, other than the time discretization, the IQS model and
method include no approximation. The actual shape of the weight vector w (r ) is irrelevant.
6 Perturbation Theory
It should be obvious by now that different approximations of the shape vector lead to different
values for the kinetics parameters. It is therefore of interest to determine whether certain
choices of the weight vector might maintain the accuracy of the kinetics parameters even when
approximate shape vectors are used. In particular, it would be very interesting to obtain highly
accurate values of dynamic reactivity, which is the determining parameter for any transient.
The issue of determining the weight function that leads to the smallest errors in reactivity when
small errors exist in the shape vector is addressed by perturbation theory. This section will
present without proof some important results of perturbation theory. The interested reader is
encouraged to consult [Rozon1998], [Ott1985], and [Stacey1970] for detailed proofs and
additional results.
Φ, AΨ A*Φ, Ψ
. (138)
The reactivity at time t can therefore be expressed as:
1
Ψ*0 , FΨ0 Ψ*0 , MΨ0
1 1 keff0
0
keff keff Ψ*0 , FΨ 0
. (142)
In Eq. (142), the “0” subscript or superscript denotes the unperturbed state. Finally, for one-
energy-group representations, the direct flux and the adjoint function are equal. It follows that
in a one-group representation, the reactivity at time t can be expressed as:
Ψ (r , 0), F(r , t )Ψ(r , 0) Ψ( r , 0), M ( r , t ) Ψ( r , 0)
(t )
Ψ (r , 0), F(r , 0)Ψ(r , 0)
2 (r , 0) f a dV
Vcore
2 (r , 0) f dV
Vcore
. (143)
More generally, the static reactivity change between any two states, which is the equivalent of
Eq. (142), can be expressed using one-group diffusion theory as:
1
dV
2
( r )
0 keff
0 f a
1
0
1
Vcore
keff keff
0 (r ) f 0 dV
2
Vcore
. (144)
d 1 d 2
Vd 1
f 0 dV
2
0
Vcore
1
keff0
2
0 fd 2 f 0 ad 2 a 0 dV
Vd 2
f 0 dV
2
0
Vcore
d 1 d 2 . (146)
The interpretation of this equation is that as long as devices are not too close together and do
not have too much reactivity worth (so that the assumptions of perturbation theory remain
valid), their reactivity worths are additive.
7 Fission-Product Poisoning
Poisons are nuclides with large absorption cross sections for thermal neutrons. Some poisons
are introduced intentionally to control the reactor, such as B or Gd. Some poisons are produced
as fission products during normal reactor operation. Xe and Sm are the most important of
these.
aX X aX
. (148)
The total macroscopic absorption cross section is now:
a a 0 aX
, (149)
and the new effective multiplication constant is:
f f
keff
a DB 2
g a 0 aX DBg2
. (150)
Addition of the poison induces a change in reactivity:
1 1 1 1
0 1 1
keff keff0 keff0 keff
a 0 DB a 0 aX DB
2 2
f f
aX X aX
f f
. (151)
To calculate the reactivity inserted by the poison, the concentration of poison nuclei, X, must
first be determined.
Non-uniform concentration
In the case of non-uniform poison concentration, the perturbation formula for reactivity can be
Reactor Dynamics - November 2014
Reactor Dynamics 33
used:
(r ) (r )dV (r ) (r ) X (r )
2 2 2
a aX (r )dV aX dV
1 1
V V
V
k0 k
(r ) (r ) (r )
2 2 2
f (r )dV f (r )dV f (r )dV
V V V . (152)
It can easily be seen that if the distribution is uniform, the previous formula is recovered:
aX 2 (r )dV
1 1 aX
V
k0 k f
f 2 (r )dV
V . (153)
In the next sub-section, specific aspects of fission-product poisoning will be illustrated for the
case of Xe.
I f ss
I
I . (156)
Similarly, the Xe concentration can be determined as:
I I X f ss ( I X ) f ss
X
X aX ss X aX ss . (157)
Note that both I and Xe concentrations depend on flux level. However, whereas the I concen-
tration increases indefinitely with flux level, the Xe concentration levels off, and it can, at most,
become equal to:
( I X ) f
X max
aX . (158)
The Xe macroscopic absorption cross section is:
( I X ) f ss aX
aX X aX
X aX ss . (159)
Using the notation:
X
X 0.770 1013 cm2 sec1
aX , (160)
the Xe macroscopic absorption cross section can be rewritten as:
( I X ) f ss
aX
X ss . (161)
If Xe is assumed to be uniformly distributed, then its resulting reactivity worth is:
Xe
aX
1 ( I X ) f ss X ss
I
f f X ss X ss
. (162)
For high reactor fluxes, in the case where ss X , X can be neglected in the denomina-
tor, and the reactivity becomes independent of flux level and equal to its maximum value of:
I X
Xe
. (163)
This is to be expected given that the Xe concentration has been found to “saturate” with in-
creased flux. The reactivity expressed in Eq. (163) is nothing but the corresponding reactivity
for the maximum Xe concentration shown in Eq. (158).
If, on the contrary, the flux is very low, in the case where ss X , then SS can be neglected
Reactor Dynamics - November 2014
36 The Essential CANDU
in the denominator, and the Xe equivalent reactivity increases linearly with flux level:
Xe
I X ss
X . (164)
Xe load after shutdown: reactor dead time
If, the reactor is shut down ( 0 ), I and Xe production from fission ceases, as well as Xe
destruction through neutron absorption. The concentration of I begins to decrease exponen-
tially due to decay. If the I concentration at the time of shutdown is I 0, the I concentration as a
function of time can be expressed simply as:
I (t ) I 0 e I t . (165)
Substituting this expression into the Xe balance equation and setting the flux to zero leads to
the following expression:
dX
I I 0 e I t X X
dt . (166)
Denoting the Xe concentration at the time of shutdown by X0, the solution can be written as:
I I 0
X (t ) X 0eX t (e t e t )
X I
I X . (167)
If the reactor is shut down after operating for a long time at steady state, the resulting Xe
concentration is:
( 1 X ) f ss I f ss t t
X (t ) e X t (e e )
X I
X aX ss 1 X . (168)
The equivalent reactivity for uniformly distributed Xe (and assuming that the reactor was shut
down after operating for a long time at steady state) is:
1 ( X ) ss t
I e I ss (e t e t )
X x I
X ss I X , (169)
where:
I
I 1.055 1013 cm2 sec1
aX . (170)
Xe concentration, and consequently Xe reactivity worth after shutdown, increases at first
because Xe continues to be produced by decay of I, whereas consumption is now reduced in the
absence of Xe destruction by neutron absorption. After a while, however, Xe concentration
reaches a maximum, starts decreasing, and eventually approaches zero. This behaviour is
shown in Fig. 4, which shows Xe reactivity worth after shutdown from full power.
Changes in reactivity induced by changes in any such parameter are referred to as the reactivity
effect of the respective parameter. For example, the reactivity change induced by a change in
fuel temperature is called the fuel-temperature reactivity effect. The derivative of the reactivity
with respect to any of the parameters, with the others kept constant (i.e., the partial derivative),
is called the reactivity coefficient of that parameter. To illustrate this, assume that all parame-
ters are kept constant with the exception of one, e.g., fuel temperature, which is varied. As-
sume further that reactivity is plotted as a function of the variable parameter, in this case fuel
temperature. The plot in question would be a plot of (T f ) . If a certain fuel temperature Tf 0 is
taken as a reference, then the effect on reactivity of deviations from Tf 0 can be calculated,
namely (Tf ) (Tf ) (Tf 0 ) . (T f ) is called the fuel-temperature reactivity effect. The
d (T f )
derivative of the reactivity with respect to the fuel temperature, namely T f (T f ) , is
dT f
called the fuel-temperature coefficient. Of course, because reactivity also depends on other
parameters, it becomes clear that this derivative should be a partial derivative. In general, if the
reactivity depends on several parameters,
( p1 ,... pn ) , (171)
then the reactivity coefficient with respect to a parameter pi is defined as the partial derivative
of the reactivity with respect to that parameter:
( p1 ,... pn )
p
i
pi . (172)
Of course, in reality, several parameters can vary simultaneously, and their variations may be
impossible to decouple. For example, moderator density also varies when moderator tempera-
ture varies, due to thermal expansion. In this case, the single-parameter reactivity coefficients
are somewhat artificial, and additional combined reactivity coefficients can be defined, which
are of more practical use. For example, in the case of simultaneous variation of both moderator
temperature Tm and moderator density dm, a much more useful quantity would be:
d (Tm , dm ) (Tm , dm ) ddm
T
m ( dm )
dTm Tm dm dTm , (173)
dd m
where the derivative is specified by the thermal expansion law.
dTm
Such coefficients are called combined reactivity coefficients. One very useful combined coeffi-
cient of this kind is the power coefficient of reactivity (PCR), which is defined as:
d n
( p1... pn ) dpi
PCR
dP i 1 pi dP , (174)
where the pi are all the parameters which change with power and on which the reactivity
ultimately depends, such as fuel temperature, coolant temperature, coolant density, and so on.
Because the core parameters depend on flux level and because they influence reactivity, which
Reactor Dynamics - November 2014
Reactor Dynamics 39
in turn influences flux, the reactivity coefficients are said to express the feedback which de-
scribes the connection between flux level and cross-section values. When such feedback is
accounted for during a transient by recalculating the cross sections and the reactivity as func-
tions of flux level (and hence of power level), it is said that kinetics calculations with feedback,
or dynamic calculations, are being performed.
This sub-section will close with a presentation of a few alternate expressions for reactivity
coefficients. If reactivity is expressed using the effective multiplication constant, then the
reactivity coefficient can be expressed as follows:
d ( p) d 1 1 dk ( p)
P 1 2
dp dp k ( p) k ( p) dp
. (175)
For reactors close to critical ( k 1 ), this can be processed to yield:
1 dk ( p) 1 dk ( p)
P
k 2 ( p) dp k ( p) dp . (176)
The last form can also be expressed as:
lnk ( p)
1 dk ( p) d
k ( p) dp dp . (177)
The last two expressions are often used to calculate reactivity coefficients.
9 CANDU-Specific Features
Given the presentation of the basic concepts of reactor kinetics in previous sections, this section
will be devoted to presenting how some of these concepts apply to CANDU reactors.
cal arrangement of the core lattice. Photo-neutron precursors can be grouped by their decay
constant, similarly to “real” precursors. It is customary to use 11 photo-neutron groups, for a
total of 17 delayed-neutron groups. Once the photo-neutron groups have been defined, photo-
neutrons are treated no differently than regular delayed neutrons in the kinetics calculations.
SDS-1: 28 cadmium shutoff rods which fall into the core from above
SDS-2: high-pressure Gd-poison injection into the moderator through six horizontally oriented
nozzles.
The reactivity worth of these reactivity devices is shown in Table 2.
Table 2 CANDU reactivity device worth
11 Problems
1. 1020 nuclei of 235U undergo fission with a delayed-neutron yield of 0.0125 and a delayed-
neutron fraction of 0.005.
a) What is the total neutron yield?
b) How many precursors are produced?
c) How many emitters are eventually produced?
2. A radioactive waste site consists of two cylindrical tanks that contain liquid waste in the
form of fissile material in an aqueous solution. The tanks are in the form of cubes with a
side equal to 1 m. The neutronic properties of the radioactive waste are: SA=0.00100 cm -1,
D=1 cm, ν=2.5, SF=0.00158 cm-1, v=2200 m/s. Assume that all fission neutrons are prompt.
a) Calculate the reactivity, generation time, and neutron lifetime for one of the tanks.
b) The site manager decides to save space and money by storing the content of both tanks
in a larger cubical tank with side 3 2m . Calculate the reactivity, generation time, and
neutron lifetime for the new tank. Comment on the result.
3. A thin foil made of a mixture of isotopes, one of which is fissile, has a fission macroscopic
cross section equal to 0.001 cm-1. When fissioning, the fissile isotope produces two types of
precursors: one with yield 0.05 and a half-life of one minute, and another with yield 0.03
and a half-life of two minutes. The sample is subjected to a pulse of neutrons at t=0 and to
another pulse of neutrons at t=90 s. The first pulse has a fluence of 108 n/cm2, and the sec-
ond pulse has a fluence of 5×107 n/cm2. What is the total number of precursors at t=5 min-
utes?
Note: Assume that the number of nuclei that react with neutrons (through fission or
otherwise) is negligible compared to the original number of nuclei present in the sample
and that neutrons emitted from the sample do not interact in the sample.
4. A thin foil of fissile material is irradiated uniformly in a neutron flux of 108 n/cm2/s, starting
at t=0. There is only one group of delayed neutrons. The total neutron yield per fission is
2.33. The delayed-neutron fraction is 0.001, and the half-life of precursors is one minute.
The number of neutrons per second emitted by the sample is measured with a neutron de-
tector.
a) What does the detector indicate 20 minutes after the start of irradiation?
b) At 25 minutes, irradiation stops. What does the detector indicate two minutes later?
Note: Assume that the number of nuclei that react with neutrons (through fission or
otherwise) is negligible compared to the original number of nuclei present in the sample
and that neutrons emitted from the sample do not interact in the sample.
5. Consider a homogeneous nuclear reactor for which all neutrons are born prompt. The
reactor is cubical, with a side equal to 4 m. The neutronic parameters of the reactor are:
D 1cm
a 0.003cm 1
2.5
v 2200m / s
The reactor is initially critical, operating at 3000 MW fission power. The energy liberated
per fission is approximately 200 MeV. The extrapolated size of the reactor can be ap-
proximated by its physical size.
a) Find f .
The prompt jump approximation is also valid when the reactor is not initially critical.
In preparation
In preparation
CHAPTER 8
Nuclear Plant Systems
prepared by
Dr. Robin Chaplin
Summary:
This chapter deals with the main components of a CANDU nuclear power plant. It follows the
general path of energy production from the nuclear reactor to the electrical generator with
descriptions of the systems and equipment essential for the purpose of generating thermal
energy, transferring heat and converting heat into mechanical and then electrical energy. Some
key auxiliary systems are included where these are an essential part of the energy processes as
are the basic control systems which maintain stable operational conditions and ensure safety of
the plant. This chapter leads into Chapter 9 which describes how a typical CANDU plant oper-
ates.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 4
1.1 General Configuration..................................................................................................... 4
2 Nuclear Reactor....................................................................................................................... 4
2.1 General Arrangement ..................................................................................................... 4
2.2 Calandria Arrangement................................................................................................... 6
2.3 Moderator Temperature Control .................................................................................... 6
2.4 Moderator Reactivity Control ......................................................................................... 7
2.5 Core Shielding ................................................................................................................. 8
2.6 Reactor Control Systems and Devices............................................................................. 8
2.7 Fuel Configuration......................................................................................................... 15
2.8 Fuel Channel Conditions ............................................................................................... 16
2.9 Fuel Handling ................................................................................................................ 17
3 Heat Transport System .......................................................................................................... 19
3.1 General Arrangement ................................................................................................... 19
3.2 Heat Transport Pumps .................................................................................................. 22
3.3 Pressurizer..................................................................................................................... 22
3.4 Inventory Control System.............................................................................................. 23
3.5 Shutdown Cooling System ............................................................................................ 23
3.6 Partial Boiling in CANDU Reactors ................................................................................ 24
3.7 Pressure and Level Effects............................................................................................. 25
3.8 Temperature and Nuclear Considerations .................................................................... 25
4 Steam Generators ................................................................................................................. 26
4.1 Steam Generator Function............................................................................................ 26
4.2 Steam Generator Conditions ........................................................................................ 26
Nuclear Plant Systems - September 2014
2 The Essential CANDU
List of Figures
Figure 1 Reactor vault and assembly .............................................................................................. 5
Figure 2 Feeder tube assembly on reactor face.............................................................................. 5
Figure 3 Moderator cooling and purification system...................................................................... 7
Figure 4 CANDU 6 reactor assembly ............................................................................................... 9
Figure 5 Reactor cross section ...................................................................................................... 10
Figure 6 Reactor longitudinal section ........................................................................................... 11
Figure 7 Reactor plan view............................................................................................................ 12
List of Tables
Table 1 CANDU fuel characteristics............................................................................................... 16
Table 2 Fuel channel parameters (CANDU 6)................................................................................ 17
Table 3 Steam generator conditions (CANDU 6) ........................................................................... 28
Table 4 Turbine generator conditions (CANDU 6)......................................................................... 31
1 Introduction
1.1 General Configuration
Specific units in a typical CANDU nuclear plant include a nuclear reactor in which heat is generated
by nuclear fission, a heat transport system to convey this heat from the reactor to the steam cycle,
a steam generator in which steam is generated, a steam system to convey steam from the steam
generator to the steam turbine, a steam turbine where available heat energy is converted into
mechanical energy, a condenser where unavailable heat energy is rejected to the cooling water
system, a steam reheating and feedwater heating system to improve cycle efficiency, an electrical
generator to convert mechanical energy into electrical energy, and an electrical system to generate
electrical energy for distribution to consumers. To balance the flow of energy through these
components and to regulate plant output, a control system is required. Each of its major systems
will be described in this chapter.
All thermal reactors have four important components: fuel, moderator, coolant, and control
elements. The moderator is that part of the nuclear reactor where neutrons are reduced in energy
to increase the probability of fission when they re-enter the fuel. Spacing of the fuel assemblies
within the moderator is therefore of key importance. Heat must be removed by the coolant from
the fuel assemblies at a high rate without making the fuel undergo excessive temperatures. This is
achieved by having multiple small diameter fuel rods (elements) in one fuel assembly. These two
requirements dictate the general reactor configuration. A unique aspect of the CANDU reactor is
the horizontal arrangement of fuel channels within the reactor calandria. These channels contain
the fuel bundles and are surrounded by the heavy water moderator, whereas heavy water coolant
flows through the channels.
Heat is generated in the nuclear reactor, and electricity is output by the electrical generator. The
production and discharge of this energy must be perfectly balanced. The steam generator is the
key component for maintaining this balance, that is, the rate of steam generation must match the
rate of steam flow to the steam turbine, or vice versa. Any change in these two energy flows will
immediately be reflected as a change in steam pressure in the steam generator. Therefore, steam
pressure is a key control parameter for the entire plant under all operating conditions.
2 Nuclear Reactor
2.1 General Arrangement
For all CANDU reactors, the horizontal fuel channels are arranged in a square array across the
reactor face, as shown in Figure 1. The calandria, which contains the moderator at essentially
atmospheric pressure, contains axial tubes in a similar square array to accommodate the
pressurized fuel channels or pressure tubes, which in turn contain the fuel bundles and the
primary system coolant. Figure 2 shows a close-up view of the feeder pipes conveying coolant
to and from the pressure tubes at one end of the reactor.
are produced, the effectiveness of the boron decreases, making it possible to maintain reasona-
bly constant reactivity with naturally small adjustments. The burnout rate for gadolinium is
faster than that of boron, and therefore it is more suitable for short term reactivity adjustments
such as those necessary during xenon transients. The xenon concentration in the fuel is lower
during periods of low load and builds up following a large power increase. Gadolinium can
compensate for this and burns out at a rate roughly corresponding to xenon buildup. Gadolin-
ium can also be used to compensate for a lack of xenon in the reactor during an outage to
ensure that the reactor will remain subcritical.
The shutdown system, which will be described later, injects liquid poison directly into the
moderator in the event of certain reactor trips. Gadolinium is used at sufficient concentration
to ensure an immediate reduction in reactivity to well below critical conditions. Upon reactor
restart, it must be removed by the moderator purification system. Gadolinium is easily removed
by ion exchange resins, whereas boron, being a weaker ion, is not easily removed. This makes
gadolinium better suited for use in the shutdown system, but it still takes several hours (almost
as long as the ensuing outage) to remove reactivity due to xenon poisoning.
In essence, boron usage is associated with the reactor regulating system (RRS) and gadolinium
usage with the shutdown system (SDS).
A moderator purification system, also shown in Figure 3, is connected to the moderator cooling
system to maintain heavy water purity and to remove or adjust the concentration of soluble
poisons such as gadolinium or boron which may have been introduced for shutdown purposes
or to assist in reactivity control. The non-active soluble poison (after neutron absorption) must
be removed to maintain the general purity of the moderator. The purification system has
strainers to remove particulate material such as resin fines from the system, followed by mixed
bed ion exchange columns to remove dissolved material in the form of positive and negative
ions.
design philosophy applies to other CANDU reactors, but the number of devices may be different
if the reactor core is of different size.
In a CANDU 6 reactor core, there are 26 in-core vertical flux detectors and 7 in-core horizontal
flux detectors. Twelve vertically installed detectors provide flux information to Shutdown
System 1, while three horizontal flux detectors supply flux data to Shutdown System 2. The
remaining vertical flux detectors send information to the liquid zone control absorbers and the
solid control rod absorbers. All these in-core flux detectors can provide data for three
dimensional flux mapping of the reactor core.
Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 show three orthogonal views of a CANDU 6 reactor. These show
the relative positions and arrangement of various components and devices.
refueled while on load and also facilitates partial refueling of a single channel because the fuel
bundles do not have to be linked together as in a vertical channel. A 37-element fuel bundle is
shown in Figure 9, while Table 1 gives details of a 37-element fuel bundle.
attachment to the reactor, the fueling machines open the fuel channel and remove the shield
plug. One refueling machine carries the new fuel in its magazine, while the other machine at
the opposite end of the fuel channel receives and stores spent fuel in its own magazine. Each
magazine can revolve and has several slots, each of which can store two fuel bundles. Two new
fuel bundles from the refueling machine are inserted at the coolant inlet end, while two used
bundles are removed at the coolant outlet end. Normally eight bundles are changed during one
channel refueling. In this way, the two bundles at each end where the neutron flux is low spend
twice as long in the reactor than those in the high flux zone in the middle. Flow through the
channel is maintained, and the pressure difference so derived is used to move the bundles into
the channel and to provide a driving force to facilitate their removal. Spent fuel is later
transferred to the irradiated fuel bay, where it is stored under water. The average time taken to
refuel one fuel channel is about two and one half hours, meaning that the refueling process is
almost continuous during normal working hours.
reactors is heavy water to minimize neutron absorption. In the pressure tubes, the coolant flows
are in opposite directions in adjacent tubes. Thus the coolant passes from the steam generators at
one end of the reactor through half the tubes to the steam generators at the other end of the
reactor and back again through the adjacent tubes.
There are two steam generators and two heat transport pumps at each end of the reactor, and
therefore the entire system is divided into two independent loops, with each serving half the
reactor. They are linked by a balance pipe with restricting orifices so that the same pressure is
maintained in each loop and only one pressurizer is required. This arrangement is illustrated
diagrammatically in Figure 14. The advantage of this arrangement is that, in the event of a serious
loss of coolant accident, only half the reactor will be affected initially, with minimum subsequent
loss of coolant from the other half.
There is a feed-and-bleed system to inject or extract heavy water from the heat transport
system. This enables the correct inventory to be maintained under transient conditions such as
start-up and shutdown and to compensate for leakage. It also enables external clean-up and
chemical treatment of coolant under lower pressure and temperature conditions, as well as
recovery of leakage and upgrading of heavy water.
3.3 Pressurizer
The pressurizer maintains pressure in the heat transport system by maintaining a cushion of
vapour above the heavy water in the lower half. Pressure can be reduced by venting vapour at
the top or by spraying water into the vapour space and can be increased by heating the water
with electric heaters at the bottom. During normal operation, the heaters generally operate
periodically because the pressurizer loses heat naturally to its surroundings. Some plants rely
on venting vapour only to reduce pressure and do not have water sprays. Level in the pressur-
izer is ramped up as the temperature of the heat transport system increases to accommodate
partially the thermal expansion of the reactor coolant during a power increase. Under cold
shutdown conditions, the pressurizer is normally isolated from the heat transport system to
maintain an elevated temperature in it.
During warm-up, the pressurizer is isolated from the heat transport system, meaning that the
system is in the so-called solid mode of operation as opposed to the normal mode of operation
where the pressurizer is connected to the system. In this solid mode, pressure control is by
feed-and-bleed action where the flow rate of heavy water in and out of the system is adjusted
to maintain the correct pressure. In the normal mode, the feed-and-bleed action of the inven-
tory control system adjusts the coolant inventory by maintaining the pressurizer level at its set-
point.
To avoid over-pressure conditions in the heat transport system, pressure relief valves on the
reactor outlet headers discharge excess coolant to the bleed condenser of the inventory control
system. If this action is insufficient to alleviate the over-pressure condition, the control system
will step back the reactor to a lower power level, and if this still does not reduce pressure
sufficiently, it will trip the reactor.
Note that the steam generators serve as a heat sink for the heat transport system, and therefore
reducing pressure and hence temperature in the steam generators will have the effect of
reducing temperature in the heat transport system, with a resulting reduction in pressure as
well.
steam reject system. If the reactor must be cooled down, the steam reject system can function
well until the steam generator pressure drops so low that the volume flow rate through the
steam reject or condenser steam discharge valves is insufficient for effective cooling. This
occurs at about 150°C to 165°C. Operation of the shutdown cooling system is initiated before
this stage is reached and removes heat directly from the heat transport system. A typical
system is shown in Figure 16. It can handle about 10% to 15% of the main system flow and is
capable of removing 1% to 3% of reactor full power heat.
This occurs because the fuel channel spacing is greater than optimum, resulting in over-
moderation of neutrons. Voidage reduces the moderating effect and reduces neutron
absorption, creating conditions closer to the optimum.
There is also an upper limit on fuel channel heavy water isotopic concentration. It should
always be less than the calandria heavy water isotopic concentration by a small margin. This is
necessary because, in the event of an in-core LOCA, the possible penetration of channel coolant
into the calandria may displace moderator containing neutron poison. The concentration of
light water must therefore be sufficient to absorb at least as many neutrons as the poison and
light water in the moderator would have absorbed before the accident.
4 Steam Generators
4.1 Steam Generator Function
The steam generator serves the primary function of supplying energy to the turbine for power
production. It also serves the secondary function, but one most important from the safety
point of view, of removing energy from the reactor. Immediately after a reactor trip, the decay
heat of the fission products amounts to some 7% of full power heat production. The most
practical method of removing this heat is through the steam generator. Hence, it is necessary to
maintain a certain minimum water inventory in the steam generator and to ensure that
adequate reserve supplies of feed water are available.
The steam generator also serves as the main controlling link between the nuclear reactor and
the turbine generator. The power flows of the primary coolant system and the secondary steam
system must be balanced under all conditions. Any imbalance will cause an accumulation or a
depletion of the total heat content of the steam generator inventory, which in turn will result in
a rise or fall of steam pressure. Steam pressure is therefore a key parameter in plant control.
The steam generator separates the primary coolant circuit from the secondary steam circuit and
hence prevents radioactive products in the reactor coolant from entering the steam turbine and
the feedwater heating system. This barrier is an additional safety feature and also minimizes
the area over which radiation monitoring is required.
As an example of the importance of the steam generator in performing an essential safety
function, consider a nuclear plant with an electrical output of 600 MW. The reactor produces
approximately 1800 MW of heat, and the decay heat amounts to about 120 MW immediately
after a reactor trip from full power. This is a substantial amount, the removal of which must be
guaranteed under all conditions, including for a certain period after shutdown, because it takes
almost 10 hours for this heat to fall to a tenth of the initial value, that is, about 12 MW for the
example given. Separate smaller capacity heat removal systems can handle these lesser heat
flows on their own after the reactor has been shut down for some time, although they are often
put into service while the steam generators are still handling the major portion of the heat flow.
transfer rate across the tubes compared with other types of heat exchangers. This high heat
transfer rate leads to a large temperature difference across the tubes themselves, as well as in
the boundary layer on each side of the tubes. Typically, the temperature differences in the two
boundary layers and across the tube itself are all approximately the same. This means that the
temperature drop across the tubes is about one third of the total temperature difference and
cannot be disregarded as in some other heat exchangers such as the main condenser.
Ideally, heat exchangers should be counter-flow to minimize the temperature difference
between the hot and cold fluids. This is not possible with a phase change on one side of the
heat exchanger. Steam is therefore generated on the secondary side at a somewhat lower
temperature than the primary coolant inlet temperature. To maintain good thermodynamic
efficiency, a partial counter-flow arrangement is achieved by the subcooled feed water, which
enters the steam generator by passing through a preheater section before mixing with the
saturated recirculating water. The preheater receives heat from the primary coolant just before
its exit to minimize large temperature differences across which heat is transferred. The
temperature profile along the length of the tubes is shown in Figure 18. Table 3 gives typical
operating parameters of a CANDU 6 steam generator.
A change in steam pressure in the steam generator affects steam generator water level. A
reduction in pressure causes the expansion of existing vapour bubbles in the water and addi-
tional evolution of vapour due to the lower saturation conditions. The result is a rise in water
level or a swelling of the inventory. An increase in pressure has the opposite effect, a shrinking
of the inventory. These are transient conditions, and the original conditions are restored when
steam pressure returns to normal.
A change in load also affects the level. A simultaneous increase in reactor output and turbine
generator load will not affect steam pressure, but will result in increased evolution of vapour
within the water space. This will in turn cause a rise in water level or a swelling of the inventory.
The opposite will cause a shrinking of the inventory. These are steady state effects, and hence
there is a relationship between load and level. The level control system takes this into account
by ramping up the level set-point as load increases.
5 Steam System
5.1 General Arrangement
From the steam generators, steam is piped to the high pressure turbine at a temperature of
about 260°C, as shown in Figure 21, where it expands partially in the high pressure turbine,
yielding some useful work. The steam is then put through a separator and reheater, where
moisture in the steam is removed in a cyclonic separator and the steam brought up to higher
temperature in a heat exchanger using steam directly from the steam generator. The super-
heated steam is then passed in parallel through two or three low pressure turbines where the
remaining energy is removed from the expanding steam. The steam is then passed to a con-
denser where it is condensed. This condensate is pumped through low pressure feedwater
heaters where it is preheated. It is then passed through a deaerator and pumped through high
pressure feedwater heaters for further preheating. It re-enters the steam generator at a tem-
perature of about 180°C. Table 4 gives typical technical and operating parameters for a CANDU
6 steam turbine.
Table 4 Turbine generator conditions (CANDU 6)
the condenser. The maximum heat rejection capabilities of the condenser therefore roughly
match the minimum load required by the reactor to avoid excessive xenon buildup and reactor
poisoning.
6 Steam Turbine
6.1 General Arrangement
Steam turbines consist essentially of a casing to which stationary blades are fixed on the inside
and a rotor carrying moving blades on its periphery. The rotor is fitted inside the casing, with
the rows of moving blades penetrating between the rows of fixed blades. Therefore, steam
flowing through the turbine passes alternately through fixed and moving blades, with the fixed
blades directing the steam at the correct angle for entry into the moving blades. Both casings
and rotors must be constructed to minimize damaging thermal stresses, and the moving blades
must be fitted securely to the rotor to withstand high centrifugal forces.
Where the rotor shaft passes through the ends of the casing, a seal is required to prevent steam
leakage. In addition, within the casing, seals are required to prevent steam from leaking around
the blades rather than passing through them. Turbine seals are of the labyrinth type where
there is no mechanical contact between fixed and rotating parts. Leakage is therefore not really
eliminated, but merely controlled to minimal amounts.
The rotor shafts are carried on bearings and are linked together and to the electrical generator.
Bearings must be properly aligned to accommodate the natural gravitational bending of the
shaft. Allowance must also be made for differential expansion between the rotors and the
casings during thermal transients. Both must be free to expand without upsetting the align-
ment, while allowing the rotors to expand more quickly and to a greater degree than the casing.
Lubrication is required for the bearings. Multiple pumps driven by alternative power sources
ensure adequate lubrication under all operating circumstances.
Figure 23 High pressure turbine cross section for nuclear unit (courtesy of Eskom)
Low pressure turbines are very much larger because they must accommodate the increase in
specific volume as the steam expands. Low pressure turbines are therefore of different con-
struction. An inner casing supports the fixed blading and has annular channels through which
steam is extracted for feedwater heating. Surrounding each entire low pressure turbine is an
exhaust hood into which the exhaust steam flows before passing into the condenser below the
turbine. Figure 24 shows the low pressure cylinder of a 900 MW turbine for a PWR which has
low pressure steam conditions fairly close to those of a CANDU reactor.
Figure 24 Low pressure turbine cross section for nuclear unit (courtesy of Eskom)
Diaphragms carrying the fixed blades are fixed inside the turbine cylinders. Like the cylinder
casings, they are split horizontally to enable assembly around the turbine rotor. Because there
is a pressure drop across the fixed blades in both impulse and reaction turbines, sealing must be
provided between the diaphragms and the rotor to minimize steam leakage.
In turbines with reaction blading, significant axial thrust is developed by the steam flow. Double
flow turbines are normally used so that this axial thrust is balanced by opposing forces. Tur-
bines with impulse blading do not develop this large thrust, but the low pressure blading near
the turbine exhaust must have a reaction component due to the length of the blades. There-
fore, all large low pressure turbines are double flow.
Figure 26 Construction of a 900 MW steam turbine for a nuclear unit (courtesy of Eskom)
The design philosophy for fixed and moving blades is naturally different. All large turbines have
pressure compounded impulse blading or reaction blading so that there is a pressure drop
across the fixed blading. The blades must withstand this pressure drop, and if the design
provides for a large diaphragm, as is usually the case in low pressure turbines, the blades must
also support the pressure difference across the diaphragm. The blades may therefore be quite
wide (as measured in the axial direction), especially towards the outer diameter. On the other
hand, moving blades are subject to high centrifugal forces and have a slender shape decreasing
in width towards the outer diameter.
When steam expands below the saturation line, some condensation takes place, and the steam
becomes wet. A very fine mist of droplets forms and passes over the blading, and some is
deposited on the blades to create a film of water. This film is swept off the blades and en-
trained by the steam. The size of these entrained drops is governed by surface tension rather
than by condensation phenomena. They are therefore somewhat larger than the original
condensation droplets and, when travelling at high velocity, can damage any material on which
they impinge. Being larger and heavier, they are also separated more easily from the main
steam flow during changes in direction. When these larger drops are swept off the fixed blades,
their velocity tends to be lower than that of the steam, and the moving blades tend to run into
them at high speed. The impact of the drops on the blades (more accurately the blades on the
drops) causes material erosion from the blades. Minute amounts of material are removed,
Nuclear Plant Systems - September 2014
40 The Essential CANDU
leaving a rough etched like surface. If severe, this material removal can change the blade profile
and weaken the blade. After impact on the moving blades, the water film tends to be thrown
off towards the periphery by centrifugal action. Turbine blades must be designed to withstand
moisture erosion in the affected areas. This is done using inserts of hard erosion resistant
material such as tungsten or stellite or by specialized heat treatment to harden the blades in
selected areas.
Figure 30 Fixing points for turbine rotors and casings (courtesy of NB Power)
All turbine rotors are slightly flexible due to the elastic nature of the material from which they
are made. They therefore bend slightly under the influence of gravity. As they rotate, this bend
remains always in the direction of the force of gravity. The couplings are consequently tilted
slightly upwards. To ensure proper alignment at the couplings, the adjacent rotors must be
installed at a slight upward angle. They in turn deform slightly under gravity, and their outer
bearings must be elevated further to compensate for bending. The further a rotor is from the
centre, the greater the compensation required. The result is that the entire turbine shaft is
mounted along a catenary, as shown in Figure 31. The end points may be some 20 mm to 30
mm higher than the midpoint in a large steam turbine and generator.
To ensure continuity of oil supply, there are three or four oil pumps driven by different power
sources. The main oil pump is usually driven directly by the turbine through a hydraulic connec-
tion to an oil driven turbine and sometimes by an uninterruptable electrical connection from a
small separate generator on the turbine shaft. As the turbine runs up to speed, more power is
provided to run the pump, which increases its speed, and at some intermediate turbine speed,
the main oil pump output reaches the required value.
The auxiliary oil pump is electrically driven and is supplied with power from the station or unit
auxiliary electrical systems. It is used during turbine run-up and rundown when the main oil
pump does not provide adequate oil pressure. It can also be used as an emergency oil pump at
any time, should the main oil pump fail. At low turbine speeds, however, this pump itself could
fail, and therefore an emergency pump is required.
At least one electrically driven emergency pump is provided. Its power supply is usually from an
uninterruptable electrical source such as the station emergency electrical system, from a DC
battery system, or both if two emergency pumps are provided.
There are also jacking oil pumps to lift the shaft off the bearings before rolling the turbine after
a shutdown in which the turbine has been stopped. These are positive displacement pumps
with a separate pump supplying each bearing to ensure a definite flow to each bearing. Figure
32 shows a typical lubricating oil system for a large steam turbine.
7.2 Deaerator
The deaerator is part of the feedwater heating system and receives extraction steam from the
turbine. The condensate to be heated and the extraction steam are intimately mixed in the
deaerator by a system of spray nozzles and cascading trays between which the steam percolates
as shown in Figure 33. The condensate is heated to saturated conditions and the steam con-
densed in the process. Any dissolved gases in the condensate are released in this process and
removed from the deaerator by venting to the atmosphere or to the main condenser. This
ensures removal of oxygen from the system particularly during turbine start-up and minimizes
the risk of corrosion within the system. Venting to the atmosphere reduces the load on the
condenser vacuum pumps, but results in some steam loss unless provision is made to condense
it and return it to the condensate system. Venting to atmosphere is only possible if the deaera-
tor pressure is above atmospheric as it is at higher loads. In the CANDU system, auxiliary
(pegging) steam is supplied at low loads to maintain elevated temperatures in the deaerator
storage tank.
other side of the header. Extraction steam from the turbine enters the shell and passes over the
outside of the tubes, where it is condensed. The condensed steam collects in the bottom of the
shell and is drained away. Generally, the drains from the high pressure heaters are cascaded
through lower pressure heaters to the deaerator, and those from the low pressure heaters
likewise to the condenser.
8 Condenser
8.1 General Arrangement
The purpose of the condenser is to condense the exhaust steam from the turbine so that it can
be returned to the system for reuse. In the Rankine cycle, the condenser is complementary to
the steam generator in that it condenses the steam while the steam generator evaporates the
water. Like the steam generator, it has a free water surface that interfaces with the steam, and
some form of level control is required. Steam leaving the turbine enters at the top of the
Nuclear Plant Systems - September 2014
48 The Essential CANDU
condenser and circulates around the outside of the tubes, where it is condensed by cooling
water passing through the tubes. The resulting condensate rains down to collect in a hotwell at
the bottom of the condenser. Figure 35 and Figure 36 show a typical arrangement for a large
condenser.
and stopping the pumps. In the event of a pump trip, vacuum breakers enable the water
column to separate at the condenser and provide an air cushion to avoid damaging reverse flow.
The condenser hotwell serves as the entry point for demineralized make-up water, which is
required to compensate for leakage losses. Level sensors indicate when there is a need for
additional water. Note that the level in the hotwell rises naturally as the system is heated and
loaded and water is displaced from other components.
An air extraction system removes air that is in the system before start-up and that may leak into
the system during normal operation. This system extracts air from the end of the steam path,
that is, at the centre of the condenser tube bundle, where it collects as steam is condensed.
Shrouded air cooling tubes in this region reduce the temperature locally to a few degrees below
saturation to increase the ratio of air to steam extracted. The air is extracted by vacuum pumps
which run continuously to maintain condenser vacuum.
In the CANDU system, water spray pipes and nozzles are located in the condenser shell outside
the tube bundle, so that during condenser steam bypass operation, cool condensate can be
sprayed into the steam entering the condenser from the bypass system. This steam is at a high
temperature and in a superheated condition and therefore must be cooled before it enters the
tube bundle.
9 Electrical Generator
9.1 Generator Rotor
The generator rotor is machined from a single long slender forging of high strength steel. Slots
are cut on two opposing sides for a two pole rotor and on four sides for a four pole rotor to take
the rotor windings. The latter are for large half speed turbine generators used in nuclear plants.
The poles between the slots produce the rotating magnetic field as the rotor turns. The copper
windings are laid in the slots in pairs so that the current flow in them produces opposite north
and south poles in a two pole rotor and alternating north and south poles in a four pole rotor.
When rotating, these magnetic poles induce an alternating current in the generator stator. The
rotor windings carry a large current at low voltage. Hence, they must be cooled and insulated
while being held securely in the slots against very high centrifugal forces.
The individual windings are separated from one another by insulating separators and from the
rotor itself by insulating slot liners. These are held in place by insulating blocks and aluminum
wedges that fit into tapered grooves at the top of the slots. The windings have spaces between
them to allow free flow of hydrogen coolant through the windings. A space is left at the bottom
of each slot to create a duct to enable coolant to flow into the rotor from the ends. The flow is
driven by centrifugal action, with the rate determined by holes in the wedges. This ensures
uniform distribution of coolant and consistent cooling of all rotor windings. Hydrogen under
moderate pressure (to increase its density) is a good coolant and very suitable for this applica-
tion.
The winding connections, which protrude at the ends of the slots, wrap around, and enter slots
further around the rotor, are held in place by end bells. These are ring shaped and are shrunk
onto the ends of the slotted part of the rotor. They cover the end windings and secure them
under the high centrifugal forces arising during operation. Centrifugal or axial flow fans are
fitted to the rotor shaft at each end to feed coolant to the ends of the rotor and to ensure
proper circulation of hydrogen through the stator. Each fan serves one half of the generator.
Rotor current is provided by an exciter connected to and driven by the generator shaft. Current
is transferred to the rotor by fixed brushes and slip rings mounted on the shaft. This current is
on the order of 5000 A and the voltage around 500 V for a 660 MW generator.
good heat transfer properties. Compared with air under similar conditions, it has twice the heat
transfer capability and several times the thermal conductivity and specific heat. This makes it
ten times more effective at heat removal than air. The hydrogen atmosphere also prevents
degradation of insulation and other materials by oxidation processes.
Hydrogen, however, is flammable and explosive in concentrations from 4% to 76% of hydrogen
in air. Hence, it must be contained in the generator and maintained at a high purity of about
97%. Special seals are required where the rotor shaft penetrates the casing, and appropriate
provisions must be made to prevent any mixing with air during gassing or degassing of the
generator. Most seals have a very fine running clearance between the fixed and moving parts,
into which seal oil is injected. The seal oil is usually lubricating oil from the main turbine gen-
erator oil tank, but is purified and pressurized for this purpose. When gassing the generator
before operation, all air is displaced by admitting heavier carbon dioxide at the bottom of the
generator casing and allowing the air to escape at the top. Hydrogen is then admitted at the
top and, being lighter, displaces the carbon dioxide downwards. When all the carbon dioxide
has been expelled, the generator casing is sealed and more hydrogen admitted to pressurize it.
Degassing is done by following a reverse procedure, with hydrogen discharged to atmosphere
from the top of the generator while being displaced by carbon dioxide admitted at the bottom.
Like the turbine, the generator runs on bearings at each end, with the exciter having its own
bearings. These are lubricated by the main turbine oil system. The bearings, however, must be
removable because assembly of the generator is different from that of the turbine. Because the
generator stator cannot be split horizontally, the rotor must be threaded into the stator from
one end of the generator, as shown in Figure 37. Once in place, the bearings are mounted and
aligned to ensure that the rigidly bolted generator couplings maintain the required shaft cate-
nary under gravity. This means that the generator bearings must be slightly higher than those
of the turbine due to the natural bending of the turbine and generator rotors under the influ-
ence of gravity at all times, even at speed. Furthermore, the generator rotor must be able to
move axially in the bearings by about 25 mm or more to accommodate axial expansion of the
turbine rotors as their temperatures increase to those of normal operation.
10 Power Transmission
10.1 Generator Main Connections
The neutral point of the generator star connection is grounded through a current limiting device
to minimize ground fault currents in the generator, should a flashover occur in the stator wind-
ings. A convenient manner of providing a low resistance, yet current limiting ground connection
is to use a transformer where the inductance limits the current. In the event of a ground fault,
the lower voltage secondary side reflects a high current. This signals the fault to the generator
protection system, which initiates a trip of the generator circuit breaker.
higher voltage in the case of the generator transformer and at a lower voltage in the case of the
unit transformer. In very large generating units, separate single phase transformers are pro-
vided for each phase. In such a case, a delta connected circuit may be provided on both primary
and secondary sides. The advantage of such a delta-delta arrangement is that one of the single
phase transformers can be isolated for maintenance or removed for replacement without
disrupting the continuity of the three phase system. The system can therefore continue to
operate, although at a reduced power level which is only about 58 percent of rated power. This
is not possible with a star connected secondary circuit, as shown in Figure 38.
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems by UNESCO, EOLSS Publishers, Oxford, UK, 2006.
Chaplin, R. A., “Electric Power Generation”, Chapter 3.10.3.9 in Thermal Power Plants, Encyclo-
pedia of Life Support Systems by UNESCO, EOLSS Publishers, Oxford, UK, 2006.
12 Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements are extended to Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and to NB Power for the
use of information, diagrams, and photographs to support the text of this chapter.
The following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and excellent com-
ments during the development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of course
the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the authors. Verify list
George Bereznai
Simon Pang
Thanks are also extended to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
CHAPTER 9
NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATION
Prepared by
Dr. Robin A. Chaplin
Summary:
This chapter deals with the operating concepts of a CANDU nuclear power plant. It combines
some theoretical aspects with basic operating procedures to explain how the plant operates.
Key aspects related to plant control are addressed. Space allows only the primary energy
generation, transport and conversion components to be covered, but there are many other
components whose operation is vital to the efficient and safe operation of the plant. There is
approximately an equal division of detail between the nuclear reactor, the heat transport and
steam systems, and the steam turbine.
Table of Contents
1 Power Production ................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Power Output Regulation ............................................................................................... 5
1.2 Operational Constraints .................................................................................................. 7
2 Plant Control and Protection .................................................................................................. 7
2.1 CANDU Plant Control Systems ........................................................................................ 7
2.2 Reactor protection systems .......................................................................................... 10
2.3 Reactor shutdown systems ........................................................................................... 10
2.4 Emergency coolant injection......................................................................................... 11
2.5 Turbine protection system ............................................................................................ 12
3 Nuclear Reactor Operation ................................................................................................... 13
3.1 Reactivity Characteristics .............................................................................................. 13
3.2 Source multiplication .................................................................................................... 13
3.3 Approach to criticality................................................................................................... 15
3.4 Approach Technique ..................................................................................................... 18
3.5 Reactor Start-Up ........................................................................................................... 19
3.6 Reactivity Changes ........................................................................................................ 20
3.7 Fuel Burnup................................................................................................................... 22
3.8 Refueling Considerations .............................................................................................. 23
4 Heat Transport System .......................................................................................................... 24
4.1 Operational Considerations .......................................................................................... 24
5 Steam Generators ................................................................................................................. 25
5.1 Plant Control ................................................................................................................. 25
5.2 Steam Generator Pressure Control ............................................................................... 26
5.3 Swelling and Shrinking .................................................................................................. 27
5.4 Steam generator level control....................................................................................... 29
6 Steam System........................................................................................................................ 33
List of Figures
Figure 1 Lagging and leading plant operation................................................................................. 5
Figure 2 Basic plant control system ................................................................................................ 8
Figure 3 Source multiplication by subcritical multiplication factor .............................................. 15
Figure 4 Stabilization time for different subcritical multiplication factors ................................... 16
Figure 5 Approach to critical-subcritical multiplication factor change ......................................... 17
Figure 6 Approach to critical - inverse count rate change ............................................................ 18
Figure 7 Major activities during start-up and loading .................................................................. 21
Figure 8 Effects of fuel burnup on reactivity................................................................................. 23
Figure 9 Steam generator temperature profile............................................................................. 26
Figure 10 Steady state swelling due to different load conditions................................................. 28
Figure 11 Transient swelling due to changing load conditions ..................................................... 29
Figure 12 Constant steam generator water level.......................................................................... 30
Figure 13 Ramped steam generator water level........................................................................... 31
Nuclear Plant Operation – September 2014
Nuclear Plant Operation 3
1 Power Production
1.1 Power Output Regulation
Consider a very simple system with a nuclear reactor, steam generator, and turbine generator
supplying electrical power to an isolated electrical grid, as shown in Figure 1. The power must
be generated at the moment it is required by the consumers connected to the grid. Power
production must follow demand exactly, and any mismatch will cause the grid frequency to fall
or rise as demand increases or decreases.
admit more steam to increase the power output of the turbine generator. The additional flow
of steam to the turbine will cause a reduction in steam pressure in the steam generator. This in
turn will be sensed by the reactor regulating system, which will lower the liquid zpnes and/or
withdraw control rods from the reactor core until the increased fission rate generates sufficient
additional heat to restore the steam generator pressure. In the event of a decrease in demand,
the reverse occurs. This is known as the reactor following or turbine leading mode of operation
(or normal mode in some plants because it is a natural way of maintaining stable conditions).
Such a system, however, cannot maintain the specified frequency (60 Hz in North America)
exactly without large unstable oscillations, and therefore a certain speed droop is incorporated
into the turbine governor. This enables a progressive increase in governor valve opening (steam
flow) as the turbine speed (grid frequency) falls. A typical droop setting is 4%, which means
that, if the turbine were initially at zero load and at full speed, its speed would have to drop to
96% before the governor valve would be fully open. Such a speed is not acceptable for the
turbine due to possible blade vibration, nor to the grid due to loss in speed of connected
motors. Therefore, the governor is adjusted to bring the speed back to 100% at full load. In the
event of a turbine trip or load reduction to zero under these conditions, the reverse would
occur, and the turbine speed would rise to 104% of full speed.
In the operating mode just described, the nuclear reactor output follows the electrical grid
demand, and therefore its power level oscillates continuously. This can have certain adverse
effects, depending upon the type and design of the reactor. Excessive oscillations impose
temperature transients on the fuel, which could cause premature failures of the fuel cladding.
Large oscillations near full power could cause power limits to be exceeded, thus tripping the
reactor and losing power production as well as imposing restart transients on it and the turbine.
Due to high capital cost and low fuel cost, it is desirable to run nuclear reactors at full power
most of the time. An alternative mode of operation is therefore often used at nuclear plants, in
which reactor power output is fixed. This is known as reactor leading or turbine lagging opera-
tion. To maintain stable operation, reactor power is controlled at a given value by measuring
the neutron flux and adjusting the control rods accordingly. Pressure in the steam generator
must be maintained at the proper value to ensure stable conditions in the reactor coolant
circuit. This is done by opening or closing the turbine governor valves to control the steam flow
from the generators. The turbine then delivers power according to the steam flow, and the
generator sends this power into the grid system, regardless of the grid frequency. The grid
frequency must then be controlled by other turbine generators which feed into the grid system
and operate in the turbine leading mode.
By referring to Figure 1 showing the two modes of operation, it can be seen that steam genera-
tor pressure is a key controlling parameter in both modes. This highlights the importance of the
steam generator, where a balance of heat input and heat output must be maintained to main-
tain its pressure. Furthermore, the difference in temperature between the primary coolant and
the secondary working fluid determines the rate of heat transfer. Hence, the reactor coolant
temperature is determined by the saturation temperature and thus by the pressure in the
steam generator.
constant (leading) and the other varied (lagging) to maintain conditions in the steam generator.
This determines the mode of operation of the plant (turbine leading and reactor lagging, or
reactor leading and turbine lagging). Steam generator pressure controls both modes of opera-
tion. In turbine leading or reactor following, the steam pressure determines the required
reactor output by signalling the reactor regulating system to increase or decrease fission heat
release. In reactor leading or turbine following, the steam pressure determines the power
output by signalling the turbine governing system to admit more or less steam to the turbine.
valve position to adapt to the change in grid demand. This will alter the turbine generator
output according to the speed droop setting. Further manipulation of the speeder gear by the
unit power regulator (turbine leading) or the boiler pressure control (reactor leading) will
restore the desired power output.
pressure of about 5 MPa to give sufficient margin from normal operating pressure to minimize
spurious injections during normal reactor cooldown.
uranium-235 and uranium-238 are naturally unstable and decay mainly by α-particle emission.
Both also fission spontaneously, giving off neutrons in the process. Any fuel, even unused fuel,
therefore produces small numbers of neutrons. Furthermore, in heavy water moderated
reactors such as the CANDU, neutrons can be created by interaction of high energy γ-rays from
certain fission products with deuterium atoms. These are known as photoneutrons. If, after a
very long shutdown, these natural sources of neutrons do not produce sufficient neutrons to be
detected by the reactor instrumentation, then artificial neutron sources are inserted into the
reactor.
These source neutrons can cause fission in fissile fuel, producing more neutrons and establish-
ing a chain reaction. When the reactor is shut down, the neutron multiplication factor k is,
however, less than unity. This means that the chain reaction will decay, but in the meantime,
other source neutrons will start new chain reactions. The result is that, along with these
neutrons, there will be some fission neutrons, so that the total number of neutrons will be
greater than would have arisen from the neutron sources only. The factor by which the total
number of neutrons S is greater than the number of source neutrons S0 is known as the sub-
critical multiplication factor. The relationship between these and the value of k is given by the
following formula:
S = S0 / (1- k) (2)
From the above equation, it can be seen that, as k approaches unity, the measured number of
neutrons S becomes many times greater than the source number of neutrons S 0. Furthermore,
it takes longer for an equilibrium condition to be reached. A very simple numerical example for
k = 0.5 and S0 =100 is given in Figure 3 for illustrative purposes.
As long as S stabilizes at a fixed value after an increase in k, the reactor remains in a subcritical
condition, with k less than unity. When k is exactly unity, however, the fraction of source
neutrons is negligible compared with the total number of neutrons, and the number of neu-
trons in each generation will be the same. The system is then said to be critical.
degree of accuracy. Once this limit has been reached, slight perturbations cause control system
responses that mask the actual value of Δk, and the reactor can be considered to be oscillating
very slightly above and below criticality. Under these conditions, the reactor is considered to be
critical, with the average value of k equal to unity.
Even though a nuclear reactor may be shut down, the reactivity within the reactor may change
with time due to buildup or decay of fission products. This means that one cannot simply
restart a reactor by inserting an amount of positive reactivity equal to the amount of negative
reactivity inserted to shut it down. Approach to critical is therefore a delicate manoeuvre, like
an approach to a moving and invisible target. At every step, therefore, an assessment must be
made of how far from critical the reactor actually is. Each step must also be small enough so as
not to overshoot the point of criticality.
While Δk has a large negative value, a change in reactivity will be reflected quickly on the
instruments because the fission chain reactions initiated by the source neutrons die away
rapidly since the value of k is far below unity. Following insertion of some positive reactivity,
the reactor power will rise quickly to a new equilibrium value. When, however, Δk has a small
negative value and k is very close to unity, the reactor will respond very much more slowly.
Under these circumstances, the fission chain reactions initiated by the source neutrons persist
for many generations. Following insertion of some positive reactivity, the reactor power will
rise slowly, but more significantly, and take much longer to settle at its new equilibrium value.
When the reactor becomes critical due to insertion of additional positive reactivity, the reactor
power will rise steadily and continuously without levelling off at an equilibrium value. Because
the reactor will be very slightly supercritical, the power will in fact rise exponentially. If power
versus time is plotted as shown in Figure 4, criticality will have been achieved when the meas-
ured power does not level off, but increases exponentially. Generally, such a crude mechanism
of monitoring the approach to criticality is not suitable for commercial reactors.
If it is assumed that the measured reactor power P (equivalent to S) doubles at each step, then
various parameters such as k and Δk can be calculated to show their changes. Figure 5 shows
how k and Δk change with each doubling of power from P = 0.0001 at k = 0.9.
removal process is then started or restarted with the RRS holding the power level. As the
reactivity tends to increase, the liquid zone levels rise to compensate, keeping reactivity and
hence power level constant. When the liquid level is high, the poison removal process is
stopped. Again the operator requests a doubling of power, and the process is repeated. Be-
cause smaller and smaller amounts of reactivity addition are required as criticality is ap-
proached, the drop in liquid level becomes smaller and smaller, and after a few iterations, the
liquid zone absorber levels can accommodate a full doubling of power. In a typical CANDU
reactor, a drop in liquid level from 65% to 20% represents a reactivity change of about 3 mk. If
the power were doubled with this change, the reactor would be about 6 mk below criticality.
Further iterations of the process can bring the reactor to within 1 mk of criticality. The final step
in the process is verification that the reactor is sufficiently close to criticality for the RRS to
maintain control of power. Power raising can then follow by the operator adjusting the power
setpoint to the required value.
The advantage of this method of approach to criticality is that the reactor does not actually go
critical and, when it is nearly critical, power is increased by adjusting power level and not by
direct manipulation of reactivity devices.
at 80°C, the approach to critical would typically commence, along with further warming of the
heat transport system.
During the approach to criticality, initiation of reactor power increase by removing moderator
poison and continued warming of the heat transport system proceed as parallel activities. The
concern about warming the heat transport system during approach to criticality is the effect
that it has on core reactivity when reactor power is being increased and criticality has not been
achieved. During the approach to criticality, only one reactivity addition mechanism should be
in use at any one time. The primary method is moderator purification by removing poison.
However, by adding pump heat from the heat transport system pumps, the reactivity is being
adjusted due to the temperature coefficients, including those of the fuel, at play during warm-
up. This reactivity effect must be considered regardless of whether an equilibrium core or a
fresh core is in place. As the heat transport system is warmed, the temperature coefficients add
overall positive reactivity to an equilibrium core due to the buildup of Pu-239 which fissions
more readily as temperature rises within this range, whereas in a fresh core, this reactivity
effect is negative due to the lack of Pu-239. Therefore, warm-up of the heat transport system is
stopped when the core is 30 mk subcritical, which is approximately equivalent to the presence
of 1 ppm of moderator poison (gadolinium nitrate). This concentration can be confirmed by
monitoring the online moderator conductivity, which is proportional to the concentration. A
subcritical reactivity balance is conducted at 30 mk to verify the prediction for criticality and to
ensure that all reactivity factors are accounted for. For the remaining approach to criticality, no
other actions which adjust reactivity other than the operator’s removing moderator poison by
moderator purification are permitted. This guarantees that the core achieves criticality as
predicted. In practice, criticality is defined as the point where the reactor regulating system has
sufficient positive and negative reactive addition available by means of the liquid zone control
absorbers to maintain reactor power at its setpoint. This occurs in an equilibrium core when
the reactor regulating system can double reactor power within a 10% change in liquid zone
level.
The effects causing these changes fall into three main categories:
Fuel burnup
Xenon transients
Temperature effects.
The fuel effects are due to fuel depletion, buildup of transuranic nuclides, and production of
fission products. Eventually, the combination of these factors prevents criticality from being
maintained, and refueling with new fuel is required.
Xenon-135 in particular is troublesome because its equilibrium level in the reactor is maintained
by its being destroyed by neutron absorption as fast as it is created. A reduction in reactor
power decreases the neutron flux and hence its rate of destruction. This results in a surge of
xenon production and an increase in neutron absorption. The consequent reactivity changes
may be difficult for the control system to overcome, especially after a significant power reduc-
tion.
The temperature effects are related to the neutron absorption characteristics of the fuel and
moderator. The temperature of the whole reactor increases from the cold shutdown condition
to the hot zero load condition. The temperature of the fuel then increases further as power is
raised from the zero load condition to the full load condition. It is desirable that the overall
effect on reactivity due to temperature be negative so that the natural tendency of the reactor
is to go subcritical (k less than unity) during a temperature excursion. This enhances the stabil-
ity of the reactor, giving it a degree of self-regulation and hence increased safety.
239 as mentioned above, together with uranium-235 depletion and fission product buildup, can
be shown graphically as in Figure 8 by plotting the value of with respect to time and noting
that the neutron multiplication factor k varies accordingly. At the very beginning, there is a drop
in η (and hence k) due to buildup of samarium-149, a neutron absorber. Somewhat later, but
still early in the fuel cycle, the value of η (and k) increases and reaches a peak due to formation
of plutonium-239. Then the effects of uranium-235 depletion and fission product buildup
become significant, and η (and k) falls progressively.
The effects of xenon-135 are not shown on this graph because the associated degree of reactiv-
ity change is due mainly to reactor load (neutron flux) and is greater in magnitude than the
effects shown here, being as much as -30 mk under full load conditions.
The preferred state during refueling is with the reactor critical, on load, and under control of the
reactor regulating system. Control absorbers must not be in the core because this is an abnor-
mal and transient operating condition. There should be no reactivity changes during refueling,
meaning that adjuster positions should not be altered nor poison addition or removal be in
progress. This ensures that reactivity changes during refueling are readily observable.
modated by the normal control systems, which either compensate for the problem or reduce
reactor power.
An accidental loss of inventory or loss of coolant accident due to a system rupture requires
different actions depending upon its severity. A major rupture could result in loss of coolant
flow to one or more fuel channels. An emergency coolant injection system is provided to supply
water to the reactor under these circumstances. This system, however, operates at a lower
pressure than that of the heat transport system, and therefore rapid depressurization is neces-
sary. This implies reducing temperature and pressure rapidly by discharging steam from the
steam generator through the steam reject valves. This procedure, known as crash cooling or
crash cooldown, imposes severe thermal stress on the components, which would subsequently
require intensive inspection.
The configuration of a CANDU reactor is such that all feeder pipes from the fuel channels are
directed upwards to headers, which in turn are connected to the steam generators at an even
higher level. Hence, any buoyancy effect due to heating or vapour generation will tend to draw
coolant upwards from the reactor to the steam generators, promoting circulation by natural
convection. In the event that the heat transport pumps fail, this provision for thermosiphoning
between the reactor and steam generator is a safety feature of the reactor. The difference in
elevation between the reactor and the steam generators promotes natural circulation, and the
built-in inertia of the pumps, giving a rundown time of between 2 and 3 minutes, enables this
circulation to be established during the initial disturbance transients. This natural circulation is
much slower than the normal forced circulation provided by the heat transport system pumps
and therefore can be used only under low power conditions.
A typical scenario under which thermosiphoning would be required is in the event of electrical
power loss to the heat transport pumps. This would result in an immediate reactor trip. As
reactor power drops to about 5% of full power within about 10 seconds (as a result of decay
heat), the circulating pumps run down slowly due to built-in rotational inertia, and flow de-
creases progressively to the point where thermosiphoning takes over naturally and maintains
flow in the same direction, but at a much reduced flow rate.
5 Steam Generators
5.1 Plant Control
As is evident from the introduction which deals with power output regulation and from Figure
1, the steam generator is a key component in satisfactory plant control. In both modes of
operation, the steam generator pressure is the measured parameter, and the control system
acts accordingly.
The rate of heat transfer Ω is governed by the following equation:
Ω = U A θ, (7)
where U is the overall heat transfer coefficient, A is the surface area through which heat is
transferred, and θ is the temperature difference between the fluids on each side of the heat
exchange surface that exists between the primary side reactor coolant and the secondary side
steam-water circuit. Because U and A do not vary much, it is evident that any change in θ will
Nuclear Plant Operation – September 2014
26 The Essential CANDU
affect Ω, and vice-versa. Figure 9 shows typical conditions of the reactor coolant and steam-
water mixture in the steam generator under full load.
to the atmosphere through the main steam safety valves and the atmospheric steam discharge
valves (MSSVs and ASDVs in Figure 16) to avoid excessive pressure in the steam generator.
These valves are a backup in the event that the CSDVs malfunction or are not available due to
condenser restrictions.
Swelling and shrinking have an influence on level control in that, for a given water inventory in
the steam generator, the level will rise and fall as the load increases or decreases. Alternatively,
for a given water level, the inventory will go down or go up as the load increases or decreases.
Both situations can lead to difficulties in maintaining desired conditions in the steam generator,
particularly during rapid changes in load when transient swelling and shrinking effects are
superimposed on the steady state effects.
Consider first the situation in which the water level is to be kept constant, as shown in Figure
12. For fixed level control, a certain margin is required to allow for transient swelling and
shrinking because, during rapid load changes, the level control system cannot respond quickly
enough to maintain the level. At low load, swelling will occur as load increases, and at high
load, shrinking will occur as load decreases. The steam generator must therefore be large
enough to accommodate these fluctuations in volume and hence in level. This is done by
increasing the diameter of the upper portion and making it tall enough so that there is a margin
above and below the desired water level.
If, however, the water inventory is maintained at a fixed value and the set level is allowed to rise
and fall with load, then this range of level can be used to accommodate transient swelling and
shrinking partially, as shown in Figure 13. Transient swelling will occur only from a low load, and
hence the required margin must be above this level. Transient shrinking likewise will occur only
from a high load and requires a margin below the level at high load. If the set level at high load
is already above the set level at zero load, the margins will overlap, as shown in Figure 13. This
enables the vessel to be made smaller while still providing appropriate margins for transient
conditions. To achieve this, the desired or set level must be increased with load, resulting in so-
called ramped level control. This is a more natural method of control because the total inven-
tory remains nearly constant and the control system does not have to drive towards a new
inventory every time the load changes.
conjunction with a ramped level setpoint results in relatively smooth control of water level
during all types of transients.
Figure 15 Steam generator level alarms and set points (courtesy of NB Power)
6 Steam System
6.1 Characteristics and Function
The main purpose of the steam system is to convey steam from the steam generators to the
steam turbine. In a nuclear plant, the steam generators also serve as a heat sink for the reactor
under all operating conditions, and because steam is produced, the steam system becomes the
major part of the reactor heat rejection system. Provision must therefore be made to handle
steam in large quantities even when not required by the steam turbine.
Steam pressure control in the steam generators is important with regard to their function as a
heat sink. As steam pressure varies, so does the prevailing saturation temperature. Because
the rate of heat transfer depends upon the difference in temperature between the primary
coolant and secondary steam systems, a variation in steam temperature will affect the overall
capacity for heat removal. Assuming that the primary coolant pressure is fixed and controlled
by the pressurizer, thus limiting the maximum primary coolant temperature, an excessive steam
pressure will limit the heat rejection capabilities of the steam generator. However, excessive
Nuclear Plant Operation – September 2014
34 The Essential CANDU
steam pressures, which would likely arise from insufficient steam discharge, would be pre-
vented by steam discharge through the main steam safety valves. Conversely, an excessively
low steam pressure and corresponding temperature will produce excessive heat flow across the
steam generator and pull down the temperature of the reactor coolant. This is done in a
controlled manner during a reactor cooldown.
For proper control of reactor state, the steam system must therefore be able to handle the
amount of steam produced under all operating conditions and to control and maintain steam
generator pressure within prescribed limits. The steam system must be designed to handle
decay heat generation following a reactor shutdown, and it is also desirable that it be able to
maintain a high heat discharge rate to prevent xenon poisoning during a short-duration un-
planned turbine shutdown.
In the turbine steam cycle, approximately one-third of reactor heat is converted into electricity,
with the remaining two-thirds rejected to the environment through the turbine condenser. The
rejection path is a convenient way of disposing of heat when the turbine is unavailable. Thus, if
a turbine trip forces a short term shutdown of the turbine generator system, the reactor can be
maintained at approximately two-thirds power, with the excess steam production dumped to
the condenser. Two-thirds of full power on the reactor is sufficient to maintain the neutron flux
at a high enough level to prevent poisoning out of the reactor and thus permit a restart at any
time.
In the event that the turbine condenser is unavailable, an alternative steam discharge path is
required. This leads directly to the atmosphere, but naturally results in an enormous loss of
fluid inventory from the system. For this reason, it is an undesirable mode of operation, but an
essential safety feature.
Figure 16 shows a typical steam system with various control, isolation, and relief valves.
working stress. When a pipe is heated from a cold condition with hot steam, the inside wall
temperature rises faster than the outside wall temperature. This causes the inside of the pipe
to try to expand while restrained by the outside. The inside is therefore subject to a compres-
sive stress and the outside to a tensile stress (in the absence of stress due to internal pressure).
If subjected to internal pressure at the same time, parts of the pipe may be subjected to
stresses greater than their permissible working stress. The result may be deformation of or
damage to the pipe. This can be avoided by limiting the heating rate of the pipe, and all sys-
tems therefore have provision for slow heating by admitting a small quantity of steam before
subjecting the pipe to full steam temperature and pressure.
During steam line heating, considerable quantities of steam condense on the inside surfaces of
the pipes and must be removed through drains at the low points of the system. The drains are
open during pipe warming to ensure that collected water is properly drained away and are then
closed during normal operation. If not properly drained, water could be entrained with the
flowing steam and carried into the turbine, where it could cause severe thermal shock or impact
damage to the turbine blading.
7 Main Condenser
7.1 Thermodynamics and Heat Transfer
From a thermodynamic point of view, the steam-water circuit receives heat at a high tempera-
ture in the boiler and rejects heat at a low temperature in the condenser. The greater the
difference in temperature, the greater will be the drop in enthalpy and the more work produced
per kilogram of steam. If the initial steam conditions remain unchanged, it is evident that a
reduction in the exhaust temperature will increase the work done in the turbine. This will
ultimately improve overall station efficiency. Exhaust conditions are therefore important and
have a direct impact on plant performance.
Exhaust steam temperature is determined largely by cooling water temperature. The heat flow
per unit time Ω from the exhaust steam to the cooling water is governed by the following
equation:
Ω = U A θ, (8)
where U is the overall heat transfer coefficient, A the surface area through which the heat is
transferred, and θ the difference in temperature between water and steam. Once the con-
denser has been designed, A is fixed, and for given flow rates on both steam and water sides,
the value of U is unchanged if the condenser tubes remain clean. The amount of heat trans-
ferred is therefore proportional to θ, the difference in temperature between steam and water.
The cooling water, in passing through the condenser tubes, picks up heat Ω at a certain rate and
increases in temperature ΔT according to the following formula:
Ω = M cp ΔT, (9)
where M is the mass flow rate and cp the specific heat of water. The outlet temperature of the
cooling water is generally some 10C higher than the inlet temperature for the design mass flow
rate. Note that Ω in this formula is the same as Ω in the previous formula because all the heat
transferred across the tubes is absorbed by the cooling water. The result is a temperature
gradient in the water along the tubes from one end of the condenser to the other.
On the steam side, there is no temperature gradient because the saturation temperature and
pressure are interdependent and the pressure everywhere in the condenser is practically the
same. A temperature profile through the condenser illustrating the meaning of θ and ΔT may
therefore be drawn, as shown in Figure 17. Note that θ is the average difference in temperature
between steam and water. More correctly, it should be the log mean temperature difference,
but using the average simplifies the analysis.
Figure 18 helps to visualize the effect of various changes. One effect is a change in inlet cooling
water temperature. This has a direct and proportional effect on steam temperature. Another
effect is a change in turbine load. This in turn changes the rate of heat transferred, Ω, and
hence both θ and ΔT. Some simple numerical examples make it possible to verify these effects.
Generally, the variation in steam temperature is proportional to load.
effective surface area A if some tubes are completely blocked. The following equation illus-
trates these phenomena:
Ω = U A θ. (11)
If either U or A is reduced, then the temperature difference θ between the steam and the
cooling water will have to increase to maintain the same total heat transfer rate Ω. The net
result is an increase in steam temperature and exhaust pressure and a consequent drop in the
work done by the turbine and a loss in plant efficiency.
To avoid fouling, provision is made in most plants to filter the incoming water through screens
and in some plants to dose the water with a biological growth inhibitor. Some fouling is inevita-
ble, and condenser tubes must be cleaned periodically either on-line or off-line.
The total pressure is the prevailing pressure in the condenser as dictated by the saturation
conditions. Under these conditions, the partial pressure of air is negligible, and an air extraction
system would extract mainly steam, which is not very effective. If, however, the partial pressure
of air is increased such that the ratio pair/psteam is increased from near zero to a reasonable
value, air removal effectiveness is much increased. This can be done by local cooling within the
condenser. Local cooling to a lower temperature will reduce p steam to a pressure corresponding
to the saturation pressure at the lower temperature. Because ptotal is dictated by the overall
conditions in the condenser, the value of pair must rise to make up the difference. Thus, the
ratio of pair/psteam is increased, and the ratio of air to steam by mass in that area is also in-
creased. The greater the mass of air in the steam, the greater will be the efficiency of air
extraction.
Local cooling in the condenser is effected by shielding sections of tubes in the tube bundle from
the incoming steam flow. The air extraction points are located in these zones where the partial
pressure of air has been increased, as can be seen in Figure 25.
8 Steam Turbine
8.1 General Operational Considerations
Steam turbines generally operate very reliably and for lengthy periods between shutdowns for
major maintenance. During these periods, however, slow performance degradation may occur
due to wear, erosion, or fouling of critical components. This has a slight detrimental effect on
overall plant efficiency, but this translates into a loss in electrical power output and loss in
revenue, which is significant in the long term, in a nuclear plant which normally operates at full
load. To optimize plant efficiency, these performance losses must be categorized and moni-
tored with a view to correcting deviations where possible.
Moisture in the steam in the turbine has a detrimental effect, but it tends to decrease as load is
decreased. At very low loads, the exhaust steam may actually become superheated, which is
even worse. Therefore, slightly wet exhaust steam provides some operating flexibility without
changes in exhaust steam temperature.
Turbine backpressure as determined by condenser conditions is also critical to turbine opera-
tion. Deviations in back-pressure affect steam flow through the last stage turbine blades,
resulting in various undesirable effects. The turbine must therefore operate within prescribed
backpressure limits, and the condenser must be capable of maintaining these limits.
Steam turbines are also subject to thermal transients, which result in thermal stress and differ-
ential expansion. These require monitoring to ensure that they do not exceed prescribed limits
and endanger turbine integrity.
The heavy turbine and generator rotors run at high speed, and therefore any slight mass imbal-
ance or shaft bending will cause serious and potentially damaging vibration. When a turbine
has been shut down and stationary for a long period, the shafts begin to sag. This sagging is in
addition to the natural deflection under gravity and is the beginning of creep, but is reversible
by slowly rotating the shaft and reversing the sag. This takes time, and, until reversed, the sag
bows the shaft, creating an imbalance. When a hot turbine is shut down after a period of
operation and comes to rest, the natural cooling process results in a temperature difference
between the top and bottom of the casing and rotor. The cooler bottom part of the rotor
shrinks slightly relative to the top, bowing the shaft upwards. This hogging also creates an
imbalance should the turbine be restarted and may in an extreme case jam the rotor against the
casing. This can be avoided by putting the turbine onto turning gear and turning the rotor until
uniformly cool.
Another critical aspect of turbine operation is governing to maintain speed and load. The
turbine is the link between the energy input as steam and the energy output as electricity. Any
mismatch between these will cause the turbine to accelerate or decelerate. Uncontrolled
acceleration is very dangerous, and precautions must be taken to ensure rapid closure of the
steam valves in the event of disconnection from the electrical grid system.
key operation is to start the lubrication system and to put the turbine onto barring gear to roll
out any sag and to ensure uniform heating once steam is admitted. Before any heat can be
received, the condensate system and feedwater system must be put into service, followed by
the condenser cooling water system to remove reject heat. When steam is available, warming
of the steam lines can commence, and the turbine gland sealing system can be put into service.
With sealing steam in place, vacuum raising can commence. When sufficient vacuum is avail-
able, steam can be admitted to the turbine to commence the runup. The turbine is normally
held at a low speed while shaft eccentricity, bearing vibration, etc. are checked and then accel-
erated to pass quickly through the critical rotor speeds so as not to excite excessive rotor
vibration. Full speed must, however, not be reached until full vacuum is available to avoid
putting excessive stress on the long low pressure turbine blades due to windage. When at full
speed, connection to the grid system can be requested. For satisfactory synchronization, the
generator voltage must be the same as that of the grid, the generator frequency, determined by
the turbine speed, must be equal to the grid frequency, and the generator phase angle must
match the grid phase angle. If synchronization is done manually, it is better to err on the side of
the turbine being slightly fast so that it picks up some load immediately as the turbine speed
drops to match that of the grid. This avoids an unnecessary reverse torque on the turbine
generator shafts, and a small load should immediately be applied to prevent fluctuating torque.
Once synchronized, the turbine can be loaded at a rate dependent upon the cylinder tempera-
tures. The initial rate is usually slow to allow metal temperatures to rise slowly to minimize
thermal stress due to steep temperature gradients in the cylinders and rotors. The reheaters
are valved in above about 25% load, and the loading rate can usually be increased after that,
provided that various checks verify that key parameters such as differential expansions are
within limits.
difference for heat transfer becomes less with reduced heat flow. At the low pressure turbine
exhaust, the moisture becomes less with reducing load, and eventually the exhaust steam
actually becomes superheated. To avoid this situation, the reheating steam flow is throttled at
very low loads to reduce steam temperatures in the LP turbine. Even with no reheat, at very
low loads, the decrease in internal efficiency due to incorrect steam flow in the blades causes
the exhaust temperature to rise to excessive values. This is aggravated by possible recirculation
of exhaust steam within the turbine blading.
fortuitous and promotes high efficiency. In contrast, hydro turbines operating with incom-
pressible water suffer marked losses in efficiency at low loads due to off-design flow directions.
As the steam pressure becomes less in the low pressure parts of the turbine, this no longer
applies because the turbine exhausts against a positive (even though very low) absolute pres-
sure. The absolute pressures around the last stages are therefore not quite proportional to
steam flow, and the pressure ratio across the last stages (especially the last) drops. This results
in reduced steam velocity entering the moving blades.
In large modern turbines, the changes in the velocity diagram at the last stage can be quite
significant, as illustrated in Figure 31. Here, the velocity diagram has been redrawn to show the
whirl velocity. As long as the whirl velocity is positive, that is, Y is on the right hand side, the
steam does work on the blade. At very low loads, the steam incoming velocity VS1 is reduced,
and at the blade tip, the whirl velocity becomes negative, that is, Y is on the left hand side,
indicating that the blade now does work on the steam. Observation of the blade profile at the
tip indicates that, once VS1 becomes substantially less than VB, the blades will act as a fan and
will drive the steam onwards. This fanning action at low steam flows occurs towards the tips of
the blades, that is, around the outer periphery of the turbine rotor. When the fanning action
exceeds the normal steam flow, a recirculation in the last stage will be set up, with steam
returning through the blades near their roots where the impulse type profile simply plows
through the steam at low loads. Such a recirculation is shown in Figure 32. Once set up, this
recirculation results in excessive steam heating by friction and turbulence. If no corrective
action is taken, steam temperatures can become so high as to cause thermal damage to the
turbine.
Two types of corrective action are possible, assuming that the turbine is obliged to continue
operation at this abnormally low load. One is simply to displace the recirculating hot steam
with a small flow of “cooling” steam through the turbine. The other is to spray cooling water
into the recirculating steam at the turbine exhaust so as to reduce its degree of superheat
before it circulates back into the turbine blades. Large nuclear units may have to operate at
very low loads for extended periods during operating manoeuvres on the reactor. These
turbines are usually fitted with exhaust hood sprays or a cooling steam system. Furthermore, a
nuclear reactor such as a CANDU may trip inadvertently or be shut down for a quick repair. In
this case, it would have to be brought back on load within about 40 minutes to avoid suffering
long term (40 hour) unavailability due to buildup of neutron absorbing xenon in the reactor core
while off-load. During such events, it is desirable to maintain the turbine at full speed and
ready to be loaded up once reactor power has been restored. This may be accomplished by
keeping the generator connected to the grid system and allowing it to drive the turbine. Such
operation is known as motoring. When motoring, recirculation of steam in the turbine blades is
most severe, and cooling steam and water sprays are required to maintain the temperature of
the low pressure turbine blades within limits.
The rotor, having less mass than the casing and being surrounded by steam, tends to expand
more rapidly than the casing, leading to so-called differential expansion between them. This is
apparent mainly in the axial direction and blading, and seals must be designed to accommodate
this relative axial movement as the temperature changes. Furthermore, each cylinder casing is
separately supported on its foundations, but the rotors of all the cylinders are linked together to
form a continuous shaft. There is one thrust bearing to locate the shaft in an axial direction,
usually near the high pressure cylinder. From this point, the expansion of each rotor contributes
to the total expansion, so that there is an additional differential expansion which is cumulative
and greatest at the cylinder furthest from the thrust bearings. Such differential expansion must
be monitored during warm-up and loading to ensure that there is no risk of contact between
fixed and moving parts.
load is therefore dependent upon governor valve position, and the governor acts to control
turbine generator load.
The main characteristic of the governor is the speed droop. This indicates the amount that the
speed will change as the load is varied. A speed droop of 5 percent indicates that, if the speed
is 100 percent at zero load, it will be 95 percent at full load. Such a change would not normally
be permitted, and the speed would be progressively reset as the load increased. The speed
droop, however, determines how turbines operating in parallel will maintain stability and share
load. With turbines operating in parallel, the speeds must all be the same and match the
system frequency. For a given change in frequency, then, a turbine with a smaller speed droop
will change its load by a greater amount.
To ensure a proper response, the boiler pressure control system ensures that the governor valve
will be closed progressively and power input from the steam generators to the turbine reduced
to zero while excess steam is diverted to the condenser through the condenser steam discharge
valves. When the turbine power falls below that required to overcome windage and friction,
the generator will draw the necessary power from the grid system. Under these conditions, the
turbine generator is driven at synchronous speed by the electrical grid and is said to be in
motoring mode. A quick recovery from motoring mode is possible so that, once the reactor trip
has been cleared, the unit can be brought up to full power quickly to minimize the effect of the
xenon transient. For this reason, other valves in the system, such as the intercept valves, may
be automatically positioned in readiness for a turbine restart. The advantage of the motoring
mode is to avoid disconnecting the turbine from the grid system, thereby eliminating partial
turbine rundown and runup as well as resynchronization, all of which require careful manoeu-
vring.
Once tripped, however, a reactor requires checking to verify the cause of tripping and careful
restart procedures, all of which take time. Therefore, motoring may not be a practical option,
and the turbine may need to be tripped automatically in response to a reactor trip.
A non-sequential trip must be initiated whenever there is an electrical fault on the generator or
generator transformer because the heavy currents arising from faults can cause severe damage
very quickly.
Chaplin, R. A., “Nuclear Reactor Steam Generation”, Chapter 3.10.2.10 in Thermal Power Plants,
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems by UNESCO, EOLSS Publishers, Oxford, UK, 2000.
[This chapter gives explanations of the dynamics of steam generators and describes level
and pressure control and consequences of inadequate control].
Chaplin, R. A., “Steam Turbine Steam System”, Chapter 3.10.3.4 in Thermal Power Plants,
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems by UNESCO, EOLSS Publishers, Oxford, UK, 2000.
[This chapter describes the steam system and explains the operation of the condenser].
Chaplin, R. A., “Steam Turbine Operational Aspects”, Chapter 3.10.3.5 in Thermal Power Plants,
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems by UNESCO, EOLSS Publishers, Oxford, UK, 2000.
[This chapter describes the thermodynamic phenomena occurring in the turbine which
affect its operation as well as the external influences such as those due to the con-
denser. It also includes thermal effects and governing].
10 Acknowledgements
Acknowledgments are extended to NB Power for the use of information, diagrams and photo-
graphs to support the text of this chapter.
The following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and excellent com-
ments during the development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of course
the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the authors.
George Bereznai
Simon Pang
Thanks are also extended to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
CHAPTER 10
Instrumentation and Control
prepared by
Dr. G. Alan Hepburn
Independent contractor (AECL Retired)
Summary:
This chapter describes the role of instrumentation and control (I&C) in nuclear power plants,
using the CANDU 6 design as an example. It is not a text on the general design of instrumenta-
tion and control algorithms, a subject which is well covered by many textbooks on the subject.
Rather, it describes the architectural design of these systems in nuclear power plants, where the
requirements for both safety and production reliability are quite demanding. The manner in
which the instrumentation and control components of the various major subsystems co-operate
to achieve control of the overall nuclear plant is described. The sensors and actuators which are
unique to the nuclear application are also described, and some of the challenges facing design-
ers of a future new build CANDU I&C system are indicated.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Learning Outcomes ......................................................................................................... 5
2 Nuclear Safety and Production Requirements for I&C Systems ............................................. 5
2.1 Requirements for the Special Safety Systems................................................................. 8
2.2 Safety Requirements for the Process Systems................................................................ 8
2.3 Production Requirements for the Process Systems ........................................................ 9
3 Overall I&C Architecture ....................................................................................................... 10
3.1 Architectural Design of the Special Safety Systems I&C............................................... 10
3.2 Architectural Design of the Process Systems I&C ......................................................... 12
3.3 Features of the CANDU DCC Design to Enhance Production ........................................ 12
3.4 Safety-Related Functions of the Process Systems......................................................... 12
4 Overall Plant Control Functionality ....................................................................................... 14
4.1 RRS control logic............................................................................................................ 15
4.2 BPC Control Logic .......................................................................................................... 18
4.3 UPR Control Logic.......................................................................................................... 18
5 Special Safety Systems Functionality .................................................................................... 18
5.1 Shutdown Systems 1 and 2 ........................................................................................... 18
5.2 Emergency Core Cooling System................................................................................... 19
5.3 Containment System ..................................................................................................... 19
6 I&C Systems Layout and Equipment ..................................................................................... 20
6.1 Sensors .......................................................................................................................... 23
6.2 Actuators ....................................................................................................................... 25
6.2.1 Instrument Air System .................................................................................................. 27
6.3 Actuators for the Special Safety Systems...................................................................... 28
6.4 Control Logic Technology in the Process I&C Systems .................................................. 29
List of Figures
Figure 1 CANDU overall plant control ........................................................................................... 15
Figure 2 Arrangement of the 14 control zones ............................................................................. 15
Figure 3 Absorber-rod drive switching.......................................................................................... 17
Figure 4 Adjuster-rod drive switching ........................................................................................... 17
Figure 5 Rod drive speed .............................................................................................................. 17
Figure 6 Layout of a CANDU 6 control room................................................................................. 21
Figure 7 Pictorial view, CANDU 6 control room ............................................................................ 22
Figure 8 SIR detector geometry. ................................................................................................... 24
Figure 9 Liquid zone control compartment (simplified). .............................................................. 26
Figure 10 Reactor building instrument air system (simplified)..................................................... 27
Figure 11 Two-thirds voting logic for SDS1 trip ............................................................................ 29
Figure 12 CANDU 6 DCC architecture ........................................................................................... 31
Figure 13 Effect of compensation on Pt-clad detector response.................................................. 35
1 Introduction
This chapter describes the role of instrumentation and control (I&C) in nuclear power plants,
using the CANDU 6 design as an example. The scope of I&C includes:
Implementation of control strategies for those control functions which are auto-
mated,
Presentation of information to the operator and receipt of operator inputs for those
functions which are under operator control,
Initiation of reactor shutdown, emergency coolant injection, and containment isola-
tion in the event of failure of the above control functions, and
Data acquisition.
The automated functions include:
Automatic control of the reactor, balance of plant, and auxiliary systems;
Activation of the special safety systems;
On-power refueling (CANDU reactors);
Human/machine interface.
Virtually all the systems in a nuclear power plant contain an instrumentation and control
element.
Although some of the material presented is common to other reactor types, the design details
described pertain to the CANDU reactor. The CANDU 6 design as implemented at sites in
Canada has been chosen as the reference because it is the most widely deployed CANDU design
world-wide. While the implementation of I&C in other plants is broadly similar, the differences
between the CANDU 6 and other CANDU stations are significant. These differences will be
noted in some cases where they are of particular interest to the understanding of I&C in gen-
eral.
At the time when the CANDU 6 and many of the world’s light water reactors were designed, the
process I&C subsystems in nuclear plants were implemented using a combination of individual
analog control loops and discrete Boolean logic using relay technology. The design of the analog
loops is based on classical linear frequency-domain control theory as described in any textbook
on the subject.
As a consequence of the large core of the CANDU reactor and of its many fuel channels, reactor
inlet and outlet headers, and other components, the CANDU design is very extensively instru-
mented. As CANDU reactors began to exceed about 250 MWe, the size of the reactor core and
the on-power refueling combined to make manual supervision of the spatial distribution of
power in the core more and more unwieldy. The result was a strong motivation to introduce
computer control of the reactor and of key process control loops. The resulting control algo-
rithms are quite complex, with many related inputs and outputs. Implementing such a system
using conventional equipment would have been impractical. Therefore, a central dual-
redundant digital control computer (DCC) system, in which the control logic is defined by
software, was introduced in the CANDU design very early on relative to the I&C industry as a
whole, to say nothing of the nuclear power industry. All CANDU reactors, starting with Douglas
Point, have used computers in their process I&C systems. At least from Pickering on, the use of
this technology was a matter of design necessity.
Instrumentation and Control – September 2014
4 The Essential CANDU
This chapter is intended to provide an introduction to the role of I&C in nuclear power plant
applications and is consequently oriented towards issues that are unique to the nuclear context.
It is not a text on the basics of instrumentation and control, nor is detailed knowledge of this
field necessary to understand the material presented. The details of the control strategies used
in each plant system are not covered. The only detailed discussions of these strategies pre-
sented are of the subsystems involved in reactor and overall plant control and of the regional
overpower trip logic.
For those interested in studying the individual systems in more detail, there is a plethora of
material available on the CANTEACH Web site (https://canteach.candu.org). In reviewing this
material, the author noted that it contains many references to design features that are unique
to individual sites as if they were part of the generic CANDU design. For those who need to
know the details of a specific station, the most reliable source is the system design manuals
pertaining to that station.
1.1 Overview
The reliability and availability requirements for nuclear power plants tend to differentiate them
from many other applications. The implications of these requirements for the major I&C
subsystems are discussed from the point of view of both nuclear safety and plant production.
References to current standards and regulatory documentation are provided.
The overall architecture of I&C systems is described, using the reference CANDU 6 design as an
example. There are close ties here with the architecture of the electrical power systems de-
scribed in Chapter 11.
The implementation technologies used in nuclear I&C are also described. As an aid to under-
standing the design decisions evinced by the design, a brief discussion of the technologies
available to the designers in the early 1970s is provided.
To give the reader an insight into the more detailed I&C logic functions typical of the CANDU
design, the operation of the main I&C systems involved in overall control of the plant (reactor
regulating system, boiler pressure control, and unit power regulation) is described in Section 4.
The design of the I&C subsystems of the special safety systems is described in Section 5. The
tools and techniques used to verify the design are discussed in Section 8.
I&C technology has arguably experienced the most dramatic change of any of the technologies
used in power plant design in the years since most of the world’s nuclear fleet was constructed.
However, at least in the case of CANDU, although a number of I&C subsystems have been
replaced by more modern equipment at various stations over the years, the lack of a truly new
build design means that the existing I&C design is now very dated. If and when the next new
build is undertaken, the designers will face an extremely challenging task in bringing the design
concepts and implementation technologies forward into the 21st century.
Several new-build designs have been initiated in the interim, notably for the CANDU 3, CANDU
9, and the Advanced CANDU reactor, but none of these has been carried out to the point where
detailed design documentation was produced and implementation planning was documented,
let alone where a reactor had been constructed, commissioned, and licensed. Furthermore, I&C
technology moves forward perhaps one generation every ten years, so new designs have a
rather limited shelf life.
Given the small number of new builds elsewhere in the world, many plants share this tendency
to have outdated I&C technology. A discussion of some of the issues facing the designers of an
upcoming new build (as opposed to a new replicate design) is included in Section 9, although, to
be sure, any such discussion will be overtaken rather rapidly by technological developments.
elements), the better. However, if dryout is ever allowed to occur, cooling deteriorates quite
rapidly, resulting in fuel melting. Therefore, power has to be raised to some point below dryout,
then held close to constant by maintaining k = 1. This manoeuvering and control is achieved by
adding or removing neutron-absorbing control elements: poison, rods, and in the case of
CANDU, light water. Insertion of each reactivity-control mechanism results in a reduction in the
neutron multiplication factor. The absorption value of these devices is expressed in milli-k (mk).
Insertion of one mk of negative reactivity decreases the neutron multiplication factor by 0.001.
In a light water reactor, fresh fuel requires maximum negative reactivity (rod insertion). As fuel
burns up, rods must be gradually withdrawn to sustain the chain reaction. Power distribution
within the core is highly predictable because the rods are withdrawn in a predetermined pat-
tern. In CANDU, with continuous refueling, fuel reactivity can be maintained indefinitely, but
local peaks will occur when fresh fuel is inserted. This, together with the larger size of the core,
which in the absence of control action can lead to local flux oscillations due to Xe 135 (a neutron
absorber with a fairly short half-life which is produced as a result of the fission process), means
that, in a CANDU reactor, flux has to be controlled both as an average value, for the entire core,
and spatially, to avoid unwanted flux tilts.
Heat must also be removed from the fuel as it is produced. This is achieved by circulating a
heat-transport fluid (e.g., light or heavy water) over the fuel. The energy removed is transferred
to the secondary coolant circuit, where it produces steam to drive the turbine. Failure to
remove heat can result in damage to the fuel or to heat-transport system components, so
control of the heat-transport system is also critical.
The safety role of the process control systems is to keep the various reactor systems operating
within predetermined safe limits. Given the potential consequences of process-system failure,
however, the defenses against such failure must be extremely robust—much more robust than
could credibly be achieved by the process systems themselves. Several additional layers of
defense are used in any modern power reactor. The probability that each layer will not be
available to accomplish its function is expressed as some unavailability figure, e.g., 10 -3 years
per year. In the case of a defense mechanism, this is equivalent to saying that the mechanism
will operate as expected 999 times out of every 1000 challenges.
In any modern reactor design, the additional levels in this defense-in-depth approach are:
The shutdown systems,
The emergency core cooling system (ECCS), and
The containment system.
In CANDU plants, these systems are referred to as the “special safety systems”, while in PWRs,
they are referred to as “reactor protection systems” and “engineered safety features”. In the
CANDU context, anything else is a “process system”. During plant operation, the special safety
systems are poised ready to perform their function when called upon to do so, while the proc-
ess systems are generally in continuous operation. However, some process-system functions are
also normally dormant, but take action to preclude the need for special safety system interven-
tion.
The role of the shutdown system is to stop the chain reaction very rapidly (generally in less than
two seconds) if there is an indication that the process parameters are going outside acceptable
limits. Shutdown systems achieve their function by rapidly inserting large amounts of negative
reactivity. This is typically done in all reactors by inserting neutron-absorbing rods into the core
using a highly reliable power source—the force of gravity (or pressurized gas accumulators, in
the case of boiling water reactors), augmented initially by springs in the case of CANDU.
The CANDU core has a slightly positive void coefficient. This means that, as power increases
through the point that the primary coolant starts to boil, the reactivity would also increase in
the absence of any control-system action. In other words, a positive feedback situation exists.
On initial consideration, this does not appear to be a desirable characteristic, because an event
that results in a power increase is not self-limiting. The Canadian industry’s response to this has
been to provide a second separate, diverse shutdown system (SDS2). In all designs from Bruce
A on, both shutdown systems are equally capable. The second system injects gadolinium nitrate
poison into the moderator, using compressed helium gas as the motivating force.
Every effort is made to ensure that the two shutdown systems are independent (different
reactivity mechanisms, different design teams, complete electrical and spatial separation of
instrumentation and mechanisms, different I&C devices wherever possible and practical), so
that the design unavailabilities of 10-3 years per year for each system can be multiplied to
achieve an overall unavailability of the shutdown function of 10 -6 years per year.
Proponents of light water reactors tend to make much of the CANDU’s positive void coefficient,
but the comparison with respect to inherent power dynamics is not all one-sided. Clearly, in
addition to the direction that power tends to move, the rate at which it moves is also important.
Although a milli-k may not sound like much, the average lifetime of a neutron is less than one
millisecond. Considered simplistically, this would mean that an excess reactivity of only 1 mk
would result in an approximate tripling of neutron power within one second. Fortunately, this
simplistic approach is not applicable in a power reactor core. Due to the effects of a relatively
small number of delayed neutrons (about 6%), the increase in power in one second would, for a
CANDU, be around 1%. In a light water reactor, it would be around 10%. This is one key differ-
ence between the CANDU core and a typical LWR. For a more complete explanation, see
[Rouben2002] and Chapter 5, Section 6. Moreover, once power reduction starts, the strong
negative power coefficient of a light water reactor tends to resist the desired power reduction,
prolonging heat generation in the fuel. In a light water reactor, the shutdown system alone
does not insert enough negative reactivity to shut down the reactor. These reactors also rely on
an inherent feature of the physics of the light water core—the Doppler resonance phenome-
non—to help terminate the reaction [Rouben2008].
Stopping the chain reaction is necessary, but not sufficient to mitigate the effects of a process-
system failure. The decay heat, which initially amounts to about 6% of the pre-shutdown value,
still has to be removed. In a fossil-fuel plant, cutting off the source of new energy (the fuel feed)
instantly removes the heat source. In a power reactor, even after the chain reaction has been
terminated, decay heat could cause the fuel to melt, with the resulting undesirable conse-
quences, for many days after the reactor has been shut down, unless continued cooling of the
fuel is provided. Usually, the heat-transport system is available to do this, but to guard against
any failures in this system, a backup cooling system is required—the emergency core cooling
system, whose role is to provide an alternate path for removal of decay heat from the fuel if
there is an indication that the process systems responsible for doing this have failed.
The last line of defense is the containment system, whose role is to provide an envelope around
the parts of the plant that contain fission products so that this material will not be released to
the environment. The containment system also condenses any steam released into this enve-
Instrumentation and Control – September 2014
8 The Essential CANDU
lope, thus limiting any upward pressure excursion following such a release.
be seen that anything longer than a brief outage of one of these key systems will have a severe
economic impact. Poisoning out is not an issue for the PWR/BWR.
Production availability is not, of course, a regulatory requirement, and therefore there are no
regulatory documents which pertain to this key attribute. It will be seen in subsequent sections
that the control systems are designed to fail safe, which will result in a shutdown of the reactor
without the need for special safety-system action. It will also be seen that much of the key
process control logic is implemented in a pair of dual-redundant digital control computers
(DCCs). Although there is no specific requirement for availability of the process systems in
general, these systems were designed to be highly reliable and tolerant of individual component
failures. The DCCs were designed not to fail in a manner that leads to a poison-out more than
once in three years. Note that, while this reads somewhat like the “serious process failure”
requirement described in the previous section, the two requirements are quite distinct because,
due to the fail-safe design of the process I&C systems, most process I&C outages will not result
in a serious process failure as defined in Section 2.2.
impact both systems simultaneously (e.g., high radiation fields, temperature, and humidity).
The equipment must therefore be qualified to function in the anticipated post-accident envi-
ronment. Equipment must also be qualified to survive and function during more widespread
common-mode events such as electromagnetic disturbances and earthquakes, against which
only limited physical protection is possible.
The low unavailability of each special safety system is achieved in part by redundancy of the
equipment within each system. To ensure independence of the instrumentation, it is channel-
ized. This involves physical separation of the instrumentation, cable routes, logic equipment,
and actuators, and the electrical supplies that power them. Typically, the special systems
instrumentation and actuation logic is divided into three or more separate channels. The
separation of the electrical supplies closely reflects the separation within the I&C systems, as
described in Chapter 11.
Channelization minimizes the probability that many classes of events will disable more than one
channel at a time. Because safety-system action requires two of the three channels to call for
activation of the safety function, the system will continue to perform its design function even if
the third channel has failed in an unsafe manner. The design of the individual channel logic is
such that unsafe failure of even a single channel is unlikely.
Channelization also enables the logic in each channel to be tested periodically. A channel under
test is placed in a state where it votes for safe action. In calculating the system unavailability,
each component failure is assumed to be random and is detected by a test carried out at a
specific test interval. On average, then, failures may go undetected for one-half this test inter-
val. Therefore,
unavailability = failure frequency x test interval / 2.
It can be seen that the test frequency of functions that are normally poised but inactive is a key
input to the unavailability calculation. Unless such functions are tested periodically, any system
which depends on them must be assumed to be unavailable.
The detailed requirements for channelization in CANDU plants are documented in a series of
safety design guides which are not in the public domain.
In PWR plants, a single shutdown system is normally used, with four channels of sensor and
actuation logic. A reactor trip will result if any two of the four channels call for a trip. For
CANDU plants, two three-channel shutdown systems are used. A reactor trip will result if any
two of the three channels in a given shutdown system call for a trip. Either shutdown system
will trip the reactor if the logic for any trip parameter calls for a trip in at least two channels.
This is known as “general coincidence” logic. It is also possible to design a system in which a trip
will occur only if the logic for the same parameter in at least two channels calls for a trip. This
design is referred to as “local coincidence logic” and is used in some other CANDU plants. It can
be seen that, although local coincidence logic is less prone to spurious trips, it requires more
inter-channel communication, which compromises channel separation to some extent and adds
complexity, particularly when the logic is hard-wired. In practice, the spurious trip rate has
been found to be sufficiently small that the additional complexity of local coincidence logic is
not warranted.
The sense of the actuation logic for all systems controlled by the DCC is chosen such that de-
energization of the DCC outputs will tend to move the affected process system in a safe direc-
tion. If both DCCs fail, for example, the mechanical control absorbers will drop into the core,
and the light water zones will fill, resulting in a reactor shutdown.
Although the DCC itself is not seismically qualified, this watchdog timer function is. Hence, it is
sometimes referred to as a “seismically qualified stepback”. This ensures that, the DCCs will be
reliably disconnected from the process equipment they control should they fail as a result of a
seismic event.
flux detectors (two in each zone) that penetrate the reactor vertically from the reac-
tivity mechanisms deck. The flux power is estimated for each of these 14 zones.
Because the platinum-clad Inconel detectors (see Section 6.1.1) do not provide an
absolute value for neutron power, the zone power estimates have to be calibrated
against thermal power. This is determined from measurements of temperature rise
between the reactor inlet and outlet headers at low power, and from secondary-side
measurements of steam flow, feed-water flow, and feedwater temperature at higher
power (> 70%), because boiling in the channels renders the primary-side measure-
ments unreliable at these power levels.
2. The appropriate power set-point is selected based on plant mode (Normal/Alternate,
see Section 4). This set-point will be overridden if a setback is required (see Section
3.4). In this event, the reactor control mode is automatically switched to alternate
mode, and the power set-point is ramped down to a predetermined endpoint. If the
operator presses the HOLD POWER button on the RRS panel, automatic adjustment
of the power set-point will also be suspended.
3. The demand power logic compares the overall reactor power measured in item (1)
above with the required set-point and generates a power error signal Ep, which be-
comes the basis for the control of the reactivity mechanisms described next.
Note that internally RRS works with logarithmic power, expressed in decades. This is
appropriate because the reactor is a multiplicative device and the reactivity-control
mechanisms control the rate of neutron multiplication. The reactivity mechanisms
are driven based on Ep, which is also a logarithmic variable, measured in decades.
However, in many explanations, and indeed in the displays seen by the operator, the
Ep axis is labelled as “Power Error %” (see, for example, Figure 3). What is implied is
that the value is a percentage of current power, not of full power.
4. During normal steady-state operation, the reactivity in each of the 14 zones is ma-
nipulated by adjusting the level of light water in each of 14 cylindrical compartments,
one located in each zone (see Figure 2). In a heavy water reactor, light water is a
neutron absorber. Each of the 14 compartments has a fixed outflow and a valve
which controls the inflow of light water. These valves are manipulated in response to
a combination of the overall power error, E p, and any deviation of zone flux from the
average over all 14 zones. The total worth of all 14 light water zones is about 7 mk.
The logic to control overall power is run twice per second. Tilt control is updated
every two seconds.
In a zone where the overall error and the spatial components of the error signal sum
to zero, inflow will equal outflow, and the light water level will remain constant at
some intermediate level. The level of light water in each zone does not contribute to
valve opening. However, as the level approaches either completely full or com-
pletely empty, the controlled variable changes from zone power to light water level
so that the zones never completely flood or drain. These light water zone controllers
are described in Section 6.2.
5. If more negative reactivity is required than the liquid zones are able to provide, as
indicated by the zones becoming close to full, then this is accomplished by the me-
chanical control absorber logic, which drives banks of neutron-absorbing rods into
the core. These absorber rods are normally located outside the core above the reac-
tor. There are four mechanical control absorbers, with a total worth of 11 mk. The
switching logic for them is shown in Figure 3.
the absorbers to fall into the core under gravity. In this way, a much faster power re-
duction is achieved than if the rods were driven electrically.
In the long term, if the light water zones tend to move significantly away from the
50%-full point, the operator can adjust the available reactivity by adding poison to or
removing poison from the moderator.
envelope has not been exceeded. If any parameter exceeds a predefined trip set-point, then the
channel votes for a reactor trip. To guard against modelling errors, the CANDU design uses two
diverse parameters in each shutdown system where practical to protect against each postulated
initiating event. The case of impracticality has been invoked in the regional overpower protec-
tion (ROP) logic, which provides the primary defence against a slow loss-of-regulation accident.
The ROP sensors use the same technology in both SDS1 and SDS2, and there is no backup
nucleonic parameter for a slow loss of regulation, although the heat-transport high-pressure
parameter does provide some protection in this case. The log-rate trip provides some diversity
for fast LORs.
Most of the parameters that trip the shutdown systems are sensed using conventional process
instrumentation, which provides fairly accurate indications of process values. However, in the
regional overpower detection function, the platinum-clad Inconel sensors provide a much less
direct indication of the physical parameter of interest: the onset of dryout in each bundle in the
core. The logic used in the ROP trip will be described in Section 7, after the limitations of the
sensors used have been introduced in Section 6.1.1.
operated. Examples are the ventilation ducts, the spent fuel port, and the feed-water and
steam lines.
The pressure rise is limited by the dousing system. In the upper area of the building, a dousing
tank contains water which is released as a spray to condense steam resulting from a heat-
transport system or steam-line break. Dousing is initiated by opening a combination of electri-
cally activated and pneumatically actuated valves located beneath the dousing tank. Series
valves are used to minimize the probability of inadvertent dosing actuation. Diverse actuation
sources enhance the probability that dousing will occur when required. (This applies to single-
unit CANDU stations. Multi-unit stations use a vacuum building common to all four units. In
the event of a LOCA, the affected containment is connected to this vacuum building, and the
steam emanating from the LOCA site is doused there).
A cooling system limits the temperature rise within containment, thus maintaining the integrity
of the building in the long term. The cooling system I&C is conventional. A hydrogen ignition
system ignites any free hydrogen gas before concentrations can become high enough to be
hazardous.
number of sensors being located within containment, although the electronics may still be
separated from the sensor elements to facilitate maintenance. The electrical signals are taken
through the containment wall by penetrations which are designed to preclude leaks from within
containment along the cables.
Actuators are likewise close to the process equipment being controlled. They may use electrical
power directly or use electrical/pneumatic converters in the case of loads driven by instrument
air. Most of the electrical loads are driven by switchgear located in the turbine building.
6.1 Sensors
For the most part, the I&C systems use sensors that are used in other process control applica-
tions. However, because the subject of this text is a nuclear reactor, a description of the sensors
used for measuring neutron flux is presented below, with particular emphasis on the in-core flux
detectors, which are unique to the CANDU reactor. To ensure the necessary independence, the
sensors used by each special safety system are dedicated to the system in question and are
separate from the sensors, wiring, and associated equipment used by the process systems.
In-core flux detectors are used in the CANDU 6 reactor to measure local flux power for both
control and shutdown systems. They resemble coaxial cables with an Inconel sheath and a
central core made of either platinum-clad Inconel or vanadium in the sensitive section, as
shown in Figure 8.
utes significantly to the complexity of both the ROP protection and power control algorithms. A
detailed explanation of this is beyond the scope of this text.
The flux detectors used and their locations are as follows:
102 vanadium detectors are inserted vertically from the reactivity mechanism deck.
These are used by the flux mapping program in the DCCs. The vanadium detectors
are also the basis for the setback on high local neutron flux (see Section 3.4.1)
28 platinum-clad Inconel detectors (two for each of the 14 zones) are inserted verti-
cally from the reactivity mechanism deck. In each zone pair, one is in channel A and
one in channel C. These are used by the RRS program, the flux mapping program,
and the stepback program in the DCCs.
34 platinum-clad Inconel detectors are inserted vertically from the reactivity mecha-
nism deck. These are used by SDS1. The detectors are divided between channels D,
E, and F.
24 platinum-clad Inconel detectors are inserted horizontally and are used by SDS2.
The detectors are divided between channels G, H, and J. Future builds are expected
to require the same number of detectors as for SDS1.
6.2 Actuators
Actuators in CANDU are primarily electrically driven by on/off 48VDC outputs from the control
system logic. Small loads may be driven directly, while heavy loads are driven by motor control
centres which receive their inputs as 48VDC signals. Some larger valves are pneumatically
actuated by electrical-to-air converters, and therefore in addition to the electrical supply
system, there is an instrument air system with odd and even channels. Because this system is
not described elsewhere, an overview of it is included in Section 6.2.1. Air-driven valves can
typically move much more rapidly than electrically driven ones. For example, on CANDU, large
air-driven valves are used to isolate containment. Air-driven valves typically use local air accu-
mulators to provide a local power source following loss of the main air supply. This power can
Instrumentation and Control – September 2014
26 The Essential CANDU
be used to drive air-driven actuators to a predetermined safe position following such an event.
There are a number of proportional actuators, such as the boiler feed-water control valves and
the valves which control the flow of light water to the 14 zone controllers.
The CANDU design predated devices that are commanded directly by digital signals sent over a
communications network, and therefore such devices will be found only in areas where the
original equipment has been replaced.
Although most actuators used in the CANDU design are conventional, the actuators which
control spatial power are unique. The reactor is divided for spatial control purposes into 14
zones (see Section 4.1). Each zone contains a cylindrical compartment with a variable amount
of light water (see Figure 9). The level of light water in each compartment is controlled by
varying the flow of water into it, using a valve whose position is determined by a 4-20 mA
controller (normally an output from the DCC). The light water outflow is essentially constant.
The level of water in each compartment is measured by bubbling helium in at the bottom of the
compartment and sensing the difference in pressure between the incoming gas and the pres-
sure in the helium balance header connected to the tops of all 14 compartments (see Figure 7).
This system has the advantage of requiring no active components inside the reactor core. It
works well as long as no compartment either floods or drains. However, flooding or draining
does occur occasionally, and an alternative design which does not have this disadvantage might
be worth investigating.
power. The air passes into the reactor building through a single line equipped with two isolation
valves in series, which are operable from the control room and provide containment isolation,
typically following a LOCA. A number of the pneumatic actuators inside the reactor building are
required to operate in the immediate post-LOCA period and must be able to operate during the
five-minute interruption caused by loss of Class 4 power. Therefore, a set of three air-storage
tanks is provided inside the reactor building to provide the necessary compressed-air reservoir.
Note that many of the loads are on/off and have to execute only a single movement in this time
frame. The single supply line branches within the reactor building to feed these tanks, each
feed being equipped with its own dual isolation valves and a check valve to preclude loss of the
tanks’ contents in the event of a loss of supply air. Therefore, the three tanks provide a short-
term source of triplicated, uninterruptable instrument air within the reactor building. The air,
once it has been used, is vented to the reactor-building atmosphere and will eventually be
exhausted through the building ventilation system.
Following a LOCA, containment ventilation will be isolated, and continued use of the normal
instrument-air source described above would tend to pressurize the reactor building gradually.
To address this concern and permit continued long-term use of pneumatic actuators in con-
tainment following a LOCA, a separate post-LOCA instrument-air source is provided on recent
CANDU 6 plants. This post-LOCA instrument-air (PLIA) system consists of a compressor located
outside the reactor building and two redundant dryers located inside the building, together with
a number of isolating valves. This equipment is not seismically qualified. The PLIA system feeds
the same reactor-building instrument-air tanks described above through appropriate isolating
valves. The compressor draws its inlet air supply from within the reactor building, thus avoiding
the tendency to pressurize the reactor building. The PLIA compressor will be brought on-line
before the valves isolating the supply of normal instrument air to the reactor building are
closed. The air handled by the PLIA system is potentially contaminated, and therefore the
system components outside containment are located in isolated rooms. Water removed from
the flow, which collects in a tank downstream of the compressor, is returned to the reactor
building active drainage through an isolated line.
To SOR Clutches
Figure 11 Two-thirds voting logic for SDS1 trip
In the case of SDS2, the contents of six tanks containing gadolinium nitrate/D 2O solution are
injected into the moderator using pressurized helium as the motive source. The pneumatically
operated valves which connect this pressurized gas to the tanks containing the poison are
arranged in a two-out-of-three configuration which is logically similar to that of the electrical
contacts shown in Figure 11. Again, a trip in any two of the three SDS2 channels will open the
corresponding helium supply valves and trip the reactor.
ware. “Mini” was a relative term. A minicomputer was the size of a small refrigerator and with
the associated input/output equipment could well expand to be 10 metres long. These com-
puters were not inexpensive, nor were they noted for their reliability. One did not procure
computers in large numbers and deploy them where they were required. Rather, a pair of
centrally located computers configured as master and standby was used, and the necessary
sensors and actuators were connected to them using discrete pairs of wires (as opposed to
communications networks). Networking of computers was unknown. Once the decision was
made to use computers, one looked at what other functions, in addition to those that had to be
there, could be implemented using this expensive but very flexible resource.
The digital computers on the CANDU 6 implement the following functions:
Closed-loop control for:
o the reactor,
o steam generator level
o steam generator pressure,
o turbine loading,
o heat-transport pressure and inventory, and
o moderator temperature;
Control of the fueling machines, which enable on-power refueling of the reactor;
Run-up of the turbine;
Presentation to the operator of annunciation information for all process systems in
the plant;
Data logging for all process systems in the plant.
A detailed description of the logic implemented in the DCCs is beyond the scope of this text, but
as an example, see the description of Overall Plant Control given in Section 4. The architecture
of the dual-DCC system is shown in Figure 12.
consists of a single predefined action and a set of post-action checks. A job is made up of a
series of steps. Jobs may be executed automatically from start to finish or may progress one
step at a time under operator supervision. In any event, if the expected feedbacks do not
materialize, execution stops, and the operator is alerted.
The sequential actions required to complete each fueling activity (i.e., a “job”) are defined in an
interpretive language developed specifically for the CANDU fueling application. Although not as
readable as a modern sequential control language, this language does provide the reader with
some level of isolation from the underlying assembly-language logic. The operator can allow
the job to proceed entirely automatically or can elect to require his permission between each
step and the next.
Because fueling is not required on a continuous basis, the fueling-machine function is only
implemented in a single DCC.
They were not, however, called computers, but were referred to as “programmable digital
comparators” (PDCs).
The trip comparator associated with each ROP detector is set to a value determined offline by a
computer code “ROVER” to ensure that at least two detectors in each SDS will call for a trip
before dryout occurs at any location in the core. The computer code considers a large number
of normal and abnormal reactor configurations, but does not account for non-equilibrium
fueling. Typically, with new pressure tubes, this comparator set-point will be around 122%,
although it declines as the pressure tubes age. The code is re-run and the comparators are
adjusted infrequently (e.g., once every three years) to account for changes that affect thermal
hydraulics, such as pressure-tube creep. The comparator setting includes the desired margin to
trip.
The RFSP (Reactor Fueling Simulation Program) code is run frequently (e.g., once every three
days). It synthesizes a flux map based on the reactor’s power and fueling history, on reactivity
mechanism positions, and on the 102 vanadium detector readings. The power in each channel j
in the channel-power peaking factor region (all but the outer extremity of the core), CP j, is then
computed and divided by the reference power for that channel, CPref j, to yield the normalized
channel power:
Pnorm j = CPj/CPref j.
The highest Pnorm j becomes the channel-power peaking factor (CPPF, typically around 1.08).
Therefore, the CPPF represents the worst-case power peaking factor due to refueling ripple over
all channels. The detector amplifier gains are then adjusted so that they read (current reactor
power x CPPF). It can be seen that this approach is quite conservative because it assumes that
all detectors will be affected equally by the channel at greatest risk. This purpose of this calibra-
tion is to compensate for changes in position of the reactivity mechanisms and for local flux
changes due to fueling. It also incidentally compensates for decreasing detector sensitivity with
age. Typically, one or two detectors per channel will be found to be out of limits in any particu-
lar adjustment cycle.
Each detector amplifier also includes two filters which compensate for the non-prompt re-
sponse of the detector itself. These are not normally adjusted. The compensated signals passed
to the comparators represent a fairly close approximation to the thermal power in the fuel,
which is what causes dryout, and hence is the signal on which the reactor needs to be tripped.
The effect of this compensation is shown in Figure 13.
The set-points for both SDS1 and SDS2 are based on the same criteria, including trip margins,
and therefore it is a matter of chance which system will trip first. Indeed, in the case of a slow
LOR, it is likely that SDS2 will trip first because it has fewer detectors and hence its set-points
must be somewhat more conservative. In the past, there was an incentive to arrange things so
that SDS1 would trip first because it could be re-poised much more quickly and potentially avoid
a reactor poison-out. Nowadays, the analysis associated with restarting the reactor after any
trip is sufficiently time-consuming that a poison-out is inevitable in either case.
8 Design Verification
All CANDU systems were subject during the design process to a design review carried out by
their designers’ peers. This review was based on the detailed design documentation produced
for the customer. With each succeeding design generation, the documentation became more
comprehensive. However, the process-systems review was never based on the detailed com-
prehensive list of system requirements which is typical of best-practice systems design in a
modern engineering context.
In the case of the special safety systems, the situation is better because it was necessary to
demonstrate detailed compliance with the safety requirements.
For closed-loop control systems, the dynamic performance of the control algorithms is of major
interest because any instability can require close operator attention at best and opera-
tor/automatic action up to and including shutting down the plant in the worst case. The design
of the CANDU controls was carried out before computers that could simulate plant dynamics in
real time were available. The performance of the proposed algorithms was checked using plant
models and models of the control algorithms run on a mainframe computer in batch mode. For
readers who never knew the days when telephones had wires, a mainframe computer occupied
a large room buried in the bowels of the design office, consumed many kilowatts of power, was
attended by a staff of dozens of technicians, and executed jobs fed to it in the form of decks
consisting of thousands of punched cards. You submitted your job and waited a day or two for
the results to be returned. These took the form of endless columns of numbers printed by a line
printer on reams of fanfold paper.
The plant models used for such verification were not themselves subject to any formal verifica-
tion.
In the case of the special safety systems, dynamic performance was of critical interest because
any unexpected delays in initiating a trip could lead to fuel damage. In this case, the codes used
for verification, such as Cathena, have been subjected to formal validation.
Over the life of the CANDU 6 plants, all sites have added operator training simulators which
closely mimic the performance of the subject plant in real time. Although these models have
not been formally validated to serve as engineering simulations (i.e., as accurate representa-
tions of the process dynamics), it has become common practice to verify any significant control
system changes on the operator training simulator before implementation. This not only
provides some assurance that the changes to the control algorithms will work, but checks any
associated changes to the human/machine interface. The training simulator has been particu-
larly effective in enhancing the level of confidence in changes to the DCC software because the
simulators typically emulate the DCC processor, which means that the new DCC software can be
loaded and run on the simulator. It should be noted, however, that due to possible lack of
fidelity in the plant models used in training simulators, successful operation of the changes on
the simulator does not offer a guarantee that the change will be trouble-free on the plant itself.
In the past, no new-build CANDU plant has had a training simulator installed when it was
originally commissioned. In today’s regulatory environment, availability of an operator training
simulator before commissioning has become a requirement. This will lead to a situation where
it becomes very important to be able to adapt the operator training simulator rapidly to reflect
changes made to the plant design before and during commissioning.
During the intervening years, at least three new CANDU designs have been embarked upon, yet
none has been developed to the point of implementation. These were the CANDU 3, CANDU 9,
and the Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR). All these featured I&C technology which was current
at the time. One might think that, given the advances in computing power, the design of the
control systems for these plants would present few problems. Yet this was far from the case.
In a modern distributed control system (DCS), use of which is standard practice in the I&C
industry today, the physical inputs are typically digitized close to the field instrumentation. The
digital data are then carried over a communications network to one of a number of processing
units in which the control algorithms are executed. The control commands are then networked
to output stations located near the controlled actuators. The algorithms in the input, process-
ing, and output modules typically run asynchronously, and inter-processor communication is
also typically asynchronous. Therefore, the time delays from input to output are no longer
deterministic, as is the case for a DCC. If the resulting uncertainties are to be negligible, every-
thing has to run many times faster in a modern system if the same dynamic performance is to
be guaranteed in the worst case.
Modern DCS systems have the advantage of being programmed in application-specific high-level
languages, frequently using graphical representations of the logic, which make the design much
more susceptible to review by outsiders. However, many vendors’ products use proprietary
languages which are not readily portable to a different vendor’s product, should it become
necessary to replace the control system at some stage in the life of the plant. An international
standard does exist for programmable controller languages [IEC1993], but adoption of this
standard has not yet been widespread.
Periodically, the prospect of using some of the more exotic modern I&C technologies such as
expert systems, optimal control, neural networks, and fuzzy logic controllers is raised, typically
by academics. Many of these techniques have been around since the 1960s, after all. The
problem with many of these approaches is that they are typically non-deterministic and there-
fore difficult to qualify. The regulators quite rightly frown on any design that cannot be guaran-
teed to produce the exact same response every time it is presented with the same sequence of
input conditions.
The old adage, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”, is very good advice. Any change to the existing
design must show that it can provide enhanced power output, greater plant availability, and/or
lower operating costs if it is to be seriously considered. In this chapter, the author has at-
tempted to point out some features of the existing design that may benefit from re-design in
any future CANDU new build.
due to the relatively small amount of logic involved and the fact that the PDCs are not geo-
graphically distributed, the new design was able to avoid reliance on digital communications.
Architecturally, then, the new PDCs were little different from the systems they replaced. The
functions of the safety-critical software running on the existing equipment were re-engineered
for the new platforms. Although this re-engineering was by no means a trivial task, the exis-
tence of well-documented requirements and accepted procedures [CANDU1999] for carrying
out this work made it fairly routine.
The replacement approach for the DCC hardware took a very different approach. The obvious
approach to DCC replacement is to use a modern DCS, as discussed in the previous section.
However, DCC replacement has the potential to lead to a very protracted and costly plant
outage if anything goes wrong during the replacement or if the software implementation proves
to have defects once the plant is brought back online. To minimize this risk, the fundamental
requirement of the plant owners has been to replicate the existing control logic in precise detail.
The existing DCCs contain a large body of purpose-designed software, ranging from the operat-
ing system to dozens of applications whose details are specific to each CANDU site. The most
reliable definition of the functionality of this software is the program listing itself, which is
written in a machine-specific assembly language.
As stated in the introduction, the design and implementation of the analog control loops
implemented in the DCCs are based on classical frequency-domain techniques. At a detail level,
the control logic consists of an interconnected set of gain elements, integrators, and differenti-
ators. However, because these elements are ultimately implemented in assembly language and
are specified in the form of difference equations, the basic structure of the control logic is far
from obvious to anybody reviewing the detailed design. Translating the existing control logic
into the context of a modern DCS platform with a high degree of confidence that the platform
change will not introduce latent errors would be a formidable task. Not only is there a risk of
errors in the interpretation of the software functionality, but the different architectures of the
two platforms make emulation of real-time performance very difficult to guarantee.
Therefore, if a DCS were used to replace these DCCs, the DCC logic would have to be reverse-
engineered and a new DCS-based design developed and re-validated from the ground up. No
plant owner or CANDU 6 replication project manager has accepted this risk. The alternative was
to custom-build replacement computer equipment which would be fit-, form-, and function-
compatible with the existing hardware and which would host the existing software with rela-
tively minor changes.
As it happened, the CANDU industry was not the only one to be confronted with this problem,
and replacement computer hardware based on more modern components had been developed
for both the Pickering A and CANDU 6 DCCs. These “clone” computers served as a starting point
for the refurbishment of these units, a process which is still ongoing.
All this means that all existing CANDUs will run with aging I&C technology for the next couple of
decades and that the first CANDU new build, should there be one, will be the proving ground for
the design, licensing, and implementation of what is now standard practice for the I&C industry,
assuming that the “clone” DCC is not retained.
The design life of a CANDU plant is around 40 years. With refurbishment, this could well extend
to 70 years or more. Each generation of I&C technology becomes obsolete in about 15 years,
particularly if one is speaking about digital equipment. The manufacturers of the equipment
typically will not guarantee to support their product beyond about 20 years, though if one
happens to pick a particularly successful product line, this date might be extended by another
10 years. Therefore, any nuclear plant will have to face replacement of its digital I&C equipment
at least twice in the lifetime of the plant. In the case of the original CANDU DCCs, the original
equipment was specifically developed in Canada by a custom systems integration supplier who
owned much of the design data and was able to purchase the rest from the original equipment
manufacturers. Manufacturers of off-the-shelf I&C products are not interested in this kind of re-
engineering business. However, by far the most economic and reliable solution in the future
will be to base the I&C on off-the-shelf equipment. Design for replacement has not so far been
a requirement on next-generation reactors. This is a challenge that should be accepted. The
existing refurbished CANDU plants will probably have to face this issue with their DCCs at least
once more during their extended lifetimes because it is hard to imagine the present vendor still
providing support in 2040. In future replacements, it is unlikely that development of a replace-
ment platform which can run the existing software will be practical, and therefore the issue of
rewriting the software when the equipment is replaced will have to be faced. If a hardware
platform which supports the industry-standard languages [IEC1993]is used, this offers some
hope that the existing software will be portable. However, the industry in general has shown
little inclination to adopt these languages, meaning that there is no guarantee that this ap-
proach will yield the desired advantages.
11 Problems
1. Starting with an equilibrium reaction, assume that a control rod is moved out of core by
a fixed distance. What form will the curve of reactor power vs. time assume?
2. Given the approximate numbers quoted in Section 2 and assuming that the light-water
zone controllers are initially half full, in the absence of any other control or shutdown ac-
tion, what value would the power in a CANDU reactor reach in one second if all the light-
water zone controllers suddenly drained? Assume that initial power = 100% and that the
total reactivity worth of the zone controllers = 7 mk.
3. From the point of view of reliability, why is it important in a reactor with two shutdown
systems that the two systems be independent?
Instrumentation and Control – September 2014
40 The Essential CANDU
15. What would be some key requirements for the secondary control area?
16. It has been suggested that the control system be made capable of initiating a power set-
back on low margin to trip. What possible objection could there be to such a proposal?
17. What are the potential effects of a failure of the air-conditioning system which services
the room housing the DCCs?
18. Why might the CDF be less relevant in the context of modern I&C technology?
19. List some pros and cons of digitizing instrument readings inside containment.
20. When using thermal measurements to calibrate flux-detector readings, what processing
will have to be applied to the flux-detector readings before they are compared to ther-
mal power measurements?
21. Why are ion chambers not used for control in the upper decade (10% to 100%) of reac-
tor power?
22. Why do you think digital sensors have seen limited application in retrofit projects on ex-
isting CANDU power plants?
23. What would be the most demanding requirement facing a potential replacement for the
level measurement in the light-water zone compartments? Suggest some possible tech-
nologies which might be used.
24. What long-term factors might require the operator to adjust bulk reactivity using mod-
erator poison?
25. What characteristics of the CANDU design drove the choice to use digital computer con-
trol before it was a widely accepted technology?
26. What are some negative consequences of having the control logic defined in software
written in assembly language?
27. What would be a major reason that an annunciation scheme based on expert system
technology might be difficult to license?
28. Give an example of a non-proprietary language which would be appropriate to the defi-
nition of sequential control logic.
29. List some advantages to making shutdown-system testing an automatic function.
30. List two reasons why software is often considered to be particularly prone to design er-
rors.
31. Which ROP adjustment accounts for the changing shape of flux within the reactor core?
32. Why will the ROP trip comparator set-points need to be adjusted downwards as the
pressure tubes age?
33. Give an example of a non-proprietary language which would be appropriate to the defi-
nition of (a) analog and (b) Boolean control logic.
34. In what way does the architecture of a distributed control system, as opposed to that of
a centralized computer system, affect the execution timing of the control logic?
12 References
[Rouben2002] Rouben, B. Introduction to Reactor Physics, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Sep-
tember 2002.
[Rouben2008] Rouben, B., Reactivity Coefficients, McMaster University course EP 4D03/6D03,
September 2008.
[AECB1977] AECB. Regulatory Document R-10: The Use of Two Shutdown Systems in Reactors,
AECB, January 11, 1977.
[AECB1991a] AECB. Regulatory Document R-8, Requirements for Shutdown Systems for CANDU
Nuclear Power Plants, AECB, February 21, 1991.
[AECB1991b] AECB. Regulatory Document R-7, Requirements for Containment Systems for
CANDU Nuclear Power Plants, AECB, February 21, 1991.
[AECB1991c] AECB. Regulatory Document R-9, Requirements for Emergency Core Cooling
Systems for CANDU Nuclear Power Plants, AECB, February 21, 1991.
[CSA2011a] CSA. N290.4-11: Requirements for the Reactor Regulating Systems of Nuclear Power
Plants, Canadian Standards Association, October 2011.
[CSA2011b] CSA N290.5-06: Requirements for Electrical Power and Instrument Air Systems of
CANDU Nuclear Power Plants.
[CANDU1999] CANDU. Standard for Software Engineering of Safety Critical Software, CE-
10010STD, Revision 2, CANDU Computer Systems Engineering Centre of Excellence, De-
cember 1999.
[IEC2001a] IEC. IEC 61508, Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic
Safety-Related Systems, International Electrotechnical Commission, June 2001.
[IEC2001b] IEC. IEC 61513, Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and Control for Systems
Important to Safety – General Requirements for Systems, International Electrotechnical
Commission, March 2001.
[IEC1993] IEC. IEC 61131-3, Programmable Controllers, Part 3: Programming Languages, Inter-
national Electrotechnical Commission, March 1993.
13 Acknowledgements
The following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and excellent com-
ments during the development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of course
the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the authors.
Werner Fieguth
Dave Fournier
Norm Ichiyen
Alek Josefowicz
Thanks are also extended to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
Chapter 11 Electrical
prepared by
Author and affiliation
In preparation
CHAPTER 12
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety
Prepared by
Dr. Edward Waller, PhD, PEng, CAIH, CHP
University of Ontario Institute of Technology
Faculty of Energy Systems and Nuclear Science
Summary:
Crucial to operation of a CANDU nuclear plant is protection of workers, the public, and the
environment. This chapter discusses:
1. Basic fundamentals of radiation physics as they pertain to radiation interactions that
have the potential to cause biological harm in living systems.
2. Concepts of regulatory guidance which governs the “as low as reasonably achievable”
radiation dose paradigm.
3. Radiation detection and monitoring techniques used in CANDU plant environs.
4. External and internal radiation hazards, including discussions on shielding and personal
protective equipment.
5. Radiation management plans, worker dose monitoring, and control and waste man-
agement issues.
6. Radiation releases to the environment, derived release limits, and environmental protec-
tion.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 6
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Learning Outcomes ......................................................................................................... 7
2 Biological Effects of Radiation ................................................................................................ 7
2.1 Basic Radiation Interactions with Tissue ........................................................................ 7
2.2 Biological Radiosensitivity............................................................................................. 11
2.3 Biological Effects of Exposure ....................................................................................... 15
2.4 Radiation Risk Models................................................................................................... 20
2.5 Effects on Pregnancy..................................................................................................... 26
2.6 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 28
3 Dosimetry, Dose Limitations, and Guidance......................................................................... 29
3.1 Dose Definitions............................................................................................................ 30
3.2 Background Radiation Exposure ................................................................................... 37
3.3 International Guidance ................................................................................................. 39
3.4 Canadian Guidance ....................................................................................................... 45
3.5 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 46
4 Radiation Instrumentation.................................................................................................... 47
4.1 Basics of Detection........................................................................................................ 47
List of Figures
Figure 1 Three pillars of health physics .......................................................................................... 6
Figure 2 DNA double helix: target for radiation damage ............................................................... 8
Figure 3 Process chain for radiation interaction with tissue .......................................................... 9
Figure 4 Direct and indirect radiation interaction mechanisms with DNA .................................. 10
Figure 5 Chromosome................................................................................................................... 11
Figure 6 The cell cycle ................................................................................................................... 12
Figure 7 Cell mitosis ...................................................................................................................... 12
Figure 8 DNA single-strand break ................................................................................................. 13
Figure 9 DNA double-strand break ............................................................................................... 13
Figure 10 Radiation damage to cells............................................................................................. 14
Figure 11 DNA damage endpoints ................................................................................................ 15
Figure 12 Differential blood count after severe radiation insult (adapted from [Gusev2001] and
[Cember2009]) ...................................................................................................................... 18
Figure 13 Dose-response curve showing two common models................................................... 23
Figure 14 Generalized dose-response curves ............................................................................... 24
Figure 15 Alternative dose-response curves ................................................................................ 25
Figure 16 Radiation protection regulation pyramid ..................................................................... 29
Figure 17 Relationship between dose and endpoint.................................................................... 35
Figure 18 Origin of average yearly radiation exposure (adapted from [NCRP2009]) .................. 39
Figure 19 Chronology of radiation-protection guidance (adapted from [Inkret1995]) ............... 40
Figure 20 Paradigm shift from deterministic to stochastic effect protection .............................. 41
Figure 21 Progression of radiation protection principles (adapted from [Clement2009]) .......... 42
Figure 22 Relationship of international bodies for radiation protection regulations .................. 42
Figure 23 Ionization process ......................................................................................................... 47
Figure 24 Ionization in a gas-filled tube........................................................................................ 48
Figure 25 Excitation process ......................................................................................................... 48
Figure 26 Excitation in a scintillator-type detector ...................................................................... 49
Figure 27 Geometric efficiency examples (far planar, near planar, and well detectors) ............. 52
Figure 28 Example energy calibration graph ................................................................................ 53
Figure 29 Example efficiency calibration graph............................................................................ 54
Figure 30 Simple particle-counting system................................................................................... 58
Figure 31 Simple spectroscopy process ........................................................................................ 59
Figure 32 Operating regions of gas-filled counters ...................................................................... 61
Figure 33 GM counter sample plateau ......................................................................................... 63
Figure 34 Commercial HPGe system (top) and detail of lead castle (bottom) ............................. 67
Figure 35 Portable contamination meter with pancake probe .................................................... 68
Figure 36 Neutron Bonner sphere ................................................................................................ 69
Figure 37 Portal monitor............................................................................................................... 70
Figure 38 Commercial portal monitor .......................................................................................... 70
Figure 39 Commercial whole-body counter ................................................................................. 71
Figure 40 TLD glow curve from irradiated LiF chip ....................................................................... 73
Figure 41 Commercial TLD reader (top) and tray of LiF chips (bottom)....................................... 74
Figure 42 LSC detection process ................................................................................................... 75
Figure 43 LSC electronics .............................................................................................................. 76
Figure 44 Commercial LSC counter (top) and detail of trays with vials (bottom) ........................ 77
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety – September 2014
4 The Essential CANDU
List of Tables
Table 1 Radiation-induced DNA damage mechanisms................................................................. 10
Table 2 Deterministic effects [NCRP2001].................................................................................... 16
Table 3 Stochastic risk coefficients (adapted from ICRP (2007)).................................................. 19
Table 4 Relative human-organ vulnerabilities to ionizing radiation............................................. 19
Table 5 Association of cancers with radiation exposure .............................................................. 21
Table 6 Epidemiological categories for radiation risk studies ...................................................... 22
Table 7 Radiation weighting factors [ICRP2007] .......................................................................... 33
Table 8 Tissue weighting factors [ICRP1977,1990,2007].............................................................. 34
Table 9 Dose units......................................................................................................................... 34
Table 10 Sample inhalation dose coefficients [ORNL2013].......................................................... 36
Table 11 Primordial and cosmogenic radioisotopes..................................................................... 38
Table 12 ICRP103 dose limits for planned exposure scenarios [ICRP2007] ................................. 44
Table 13 Standard thickness of various beta attenuators (from [Cember2009]) ........................ 81
Table 14 Important neutron reactions ......................................................................................... 88
Table 15 Removal cross sections for neutrons ........................................................................... 102
Table 16 Parameters affecting internal dose.............................................................................. 104
Table 17 Effective half-life .......................................................................................................... 108
Table 18 Air-purifying cartridge designations............................................................................. 116
Table 19 Example of samples collected by Canadian utilities [Cole1997].................................. 128
Table 20 Some key fission and activation radionuclides expected from a reactor release ....... 129
Table 21 Order-of-magnitude CANDU radionuclide emissions .................................................. 133
Table 22 Reference animals and plants (RAP) ............................................................................ 136
1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, the fundamentals of nuclear physics, radioactive decay processes, and radiation
interactions with matter were discussed. This chapter expands upon the concepts in Chapter 3
and explores the fundamentals of radiation protection and environmental safety, which are of
vital importance to the safe operation of CANDU stations. In a holistic sense, the overarching
field that deals with radiation protection and environmental safety is the area of health physics.
Health physics is the branch of science that deals with protection of workers, the public, and
the environment from potential detrimental effects from exposure to ionizing and non-ionizing
radiation. The three primary pillars of health physics in the context of CANDU operations are
presented in Figure 1. Radiation shielding is presented as a pillar because it is an important
aspect of radiation protection that is often a field in and of itself.
Health Physics
Environmental Safety
Radiation Shielding
Radiation Protection
1.1 Overview
Experts in health physics generally require formal training in radiation protection, environ-
mental radioactivity, and shielding design. In this chapter, the concepts of biological effects,
radiation protection, health physics, shielding, and environmental safety are discussed with an
emphasis on CANDU nuclear plant operations. This chapter represents the principal concepts
related to the three pillars (Figure 1) which provide the well-rounded understanding of health
physics that is required for a career in CANDU nuclear operations. Specific concepts discussed
are: (1) basic fundamentals of radiation biology and the basics for understanding biological
harm in living systems; (2) concepts of regulatory guidance which govern the “as low as rea-
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety – September 2014
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety 7
sonably achievable” radiation dose paradigm; (3) radiation detection and monitoring tech-
niques that may be used in CANDU plant environs; (4) external and internal radiation hazards,
including discussions on shielding and personal protective equipment; (5) radiation manage-
ment plans, worker dose monitoring, and control and waste management issues; and (6)
radiation releases to the environment, derived release limits (DRL), and personnel and envi-
ronmental protection.
and to treat cancer, so that the mode of application of radiation to material becomes important
in determining the system endpoint. The fundamentals of radiation interactions with tissue
begin with the concept of energy deposition.
Energy that is deposited in biological material can lead to two principal effects on an individual
atom: excitation or ionization. Excitation raises an orbital-shell electron to a higher energy state
without ejecting it from the atom; radiation can be emitted during this process. Ionization, on
the other hand, is the ejection of an electron from an orbital shell of an atom; other kinds of
radiation can also be emitted during this process. It is generally the ionization process that
causes damage to DNA through direct or indirect action.
If DNA is the primary critical target for radiation-protection applications, then consideration
must be given to DNA damage from direct and indirect action of the radiation to which tissue is
exposed. DNA is a macromolecule which is the main constituent of chromosomes and the
material that contains and communicates genetic information about all life. The DNA molecule
is formed as a double helix and is coded with nucleotide base pairs along a twisted backbone of
alternating sugar and phosphate groups, as depicted in Figure 2.
Backbone
Double helix
cells. Therefore, most direct interactions of all types of radiation on the human body are with
water.
The process of indirect DNA damage proceeds as follows: radiation ionizes a water molecule, as
described by Eq. (1):
H 2O H 2O e . (1)
The products of water dissociation, H2O+ and e-, interact further with water molecules. The
electron interaction with water yields a hydrogen free radical, H , and a hydroxide ion, OH-, as
shown in Eq. (2):
H 2O e H 2O H OH . (2)
The positive ion undergoes immediate dissociation as described in Eq. (3):
H 2O H OH , (3)
which yields a positive hydrogen ion, H+, and a free hydroxyl radical, OH , the neutral form of
the hydroxide ion, OH-. The free hydrogen radicals tend to form gaseous hydrogen (H2) which is
relatively harmless in the human body. The hydroxyl radical, however, is extremely reactive and
can damage DNA. These hydroxyl radicals are, however, short-lived and therefore need to be
created in the vicinity of target DNA to do damage. An alternate damage mechanism is for the
short-lived hydroxyl radicals to combine to form hydrogen peroxide as indicated in Eq. (4):
OH OH H 2O2 . (4)
Hydrogen peroxide is a strong oxidizing agent which is fairly stable in the human body and can
therefore migrate to distances far from the creation point and damage DNA.
A number of events on varying time scales must occur before deleterious effects from exposure
are observed. The complex chain of events from radiation exposure to a biological endpoint is
summarized in Figure 3.
Chemical
Free changes
Incident Fast radical Biological
radiation electron from bond effects
formation
breakage
The time scales extend from femtoseconds for initial ionization, to tens of nanoseconds related
to ion-radical lifetimes, to tens of microseconds for free-radical lifetimes, and finally to years
post-exposure for onset of cancer.
The dominant modes of interactions for ionizing radiation that are important to CANDU reac-
tors are contrasted in Table 1. The direct and indirect interaction mechanisms of the creation of
charged particles by neutral particles are depicted in Figure 4. Dose assessment will be consid-
ered in Section 5 for external irradiation and Section 6 for internal irradiation.
Table 1 Radiation-induced DNA damage mechanisms
Tissue inter-
Radiation Dominant damage mechanism
action
Production of fast-moving electrons creating free radicals
X- and γ rays
Indirect which induce strand breaks
ionization Production of recoil protons, alpha particles, and heavier
Neutrons
atoms, creating free radicals which induce strand breaks
Beta particles
(electrons) Direct ioniza- Direct action with DNA, inducing strand breaks. Directly
Alpha particles tion ionizing particles can also generate free radicals.
(helium nuclei)
Indirect Action
gamma
H ray
free radical
OH· O
H
fast
Direct Action neutron
2 nm
4 nm
Figure 4 Direct and indirect radiation interaction mechanisms with DNA
Chromatid w/DNA
Centromere
(intersection of two chroma-
tids)
Figure 5 Chromosome
The cell cycle is depicted in Figure 6. The cell progresses from mitosis (cell division) to gap 1
(inactivity) for each divided cell which goes on to its own cycle, then to DNA synthesis, and then
to gap 2 (inactivity) before mitosis.
The cell has maximum radiation sensitivity during the mitotic phase of the cell cycle. The cell
cycle involves a number of stages before replication, as depicted in Figure 7.
G1
(1st gap:
G2 relative
(2nd gap: inactivity in
relative M (mitosis) cell)
inactivity in
cell)
S G1
(DNA (1st gap:
Synthesis relative
inactivity in
phase)
cell)
replication
Misrepair
γ dicentric
γ Death or
mutation
fragments
normal damaged
DNA DNA
[3] error prone repair
radiation
Figure 11 DNA damage endpoints
As presented above, exposure can be categorized in many ways. Two very important concepts
related to risk are the rate of dose delivery for exposure and the endpoint.
The rate of dose delivery for exposure is conveniently divided into two principal categories: (a)
acute and (b) chronic. Acute exposure is normally considered as a single, large, and short-term
whole-body dose, and the effects are observed in a short time frame post-exposure. The effects
are categorized by four sequential stages: (i) Initial (prodromal) which lasts approximately 48
hours, (ii) latent, which lasts 48 hours to 3 weeks, (iii) manifest illness, which lasts 6–8 weeks,
and (iv) recovery, which can last weeks to months (if death does not occur). Chronic exposure,
on the other hand, is typically defined as a lower, protracted dose over a long period of time.
The two principal categories describing the endpoint effects of radiation exposure in humans
are (a) deterministic effects and (b) stochastic effects. Dose definitions (Gy, Sv, etc.) are provid-
ed in Section 3.1.
†LD50/30 is the Lethal Dose where 50% of an exposed population dies within 30 days.
LD50/60 is a similar definition at 60 days post-exposure.
There are three general categories of acute radiation sickness, as presented below.
1. Hematopoietic
Dose range 3–8 Gy
Radiation damages precursors to red and white blood cells and platelets
Prodromal phase may occur immediately
Symptoms include septicemia
Mixed survival
Examples include Chernobyl personnel (203 exhibited symptoms; 13 died)
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety – September 2014
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety 17
2. Gastrointestinal
Dose > 10 Gy
Symptoms include abdominal pain/fever, diarrhea, and dehydration
Death in 3–10 days (no record of human survivors above 10 Gy)
Examples include Chernobyl firefighters
3. Cerebrovascular
Dose > 100 Gy
Death in minutes to hours
Examples include criticality accidents.
Radiation exposure to high doses is well known to induce changes in blood-count levels. There
are numerous components of blood and a variety of ways to subdivide blood characteristics.
The four factors that are often examined when high radiation exposure is expected are lympho-
cytes, neutrophils, thrombocytes, and hemoglobin, described below:
Lymphocytes are white blood cells that govern the body’s immune response (directly
fighting disease and infection)
Neutrophils are a subset of white blood cells that fight infection
Thrombocytes (platelets) are active in blood clotting
Hemoglobin is the component of red blood cells that carries oxygen.
An example of a hypothetical complete blood count with differential (CBC w/ diff) after expo-
sure to a large dose (insult > 2 Gy whole body) of radiation is provided in Figure 12. It may be
seen that immediately after exposure, there is a sharp decrease in lymphocytes, followed by a
spike in neutrophils. The neutrophil spike is the body’s response to what it believes may be an
infection. Three distinct stages of illness are evident through the exposure: (1) latent period
from exposure to approximately 20 days, (2) manifest illness, where the exposed person is
extremely sick, from day 20 to 35, followed by (3) recovery, assuming the exposed person has
survived the blood counts dropping to almost zero. Note that Figure 12 represents a very high
whole-body exposure and that the actual blood counts and time frames can vary greatly from
person to person. Note also that models have been developed to determine the severity of
radiation exposure retrospectively using sequential lymphocyte counts post-exposure
[Goans1997].
24 20 400
Lymphocytes and
Neutrophils x 1000 350
Thrombocytes x 1000
20
Hemoglobin (grams) 10 300
16
250
12 200
150
8
100
4
lymphocytes 50
Insult
0 0
-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Days
Figure 12 Differential blood count after severe radiation insult (adapted from [Gusev2001]
and [Cember2009])
The universal principles of radiation protection dictate that deterministic effects must be
avoided in occupational exposure. However, this is not the case with medical exposure because
a deterministic-level dose may be required for the medical procedure. A typical example is
radiation therapy for treatment of cancer, where deterministic-level doses are routinely applied
to treat the cancer.
A study performed by [Brenner2003] indicated that, for doses within a range of 50–100 mSv
(protracted exposure) and 10–50 mSv (acute exposure), there was direct epidemiological
evidence from human populations to indicate that exposure to ionizing radiation increased the
risk of certain cancers. The primary argument to support linear non-threshold response at low
dose is not from scientific observation, but from mechanistic arguments and assumptions.
Based upon the scientifically observed evidence, there is no conclusive proof of any deleterious
endpoint effect below 10 mSv and only weak evidence of an effect below about 50 mSv. In any
case, the risk factors below approximately 100 mSv are very low for all exposure scenarios.
Note that effects from radiation exposure cannot be definitively attributed to an individual.
That is to say, a deterministic effect that may be observed in an individual at one dose level
may not be observed in another individual at the same dose level. This occurs because indi-
viduals have different sensitivities to ionizing radiation exposure. Likewise, cancer risk from
radiation exposure cannot be extrapolated to an individual for a given exposure. Radiosensitiv-
ity is organ-specific because not all organs have the same vulnerability to radiation. Table 4
depicts the relative sensitivity variation among some critical organs.
Table 4 Relative human-organ vulnerabilities to ionizing radiation
Although cellular and animal studies provide indicators of risk, the primary source of data for
radiation-exposure risk modeling is epidemiological studies [UNSCEAR2008]. The primary
source of data used for risk models is the Japanese atomic-bomb survivors. Other exposed
groups that have contributed data to risk modeling include radiotherapy cancer patients
(cervical, endometrial, childhood, breast, Hodgkin’s lymphoma, etc.), radiotherapy patients
with non-malignant conditions (spondylitis, thymus, tonsils, ringworm, etc.), diagnostic radiol-
ogy patients (tuberculosis fluoroscopy, pelvimetry, scoliosis, etc.), workers with occupational
exposure (radium dial painters, miners, radiologists, nuclear workers, etc.), and people experi-
encing environmental exposure (nuclear weapons fallout, Chernobyl, Techa River, etc.).
Radiation is an incredibly weak carcinogen, and as therefore estimation of risk from exposure at
low doses requires the use of risk models, which are described in the following section.
Therefore, it is possible to have a low-probability event with high consequence with a low risk
factor, or a high-probability event with low consequence with a low risk factor. However, if
neither probability of occurrence nor consequence is non-trivial, then it is possible to have a
high risk factor. In terms of radiation risk, the BEIR Committee [BEIRVII2006] defines risk as:
“the chance of injury, loss, or detriment; a measure of the deleterious effects that may
be expected as a result of action or inaction”.
To understand risk from radiation exposure, a fundamental understanding of what the risk
detriment parameter is (for example, cancer) and the background incidence of this detriment is
required. Incidence of effect, or endpoint, can be estimated using in vitro or in vivo studies of
humans, animals, or plants (of organisms, components of organisms, or both, down to the DNA
level). Risk to populations from exposure can be estimated using the principles of epidemiology,
which is the study of the causal factors of the frequency of disease in humans.
Risk from radiation exposure is typically quantified as some probability of endpoint effect
(incidence) per unit dose exposure. The relative risk (RR) is a common measure of risk and is
defined by Eq. (6):
Incidence in exposed population
RR = . (6)
Incidence in unexposed population
An important metric for risk estimate is based on the increased likelihood of an endpoint
(cancer) as a result of exposure to a carcinogen (radiation) and is termed the excess relative risk
(ERR), defined by Eq. (7):
Incidence in exposed population
ERR = RR - 1 = - 1. (7)
Incidence in unexposed population
The excess absolute risk (EAR), sometimes called the attributable risk, is a measure of the
discrepancy in incidence rates between exposed and non-exposed populations and is given by
Eq. (8):
EAR = Incidence in exposed population Incidence in unexposed population . (8)
For example, if the cancer incidence in an exposed population is 0.5 Gy-1 and in an unexposed
population is 0.4, the RR is 1.25 Gy-1, and the ERR is 0.25 Gy-1. The EAR requires that the inci-
dence in the unexposed population be resolved to a percentage by multiplying by the exposure
(Gy). For a 100-mGy exposure, RR = 0.125, ERR = 0.025, and EAR is negative. When RR >1, then
exposure increases the risk, and if RR <1, then exposure does not increase risk. In this hypothet-
ical case, the exposure does not increase cancer risk.
It is often desirable to estimate whether a given exposure is the cause of an observed endpoint
(for example, cancer). The metric used for this is the probability of causation (PC), which is
given by Eq. (9):
ERR
PC= . (9)
1+ERR
In the example above, the PC is calculated as 0.024.
Understanding the risks of radiation exposure means understanding the cause-effect relation-
ships between endpoints and exposure. Some cancers are more strongly linked to radiation
exposure than others. Table 5 presents a variety of cancers in the following categories: (i)
strong association with radiation exposure, (ii) moderate association with radiation exposure,
although strongly influenced by other risk factors, and (ii) little or no association with radiation
exposure.
Table 5 Association of cancers with radiation exposure
Strong Moderate Weak to none
Breast Esophageal
Colorectal Kidney
Stochastic risk, such as the incidence of cancer, can be plotted as a function of dose to generate
a dose-response curve that represents the incidence of an endpoint as a function of increasing
dose. There are numerous sources of data for generating risk curves; some major cohorts
where data have been obtained are presented in Table 6.
Generally speaking, much of our knowledge about dose response has been obtained from
relatively high dose / high dose rate exposure, whereas most non-medical exposure is low dose
/ low dose rate exposure. Figure 13 depicts a hypothetical, yet realistic, dose response curve
(incidence versus dose, where incidence could be relative risk of cancer, for example). The solid
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety – September 2014
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety 23
circles represent points for which there are statistically significant data with reasonable confi-
dence levels (for example, data from Japanese atomic bomb survivors). The open circles repre-
sent non-statistically significant data with low confidence. “High dose” would generally refer to
data obtained above a 1-Gy whole-body dose; “low dose” would generally refer to data below
approximately 0.1 Gy. Some risk estimates (for example, leukemia) are generated using a linear
quadratic curve [BEIRVII2006] through the data and through the point (0,0), which represents
“zero risk at zero dose”. Most risk estimates, however, are generated using a linear curve
through the data and through point (0,0). This is termed the linear no-threshold (LNT) hypothe-
sis of radiation risk and is very contentious in the radiation-protection community [Bond1996]
[Scott2008] [Siegel2012].
Incidence
Adequate fit to
data possible
in this region
(0,0)
Low Dose High Dose
Dose
Figure 13 Dose-response curve showing two common models
The primary reason why the linear no-threshold hypothesis of radiation risk is contentious is
that, as discussed in Section 2.3, there is no conclusive evidence below approximately 100 mGy
to demonstrate deleterious effects of exposure to ionizing radiation. That being said, regulators
have adopted the linear no-threshold hypothesis for radiation risk because it is considered
conservative (that is, to overestimate the risk from ionizing-radiation exposure).
The various models for dose response [Cember2009] can be represented by a generalized
expression given by Eq. (10):
D D
f D 0 1 D 2 D 2 e
2
1 2
, (10)
where the dose-response function is given by f(D), D is the dose, 0 is the natural incidence of
the effect (for example, spontaneous cancer incidence), 1 and 2 are linear and quadratic
fitting parameters, and β1 and β2 are parameters used in representation of cell killing or mortal-
ity only at higher doses (that is, the killing function dominates at high dose).
In terms of relative risk (RR), Eq. (10) becomes Eq. (11):
D D
2
f D 0 1 D 2 D 2 e 1 2
RR . (11)
0 0
A graphical representation of the various functions for Eq. (10) is provided in Figure 14. The
values for the fitting parameters have been selected arbitrarily, and a background incidence (of
a given effect) was arbitrarily selected as 10-3. At low dose, the linear, linear quadratic, and full
expressions are basically identical. At high dose, the quadratic function matches the linear
quadratic function, and clearly cell killing/mortality attenuates the linear quadratic curve.
10
1
Incidence
linear
0.1
quadratic
linear-quadratic
w/ killing
0.01
0.001
0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10
Dose
D D
2
1 D 2 D 2 e 1 2
RR 1 B D * PROFAC ,
0
(12)
0
where PROFAC is the protection factor, which is the population average probability of cancer
prevention given activated natural protection and B(D) is the benefit function, which is the
probability of activated natural protection [Scott2012], which increases at low doses far more
than f(D). At low doses, f(D)/0 is essentially unity, and at low doses, the relative risk may be
approximated by Eq. (13):
RR 1 B D * PROFAC . (13)
Incidence
(0,0)
hormesis High Dose
Dose
Figure 15 Alternative dose-response curves
(b) performing animal studies, and (c) performing epidemiological studies on exposed popula-
tions [BEIRVII2006].
Scientific debate on low-level radiation effects in the radiation-protection community involves
the model used to determine risk from exposure. There is no unanimous agreement on the
model of stochastic risk as low doses. There is scientific support for the linear-non-threshold
model, threshold dose models, and also hermetic models. Although our current system of
radiation-protection guidance is based upon the linear non-threshold model of dose-response,
the concept of threshold dose is apparent as early as the writings of Paracelsus (1493-1541), in
his famous statement “What is there that is not poison? All things are poison and nothing is
without poison. Solely the dose determines that a thing is not a poison” [Deichmann1986]. In
abbreviated terms, Paracelsus’ statement becomes “The dose makes the poison”. This suggests
that, upon exposure to an anthropogenic chemical, there is a threshold dose above which
something becomes poisonous to the body. The concept of threshold dose, established in the
16th century, was abandoned for stochastic-effect radiation-protection purposes in the 20th
century. As early as the 1955 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiologi-
cal Protection, statements were promulgated that “no radiation level higher than natural
background can be regarded as absolutely ‘safe’ ” [Clarke2005], despite there being no conclu-
sive proof that low-dose radiation causes any harm, stochastic or non-stochastic. It is this belief,
manifest in the so-called linear non-threshold (LNT) hypothesis of radiation risk described
above, that has divided public opinion and worker understanding of the effects of ionizing
radiation. Various misapplications and misinterpretations of radiation risk using the linear non-
threshold hypothesis [Bond1996] [Siegel2012] have made general understanding of the risk of
exposure to low-dose radiation confusing and controversial.
2.5.1 Teratogenesis
The conceptus is a blanket definition which encompasses the zygote, embryo, and fetus stages.
Teratogenic insult may be defined as any exposure that is capable of harming the conceptus
(for example, inducing birth defects). Radiation is extremely harmful to the conceptus, and to
children in general, for two simple reasons: (1) a majority of the cells are in active growth
stages in young organisms, and as was demonstrated by the law of Bergonie and Tribondeau,
rapidly dividing cells are more radiosensitive; and (2) exposure in the young allows for more
time for observable effects to manifest before death.
The human conceptus has an approximate nine-month gestation period, with different radia-
tion sensitivities over this time frame. During the first two weeks of gestation (the zygote
stage), the egg is fertilized and implanted in the uterine wall. During this phase, the cells divide
at a rapid rate and are highly sensitive to radiation. During this stage, cell killing is the most
likely outcome from large doses of radiation. During the following approximately three to seven
weeks of gestation (the embryonic stage), differentiated organ development begins, and the
embryo is susceptible to cell killing or congenital malformations at moderate to high doses of
radiation exposure. From approximately week 8 until birth (the fetal stage), there is rapid
growth which makes the fetus susceptible to birth anomalies such as mental retardation. After
approximately 17 weeks gestation, all the brain cells have formed and do not further divide,
and therefore the most sensitive period for teratogenic effects such as mental retardation is
believed to be between 8 and 17 weeks gestation for moderate- to high-dose radiation expo-
sure.
The manifestation of stochastic effects (such as cancer-cell induction) is more probable for in-
utero exposure. This is recognized by the International Commission on Radiological Protection
by suggesting that the risk is a few times that of the population as a whole. Using the value of
5.5%/Sv from Table 3, the cancer-risk coefficient for in-utero exposure is estimated at approxi-
mately 17%/Sv. Note also that most regulatory agencies have adopted a “balance of preg-
nancy” dose limit on workers, which is designed to limit in-utero exposure. Operationally, when
a worker declares a pregnancy to her employer, the dose to the conceptus must be limited to a
pre-determined value (in the 2007 ICRP recommendations [ICRP2007], this is 1 mSv).
be extremely low. After counselling, the perception of teratogenic risk did not differ between
the groups. This result is very important because it suggests that education and consultation
with pregnant women who may be exposed to ionizing radiation can reduce stress and anxiety
from the exposure and possibly reduce the risk of the mother selecting therapeutic abortion
due to unfounded perceptions of the exposure.
2.6 Summary
From a toxicological standpoint, more is known about the effects of radiation on living organ-
isms than any other insult, including chemicals. As far as carcinogenic toxins go, ionizing radia-
tion is one of the weakest carcinogens on the planet. Effects have been investigated using
studies of DNA/molecules/cells, studies on animals, and human epidemiological studies. The
time frames for observable effects extend from subseconds (physical) to seconds (chemical) to
many years (biological). The endpoints for effects may be (i) radiation enters the body, but
misses important targets (a highly likely “endpoint”); (ii) radiation does not cause any damage
to the targets; (iii) radiation damages the target, but the target repairs itself; (iv) damaged cells
may die; and (v) damage cells may change (mutate). High doses of radiation may cause prompt
deterministic effects, such as skin burns. Both high and moderate doses of radiation may
increase the risk of stochastic effects such as cancer. Low-dose radiation exposure had not been
observed to cause deleterious effects in the populations studied, although the risk of exposure
has been extrapolated from high-dose observable effects to the low-dose regime using the
linear no-threshold (LNT) dose-response model.
What is known about ionizing radiation exposure can be summarized as:
Radiation is a very weak carcinogen
Probability of cancer is a function of dose (increased risk with increased dose; severity of
cancer is not a function of dose)
There is weak-to-no evidence of cancer effects at doses below approximately 100 mSv.
What is NOT known about ionizing radiation exposure:
Whether there are any negative effects of exposure below approximately 100 mSv
Whether there are any beneficial effects of exposure below approximately 100 mSv
Whether there are any effects at low dose other than cancer and leukemia
Whether there are any inherited effects at any exposure.
Some practical considerations for understanding ionizing-radiation exposure:
“Normal” cancer incidence is very high (30%–40% over the population)
o Cause-effect relationships cannot be proven on an individual basis; relative risk
can only be established for large exposed groups
Stochastic effects have a long latent period
o Leukemia: 2–7 years post-exposure
o Other cancers: 10–50 years post-exposure
Exposure must occur to tissue for radiation-induced cancer to form
o Cancer will not initiate in an organ of the body unless that organ has received a
dose
Certain cancers are not associated with low to moderate doses of ionizing radiation
o Hodgkin’s disease
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety – September 2014
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety 29
o Non-Hodgkin’s disease
o Chronic lymphocytic leukemia
o Cutaneous malignant melanoma
o Uterine cancer
o Prostate cancer
Risk from radiation exposure to child and conceptus are enhanced
o Rapidly dividing cells are radiosensitive
o Longer lifespan post-exposure enables latent cancers to manifest.
The risks of ionizing radiation exposure have been quantified using a variety of dose-response
models. A commonly used model is the linear no-threshold (LNT) model, which is generally
considered to be conservative and as such is used extensively by regulators. There are numer-
ous other models, including hormesis models, which are actively debated in the scientific
literature and about which scientists have shown evidence for and against. Dose-protection
guidance, the LNT approximation, and how the “as low as reasonably achievable, social and
economic factors taken into account” (ALARA) mantra is used are discussed in Section 3.
National
Regulations
International
Recommendations
Scientific Knowledge
tend to follow international recommendations, they are not obligated to do so. In Canada,
there are various governmental agencies involved in establishing radiation-protection guide-
lines, with different areas of responsibility depending upon the source of radiation. For exam-
ple:
Nuclear reactor operations – Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)
Radioactive sources and waste – Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)
Uranium mining and milling operations – Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)
High-energy particle accelerators – Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)
X-ray regulations – each province regulates independently
o X-ray use – Health Canada (HC) guidelines
Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM) - each province regulates independently
o NORM mitigation – Health Canada (HC) guidelines.
Other agencies that have input into radiation protection regulations include Environment
Canada (EC) and Transport Canada (TC). A number of national agencies in Canada are involved
in safety and security of radioactive material, including (i) all the above-named agencies, (ii)
Public Safety Canada, (iii) Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), (iv) Department of
National Defence, and (v) Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).
This section discusses fundamental definitions related to ionizing-radiation dose, background
radiation, and national/international guidance regarding dose and dose limitations. Background
information on the historical development of the radiation protection-system can be found in
[Inkret1995] [Lindell1996] [Jones2005] [Clarke2005] [Walker2000].
3.1.1 Exposure
Before discussing dose, it is worthwhile to discuss, in a historical sense, exposure. In the early
days of X-rays, a common dosimeter was a piece of dental film attached to a paper clip. The
daily allowable exposure was an exposure that was just enough so that some “fogging” of the
film could be observed on processing. This was known as a “paper-clip unit” of radiation expo-
sure and amounted to an early dosimeter. For larger doses such as might be used in therapeutic
medicine, a “skin erythema unit” was used, which was an exposure that would just cause visible
reddening of the skin. Neither unit was what could be considered biologically meaningful,
although they did provide a measure of protection.
Exposure was defined for X- (and gamma) radiation in terms of air ionization, and the original
unit of air ionization established in 1928 was the Roentgen (R). The current definition is given
as:
1 R 2.58 104 C kg 1 of air .
Absorbed dose was subsequently defined as the energy absorbed per unit mass from any kind
of ionizing radiation in any target. As such, the absorbed dose is a physical quantity. To calcu-
late the absorbed dose in air from a given exposure, the ionization potential of air (which is 33.7
eV/ion pair or 33.7 J/C) can be used. Using this value, the absorbed dose in air from an expo-
sure of 1 Roentgen can be calculated as:
C J J
1 R 2.58 104 33.7 8.7 103
kg C kg .
H T wr DT ,r , (16)
where
HT is the equivalent dose to target T (Sv)
wr is the radiation weighting factor for the radiation type.
Radiation weighting factors are related to the relative biological effectiveness (RBE) of different
kinds of radiation, which is an indication of the relative amount of radiation damage done to
tissue for a given absorbed dose. The recommended radiation weighting factors from ICRP103
are provided in Table 7.
2.5 3.25e 6
E 50 MeV
The effective dose, E, is calculated using the equivalent dose and tissue weighting factors using
Eq. (17):
E wT H T , (17)
Absorbed dose Radiation absorbed dose (Rad) Gray (Gy) 100 Rad = 1 Gy
Equivalent dose Roentgen equivalent man (Rem) Sievert (Sv) 100 Rem = 1 Sv
Effective dose Roentgen equivalent man (Rem) Sievert (Sv) 100 Rem = 1 Sv
In Canada, it is not uncommon to find references to classical units used as operational quanti-
ties in nuclear power plants. However, SI units are the approved units of radiation dosage
according to the CNSC regulations.
As was discussed in Section 2.3.2 and demonstrated in Table 3, after exposure to low-dose-rate
radiation, the ICRP [ICRP2007] suggests detriment-adjusted nominal risk coefficients for cancer
and heritable effects in terms of risk per Sv (% per Sv).
The relationship between the various dose quantities and endpoint estimates is depicted in
Figure 17. The relative uncertainty in physical and derived quantities is shown by increasing
arrow thicknesses, with the uncertainty compounding with each step to calculate the endpoint
risk. This demonstrates that, although absorbed-dose estimates may be made with relatively
good confidence, the ability to estimate population risk from low dose / dose rate exposure is
highly uncertain.
These conversion factors are derived using compartmental biokinetic models for internal
dosimetry. Other dose-conversion factors can include external DCFs such as those found in
ICRP74 [ICRP1996b] and discussed in Section 5.
Dlimit Sv 0.02 Sv
ALI Bq
Sv Sv . (18)
wT HT Bq DCF
Bq
3.1.5.3 Derived air concentration (DAC)
The derived air concentration (DAC) is defined as the air concentration (Bq/m 3) that would lead
to the inhalation of 1 ALI by a reference person over 2000 hours (50 weeks x 40 h/week)
assuming that the reference person inhales 1.2 m3/h (light work). The DAC is calculated using
Eq. (19):
Bq ALI Bq ALI Bq
DAC 3
m 2000 hr 1.2 m
3
2400 m3 . (19)
hr
DACs enable rapid estimation of committed effective dose rate because the DAC represents 1
ALI (in the case of Canadian regulations, 20 mSv) in 2000 h, or stated in another manner, 1 DAC
= 10 μSv/h. The number of DAC-h corresponds to the CED.
and precipitation). Some important primordial and cosmogenic radioisotopes are listed in Table
11.
Table 11 Primordial and cosmogenic radioisotopes
Primordial Cosmogenic
40 142 174 10 22
K Ce Hf Be Na
50 144 180 26 35
V Nd Ta Al S
87 147 187 36 7
Rb Sm Re Cl Be
113 148 190 14 33
Cd Sm Pt C P
115 152 204 32 32
In Gd Pb Si P
123 156 238, 235 39 28
Te Dy U Ar Mg
138 176 232 3 24
La Lu Th H Na
In addition to the two natural source categories, radioisotopes are introduced into the envi-
ronment from anthropogenic sources such as nuclear medicine, certain industrial processes,
routine nuclear power operations, historical nuclear weapons testing, and nuclear reactor
accidents. Theoretically, all radioisotopes on the nuclide chart can be introduced into the
environment through anthropogenic processes. In practice, only a few anthropogenic radioiso-
topes are persistent in the environment, for example, 137Cs. All the above-listed sources con-
tribute to the ubiquitous background that constantly surrounds us [Waller2013].
The most recent analysis of U.S. population dose due to natural and anthropogenic radionu-
clides was conducted by the NCRP and published in Report No. 160 [NCRP2009]. The report
indicated that roughly half the yearly exposure to a member of the U.S. population is from
natural background radiation, primarily radon (originating from uranium in the ground) and
thoron (originating from thorium in the ground) gases, whereas the other half is from anthro-
pogenic (human-made) sources, of which the majority is due to medical procedures (see Figure
18). In Canada, it can be expected that the ratios will be similar to the U.S. values.
Note that in the U.S. report [NCRP2009], the average estimated yearly dose corresponding to
Figure 18 is approximately 6.2 mSv. The data indicated a large increase in average yearly dose,
which was exclusively due to medical procedures. Before the release of NCRP Report No. 160,
the average yearly dose was estimated to be approximately 3.6 mSv from all sources
[NCRP1987]. Therefore, the dose increase of 3.6 mSv to 6.2 mSv (almost 75% greater) due to
medical procedures is significant and worthy of increased surveillance.
Because Canada is a country in which advanced medical procedures such as computer tomog-
raphy (CT) are widely used, it is likely that our yearly average dose is proportionally similar to
that shown in Figure 18.
Terrestrial
3%
Internal
5%
Space
Computed 5%
Tomography
24%
Nuclear Medicine
12% Radon & Thoron
37%
Interventional
Fluoroscopy
7% Conventional
Radiography Consumer Industrial
Occupational
5% 2% < 0.1%
<0.1%
As crude as the above recommendations are, they embody the underlying protective mantra of
radiation shielding that we still use today: shielding, distance, and time. As a result, in 1902, a
first crude limit corresponding to approximately 100 mGy per day (or 30000 mGy per year) was
proposed, corresponding to the lowest radiation exposure that could be detected by fogging on
a photographic plate [Inkret1995]. However, despite an acknowledgment of potential detri-
mental effects, between the time of discovery of X-rays and the mid-1920s, numerous injuries
due to radiation exposure were reported (especially among early radiologists). Following
increasing radiation-safety concerns by radiologists and the public, the first International
Congress of Radiology was held in 1925 in London, England. Until that point, quantification of
dose was not consistent and therefore was considered a priority. As a result, the International
Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements (ICRU) was formed. In 1928, the second
Congress was held in Stockholm, Sweden, which led to the formation of the International X-Ray
and Radium Protection Committee, which was the predecessor of the International Commission
on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Throughout the years, the trend in radiation protection has
involved a lowering of the acceptable radiation dose for workers, and by the 1960s, of limita-
tions on acceptable dose for members of the public. The trend in dose standards is presented in
Figure 19.
100,000.0
30 Sv
Occupational
10,000.0 Public
Dose equivalent (mSv)
1 mSv
1.0
0.1
1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Deterministic Stochastic
Increasing Probability
Increasing Severity
Linear no-threshold
assumption
Threshold
Optimization and
Practical guidance Dose limitation
dose limitation
Regulator
IAEA
Practical Guidance
ICRP
Philosophy & Policy
UNSCEAR
Basic Radiation Effects Science
3.3.1 UNSCEAR
UNSCEAR is the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, which
was established by the United Nations in 1955 to assess and report levels and effects of expo-
sure to ionizing radiation and provides the scientific basis for evaluating radiation risk and for
establishing protective measures. UNSCEAR provides the scientific guidance that is consulted
when developing ICRP recommendations. UNSCEAR publications can be found online at:
http://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/publications.html .
3.3.2 ICRP
ICRP is the International Commission on Radiological Protection, established in 1928 to advance
for the public benefit the science of radiological protection, in particular by providing recom-
mendations and guidance on all aspects of protection against ionizing radiation. The main
objective of the Commission’s recommendations is to provide an appropriate standard of
protection for humans without unduly limiting the beneficial practices giving rise to radiation
exposure. The ICRP produces recommendations on radiological protection that are adopted
worldwide based on science and value judgements. The ICRP guidance documents form the
basis for IAEA regulatory recommendations. ICRP publications can be found online at:
http://www.icrp.org/publications.asp.
while voluntarily helping in the support and comfort of patients; and by volunteers in a pro-
gramme of biomedical research involving their exposure.
Dose limits corresponding to planned public and occupational exposure are provided in Table
12. Note that the numerical values are essentially the same as reported in ICRP60 [ICRP1990],
from which the current CNSC regulations are derived. Note that the dose-limit guidance refers
to exposures above background radiation (as discussed in Section 3.2) and as such may be
considered as an additional dose over background. It should also be noted that, operationally,
action levels are often used that are a fraction of the dose limit. Exceeding an action level
would initiate an investigation into the reason for the dose and may initiate a review of proce-
dures to make doses as low as reasonably achievable, social and economic factors being taken
into account (ALARA). The ALARA principle is also found in CNSC document G-129, Rev1
[CNSC2004].
Table 12 ICRP103 dose limits for planned exposure scenarios [ICRP2007]
Occupational Public
20 mSv/a averaged
Effective Dose (Whole Body) over 5 years (50 mSv/a 1 mSv/a
max)
ICRP103 also considers the target for exposure in defining a “representative person”. A repre-
sentative person is an individual receiving a dose that is representative of the more highly
exposed individuals in the population. This term is the equivalent of, and replaces the notion of,
the “average member of the critical group” described in prior ICRP documents (for example,
[ICRP1990]).
Finally, ICRP103 considers explicitly the need for protection of the environment by delineating
the requirement for scientific evidence to demonstrate that protection is adequately afforded
and the need for improved protection as required. Further guidance is provided by ICRP108
[ICRP2008].
3.3.4 IAEA
The IAEA is the International Atomic Energy Agency, established within the United Nations
framework in 1956 as the world’s “Atoms for Peace” organization to promote safe, secure, and
peaceful nuclear technologies. The Agency works with its member states and multiple partners
world-wide to promote safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear technologies. Three main areas of work
underpin the IAEA’s mission: Safety and Security; Science and Technology; and Safeguards and
Verification. The IAEA has a wide range of programmes, including development of safety stan-
dards in regulatory language. IAEA Safety Series documents are often used as the principal
references for national regulatory policy. The most fundamental IAEA radiation protection
standard was the “International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation
and for the Safety of Radiation Sources” [IAEA1996], which has been superseded by an interim
General Safety Requirements Part 3 report [IAEA2011]. IAEA publications can be found online
at: http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/.
[ICRP1990]). In Canada, standards and practices to protect people from radiation exposure are
also developed by the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Radiation Protection Committee (FPTRPC),
which provides a national forum on radiation-protection issues.
The CNSC offers instruction, assistance, and information on these requirements in the form of
regulatory documents, such as policies, standards, guides, and notices. Licensee compliance is
verified through inspections and reports.
In Canada, the current (2013) radiation-protection regulations are based on ICRP60 [ICRP1990].
However, the numerical values of the dose limits have not been changed in ICRP103
[ICRP2007], and therefore the basic values on which Canadian regulatory guidance is based will
continue for many years into the future. The operational values used by the CNSC are provided
in Table 12 with the inclusion of a balance-of-pregnancy dose limit for workers of 4 mSv. The
effective dose is calculated using Eq. (20) and compared to the dose limit for regulatory pur-
poses [NSCA2000]:
mSv I
Etotal E 5 RnP 20 mSv , (20)
WLM ALI
where
Etotal is the total effective dose from all sources (mSv)
E is the effective dose from external sources + committed effective dose measured di-
rectly or from excreta (mSv)
RnP is the exposure to radon progeny in working-level months (WLM)
I is the intake of radionuclides not already accounted for (Bq)
ALI is the annual limit on intake (Bq to give 20 mSv in 50 years).
3.5 Summary
Radiation-protection standards have evolved over the years to provide increased levels of
protection for workers and the public. Dose limits are established on the basis of scientific
knowledge which forms policy, best practices and guidance, and then national regulations.
The basic dose quantities used are absorbed dose, equivalent dose, and effective dose. Al-
though nuclear power plant operations often use obsolete units (such as Ci, Rad, and Rem) in
their plants, most of the nuclear industry uses SI units. Dose quantities for regulatory purposes,
as promulgated through the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, use SI units. Dose limits derived
from International Commission on Radiological Protection guidance are established in Canada,
and derived quantities are used in operations.
Background radiation is made up of natural and anthropogenic components. Dose limits are
established to provide protection above the ubiquitous background level, which has a wide
annual dose range world-wide. In Canada, the background dose is estimated to be approxi-
mately 3.6 mSv per year. Evidence from U.S. estimates indicates that increased use of advanced
medical imaging procedures such as computed tomography is resulting in a larger estimated
background dose; however, no such study has indicated that this is the case in Canada.
As research continues into large epidemiological studies and low-dose rate radiation effects,
dose-limit guidance may change in the future.
4 Radiation Instrumentation
Detection of ionizing radiation is vitally important to all aspects of the nuclear energy industry.
The ability to identify sources of radiation, quantities of radiation, and specific radioisotopes
enables the administration of comprehensive radiation protection, environmental monitoring,
and security programs.
Before discussing the mechanisms of how radiation interacts with detection materials, the
basics of radiation interactions with matter must be understood. These concepts were dis-
cussed in Chapter 3 (Nuclear Processes and Neutron Physics). This section considers radiation
instrumentation that may be pertinent to CANDU operations. The basics of detection, as well as
gas-filled, scintillation, and semiconductor detectors, are discussed. Dosimetry detectors,
especially as they relate to CANDU plant operations, are explored.
electron
+
radiation
anode (+v)
cathode (-v)
Figure 24 Ionization in a gas-filled tube
Excitation
In an excitation-based detector, part of the radiation energy is transferred to bound electrons
and raises them to an excited state in the atom or molecule. When the excited species returns
to its ground-state energy level, the excited atom or molecule may emit electromagnetic
energy in the ultraviolet to visible region (Figure 25). This light can be detected by a photomul-
tiplier tube (PMT), which generates secondary electrons using a photocathode and multiplies
them to generate a detectable signal. This process is depicted in the scintillation-type counter
system shown in Figure 26.
UV light
ionizing radiation
photocathode
UV light photomultiplier
signal out
e-
For a counting rate, R, from a radioactive source, the presence of coincidence will mean that
the rate actually measured, r, will be less than the expected value (r < R). If the detector has a
dead time of T, then the true count rate is given by Eq. (21):
R r rRT . (21)
The counting rate can therefore be corrected for dead time using Eq. (22):
r
R . (22)
1 rT
The value of dead time, T, can be determined using a two-source method by measuring the
activity from two known sources r1 and r2. In theory, the measurement, r3, should be the simple
sum of the two sources as given by Eq. (23):
r1 r2 r3 b , (23)
where b is the background counting rate. If each of these counting rates is corrected for dead
time, then Eq. (23) becomes Eq. (24):
r1 r r3
2 b. (24)
1 rT1 1 r2T 1 r 3T
Because the background count rate may be considered negligible for this measurement, Eq.
(24) can be expressed in the form of a quadratic equation:
detector
detector
source
source
source
Figure 27 Geometric efficiency examples (far planar, near planar, and well detectors)
For detectors that perform spectroscopy (measurement of incident radiation spectra), both
energy and efficiency calibration are generally required. As an example of how this calibration is
performed, consider a simple scintillation (sodium iodide) gamma spectroscopy system. When a
gamma ray (emitted during a change in an atom’s nucleus) interacts with a sodium iodide
crystal, NaI(Tl), the gamma ray will frequently give all its energy to an atomic electron through
the photoelectric effect (PE). This electron travels a short, erratic path in the crystal, converting
its energy into photons of light by colliding with many atoms in the crystal. The more energy
the gamma ray has, the more photons of light will be created. A photomultiplier tube (PMT)
converts each photon interaction into a small electrical current, and because the photons arrive
at the PMT at about the same time, the individual currents combine to produce a larger current
pulse. This pulse is converted into a voltage pulse with size proportional to the gamma-ray
energy. The voltage pulse is amplified and measured by an analog-to-digital conversion (ADC)
process. The result of this measurement is an integer between 1 and 1024 for a 10-bit ADC. One
is the measured value for a voltage pulse less than a hundredth of a volt, and 1024 is the
measured value for a pulse larger than approximately 8 volts (or the largest voltage pulse in the
ADC). Pulses between 0V and 8V are proportionately assigned an integer measured value
between 1 and 1024. This measure is called the channel number. The analog-to-digital conver-
sion process is performed, and the computer records the measurements as the number of
gamma rays observed for each integer measurement or channel number.
The spectrum is a visual display of the number of gamma rays as a function of the channel
number. In the case of known sources (location of the energy peak(s) is well known), then a
correlation of channel number with gamma-ray energy can be generated. The result is a graph
of the channel number (memory location) as a function of gamma-ray energy (photopeak). The
slope of this graph (energy/channel) is the energy calibration (a fitted equation may also be
used if the relationship is not linear over all energy values). An example of energy calibration is
shown in Figure 28.
2000
1500
Energy (keV)
1000
500
0.040
0.035
0.030
0.025
Efficiency
0.020
0.015
0.010
0.005
0.000
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Energy (keV)
Figure 29 Example efficiency calibration graph
Energy calibration is essential for isotope identification, and efficiency is essential for activity
determination.
x x
2
i
i 1
. (30)
N 1
The standard deviation is a measure of the variation of the data without regard to position
above or below the mean (that is, an absolute value using the square). Because most meas-
urements tend to follow a Gaussian distribution about the mean (i.e., they are symmetrical),
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety – September 2014
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety 55
the mean and standard deviation are widely used measures to predict behaviour. However,
particle counting is not symmetrical about a mean. Radioactive decay is a random process that
occurs very infrequently for low-activity samples and very frequently for high-activity samples.
Three statistical distributions useful in particle counting will be discussed below.
m pN , (32)
and the standard deviation is calculated using Eq. (33):
mq Npq Np 1 p . (33)
To study radioactive decay, a distribution is required that represents a large number of counts
and a small probability of success (large N and small p). The Poisson distribution is appropriate
for this purpose.
mn m
P n e , (34)
n!
where m is the mean of the distribution (m = Np). A primary feature of the Poisson distribution
is the ease of calculating the standard deviation using Eq. (35):
m. (35)
For individual measurements, the standard deviation is the square root of the number of
counts, (N), as given by Eq. (36):
N . (36)
For large values of m (m > 20), a more appropriate distribution, called the Gaussian distribution,
is used.
x m 2
1
P n e 2 2
. (37)
2
For a large number of measurements, the data should follow a Gaussian distribution and yield
the mean and standard deviation presented by Eqs. (29) and (30).
LC 2k b , (38)
where k is the Gaussian parameter related to area under the curve (sometimes termed “z”) and
σb is the standard deviation of the background radiation. Consider a normal distribution of
background counts, a 95% confidence level, and the fact that for a normal distribution, the 95%
confidence level occurs at k = 1.645; in this case, the critical level is defined as in Eq. (39):
Therefore, the procedure to determine the critical level (the decision criterion) is:
1. Obtain numerous background measurements (for example, 20), spatially and temporally
separated, but NOT near contamination or radioactive sources.
2. Determine the mean and standard deviation of the measurements
3. Multiply the standard deviation by 2.33 and add it to the mean to obtain the decision
criterion.
For example, if the background-count rate mean is 30 cpm and the standard deviation is 5 cpm,
the decision criterion is 30 cpm+12 cpm = 42 cpm. If a measurement above 42 cpm is obtained,
it can be attributed to non-background radiation.
analog
4 5 6 7
3
2 8
1 9
Integrator
threshold
or ADC
pulse
detector
123456
digital
1024
.
SOURCE .
.
6
3
2
DETECTOR 1
pulse train
ULD
window
LLD
Threshold
Photopeak. A photopeak is generated in the spectrum when gamma rays deposit all their
original energy in the detector through the photoelectric (PE) interaction. This is the prima-
ry signature in a gamma spectroscopy system and is used both to identify and to quantify
the radiation.
X-Ray Escape Peak. An X-ray escape peak is generated in the spectrum when gamma rays
deposit all their original energy in the detector through the photoelectric effect (PE), except
for the energy of an iodine or germanium X-ray that leaves the detector.
Compton Continuum. The Compton continuum is produced when gamma rays interact in
the detector through Compton scattering (CS) and then leave the detector.
Double Escape Peak. The double escape peak is produced when gamma rays interact in the
detector through pair production (PP) and two 511-keV annihilation photons escape the de-
tector.
Single Escape Peak. The single escape peak is produced when gamma rays interact in the
detector through pair production (PP) and one 511-keV annihilation photon escapes the de-
tector.
applied between cathode and anode is not large enough to collect all the electrons. This region
is not useful for counting radiation.
The next region is the ion-saturation region. The potential difference is sufficient to collect all
freed electrons. A detector working in the saturation region is called an ionization chamber, and
its output is proportional to the deposited radiation energy. Internal or thin-window ionization
chambers are used as alpha-particle and fission-fragment detectors.
The next important region is the proportional region. The applied voltage is large enough that
the electrons freed by the initial radiation are accelerated, so that they in turn ionize additional
atoms or molecules (secondary ionization) to free more electrons. This electron multiplication
generates an avalanche toward the anode for each primary electron that was freed. The
applied voltage domain is called the proportional region because each avalanche is character-
ized by the same electron multiplication at a given applied voltage. The output signal is directly
proportional to the deposited energy, although each pulse is many times larger than in the
ionization region. The limited proportional region is at slightly higher applied voltage, and the
proportionality of the output signal to the deposited energy at a given applied voltage no
longer applies. Amplification of the greater deposited energy reaches its limit while that for the
lesser deposited energy continues to increase. This region is usually avoided as a detection
region.
pulse
amplitude Geiger
Muller
region
2 MeV limited
prop.
1 MeV region
proportional
ion region
saturation
Applied voltage
Details about the two most common types of radiation detectors used in nuclear operations,
namely the proportional counter and the Geiger-Müller (GM) counter, are discussed in the
following sections.
4.3.1 Scintillators
Scintillators are categorized as fluors as opposed to phosphors. Fluorescence has a lifetime in
the excited state from 10-7 to 10-10 s, whereas phosphorescence has a lifetime in the excited
state of 10-3 s or longer. It is desirable to have a material with a short excited-state lifetime to
achieve a shorter resolving time. Scintillation materials can be classified as solid, liquid, or gas,
as detailed below.
Gas scintillators: The radiation energy excites the electrons of the gas molecules, and light
photons are emitted when the electrons de-excite. Because these photons are typically in
the UV range, a PMT must be chosen that is UV-sensitive. Gas scintillators are extremely
fast, but their light output is poor (low efficiency). The most extensively investigated gas
scintillators use the noble gases xenon and helium.
Liquid scintillators: Liquid scintillators consist of an organic scintillator dissolved in an
appropriate solvent. Normally, the sample to be counted is also dissolved in the scintillator.
The advantage of this arrangement is a high counting efficiency for beta particles, even for
betas of the lowest energies (e.g., 3H). In some cases, the liquid scintillator is used to meas-
ure external radiation sources (e.g., cosmic rays). In such cases, the liquid scintillator is
packaged and treated as if it were a solid crystal. One advantage of liquid scintillators is the
fact that extremely large detectors can be constructed. This is the basis of the commonly
found liquid scintillation counter (LSC).
Solid scintillators: This is the most common type of material used for gamma spectroscopy.
Aside from their physical form, scintillators may also be classified chemically as organic or
inorganic:
Inorganic: gas scintillators (e.g., He, Xe), inorganic crystals (e.g., NaI, ZnS, CsI, LiI, BGO), glass
scintillators.
Organic: liquid scintillators (e.g., PPO, Bis-MSB, POPOP), organic crystals (e.g., anthracene,
stilbene), plastic scintillators.
Two extremely common solid scintillation materials used in the nuclear industry are ZnS and
NaI, which are discussed below.
Zinc Sulfide
Zinc sulfide is often doped (activated) with silver in the form of ZnS(Ag). It is typically used in
alpha detectors and for heavy-particle detection. In the past, ZnS was combined with 226Ra to
form radium paint, which was used to paint clock and aircraft dials so that they would “glow in
the dark”. ZnS is fairly opaque and has high scintillation efficiency (~40%) with a long decay
time.
Sodium Iodide
Sodium iodide is an alkali halide. Its use as a scintillator dates back to the late 1940s, and it is
often activated using thallium in the form NaI(Tl). Thallium is added in trace amounts, at a level
of approximately one atom in one thousand. NaI is used primarily for photon (X- or gamma)
radiation detection. NaI has a high light yield with a scintillation efficiency of approximately
12%. In other words, approximately 12% of the gamma-ray energy deposited in the crystal will
be emitted as light. The average energy of a photon emitted by NaI activated with thallium is 3
eV (which has a wavelength of approximately 415 nm, a wavelength readily detected by most
photomultiplier tubes). For a hypothetical 1-MeV gamma ray that deposits all its energy in the
NaI scintillator, one would expect 120 keV (12% of 1 MeV) to be emitted as light. With an
average photon energy of 3 eV, this would be equivalent to 40,000 photons of light. NaI crystals
can be grown to relatively large sizes for application in airborne/carborne spectroscopy systems
or portal monitors.
Scintillators produce photons of light in the UV to near-visible region and require photomulti-
plier tubes (PMT) as part of the detection process (Figure 26).
Figure 34 Commercial HPGe system (top) and detail of lead castle (bottom)
in counts per minute, counts per second, or both. If the instruments are calibrated, readings are
in dose rate (μ-, mSv, or Gy per hour) and if they have an integration function, in total dose.
gamma emissions from the contamination should be detected by the scintillators and trigger an
alarm on the electronic panel. This will elicit a response from health physics personnel to clean
the contamination and generate an incident report.
Scintillator
detectors
Alarm and
display
Electrons and holes will remain in traps provided that they do not acquire sufficient energy to
escape. The number of trapped states is directly proportional to the number of ionizing-
radiation interactions with the material and hence the total dose. When the temperature of the
material is raised, the trapped charge carriers are given sufficient energy to escape from their
traps to the conduction band, where they recombine at a luminescence centre, and the excess
energy is radiated as visible or UV light, which is recorded by a photomultiplier tube (see
Section 4.3.2). The TLD reader unit provides a correspondence between the signal generated
from the measured light and the radiation exposure of the TL material.
Reading a TLD chip is relatively simple. The TL material is heated from the ambient temperature
up to 300°C–400°C, and the emitted light is collected and measured quantitatively. The TLD
reader consists of four components: (i) heating unit, (ii) light collection and detection system
(PMT), (iii) signal measuring system, and (iv) data recording system. The emission of light from
heated TLD material is often called a “glow”, and the resulting spectrum from heating the
material to release the traps is called a “glow curve”. A typical glow curve obtained from a
Harshaw model 3500 TLD reader for LiF TLD material irradiated to 500 μSv total dose from a 1
Ci 137Cs irradiator is depicted in Figure 40. The portion of the curve corresponding to the deliv-
ered dose is denoted by the region of interest marked with vertical lines.
Figure 41 Commercial TLD reader (top) and tray of LiF chips (bottom)
The TLD is the dosimeter of record for nuclear energy workers (NEW) in Canada (National Dose
Registry, Radiation Protection Bureau, Health Canada), as it is in most countries world-wide. All
nuclear energy workers in Canada wear TLD dosimeters if they are working around sources of
radiation exposure and as directed by the health physics department.
made from small GM tube or semiconductor detectors, and although the most common are
sensitive to X- and gamma radiation, some have neutron-detection capabilities.
Although EPDs do not provide a legal dose of record, they are often worn in conjunction with
TLDs by personnel working in nuclear-facility radiation environments, especially in non-
homogeneous fields or in areas where exposure may be in excess of action or regulatory limits.
β UV PMT
Radionuclides Solvent Scintillator
chemical colour
quench quench
The electronic process of light detection and pulse generation in an LSC analyzer is depicted in
Figure 43. In most scintillation counters, two photomultiplier tubes collect the total light
produced within the scintillation vial that either (a) falls directly onto the two photocathodes or
(b) is reflected onto each photocathode by a reflector centrally mounted between the two
PMTs. Radioactive decay events produce approximately 10 photons per keV of energy. Beta
decay yielding a multiplicity of photons will stimulate both PMTs at the same instant in time,
and the signal from each PMT is fed into a summing circuit which produces an output only if the
two signals occur simultaneously, which is called coincidence. Because electrical noise from the
PMTs is produced randomly over time, it occurs at a sufficiently low rate to be excluded by the
coincidence circuit (below the equivalent of 1 keV). The sample in the counting chamber and
the PMTs are surrounded by lead, typically about 5 cm in all directions, which generally reduces
the background radiation to low levels.
The output from the analog-to-digital converter is processed with a spectrum analyzer cali-
brated in keV, and regions between 0 and 2000 keV are used for sample analysis. For example,
the region of interest for 3H is 0–18.6 keV (3H maximum beta energy = 18.6 keV) and for 14C is
0–156 keV (14C maximum beta energy = 156 keV).
Figure 44 Commercial LSC counter (top) and detail of trays with vials (bottom)
4.8 Summary
Ionizing radiation cannot be detected by the human senses, and therefore instrumentation is
required. A variety of radiation detection instruments is used in nuclear facilities to support
routine operations such as dosimetry, radiation protection, and environmental monitoring.
Instrumentation is selected by health physics personnel based on its applicability to the mission
design. Radiation fields to be measured in nuclear facilities may be in the form of external
fields, water effluent, airborne gases, or particulates. Instrumentation is of critical importance
for the safe operation of nuclear facilities such as nuclear reactors and therefore is an integral
part of the radiation-safety management plan.
Contact
Stand-off
Contact
The intensity of beta radiation for depths less than the range of the beta particles can be
described by Eq. (42):
t
o e , (42)
where
φ is the beta intensity at depth t (particle flux, energy flux, etc.)
φo is the initial intensity (same units as φ)
is the beta-ray absorption coefficient (cm2/g)
t is the depth(density thickness) in material (g/cm2).
The beta attenuation coefficients for tissue and air are given by Eqs. (43) and (44) respectively:
cm2
, tissue 18.6 Emax 0.036
1.37
(43)
g
cm2
, air 16 Emax 0.036
1.4
, (44)
g
where Emax is the maximum beta-ray energy in MeV.
The dead layer of skin provides some beta shielding and is typically represented by 0.007 g/cm2
density thickness. After the beta particles pass through the dead layer of skin, all beta energy is
deposited in living tissue (betas travel no more than approximately 1 cm in tissue), and the
energy deposited is essentially equal to the dose.
Beta doses from common industrial scenarios are presented below.
0.5Ca E , (45)
where
is the energy flux at the surface (MeV cm-2 s-1)
Ē is the average energy per disintegration (MeV)
Ca is the areal activity (Bq cm-2).
The beta surface dose rate, considering the uncollided particles, may be determined using the
beta attenuation coefficient as in Eq. (46):
MeV
D 0.5Ca E . (46)
gs
Rewriting Eq. (46) in standard SI dose units yields Eq. (47):
MeV Gy
D 0.5Ca E 7
2.88 10 Ca E . (47)
gs h
Of interest also is the contact dose to the skin (the scenario in which the tissue comes into
contact with a surface that has beta-emitting contamination). The dose rate to tissue on con-
tact is represented by Eq. (48):
g
Bq MeV J s 0.007 2
13
0.5 f Ca 2
E 1.6 10 3600 e cm
cm transform MeV h
D , (48)
0.001 J / g Gy
and the dose rate for tissue on contact with a contaminated surface is given by Eq. (49):
Bq MeV 0.007 tissue mGy
D contact 3.6 104 Ca 2 E e
cm transform
h
, (49)
which assumes that approximately 25% of the beta particles going down into the contaminated
surface are backscattered [Cember2009] towards the dose point (i.e., fβ=1.25) and the expo-
nential represents attenuation through 0.007 g/cm 2 of tissue (the dead tissue-layer density
thickness).
For tissue at some distance d away from the contaminated surface, air attenuation must also be
taken into account, as in Eq. (50). Subsequent layers of attenuating material (such as gloves on
hands) may be taken into account using similar exponentials:
Bq MeV 0.007 tissue mGy
D at d 3.6 104 Ca 2 E e
cm transform
d air
e
h
. (50)
5.1.1.2 Beta dose rate from contamination on skin (or hot particles)
For the case where the beta contaminant is in direct contact with external tissue with no
backing material, the beta dose rate is expressed by Eq. (51). Note that no backscatter (fb)
factor is required in this scenario because there is air “behind” the source:
g
Bq MeV J s 0.007 2
0.5 Ca 2
E 1.6 1013 3600 e cm
cm transform MeV h
D
0.001 J / g Gy . (51)
mGy
2.88 104 Ca E e
0.007
h
If the beta emitter is not in contact with the external tissue, other attenuating material can be
added using exponential attenuation factors with appropriate attenuation coefficients. Some
materials that can attenuate betas for skin doses in an industrial setting are listed in Table 13. If
the material is hydrocarbon-based, the tissue beta attenuation coefficient may be an appropri-
ate approximation in the exponential.
Table 13 Standard thickness of various beta attenuators (from [Cember2009])
Bq tps MeV J s
0.5 1.1 C 3
1 E 1.6 1013 3600 e 0.007
m Bq transform MeV h
D
J
kg kg . (53)
1.293 3 1
m Gy
Gy
2.45 1010 C E e 0.007
h
Note that Eq. (53) can be modified for attenuation though clothing by multiplying by an expo-
nential factor e-μ * t, where μ represents the beta-attenuation coefficient for the material and t
is the thickness of the material.
fi / t E i MeV / 1.6 106 erg / MeV 3.7 1010 dps / Ci 3600 s / h m1 , (54)
4 1 m kg / m3 87.7 erg / g / R
2
where
fi is the fraction of transformations that yield a photon with energy Ei
μ is the linear energy absorption coefficient for dry air at density 1.293 kg/m 3 (m-1).
Plane or volume
Point
Sv m 2
1.24 10 7 f i Ei . (57)
i MBq h
-4
2x10
Attenuation
-4
10
Interaction coefficient (cm )
-1
Absorption
-5 -1
3.5x10 cm
-5
10
-1 0 1
10 10 10
Energy (MeV)
Figure 48 Linear interaction coefficients for dry air
Use of the specific gamma constant (Γ) to determine dose equivalent rate from a point source is
straightforward, as shown in Eq. (58):
A R or Sv
H p 2 wr , (58)
d h
where
H p is the dose equivalent rate (Rem or Sv per hour, depending upon which form of Γ is
used) at point p (distance d away from the source)
A is the source activity (Ci or MBq, depending upon which form of Γ is used)
d is the distance from source to receptor (m)
wr is the radiation weighting factor (=1 for gamma rays).
l=l1+l2
dl
l1 l2
d1 h d2
l12 + h2=d12 l22 + h2=d22
θ
p
Figure 49 Line-source geometry
For a linear concentration of radioactivity C i (Ci/m or MBq/m), the dose rate at point p can be
expressed as a function of the point source-specific gamma constant as defined in Section
5.1.2.1, using Eq. (59):
Cl 1 l1 l
H p tan tan 1 2
h h h
or , (59)
Cl
H p
h
where
H p is the dose rate (R/h or Sv/h, consistent with Γ)
l1, l2, and h are defined in Figure 49 (m)
θ is the opening angle (radians)
Γ is the specific gamma constant for a point source (conventional or SI units)
Ci is the linear activity (Ci m-1 or MBq m-1, consistent with Γ).
dr
r
p
r 2 h2
H p Ca ln 2 , (60)
h
where
H p is the dose rate (R/h or Sv/h, consistent with Γ)
r and h are defined in Figure 50 (m)
Γ is the specific gamma constant for a point source (conventional or SI units)
Ca is the areal activity (Ci m-2 or MBq m-2, consistent with Γ).
r
p
x
dx
h
Figure 51 Volume-source geometry
For a uniform volume concentration of radioactivity Cv (Ci m-3 or MBq m-3), the dose rate at
point p can be expressed as a function of the point source-specific gamma constant as defined
in Section 5.1.2.1, using Eq. (61):
r 2 h2
H p
Cv
1 e t
ln 2 , (61)
h
where
H p is the dose rate (R/h or Sv/h, consistent with Γ)
r, t, and h are defined in Figure 51 (m)
Γ is the specific gamma constant for a point source (conventional or SI units)
Cv is the volume activity (Ci m-3 or MBq m-3, consistent with Γ)
μ is the linear absorption coefficient of the volume source material (cm-1).
It is possible to extend this volume treatment to other simple geometries in a similar manner.
5.1.3 Neutrons
Neutrons can be classified in a variety of ways. The most common way to classify neutrons is by
kinetic energy. Thermal neutrons and neutrons in thermal equilibrium with their environment
are distributed according to a Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. Their most probable energy is
0.025 eV at 20°C. At higher energies from 0.01–0.1 MeV, neutrons may be classified as slow,
intermediate, or resonance. Fast neutrons have energies from a few MeV up to approximately
20 MeV, and relativistic neutrons have still higher energies. Neutrons are uncharged (neutral)
like photons and can travel appreciable distances without interacting. Neutrons are attenuated
exponentially under good geometry and do not interact appreciably with electron fields.
Neutrons collide with atomic nuclei in elastic and inelastic collisions. With elastic collisions, the
total energy is conserved, and the energy lost by the neutron is equal to the total energy of
recoil of the nucleus. With inelastic collisions, the nucleus absorbs some of the energy and is
left in an excited state, which upon de-excitation can yield neutrons, gammas, and light ions.
Fast neutrons undergo a series of primarily elastic scattering reactions, being slowed down in a
process called moderation. As neutron energy decreases, scattering continues, but the proba-
bility of capture by another nucleus increases. If the neutron reaches thermal energies, it will
randomly move around until absorbed by a nucleus.
Besides the interactions presented in Table 14, neutron activation of materials can also be a
significant source of gamma dose in nuclear plants. Neutron activation is the production of a
radioactive isotope by absorption of a neutron and is governed by Eq. (62):
dN
n N
dt
or , (62)
N n 1 e t
A
where
A is the activity of the radioisotope produced through neutron activation (Bq)
is the neutron flux (n cm-2 s-1)
is the activation cross section (cm2)
is the decay constant of the produced isotope (s-1)
N is the number of produced atoms
n is the number of target atoms.
Although the radioisotopes produced are generally a gamma radiation hazard, activation is an
important reaction with respect to this source of gamma (or beta) dose.
( E ) E Ni i fi
Gy
Dn E i
1
J
Gy s , (63)
kg
where
(E) is the fast neutron flux (n cm-2s-1)
E is the neutron energy (Joules; 1.6E-19 Joules per eV)
Ni is the number of atoms per kg for the ith material element
i is the scattering cross section (cm2) for the ith material element
fi is the fractional energy transferred from neutrons for the ith material element, given
2M i
by f i , where Mi is the atomic mass of the ith material element. fi
( M i 1) 2
represents the average fraction of neutron energy transferred in an elastic colli-
sion assuming isotropic scattering.
The fast neutron dose can be calculated as a function of different energy groups (corresponding
to the neutron energy spectrum) to determine the total fast neutron dose.
II. Thermal neutrons
The most important specific thermal neutron reactions for tissue dosimetry (hydrogen and
carbon) are described below.
Hydrogen capture - 1H(n,)2H
This is an example of a radiative capture process. The neutron is absorbed, followed by imme-
diate emission of a gamma photon, 01n 11H 12 H 00 , with photon energy 2.22 MeV. This
reaction is of significance when tissue is exposed to thermal neutrons. This reaction yields a
uniformly distributed gamma-emitting radioisotope, and therefore initially one must solve for
the specific activity (As) of this source using Eq. (64)
Bq
As N H H , (64)
kg
where
is the thermal neutron flux (n cm-2s-1)
(e) Contamination, in liquid or aerosol form, due to fission and activation products that be-
come inadvertently uncontained (which also may pose a significant external beta hazard
and internal alpha/beta hazard if inhaled).
The possible sources of the radiation that may contribute to external radiation dose while a
CANDU reactor is operating are depicted in Figure 52. The simplified drawing depicts the
biological shield (this shield also encompasses the thermal shield and reflector region), the core
(where the fission reaction takes place), and the primary heat transport (PHT) system that
circulates the hot pressurized water directly to the steam generators. The reactor operates as a
“closed primary circuit”, and therefore radioisotopes generated as a result of fission, activation,
or other nuclear processes may be circulating in the primary heat transport (PHT) system. The
primary circuit is physically separated from the secondary steam-generation circuit at the steam
generators. In theory, there should be no sources that migrate from the primary to the second-
ary side in a CANDU, and therefore no radioactivity at the turbines. Referring to Figure 52, the
potential sources may be described as follows (after [Goldstein1962]):
Prompt fission neutrons – emitted within first few μs after fission
Delayed fission neutrons – emitted from excited nuclei up to a few minutes after fission
Activation neutrons – emitted from nuclear reaction products
Photoneutrons – produced through threshold (γ,n) reactions
Prompt-fission gammas – emitted in coincidence with fission (< μs)
Short-period fission gammas – emitted by fission products within a few minutes (~10 min)
after fission
Long-period fission gammas - emitted by fission products after ~10 minutes
Capture gammas – emitted in (n,γ) reactions
Inelastic-scatter gammas – emitted from excited nuclei after neutron inelastic scattering
Reaction-product gammas – emitted from products of charged-particle reactions induced
by neutrons
Activation-product gammas – emitted from radioactive products of nuclear reactions
Annihilation photons – emitted from positron annihilation due to certain activation or
fission products
Bremsstrahlung photons – emitted from decay electrons (beta particles) slowing down in
material.
Note that not all the listed sources are of equal importance, and often their importance is
dictated by their physical location in the reactor with respect to receptors (workers). In addi-
tion, the importance of sources is affected by the state of the reactor. On shutdown, some of
the sources disappear, and the relative importance of the remaining sources changes. There is
residual fission power in a CANDU core after shutdown, and therefore there are still prompt
fission gammas and neutrons, as well as capture gammas produced in the core. However, they
are produced at levels several orders of magnitude lower than during operation. Possible
external radiation sources ~10 minutes after shutdown are depicted in Figure 53.
Biological Shield
Neutrons
Photoneutrons
Core Secondary
Core side
Gamma rays
Capture Neutrons Gamma rays
Inelastic Prompt fission Prompt fission
Reaction Short period fission
Activation Capture
Annihilation Inelastic
Biological Shield
Neutrons
Photoneutrons
Core Secondary
Core side
Gamma rays
Activation Neutrons Gamma rays
Photoneutrons Long period fission
Activation
PHT
Gamma rays
Long period fission
Activation
Neutrons Bremsstrahlung
Photoneutrons Annihilation
Some examples of external hazards in a nuclear reactor environment include (but are not
limited to) the following:
Mixed neutron/gamma fields from normal operation (under power or shut down) at various
locations around the reactor
Contaminated coolant in a pipe (circulating or uncirculating)
Contaminated resin columns
Fission or activation products that have lodged or attached somewhere unexpectedly in a
piping system
Leakage from a contaminated water system
Outage activities that may involve opening piping or pump systems, welding and grinding
activities on potentially contaminated systems, etc.
Protection against these external hazards includes proper work planning (discussed in Section
7) along with use of the ALARA principle and shielding (discussed in Section 5.3).
surface area 4 r 2
r
2r
3r
radiation intensity, this demonstrates that dramatic decreases in dose can be achieved with
moderate changes in distance from the source, particularly close to the source.
As discussed earlier, shielding is the act of placing a material between the source of radiation
and the receptor, which has the effect of reducing the amount of radiation impinging on the
receptor. In radiation protection, shielding is often called biological shielding because its
primary purpose is to reduce the biological dose to humans. As such, shielding materials are
critically important to the effectiveness of shields. The following sections consider shielding for
gamma and neutron radiation.
I I 0e x , (66)
where
I is the intensity of the radiation after passing through the shield (fluence, flux, or dose
units)
Io is the intensity of the radiation before passing through the shield (same units as I)
μ is the linear attenuation coefficient for that material (cm -1)
x is the thickness of the shield (cm).
Taking into account both the distance from the source and receptor and the influence of the
shielding material, the intensity at a point r units away from a source shielded by a thickness x
of material is given by Eq. (67):
I 0e x
I . (67)
4 r 2
The physical conditions that describe this type of attenuation are that (i) the radiation is a
narrow beam interacting with the shield and (ii) the shield is thin with respect to the mean free
path (1/μ) of the gamma radiation in the shield. This scenario is depicted in Figure 56. In this
case, the radiation, depicted by the dashed lines, scatters away from the receptor.
I0
x
I 0e x
4 r 2
Figure 56 Narrow-beam or thin-shield attenuation
5.3.1.1 Buildup
Although approximation of Eq. (66). may be valid in some cases, there are a number of situa-
tions in which the radiation source may be considered a broad beam with respect to the shield
or the shield may be thick with respect to the mean free path of radiation in the shield. This
case is depicted in Figure 57. It has been observed that in this scenario, some of the radiation
that would have scattered away from the receptor actually scatters towards the receptor and
contributes additional intensity to the receptor location that is not predicted by Eq. (66). In this
case, a factor is used to modify the standard attenuation equation to account for the scattering.
This factor is known as the buildup factor (B) and is dimensionless. The intensity equation
therefore becomes Eq. (68):
I 0 Be x
I . (68)
4 r 2
r
I0 I 0 Be x
x
4 r 2
Figure 57 Broad-beam or thick-shield attenuation
The buildup factor is both a function of energy and the shield material (μx, denoted as the
optical length, relaxation length, or number of mean free paths) and is given as Eq. (69):
I 0 ( E , x) I s ( E , x) I ( E , x)
B( E , x) 1 s , (69)
I 0 ( E , x) I 0 ( E , x)
where
B is the buildup factor (dimensionless)
I0 is the non-collided intensity (fluence, dose, or dose rate) at the receptor
Is is the scattered (collided) radiation contribution at the receptor.
The buildup factor is the ratio of the radiation intensity, including both primary and scattered
radiation, at any point in a beam to the intensity of primary radiation only at that point. The
buildup factor accounts for scattering into an area due to poor (broad-beam) geometries and is
a function of shield material and shield thickness (x). Examining Eq. (69) leads to the conclusion
that B is always ≥ 1. Values for B have been experimentally determined; however, the bulk of
data available are from calculations, and many evaluations are presented in tables or in a
graphical format.
Two common ways of using the buildup factor for solving a shielding problem are: (i) knowing
the source and shield, calculate the intensity, and (ii) knowing the desired intensity at the
receptor point, determine the amount of shielding required.
Calculating intensity
The steps in calculating intensity (fluence, dose, or dose rate) are given as follows:
1. Look up B for:
Material of interest (e.g., lead, iron, etc.)
Energy of photons (e.g., 1 MeV)
Relaxation length of shield (μx) – Relaxation length is the thickness of shield ma-
terial that will attenuate a narrow beam to 1/e of its original value.
2. Solve equation: I=I0*B*e-ux for fluence, dose, or dose rate.
Calculating required shield thickness
The calculation of the thickness of a shield required for a given desired fluence, dose, or dose
rate is difficult because the equation must be solved simultaneously for two variables, B and x,
which can be solved for only by iteration. The steps in calculating the required shielding thick-
ness are the following:
1. Define the target exposure I (fluence, dose, dose rate)
2. Solve the narrow-beam equation I=I0*e-ux to obtain an initial shielding thickness x. This
thickness will be too small.
3. Add one half-value of thickness to x (μ = (ln 2) / x1/2 → x1/2 = (ln 2) / μ)
(new x) = (x + x1/2)
4. Look up B for material, energy, (new x)* μ.
5. Solve I=I0*B*e-ux with new values
Check: Is the calculated value of I close to the target I?
6. If the calculated I is still too large, then add another x 1/2 and recalculate (i.e., go to step
3).
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety – September 2014
98 The Essential CANDU
Note that the shield may be placed anywhere between the source and the receptor; however,
when the shield is placed closer to the source, it provides the greatest solid-angle protection to
the receptor. Tabulated buildup factors can be found in a number of sources including, for
example, through the American Nuclear Society [ANS1991] and in work by Shultis and Faw
[Shultis2000].
A number of numerical techniques can be used to perform gamma-radiation transport calcula-
tions suitable for use in shielding estimates, for example, point-kernel techniques, discrete-
ordinate techniques, and Monte Carlo simulation. The need for advanced gamma-shielding
approaches arises from requirements to simulate complex geometries, multilayer shields,
complex materials, complex source terms, and differing cross-section evaluations.
5.3.1.2 Materials
In general, there are three categories of shield materials: (1) natural materials, (2) construction
materials, and (3) special materials. Natural materials include air (insofar as it can be a scatter-
ing medium), water, and soil, and often shielding design involves making judicious use of these
natural materials. Construction materials are a very advantageous design material from an
optimization standpoint because they can serve two purposes, as structural and as shield
materials. Construction materials may include concrete, steel, wood, plasterboard, and glass.
Special materials for gamma shielding are generally high-atomic-number materials such as
steel, iron, lead, tungsten, and uranium. The usefulness of a shield for any given application is
related to the mass-attenuation coefficient (directly related to the interaction cross section)
and the mass density of the material as a function of the photon energy spectrum. A plot of the
interaction cross sections of photons in lead is provided in Figure 58. It can be seen that the
photoelectric effect is the dominant interaction at energies below approximately 0.2 MeV,
Compton scattering is competing or dominant between approximately 0.2 and 4 MeV, and pair
production dominates above 4 MeV (further discussion of photon interactions is provided in
Chapter 3).
6
10
Compton scatter
Photoelectric
5
10 Pair production
Cross section (b/atom)
4
10
3
10
2
10
1
10
0
10
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
10 10 10 10 10 10
Energy (MeV)
Photon total-interaction coefficients for uranium, lead, aluminum, and water are shown in
Figure 59. It can be seen that for high-Z materials such as uranium and lead, the interaction
mechanisms are very similar. For lower-Z materials such as aluminum and water, the interac-
tion coefficients are significantly lower at most energies. Note that the total interaction coeffi-
cients at moderate energies (0.5–3 MeV) are similar for all four materials and that therefore
their attenuating power comes primarily from their different mass densities because x
is the argument of the exponential function when μ is the linear attenuation coefficient.
4
10
Interaction coefficient (cm /g)
3
10
2
Uranium
Lead
2
10
1
10
Water
0
10 Aluminum
-1
10
-2
10
-3 -2 -1 0 1
10 10 10 10 10
Photon Energy (MeV)
Figure 59 Photon interaction coefficients
Taking all this into account, a simplified approach such as using buildup factors (similar to the
approach with photons) is not generally practical for neutron problems because [Shultis2000]:
Neutrons scatter much more than photons, thereby making B very large
There is a large buildup of low-energy neutrons because the absorption cross section (σa) is
small in the slowing-down energy region
B depends strongly on the
o Isotopic (material) composition of the shield
o Physical geometry of the shield
o Incident neutron-energy spectrum.
Due to the difficulties outlined above, the buildup-factor approach will not be developed for
neutrons. However, in addition to the above, because neutrons have radiation-weighting
factors that are energy-dependent, the difference between dose conversion factors (response
functions) for air kerma, ambient dose, and dose equivalent can be significant, as shown in
Figure 60. This can lead to significant differences in dose estimation.
3
10
Response function (pGy cm or pSv cm )
2
2
10
Effective equivalent (AP)
1
10
2
Deep dose
Ambient dose
0
10
Tissue KERMA
-1
10
Air KERMA
-2
10
-3
10
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Neutron Energy (MeV)
Figure 60 Response functions for neutrons
General considerations with respect to neutron shielding include:
For biological shields, fast neutrons are of most concern because thermal neutrons are
readily absorbed
Q (wR) varies with neutron energy and is greatest for 0.1 < E < 2 MeV
Materials with large σa are used to absorb thermal neutrons (e.g., Cd, In, B, Li). However,
one must consider the resulting capture gamma radiation
r S G r e r t
where
, (70)
rwater r
0.12 e
G r
4 r 2
where
φ is the fission (> 1 MeV) neutron flux at r (n cm-2 s-1)
S is the source emission rate (n s-1)
Σr is the macroscopic removal cross section for the shield material (cm -1)
Σrwater is the macroscopic removal cross section for water (0.103 cm -1)
t is the thickness of the shield (cm)
r is the distance of the water from source to receptor (cm).
The macroscopic removal cross section can be expressed as a function of the microscopic cross
section, as in Eq. (71):
r N r
or , for mixtures . (71)
r Ni ri
i
Macroscopic and microscopic cross sections for a variety of elements and mixtures are provided
in Table 15 (adapted from [Shultis2005]).
Aluminum 1.31
Hydrogen 1.00
Deuterium 0.92
Boron 1.07
Oxygen 0.92
Tungsten 3.36
Zirconium 2.36
Water 0.103
Paraffin 80.50
Concrete
0.089
(6% water)
An approximation for the removal cross section (where Σr = μr) in terms of μr/ρ is given by Eq.
(72):
r 1.3 0.294 cm
2
0.206 A Z . (72)
g
Functionally, the removal technique can be used to estimate the flux at the surface of a shield,
and then this flux can be used to estimate the flux at a position outside the shield. Knowing the
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety – September 2014
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety 103
fast neutron flux at a receptor point outside the shield, the dose rate can be estimated using
Eq. (63). Note that this is a simplified approximation, and a more complex analysis (such as the
Monte Carlo technique) is required to determine the intensity accurately.
5.4 Summary
External radioisotope hazards associated with CANDU reactors include hazards directly associ-
ated with the nuclear chain reaction (neutron and gamma fields) or indirectly associated as is
the case with fission products from fuel (whether intact or defective) and activation products
(whether fixed or mobile). Dosimetry can be accomplished from first principles using source
activity and geometry or by using dose-conversion factors and fluence measurements.
External hazards in CANDU reactors involve gamma, neutron, and beta fields, and protection of
the worker from external hazards is accomplished by adhering to the principles of “as low as
reasonably achievable” dose and the concepts of maximum shielding (of source), maximum
distance (from source), and minimum time (around source) for any given work function.
3. Transfer of contamination to
food product, or hand-to-face
4a. Intake of directly
contamination from food
5. Uptake into blood product or orofacial 2b. If wound,
and GI tract contamination transfer into blood
2a. Transfer of
contamination to hands
1. Contamination
The dominant intake regimes related to transport through the body to excretion are outlined in
Figure 63. This is a simple representation of what is called a compartmental model. Dosimetry
can be accomplished by solving mathematically for the transport, deposition, and excretion of
radioisotopes through “compartments” in the body. Most internal-dosimetry computer codes
perform this type of calculation (for example, see [IMBA2010]). Compartmental modelling of
internal dose is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Inhalation into the respiratory system can be subdivided into three regions: (i) nasal-pharyngeal
(inhalable), (ii) tracheal-bronchial (thoracic), and (iii) pulmonary (respirable, or deep lung).
Particle deposition takes place in the three regions with an efficiency based on particle diame-
ter. Generally speaking, particles from submicron to ten microns are considered respirable,
whereas larger particles deposit in the upper airway regions. Although upper-airway deposition
can lead to dose, the respirable fraction is of primary significance for internal dosimetry.
Inhalation leads to deposition in one of the three regions of the respiratory tract, and if depos-
ited in the deep lung, particles can be absorbed into the blood for transport to target organ(s).
Inhalation can also lead to a fraction being removed mechanically (by coughing, etc.) from the
respiratory tract into the GI tract, where it may be treated as an ingestion and similarly ab-
sorbed into the blood for distribution to other organs before excretion. Excretion may occur
through urine, feces, sputum, sweat, tears, etc.; however, the dominant modes of biological
excretion are through urine or feces. Before radioisotopes are excreted, they will deposit
energy in the target tissue(s). The deposition of this energy into a mass of tissue is the defini-
tion of absorbed dose.
Extracellular
Uptake By
Fluid
Organ,
Deposition In
Tissue
Inhalation Ingestion
Respiratory
Tract Mechanical
Removal G-I
Tract
Absorption Absorption
Blood
(Cumulative Uptake)
Other Organs
Biological Removal
Figure 63 Intake to excretion pathways
The computation of internal dose requires three (3) critical pieces of information:
1. Rate of dose deposition (dose rate in tissue)
2. Elimination of radioactivity from tissue (decay and removal)
3. Total dose “committed” to tissue (committed dose).
In addition, simplified approximations can be made for short-range (high linear energy transfer)
particles such as alpha and beta radiation, compared to most penetrating (low linear energy
transfer) X- and gamma radiation. These approaches will be developed in Sections 6.1.1 and
6.1.2.
Using Eq. (74) as a basis, the estimated dose rate at some time t after intake of a radioisotope is
given by Eq. (76):
0.693
- ×t
=D
D e -λ e t e
=D TE
. (76)
t α/β α/β
Finally, the dose may be determined by integrating over time as in Eq. (77):
t
e-λ E t dt
D=D 0
, (77)
1- e
D α/β -λ E t
=
λE
where D is the dose (Gy), D / is the instantaneous dose rate at time=0 (Gy/d), and E is in
units of d-1 (any time base will work as long as the dose rate and the effective elimination
constant have the same base unit). For long times (on the order of seven half-lives or more),
the dose approximation becomes Eq. (78):
D α/β
D= (Gy) . (78)
λE
For regulatory purposes, t = 50 years is normally used for a committed dose, and the absorbed
dose (or dose rate) can be converted to equivalent and effective quantities using the appropri-
ate weighting factors.
words, the absorbed dose cannot be calculated by assuming the tissue or organ to be infinitely
large because gammas are highly penetrating (unlike alphas or betas). Therefore, only a fraction
of the energy carried by photons originating in the tissue containing the radioisotope will be
absorbed within that tissue. Therefore, an alternative approach to that used for charged
particles is required. For this scenario, the following parameters must be considered in the
calculation of absorbed dose:
Energy per decay
Total activity
Mass of tissue or organ (target)
Fraction of energy emitted which is absorbed in the target
absorbed fraction, φ
o φ = (Energy absorbed by target)/(energy emitted by source)
o φ = 1 for both alpha and beta particles (therefore, this approach will also work
for these particles).
The concept of absorbed fraction is illustrated in Figure 64. The absorbed fraction can be
ΔE
calculated as = .
E in
Φ=
φ
m
kg .
-1
(79)
Specific absorbed fractions are computed using mathematical phantom calculations (Monte
Carlo simulations) and are tabulated as a function of target organ and photon energy for
sources in various tissues [MIRD1978]. The generic equation for calculating absorbed dose rate
using the absorbed fraction concept is given by Eq. (80):
k A n i E ii
=
D i
, (80)
m
where
D is the absorbed dose rate (Rad/s or Gy/s)
A is the activity in the source organ (Ci or Bq)
ni is the yield of particles at energy E emitted per disintegration (also denoted as fi or Yi)
E is the average energy per disintegration (MeV per transform)
φi is the absorbed fraction
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety – September 2014
110 The Essential CANDU
A A t dt A 0 e E t dt As 0 ,
(81)
0 s s 0 E
where As(0) is the activity in the source organ at time = 0. The units of A are activity-time (for
example, Ci-h or Bq-s, etc.). The total dose is then given by:
kA i ii
n E
i
D= . (82)
m
To calculate total dose in the body, consideration must be given to the source (S) and the target
(T). The absorbed fractions are usually denoted as T S , and if there are multiple sources
or targets, this approach can be extended to sum all contributions. For example, for multiple
sources (S=1,2,…) contributing to a single target (T=1) of interest, the total-dose equation
becomes:
6.2.1 Tritium
Tritium is an isotope of hydrogen with one proton and two neutrons. Tritium may be denoted
as 3H, H-3, or T for short. A tritium nucleus decays by emitting a single beta particle with a half-
life of 12.3 years. The maximum beta energy is 18 keV (average beta energy ~ 5.6 keV). Tritium
can contribute a large portion of the committed dose in a CANDU reactor and has been respon-
sible for 30% to 40% of the radiation dose received by nuclear station staff in the past [Burn-
ham1992]. Tritium, when taken into the body, distributes itself homogeneously throughout the
entire body.
Because a beta particle requires at least 70 keV to be able to penetrate the dead surface layer
of the skin, tritium is not a significant external hazard; however, it can be a significant internal
hazard in large quantities. Tritium is produced through neutron absorption in deuterium (
1
n 2 H 3H ), which is abundant in the moderator and the primary heat-transport (PHT)
system of a CANDU reactor core. When neutrons irradiate heavy water (D2O), some of the
deuterium atoms (D) in the D2O absorb neutrons to become tritium atoms (T) and generate
TDO (tritiated heavy water). T2O will also be produced, but in insignificant amounts.
In the case of heavy water that spends many years in the reactor core (for example, moderator
water), after a few years, the tritium content of the D 2O can be on the order of several TBq 3H
per kg D2O. For heavy water that spends most of its time outside the reactor core, for example,
the primary heat-transport system water, after a few years, the tritium content of the D2O can
be on the order of a few hundred GBq 3H per kg D2O. A moderator leak can produce significant
committed dose rates if unprotected. For example, for 2 TBq/kg of moderator water that leaks
into the vault, an upper estimate of the committed dose rate is approximately 3 Sv/h, or 50
mSv/m [Burnham1992]. Workers around the moderator system must therefore be aware of the
enormous tritium risk that can exist there if D 2O leaks are present, and therefore evaluation of
the concentration of tritium in air is required before entry. People working with moderator
water or performing maintenance on moderator D 2O systems must wear water-resistant
(plastic) suits and breathe supplied air.
Because the PHT system operates at high temperature and pressure (300°C / 10 MPa), leaks are
inevitable in a CANDU reactor. Each fuelling machine also spills about 1 L of D 2O during each
channel visit, the result being that the atmosphere of the fuelling-machine vaults and the boiler
room can be expected to have levels of tritiated water vapour up to 50 Sv/h under normal
conditions [Burnham1992]. Design improvements to the fuelling-machine (FM) snout assembly
to catch D2O that escapes during re-fuelling operations have been made to reduce tritium-in-air
levels in the FM vaults and boiler room [Aydogdu2013]. Any spill or leak of water in any of the
CANDU reactor water-handling systems should be assumed to be radioactive, and workers
must be aware that high localized levels of exposure may be possible.
Due to the relatively long half-life of tritium, it should be noted that the risk is present whether
or not the reactor is on power and remains for a long time after shutdown.
6.2.2 Radio-iodines
Several radioactive isotopes of iodine (I-131, -132, -133, -134, -135) are produced in the fuel as
fission products. These are volatile and can easily escape from defective fuel. All radioiodines
decay by beta emission with associated gamma emission. Radioiodine is routinely expected to
be circulating in the PHT system, and therefore any leakage from the PHT system gives rise to
an airborne radioiodine hazard. Radioiodines, when taken into the body, migrate rapidly to, and
are taken up by, the thyroid.
Radio-iodines can exist as elemental iodine (I2 molecules), as organic iodine (frequently as
methyl iodide (CH3I) from ion-exchange resins in the PHT purification circuits), and as volatile
hypoiodous acid (HOI). If a leak of PHT steam occurs, the radioiodines enter the air and are
picked up by dust particles to exist in particulate form [Burnham1992].
Both tritium and radio-iodines are produced when the reactor operates, and production of both
stops when the reactor shuts down. However the radio-iodines, with half-lives on the order of
hours to days, decay away over a period of weeks, whereas the tritium does not. Therefore, the
radio-iodines are a transient hazard, whereas the tritium is a persistent hazard in a CANDU
reactor. There are gaseous fission-product and delayed-neutron monitoring systems in CANDU
reactors to detect and locate failed fuel promptly. The FM can then remove the failed fuel from
the channel to reduce radio-iodine levels in the coolant. The heavy-water purification system
also removes radio-iodines from the coolant. Note that the fuel-failure rate in CANDU reactors
is low (<< 0.1%), and therefore, out of approximately 5000 bundles discharged from the core
annually, only a few bundles have a single fuel-element defect [Aydogdu2013].
6.2.3 Particulates
Radioactive particulates can be present in CANDU reactors as (i) fission products, (ii) activation
products, or (iii) other radioactive volatiles attached to dust particles. Radiation hazard from
particulates arises when airborne particulates are inhaled or when “hot” particles come into
close proximity to or contact with tissue. There are two general categories of particulates:
short-lived and long-lived.
Short-lived particulates, principally fission-product noble gas progeny 88Rb and 138Cs, are not a
significant internal hazard due to their short half-lives (18 and 32 min respectively [Burn-
ham1992]).
Long-lived particulates such as 141,144Ce, 140Ba, 140La, 134,137Cs, 131I, 103,106Ru, 95Zr/95Nb, 90Sr, 65Zn,
60
Co, 59Fe, 54Mn, 51Cr, and 14C are all beta emitters, and most also emit gamma radiation. These
particulates may be found at various locations in a CANDU reactor, essentially anywhere that a
leak can occur or maintenance is being done.
6.2.4 Carbon-14
Carbon-14 decays through beta emission with a maximum energy of 156 keV (average ~50 keV)
and has a 5730-year half-life. Carbon-14 is generated in CANDU reactors by three processes:
1
n 17O 14C moderator and PHT water
1
n 14 N 14C p air
1
n 13C 14C .
About 1985, during a pressure-tube change outage at the Pickering NGS, 14C was found to be
widely distributed within the plant. Because of the large volume of moderator (and therefore
relatively large quantity of 17O), generation of 14C in CANDU reactors is about an order of
magnitude greater than in other pressurized-water reactors. 14C was also generated in large
quantities from 14N in the N2-filled annulus gas spaces of the pre-1985 Pickering A reactors and
is also formed in CANDU reactors whenever there is air in-leakage into the core (for example,
from the flux detectors). Carbon-14 was primarily a problem in the Pickering A Unit 1 & 2
CANDU station due to the annulus-filling gas and the lack of awareness of the extent of the
condition. 14C particulates were released when pressure tubes were replaced at Pickering A in
the 1980s and is still present as residuals in the annulus space and in waste from the pressure-
tube refurbishment. Although 14C is always present in CANDU reactors, it is less of a hazard in
other CANDU reactors than in Pickering A. Since the annulus gas was changed from N 2 to CO2 in
the Pickering A reactors, 14C formation in the annulus gas has been reduced significantly. The
production of 14C in the calandria vault air applies to the Pickering A reactors because the vault
atmosphere is air. The calandria is inside a water-filled tank in Bruce A, B, and Darlington
reactors and inside a water-filled concrete vault in CANDU 6 and Pickering B reactors [Ay-
dogdu2013]. Note, however, that due to its long half-life, 14C can be a persistent problem for
operation, shutdown, and subsequent decommissioning and disposal activities.
contaminants by movement of the entire air mass into, around, and out of the workplace
[ANSI2007], and (2) local exhaust ventilation (LEV) by systems that remove air at the point
where the hazard is generated [ANSI2006,2003] [CSA2004]. The selection of a given ventilation
solution depends upon multiple factors. General guidance principles are the following: GEV for
non-toxic contaminants, multiple sources, widely distributed sources, and non-contaminated
dilution air; LEV for moderately to highly toxic contaminants, one or a few sources, and when
there is risk of direct worker exposure. Nuclear facilities use combinations of GEV and LEV with
highly monitored and filtered air discharge systems.
For example, the worker depicted in Figure 65 is wearing P100 toxic-particulate cartridges on a
half-face air-purifying respirator. The P100 is the most common filter type for work in low-level-
contaminated particulate environments. In many environments found in CANDU plants, the
contamination is in the form of contaminated water, aerosols, or vapour, and therefore atmos-
phere-supplying respirators would be required. Air-line supply may be preferable when work
will take longer than an SCBA tank full of air will allow, or when complete body coverage is
required (such as might be the case in a tritiated water-vapour environment). SCBA may be
preferable when increased mobility of the worker is required or when a higher inhalation
protection factor is needed. As previously stated, the choice of respirator solution must fit the
objectives of the task.
In addition to personal protective gear, another strategy for protection from radio-iodine is to
use a thyroid blocker in the form of stable iodine (potassium iodide (KI)). The mechanism of KI is
to saturate the thyroid with non-radioactive iodine so that when radioiodine is inhaled, it will
be rejected by the thyroid and excreted, primarily through urine. The use of KI is not recom-
mended for routine operations and is therefore only a strategy for emergency response.
Charcoal-based cartridges for air-purifying respirators provide radioiodine protection in the
absence of atmosphere-supplying respirators.
6.4 Summary
A variety of internal radioisotope hazards are associated with CANDU reactors. Dosimetry
methods are well established, either using dose conversion factors on activity estimates (de-
termined from bioassay measurements) or from first principles and compartmental models.
Internal hazards in CANDU reactors involve alpha, beta, and gamma emitters and include 3H
(the principal internal hazard), 14C, radio-iodines, and particulates that can be present from
leaks of fission products (defective fuel) and activation products (directly or through corrosion).
Protection of the worker from internal hazards is accomplished by ventilation systems with
filter trains, heavy-water vapour-recovery systems, atmospheric separation and access control
features, control of sources of contamination, and judicious selection of personal protective
equipment. Respiratory protection can afford a worker a significant protection factor when
used appropriately.
The detection of radiation fields or potential contamination is facilitated by air monitors, area
monitors, portal monitors, and hand-held instrument readings. The principal personal expo-
sures in CANDU stations being monitored for are:
External dose – thermo-luminescent dosimetry (TLD)
o Whole-body gamma (deep and shallow)
o Whole-body neutron (could be from instrument reading instead)
Extremity dose – extremity pack or finger (ring) TLD
o typically for near-field and contact beta/gamma exposures
Internal dose - bioassay
o Tritium
o Other (14C).
The results of dosimetry estimates at any given time can be used to optimize worker exposure
to ALARA levels, or if needed, to remove a worker from further exposure. Yearly reports are
provided to NEWs which show their historical dose of record, dose received every year during
employment, quarterly dose in the past year, and lifetime occupational dose. These data are
maintained locally and are available through the National Dose Registry [NDR2013] upon
request.
7.2.2 Zoning
In addition to categorization of workers, CANDU plants are also categorized by location and
potential for radioactive contamination. Although any given CANDU station may have its own
zone categories, a typical scheme is presented below [Burnham1992].
Unzoned – areas with absolutely no contamination, generally not within the boundary of a
reactor, but within the station boundary (for example, a switchyard).
Zone 1 – clean areas where absolutely no contamination is permitted; no radiation training
is required to be in these areas (for example, administrative offices).
Zone 2 – areas that contain no radioactive systems and are normally free of contamination
(although the potential exists for contamination due to ventilation and personnel traffic (for
example, a turbine hall).
Zone 3 – areas that contain radioactive systems that may act as sources of contamination
(for example, a reactor building).
Contamination monitoring stations must be used before crossing the boundary from Zone 3 to
Zone 2 or from Zone 2 to Zone 1. A two-zone system is to be introduced in new CANDU reac-
tors: a radiation-controlled area (RCA) and non-RCA spaces [Aydogdu2013]. Zone 3 becomes
RCA, and Zones 1 and 2 become non-RCA areas. Work plans must take zoning into account
because this impacts the level of qualification required for workers and the PPE or dosimetry
that will be assigned.
operations. The relative relationships, with four different measurement cases, can be seen in
Figure 66.
regulatory limit
detection limit
background
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 66 Relationship between background, action level, detection limit, and regulatory limit
In Case 1, the measurement lies at the background level and therefore is considered back-
ground. Note that a measurement cannot, by definition, be less than background, although the
background level may vary from one place to another. In Case 2, the measurement lies be-
tween the background level and the detection limit of the instrument. In this case, with a given
confidence, the measurement is below the detection limit of the contamination-survey instru-
ment, and generally no further action is taken. In Case 3, the measurement lies above the
detection limit, and radiation has been positively detected with a selected confidence level.
This measurement is useful for identifying the presence of radioactive material and may assist
in decontamination. In Case 4, the reading has exceeded an action level (as put in place by the
station operator), and generally decontamination may be required to mitigate the hazard
(although it is not strictly required by the regulations). The location of the detection limit and
the action level may be exchanged. In Case 5, the measurement lies above the regulatory limit.
In this case, decontamination procedures must be carried out to bring the levels of measured
radioactivity to levels below the regulatory limit and as low as reasonably achievable (typically
below the action level).
spent (or used) fuel. This material is not really waste as such because there is a strong possibil-
ity of reuse (or reprocessing) of the fuel in the future. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s
philosophy for long-term storage is that future generations should be afforded the same degree
of protection as the current population. Spent nuclear fuel will not be considered further in this
chapter.
There are two general approaches to radioactive waste management [IAEA1995]:
1. Dilute and disperse
a. Aerosol: discharge as gases or other fine particulates
b. Liquid: discharge into marine or fresh-water environments
2. Concentrate and contain
a. Solid: storage (delay and decay).
Dilution and dispersion occur routinely under the CNSC license conditions for the CANDU
operator. Solid-waste management may be considered in three practical categories for CANDU
operations: (i) sources (which may include activated materials or “hot” particles, (ii) loose
contamination, and (iii) tritium waste, as discussed in the next subsection.
7.4.1.2 Sources
Sources, including fixed surface contamination, will normally be collected by removing the
entire item to solid-waste storage. Efforts to remove sources of radioactive material from the
equipment or item to which they belong (such as removing a hot particle from a section of
pipe) may not be undertaken depending on the hazard analysis. Measures to ensure the
integrity of the source or fixed contamination must be implemented to prevent the spread of
contamination while the material is being moved.
Removable tritium – tritium near the surface that is easily removed by light washing.
Fixed tritium – located deep within the surface of the material and not amenable to surface
decontamination techniques; and
Transferable tritium – tritium that is near the surface and acts as a reservoir of tritium to
replenish the removable tritium if that layer is significantly diluted.
Accordingly, decontamination only of the removable layer will likely result in reappearance of
the tritium after a short time (less than one month) as removable tritium. Repetitive decon-
tamination of the surface layer will eventually reduce the inventory and hence the eventual
level of removable tritium on a surface.
The most commonly used methods for tritium decontamination are washing, vacuuming,
purging, thermal desorption, and isotopic exchange by adding water or hydrogen gas in the
purge gas. These are generally adequate, but are time-consuming. More sophisticated tech-
niques such as chemical or electrochemical etching and plasma can potentially provide high
decontamination factors. Baking of the tritium in a contaminated surface is an alternate
method for decontamination, but is not normally used.
Tritium contamination of walls and floors, particularly concrete, poses a chronic outgassing
problem. Concrete decontamination is very difficult and slow. Covering the surfaces with non-
porous covers may be an alternative approach to decontamination. Walls inside a CANDU
reactor building are painted with reinforced epoxy-resin paint for ease of decontamination and
to reduce tritium contamination.
7.6 Summary
Radiation-protection program management for CANDU operations is essential for both person-
nel safety and reactor safety functions. The health physics office will be involved in or responsi-
ble for various management aspects including licensing, training, personnel monitoring and
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety – September 2014
124 The Essential CANDU
bioassay, work planning and review, surveys and equipment maintenance, inventory control,
waste management, emergency preparedness, quality assurance, and audits. Well-defined and
well-executed management plans at CANDU plants ensure that the stations operate in the most
safe and reliable configuration possible.
ing release pathways leading to humans; those humans likely to be most exposed because of
specific habits (one or more critical groups); sample types in these pathways; and collection
frequency of these sample types. Usually, collection frequency and sample type are based on
analyzing those samples that are most likely to provide evidence of specific radionuclides that
would be indicative of releases from the facility into the environment. There are constraints on
detection because of dispersion (dilution) from the point of release. In most airborne pathways,
a dispersion factor of about one million is applied up to the first kilometre. In water effluents,
the dispersion factor is a function of cooling-water flow and tidal mixing and may range from a
factor of ten to thousands. In addition, radionuclides dispersed into the environment may
become concentrated into various biota, making their detection relatively simple. For example,
many marine biota concentrate various metals (including radioisotopes of those metals) from
seawater. Much of this information is summarized in Canadian Standards Association document
N288.4-10, which defines the desirable features of an environmental radiation-monitoring
program, and to which Canadian nuclear utilities generally conform.
Table 19 indicates some significant sampling media and their approximate frequency of collec-
tion in the two major pathways (air and water) by the various provinces, all of which operate
CANDU nuclear reactors. The most significant data outside plant boundaries are obtained from
samples gathered close to the point of emission in each of the two major pathways (air and
water). The air pathway leads the most directly to humans. Air is monitored by means of
continuous sampling for airborne radiation particulates, radioiodines, noble gases, tritium, and
carbon-14. Sampling is continuous, and measurements by the GEM of 131I, noble gases, and
particulate emissions are also continuous, but measurements of tritium and 14C releases are
not; tritium cartridges and 14C samples are taken to the laboratory for tritium and 14C meas-
urements on a regular basis (daily or weekly). Samples which are not amenable to continuous
collection (soils, vegetation, vegetables, fruits, milk, and potable water) are taken as grab
samples on a monthly or quarterly basis or as the season permits. The effectiveness of air-
pathway monitoring relies upon continuous and repetitive sampling of the given media. In the
liquid effluent pathway, the primary sample is the water itself. For water which is not used for
human consumption, such as seawater, grab samples may be taken quarterly from several
locations. In the case of potable lake water from which communities draw their drinking water,
for example, water from Lakes Ontario and Huron, daily samples (sometimes several samples
per day) may be taken, primarily to monitor for tritium. Less frequently, samples of raw lake
water, fish, aquatic plants and sediments may be collected, usually on a quarterly (or less
frequent) basis.
Air pathway samples Air particulates (m) Air particulates (m) Air particulates
(continuous sampling) (m)
Water pathway sam- Seawater (q) Lake water (y) River water (m)
ples
Mud (q) Aquaculture fish (m) Sediment (q)
Other Rain water (m) Rain water (m) Rain water (m)
TLD (c ) TLD (c )
products. Selection of key indicator radionuclides (e.g., 131I, 137Cs, 95Zr, 95Nb, 144Ce, 59Fe, 54Mn,
60
Co, etc.) for analysis is sufficient to define whether or not such leakage can be detected and
avoids the need to address unusual and difficult-to-analyze radionuclides such as 90Sr (which is
a pure beta emitter and is more difficult to identify). If the indicator nuclides are not detected,
then it can be assumed that an isotope such as 90Sr is unlikely to be present.
Table 20 Some key fission and activation radionuclides expected from a reactor release
8.1.3.1 Modelling
A formal pathways analysis model is required to determine the significant pathways and the
types of samples and measurements required for all locations around the source of release. In
addition, baseline meteorological data showing long-term weather patterns, especially with
respect to prevailing wind directions at different seasons, may or may not indicate that a
specific geographical direction should be emphasized for sample collection at each site.
8.1.3.2 Pathways
In pathways analysis, environmental components are analyzed to determine:
ability to accumulate environmental contaminants;
relative residence time of contaminants in the medium;
importance as a food source to humans; and
suitability for inclusion in a radiation monitoring program.
A generalized environmental transfer model is depicted in Figure 67.
Immersion
Inhalation
Ingestion
Atmosphere Forage and Crops
(b) (d)
Ingestion
Animal Produce
(e)
Source Dose
(a) (f)
Ingestion
Aquatic Animals
(c)
Ingestion
Aquatic Plants
Sea Water (c)
(b)
Sediment External
(c)
Immersion
8.1.3.4 Seasonality
Time of year (for release and sampling) can have a significant impact on the way in which
radionuclides move through the environment, particularly in their use in the various food
chains. Although this feature is generally not a primary consideration when performing emer-
gency environmental analysis, it can be extremely important for establishing baseline levels of
radionuclides in the environment.
o Guard dogs
o Hunters.
Is the sampling team prepared personally to be out-of-doors?
o Anti-allergens (EpiPens®)
o Appropriate footwear
o Appropriate clothing for time of year, terrain, and weather.
The above is not an exhaustive list, but provides examples of some of the considerations
required to ensure safe environmental sampling.
public dose as well (see, for example, [OPG2012]). However, as was previously discussed, the
dose attributable to these radionuclides is approximately 1 μSv/y, which is an extremely small
fraction of the average person’s dose attributable to background radiation exposure.
Practices
Figure 68 Common radiological assessment approach for human and non-human biota
Whereas assessment of risk for human exposure involves comparison against dose limits and
constraints, non-human biota assessment involves comparison against derived consideration
levels. The concept of derived consideration levels is depicted in Figure 69.
RAISED CONCERN
> Several times the natural
background
LITTLE CONCERN
Figure 69 Derived consideration levels
In Figure 69, estimated values of dose to the reference organism that are less than the natural
background are of little concern, whereas levels that are several times greater than the natural
background do raise concern. The derived consideration level is a band of dose rate for a type
of RAP within which there is some chance of deleterious radiation effects.
A reference animal or plant (reference organism) is a hypothetical entity with the assumed
basic characteristics of a specific animal or plant, described to the taxonomic level of family,
with precisely defined anatomical, physiological, and life-history properties [ICRP2007]. RAPs
are used for relating exposure to dose, and dose to effect, for that type of organism. The ICRP
reference animals and plants are presented in Table 22, along with their respective wildlife
groups and environments.
Table 22 Reference animals and plants (RAP)
Frog Amphibians X X
It is highly likely that the future of radiological environmental monitoring programs will involve
incorporating explicit consideration of RAPs to demonstrate protection of both human and non-
human biota.
8.4 Summary
CANDU reactors release routine quantities of radioactive material to the environment as
permitted under their licensed operating conditions. Radiological environmental monitoring
programs are designed to demonstrate that there is a minimal impact of CANDU nuclear
reactors as related to human exposure and that the radiological emissions are below derived
release limits established by the federal regulatory body (CNSC). Over the operating lifetime of
CANDU reactors, the releases have had minimal impact on the environment, and the dose
calculated for critical groups have been generally been orders of magnitude below the limits set
by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. The future of environmental protection around
nuclear facilities in Canada may involve explicit consideration of reference animals and plants
and require demonstration that a high degree of protection is afforded to non-human biota.
10 Problems
Note: Solutions to the problems in this chapter will require reference to other texts, data,
materials and/or Web resources.
1. Calculate the individual electron densities and the ratio of the electron densities of a 1.5-cm-
thick piece of aluminum to that of the equivalent density thickness of a piece of lead.
2. How much energy does an alpha particle require to penetrate the minimal protective epi-
dermal layer of skin (thickness ~7 mg/cm2)?
3. How much energy does a beta particle require to penetrate the minimal protective epider-
mal layer of skin (thickness ~7 mg/cm2)?
4. Some important reactions in nuclear fuel have implications with respect to nuclear non-
proliferation. Two important isotopes are Pu-239 and U-233, which are both fissionable.
a. Starting with a neutron absorption in U-238, write the decay relationship to the end-
point of Pu-239.
b. Assuming that you can have neutron absorptions in both Pu-239 and Pu-240, write
down the decay relationships to the endpoint of U-233.
5. A beam of photons is incident on a slab thickness of aluminum shield on one side and exits
on the other. Assume that the beam consists of photons at only two energies: 500 keV and
1000 keV, and that the incident intensities of the two energies are equal. Your goal in designing
the shield is that there be 25% intensity of the 500-keV beam component compared to the
1000-keV component on the exit side of the shield. What thickness of shield is required?
6. A primary gamma ray from the decay of K-40 is scattered twice: first, through an angle of 25
degrees, and then through an angle of 130 degrees.
a. What is the energy of the photon after the second scattering? Show intermediate en-
ergy.
b. What would the energy of the photon be if you reversed the order of scattering (i.e.,
first 130, then 25 degrees)? Show intermediate energy.
7. You are designing a slab shield for the outer region of a small light-water-moderated reactor.
Assume that the neutron flux is 100% thermal inthe outer reactor region. What thickness of
natural cadmium shield is required so that no more than 1% of the thermal flux penetrates the
shield? Assume σcapture = 2450 barns.
8. Assuming that the specific heat of the body is 1 cal g -1 oC-1,
a. Plot the approximate temperature rise as a function of whole-body doses ranging
from 100 mGy to 10 Gy;
b. What temperature rise in the body corresponds to an LD50 dose of 4 Gy? Comment
on this temperature rise.
c. What whole-body absorbed radiation dose corresponds to a 3 mL sip of 60 oC coffee?
Show calculations for both males and females.
9. Pocket ionization chambers are built in the form of an electrical capacitor. From previous
physics courses, you know that capacitance is equal to a change in charge over a change in
voltage, as follows:
Q
C
V ,
where the capacitance, C, is in Farads (F), the voltage, V, is in volts (V) and the charge, Q, is in
coulombs (C). You have a chamber that has a sensitive cylindrical volume with a diameter of
6.35 cm and a length of 63.5 cm. The standard density of the air in the chamber is 0.001293
g/cm3. The chamber is calibrated so that its quartz fibre has full deflection when there is 100 μC
per kg of air. The capacitance of the chamber is 1.2 nF.
a. If it takes 300 volts to charge the chamber, what is the voltage in the chamber at full-
scale deflection?
b. To what exposure (in Roentgen) does full-scale deflection correspond? To what ab-
sorbed dose in air and in tissue does it correspond?
10. You have 10 GBq of each of Co-60, Cs-137, I-131, and Ir-192 (which you can assume to be
point sources of radiation).
a. Compute the exposure rates, in mGy/h, at 25 cm, 50 cm, and 100 cm away from the
sources (present your results in a table for full value: rows = isotope; columns = dis-
tance)
b. For each isotope at the 1-m distance, how long would it take to get to the public dose
limit of 1 mSv/y (assume 1 Sv = 1 Gy)?
11. A standard-size male has an injection of 150 mCi of I-131. Assuming that 90% of this injec-
tion goes to, and is retained in, the thyroid, compute the initial dose rate (Gy/h) to the thyroid
from the beta radiation.
12. You are working in a nuclear plant, and the area monitors have detected a puff release of
CO2 that has escaped from maintenance being performed on a sealed pressure tube. The only
radionuclide identified in the plume is 14C. You are wearing full SCBA (self-contained breathing
apparatus), so that you have no possibility of getting an inhalation dose. However, it is later
found that you were submerged in the plume for a total of 25 minutes. Using the assumptions
listed below, determine your dose from this exposure.
Assumptions:
14
C activity detected on 1000-L air sample by area monitors = 55 kBq
Air at STP
Average material covering the worker has the standard thickness of a thick outer
glove (assume that the beta attenuation coefficient for tissue will approximate
this material).
13. You work in a plant that manufactures sources for radioisotope thermoelectric generators
(RTGs). The source is fabricated by pressing and sintering powdered strontium titanate
(90SrTiO3). A spill of the powdered material occurred in the plant after a shielded vessel which
transports the raw material from shipping and receiving to the handling area fell over and
broke open. While the person who was handling the material was trying to find a manager, one
maintenance worker (Worker A), who was not wearing personal protective gear, worked near
the spill (which was spread out evenly on the floor). You are the health physicist charged with
determining the potential exposure to the worker. You interview the worker and co-workers
and take measurements near the spill. You gather the following data to use in your analysis:
Sr-90 contamination measured: 2 MBq cm-2 (assume uniform)
Approximate distance of Worker A’s hands from the spill: 1 foot
Approximate time Worker A’s hands spent in the vicinity of the spill: 12 minutes
a. Calculate the dose rate to Worker A’s hands using the above data.
During your interview, you also determine that Worker A came into brief contact with
the spill and contaminated her hands. She washed her hands immediately after coming
in contact with the spill (two hours ago). You estimate that casual hand washing is only
65% effective in removing this type of contamination. You immediately assist her to de-
contaminate her hands with some strong detergent and a scrub pad.
b. Calculate the dose to Worker A’s hands from this contact exposure.
14. A solution is being prepared using 0.835 GBq of Ba-133. The solution spread into a roughly
circular area of diameter 50 cm. What is the maximum dose equivalent rate (SI units) 50 cm
above the spill?
15. You have the following sources with associated activities:
Bq Source
5.00E+09 Co-60
7.50E+09 Ir-192
1.00E+09 Na-22
5.00E+10 Tc-99m
7.50E+10 Au-198
1.00E+11 Ra-226
a. Compute the exposure rates, in mGy/h, at 50 cm away from these sources (present
your results in a table for full value: rows = isotope; columns = distance)
b. For each isotope at the 50-cm distance, how long would it take to get to the public
dose limit of 1 mSv/y (assume 1 Sv = 1 Gy)?
16. You are asked to decommission an old radioactive-waste storage room, and inside you find
a large lead pig (sphere). To dispose of the source, you need to know both the radioisotope and
the activity. Unfortunately, there is no documentation for this source, and there are no mark-
ings on the pig. You take a dose-rate measurement at about 4 feet away from the surface of the
lead sphere and find that it is 100 μGy/h. You assume that there is a point gamma source at the
center of the sphere, and using a ruler, you determine the diameter of the sphere to be about
20 cm. Using your portable GR-135 gamma spectrometer, you determine the isotope to be Co-
60 by identification of the 1.17 and 1.33 MeV peaks. What do you estimate the activity of this
source to be (SI units)? (Hint: do not neglect buildup).
17. You are responsible for health physics at a nuclear plant. You have just been told that there
are measurable levels of 14C in air in the form of carbon dioxide. This has previously not been a
hazard, and therefore there are no derived limits for this radioisotope. Estimate
a. the allowable intake limit (Bq), and
b. the derived air concentration (Bq/m3) for 14CO2 using the stochastic limit for nuclear
energy workers at your plant (20 mSv/annum). Note: Assume that after inhalation, the
14
CO2 is highly soluble and transfers directly into the blood.
You have been told that two workers, who did not know there was an airborne 14CO2
hazard, performed their duties in a 2-DAC environment. Worker “A” was wearing a half-
face air-purifying respirator with P100 (purple) cartridges while performing his duties for
three hours in the morning and four hours in the afternoon. A welder (Worker “B”) was
wearing an air-line, continuous-flow, half-mask respirator while performing her duties
for five total hours.
c. Estimate the committed effective dose from this hazard for both Worker A and
Worker B (assume no external hazard).
18. A standard-size male working in a nuclear plant breathes in 100 mCi of Kr-87. Assuming that
75% of this intake is retained in the lung mass, compute the initial dose rate (Gy/h) to the lungs
from the beta radiation (N.B.: only use betas with a probability of emission greater than 1%).
19. Calculate the allowable limit on intake for tritium (HTO vapour) in Bq using the stochastic
limit for nuclear energy workers of 20 mSv per annum. Assume that the source is whole-body
and the target is whole-body.
20. The DAC value for tritiated water is typically adjusted to allow for the fact that a person
working in a tritiated atmosphere will absorb half as much tritium through the skin as through
inhalation (factor of 1.5). For example, if a person inhales 100 Bq of tritium, another 50 Bq will
have been absorbed through the skin (i.e., 150 Bq total). Using the above, what is the DAC for
tritium (Bq/m3)?
21. A worker is performing his duties in a tritiated atmosphere of 1 DAC for eight hours wearing
a positive-pressure (PP) air-purifying full-facepiece respirator. What is the worker’s committed
dose from his exposure to this environment?
22. You are the health physicist at a nuclear power station. The chemistry manager has asked
you to review a purchase requisition that has been initiated for a nitrogen-16 calibration
source. The source generates N-16 through an (α,p) reaction involving curium-244 (spontane-
ous fission radioisotope) and carbon-13. The source gamma-emission strength is 2.2x106 γ/s,
and the neutron-emission strength is 2.0x105 n/s. Assume a gamma energy of 6.1 MeV and an
average neutron energy of 2.5 MeV. Data provided are:
Neutron flux-to-dose equivalent (at 2.5 MeV);
20 n/cm2-s = 25 μSv/h.
a. Write the stoichiometric relationship for the N-16 production reaction.
b. Calculate the total gamma dose-equivalent rate at 1 foot (μSv/h), assuming 100%
emission rate from the principal gamma peak.
c. Calculate the total neutron dose-equivalent rate at 1 foot (mRem/h).
Both lead and polyethylene are available to shield the source.
d. Which shielding arrangement (from the source outward) listed below would be ex-
pected to yield the lowest overall dose rate? Explain your answer.
i. Lead only
ii. Polyethylene followed by lead
iii. Polyethylene only
iv. Lead followed by polyethylene
v. No shielding is necessary because the 12-inch air gap will sufficiently scatter or at-
tenuate the neutrons.
e. If the source is surrounded by 3.93 cm of lead, by what percentage will the gamma
dose rate at 1 foot be reduced?
23. The radioisotope 140La is a common fission product that requires shielding. For La-140, find
the:
Physical half-life (h)
Decay scheme, and
Average beta energy (keV).
a. Calculate the specific gamma constant for La-140 using the four (4) most dominant
gamma lines.
24. List the (strongest transition) capture gamma-ray energy (MeV) and capture cross section
(barns) for the following isotopes: H-1, B-10, Cd-113, Gd-157. Answer the following questions:
a. Why are cadmium and gadolinium used by control and safety systems in nuclear reac-
tors? Where are they used?
b. With respect to B-10, discuss the principal thermal-neutron capture reactions and
discuss the importance of the (n,α) reaction for shielding. What other practical use does
the 10B(n,α) reaction have?
25. Derive the working rule for specific gamma constant in classical units (i.e., 0.5 EiYi ).
i
Show all work and units (i.e., be explicit about where the factor of 0.5 comes from).
26. To account for the number of atoms in a material, the density of atoms in the material must
be deduced. This is necessary because the interaction cross section for a material depends on
the number of atoms that may potentially interact with the transiting radiation per unit path
length. The terminology “mixing cross sections” refers to the proportion of the cross section
assigned to each element in a material. For example, water has two atoms of hydrogen and one
atom of oxygen per molecule in water, and both hydrogen and oxygen have interaction cross
sections that are a function of energy and radiation type. The number density of a single-
element material is typically expressed as follows:
Av
N
MW ,
where
N is the atom density (atoms/cm3)
ρ is the mass density (g/cm3)
Av is Avogadro’s number (6.02E23 atoms/mole)
MW is the molecular weight of the element (atoms/mole).
For compounds or mixtures, the number density of the ith element in the mixture can be
calculated using the weight fraction wi of the ith element in the mixture. The weight fraction can
be determined as:
ni Ai
wi
MW ,
where
ni is the number of atoms of element i in the mixture;
Ai is the molecular mass of element i in the mixture (g/mole); and
MW is the molecule mass of the mixture (g/mole).
The number density of the ith constituent in the mixture is therefore given as:
Av
N i wi
MWi ,
where Ni is the number density (atoms/cm3) of the ith constituent in the mixture (atoms/cm3). It
is common to express the number density in terms of (atoms/b-cm), and therefore:
1
i N i i
cm .
This is related to material mixing in that the macroscopic cross section for the mixture is pro-
portional to the individual number densities as:
1
Ni i
i cm .
Note that depending on the nomenclature used, μ = Σ.
In addition, many computer-based codes require, for material definition, the elemental compo-
sitions in terms of weight fraction or number (atomic) density, and therefore it is very useful to
know how to compute these (because this is how the computer-based code will use the cross
sections!).
a. Show that the weight fraction of oxygen is 0.888 and that of hydrogen is 0.112 in wa-
ter.
b. Calculate the atom fractions of oxygen and hydrogen in water.
c. Calculate the number densities (atoms/b-cm) of oxygen and hydrogen in water.
27. Using the following absorption and scatter cross sections, determine the macroscopic
absorption, scattering, and total cross sections for H2O. What is the mean free path of neutrons
in water based on your calculation?
28. Define and/or briefly explain the significance of the following:
a. ICRP
b. IAEA
c. NCRP
d. WHO
e. MARSSIM
f. MARLAP
g. RESRAD
Radiation Protection and Environmental Safety – September 2014
144 The Essential CANDU
11 Further Reading
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13 Acknowledgements
The following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and excellent com-
ments during the development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of
course the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the authors.
Kam Aydogdu
Esam Hussein
Thanks are also extended to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 6
1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 6
1.2 Learning Outcomes ............................................................................................................. 8
1.3 Risk ...................................................................................................................................... 8
1.4 Hazards from a Nuclear Power Plant ................................................................................ 10
1.5 Types of Radiation in a Nuclear Power Plant .................................................................... 12
1.6 Effects of Radiation ........................................................................................................... 12
1.7 Sources of Radiation ......................................................................................................... 14
1.8 Risk .................................................................................................................................... 15
1.9 Problems ........................................................................................................................... 17
2 Design Basis Accidents .......................................................................................................... 18
2.1 Top-Down Approach ......................................................................................................... 19
2.2 Bottom-Up Approach........................................................................................................ 20
2.3 Probabilistic Safety Analysis.............................................................................................. 21
2.4 Experience......................................................................................................................... 22
2.5 Canadian Approach to DBAs ............................................................................................. 22
2.6 Other Design Basis Events................................................................................................. 25
2.7 Problems ........................................................................................................................... 25
3 Experience............................................................................................................................. 31
3.1 Criticality Accidents and Power Excursions....................................................................... 32
3.2 Loss of Cooling / Heat Removal ........................................................................................ 45
3.3 Problems ........................................................................................................................... 53
4 Safety Goals and Risk Assessment ........................................................................................ 54
4.1 Safety Goals....................................................................................................................... 54
4.2 Risk Assessment ................................................................................................................ 58
4.3 Problems ........................................................................................................................... 74
5 Mitigating systems ................................................................................................................ 76
5.1 Defence-in-Depth.............................................................................................................. 76
5.2 Shutdown Systems ............................................................................................................ 77
5.3 Heat-Removal Systems...................................................................................................... 86
5.4 Emergency Core Cooling System....................................................................................... 92
List of Figures
Figure 1 Chapter concept map........................................................................................................ 7
Figure 2 Risk optimization............................................................................................................. 10
Figure 3 Examples of radiation dose ............................................................................................. 12
Figure 4 Fuel element cross section showing location of fission products .................................. 14
Figure 5 Simplified top-down approach........................................................................................ 20
Figure 6 Simplified bottom-up example ....................................................................................... 21
Figure 7 Criticality experiment...................................................................................................... 26
Figure 8 SES-10.............................................................................................................................. 27
Figure 9 ZED-2 cutaway................................................................................................................. 29
Figure 10 ZED-2 top view .............................................................................................................. 30
Figure 11 Learning and forgetting................................................................................................. 31
Figure 12 SL-1 cutaway ................................................................................................................. 34
Figure 13 NRX fuel cross section................................................................................................... 36
Figure 14 NRX elevation................................................................................................................ 37
Figure 15 RBMK schematic diagram ............................................................................................. 41
Figure 16 RBMK reactor ................................................................................................................ 43
Figure 17 Reverse shutdown in RBMK ......................................................................................... 44
Figure 18 RBMK building cross section ......................................................................................... 45
Figure 19 TMI schematic ............................................................................................................... 46
Figure 20 TMI core end state ........................................................................................................ 47
Figure 21 Fukushima Dai-ichi before earthquake ......................................................................... 49
Figure 22 BWR Mark 1 containment............................................................................................. 50
Figure 23 Design basis versus actual flood level ........................................................................... 51
Figure 24 Typical λ(t) versus time ................................................................................................. 64
Figure 25 Reliability for constant λ................................................................................................ 66
Figure 26 Availability with repair .................................................................................................. 67
Figure 27 Simple pumped system ................................................................................................. 69
Figure 28 Sample fault tree with labels ........................................................................................ 70
Figure 29 Simple event tree .......................................................................................................... 72
Figure 30 Contributors to SCDF for CANDU 6 ............................................................................... 74
Figure 31 Simple fault-tree exercise ............................................................................................. 75
Figure 32 Defence-in-depth: barriers............................................................................................ 76
Figure 33 CANDU shutdown systems............................................................................................ 79
Figure 34 Xenon transient after shutdown and start-up .............................................................. 81
Figure 35 2/3 logic......................................................................................................................... 85
Figure 36 SDS2 testing .................................................................................................................. 86
Figure 37 Bundle power after shutdown ...................................................................................... 88
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
4 The Essential CANDU
List of Tables
Table 1 Single / dual failure limits ................................................................................................. 23
Table 2 Consultative document C-6 limits .................................................................................... 24
Table 3 Dose limits ........................................................................................................................ 24
Table 4 SL-1 chronology ................................................................................................................ 35
Table 5 Bayes’ theorem example .................................................................................................. 62
Table 6 Reliability terms and relationships ................................................................................... 65
Table 7 Levels of defence in depth................................................................................................ 77
Table 8 Typical trip signals for CANDU .......................................................................................... 83
Table 9 Grouping and separation example ................................................................................... 85
Table 10 Operating pressure of decay heat-removal systems ...................................................... 92
Table 11 Some conservative assumptions and parameters........................................................ 113
Table 12 Reactivity effects in PWR and CANDU .......................................................................... 124
Table 13 Examples of reactivity response to accidents for PWR and CANDU ............................ 125
Table 14 Typical core inventory of volatile fission products ....................................................... 148
Table 15 Stages of organizational decline ................................................................................... 153
Table 16 INES event scale............................................................................................................ 154
Table 17 Categories of passive safety characteristics ................................................................. 157
1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the safety characteristics of nuclear reactors and how
their safety performance is predicted and verified.
1.1 Overview
Figure 1 summarizes the chapter concepts and their logical relationship. We describe each box
in turn.
Section 0 (this section) defines risk. The type of risk depends on the activity. Most people want
their activities and surroundings to be “safe”. However, this is a meaningless ideal, and impos-
sible to achieve in absolute terms, because every activity imposes some risk. Fortunately, risk
can be quantified. Then society can set acceptable levels of risk in a reasonably objective
manner.
The risk from nuclear reactors comes from accidental release of radioactive material. Most of
the radioactive material is in the reactor fuel. Therefore, one can postulate accidents which
might allow radioactivity to escape and then design systems (called mitigating systems or safety
systems) to prevent or control such accidents. These design basis accidents1 (DBA) are covered
in Section 2. As well, much knowledge about the risk from nuclear reactors comes from actual
experience in both small research and large power reactors. Case histories of the most impor-
tant events which influenced the development of nuclear power reactor safety are covered in
Section 3. Lessons learned from these were extracted in the form of specific deterministic
requirements, which described the accidents that had to be designed for and the assumptions
used in showing the safety systems were effective. These accidents also became design basis
accidents.
This approach limits risk, but does not lend itself to quantifying risk because the deterministic
requirements and the design basis accidents were chosen “conservatively”, i.e., to be worse
than what would happen in reality, and with little regard to frequency. In addition, descriptions
of these accidents were not complete. A parallel approach is to start off by setting numerical
risk targets for the plant as a whole (safety goals). Possible accidents are identified and classi-
fied using a frequency-based approach. This probabilistic approach is covered in Section 4. It
leads to another list of accidents which overlaps with, but is different from, the list of design
basis accidents.
1
We bow to common practice in using this term. The term was not used in Canada until recently, but has been
used for a long time in the United States. It originally implied that as long as the plant was designed to withstand
“design basis” accidents, all would be well. The accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl showed the weakness
of this concept. At Fukushima, the design basis was wrong (and was known to be – see [IAEA, 2011] p. 75). This
means that design basis accidents do not define a strong boundary between possible and “incredible”. “Beyond
design basis” accidents are now of much interest—indeed, although infrequent, they are the only ones which
could have significant consequences.
Introduction
Section 1
Experience Safety Goals
Section 3 Section 4
Section 4
Future Trends
Review Section 9
escape from the fuel and where it will be transported. It shows that the deterministic
requirements have been met. Section 6 describes the phenomenology of accidents, and
Section 7 summarizes the mathematical tools used to predict how they evolve.
Ultimately, the safety of a plant, however well-designed, depends on the people who run it.
Section 8 covers safety aspects of operation, including safety culture. A brief summary of
innovative designs which promise to deliver increased safety wraps up Section 8.
Section 9 summarizes the key points of the Chapter. Section 10 gives the references used in this
Chapter, and Section 11 lists other sources of information on reactor safety. A Glossary in
Section 12 is a ready reference for the abbreviations used in this Chapter. Each subsection
includes problems for further self-study and the occasional worked example.
1.3 Risk
Risk involves three key ideas:
all technologies involve risk,
every endeavour involves a risk/benefit trade-off, and
risk can be quantified and reduced to an acceptably low level.
Nuclear reactors, hydro dams, and fossil-fuel electrical generating stations are all inherently
dangerous. The nature of the hazard in each case is quite different. Hazards can be sudden
(acute) or delayed. For hydro dams, an acute hazard is rupture of the dam, causing massive
floods downstream. A delayed hazard is build-up of toxic mercury in the water behind the dam
due to leaching from the rocks. For natural-gas plants, there is a local acute hazard due to
explosion and a global delayed hazard due to climate change from the release of combustion
products (greenhouse gases) to the atmosphere. Coal plants are likewise a major source of
greenhouse gases and in addition can cause respiratory disease from the combustion and
release of toxic chemicals in the coal; see [Inhaber, 1978] and [Rogers, 2004] for Canadian
examples. Some coal plants emit more radioactive material to atmosphere in normal operation
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis 9
than a nuclear power plant. For a nuclear power plant, the hazard of most interest is the
release of radioactive material in accidents. Unlike a coal plant, an inadvertent rise in power in
a nuclear plant (if it is not stopped) can both drive the release of radioactive material out of the
fuel and rapidly cause damage to the reactor and its containment structure.
We “accept” hazards of technologies when they have a benefit which is perceived to offset the
risk. Sometimes this decision is made on an individual basis: you may go sky-diving (an activity
so objectively risky that you cannot get insurance coverage for it) because you believe that the
unique thrill is worth the risk. You accept the hazards of electrical shock and fires for the
convenience of using electric lights and appliances. Nothing that we do on a day-to-day basis is
as risky as hurtling down a narrow strip of levelled ground at 100 km/h in a thin metal container
containing 60 litres of explosive liquid towards someone else in a similar device, using a painted
strip as a guide to avoid collision. Yet almost all people believe the benefits of driving are worth
the risk.
Sometimes the decision is made on a societal basis: if you live in a city, you cannot easily choose
to accept or reject risks such as being hit by a car (even if you choose not to drive one), breath-
ing polluted air, or getting mugged. Activities which pose an involuntary risk are often regulated
by law. In our three examples, the respective regulatory devices would be traffic laws, emission
controls, and the criminal laws.
The benefits of nuclear power include production of clean electricity. In Ontario, over half the
electricity comes from nuclear power; in countries such as France, as much as 80%. Other
benefits of nuclear technology are medical and industrial applications, insect control, environ-
mental protection, and scientific research. Canada is the source of much of the world’s produc-
tion of medical isotopes, largely originating from the NRU reactor at Chalk River.
This chapter is concerned with risk to humans. Many technologies also pose risk to other living
organisms. For nuclear technology, in general, if radiation risk to humans is acceptable, the risk
to other living things will also be acceptable because they are less susceptible to radiation (e.g.,
they do not live as long (and therefore do not develop cancer as easily) or are inherently more
resistant to radiation damage (e.g., insects)). Radioactive elements and compounds can be
concentrated as they move up the food chain, and therefore these pathways must be modelled
to provide a scientific basis to show that humans are limiting this risk.
Safety can be thought of as the complement to risk; however, usually it is risk that is quantified,
and we shall focus on risk in this Chapter.
Because risk cannot be eliminated, it must ideally be optimized. This means a cost/benefit
analysis, although such an analysis often looks only at the risk of a technology, without factoring
in benefits. At a risk optimum, the additional resources used to provide additional risk reduc-
tion would come at a disproportionate cost, and any resources removed from risk reduction
would cause a disproportionate increase in risk. This situation is shown in Figure 2. This opti-
mum is never achieved in practice. This is partly because the risk from nuclear power is per-
ceived to be greater than that of other technologies, even if the numerical risk is the same, due
to social factors such as unfamiliarity with the technology and its association with atomic
weapons and cancer. Hence, regulation of nuclear power often includes a penalty on the
allowed risk, called risk aversion. Such a topic is beyond the scope of this Chapter; see [Slovic,
1987] or [Siddall, 1981] for examples. However, we still need an objective means of quantifying
risk in terms of frequency and consequences. We start with the latter—what are the conse-
quences of a nuclear accident?
2
There could be a small biological hazard if the plant uses cooling towers and does not keep them clean, in which
case they could become a source of bacterial growth.
[UNSCEAR, 2001].
1.6.2 Hormesis
The difficulty with the linear hypothesis is that the effects of radiation on humans at low doses
(below 0.1 Sv) are so small (or even beneficial—the hormesis hypothesis) that the models are
very difficult to validate. At the moment, for better or worse, the linear hypothesis is used
internationally as the basis for setting regulations for radiation protection. However, the
Fukushima accident has led to a rethinking of overly conservative regulations because there is a
real risk in evacuating people unnecessarily, which may be greater in some cases than the risk of
radiation exposure. Moreover, ICRP has taken great pains to distinguish a priori theoretical risks
from a posteriori predictions of “real” health effects resulting from low radiation doses to many
people; see, e.g., [Gonzales, 2013], from which the following is quoted: “Following exposure to
low radiation doses below about 100 mSv, an increase of cancer has not been convincingly or
consistently observed in epidemiological or experimental studies and will probably never be
observed because of overwhelming statistical and biasing factors.”
For more details on hormesis, see, e.g., [Cuttler, 2009]. As an example [Chen, 2007], steel
containing Co60 was used in the construction of 1700 apartments in Taiwan, resulting in an
average dose of 0.4Sv to the 10,000 occupants. What was observed was a significant decrease,
rather than an increase, in cancer deaths.
These exist in the ratio of about 9:1 for the highest-powered fuel element in a CANDU reactor,
as shown in [Ionescu, 2009].
Therefore, accidents which cause perforation of the fuel sheath (but which do not damage the
UO2) have the potential to release only somewhat less than 10% of the gaseous fission prod-
ucts. Sheaths can be damaged mechanically (in fuel-handling accidents) or by overheating: if
the sheath overheats from its normal temperature of 300°C to about 600°C–800°C, it will
plastically deform because of the pressure of the fission product gases it contains, and eventu-
ally rupture. To drive out the remaining gaseous fission products and the solid fission products
such as cesium and strontium, the fuel temperature has to be raised to close to the melting
point (2840°C) or the fuel itself must be heavily oxidized by direct exposure to air or steam.
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis 15
Therefore, accidents which release significant amounts of radioactive material are initiated by:
overheating the fuel in the core due to a mismatch between power and cooling
leaks or pipe breaks in the coolant or moderator
mechanical damage to the fuel
overheating of the spent fuel in storage due to a power/cooling mismatch.
All accident analyses reduce to these categories of failures.
It follows that the fundamental safety functions that must be carried out after an accident are:
Control the fission reaction (and shut down the reactor)
Cool the fuel (remove the decay heat)
Contain any release of radioactive material
Monitor the state of the plant.
In summary, control / cool / contain / monitor is the essence of safety design.
1.8 Risk
Safety concerns are ultimately expressed in terms of risk. The risk of a system, which must be
specified (e.g., risk of a component failure, of an activity, of a nuclear reactor, of the nuclear fuel
cycle) is customarily defined as:
Risk fi ci
i , (2)
where fi is the expected frequency of event i and ci is its consequence; the summation is over all
events. Like the risk of betting money, this summation makes sense only for a large number of
systems over a long period of time; it does not apply to a single machine (or a single bet), for
which the event outcome is binary (e.g., for one bet, you either win or lose). In nuclear safety,
probabilistic risk analysis can be used to quantify the risk posed by a nuclear power plant; more
typically, it calculates risk indicators such as severe core-damage frequency or large off-site
release frequency. Such indicators can identify potential plant improvements to reduce risk
where practical.
Sample problem
The frequency of a (fully-contained) core-damage accident in a certain 1000 MWe nuclear
power plant is 10-7 per year. If your insurance conglomerate were asked to insure the plant,
what premium would you have to charge to break even over the long term?
Answer:
We need to use a common measure of comparison, in this case average cost / year. A contained
core melt would require removal of the damaged core, decontamination, and replacement of
the reactor. This could take ten years. In addition, the electricity formerly generated by the
plant would have to be replaced. Since the accident is stated to be contained, we do not add
costs for off-site decontamination, evacuation, relocation, nor health effects – for an accident
resulting in a significant release, these would have to be considered. This means that the
average cost / year is (using rough ballpark values—the problem can easily be made very
complex if greater sophistication and accuracy is needed):
{[$5 × 109 for decommissioning / decontamination + $5 × 109 for rebuilding the plant] +
[106 kW × $0.06 /kW-hour × 24 hours / day × 365 days / year × 10 years]} × [10-7 / year]
= [$1000 + $526] / year or ~$1500 /year.
Note the importance of the replacement electricity cost.
Because accidents cannot be prevented in any significant human endeavour, the broad goals of
reactor safety analysis are to:
Show that the frequency and consequences of accidents are within acceptable limits
and/or
Show that the frequency of an accident is too small to consider.
Acceptable limits are defined (broadly) with respect to the event frequency. For example,
frequent occurrences (minor faults such as loss of electrical power) should not stress the
system, damage fuel, or invoke protective systems. Very infrequent events, like a large loss of
coolant, are permitted to push the physical systems into plastic deformation or damage fuel, but
not to allow radioactive release beyond a prescribed limit. Severe accidents may damage the
core, but should not fail the containment building. This approach may, but does not necessarily,
address the direct economic costs of a severe accident, which can be huge, even if the public
safety impact is minimal, e.g., Fukushima.
This framework implies that:
1. We have to know what the possible accidents are.
2. We have to be able to predict their frequency.
3. We have to be able to predict their consequences.
Safety analysis is carried out at several stages in the plant life cycle:
During preliminary design (design assist), to ensure that the design concepts meet safety
requirements.
During final design, to confirm that safety requirements are met and to include the re-
sults as part of the applications for the licences required to construct and operate the
plant (see Chapter 16).
For an operating plant, to incorporate the effects of any changes in the plant, in funda-
mental knowledge, in operating experience, and in safety analysis methodology.
Three safety-analysis methods are used during some or all of these stages. These are comple-
mentary, not mutually exclusive, and in practice all three are used:
1. Rule - e.g., use the ASME code for pressure-vessel design. It is implied that following the
code or the standard reduces the likelihood of failure of the material to a very low level.
This is largely based on long experience, testing, and more recently, analysis.
2. Deterministic safety analysis - i.e., assess a prescribed list of failures which are selected
based on past experience and judgement. Sometimes these are called “design basis ac-
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis 17
cidents”, as discussed in Section Error! Reference source not found.. Each accident se-
quence is chosen to be severe enough that the consequences of a “real” accident should
be less; this means that only a subset of possible accidents is analyzed. For example, the
Emergency Core Cooling (ECC) system is sized to provide enough flow to refill the core
after a break in the heat-transport system that is up to twice the flow area of the largest
pipe and on a time scale that prevents excessive fuel damage. The consequences of
these stylized accidents are predicted and compared against analysis limits. Such analy-
sis limits can be loosely based on frequency.
3. Probabilistic safety analysis - i.e., assess the frequency and consequences of failures,
optimizing to deal with the high-risk contributors. PSAs therefore proceed using the fol-
lowing methodology:
a. define risk-based criteria,
b. generate a set of accidents to consider,
c. predict the frequency and consequences of each event,
d. show that the criteria are met.
Much of the rest of this Chapter covers these three methods.
1.9 Problems
1. International bodies set limits for the dose an individual should receive from all man-
made sources. A number of issues exist behind this framework. Discuss the following four
questions and draw reasoned conclusions:
a. How should exposure from radiation used for medical purposes be controlled
(i.e., what factors should determine whether or not, and how much, radiation
should be used)?
b. Should large power reactors have the same dose limits as small research reactors
such as the McMaster Nuclear Reactor (which also produces medical isotopes)?
Why?
c. You are a safety expert and have been asked to approve a smoke detector. As-
sume that the smoke detectors give a whole-body dose [USNRC, 2001] of 10-5
mSv per year to each of the 35,000,000 people in Canada. What would your de-
cision be, and why? What factors would you look at in normal operation of the
detector? What is the most severe accidental exposure that can happen with a
smoke detector, and how would you assess its acceptability on a risk basis?
d. What dose would you accept for voluntary lifesaving (i.e., your colleague is
trapped in a very high radiation field and you are asked to go in and save him)?
Give reasons.
2. A nuclear designer is trying to optimize his design. He knows of an accident with a
frequency of 10-7 per year which leads to a contained core melt and causes the following
effects:
a. Permanent damage to the plant (i.e., cannot be recovered)
b. Evacuation of nearby people (5,000) for three days
c. No prompt fatalities
d. A collective dose to the closest population of 100 Sv.
He can reduce the frequency (but not the consequences) of this accident by a factor of ten by
putting in an extra heat-removal system costing M$10 in capital costs and an extra $100,000 per
year in maintenance and operating costs. How would you make this decision in a quantitative
way? Hint: Consider expressing all accident consequences in terms of dollars. Then calculate
the total average annual costs in each scenario. Some organizations assign a cost per Sv of
dose—find out typical values. This problem will take you some time.
3. A massive spontaneous failure (i.e., due to a material flaw, not as a result of a core melt)
in an LWR pressure vessel would simultaneously breach all the physical barriers which prevent
radioactive material from escaping: the fuel, the primary-coolant pressure boundary, and the
containment. Research and describe the approach taken by LWR designers to show that this is
“incredible”. Does this issue apply in any way to CANDU?
4. A nuclear regulator is considering a high-level safety goal for new nuclear power plants
in Canada. He proposes two requirements:
a. The risk to an individual close to the nuclear power plant of dying immediately
from an accident must be less than 10-6 per year.
b. The risk to an individual close to the nuclear power plant of getting cancer from
an accident must be less than 10-5 per year.
Two nuclear power plants apply for a licence. Each has done an accident analysis, and the
results are as follows:
1. For plant 1, no significant releases occur for any accident above a frequency of
10-7 per year. However, there is a core melt at that frequency which fails con-
tainment and gives a dose of 10 Sv to each individual in the nearby population.
2. For plant 2, two accidents are the major contributors to risk. One causes severe
fuel damage, but prevents core melt. It occurs at a frequency of 10-4 per year
and gives a dose of 0.25 Sv to a number of individuals in the nearby population.
The other is a core melt, but it is contained—it occurs at a frequency of 10-6 per
year and gives a dose of 1 Sv to a number of individuals in the nearby population.
Determine numerically whether these plants meet either or both safety goals or neither one.
Hint: consider converting average dose to risk.
engineering field) that is guaranteed to be complete. The history of any technology is replete
with unpleasant surprises, especially at the beginning—just think of the Hindenburg disaster,
the Flixborough cyclohexane explosion [Venart, 2004], and of course the Titanic. Technolo-
gies—if we are fortunate—have their accidents early on, when the scale is small and the lessons
learned can be applied to commercial applications.
The best way to obtain a “nearly complete” list of accidents, apart from experience, is to use
more than one technique. In the next few subsections, we describe several such techniques.
consequence if this component fails. If systems exist which are supposed to protect the reactor
against such a failure, what are they, and what happens if they also fail? Eventually, if the power
plant is well designed, one gets to a very low frequency and draws the boundary between
design basis and beyond design basis accidents again. This is called a “bottom-up approach”.
Another term is FMEA, which stands for “failure modes and effects analysis”, although this
approach tends to be more limited because it stops after the first failure.
Sample Problem: Do a bottom-up analysis of the feed-water system in a nuclear power plant.
(The reader is assumed to be familiar with CANDU design—if not, please consult the earlier
Chapters in this book.)
Answer: The feed-water system can fail in a number of ways: power to the pumps may fail, or a
feed-water line may break, or the feed-water valve(s) may inadvertently close. Taking each
feed-water system component in turn and assuming that it fails, we then identify the systems
which are there to protect against such failures—e.g., the auxiliary feed-water system, the
shutdown cooling system, and the emergency water system (these are described in Section 5).
We then look at the failure of each of these mitigating systems. From these results, using
judgment to determine frequencies, we can select likely candidates for DBAs, shown in ovals in
Figure 6. The un-terminated arrows represent further development of the diagram.
Failures in
Feedwater System
frequencies to them. PSA uses a top-down approach to generate the failure frequencies of
operating systems and the failure probabilities of safety systems (fault trees). It then combines
failure of each operating system with successive failures of the required safety systems to obtain
a long list of accidents and their frequencies (event trees). One can also select design basis
accidents from this list if they have not already been picked up by other techniques. This topic
is covered in more detail in Section 4.
2.4 Experience
Design basis accidents may also be added because of experience.
For example, Canadian practice requires that each design basis accident be analyzed assuming
complete failure of one shutdown system, no matter how low the frequency. The reason goes
back to 1952, when the core of the NRX research reactor in Chalk River, Ontario, was damaged
in an accident ([Lewis, 1953] [Hurst, 1953]) in which the power increased and the shutdown
system was impaired. One of the causes was a complex control/shutdown system design; the
shut-off rods were hydraulically driven, and their performance was sensitive to dirt in the
system. The accident resulted in a large subsequent emphasis on shutdown-system reliability,
testability, and robustness, to the extent that, even though the shutdown systems in CANDU
bear no resemblance to those in NRX (lessons having since been learned about shutdown-
system design), the CANDU reactor had to be designed to survive an accident even if the
shutdown system failed. Although one could show that the most severe accident without
shutdown (a large LOCA) would not release enough energy to break containment, the designers
decided (eventually) to add another, fully independent shutdown system, so that even if one
shutdown system failed completely, the other could be credited.
The accident at Fukushima in 2011 [JNTI, 2011] is a recent example of a poor choice of the
parameters for a design basis accident. Although the plant had a Design Basis Flood level, it was
clearly inadequate, and since the accident, all operating plants have had to change their provi-
sions for both Design Basis Floods and Beyond Design Basis Floods. We shall cover key historical
events in more detail in Section 3.
system: these constituting the so-called special safety systems. For each category, a frequency
and a consequence limit was chosen that had to be satisfied. In addition, to deal with the siting
of a reactor (Pickering A) next to a major population centre (Toronto), population dose limits
were defined for each category of accident.
The limits were as follows (sometimes this is called the Siting Guide):
2.5.3 RD-337
As the nuclear industry has become more international and more competitive, the Canadian
Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) has understood the need to align its requirements, espe-
cially for new builds, more closely with international ones and has therefore developed top-
level design requirements [CNSC, 2008] which align more closely with IAEA standards [IAEA,
2000] and are less technology-specific. Events are divided into three classes: anticipated
operational occurrences (AOOs), which are expected to occur at least once in the plant lifetime;
design basis accidents; and beyond design basis accidents (BDBAs), including event sequences
that may lead to a severe accident. The limits are from [CNSC, 2008] and [CNSC, 2008a].
Table 3 Dose limits
Event Frequency Dose Limit (Sv)
Anticipated Operational Occurrence 10-2 / reactor-year 0.0005
Design Basis Accident 10-2 to 10-5 / reactor-year 0.020
There are no dose limits for BDBAs, but there are numerical safety goals and specific system
design requirements; see Section 4.
3
Expected frequency ranges are not part of C-6; they were used by Ontario Hydro in the licensing of Darlington to
classify events not listed in C-6.
2.7 Problems
The reader should have read and understood Chapters 3, 4, and 5 on reactor physics before
proceeding.
1. A laboratory experiment has been set up to determine the critical mass of enriched
uranium. Two hemispheres of U235 metal are supported in an unshielded facility by one scien-
tist. Other scientists are in the same room, observing. A screwdriver is used to slowly push one
hemisphere closer to the other, while a neutron detector measures the increase in neutron flux
as they approach each other (Figure 7). (This scenario is modelled on, but is not quite the same
as, the Lewis Slotin accident in 1946 [LANL, 2000]). Develop a safety approach using the con-
cept of design basis accidents as follows:
a) Use both “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to define a set of accidents. Specifi-
cally: What is the “top event” that is to be avoided? What could cause the accidents?
b) How fast do the accidents occur (i.e., what physical process determines the time scale)?
What inherently limits the consequences (why don’t you get a nuclear bomb)?
c) Compare the nature of the hazard to the scientists with that to the public.
d) How could the consequence of an accident be prevented or mitigated:
Without any further equipment, i.e., just after it has occurred?
With equipment installed beforehand?
Figure 8 SES-10
3 Experience
Current power reactor safety design has been powerfully influenced by accidents that hap-
pened during the development of the technology. In this Section, we describe a few of them—
space constraints do not permit an exhaustive study.
Real accidents almost never follow the simple assumptions in design basis safety analysis. Most
real accidents tend to be very complex, have more than one contributing factor, have a high
component of human error and extraordinary human recovery, and often leave one wondering,
“How did all these things happen together?”
The answer is, of course, that if they didn’t happen together, there would be no accident. It is a
poorly designed nuclear power plant where a single failure or error causes a catastrophic
accident. Most accidents are the end-point of a chain of events, prevention of any one of which
would have stopped the accident from happening. We will discuss this later in Section 5.1
(Defence-in-depth).
was its nature? What were the root causes? What were the lessons learned for design? For
operation? The exercises at the end of the chapter give you some additional actual incidents to
assess.
You should have read and understood Chapters 3, 4, and 5 on reactor physics before proceed-
ing.
Each of the case studies described below gives a brief description of the facility, the event, and
lessons learned. These are all of necessity very abbreviated. In particular, of the dozens of
lessons learned, only the few most important are listed. The reader should consult the refer-
ences for more detail.
practice, as we shall see from the case studies, to have an additional means of shutdown always
poised, even during shutdown.
You may want to think about whether it is safer to refuel a reactor while it is critical or during a
shutdown.
3.1.1 SL-1
3.1.1.1 Description
This summary uses material from [USAEC, 1962], [USAEC, 1962a], [USAEC, 1962b], [Stacy, 2000],
and [Thompson, 1965].
The SL-1 (Stationary Low Power Reactor No. 1) was a natural-recirculation pressurized boiling-
water military reactor with a thermal power of 3 MW. It was located at the Atomic Energy
Commission National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Figure 12 shows a cutaway of
the reactor vessel. At the time of the accident, on January 3, 1961, there were 40 fuel assem-
blies and 5 control rods in the core.
-120 msec Reactor goes critical with rod at 16.7 in. (40.6 cm).
Central rod at 20 in. (50.8 cm), period = 3.9 ±0.5 msec, (2.4 ± 0.3)% Δk.
~2 msec Prompt nuclear energy release ends; total nuclear energy of excursion =
(133±10) MW-sec [+(24 ±10) MW-sec in metal-water reaction].
20% of plate area destroyed; centre 16 elements 50% melted; central shroud
and control blade ejected from core.
Water column above core accelerated by average pressure (500 psi or 35 atm)
to a velocity of 160 ft/sec (49 m/sec).
34 msec Water slams against lid of vessel. Maximum pressure ≈10,000 psi (~700 atm).
Head shielding ejected. Plugs ejected with velocity of 85 ft/sec (26 m/sec) or
less. Vessel rises, shearing connecting pipes. Guide tubes collapse. Nozzles
and vessel expand.
160 msec First plug hits ceiling.
Vessel hits ceiling. Total kinetic energy involved ~1% of total energy released.
3.1.2 NRX
3.1.2.1 Description
This summary uses material from [Lewis, 1953], [Hurst, 1953], [Larson, 1961], and [Cross, 1980].
NRX was Canada’s first large research
reactor, built in 1947 with a thermal power
of 30MW. The moderator was heavy water
contained in a cylindrical calandria. Cool-
ing was once-through, light-water, taken
from and returning to the Ottawa River.
Passing through the calandria were vertical
tubes open to the air at top and bottom.
Each fuel rod, made from metallic uranium
sheathed in aluminum, had its own cooling
jacket (Figure 13); each rod, with its cooling
jacket, was located in one of the vertical
tubes (Figure 14). A stream of air passed Figure 13 NRX fuel cross section
between each fuel rod and its calandria
tube. Twelve boron shut-off rods passed through 12 of these tubes. Start-up was achieved by
removing half these rods, after which the reactor was controlled by varying moderator level.
The shut-off rods could be raised by compressed air and were then held up by an electromag-
net. They could be driven back in using high-pressure air, although they would fall more slowly
the first to be removed during a start-up and was designed to overcome any reactivity added if
the reactor should go inadvertently critical on removal of any of the remaining banks of rods.
Removal of the safeguard bank was prohibited by limit switches on each rod unless all other
rods were down; however, the switches had been giving trouble and had been disabled.
To ensure fast start-up after a shutdown (and avoid xenon poison-out), it was possible to drive
up the first four rods, worth 30 mk, in a few seconds.
There were four pushbuttons on the control panel. Pushbutton 4 charged air to the heads of
the shut-off rods; release of this air drove the rods down. Pushbutton 3 temporarily increased
the current in the electromagnet and ensured that the rods were properly seated. Pushbutton
1 raised the safeguard bank, and Pushbutton 2 raised the remaining banks in automatic se-
quence. Normal operation was to press Pushbutton 3 along with 4, 1, and 2. If 3 was not
pressed with 4, air might leak from the head system; if 3 was not pressed with 1 and 2, the shut-
off rods might not be drawn fully home, and the safety circuits would prevent start-up from
proceeding.
The void reactivity was positive and large; that is, removal of all the light-water coolant would
result in an increase in reactivity of 25 mk.
been up already) was raised. The supervisor realized his mistake, but the assistant in the
control room had to leave the phone to use both hands to push the two buttons.
From [Cross, 1980]:
“It was soon apparent from instruments in the control room that the reactor was above
critical and the power level was rising. This was surprising, but not alarming, since the
reactor could easily be turned off by dropping the shut-off rods just raised. However,
when after 20 seconds, the button was pressed to do this, only one of the four rods ac-
tually went down. The power level continued to climb and, after some discussion in the
control room, it was decided to dump the moderator into a storage tank. Within less
than 30 seconds, the power-level metres were back on scale and the power dropped
rapidly to zero.”
The removal of the safeguard bank made the reactor supercritical by about 6 mk and started a
power rise to about 100 kW. The lone shut-off rod started to fall in at this point, but the power
kept rising to about 17 MW. Boiling then occurred in some of the temporarily cooled rods,
expelling the light water and increasing the reactivity by another 2.5 mk. Power continued to
rise to 60–90 MW, when it was stopped by dumping the moderator.
The power surge melted a number of fuel rods and caused a number of calandria tubes to fail.
Eventually, in a major operation, the reactor calandria was removed and buried; the building
was decontaminated, and the reactor was replaced.
3.1.3 Chernobyl
This summary uses material from [USSR, 1986], [USDOE, 1986], [Howieson, 1987], [Chan, 1987],
[Rogers, 1987], and [INSAG, 1992].
3.1.3.1 Description
Chernobyl unit 4 was of the RBMK type (Реактор Большой Мощности Канальный, or High-
Power Channel-Type Reactor) and the most recent of the 1,000 MW(e) series. It was a graphite-
moderated, boiling-light-water-cooled, vertical-pressure-tube design using enriched (2% U235)
UO2 fuel with on-power refueling. It used a direct cycle to produce electricity from twin tur-
bines (Figure 15, from [INSAG, 1992]). The reactor cutaway is shown in Figure 16, from [Se-
monov, 1983].
There are two independent primary coolant circuits, each containing about 830 fuel channels,
two steam separators, and four pumps (with one normally on stand-by). Refueling is done
during operation from the top of the core. A containment structure encloses the inlet piping in
the lower portion of the reactor and provides pressure relief to a water pool located beneath
the reactor (Figure 18). Control and shutdown are performed by movable absorbing rods in
lattice positions. Emergency core cooling is provided for pipe breaks through a system consist-
ing of a combination of pressurized-water accumulators and electric pumps.
The reactor has a void coefficient which varies from negative to positive according to the
operating state. It is limited in normal operation through control of operating conditions.
The containment is a pressure-suppression type (see Section 5) and is compartmentalized
(Figure 18). All inlet pipes are enclosed in leak-tight compartments which connect to a bubbler
pond or suppression pool below the reactor. Steam discharged from a pipe break is directed to
the bubbler pond, where it condenses. Each channel is accessible (for refueling) from the top
through a large cover plate, to which its extension is welded (Figure 16). The (small) outlet
pipes above the core are in an enclosure designed for a rupture of up to two channels or their
outlet pipes, because rupture of more than one was believed to be highly improbable. As noted
in [INSAG, 1992], “Simultaneous failure of a greater number of fuel channels would generate a
pressure high enough to fail the containment function by lifting the cover plate, in the process
severing the remainder of the fuel channels”.
drop to zero neutron power occurred and lasted for four to five minutes. The operator, instead
of aborting the test, then attempted to recover power, but because of xenon decay, had to raise
the control rods so that most of them were out of the core. In the end, the reactor never
reached the planned initial power level.
Key: 1: graphite reactor core; 2: fuel channel; 3: in-core instrumentation tube; 4: feedwater
pipe; 5: steam separator drum; 6: downcomer; 7: intake header; 8: main circulating pump; 9:
bypass; 10: high-pressure header; 11: stop valve; 12: distribution group header; 13: steam
header; 14: steam dump valve; 15: accident localization system; 16: ECCS water reserve tank;
17: pressure controller; 18: turbogenerator; 19: condenser; 20: moisture separator/reheater;
21: condensate pump; 22: preheater; 23: deaerator; 24: emergency electric feedwater pump;
25: electric feedwater pump; 26: mixing preheater; 27: condensate collecting tank; 28: moisture
separator/reheater condensate pump; 29: level controller; 30: ECCS hydraulic accumulator; 31:
ECCS pump; 32: ECCS header; 33: ECCS fast-acting valve; 34: leak limiter.
Figure 15 RBMK schematic diagram
In the immediate aftermath of the accident, the Soviets [USSR, 1986] placed much blame on the
operators for not following test procedures and performing the test in an unauthorized reactor
configuration. The initial cause of the power rise was stated to be the increase in void reactivity
as coolant boiling increased following pump trip. It was implied that because most of the dual
control/safety rods were withdrawn, the reactor trip was ineffective in stopping the power rise.
Later analysis ([Chan, 1987] and [INSAG, 1992]) indicated that a major cause of the accident was
the unexpected behaviour of the shut-off rods, which actually caused an increase in reactor
power rather than shutting the reactor down. This surprising design aspect requires more
detailed explanation. The absorber rods have graphite displacers or followers attached to their
lower ends which are designed to increase the absorber reactivity worth. As they are inserted,
the absorber rods move into the high-flux region in the centre of the core, which was previously
occupied by the graphite, so that the absorber-rod effectiveness is enhanced (see Figure 17). If
no graphite were present, the rod would displace water—also an absorber—in which case the
change in reactivity with insertion would not be as great.
However, during the accident, most of the absorbers were well removed from the core, which
was an abnormal configuration. The flux was peaked at the top and bottom, where most of the
reactor power was being generated. Therefore, when absorber insertion first started, the water
in the high-flux region at the bottom of the core was first displaced by the graphite follower,
leading to a reactivity increase. Therefore, operating the plant in an abnormal condition re-
sulted in an unusually large hold-up of void reactivity, which combined with a deficient shut-
down-system design, led to the large power excursion and the resulting core damage. [INSAG,
1992] indicates that this deficiency was known by designers before the event.
The power rise failed a number of fuel channels; the resulting steam release blew off the top
cover and severed the remaining fuel channels, effectively exposing the core to the environ-
ment and by-passing the containment.
The core damage rendered it subcritical, although to make sure this was the case, the Soviets
used helicopters to dump boron into the open reactor structure. The graphite moderator, when
exposed to air and heated by the fuel fragments, began to burn and did so for several days until
it was smothered by a combination of sand dropped onto the core pit and liquid nitrogen
pumped in from underneath. The core melted and flowed into the rooms below the reactor
vault, although this was not realized until some years afterwards, when the reactor cavity was
inspected remotely and found to be empty. A temporary cover (the sarcophagus) was rapidly
built over the damaged structure to prevent radioactive material from escaping and is currently
being replaced by a more permanent cover.
3.2.1.1 Description
The Three Mile Island reactor was a conventional pressurized-water reactor; a flow-sheet is
shown in Figure 19. The reactor core is inside a large pressure vessel; unlike most CANDUs and
BWRs, the coolant is highly sub-cooled and kept so by a pressurizer connected to the pressure
vessel. A pressure relief valve on top of the pressurizer provides overpressure protection for the
reactor coolant system (RCS).
running far behind the event), as well as provision of diagnostic aids to the operators.
2. The prescriptive approach to reactor safety in the United States, which was based on
regulatory-driven lists of design basis accidents, had focused attention on too narrow a
range of accidents, not just because it omitted severe accidents, but also because it fo-
cused on bounding design basis accidents and treated superficially the supposedly less-
severe DBAs such as a small LOCA.
3. PSA became far more important and more widely used to define and therefore prevent
possible severe accidents.
4. Sharing of prior experience with other plants was poor. TMI led to the establishment of
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) for industry-wide cooperation in op-
erations and training.
3.2.3.1 Description
There are six nuclear power reactors at the Fukushima I (Dai-Ichi) site. All are boiling-water
reactors (BWRs). There are four more BWR reactors nearby at Fukushima II (Dai-Ini). Figure 21
(from [USNRC, 2011]) shows the overall station layout of Fukushima Dai-Ichi.
Mark 1 type BWRs have an “inverted light-bulb” containment (the drywell) connected to a
toroidal suppression pool or chamber (the wetwell), as can be seen in Figure 22. The purpose
of the suppression pool is to condense any steam released inside the containment in an acci-
dent, such as a loss-of-coolant accident, and also to act as a temporary or permanent heat sink
for decay power in case the main heat-removal mechanisms are unavailable. If the suppression
chamber (S/C) is to act as a long-term heat sink, it must be cooled by an external circuit, e.g., for
Unit 1 (which we shall use as the example), the isolation condenser.
The current state and location of the core and the integrity of the reactor vessel and the pri-
mary containment are not known with certainty, although damage to both is expected.
A further issue was the condition of the fuel in the spent-fuel pools. Normally, the decay heat
generated by the fuel bundles in the pools is removed by active systems, which of course were
lost when all AC power was lost. In the absence of heat removal, or if water is lost due to
leakage, heating of the spent fuel is slower than heating of the core, but if not addressed, will
eventually lead to uncovering of the fuel and fuel damage. In Fukushima, the spent-fuel bays
are located high in the reactor building to facilitate transfer of fuel assemblies from the core.
Spent-fuel cooling was made more difficult by the elevation (and inaccessibility) of the spent-
fuel bays, and concerns were voiced about their structural integrity following the earthquake.
In the early phases after the accident, water was added manually to the bays (initially from
helicopters and later from cranes); stable cooling has since been restored to all pools. Inspec-
tion of the bays shows debris from the damaged reactor buildings; TEPCO has stated, “Most
spent fuels estimated to be undamaged” based on the radioactive contents of the pool water
and remote inspection. As of December 2013, fuel in the Unit 4 pool is now being removed.
Fukushima II was not flooded nearly as severely as Fukushima I and successfully achieved cold
shutdown of all units.
The safety goal is to achieve cold stable shutdown, with temperatures below 100°C and any
releases of radioactive materials from containment under control.
The injection of sea-water, while presumably stopping further core melting, led to a large
accumulation of highly radioactive water in the basement of the buildings because cooling was
essentially “once-through”. Some of this water intermittently leaked to the sea and to ground.
Once-through cooling was later converted to closed-loop cooling and continuously decontami-
nated using on-line filtration. In addition, to prevent further release of airborne radioactive
material from debris or leakage to ground or sea from rain, the reactor buildings are being
covered by weatherproof covers.
Finally the large amounts of highly contaminated water on site have to be treated and securely
stored.
loss of power.
5. Prevent loss of monitoring (e.g., design the station emergency batteries to last for a sig-
nificant length of time, protect them against external events, and provide recharging ca-
pability). Maintain on-site and off-site communications.
5. Provide facilities on site to deal with physical destruction and high radiation fields (e.g.,
bulldozers to clear debris).
6. Review lessons learned about institutional behaviour, e.g., the role of the regulator. See
Chapter 16 for a case study.
7. Examine the impact on accident evolution of having multiple units at one site.
3.3 Problems
1. Browns Ferry Fire, 1975:
a. Locate (as a minimum) the following source material (try the USNRC web site):
Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant; Tennessee Valley Authority; March 22, 1975 -
Final Report of Preliminary Investigating Committee, May 7, 1975.
b. Assess the Browns Ferry fire in terms of threats to the ability to control, cool,
contain, and monitor.
c. Indicate lessons learned. Describe how you derived these lessons learned. Do
not just copy official lessons learned.
d. Comment on the robustness of the design and indicate whether design or oper-
ating changes should have been considered (and why).
2. Tokai-Mura, 1999:
a. Locate (as a minimum) the following material: International Atomic Energy
Agency, Report on the Preliminary Fact Finding Mission Following the Accident at
the Nuclear Fuel Processing Facility in Tokaimura, Japan; IAEA report, 1999.
b. Assess the accident in terms of threats to the ability to control, cool, contain, and
monitor.
c. Indicate lessons learned. Describe how you derived these lessons learned. Do
not just copy official lessons learned.
d. Comment on the robustness of the facility design and operation, and indicate
whether design or operating changes should have been considered (and why).
cepted that people will implicitly accept a somewhat higher risk to life and limb if it
comes as part of their job, i.e., if a direct benefit is obtained. Attempts have been made
(e.g., in the United Kingdom, see [HSE, 2006]) to set (nuclear) safety goals for plant
workers in nuclear power plants, but the risk to such workers is dominated by conven-
tional industrial risk, which itself turns out to be less than in comparable non-nuclear in-
dustries.
The goal refers to the risk of nuclear power in isolation. Just as there is a risk to having
nuclear power, there is also a risk to not having it, because the electricity would then
have to be generated from other sources with greater (or lesser) risk.
The goal does not distinguish between prompt and delayed risk of death. We can break down
the safety goal proposed above into two sub-goals:
“The annual risk of prompt death to the most exposed member of the public due to ac-
cidents in a reactor should be small in comparison to his/her total annual risk of prompt
death due to all accidents”,
and
“The annual risk of fatal cancer to the most exposed member of the public due to acci-
dents in a reactor should be small in comparison to his/her total annual risk of fatal can-
cer due to all causes.”
211 deaths per 100,000 people. Therefore, the average person’s risk of dying from cancer is 2.1
× 10-3 per year (or about 16% over a 75-year lifetime). Recall from Chapter 1 that 100 person-Sv
will produce about five fatal cancers in the exposed population, or a risk of 5 × 10-2 fatal cancers
per Sv. Therefore, using the linear dose-effect hypothesis, 211 cancer deaths per 100,000
people would be induced by a collective dose D calculated as follows:
D(Sv) × 5 × 10-2 (cancers / Sv) = 211 cancer fatalities, (4)
which means that D = 4220 Sv, or an average individual dose of 42 mSv. However, the linear
dose-effect hypothesis is not applicable to such low doses. Regardless, if we divide by 100 again,
then the maximum time-averaged individual dose from accidents should be less than 0.4 mSv
per year, averaged over a group of people, or about 25% of natural background radiation in
Toronto (1.6 mSv / year). The paradox with this safety goal is that it would make nuclear power
safer than natural background radiation.
This is not as useful a safety goal as the previous one because it does not tell us anything about
the frequency distribution of accidents. However, it can likewise be validated by summing all
the events in a PSA which cause a release of radioactive material.
At a more basic level, summing low doses over large numbers of people is incorrect, and a
safety goal derived this way is fundamentally flawed.
This is largely consistent with international practice for new reactors, with one new concept: the
low release frequency. It is intended to address those accident scenarios which may result in
small but significant releases. These accidents may require emergency measures such as
sheltering or short-term evacuation of an area around the plant, and the low release frequency
sets a limit on these [Rzentkowski, 2013].
An approach to safety based only on a safety goal has both benefits and limitations. The
greatest benefit is that risk-based decisions require greater levels of protection on those areas
of greatest risk, and conversely, i.e., they optimize safety resources. Some limitations are:
To determine compliance with a risk target, all significant events have to be identified
and summed. This might be challenging in the early phases of a design.
Safety goals are meaningful only for events for which frequencies and consequences are
reasonably calculable. In practice, this includes most “internal” events for which actual
data exist, for which the failure combinations can be calculated, or for which a reason-
able extrapolation from the historical record can be made. However, if the design has
innovative features, with little operating experience, it may be difficult to support the
reliability values and hard to spot the cross-links4. Passive safety systems pose a par-
ticular challenge in this regard because they can be difficult to test, and therefore it is
hard to build up a reliability database.
Not all (rare) events can be assigned a frequency and consequence with confidence, for
example:
o massive structural failure
o massive failure of pressure vessels
o very low-frequency, high-consequence external events such as earthquakes be-
yond historical record-keeping
o sabotage, terrorism, and war.
The approach to the first two is usually to design to accepted engineering codes and standards.
Then one can infer from experience the likelihood of sudden failure of structures and compo-
nents so designed. Massive failure of a LWR pressure vessel would be a catastrophic event
because it would lead to an immediate release of fission products and probably would damage
containment at the same time. Calculations have been done to show that such massive failures
are less frequent than 10-8 per year, but such low frequencies must be treated with some
skepticism. Rare events can happen by unanticipated sneak paths; for example, a precursor to a
pressure-vessel boundary failure was the undetected almost-through-wall erosion of the
reactor pressure vessel in the Davis-Besse plant [USNRC, 2002]. Similarly, historical records
make it possible to define the intensity of earthquakes down to about the ten-thousand-year
return frequency, which is taken as the design basis earthquake (DBE) in Canada. More severe
but rarer earthquakes are hard to characterize. One can carry out a “seismic margin” analysis to
calculate the likelihood of surviving an earthquake somewhat more severe than the DBE; much
beyond that, about all one can say is that the effects of damage to the nuclear plant would be
4
A cross-link is a failure that affects more than one system or component, e.g. a common supply of instrument air.
small compared to the havoc wreaked by such an earthquake on the rest of society, as was the
case for Fukushima. Finally for events resulting from hostile human actions, the approach has
generally been to design according to rules (e.g., the plant’s inherent defences plus the local
security force should be able to delay an attack of x people armed with y type of weapons for z
minutes); x, y, and z are indeed chosen based on reasonableness (likelihood), but the historical
database of hostile acts against nuclear power plants is sparse. In any case, the defences being
built into new plants for severe accidents are also helpful against malevolent acts.
For these reasons, those regulators that have safety goals use them in addition to whatever
deterministic criteria they have developed. This combination is called a risk-informed approach,
in which the quantified risk provides a powerful rationality check.
P( A
n 1
n | B) 1 . (7)
Multiplying by P(B):
N N
P ( B ) P ( B ) P ( An | B ) P ( An ) P ( B | An )
n 1 n 1
. (8)
This is Bayes’ theorem. Therefore, if we know P(B|An), we can calculate P(An|B). A couple of
examples will make this clearer.
Sample Problems
Pipe Inspection
Suppose that you are radiographing a Class I pipe for a defect. You know from past experience
that the likelihood of a defect is one per 100,000 radiographs. You also know that the likelihood
that the instrument indicates a defect when there is no defect (false positive) is 1%, and the
likelihood that the instrument indicates a defect when a defect in fact exists is 99%. Your test
indicates a defect. What is the probability that the pipe actually has a defect when the instru-
ment says it does?
Answer:
Apply Bayes’ theorem to two events:
1
This is a slight simplification using the fact that P(A) is small. Actually
P(B) = P(B|A) P(A) + P(B|Ᾱ) P(Ᾱ)
= 0.99 × .00001 + 0.01 × 0.99999
= 0.0100098
or approximately 0.01 as stated.
In words, the first term is the 99% chance of detecting the defect in the one pipe in 100,000 that has the defect;
the second term is the 1% chance of indicating a false positive in the remaining 99,999 pipes out of 100,000.
Uniform Prior
P(An) 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667
P(An|B) 8.14 x 10-66 1.20 x 10-7 0.0741 0.281 0.321 0.325
Non-Uniform Prior
P(An) 0.001 0.01 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.089
P(An|B) 2.27 x 10-66 3.36 x 10-9 0.0251 0.358 0.394 0.0808
where p(x) is the probability density function. If p(x) is a constant, po, then P(X) = po(X-xmin), as
expected.
There are two types of systems:
1) Those that operate on demand (i.e., safety systems)
2) Those that operate continuously (i.e., process systems).
Assuming that the device eventually fails, the reliability, R(t) is defined as
R(t ) 1 F (t )
t
f ( )d f ( )d . (16)
0 0
f ( )d
t
Therefore,
dR(t ) dF (t )
f (t ) . (17)
dt dt
Let λ(t) dt = probability of failure at time t given successful operation up to time t (i.e., the
conditional failure rate); then:
f (t )dt (t )dtR(t )
or , (18)
dR(t )
f (t ) (t ) R(t )
dt
and hence
dR(t )
(t ) R(t ) . (19)
dt
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
64 The Essential CANDU
( ) d
R(t ) e 0
. (20)
If λ is constant, (i.e., random failures):
R(t ) e t . (21)
A typical λ(t) is shown in [McCormick, 1981], page 26—the “bathtub” curve (Figure 24).
f ( )d
( ) d
t
e 0
f ( )d
( ) d
0
1 e 0
f ( )d
MTTF= 0
f ( )d
f ( )d
0
0
(22)
since f ( )d 1
0
(a component will eventually fail).
If λ is constant, then
1
MTTF e d . (23)
0
Let repair occur at some time interval, τ. This resets the failure probability to zero each time the
component is repaired, assuming that the repair is perfect and restores the component to its
original condition. Then F(t) is a sawtooth curve, as illustrated in Figure 26.
If τ << λ, then
2t 2
F (t ) 1 (1 t ...) t for t< in any interval , (24)
2
with t measured after the time of last repair.
Hence:
F , (25)
2
i.e., the failure probability is half the test interval times the failure rate.
A common task is to design a system (composed of components that have a known failure rate)
to meet some target unavailability (1-A) or Ᾱ. Given a design, the repair interval is the remain-
ing variable. A frequent repair cycle (low τ) gives a low Ᾱ, but such frequent repair may be
impractical due to excessive cost, radiation exposure, or wearout (i.e., repair does not restore
the equipment to an as-built state). In such a situation, alternative designs would have to be
considered.
Often repair may not be required to return F to zero. It may be sufficient simply to test the
components to ensure that they are available. This is usually the case for “demand” systems.
Sample Problem
Consider the case of a single shut-off rod (SOR) for a reactor. Given a failure rate based on
previous experience of λ = 0.002/year and a required unavailability of ≤10 -3, what is the re-
quired test period, τ?
Answer:
A 0.001 . (27)
2
To meet the Ᾱ target of 10-3, we solve for τ:
103
1 year . (28)
0.001/ yr
The conversion to the second term makes the calculation much easier because there are fewer
terms to sum. Assuming that the rods fail independently and that the failure rate is λ, then the
probability of a given rod failing on average is:
F p for conciseness (30)
2
as before. The success probability is 1-p. In general, the probability of event Ek is
N!
P( Ek ) (1 p)n k p k . (31)
( N k )!k !
N!
The factor gives the number of possible ways for the event to happen, the factor
( N k )!k !
(1-p)n-k is the probability that N-k rods all successfully drop, and the factor pk is the probability
that k all fail to drop.
The last step is not conceptually difficult, but the amount of arithmetic can be huge. It is almost
always done using special-purpose codes for all but the simplest of fault trees.
One test of a properly drawn fault tree is that causality cannot pass through an OR gate—if it
does, an AND gate is missing. For an OR gate, the input faults are never the causes of the
output fault—they are identical to the output, but more specifically defined as to cause. For an
AND gate, there is a causal relationship between the inputs and the output—the input faults
collectively represent the causes of the output fault.
There are additional types of gates which we will not cover here. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Fault Tree Handbook [USNRC, 1981] is a superb source for learning fault-tree
analysis.
Sample Problem
etc.
This results in the fault tree shown in Figure 28. Note that there are many ways of drawing this;
for example, one could recognize that the failure of the signal affects all components and
therefore could be in an “OR” gate just under the top event. It is always safer, however, to
follow the principle of immediate cause.
Having drawn the fault tree, we now assign labels to each basic event (V1, V2, V3, S, P1, P2), as
shown in Figure 28. We can also assign intermediate labels (A, B, C) to help in the calculations.
Now we can write out the Boolean algebra, starting from the bottom. It is important NOT to
assign numerical values immediately to the basic events and work out the final answer before
doing the Boolean algebra. In many cases, this will lead to double counting because terms such
as S+S will be counted twice. Remember that in Boolean logic, S+S=S, not 2S, and S●S=S, not S2.
they have to account for a failure in the fault tree (example, loss of instrument air) also occur-
ring in the event tree, or a failure of a mitigating system (e.g., loss of service water) which is
common to the failure of other mitigating systems. This topic is well beyond the scope of this
section. For more on common-cause failures, see [USNRC, 1981].
A simple example, which should be self-explanatory, is shown in Figure 29, where P1, P2, P3,
etc. are the probabilities of success for each mitigating system. Note that if the failure prob-
abilities (1 – Pi) are small, the success probabilities can be assumed to be equal to one when
calculating each success branch. So, for example, the frequency of core damage in the se-
quence just below the box labelled “Stable” is:
Small LOCA frequency x (1-P3) x P4,
and one could set P4=1 in calculating this branch, as a good approximation. Note also that even
if ECC fails, the moderator will maintain pressure tube integrity and prevent fuel melting by
removing heat from the fuel channel, as described in Section 5.3.2.3.
function of ECC is called ECI, or Emergency Coolant Injection, because ECC also has other
functions such as steam generator cooldown and loop isolation 1). Then, after the HTS has been
depressurized, medium-pressure and finally low-pressure water is injected. The HP water is
supplied, for example, from a water tank (accumulator) pressurized by huge gas cylinders.
Medium-pressure cooling water can be supplied from a water tank by ECC pumps, and low-
pressure water is retrieved from the sumps in the reactor-building basement, cooled, and
pumped back into the HTS. For CANDU reactors, an ECC mission time of one to three months
has been set2. The ECCS is consequently divided into two separate fault trees for the purposes
of analysis: dormant ECC and long-term ECC (designated DECC and LTECC respectively). The
DECC fault tree focuses on failure to detect the LOCA event, failure to initiate high-pressure (HP)
cooling water, failure to distribute the flow, and failure to provide medium- and low-pressure
water. The LTECC fault tree focuses on failure to provide long-term low-pressure cooling due to
pump failure, valve failure, flow blockage, loss of electrical power, or loss of coolant supply.
1
Such a distinction is made in Canada, but most other places just use ECC.
2
The mission time is defined here as the time beyond which the decay heat can be removed from the fuel to the
moderator without any water in the fuel channel, so as to prevent any further fuel failures due to overheating. It is
a calculated number.
were excluded.
The contributors to the SCDF are shown in Figure 30. Note that it is the high-frequency initiat-
ing events, including many AOOs, that dominate the SCDF; the bounding accidents such as large
LOCAs contribute very little and hence are much less risk-significant.
4.3 Problems
1. What can you say quantitatively about the probability of a pressure-tube/calandria tube
failure in a CANDU, based on that fact that only one has occurred? You will need to calculate the
number of reactor-years of experience with CANDU operation. Use Bayes’ Theorem.
2. Two 100% electrical motor-driven auxiliary feed-water pumps are located in the turbine
building and depend on recirculated cooling water and two independent power supplies. They
have the flow capability to mitigate steam- and feed water-line breaks. Identify common mode
and common-cause failures. The utility wants to extend the life of the plant and is planning
refurbishment. What mitigation features or modifications would you include to reduce or
eliminate these failures?
3. Develop a set of high-level safety goals for a military-use nuclear submarine. They can
be, but do not have to be, numerical. The most important part of your answer is to explain and
justify it, not whether or not it matches someone else’s “official” goals. Consider any differ-
ences due to docked versus at-sea and peacetime versus war.
4. Small reactors could be used in remote northern communities for heating and electricity
production. They would replace very expensive diesel generators, the fuel for which has to be
flown in, whereas the reactor could be designed to be refueled once in twenty years. Small
reactors have also been used for powering unattended remote military installations. Propose
5 Mitigating systems
In previous sections, we have referred to the four safety functions required in a nuclear reactor:
shut down the reactor
remove decay heat
contain any radioactive material
monitor the state of the plant.
In this section, we shall describe the major systems that perform these functions. We shall
concentrate on CANDU for our examples, although other reactor types have similar systems.
First, however, we need to ask how much redundancy and independence we need for each
safety function. This concept is called defence-in-depth and is a fundamental underpinning of
nuclear safety.
5.1 Defence-in-Depth
The concept of defence-in-depth was developed for military purposes. At one level, it consists
of a series of physical barriers, so that breaching any one barrier (or even more) does not lead
to disaster. The Krak Castle in Syria is one such example, where an (ancient) intruder would
have to breach the moat, the outer wall, the inner wall, and the keep to capture the ruler. More
generally, defence in depth requires that a defender deploy his resources, such as fortifications,
field works, and military units both at and well behind the front line, so that a breach in the
front line does not lead directly to defeat.
the various approaches in Section 2, e.g., large loss-of-coolant accident, loss of reactivity
control, loss of Class IV power, etc. Each of these accidents contributes to answering the
following questions, and the limiting value in each case becomes a design requirement for the
shutdown system:
How is negative reactivity inserted into the core?
How fast does the system have to act once it receives a signal?
How much reactivity depth must it have (how many negative milli-k?)
How reliable must it be?
What are the analysis limits that describe effectiveness?
What sorts of signals are available and practical to trigger the shutdown system for
each accident?
What sort of environment must the shutdown system be designed to withstand?
How do we ensure that a fault does not affect both the control system and a shut-
down system? Or both shutdown systems?
How do we know that the systems will work as designed?
How does the operator know that the system has been required and that it has
worked?
We shall cover these topics in turn. Many of these questions are common to other safety
systems, and therefore we shall explore them in detail the first time and simply refer to them
later.
spring-loaded, which accelerates them over the first few feet of travel. Mechanically, the rod is
suspended on a cable running over a pulley, which is released by a clutch and wound back up by
a motor. The rod itself falls into a perforated guide tube within the moderator; the purpose of
the guide tube is to make sure that the rod falls straight in and does not tip over or snag.
5.2.2 Speed
The required speed is set by the fastest accident. In CANDU, this is the large loss-of-coolant
accident, where the break is assumed to grow to full size instantaneously—a very pessimistic
assumption and inconsistent with what we know of pipe dynamics [Tregoning, 2008]. Core
voiding for such a case inserts positive reactivity at a rate of approximately 4 mk/sec. One of
the main safety requirements during this phase is to prevent melting of the central part of any
fuel pin due to overpower, because significant amounts of molten fuel could risk failure of the
nearby pressure tube. As long as the net positive reactivity is kept below approximately 6 mk,
depending on the design and the assumptions, the energy is not sufficient to melt the centre of
the fuel. This then suggests that the shutdown system has to start to bite (insert negative
reactivity) in approximately one second, and that the initial reactivity insertion rate has to
overcome the 6 mk already inserted, as well as turning the transient over by 1.5 seconds—in
other words, tens of (negative) mk/sec.
5.2.4 Availability
Demand unavailability is expressed in dimensionless units, although it is also written as
hours/year or years/year. The required unavailability is set primarily by the safety goals applied
to the reactor by the regulator, and for current CANDUs, it is at most one failure per 1000
demands (10-3 per demand) for safety systems. Experience has shown that the shutdown
systems normally meet approximately 10-4 per demand. Unavailability values much lower than
this are possible, but are usually not credited for a single system because of:
5.2.6 Signals
A shutdown system must detect an accident soon enough that the analysis limits are met.
Some of the commonly used trip signals are listed in Table 8 (this list is illustrative rather than
complete).
Manual trip is credited if the time scales are long—typically fifteen minutes from the first clear
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis 83
signal of the accident in the main control room—and if there is no practical alternative.
5
For plants where portions of the steam mains are within containment
accident. If it is not possible to meet this requirement, then a redundant system is needed. For
example, a major fire in or near the main control room would require shutdown (because it
could affect the control computers) and at the same time would possibly damage some of the
components of Shutdown System 1 so that it would not respond (although it would very likely
fail safe)—and therefore SDS2 (which does not depend on the integrity of the main control
room) is used as a back-up to perform this safety function.
The shutdown mechanisms in CANDU act mostly within the moderator, which protects them
from some of the effects of accidents—but not all. For example, we must design so that:
no high-energy pipes are within striking distance of the reactivity mechanisms deck
on top of the reactor, where the shut-off rod clutches and pulleys are located.
an in-core break cannot disable shut-off rods to the extent that the system does not
meet its reactivity depth requirements (it is not possible to protect all the guide
tubes and rods from pipe whip and jet forces from an in-core break).
shutdown-system cables and instruments are separated to the extent practical so
that a local fire will not incapacitate both shutdown systems.
steam, high temperatures, water, and high radiation fields from an accident must not
prevent a shutdown system from firing when needed (once it has fired, however,
such protection is no longer needed).
shaking due to an earthquake must not prevent the shutdown system from actuating
nor slow it down so severely that it cannot meet its analysis limits.
5.2.9 Testing
Section 4.2.3.3 discussed the link between testing and avail-
ability. It is not practical to test safety systems fully during on-
power operation; instead, they are designed to have their
components tested in such a way as to preclude actual system
operation. Specifically, the testing of the logic is separated
from that of the final mechanism, and the mechanism is
tested in stages, not all at once.
All safety systems in CANDU have three logic channels, with
two out of three being sufficient to initiate the trip or safety- Figure 35 2/3 logic
system action (Figure 35). The requirement that two channels
must both vote for a trip reduces the likelihood of spurious
trips due to a single component failure. On the other hand, the reactor will still trip if required
even if one channel is unavailable (failed unsafe). Finally, a single channel can be tested without
tripping the reactor.
The shut-off rods are designed to be partially dropped individually in a test. In other words,
shortly after the clutch has released and the rod begins to fall, the clutch can be re-energized
and the rod “caught” before it enters the core. This proves that the rod is not stuck in the first
part of its travel. Typically, each rod is partially dropped about once a week.
For Shutdown System 2, Figure 36 shows one way of testing each logic channel and each valve
without firing the system, while any two channels which trip will fire the system. Testing any
single logic channel opens two valves, but does not allow (much) poison to leak into the mod-
erator.
Performance testing is usually done by
measuring the speed of actuation of one or
more components. Therefore, on a partial
rod drop, one can determine how long it
takes the rod to reach the point when it is
caught, or one can test the valve opening
times on SDS2. Before a scheduled shut-
down, a full actuation test of the shutdown
system measures the rod drop versus time
and the actual power rundown.
How much heat must they remove (full power, decay heat, decay heat after x min-
utes, etc.)?
Where are they connected (primary side, secondary side, etc.)?
How are they initiated?
Under what conditions can they operate (pressure, temperature)?
What is their reliability?
Figure 37 shows the variation of decay heat with time after shutdown.
The desired end-point of an accident is a stable cold shutdown—i.e., the reactor is well sub-
critical, the decay heat generated by the fuel is being removed, no further release of radioactive
material from the fuel is taking place, and the reactor is depressurized and “cold” (i.e., ~100°C
or less). Therefore, in addition to removing the decay heat from the fuel as it is generated,
there must be some additional heat-removal capability to cool the reactor down.
removal system (pumps and heat exchangers) and can be used in a severe core-damage acci-
dent, e.g., if a LOCA plus loss of ECC plus loss of moderator heat removal all occur. In current
CANDUs, the shield tank does not have enough heat-removal capability (0.3%) to match that
being generated by the fuel; in addition, the causes for the failure of ECC and moderator cooling
may also have disabled the heat-removal capability of the shield tank (e.g., loss of electrical
power, loss of service water). However, several current CANDUs and all new ones, have in-
stalled gravity-driven makeup to the shield tank and/or the calandria to provide a much longer-
term heat-removal capability.
5.3.5 Reliability
Unlike the case of shutdown systems, the mission time of decay heat-removal systems can
extend to days or months, and therefore we need to determine both the demand availability
(reliability to start) and the running reliability once the system has started. A typical active
decay heat-removal system consists of pumps, which require electrical power, and heat ex-
changers, which require a source of cooling water, which in turn requires electrical power.
Unavailabilities in the range of 10-2 to 10-3 to start and 10-1 to 10-2 over a specified mission time
are typical. Therefore, redundancy in decay heat-removal systems is necessary.
A high-pressure initial injection phase limits fuel overheating for small breaks and forces
early cooling for large breaks (to limit pressure-tube deformation and early fuel damage).
Typical injection pressure is 5.3 MPa. In CANDU 6, high-pressure injection comes from two
water tanks which are pressurized by gas at the time of a LOCA signal. In some multi-unit
CANDU plants, this high-pressure phase is supplied by electrically driven pumps because the
reliability of Class IV power tends to be very high (it can be obtained from other operating
units as well as the grid).
Medium-pressure injection takes over when the high-pressure water tanks are nearly empty.
It uses medium-pressure (~1 MPa) pumps and draws cold water from the dousing tank or a
similar reservoir. It pumps this water into the same locations (all headers) as the high-
pressure ECC. The medium-pressure phase ensures that enough water has collected in the
basement of the containment building before the next (recovery) phase starts.
In recovery injection, the medium-pressure ECC pumps are switched over to take water from
the sump in the basement. They pump this water through dedicated ECC heat exchangers
before returning it to the heat-transport system. This phase is the long-term heat sink.
Figure 41 shows the three phases schematically for a large LOCA.
Crash cooldown is more significant. If a break is small, less than, say, a feeder failure, it is not
able to depressurize the heat-transport system down to ECC pressure or to keep it below ECC
pressure once injection begins. Crash cooldown opens all the MSSVs on all the steam lines and
blows down the steam-generator secondary side to near atmospheric pressure over about 15
minutes. Because the steam generators are still a heat sink for the primary coolant in a small
LOCA, this forces the primary-side pressure down over the same time scale. Therefore, it
ensures that ECC is not blocked by the heat-transport pressure “hanging up” at secondary-side
pressure and that the unfailed loop will also be refilled by ECC. Some CANDUs (Darlington) use
high-pressure pumps for a small LOCA and are not as dependent on crash cooldown for this
purpose.
5.4.6 Reliability
As a safety system, the ECC must meet a demand unavailability of 10-3 or less. A running
unreliability of 10-2 over the three-month mission time has been used as a design target.
Availability will be better because fuel will heat up more slowly in the longer term if interrup-
tions in ECC occur; hence, there may be time to repair the fault in ECC before further fuel
damage occurs.
5.5 Containment
The important aspects of containment are the following:
1. What is the design pressure?
2. What is the leak rate at design pressure?
3. How is pressure controlled? How is heat removed?
4. How is containment isolation ensured?
5. What is the containment reliability?
6. What other functions must containment perform?
Should the pressure exceed the design pressure, the building will not explode (typical safety
margins on massive failure of the building are a factor of about three over the design pressure;
see [Rizkalla, 1984], [Rizkalla, 1986]). However, the leak rate is harder to predict because the
leak area may increase. In particular the leak-tightness of any penetrations and seals above
design pressure is dependent on their detailed design and will need to be determined on a case-
by-case basis. In any event, for an epoxy-lined containment, leakage would increase through
penetrations and cracks before the internal pressure reached failure pressure, and therefore it
would be very unlikely for the building to fail catastrophically.
[Morison, 1987]). The sprays are likewise self-actuated on the pressure differential caused by
the LOCA. The water sprays condense the steam and reduce the internal pressure. The con-
tainment pressure quickly goes sub-atmospheric and remains so for several days after an
accident, meaning that leakage is inward, not outward.
The single-unit CANDU 6 also uses pressure suppression (Figure 42). The sprays and the ele-
vated water tank are located in the reactor building. There are six spray arms, each with spray
valves, arranged as two valves in series on each spray arm (to avoid a spurious douse). The
valves on three spray arms are pneumatically operated, and for diversity, the valves on the
other three are electrically operated. The containment building is made of pre-stressed, post-
tensioned concrete with an epoxy liner for leak-tightness. Dousing cycles on and off for small
breaks, but for large breaks, it remains on until the dousing water is used up and is all on the
basement floor of the reactor building. Dousing does not control pressure in the long term
because it is used up in the early part of an accident.
In the longer term, heat can be removed by containment air coolers. These require both water
and electrical power. Alternatively, low-flow sprays can also be used, with heat being removed
from the spray water by heat exchangers and the cooled water pumped back up to the spray
arms.
5.5.3 Isolation
In normal operation, containment is not a sealed system. Many fluid lines penetrate the build-
ing (e.g., steam lines, feed-water lines, service water lines, instrument lines). For CANDUs, the
building is normally ventilated for atmospheric temperature control, especially because person-
nel access to parts of the building is possible and required during operation. Some penetra-
tions, particularly ventilation, could be pathways for release of radioactive material if an acci-
dent should occur, and therefore, on an accident signal, these are automatically isolated.
Steam, feed-water, and service-water lines are not isolated immediately in CANDU practice
because continuing to use a running system is more reliable than stopping it and starting up
another one. For LWRs, the opposite approach is taken due to a different philosophy of con-
tainment isolation [USNRC, 2013] and partly due to the reactivity increase on a steam-line break
in LWRs. However, main steam isolating valves (MSIVs) are used in recent CANDUs to prevent
leakage to the environment through a pre-existing steam-generator tube failure after an acci-
dent, but they are manually operated and slow. Feed water and service water are not normally
isolated.
5.5.4 Reliability
As a special safety system, the containment must meet a demand unavailability of 10 -3
years/year or less. Containment leak-tightness is tested every few years by pressurizing the
building and measuring the leak rate. This is an invasive and expensive test, and if the leak rate
exceeds the requirement, one must assume that a containment impairment has existed for half
the interval between tests. Therefore, on-line leakage monitoring systems are being deployed
in existing reactors. The containment isolation system is likewise tested during operation to
prove that its unavailability target is not being exceeded.
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis 99
5.6 Monitoring
For most accidents, the plant state is monitored from the main control room (MCR), and the
safety functions of shutdown, heat removal, and containment can be performed from there.
Some accidents, however, can render the MCR uninhabitable or inoperable: for example,
earthquakes, fire in the MCR, hostile takeover, aircraft strikes, and high radiation fields. A
secondary control area (SCA) is provided for such eventualities; the operators relocate to the
SCA and can perform the required safety functions from there.
5.7 Problems
1. Select an accident from the case studies discussed in Section 3 and analyze it in terms of
the five levels of defence in depth (both barriers and objectives). Which aspects were present?
Which were missing?
2. Consider the ZED-2 reactor described in Section 2.7. What elements of defence in depth
are present in this design? What elements are missing? Why might it be acceptable to have
missing or weak levels of defence-in-depth?
3. Using the SLOWPOKE 10MW heating reactor described in Section 2.7, describe the
possible shutdown-system requirements in terms of design, rate, depth, signals, margins,
environment, and independence. Give reasons—do not simply copy existing material.
4. Using the ZED-2 zero-power research reactor described in Section 2.7, describe the
possible shutdown-system (moderator dump) requirements in terms of design, rate, depth,
signals, margins, environment, and independence. Give reasons—do not simply copy existing
material.
5. Look up (e.g., from the USNRC web site) the design of either the EPR or AP1000 decay
heat-removal systems. Summarize them and discuss advantages and disadvantages compared
to the CANDU decay heat-removal systems (choose one CANDU plant for your comparison). If
you do not have access to CANDU information, simply compare EPR and AP1000 decay heat
removal systems.
6. What are the options for heat removal from containment after a severe accident (core
damage)? What are the pros and cons of each of these options? Feel free to look up what
choices have been made by modern designs.
6.2 Margins
A discussion of margins must start by defining the essential physical barriers that need to be
preserved, or their degradation limited, to meet regulatory dose limits with confidence.
Typically, these barriers are the fuel matrix, the fuel sheath, and the heat-transport system
including the pressure tube, the calandria tube, and the calandria shell. To prevent failure of an
essential barrier, physically based quantitative parameter limits are chosen for each failure
mechanism—e.g., Tfuel < 2800°C is a parameter limit (no fuel melting) which will prevent one
mechanism of failure of the pressure-tube barrier through local strain. More conservative
surrogate criteria are chosen if the parameter limit is uncertain. Analysis limits are chosen to
ensure that the parameter limit or surrogate criterion is met. This framework, along with the
use of conservative assumptions and data in the safety analysis, gives the margin to the barrier
failure point, as shown in Figure 44.
Figure 44 Margins
Of necessity, many assumptions about plant operation are made in safety analysis. These are
usually chosen to envelop actual or expected operation—for example, safety analysis will use a
maximum bundle power that is greater than that expected in operation. The plant must oper-
ate consistently with the assumptions in the safety analysis. The operators therefore define a
safe operating envelope (SOE) of parameters under operational control6. Operating the plant
within this envelope ensures consistency with the safety analysis assumptions and incidentally
provides another margin to the results of safety analysis. It is important that the safety analyst
not make assumptions that are too restrictive because this will unnecessarily limit operation.
Other methods of safety analysis are best estimate with analysis of uncertainties (BEAU), which
we will cover later, and best-estimate analysis, which is used for severe accidents.
6
In other countries, a set of Technical Specifications serves a similar purpose.
an accident (if any) and the release of fission products to the fuel channel. Codes used include
ELESTRES-IST for initial fuel conditions and ELOCA-IST for transient behaviour [Lewis, 2009].
Under certain circumstances, such as a large LOCA combined with loss of ECC injection, the
pressure tube will overheat and (depending on the internal pressure) sag or strain into contact
with the calandria tube. This requires models of the pressure-tube thermal-mechanical tran-
sient behaviour to predict the extent of deformation and the pressure-tube temperature and
internal pressure when or if it contacts the calandria tube. Such models are now part of the
system thermo-hydraulics code.
The behaviour of a channel subsequent to such contact depends on the heat transfer from the
calandria tube to the moderator. Further deformation will not occur if the calandria-tube outer
surface does not dry out, or at least does not go into widespread film boiling. This in turn
depends on the heat transfer coefficient between the pressure tube and the calandria tube, and
the local moderator sub-cooling. For the first, there are theoretical models and comparisons
with experiment – see, e.g., [Currie, 1984] and [Currie, 1986]. For the second, a two- or three-
dimensional prediction of moderator temperatures (and hence flows) is required. Of most
interest is the steady-state distribution at the time of contact, although transient calculations
are required for in-core breaks. The current industry code is MODTURC-CLAS. See [Xu, 1999]
for a brief description of MODTURC-CLAS and a good summary of thermo-hydraulic codes used
in CANDU.
Following the release of fission products from the fuel, their movement through the heat
transport system to containment and then within containment should be predicted. To date,
CANDU safety analysis has not used models for fission-product transport within the HTS and for
deposition on surfaces such as end fittings and feeder piping, although this is clearly an area
which could be included and has been the subject of intensive R&D over a number of years.
However, the partitioning of fission products between steam and water phases at the break and
within containment has been modelled, as has long-term formation and transport of organic
iodides within and from the water pool. See [Wren, 1999] and [Wren, 2001].
The containment-pressure transient calculation uses the transient energy release from the
break and includes sub-models for dousing, containment air coolers, fission products, hydrogen
transport, and natural and forced circulation. Multi-node, multi-fluid (water, steam, air, hydro-
gen) three-dimensional containment models are used for this analysis. The GOTHIC interna-
tional code is used for CANDU; see, e.g., [Andreani, 2010].
The final step is calculation of dose to the public. The atmospheric dispersion model typically
uses a Gaussian plume model to predict exposure as a function of distance from the station; the
input is the predicted transient release of radionuclides from containment for each accident.
See [Boss, 2006] for an example. The weather assumed is traditionally the worst weather
occurring more than 10% of the time at the site. Exposure-to-dose calculations use standard
ICRP-recommended conversion factors ([ICRP, 2010], [ICRP, 2012]).
Figure 45 shows this whole process as a flowchart.
6.4.2 Thermo-hydraulics
The major integral facility used for validation of system thermo-hydraulic codes is RD-14M,
shown in Figure 47 [Buell, 2003]. It is a full-elevation model of a typical figure-of-eight CANDU
reactor heat-transport system, at full pressure and temperature conditions, and with ten full-
length electrically heated channels. All HTS components are simulated: channels, end-fittings,
feeders, headers, and steam generators. Mass flux, transit times, and pressure and enthalpy
distributions are similar to CANDU. Tests cover all phases of a large or small LOCA scenario,
including blowdown and refill, natural circulation in single-phase and two-phase, and loss of
shutdown cooling.
6.4.3 Fuel
Separate-effects fuel testing is performed out-of-reactor. For integral tests, the NRU reactor has
a vertical in-core loop that can be loaded with CANDU fuel elements and subjected to a LOCA
(Blowdown Test Facility). Fuel behaviour during extended post-dryout operation has also been
studied in the NRU loops.
Maximize overpower
Fresh transient
Steam Generators
HTS Pumps
1) Pump Suction
Feeders
2) Inlet Header
7
Pickering A and B, CANDU 6, and Darlington
pressure, which is falling, and can force the sheath to strain. Some fuel sheaths may fail.
The temperature excursion depends on the break size, which is traditionally chosen to
“stagnate” the flow in the downstream channels, e.g., 30%-40% RIH breaks8 in Figure 54.
8
The percentage is twice the cross-sectional area of the pipe; hence, a 100% break is twice the cross-sectional
area, allowing for discharge of coolant from both ends of the broken pipe. Note that other breaks may also
stagnate at different times; which one results in the highest fuel and sheath temperatures is determined by
analysis.
These requirements for barrier protection can be translated into analysis limits, as discussed
earlier. A detailed list of analysis limits is outside the scope of this Chapter.
some typical accidents in Table 13. Relevant coefficients are shown in brackets.
For further information, a detailed and quantitative comparison of power transients in LWRs
and CANDUs has been given by Meneley and Muzumdar in two papers. The first [Meneley,
2009] gives an overview comparison of positive reactivity insertion accidents, whereas the
second [Muzumdar, 2009] looks specifically at large LOCA events in CANDU. These papers are
recommended reading for those wishing to understand further the safety differences and
similarities between the two reactor concepts.
9
For Bruce and Darlington, the steam line runs entirely outside the containment boundary.
inventory, heat removal from the heat-transport system degrades, and the operator is required
to initiate an alternate heat sink such as the shutdown cooling system. Note that because the
shutdown cooling system is a high-pressure heat-removal system, the operator does not need
to depressurize the HTS before initiating this alternate heat sink in emergencies.
under its own weight as well as that of the supported channels [Simpson, 1996]. This process
continues as more channels are uncovered. As sagging increases, channel segments separate
near the bundle junctions by sag-induced local strain. A suspended debris bed is thus formed
which moves downward with the falling moderator level. Because a submerged channel can
support only a certain number of channels, the ends of those channels are expected to fail by
shear. This process will increase the loading on the channels below, leading to progressive
failure of the channels and resulting ultimately in the collapse of the reactor core into the water
pool in the bottom of the calandria vessel.
To address the plant state once the debris has collapsed to the bottom of the calandria, Rogers
et al. [Rogers, 1995] developed an empirically based mechanistic model (Figure 62) of the
collapse process, which showed (assuming that the reactor vault is kept full of water) that the
end-state consists of a bed of dry, solid, coarse debris irrespective of the initiating event and the
core-collapse process. Heating of the debris bed is relatively slow because of the low power
density of the mixed debris and the spatial dispersion provided by the calandria shell, with
melting possibly beginning in the interior of the bed about two hours after the start of bed
,
,
fail, in the shield tank / reactor vault. Only if these also fail will debris be in contact
with the containment boundary
Subcritical
Amenable to mitigation by adding water to either the moderator or the reactor vault
/ shield tank.
Some validation of CANDU severe-accident phenomena has been carried out at both large and
small scales. Results obtained from the RASPLAV facility in Moscow have been used to support
heat transfer through vessel walls and retention of debris in a vessel: see [Ader, 1998] and
[Rogers, 2002]. See [Mathew, 2004] for a summary.
6.15 Problems
1. Consider loss of cooling of the spent-fuel bay due to loss of electrical power to the
cooling system. What operating parameters would have the most influence on the outcome,
and how would you select conservative values? What tools would you need to analyze the
accident (i.e., what capabilities would they have to have)?
2. Estimate the evolution (using hand calculations if necessary) of the following severe
accident in CANDU: small loss of coolant plus loss of ECC (assume that crash cooldown is
available because it is on a redundant signal) plus loss of moderator cooling. Write down the
expected event sequence (based on the list below) and estimate the approximate time of:
reactor trip
start of fuel overheating
failure of first channel
core collapse
shield-tank failure
containment behaviour.
Only an approximate answer is sought (to do this accurately could take weeks). If you cannot
obtain the physical data in some cases, especially for the last item, use symbols to show how
you would do the calculation. One approach is to use heat balance.
3. Consider a CANDU that has undergone a severe core-damage accident. Assume that the
core has collapsed into a debris bed at the bottom of the calandria and is being cooled by
boiling of the shield-tank water. Calculate the depth of the debris bed in the calandria (assum-
ing zero porosity) and the average heat flux through the calandria wall. Do the calculation at 12
hours after the event. You will need to look up typical CANDU geometry [AECL, 2005] and
calculate the core decay heat. Do not strive for high accuracy.
where:
Nf(t) is the number of neutrons as a function of time t
k is the multiplication factor for an infinite reactor
ρ is the reactivity
is the total delayed neutron fraction
lp is the prompt neutron lifetime
M is the number of delayed neutron groups (chosen by the analyst, typically 6)
i is the decay constant of the ith delayed neutron group
Ci is the number of neutrons of the ith delayed neutron group,
and for each delayed neutron group:
dCi i N f (t )
i Ci , (33)
dt l p (1 )
where:
Pd(t) is the power produced by all decaying fission products at time t
ni(t) is the number of atoms decaying per unit time of fission product i at time t
Ei is the average energy produced by the decay of each atom of fission product i.
This is more complex than it seems because ni(t) will depend on the irradiation history, each
fission product may have more than one decay chain (with different energies), and many fission
products are generated. In practice, such a fundamental calculation is done as a reference,
assuming a rapid shutdown after equilibrium operation. In most cases, the evolution of the
accident (because it is short) does not materially change the decay power, so that the results
from the fundamental calculation can be fitted using a series of exponentials, and the curve fit
is simply added to the fission power predicted by the physics codes. In exceptional cases, such
as an accident occurring during power manoeuvring, the result will not be very accurate, but as
with any analysis, an upper bound can be assumed (e.g., assuming the decay power appropriate
to prolonged steady-state operation at the maximum operating power level before the acci-
dent). Such a trade-off between simplified assumptions which give a conservative bound to an
answer, and more realistic assumptions which require more sophisticated analysis tools, is very
common in safety analysis. Because safety analysis resources, like all other resources, are finite,
part of the art of safety analysis is in judging when to use bounding assumptions and when to
use realistic complex models. The difficulty is, of course, that bounding models may lead to
unnecessary restrictions on operation, as discussed in Section 6.2.
7.3 Fuel
The key safety parameters related to fuel are:
fuel-sheath integrity
fission product inventory in (and release from) the fuel, and
fuel temperature.
Prediction of fuel temperature in CANDU is important because:
it drives sheath temperature and hence sheath integrity;
high fuel temperatures drive pressure-tube deformation rates;
limited fuel melting can lead directly to fuel-sheath failure;
extensive melting can lead to pressure-tube failure;
release of fission products from the fuel increases with fuel temperature;
reactivity feedback from fuel temperature does occur, although it is small in CANDU.
to a maximum of about 10% for typical CANDU operating conditions [Lewis, 1990].
At any given burnup, a larger fraction of the fission product gases is released near the centre of
the pellet, where the temperature is highest. All volatile fission products tend to migrate down
the temperature gradient toward the outside of the pellet. Their diffusion is assisted by the fact
that the pellet cracks under the influence of the temperature gradient; this cracking increases
with fuel burnup and pellet centre temperature.
In summary:
(a) at low burnup or temperature, nearly all fission products are trapped in fuel grains;
(b) fission products trapped at grain boundaries increase with temperature and burnup;
(c) the gas-gap inventory increases steadily with fuel temperature and burnup.
H a 2
q , (42)
2 (a b)
so that
Ha 2
TC TSo . (43)
2h(a b)
Typical values in CANDU fuel are (see [Page, 1972] for a summary):
kF = 0.004 kW/m.°C
kS = 0.017 kW/m.°C
hg = 7–60 kW/m2.°C
a = 6.07 mm
b = 0.42 mm.
Heat capacity, c, does not enter the steady-state equations, but is important in transients. The
values for uranium dioxide and Zircaloy-4 are respectively 0.5 and 0.4 J/g-°C. The corresponding
heats of fusion are 27 and 42 J/g. The relatively large value of c and the high melting point
(2840°C) for UO2 represent important safety characteristics: typically, one can almost double the
stored energy relative to the normal operating point, inside UO 2 before it melts. Metal fuel, on
the other hand, has little heat capacity and melts at a lower temperature, but has much higher
thermal conductivity, typically ten times more than UO2.
Pr
, (44)
w
where:
P is the pressure differential across the tube,
r is the tube radius,
w is the tube thickness.
The strain rate is then expressed in terms similar to the following:
d
A n e k /T B me /T , (45)
dt
where is strain, A, B, k, l, m, n are determined by experiment, and T is temperature.
where the Wk are all the mass flows into and out of node i along links k.
The conservation of momentum equation is applied to link k and is (ignoring gravity):
dWk Ak f k Lk Wk 2
i
( P P ) k k 2
, (47)
2 gc Ak
j
dt Lk Dk
where for the link:
W is the mass flow in link k (in Figure 66, between nodes i and j)
A is the flow area
P is the pressure in the nodes connected to the link
L is the length
D is the hydraulic diameter
f is the friction factor
(fL/D + k) is a pressure-loss coefficient which accommodates changes in flow area, en-
trance effects, etc.
The first term is simply Newton’s law applied to a fluid to which a pressure difference is applied;
the second term is the loss due to friction plus other effects that cause pressure loss. Terms for
pumps and gravity can be added.
Conservation of energy is applied to each node i as follows:
dU i
Win ein Wout eout Qi , (48)
dt
where
Ui is the internal energy of node i
Qi is the heat generated in node i.
The summations are the rates of energies coming into and out of node i due to mass transfer.
These three equations are applied to each phase. There are four unknowns, e.g., mass, mo-
mentum, temperature, and pressure. The fourth equation needed is the equation of state for
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
144 The Essential CANDU
where
ε is emissivity
T is temperature in degrees Kelvin
σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant (1.36 × 10-4 kilo-calories per metre2-second-K)
f refers to fuel and PT to pressure tube.
A similar equation would apply to radiation from the pressure tube and from the steam itself,
although these quantities tend to be small.
In practice, radiation becomes important at sheath temperatures of approximately 800°C or
more and is approximately equal to the decay power in the fuel around 1200°C–1400°C. In
practice, the hard part is working out the geometry: computer codes break the complex fuel
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis 145
bundle and pressure tube into smaller pieces, calculate the “view factor” (how much of the
pressure tube or neighbouring fuel element each piece can “see”) for each piece, and calculate
the radiation heat transfer piece by piece.
Heat can also be transferred from the calandria tube to the moderator, which is significant after
pressure-tube contact (see below). The heat-transfer characteristics follow a pool boiling curve.
Limited patches of film boiling can be tolerated for short periods after contact; lengthy or
extensive dryout will lead to calandria-tube (and pressure-tube) failure.
7.5.2 Strain
The pressure tube can be heated by conductive, convective, and radiative heat transfer from the
coolant and the hot fuel. If the pressure tube heats up beyond 800°C or so, it will start to
deform plastically. If the channel pressure is high (> 6MPa), the strain highly localized, or both,
the pressure tube may burst; if not, it will either strain radially or sag under gravity to contact
the calandria tube and transfer heat to the moderator water. The equations for pressure-tube
strain are, not surprisingly, similar to those for sheath strain.
7.5.3 Hydrogen
At high temperatures, Zircaloy oxidizes in steam to produce heat and hydrogen:
Zr 2 H 2O ZrO2 2 H 2 heat . (50)
This is a quadruple threat:
hydrogen collects in containment (significant amounts of hydrogen can be produced
quickly only by a LOCA with ECC failure or in a severe core-damage accident) and
can, under the right circumstances, become flammable or detonate; hydrogen can
also be produced slowly over the long term by radiolysis (radiolytic decomposition)
of ECC water as it circulates through the core;
the heat generated by the chemical reaction increases fuel and pressure-tube tem-
peratures;
the presence of a non-condensable gas in large quantities can impede ECC water if
the operator tries to recover from an impairment of ECC by injecting water late 10;
and
the formation of zirconium dioxide may embrittle the sheaths so that they may
fragment and block cooling flow if ECC is eventually restored.
Correlations of the reaction rate of steam and Zircaloy therefore form an essential part of fuel-
channel codes.
The reaction rate becomes autocatalytic around 1400°C–1500°C, that is, the heat it generates
10
This was the fear behind the “gas bubble” within the reactor vessel during the Three Mile Island accident. The
concern was not burning within the vessel because no oxygen was present. The hydrogen which escaped to
containment, which did contain oxygen, formed a flammable mixture of 9% hydrogen and did indeed burn without
serious consequences [Jaffe, 1979].
keeps the chemical reaction going with no further heat input. In light-water reactors, this is a
major concern: the fuel elements are close together, so there is no place to which the heat can
radiate. Regulatory practice in the United States sets a strict limit on sheath temperature in a
design basis accident—namely, 1200oC—which was chosen to allow little possibility of an
autocatalytic reaction. In CANDU, the presence of the colder pressure tube less than a few
centimetres from each fuel element moderates the reaction. Embrittlement is still a concern,
but regulatory practice permits calculation of actual oxidation rates and thicknesses, rather than
setting a criterion based on temperature alone; the particular criterion used in Canada is: “the
oxygen concentration in the cladding must remain below 0.7 wt.% over at least half of the
cladding thickness” (see [Grandjean, 2008] for a broad review).
7.6 Moderator
The modelling requirement for the moderator is to predict the transient local water tempera-
ture at each point. The objective is to show that local moderator sub-cooling at any location
where the pressure tube contacts the calandria tube in an accident is sufficient to prevent
prolonged film boiling on the outside of the calandria tube. The physical problem is therefore
solution of three-dimensional fluid flow with heat addition in a porous medium; the medium is
not continuous because of the presence of fuel channels, reactivity devices, etc. The mass,
momentum, and energy equations described above are therefore generalized to three dimen-
sions. Experimental validation is, of course, a must because of the complex geometry.
7.7 Containment
As far as fundamental equations are concerned, containment behaviour is governed by the
same physical phenomena as the heat-transport system, with a few complications:
the containment volume is compartmentalized, and the flow within the larger com-
partments is three-dimensional;
a number of different fluids coexist: air (the normal contents of containment), steam
and water from a pipe break, and hydrogen if the sheaths are heavily oxidized;
heat is added by steam and hot water and also by radioactive decay of any fission
products carried into the containment atmosphere by the discharging fluid; heat is
removed by water sprays, condensation on containment and equipment surfaces,
containment air coolers, and indirectly by ECC in recovery mode;
pressure can also be influenced by use of the vacuum building (in multi-unit plants),
leakage from containment through cracks, and deliberate venting through filters.
Containment codes usually have sub-models for each of these phenomena.
Many containment codes also track the movement of fission products along with other fluids.
Fission products can exist as:
noble gases, which interact very little with water or surfaces;
tritium oxide (specifically the mixed oxide DTO) from the coolant or moderator.
iodine, cesium, strontium, etc. which interact strongly with water (dissolve and ion-
ize) and tend to plate out on surfaces;
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis 147
actinides such as plutonium. These are released from the fuel in quantity only if the
core is massively destroyed.
Generally, iodine-131 is the significant radioisotope of concern because of its short half-life (8.1
days), high-energy gamma emission, and ability to get into the food chain as described in
Section 7.8.3.
As long as the pH of water inside containment is high, iodine will stay dissolved in the water.
High pH can be engineered through storage of chemicals such as tri-sodium phosphate in areas
likely to flood in an accident. However, a fraction of the iodine will react with organic material
in containment and form methyl iodide, which is volatile, not very soluble, and hard to capture
on filters. In an accident, any iodine-131 which does leak from containment is therefore likely to
be in this chemical form.
Table 14 gives the inventories of the most important noble gases and iodine fission products
computed for a typical 1000 MWe (PWR) plant at the end of a fuel cycle. This example is
illustrative: the time-average inventory would be different in a 1000 MWe CANDU partly be-
cause of on-power fueling and lower burnup.
7.8.3 Dose
Release of radioactive material from containment leads to an external dose to humans (often
called “cloud” dose) which depends on the ambient radiation level and an internal dose which
depends on inhaled species (and, in the longer term, ingestion of contaminated foods). External
dose is a function of exposure time to an ambient radiation level. Internal dose is a function of
radiation uptake and residence time in the body.
For example, the dose from I131 can be delivered through the following route:
released from containment
deposits on grass
eaten by cows
excreted in milk
drunk by people.
Alternatively, I131 can deposit on plants which are eaten directly by people. The external (direct)
dose from atmospheric release of I131 can also be significant.
Detailed tables have been prepared for each radioisotope which make it possible to convert
from external concentration, inhalation, and ingestion to dose. See [ICRP, 2010] for the most
recent tables. However, these are given by type of radiation rather than by radionuclide; for an
older report that does give the conversion factors by radionuclide, see [EPA, 1993].
Sample Problem
Consider a major release of radioactive Ar 41 causing an air concentration χ of 108 Bq/m3. A
person is immersed in this cloud for an hour. What is his external dose?
Answer
From [EPA, 1993], Table III.1, we see that the effective dose coefficient hD for air immersion in
Ar41 is 6.5×10-14 Sv/Bq-s-m3. Hence, the dose D for an immersion of t seconds is:
D hD t 6.5 10 14 Sv/Bq-s-m 3 108 Bq/m 3 3600sec 0.23Sv . (58)
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
150 The Essential CANDU
Note that this assumes a continuous release because we have not accounted for decay; the half-
life of Ar41 is 1.83 hours.
7.9 Problems
1. Calculate the dose to a person due to the release of 1000 Ci/hour of xenon-133 from a
CANDU. Assume that the release point is 20 m high and the receptor is 1 km distant. Assume
further that the person stays in that location for 15 minutes. Consult CSA-N288.1 for any
models you need. You should be able to find dispersion factors in the (public) annual environ-
mental monitoring reports issued, e.g., by OPG.
2. How many grams does 1000 Ci of iodine-131 represent? (Hint: remember or look up the
half-life).
3. Calculate the average volumetric heat generation of the fuel in a 600MW CANDU at
100% power. At what percentage power (assuming the same heat removal from the fuel as in
normal operation) would the centre of the average pin melt?
4. Do the following:
(a) Calculate the amount of hydrogen produced by oxidation of 25% of the Zircaloy in the
sheaths in a CANDU (this is not atypical of a severe accident such as a LOCA + LOECC);
(b) Calculate the amount of energy released (you will need to look up the heat of reaction)
(c) Assume that this energy is released starting from 30 minutes after the accident and ending
two hours afterwards. Compare the energy to the decay heat produced in the same time.
(d) Now assume that the hydrogen is transported into containment and burns. Calculate the
energy produced by the burn.
8 Safety of Operation
In this section, we shall touch briefly on some high-level aspects of safety in operation. No
matter how well a plant is designed, in the end, its safety strongly depends on how, and by
whom, it is operated. We shall then touch briefly on future trends in safety, notably use of
passive systems.
in safety culture.
The difficulty with safety culture was that it was hard to “get hold of”—like personal character,
one could sense when it was deficient, but it was hard to measure. INSAG therefore hastened
to elaborate on the term in a subsequent report [INSAG, 1991] entitled Safety Culture. The
term was redefined as:
“Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and in-
dividuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues re-
ceive the attention warranted by their significance”.
The three concepts in this definition are that safety culture is attitudinal as well as structural;
that it relates both to organizations and individuals; and that it matches all safety requirements
with appropriate perceptions and action. Note that it gives safety a priority to the extent
warranted—it is not an absolute.
In simpler terms, the best design and the most carefully written procedures will not help if staff
does not place safety first in their thoughts and actions. See [IAEA, 2002] and [INSAG, 1999] for
more detail.
Other organizations have used variant definitions. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
[USNRC, 2011a] defines it as “the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective com-
mitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protec-
tion of people and the environment.”
Informal but revealing definitions include “Safety culture is what you do when the boss isn’t
looking”, and “Safety culture is the way we do things around here”.
To assist in recognizing a lack of safety culture, the IAEA has defined the stages of organizational
decline, as shown in Table 15.
Description People and the environ- Radiological barriers and Defence in depth
and INES ment controls at facilities
Level
Serious Exposure in excess of ten Exposure rates of more Near accident at a
Incident Level times the statutory than 1 SV/h in an operat- nuclear power plant with
3 annual limit for workers. ing area. no safety provisions
Non-lethal deterministic Severe contamination in remaining.
health effect (e.g., burns) an area not expected by Lost or stolen highly
from radiation. design, with a low prob- radioactive sealed
ability of significant public source.
exposure. Misdelivered highly
radioactive sealed source
without adequate
radiation procedures to
handle.
Incident Exposure of a member of Radiation levels in an Significant failures in
Level 2 the public in excess of 10 operating area of more safety provisions, but
mSv. than 50 mSv/h. with no actual conse-
Exposure of a worker in Significant contamination quences.
excess of the statutory within the facility into an Found highly radioactive
annual limits. area not expected by sealed orphan source,
design. device or transport
package with safety
provisions intact.
Inadequate packaging of
a highly radioactive
sealed source.
Anomaly Overexposure of a
Level 1 member of the public
above statutory limits.
Minor problems with
safety components with
significant defence in
depth remaining.
Low-activity lost or stolen
radioactive source,
device or transport
package.
No safety significance (Below scale/Level 0)
8.3.1 Definitions
Inherent safety refers to the achievement of safety through the elimination or exclusion of
inherent hazards through the fundamental conceptual design choices made for the nuclear
plant. This is impossible for practical reactor sizes because it requires elimination of systems
(because they would not be needed) to remove or compensate for decay heat, excess reactivity,
and high energy releases. It is possible to have inherent safety for low-energy pool reactors
such as the 20kW(th) SLOWPOKE-2 research reactor [AECL, 1976]—the total potential reactivity
addition can all be compensated for without fuel damage by the inherent negative feedback
from fuel and coolant temperatures, and the power at which this compensation is achieved can
be absorbed indefinitely by the pool and the surroundings. For larger reactors, elimination of
one or more of these hazards does, however, give a reactor an inherently safe characteristic.
Note that the hazard must be eliminated deterministically, not probabilistically; for example, a
plant is inherently safe against fires if it has no combustible material.
An ideal passive component does not need an external input to operate; a passive system is
composed of passive components and structures. Ideally a passive system has no reliance on
external mechanical or electrical power, signals, or forces. It does rely on “natural” laws,
properties of materials, and internally stored energy. Therefore, heat removal from a reactor by
thermo-siphoning to an elevated tank of water is passive, at least until the water runs out. In
practice, most passive designs do allow active signals because there is usually a need to switch
from the active heat-removal systems used in full-power operation to passive decay-heat
removal systems after an accident. CANDU shutdown systems are passive in this respect: once
they receive a signal, they actuate by gravity or stored energy.
An active component or system is one which is not passive.
Fail-safe means that a given failure leads to a safe condition; the component or system is then
fail-safe with respect to that condition. The fail-safe characteristic is specific to the failure
mode: for example, Shutdown System 2 in CANDU is fail-safe with respect to loss of electrical
power to the valves, but not to loss of gas pressure.
Grace period is the period of time during which a safety function is ensured after an accident
without the necessity for human intervention. Colloquially, it used to be called “walk-away
safe” for whatever grace period was involved—this term has unfortunate connotations (opera-
tors are not expected to walk away from an accident) and is best not used. A grace period can
be achieved through active or passive means; usually, the first line of defence is assumed to
function properly in determining the grace period. Therefore, the grace period for loss of feed
water in first-generation CANDUs is about 30 minutes because after this period, the operator
must manually valve in an alternate heat sink. For new CANDU designs, the grace period is
extended to days through use of automatic steam-generator depressurization followed by
automatic connection of the elevated reserve water tank to the steam generators. For modern
reactor designs, evolutionary or passive, a grace period of three days for most single failures is
expected.
can be carried out in a passive or pseudo-passive manner. Recall that these functions are to
shut down the reactor, to remove decay heat, and to contain any fission products. We describe
in general terms how each of these might be accomplished.
8.3.4 Summary
This Section has indicated the direction that safety may take in the future. Passive safety is
attractive because of its simplicity, public appeal, and aura of high reliability. Evolutionary
designs have also incorporated safety enhancements while both remaining economical and
posing less of an “innovation” risk to owners and operators. Once adequate (or even more than
adequate) safety is achieved, factors such as economics and proven performance may become
the determinants of the choice of technology, particularly as electricity markets become more
deregulated.
8.4 Problems
1. Place the following accidents on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale,
with brief reasons for your choice. You may need to research some of these if they are
not covered in the text:
1. NRX accident, 1952
2. SL-1 accident
3. Pressure-tube failure in Pickering A (G-16)
4. Fire in Narora plant in India
5. Chernobyl accident (power runaway)
6. Three Mile Island accident (core melt)
7. Fukushima tsunami-induced accident
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
160 The Essential CANDU
2. If you work for a design organization or a regulator or a nuclear power plant, evaluate
its safety culture in terms of the safety culture framework defined by one or more of
INSAG, IAEA, INPO, etc. Give reasons and evidence, not just opinion.
3. Look up information on any two modern designs (e.g., Enhanced CANDU 6, Westing-
house AP1000, EPR). Compare and contrast them as follows: for each of the systems
performing the fundamental safety functions (shut down, cool, contain radioactive ma-
terial), categorize them as active or as passive categories A, B, C, or D (give reasons).
9 Review
This Chapter has summarized the basic concepts of safety for nuclear power plants. Starting
with the hazards inherent to nuclear power, it has described tools to identify possible accidents,
in particular the top-down and bottom-up approaches. Real experience has been a powerful
driver in the approach to nuclear safety, and the Chapter has described seminal historical
accidents and lessons learned—and as Fukushima has shown, learning lessons is an ongoing
process. We presented risk assessment, first in terms of safety goals for acceptable safety
performance, and then developing the probabilistic tools used to show that the goals have been
achieved. We then described (for CANDUs) mitigating systems to shut down the plant, remove
decay heat, and contain fission products in response to the needs identified by both determinis-
tic and probabilistic analyses. We looked at accident phenomenology, using a large LOCA as a
model, and extended this discussion to CANDU characteristics in severe core-damage accidents.
Then we described (at a high level) the mathematical models underlying the safety-analysis
codes used to predict plant behaviour in accidents. Finally we looked—all too briefly—at the
safety role of the plant operators and indicated the options for the safety characteristics of
future designs.
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12 Glossary
AECB Atomic Energy Control Board
AECL Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
AOO Anticipated Operational Occurrence
BDBA Beyond Design Basis Accident
BEAU Best Estimate with Analysis of Uncertainties
BECS Boiler Emergency Cooling System
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
CHF Critical Heat Flux
CNSC Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
DBA Design Basis Accident
DBE Design Basis Earthquake
DSA Deterministic Safety Analysis
ECC Emergency Core Cooling
ECI Emergency Coolant Injection (a subsystem of ECC)
EPR European Pressurized Reactor
EWS Emergency Water System
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
HPECC High-Pressure ECC
HTS Heat-Transport System (see also RCS)
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
INES International Nuclear Event Scale
INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
INSAG International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group
LLOCA Large Loss-of-Coolant Accident
LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident
LPECC Low-Pressure ECC
LWR Light-Water Reactor
MCR Main Control Room
MPECC Medium-Pressure ECC
MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis 171
13.1 Operators
Several operators can act on these statements:
AND is an operator which gives the answer C=1 only if both of its inputs are 1, and 0 otherwise.
It should be represented as:
A.B or AB or A∙B or A B or A.AND.B, or graphically as in Figure 69. C
It can be thought of as the intersection of sets A and B.
Examples:
AND
If A is true and B is true, then A B should be true.
If A=1 and B=0, then A.B=0.
A B
OR is an operator which gives the answer C=1 only if either or both of its inputs Figure 69 AND gate
are 1, and 0 otherwise. It is represented as:
A+B or A∪B or A.OR.B, or graphically as in Figure 70.
C
It can be thought of as the union of sets A and B.
Examples:
OR
If A is true and B is false, then A∪B is true.
If A=1 and B=0, then A+B=1.
A B
NOT is an operator which inverts the input. Figure 70 OR gate
It is represented as .NOT.
The output of .NOT.A is denoted as A’ or Ā.
It is represented graphically as in Figure 71.
It can be thought of as “the opposite of” or “the complement of” set A.
Examples: Figure 71 NOT gate
If A is true, then .NOT.A is false.
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis
Reactor Safety Design and Safety Analysis 173
There are also four lesser-used operators (.NAND., .NOR., .XOR., and .XNOR.)
A=0 or A=1
(i.e., something can only be true or false, not both)
If A=0, A A=0
(i.e., if A is false, and because A A=A, then A A is false. Sometimes this is written as 0.0=0)
If A=1, A∪A=1
(i.e., if A is true, and because A∪A=A, then A∪A is true. Sometimes this is written as 1+1=1.
Remember, you are not doing arithmetical addition!)
13.3 Theorems
These sound abstract, but are obvious once you draw Venn diagrams with set-theory symbols.
You can substitute the mathematical symbols + and ∙ for ∪ and if this is more intuitive for
you.
Commutative Law
A∪B = B∪A
A B = B A
Associative Law
(A∪B)∪C = A∪(B∪C)
(A B) C = A (B C)
Distributive Law
A (B∪C) = (A B) ∪ (A C)
A∪(B C) = (A∪B) (A∪C)
Identity Law
A A = A
A∪A = A
Completeness
(A B) (A B) A
(A B) (A B) A
Redundancy
A∪(A B) = A
A (A∪B) = A
Mathematical
1+A=1
1∙A=A
0+A=A
0∙A=0
A+Ā=1
A∙Ā=0
A + ĀB = A + B
A(Ā + B) = A∙B
DeMorgan’s Theorem
(A B) A B
(A B) A B
These will be useful when you work out fault trees mathematically.
occurred.
Figure 72 shows this graphically; yellow represents all events; green those events with outcome
A1; blue with outcome A2; red, with outcome both A1 and A2.
8
N (33 108 ) 1 e1.710 3310 2.3 1024 .
8
(71)
Using very crude assumptions, such as not adding in the contribution of previous generations of
neutrons and not counting energy losses and core expansion, we can estimate the order of
magnitude of the energy produced. If each fission event generates 180MeV of usable energy,
and if for each incident neutron absorbed in Pu239, two fast neutrons are produced, the number
of neutrons in Equation (71) is accompanied by an energy release at 56ns of:
1kT
E 2.3 1024 neutrons 0.5 fissions / neutron 180Mev / fission 8kT , (72)
2.6 1025 MeV
where kT is kilotons of TNT equivalent. This is 34 × 106MJ.
The reaction is self-limiting because the thermal energy causes the core to expand rapidly and
stops the chain reaction.
By contrast, in a thermal reactor such as CANDU, the largest - (from a large LOCA) is about
0.011; is about 0.001 sec. The timescale is measured in tens of seconds rather than nanosec-
onds, and the reaction is terminated by damage to the core lattice after about ten seconds, with
an energy input of ~50 full-power seconds. The total energy produced for an 1800MWth
reactor is therefore 9×104 MJ, or more than two orders of magnitude smaller than the value for
a bomb.
16 Acknowledgments
We gratefully thank the following reviewers for their hard work and excellent comments during the
development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of course the responsibility for any
errors or omissions is entirely the author’s.
Glenn Archinoff
Glen McGee
Dan Meneley
Terry Rogers
We also thank Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
Chapter 14
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion
prepared by
Dr. Derek H. Lister and Dr. William G. Cook
University of New Brunswick
Summary:
The choice of materials of construction of a nuclear reactor, while important in terms of plant
capital cost, is crucial to the safe and economic operation of the unit throughout its design
lifetime; it also affects decisions about plant life extension. Most of the failures of nuclear
systems involve the degradation of materials as they interact with their environments, indicating
that chemistry control within systems should be formulated as materials are selected. All of the
three major process systems of a CANDU reactor – the primary coolant, the moderator and the
secondary coolant – have a variety of materials of construction, so the control of system chemis-
try in each is a compromise based on the characteristics of the interactions between the system
materials and the environment, including the effects of irradiation on both the material and the
coolant or moderator. Ancillary systems, such as those providing condenser cooling water or
recirculating cooling water, have similar constraints on material choice and chemistry control.
Components such as concrete structures, cabling and insulation, although not necessarily
associated with process systems, may also be critical to safety or plant operation and must have
their materials chosen with care. This chapter describes the materials of construction of the
main systems and components of a CANDU reactor and shows how they interact with their
environments.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3
2 Materials for Nuclear Applications ......................................................................................... 4
2.1 Metallurgy and Irradiation Effects............................................................................................... 4
2.2 Materials of Construction............................................................................................................ 7
3 CANDU Process Systems and their Materials ....................................................................... 21
3.1 Major Process Systems.............................................................................................................. 21
3.2 Ancillary Process Systems.......................................................................................................... 23
3.3 Supporting Structures and Components ...................................................................................25
4 Corrosion and Material Degradation in Nuclear Reactor Systems ....................................... 27
4.1 General Corrosion......................................................................................................................27
4.2 Flow-Accelerated Corrosion (FAC).............................................................................................35
4.3 Galvanic Corrosion.....................................................................................................................39
4.4 Stress-Corrosion Cracking & IGA ...............................................................................................42
4.5 Crevice Corrosion & Pitting ....................................................................................................... 45
4.6 Fretting Wear & Flow-Induced Vibration ..................................................................................48
4.7 Hydrogen Effects .......................................................................................................................49
List of Figures
Figure 1. Unit cell configurations of some common metallic crystal structures (after Callister) ... 5
Figure 2. Grain structure for low-alloy (UNS G10800), austenitic (316 SS) steels and Zircaloy 4
(ASM, 2004). ..................................................................................................................... 5
Figure 3. Effect of neutron irradiation on the stress/strain properties of materials with cubic
crystal structures (after Was, 2006).................................................................................. 6
Figure 4. Partial iron-carbon phase diagram (after Callister)........................................................ 10
Figure 5. Schematic Cross-Section through Magnetite Film on Carbon Steel [Lister, 2003] ........ 31
Figure 6. Scanning Electron Micrograph of Magnetite Film formed on Carbon Steel during an
1100-h Exposure in High-Temperature Water [Lister, 2003] .......................................... 31
Figure 7. Schematic diagram of Zircaloy corrosion in high-temperature water, showing three
regions (dotted line indicates early assumed pre-transition cubic and post-transition
linear kinetics) [Hillner et al, 2000]................................................................................. 33
Figure 8. Scalloped surface of outlet feeder from Point Lepreau CANDU.................................... 36
Figure 9. (a) Effect of temperature and flow on FAC at pH25ºC 9.0 with ammonia; (b) Effect of
temperature and pH on the solubility of magnetite. ..................................................... 38
Figure 10. The overall mechanism of flow-accelerated corrosion................................................ 38
Figure 11. Examples of transgrannular (TGSCC) (a) and intergrannular (IGSCC) (b) stress
corrosion cracking in stainless steel and brass respectively (after Fontana 1986)......... 42
Figure 12. Typical sensitization mode and IGA of Type 304 stainless steel (after Fontana 1986) 44
Figure 13. Initial (A) and final (B) stages in the development of crevice corrosion of a metal M
(Fontana, 1986)............................................................................................................... 46
Figure 14. Self-perpetuating corrosion pit (after Fontana, 1986)................................................. 47
Figure 15. An undercut pit and surface wastage from overlapping pits....................................... 47
List of Tables
Table 1. Compositions of commonly used zirconium alloys in CANDUs......................................... 8
Table 2. Standard compositions of commonly used ferritic, martensitic and austenitic steels in
CANDUs........................................................................................................................... 14
Table 3. Compositions of commonly used nickel alloys in nuclear power plants......................... 15
Table 4. Severity of radiation-induced damage of common polymers......................................... 20
Table 5. The galvanic series for important metals ........................................................................ 41
Table 6. Biocides used in industrial water systems. ...................................................................... 51
1 Introduction
The performance of power-producing systems has always been limited by the properties of
engineering materials and their interactions with the environment. Since the early days of
industrial steam generation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, the ever-
increasing need for power for new factories created a steady demand for larger boilers and
increasingly severe steam conditions. Materials selection was based on limited knowledge of
corrosion, especially stress corrosion cracking as the consequence of chloride and oxygen
contamination of the water used in the boilers and catastrophic failures of equipment occurred
frequently.
As late as the end of the nineteenth century, hundreds of steam plant explosions accompanied
by large numbers of casualties were being recorded every year in Europe and North America.
The causes were generally linked to the failure of riveted joints or poorly worked steel plate in
fire-tube boilers. The innovation of the water-tube boiler and the understanding of localized
corrosion of steels in high-temperature water were major factors that led to much safer equip-
ment - even as operating conditions continued to become more severe. The major conse-
quence of these failures was the development of codes and standards for pressure retaining
components, the ASME Pressure Vessel Code in North America for example, which dictate the
acceptable design and construction practices for materials produced to particular specifications.
Today, the risk of catastrophic failure of a power-producing system is low. This can be attributed
to the strict adherence to the standards that are imposed on component designers and manu-
facturers as well as on plant operators. The setting of these standards clearly involves a thor-
ough knowledge of the properties of the materials of construction and an understanding of their
behaviour in the local environment. That environment may itself be adjusted for overall opti-
mum performance by specifying optimum chemistry control strategies. The prime example of
such chemistry control is the specification of an alkalinity level in the feedwater systems of
steam-raising plants, including nuclear secondary coolants, which is necessary to minimize
corrosion of piping and components and to keep systems clean of dissolved and particulate
corrosion products and impurities. In a nuclear reactor core, materials must be able to with-
stand not only the operational conditions (pressure, temperature and water chemistry) but
must show minimal degradation from the effects of radiation (high gamma and neutron flux).
Radiation effects on materials may include loss of ductility, shape change from radiation en-
hanced creep and growth and enhanced corrosion resulting from hydrogen ingress (deuterium
ingress for the case of heavy water systems).
While the current performance record of power plants is generally good, technology is not
standing still. The push for bigger returns on capital investment and the accompanying trends
towards higher plant efficiencies and longer component lifetimes lead to even more severe
operating conditions in power systems. Inevitably, the demands on the materials of construc-
tion escalate. The predominant materials of construction in steam-raising equipment and
nuclear systems are the metals and alloys. Their interaction with the operating environment
very much dictates the chemistry control to be practised by plant operators.
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
4 The Essential CANDU
As described above, materials of construction for nuclear applications must be strong, ductile
and capable of withstanding the harsh environment to which they are subjected. Furthermore,
for materials used in the core of a nuclear reactor, it is important that they have specific proper-
ties such as low neutron absorption and high resistance to radiation-induced creep, hardening
and the associated loss of ductility so that reactors can operate for the decades expected by
plant owners. Thus, nuclear materials must be selected or specified based upon their strength
and interactions with the environment (including the effects of radiation), all of which are
dependent upon the metallurgy of the material.
Figure 1. Unit cell configurations of some common metallic crystal structures (after Callister)
The grains of a metal or alloy may be engineered through appropriate heat treatments (hot and
cold working and annealing for example) to be of a specific size and/or orientation to meet a
specified purpose. Small-grained metals (1 – 25 m) will have more grain boundaries and may
be more affected by phenomena such as high-temperature creep or radiation-induced creep.
Examples of the metallurgy and microstructure of ferritic steel, austenitic stainless steel and
zirconium are shown in Figure 2. Note that the grain structure, size and orientation may play
significant roles in the specific materials properties such as strength, conductivity and creep
resistance.
Figure 2. Grain structure for low-alloy (UNS G10800), austenitic (316 SS) steels and Zircaloy 4
(ASM, 2004).
The fact that neutron bombardment creates interstitials and vacancies within the material gives
rise to changes in the physical dimensions and the mechanical properties of the material when
placed under stress. The creation of vacancies within the material leads to swelling, elongation
and growth whereas production of interstitials can cause the material to shrink. The energy
dissipated by radiation may induce phase changes within the material or promote segregation of
alloying constituents, both phenomena will affect the material’s strength and ductility. Overall,
the mechanical properties and dimensions of a material under irradiation will change and the
effect ultimately leads to challenges for the integrity of the components that make up a nuclear
reactor. Each mechanical effect is described briefly below, more details can be found in Funda-
mental of Radiation Materials Science (Was, 2007).
Irradiation Hardening
When a polycrystalline material is placed under stress it will stretch elastically with increasing
stress/strain up to the yield point of the material. Additional strain beyond the yield strength
leads to plastic deformation whereby the original shape and dimensions of the material can no
longer be attained with the relaxation of the strain. Plastic deformation, at the atomic level, is
induced when the atoms in the crystal lattice slip, which typically occurs on slip planes in the
matrix. When a material is irradiated by particles (neutrons) producing Frenkel pairs, the effect
of the interstitital/vacancy sites is to provide barriers to the normal slip planes within the
material. This effectively increases the yield strength, which will increase continuously in
proportion to the increasing radiation dose (dpa). Figure 3 shows the effect of neutron irradia-
tion on the yield stress/strain for materials with the FCC and BCC crystal structures [Was, 2006].
Figure 3. Effect of neutron irradiation on the stress/strain properties of materials with cubic
crystal structures (after Was, 2006).
creep alone. Since the diffusion rates of vacancies and interstitials are unaffected by irradiation
(diffusion is a temperature dependent phenomenon), irradiation creep is more complex in its
mechanism and involves the preferential absorption of interstitials under the action of strain in
the material and phenomena such as the “climb and glide” of the dislocations over barriers to
the diffusion process. Irradiation creep is preferential in directions perpendicular to the applied
stress i.e. pipes will tend to elongate due to irradiation creep.
For materials that do not have a cubic crystal structure (zirconium being the most relevant with
an HCP structure below 862oC), grain distribution and orientation (described as the material’s
texture) play significant roles in irradiation creep and growth. The distinction made between
creep and growth is that the former is the elongation of a material under applied stress while
the latter occurs even when no external stress is applied. The material’s texture gives rise to
anisotropy in the preferred crystallographic planes by which the material will stretch under an
induced strain as well as grow in a preferred direction during creep. Thus, the creep characteris-
tics of non-cubic crystal materials (zirconium and zirconium alloys) are highly dependent upon
the applied stress as well as the operational temperature.
Irradiation Embrittlement
As a metal gains strength upon particle irradiation, it will also tend to lose its ductility, becoming
hard and brittle with increasing damage and radiation dose. The material’s yield strength
increases through build-up of dislocations along barriers to atom migration, but other effects
such as the precipitation of secondary and tertiary phases within the material can change the
mechanical properties dramatically. Materials that are typically ductile and not susceptible to
brittle fracture in an un-irradiated environment may cleave and fracture excessively upon
irradiation due to the increasing hardness and loss of ductility.
reactor core and reduce the fuel burn-up. Pure zirconium has an HCP structure that transforms
to BCC at 862C before melting at 1850C. It is a reactive metal that combines easily with
oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon and silicon and in air retains its metallic lustre because of a
very thin but protective zirconia (ZrO2) oxide layer. A protective but thicker zirconia layer is
retained during exposure to high-temperature water, making zirconium alloys ideal for service in
water-reactor cores. The pure metal is alloyed with small amounts of elements such as tin,
chromium, iron, nickel and niobium to improve mechanical strength, corrosion resistance and to
reduce hydrogen pickup. In CANDUs, the alloy Zircaloy-2 is used for the calandria tubes and was
the initial choice as the pressure tube material. Zircaloy-2 contains 1.2 – 1.7 weight percent Sn,
0.07 – 0.2 weight percent Fe, 0.05 – 0.15 weight percent Cr and 0.03 – 0.08 weight percent Ni. It
is also the material used for BWR fuel cladding. For fuel sheathing in CANDUs and fuel cladding
in PWRs, Zircaloy-4 was developed and used because it was observed to have a lower overall
corrosion rate and a reduced tendency to pick up hydrogen. It has a similar composition to that
of Zircaloy-2 except for the nickel content, which is reduced to a maximum of 0.007 weight
percent, and the iron content, which is increased to 0.18 – 0.24 weight percent. The composi-
tions of zirconium alloys used in CANDU reactors are shown in Table 1. Comparatively recent
developments in fuel cladding technology for PWRs are the Westinghouse alloy ZIRLO, which
contains 0.7 – 1.0 weight percent Sn and 1.0 weight percent Nb, and the Areva variant M5,
which has no Sn and 0.8 – 1.2 weight percent Nb. A Zr-1%Nb alloy was developed and used for
decades as the fuel cladding material in the Russian VVERs and the Westinghouse and Areva
alloys are modifications from the original Russian composition. They are reputedly more
corrosion-resistant and have lower hydrogen pick up than Zircaloy-4 under high fuel burn-up.
Similarly, for BWR cladding, Westinghouse has developed the alloy ZrSn, which is Zr with 0.25
weight percent Sn. The pressure tubes in CANDUs are made of Zr-2.5%Nb, an alloy of Zr and Nb
with the latter within the range 2.4 – 2.8 weight percent. This too is a modification of Russian
alloys developed for the RBMK reactors.
2.2.2 Steels
Carbon Steels
The most widely used materials in power-producing systems are the steels, which are basically
alloys of iron and carbon but which may also contain other metals as minor or major alloying
elements. The alloying elements impart desired properties such as strength, hardness or
corrosion resistance to the steel.
Pure iron at ambient temperatures has a body-centred cubic (BCC) crystal structure, in which
the atoms making up the unit cell of the crystal lattice are conveniently pictured as occupying
the corners of a cube with an atom at the cube centre. Figure 1 shows illustrations of unit cell
configurations of typical metals. The BCC phase is called α-iron or ferrite, which in pure iron is
stable below 912°C. Above this temperature the -iron or austenite phase with a face-centred
cubic (FCC) crystal structure is stable up to 1394°C. The FCC unit cell has an atom at each corner
of a cube and one at the centre of each face as shown in Figure 1. Above 1394°C another BCC
phase, δ-iron, is stable up to the melting point at 1538°C. The relatively small atoms of carbon
that can exist in solid solution in these structures are in random interstitial positions between
the iron atoms. The carbon concentration determines the stability limits of the phases.
As the portion of the iron-carbon phase diagram that is pertinent to steels indicates, carbon has
a low solubility in ferrite. Figure 4 illustrates the iron-carbon phase diagram, in which the
regions of stability of the different steel phases are shown in terms of their composition and
temperature. The maximum in ferrite is 0.02 weight percent and occurs at a temperature of
727°C. At temperatures much above and below this, the solubility declines to almost zero. The
common carbon steels, however, have carbon contents ranging up to about 2.0 weight percent,
and they are quite stable at temperatures below 727°C. To accommodate the carbon, these
steels are composed of more phases than just the ferrite. As the phase diagram indicates, for
carbon contents up to 6.7 weight percent, which is the amount of carbon in the compound Fe 3C
(iron carbide or cementite), two distinct phases exist together in equilibrium - ferrite and
cementite. The proportions depend upon the overall amount of carbon in the mixture but are
not affected much by temperature below the 727°C region.
In the aggregate of metal grains and intercalating grain boundaries that make up a carbon steel,
some grains may be ferrite or cementite and some will be a two-phase ferrite-cementite com-
posite. The composite grains are formed from alternating microscopic layers or lamellae of
ferrite and cementite in a structure called pearlite. The size of the grains, the proportions of the
different phases, and the details of the pearlite structure govern the mechanical properties of
the steel. In general, higher carbon contents produce steels that can be made stronger and
harder by heat treatment and mechanical working to control grain structure and properties. At
carbon contents above the 2 weight percent value, however, the material enters the range of
the cast irons and starts to become brittle and lose properties such as ductility and toughness
that are important for many power plant applications. For most boiler applications and piping in
general, steels with carbon contents of 0.20 weight percent or less are employed. Equipment
such as pumps, valves, turbine components etc. requiring stronger or harder material commonly
use steels with carbon contents up to 0.50 weight percent or more.
The phase diagram in Figure 4 indicates that the high-temperature -phase of iron, austenite,
can contain a relatively large amount of carbon in solid solution - up to 2.1 weight percent at
1148°C. This is because the FCC structure of austenite, although having a higher atomic packing
fraction than the BCC structure of ferrite (0.74 versus 0.68), has more interstitial sites to ac-
commodate the small carbon atoms (by contrast, the more open structure of BCC leads to
higher rates of solid-state diffusion). Note that austenite is stable down to the eutectoid tem-
perature 727°C, below which it transforms into the lamellar pearlite. A heat treatment may
then consist of heating a carbon steel to a temperature that puts it in the austenite region,
where the carbon is completely miscible. Cooling at a controlled rate to below 727°C will then
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
Nuclear Materials and Corrosion 11
If, during the heat treatment, the austenitized steel at high temperature is cooled suddenly or
quenched (by plunging into cold water, oil, etc.) rather than cooled in a slow controlled fashion,
a different phase called martensite is produced. This has a body-centred tetragonal (BCT) crystal
lattice, the unit cell of which can be viewed as a BCC structure stretched in the direction of one
of the cube axes as shown in Figure 1. Carbon atoms can then be accommodated in interstitial
positions between iron atoms in the direction of elongation or in the centres of the basal planes
and can thereby stay in solid solution. Martensite is a very hard, strong but quite brittle materi-
al that has a metastable structure (and therefore does not appear on the phase diagram, which
shows equilibrium states only). It nonetheless survives indefinitely at ambient temperature.
The formation of martensite can impart very useful properties to steel. Thus, by selective
austenitizing, quenching and then tempering for a given period at temperatures near the
eutectoid point (727°C), the amount of martensite in a steel can be controlled and a hard, strong
material that is not too brittle can be obtained. Other iron-carbon phases called bainite and
spheroidite are also formed during selective heat treatments to produce steels with specific
characteristics of strength, ductility and toughness.
Alloying elements
Metals other than iron may be added to steel to impart desired mechanical properties or
corrosion resistance - particularly useful for service at high temperature. The atoms of alloying
metals are generally in substitutional solid solution, meaning that they take the place of iron
atoms in the crystal lattice. If the metal addition is less than 5 weight percent what is commonly
called a low-alloy steel results, while additions greater than 5 percent produce the intermediate-
and high-alloy steels. Note, however, that the plain carbon steels often contain small amounts
of elements such as manganese, phosphorus or sulphur - generally less than 1 weight percent -
as residuals from the steelmaking process or they may be added for specific reasons such as
improved machinability. Manganese in particular can impart desirable mechanical properties to
steel and in fact may be added deliberately to form low-alloy manganese steel with a marked
resistance to wear. Table 2 shows the typical compositions of various steels and stainless steels
commonly used in CANDUs.
Plain carbon steel and manganese steel are used extensively for general construction steelwork
in power systems and in non-nuclear boiler construction for tubing and components that
experience temperatures below about 500°C. They are also employed in the secondary or
steam-raising systems of nuclear power plants and constitute a major proportion of the piping in
the primary coolant systems of heavy water reactors such as the CANDU reactor, which operate
below about 320°C, and for steam generator tubes and piping in carbon-dioxide-cooled Magnox
reactors, which operate below about 360°C. As the service temperature increases the amount
of alloying is necessarily increased to impart resistance to creep and scaling. For example, boiler
superheater tubes operating at temperature up to 580°C are made of alloys such as 23 weight
percent Cr, 1 percent Mo or even 9 percent Cr, 1 percent Mo. For still higher temperatures, the
use of these low- or intermediate-alloy ferritic steels would require excessive wall thicknesses to
withstand high pressures and to offset scaling, and their cost advantage would be lost. The
highly alloyed materials - in particular, the austenitic stainless steels, “super alloys” and Ni-Cr-Fe
alloys such as the Inconels and Incoloys - are therefore employed.
Stainless steels
The addition of small amounts of selective elements such as copper or chromium to steel can
impart substantial resistance to corrosion, so that some of the low-alloy steels have superior
performance to plain carbon steel in atmospheric environments. True passivity in single-phase
water systems, as achieved with the stainless steels, requires at least 12 weight percent of
chromium as an alloying element. At least 20 weight percent chromium is required for true
passivity in high-temperature gaseous oxidation. [Birks, 2006]
The stainless iron-chromium alloys are basically ferritic with a BCC crystal structure. They
typically have chromium contents of 12-25 weight percent with about 1 percent manganese and
silicon and up to 0.2 percent carbon, to which other elements such as the strong carbide-
formers molybdenum, vanadium and niobium are added to enhance properties such as creep
resistance. Like the carbon steels they can be heat-treated and conditioned, depending upon
their content of carbon and other elements, to provide desired properties of strength, hardness
and toughness. There are also grades that are commonly used in the martensitic condition,
which typically contain 12-20 weight percent chromium, up to 1.0 percent carbon and often 1-2
percent nickel or up to 1.0 percent molybdenum.
The stainless steels used for corrosion resistance and for highest temperature service in power
systems are the austenitic grades. For example, the cladding for the fuel sheaths in the carbon-
dioxide-cooled AGR nuclear reactor, operating at temperatures up to about 650°C, is a 20 weight
percent chromium, 25 percent nickel-niobium stainless steel. The Russian design of pressurized
water reactor, the VVER, also uses austenitic stainless steel for the steam generator tubes
operating below about 320°C. Austenitic steels have the FCC structure, which is stabilized at low
temperature by the presence of nickel at concentrations between about 6 and 20 weight
percent. Resistance to corrosion is again provided by the chromium, which is added at a con-
centration between 16 and 30 weight percent. For most power plant applications, stainless
steels based on the common 18-8 or 18-12 (18 weight percent chromium and 8 percent or 12
percent nickel) grades are employed. In the designation of the American Society for the Testing
of Materials (ASTM) they are types 304 and 320, respectively, of the general 300-series austenit-
ic grades. Manganese is usually present at 2 weight percent and carbon at up to 0.2 percent,
though special low-carbon grades with less than 0.03 percent carbon are available when a
particular resistance to the deterioration of heat-affected regions such as welds by intergranular
attack in corrosive media is required (see intergranular attack Section 4.4). The addition of small
amounts of titanium or niobium to form the stabilized grades can also counteract such weld
deterioration, which is caused by the removal of the protective chromium from solid solution
within the grain boundaries by solid-state precipitation as chromium carbide over a specific
temperature range – a process called sensitization. For resistance to pitting corrosion and to
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
Nuclear Materials and Corrosion 13
improve creep resistance, molybdenum is added in the range of 2.0 to 3.0 weight percent to
form type 316 stainless steel. It should be noted that the austenitic stainless steels cannot be
heat-treated like the ferritic steels to improve strength or hardness; however, cold working can
change the microstructure and form small amounts of martensite, for example, that change the
properties and may even induce ferromagnetism. Annealing at high temperature will relieve the
effects of cold-working.
Elemental nickel has the FCC crystal structure, which it tends to promote in its alloys - austenitic
stainless steel being the prime example described above. Oxidation resistance of the nickel
alloys is provided by chromium, which is present in the common alloys at concentrations
between about 14 and 25 weight percent. For highly aggressive environments, such as strong
acid solutions, the so-called “super alloys” with molybdenum additions up to 20 weight percent
in alloys of the Hastelloy type, as produced by the Haynes International company, are effective
and even higher levels (at about 30 percent with little or no chromium) produce the alloy
Hastelloy B2 with superior resistance to concentrated hydrochloric and other reducing acids at
all temperatures up to the boiling point. These materials may however have limited application
in high-temperature environments in power systems.
Table 2. Standard compositions of commonly used ferritic, martensitic and austenitic steels in
CANDUs.
A class of nickel alloys that should be mentioned here, even though they have not achieved wide
use in thermal power systems but are extensively employed for gas turbine applications, is that
of the super alloys, briefly mentioned above. They have outstanding strength, creep resistance
and oxidation resistance at high temperature. Chromium concentrations around 20 weight
percent provide their oxidation resistance, which may be enhanced by molybdenum at concen-
trations up to 10 percent in some cases. Grain-boundary properties, which affect creep, are
improved by small additions of metals such as niobium, zirconium or hafnium while strength is
imparted by additions of aluminium and titanium. The last two metals, usually present at levels
of a fraction of a percent, strengthen the FCC crystal structure by precipitating with nickel as an
intermetallic compound called gamma prime (’). This precipitation hardening or age hardening
process is carried out at temperatures approaching 900°C on material that has been quenched
from solution treatment in a high-temperature region where all the constituents are in solid
solution. A typical alloy of this type is Inconel X750, as produced by the International Nickel
company, which contains 70 weight percent nickel, up to 17 percent chromium, up to 9 percent
iron, about 1 percent niobium, 2.25 - 2.75 percent titanium and 0.4 - 1.0 percent aluminium.
Alloy X750 in wire form has been used to form toroidal spacers to separate the hot pressure
tubes from the surrounding cool calandria tubes. The alloy loses practically all its ductility under
neutron irradiation but maintains sufficient strength to carry the necessary loadings. Composi-
tions of some nickel alloys commonly used in nuclear power plants are shown in Table 3.
The most widespread application of nickel alloys in the nuclear industry is for the tubing of
steam generators in water-cooled nuclear reactors of the CANDU or pressurized water reactor
(PWR) type. In order to ensure resistance to stress corrosion cracking and general corrosion,
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
Nuclear Materials and Corrosion 15
Alloy-400, a nickel-copper alloy based on Monel-400 (63-70 weight percent nickel, 28-34
percent copper, with 1-2 percent iron, as produced by International Nickel), was employed in
early CANDU reactors. The more rigorous operating conditions in later CANDUs prompted a
move to alloys with better resistance to general corrosion in a somewhat oxidizing water
coolant, so Alloy-600 (72 weight percent nickel, 14-17 percent chromium and 6-10 percent iron)
or Alloy-800 (30-35 percent nickel, 19-23 percent chromium with the balance of iron, which is
still classed as a nickel alloy, even though the major constituent is iron) were employed. The last
two materials, respectively based on Inconel and Incoloy as produced by International Nickel,
are used widely in the PWRs, though Alloy-600 is being replaced with Alloy-690 (61 weight
percent nickel, 30 percent chromium and 9 percent iron) as a material more resistant to crack-
ing. It should be noted that the nickel-chromium alloys used for steam generator tubing im-
prove their resistance to cracking when they are thermally treated to relieve the stresses
imparted during tube forming.
Copper has an important engineering role in electrical equipment and conductors, stemming
from its high electrical conductivity (second only to that of silver, which is about 10 percent
higher). In addition, its high thermal conductivity, good mechanical properties and corrosion
resistance in many environments make it an important material for heat exchangers in the
power industry and elsewhere.
The pure metal melts at 1082C and at all temperatures below this it has an FCC crystal struc-
ture as shown in Figure 1. It is readily worked and machined and has good resistance to atmos-
pheric corrosion and corrosion in clean waters. For heat exchanger applications, however, it is
alloyed most commonly with zinc - to form the brasses - or with nickel - to form the cupronick-
els. The alloys are harder and stronger than elemental copper and offer good resistance to
aqueous corrosion - particularly in marine environments.
Zinc itself has an HCP crystal structure and it dissolves in copper to a maximum of about 37
weight percent at 500C without changing the structure from FCC. The resulting solid solutions
are in the α phase, which is the basis of the α-brasses. Zinc concentrations above the 37 weight
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
16 The Essential CANDU
percent limit precipitate a second phase, the BCC β phase, which becomes the sole equilibrium
phase between about 46 and 50 percent zinc. Above this limit another phase, the phase,
precipitates but forms brittle alloys that are of little commercial utility.
The most widely used brass in the power industry is based on the single-phase 70-30 alloy (70
weight percent copper, 30 percent zinc), since this has the optimum combination of mechanical
properties and corrosion resistance and is not subject to the problems of reduced ductility and
difficulty of working experienced by the two-phase α-β or the single-phase β brasses. While the
α-brasses are easily formed into tubing etc., they tend to lose ductility with increasing cold work
and must be annealed at high temperature to avoid stress corrosion cracking (known as season
cracking) in service. Brasses are also susceptible in aqueous environments to a type of corrosion
called dezincification, in which the alloy is transformed in its original shape to porous copper
having little rigidity or strength. This phenomenon is stifled by as little as 0.04 weight percent
arsenic, which is a standard additive to α-brasses. A common material for heat exchangers and
condensers is Admiralty brass, having 71 weight percent copper, 28 percent zinc, 0.02 to 0.06
percent arsenic and small amounts of lead and iron. Antimony and phosphorus are similar to
arsenic in their corrosion inhibition of brass.
Nickel has a similar FCC crystal structure to that of copper, and the two elements are completely
soluble in each other in all proportions. The resulting α-phase solid solutions therefore have
melting points between that of pure copper (1082C) and that of pure nickel (1452C). The
cupronickels (so-called when the copper is the major constituent) are tough, readily worked and
have a high corrosion resistance. Alloys based on 70 weight percent copper and 30 percent
nickel, the 70-30 cupronickels, find widespread use in heat exchangers for sea water service,
when additions of iron and manganese to about 2 percent provide extra resistance to erosion-
corrosion. The 90-10 cupronickels have better thermal conductivity than the 70-30 alloy and are
more resistant to aqueous corrosion at higher temperatures, so they have been commonly used
in feedwater heaters in steam-raising systems.
Pure titanium has an HCP crystal structure (the α phase) at temperatures up to 884C, where it
transforms to the BCC β phase, which is stable up to the melting point of 1677C. Alloying
elements stabilize one phase or the other. Aluminum, carbon, oxygen and nitrogen, for exam-
ple, stabilize the α phase and raise the α-β transition temperature, whereas copper, chromium,
iron, molybdenum and vanadium lower the transition temperature and may even stabilize the β
phase at room temperature.
The principal titanium alloys are therefore of three types: alpha or near-alpha, alpha-beta and
beta. Their high strength-to-weight ratio (especially of the alpha or near-alpha and alpha-beta
alloys) has put them in high demand in the aerospace industry, while in the power industry the
exceptional resistance to corrosion in a wide range of corrosive waters - particularly sea water -
has made titanium an important material for condenser tubes and plate heat exchangers.
Titanium is actually a very reactive metal and must be melted and machined with care. Its
resistance to corrosion is afforded by the thin, protective layer of oxide (TiO2) that spontaneous-
ly forms in air to produce an effective barrier against the environment, thereby putting titanium
in the class of passive metals. The rather specialized metal refining and component manufactur-
ing process for titanium tubing at one time made the material an expensive proposition for
condensers. The growing demand for titanium products, however, has had the effect of lower-
ing the price relative to competitive materials - especially the copper alloys and steels. Also, the
development of seam-welded tubing suitable for condenser service and the fact that no thick-
ness allowance need be made for corrosion on the tube wall makes titanium an attractive
alternative.
The titanium used mostly in condenser applications is the commercially pure material, which is
therefore an alpha-phase material. It exists in five grades distinguished by their impurity
content. Thus, the maximum amounts of carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, iron and oxygen are
specified for each grade at levels of the order of 0.01 to 0.1 weight percent, and each grade has
particular mechanical properties. Titanium condenser tubing is relatively immune to corrosion
in salt or brackish water and in all types of polluted water. Marine organisms stick to its smooth
surface with some difficulty and surfaces that do foul or silt are not susceptible to pitting or
crevice corrosion. On the condensing steam side of the tubes used for power plant condensers,
there is no effect on titanium from common gases such as ammonia, carbon dioxide or oxygen.
In fact, the main concern with the use of titanium for condenser tubes is that less noble compo-
nents of the condenser may suffer galvanically-accelerated corrosion and must be protected
either cathodically or by coating or both. It must be borne in mind that in aqueous service the
metal absorbs hydrogen readily, so that its exposure as the cathodic component of a metallic
couple can promote degradation as the titanium-hydride is formed and the material becomes
embrittled.
2.2.6 Concrete
Concrete is an inorganic composite consisting of a coarse aggregate of gravel, crushed rock or
slag and a fine aggregate of sand, all held together with a cement. Angular particles or rock
fragments are preferred to rounded ones for the aggregate because they tend to interlock and
produce a more bonded and therefore stronger structure, although they have more surface
defects that can initiate cracks or voids. The larger the aggregate the better in order to minimize
the defects, bearing in mind that the size of the particles or fragments should be no more than
~20% of the structure’s thickness. The aggregate material can be tailored to the requirements of
the structure. Lightweight concrete incorporating steel-making slag as aggregate, for instance, is
a better thermal insulator than one incorporating normal silica-based rock, and heavy concrete
incorporating dense mineral aggregate such as ilmenite, barytes or magnetite or even metal
shot is used for radiation shielding. Ideally, the sand is a silica-based mineral with particle size
0.1 – 1.0 mm. It partially fills the spaces between the coarse aggregate and reduces the porosity
of the final concrete, in turn reducing the tendency to disintegrate during alternate freeze-thaw
cycles. The cement is a mixture of fine mineral particles that sets and hardens after being made
into a paste with water. The most common type of cement is Portland cement, named after the
cliffs at Portland in England, which the hardened material resembles. Portland cement is a type
of hydraulic cement, i.e., one that hardens upon reaction with water. It is a mixture of calcium
silicate (conveniently designated as 60-65% CaO and 20-25% SiO2), iron oxide and alumina (7-
12%). Adding water hydrates the mixture to produce a solid gel, releasing heat as it does so. The
main chemical reactions can be generalized to:
Like other ceramic-based materials, concrete is strong in compression but weak in tension, so
for most construction purposes it has to be strengthened. Reinforced concrete has steel rods
(“rebars”), wires or mesh introduced into the structure to take the tensile loads, while the
concrete supports the parts under compression. Such a combination is effective for components
undergoing bending forces. In prestressed concrete the reinforcing steel is pulled in tension
between an anchor and a jack while the concrete is poured and cured. After the concrete has
set, the external tension on the steel is removed and as it relaxes the forces are transferred to
the surrounding restraining concrete, placing it in compression. The component can now resist
higher tensile or bending forces. Post-stressed concrete also has induced compressive stresses,
but they are imposed by running steel cables or rods through tubes set in the structure and
pulling and maintaining them in tension after the concrete has hardened. Reinforced concrete
has many applications in nuclear reactor construction – building foundations, primary contain-
ment and shielding, supports for large components such as steam generators, etc. Concrete
containment buildings are pre- or post-stressed, and for the LWRs are lined with steel plate.
Existing CANDU containment buildings are lined with epoxy.
Concrete structures undergo various modes of degradation. Rebar in civil installations, typically
bridges and road overpasses, corrodes in contact with aqueous solutions such as road salt and
in time can cause serious deterioration of the structure. Pre- and post-stressing steel can also
rust and lose strength and over time the compressive stresses may relax. The concrete itself may
be attacked; chlorides, nitrates and sulphates react with the cement and cycles of freezing and
thawing can cause cracking. An insidious mode of degradation for concretes with aggregate
containing silica in a non-crystalline or glassy form is the co-called alkali-aggregate reaction
(AAR). This is an internal process whereby alkaline constituents of the cement react over time
with the silica to form a hydrated calcium silicate. This compound has a larger volume than its
precursors and the resultant swelling causes the structure gradually to spall and crack. The
hydro-electric dam at Mactaquac on the St. John river in New Brunswick has a particularly
pernicious form of this degradation. The concrete swelling puts such severe compressive forces
on the structure, which is firmly anchored between rock abutments, that the stresses have to be
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
Nuclear Materials and Corrosion 19
relieved periodically by sawing vertically through the dam from top to bottom – a process that
can continue only for about another decade. The plinth supporting the turbine at the Gentilly-2
CANDU is cracking because of this form of degradation. Concrete used as radiation shielding
around a nuclear reactor relies on its water content to maintain not only its strength but also its
effectiveness for stopping neutrons. Over time, the absorption of radiation and the resulting
heating can lead to dehydration, involving water both bound chemically with hydrous minerals
and free as excess molecules. To minimize these losses, reactor shielding structures are continu-
ously cooled, often with cooling water pipes embedded in the structure.
2.2.7 Polymers
Polymers for industrial or domestic consumption are generally called plastics. Because of their
ease of manufacture and formation, their physical and chemical properties and their low cost
they have a huge number of applications. The transparency of several types makes them useful
as substitutes for glass whilst the elasticity of others puts them in the class of elastomers. They
can be produced as homogeneous material or as both the matrix and the fibre reinforcement
for composites. In reactor systems they are used for electrical insulation, coatings, seals, etc.
and occur in a myriad of common articles such as textiles, containers, tools, etc.
Most polymers, and the ones discussed here, are composed of “giant” molecules consisting of
chains of simpler units bonded together. They are usually organic carbon-based compounds,
although some are inorganic, based on silicone Si-O units. Molecular weights can range from
104 to 106 g/mol or higher. A linear polymer has its molecules as single strands in a tangled
arrangement, rather like a portion of spaghetti. In a branched polymer, each “spaghetti” strand
has one or more shorter strands branching off. Linear or branched polymers can be cross-linked,
whereby atoms in individual strands are strongly bonded covalently to atoms in other strands,
either directly or via linking atoms.
Thermoplastics are composed of linear or branched molecular strands that are weakly connect-
ed to each other by van der Waals bonds and that can be partially separated or untangled by
applying tensile stress. Thermoplastics therefore are ductile and deform plastically. When
heated they at first soften and then melt, making them easily moulded into useful articles and
readily recycled. Polyethylene is a common example of a thermoplastic. By contrast, thermoset-
ting plastics have their linear or branched molecular strands strongly bonded covalently to each
other in a rigid, three-dimensional network. They are therefore stronger than thermoplastics but
more brittle. On heating, they do not melt but decompose, making them difficult to recycle.
Polyurethanes are an example of a thermosetting plastic. Elastomers are thermoplastic or lightly
cross-linked polymers that have their molecular strands in a folded or coiled configuration.
Under stress the molecules deform reversibly, rather like a spring, so that the original form is
regained when the stress is relaxed. Natural rubber is the prime example of an elastomer which
can be stretched elastically to >200%. The soft, thermoplastic latex from the rubber tree is
made into useful rubber by “vulcanising”, involving reacting it with sulphur to cross-link the
highly folded molecular strands. Depending on the degree of vulcanisation, a tougher and more
elastic material is formed, one that does not soften and become sticky when heated to moder-
ate temperatures. Low (1 – 3%) sulphur contents form soft commercial rubber, while high (23-
The damage mechanism is the radiation-induced rupture of the chemical bonds holding the
polymer together, and the subsequent re-forming of the bonds to create an altered structure.
Depending on the material, the degree of cross-linking can be increased and polymerization
increased or reduced, oxidation in air can be promoted and deterioration with gas evolution
may occur. Serious changes in properties such as conductivity, strength, hardness, ductility, etc.
result. Table 4 indicates the severity of damage of several common polymers caused by radia-
tion.
Table 4. Severity of radiation-induced damage of common polymers
polyethylene
polypropylene
nitrile rubber
natural rubber
polystyrene
plexiglass
mylar
cellulose
PTFE
PVC
neoprene
nylon
10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101 102
Absorbed Dose MGy
It is noteworthy that polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE – or the DuPont trade name Teflon®), a most
useful product in many domestic and industrial applications because of its non-stick and low
friction properties, is the most severely affected by radiation in the list in Table 4 (in any case, its
use in reactor systems is proscribed because it tends to release fluorine species as it degrades,
and fluorine is particularly damaging to zirconium and its alloys).
The fuel channel components in contact with the heavy water primary coolant comprise the
pressure tubes of Zr-2.5%Nb, the end-fittings of type 403 stainless steel, the liner tubes of type
410 stainless steel, the shield plugs of ductile iron and the seal plugs of Cr-Fe stainless steel. The
fuel bundles are of elements sheathed with Zircaloy-4 that are separated by spacers of Zircaloy-
4 that are resistance-welded to the end-plates, which are also made of Zircaloy-4. Bundles sit
inside the pressure tubes on bearing pads of Zircaloy-4 which, like the spacers, are attached to
the elements with a braze of Zr-Be.
The feeders and headers are made of carbon steel. Originally, when a low cobalt content was
specified to minimize radiation-field build-up around the PHT circuit, a low-chromium material
(A106 grade B with ~0.02wt%Cr) was selected. As described in Section 4.2 of this chapter and in
Section 3.2 of Chapter 15, this gave rise to flow-accelerated corrosion (FAC) of the feeders at the
reactor outlet. Replacement outlet feeders are specified as A106C with a chromium level of
about 0.3wt%Cr, which, based upon extensive laboratory testing, should be enough to extend
the life of the outlet feeders by about 50% and significantly reduce system fouling from trans-
ported corrosion products. A degradation phenomenon in some outlet feeders before replace-
ment was a type of cracking, which occurred only at the Point Lepreau CANDU-6. Incidences of
feeder cracking at other CANDUs have been extremely low – confined to one repaired field weld
– making the Point Lepreau experience unique and rather mysterious. By 2005, nine feeders had
been removed because of deep cracks from the inside surfaces, in some cases they were
through-wall (Slade and Gendron, 2005), and a total of 12 feeders had been removed and
replaced up to the time of the refurbishment shut-down that began in 2008. Cracks were all in
the first and/or second tight-radius bends downstream of the fuel channel outlet, where
residual stresses were high and where FAC was prevalent. Detailed examination revealed
extensive shallow cracks on the outside surfaces also, and these outside-surface cracks were
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
22 The Essential CANDU
found to be widespread in feeder bends across the reactor face. The cracking mechanism was
not conclusively identified before Point Lepreau was shut down for the refurbishment, which
included replacement of the feeders with the A106C material mentioned above and with stress-
relieved bends. However, it was postulated that the inside-surface cracks possibly originated
from stress-corrosion cracking caused by slightly oxidizing conditions at the reactor outlet due to
insufficient suppression of radiolysis and exacerbated at reactor start-up, especially if air ingress
had occurred. The outside-surface cracking was possibly low-temperature creep cracking,
facilitated by atomic deuterium diffusing through the metal lattice due to FAC (Slade and
Gendron, 2005).
The purification is a feed-and-bleed system taken off the connection between the coolant loops
or, at Bruce A (which has only one primary loop) directly off the reactor headers. It has heat
exchangers with tubes of nickel alloy (e.g., Alloy-600 or Alloy-800) and vessels such as the ion-
exchange columns of 300-series stainless steel. The pressurizer, also taken off the connection
between the coolant loops, is a carbon-steel vessel with immersion heaters clad with nickel
alloy.
The steam generators are tubed with nickel alloy – Alloy-400 at Pickering, Alloy-600 at Bruce and
Alloy-800 at the CANDU 6s and Darlington and the refurbished units at Bruce (Units 1 & 2). The
replacement units at Bruce, like all the other CANDU steam generators except the original
designs at Bruce A, are of the “light-bulb” design (see Figure 17 in Chapter 8) with the steam
separator and dryer separate for each unit above the tube bundle (each original Bruce A design
has four steam generators connected to an integral steam drum at each end of the reactor). The
tube sheets in the primary heads are clad with the tube material, but the heads themselves are
carbon steel. The divider plates in the steam generator heads have been replaced with stainless
steel to eliminate FAC. All the steam generators except those at Bruce have integral preheaters,
but at Bruce the preheaters are separate heat exchangers of carbon steel with tubes of Alloy-
600 and tube sheets in contact with the primary coolant clad with the same material (the Bruce
preheaters remove heat from the primary coolant serving the inner core fuel channels, which
run at a higher power than the outer core ones).
As mentioned above, steam generator tubing is Alloy-400 at Pickering, Alloy-600 in the original
units at Bruce – Alloy-800 in replacement units and at Darlington and the CANDU 6s. The tube
supports at Pickering A are lattice bars of carbon steel and at Pickering B are broached plates of
carbon steel; at Bruce the original supports are broached plates of carbon steel but, like Darling-
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
Nuclear Materials and Corrosion 23
ton and the CANDU 6s (except Embalse, Point Lepreau and Wolsong 1), the replacement units
have lattice bars of type 410 stainless steel. Embalse has broached plates of carbon steel, Point
Lepreau has broached plates of type 410 stainless steel and Wolsong 1 has lattice bars of Alloy
600. Steam generator shells, shrouds, etc. are of low-alloy/carbon steel.
The feedwater and steam cycle piping is generally carbon steel, although some regions of the
system susceptible to flow-accelerated corrosion, such as piping carrying two-phase steam-
water mixtures or highly-turbulent feedwater, may have alloy steel or even stainless steel.
All CANDUs except Embalse have a deaerator in the feed water train. These, the high-pressure
feedwater heaters and the moisture-separator/reheater in the steam circuit are made mostly of
carbon steel, although stainless steel may be employed for some reheater tubes. The low-
pressure feedwater heaters are made of stainless steel.
The condensers at Point Lepreau and the Qinshan CANDUs are tubed with titanium since they
draw from sea water while the Embalse plant continues to use Admiralty brass (with stainless
steel for the outer tubes of the bundles). The remaining CANDUs use Type 304 stainless steel as
their condenser tubes, Bruce units 1 & 2 being the most recently converted during their refur-
bishment project that was completed in 2012.
3.1.3 Moderator
The moderator system is the piping and components containing and processing the heavy water
moderator (isotopic purity ≥99.75wt%). It includes the cover gas system containing the helium
cover gas and maintaining its content of deuterium and oxygen (formed by heavy-water radioly-
sis in the reactor) at safe levels of <2wt% via a catalytic recombiner.
All reactors have a calandria vessel made of type 304L stainless steel and calandria tubes made
of Zircaloy-2. Most of the rest of the circuits (including the heavy water expansion tank) are of
stainless steel, except the heat exchangers, which are nickel alloy – primarily Alloy 800.
The condenser tubing materials have already been listed above. Like the condenser shells, the
inlet and outlet “water boxes” are of carbon steel and they may be cathodically protected from
galvanic corrosion caused by contact with tube sheets of more noble metals.
The purified water, maintained at high pH with lithium hydroxide, is circulated through heat
exchangers tubed with nickel alloy or even copper alloy, where it is cooled by plant service water
(RCW).
The dousing tank below the roof slab is made of reinforced concrete and the piping system of
carbon steel and stainless steel. In the later reactors the shell-and-tube ECC heat exchangers to
reject heat to the outside are alloy-tubed but early designs used titanium plate-type heat
exchangers.
3.3.1 Containment
In the four-unit CANDUs at Darlington and Bruce A and B, the reactor of each unit is contained
within a reinforced concrete vault, which extends to shielded rooms above containing the steam
generators, heat transport pumps and reactivity drive mechanisms. Main steam piping exits the
containment for the turbine building. Openings in the floor of the vault allow entry of the
fuelling machine, which serves all four units via a duct running below grade for the length of the
station and connecting to a fuel handling facility. The overall building for each unit has a flat,
steel roof.
The four-unit CANDUs at Pickering A and B, like the CANDU 6 reactors, each have the reactor,
steam generators, etc., in a separate containment building of pre-stressed, post-tensioned
concrete with a domed roof. The building is lined with epoxy, but future designs could incorpo-
rate a steel liner. The main steam pipes exit the containment directly for the turbine building.
The vacuum building is constructed of reinforced concrete. It is supported inside with an ar-
rangement of columns and beams that also hold up the ECC storage tank and the vacuum
chambers.
The machines simultaneously clamp onto the end-fittings of a channel, unlock, remove and
store the seal plugs, remove and store the shield plugs then push new fuel bundles into the
pressure tube from one end and remove and store spent fuel bundles from the other end,
replace the shield plugs and finally replace and lock the seal plugs. During the operation the
machine is in contact with the primary coolant at pressure and sustains a flow of heavy water
from the PHT supply tanks. The seal plug sealing faces must be maintained in good condition to
prevent expensive heavy water leaks.
Fuelling machines are large pieces of equipment comprising many components that remotely
perform a complex series of tasks. They are made of many engineering materials. Of note are
the mechanical bearings that support the rotating magazine, which have traditionally been
made of the extremely hard-wearing cobalt alloy, Stellite®. This has been responsible for a
significant component of out-core radiation fields, since even very small releases of cobalt to the
primary coolant during a refueling operation may give rise to the production of 60Co in the
reactor core, and this distributes around the circuit and contaminates out-core components,
particularly at the reactor faces and in the steam generator heads. Recent research is identifying
alternative materials for the bearings such as silicon nitride (see for example Qiu, L., 2013).
Additionally, activation products of antimony (primarily Sb-124) originate from bearings in the
heat transport pumps and as impurities in steel and may contribute significantly to the overall
activity levels throughout the primary heat transport circuit.
3.3.4 Fuel
The fuel materials in contact with the primary coolant, viz. the element sheaths, end plates,
bearing pads, spacers and the braze attaching the appendages to the sheath have already been
described. The fuel pellets themselves within a sheath are of high-density, sintered UO2 of
natural isotopic content (0.7% 235U) and the inside surface of the sheath is coated with a thin
layer of graphite to reduce sheath-pellet interactions (the CANLUB system). The standard bundle
is of 37 similar elements; however, more-efficient designs such as the CANFLEX® bundle with 43
elements of different diameters have been proposed; thus, for future applications, the Ad-
vanced CANDU Reactor employs low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel of UO2 with 3-4% 235U in a
CANFLEX®-type bundle with a central element containing a neutron absorber. Note that the
flexibility of the CANDU system makes it suitable for a wide variety of fuel materials, and trials
with thorium, recovered uranium (from reprocessing of LWR-type fuel) and plutonium mixed-
oxide (with uranium) have been carried out successfully.
There are mechanical adjuster rods (21 in the CANDU 6s), also inserted vertically into the
moderator, to act as neutron absorbers. They are tubes of stainless steel or Zircaloy containing
“shim rods” of steel/cadmium or cobalt that are normally fully inserted to flatten the flux profile
but can be withdrawn mechanically via motor-driven winches (sheaves) and cables as override
for xenon poisoning following reactor shutdown or a power reduction.
Shut-off rods and mechanical control absorbers are of similar design, penetrating the calandria
vertically between the calandria tubes in similar fashion to the adjuster rods. Each employs a
cable, winch and clutch to hoist, hold or release an absorber tube containing cadmium as a
neutron absorber. They are normally parked in thimbles above the calandria but can be driven
vertically downwards into the core to reduce reactivity through perforated guide tubes of
Zircaloy that are anchored at the bottom of the calandria. Shutdown System #1 comprises 28
such assemblies arranged throughout the reactor; they release their rods by de-energising the
clutch and drive them into the core by spring-assisted gravity to achieve rapid power decrease.
Four other assemblies can be used for reactor control to supplement the liquid zone controllers.
They are normally parked out of the core but are driven in at variable speeds as required to
reduce reactor power.
As described above and elsewhere in this text, a nuclear reactor is a complex system of different
connected materials that must behave optimally in unison to ensure the safe and efficient
operation of the plant. Even under the strictest chemistry control practices and careful plant
operation, the corrosion and subsequent degradation of the plant components are the inevita-
ble consequences of thermodynamics; the metals that make up the pipes, valves, fittings and
vessels all tend to revert back to their thermodynamically stable state – usually an oxide,
haematite (Fe2O3) for example, the basis of rust on iron and steel. In some cases, the degrada-
tion of system components is exacerbated by vibration, fatigue or fretting or by the interaction
with high-velocity coolant creating flow-accelerated corrosion (FAC); in all cases, component
lifetimes are shortened. Thus, knowledge of the basic forms of corrosion is a prerequisite to
understanding the materials selection and chemistry requirements of CANDUs.
thickness (incorporating a “corrosion allowance”) that will last for the desired lifetime; failures
are rare.
The mechanism for the formation of the duplex oxide film on the AGR steel has been postulated
to be the direct reaction of metal with CO 2 that diffuses through pores and microchannels in the
growing oxide [Kofstad, 1985]. For example:
The carbon is distributed through the oxide and may carburise the metal. The development of
the oxide porosity is governed by stresses created at the metal-oxide interface (M-O) by the
difference between the density of the oxide and that of the metal (quantified as the “Pilling-
Bedworth” ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the volume oxide formed to the equivalent
volume of metal consumed; it is greater than unity for the common transition metals). We note,
however, an alternative mechanism [Taylor et al., 1980], whereby corrosion is controlled by the
protective nature of the inner layer; thus, the magnetite forms at the oxide-coolant interface (O-
C) via direct chemical reaction with CO2 of Fe that has migrated through the oxide:
although the details will involve reactions with diffused ionic species:
The kinetics of general corrosion governed by the increasing protection afforded by a continu-
ously-thickening oxide film are often described by a parabolic expression, derived from the
principle that diffusion rate, and therefore corrosion rate and oxide film growth rate (dm/dt), is
inversely proportional to film thickness (m):
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
Nuclear Materials and Corrosion 29
dm k
= (0)
dt m
which integrates to:
m2 −mo2 = kt (0)
where mo is the initial film thickness. Modifications of (8) such as (9) are occasionally quoted:
CANDU reactors have two main gas systems, although several ancillary systems also use inert
cover gases to help prevent corrosion and maintain safety envelopes. The two main gas systems
include the moderator cover gas system (already described) and the annulus gas system (AGS).
The AGS circulates CO2 through the annulus between the calandria tube and its companion
pressure tube. The system is continually monitored for moisture by dew point measurements as
a warning of a leak from the PHT system or from the calandria end shield joint. Deuterium
produced from the corrosion of the pressure tube on the PHT-side, diffuses into the AGS
forming heavy water vapour when combined with oxygen present in the CO2 so the system
needs to be regularly purged to reduce the moisture content. The oxygen added to the CO2 in
the AGS also performs an important role of oxidizing the outside of the pressure tube. By
oxidizing the outside pressure tube surface it helps to maintain a barrier to the ingress of
deuterium into the pressure tube and promotes oxide formation on the X750 garter-spring
spacers.
The carbon steel feeders in CANDU primary coolant corrode accordingly, except that the coolant
is D2O rather than H2O and deuterium rather than hydrogen is evolved. Mechanistically, (10)
can be regarded as two half-reactions, the anodic or oxidation process:
The half-reactions occur simultaneously and at the same rate. According to the classic Wagner-
Traud theory [Wagner and Traud, 1938] it is postulated that the anodic sites on the metal,
where metal ions dissolve (reaction (11)), are separate from the cathodic sites, where electrons
are discharged, oxide ions form and hydrogen is released (reaction (12)). The electrons are
transported between the sites and the metal ions and oxide ions interact and precipitate as
magnetite. Clearly, for the oxidation to be uniform, the sites must be mobile across the surface.
In reality, it is understood that in high-temperature water the oxidation at the M-O produces
ferrous ions according to:
where H is in the form of hydrogen atoms that migrate through the metal. It is important to
note that if dissolved oxygen is introduced into neutral or alkaline water, reaction (14) is re-
placed by the more favourable reaction (15):
The ferrous ions and hydroxide ions from (13) and (14) or (15) interact to form soluble ferrous
hydroxide:
but this oxidises and precipitates as magnetite according to the Schikorr reaction [Schikorr,
1928]:
Again, if oxygen is present, the oxidation of ferrous hydroxide proceeds via the more favourable:
There is only room at the M-O (metal-oxide interface) for about half of the ferrous hydroxide to
precipitate there as inner-layer magnetite; the other half, along with any hydrogen molecules
generated at the M-O by (17), diffuse through the developing magnetite film to the O-C (oxide-
coolant interface). There, if the coolant is reducing and saturated in dissolved iron as in the
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
Nuclear Materials and Corrosion 31
carbon steel inlet feeders of CANDUs, it precipitates as outer-layer magnetite according to (17);
the molecular hydrogen is then dispersed in the bulk of the flowing coolant. In the presence of
dissolved oxygen, the outer layer precipitates according to (18) and the magnetite film develops
completely without the evolution of hydrogen. In time, it may itself oxidise to the Fe(III) oxide
haematite:
and if the conditions are oxidising enough haematite may be formed directly without the
intermediate formation of magnetite.
The duplex films of magnetite generally consist of a fine-grained inner layer of particles ten or so
nanometres in size, overlaid with crystallites of sizes up to about ten micrometres. The outer
layer crystallites are generally facetted octahedra, obviously grown from solution (see Figure 5
and 6).
Figure 5. Schematic Cross-Section through Magnetite Film on Carbon Steel [Lister, 2003]
Figure 6. Scanning Electron Micrograph of Magnetite Film formed on Carbon Steel during an
1100-h Exposure in High-Temperature Water [Lister, 2003]
The general corrosion of the higher alloyed materials in widespread use in water reactor sys-
tems, such as the stainless steels and nickel alloys, also leads to the development of duplex
oxide films. The oxide layers are generally thin and compact, conferring a high degree of corro-
sion resistance. The precise compositions of the oxides depend on the coolant chemistry,
particularly the oxidising propensity. In general, it is the inner layers that “passivate” the alloy;
these are based on the normal spinel FeCr2O4, which has a very stable lattice structure and a low
solubility in the chemically reducing coolants of the pressurised water reactors (PWRs) and
CANDUs [Lister, 1993]. Variants of the iron chromite structure contain elements arising from
other alloy constituents such as nickel, viz. Ni xFe1-xCr2O4, where x depends on the composition
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
32 The Essential CANDU
of the alloy; small amounts of other metals such as cobalt may also be incorporated and in the
primary coolant this gives rise to radiation fields from 58Co and 60Co. The outer-oxide layers are
variants of the inverse spinel magnetite and are designated as NixFe3-xO4; again, x depends on
the composition of the underlying alloy but also, since the layer is precipitated from solution, it
depends upon the metals dissolved in the coolant and originating in the rest of the circuit [Cook
et al., 2000]. In PWRs, the composition of the outer layers on the alloys approximates
Ni0.6Fe2.4O4, a variant of nickel ferrite (or trevorite, NiFe2O4). This also approximates the compo-
sition of the particulate matter (called “crud”) that circulates in suspension in the primary
coolant at concentrations of the order of a ppb (part per billion) or less and that forms deposits
on in-core fuel assemblies. In CANDU primary coolants the large surface area of carbon steel
feeders makes magnetite the predominant constituent of crud.
The boiling water reactors (BWRs) traditionally operate under conditions of normal water
chemistry, NWC, which exposes their alloys to high-temperature water that is slightly oxidising.
This favours the formation of soluble Cr(VI) rather than the Cr(III), which is the basis of the
chromite oxides that are widespread in the PWRs. Consequently, the stainless steels that
constitute much of the BWR circuits develop oxides with less FeCr 2O4; they also contain the
Fe(III) oxide Fe2O3, haematite. In the move to less-oxidising coolant chemistry in the BWRs,
accomplished by adding hydrogen to the feedwater to create hydrogen water chemistry (HWC),
the oxides on stainless steel approach those found in the PWRs. It is interesting to note that
detailed in-situ studies of corrosion rates on type SA 316L stainless steel indicate that NWC
conditions are somewhat less corrosive than HWC conditions [Ishida and Lister, 2012]. The
corrosion for the first 100 – 150 h under NWC follows logarithmic kinetics whereas under HWC it
follows a joint parabolic-logarithmic law.
The corrosion of zirconium alloys has been postulated as occurring in three stages, as shown in
Figure 5. The stages have been characterized as [Hillner et al., 2000]:
M-O.
Post-transition, when kinetics become rapid and linear and white or grey oxide is
formed.
As indicated in Figure 7, the transitory period was not recognized in early models, although the
omission has little effect on the general description. The transition occurs at film thicknesses of
2–5 µm.
Much of the early research leading to our understanding of the corrosion and hydriding of
zirconium and its alloys was conducted by Cox [Cox, 1976]. The basic electrochemical reaction is
the formation of a compact oxide film based on zirconia (ZrO 2) via:
The pre-transition film is adherent and compact zirconia of tetragonal crystal structure that
grows via the solid-state diffusion through the oxide of ions/vacancies and electrons/holes.
Electron diffusion is rate-determining and drives the cathodic reaction by reducing water to
form hydrogen. The hydrogen generated (in overall terms by (20)) enters the metal in atomic
form and at high enough concentrations precipitates within the lattice as flakes of hydride of
nominal composition between ZrH and ZrH2, making the material brittle. The post-transition
oxide has monoclinic crystal structure and is much less protective than the pre-transition oxide,
hence the accelerated corrosion. Since these processes occur with no oxide dissolution or
release of cations to the coolant, the weight-gain of laboratory specimens is an accurate gauge
of corrosion.
The oxide thicknesses on Zircaloy-4 cladding on high-burnup PWR fuel may reach 100 µm or
more but on the advanced alloys are generally less than half that amount. Concentrations of
LiOH of more than ~4 ppm (parts per million) may exacerbate corrosion rate. BWR exposures of
Zircaloy-2-clad fuel induce nodular corrosion, whereby white spots of thick oxide appear on the
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
34 The Essential CANDU
underlying black oxide and grow with increasing exposure. The severity of nodular corrosion
depends upon the metallurgy of the alloy and the aggressiveness of the environment, but rarely
causes problems (although spalled oxide has occasionally caused abrasion damage in BWR
control-rod drive mechanisms). So-called “shadow corrosion”, where galvanic effects thicken
ZrO2 films in proximity to components made of non-zirconium alloys such as stainless steel
control-blade handles, is an additional mechanism in the low-conductivity and low-hydrogen
environment of the BWR. BWR fuel is also subject to increased corrosion when the surface
temperature is increased by the deposition of copper-containing crud that impairs the nuclea-
tion of steam bubbles. Such “CILC” (crud-induced localized corrosion) has led to fuel failures.
These mechanisms of corrosion of zirconium alloys are reviewed in detail in the report of
Adamson et al. [2007].
Because of its relatively low burn-up, CANDU fuel sheathing develops a very thin, protective
oxide and failures from coolant-induced general corrosion are almost non-existent. The Zr-
2.5%Nb pressure tubes in CANDUs and other PHWRs also experience low corrosion rates and
their general corrosion over the 20-30-year lifetime in-reactor is acceptable. The oxidation,
however, does force hydrogen (actually, deuterium from the heavy-water coolant) into the
metal lattice, and this is much aggravated by deuterium that migrates into the pressure-tube
ends across the rolled-joint between it and the stainless-steel end fittings, which also experience
general corrosion. Hydriding (deuteriding) can then be a problem if concentrations exceed the
“terminal solid solubility” (TSS), leading to precipitation of hydride “platelets”, brittleness and
possible cracking if excessive stresses are experienced [Simpson et al., 1974]. In fact as men-
tioned earlier, in the past, pressure tubes have failed because of delayed hydride cracking (DHC),
so they must be continually monitored for uptake of hydrogen/deuterium during service [Per-
ryman, 1978].
The Zr-Nb alloy of CANDU pressure tubes is subject to several other forms of degradation
(growth and creep), and these will be life-limiting for the components in one form or another
and are the primary reason a mid-life refurbishment (after approximately 30 years of operation)
is required on CANDU reactors. As described in Section 2.1 above, neutron irradiation causes an
increase in strength and a loss of ductility (or loss of toughness) in Zr-2.5%Nb alloys (as it does in
all metals) but this does not prevent the pressure tubes from performing their role as a pressure
boundary. The neutron irradiation causes additional defects (dislocations) to be produced in the
metal lattice, which move through the metal’s crystal structure either under the action of stress
(known as radiation induced creep) or by the action of the neutron flux alone (radiation induced
growth). The migration of the dislocations results in extension or contraction of the tube in its
three major directions but because of the tube’s texture or predominant grain orientation,
growth is concentrated in the longitudinal direction. Providing sliding bearings on each end
fitting has been demonstrated to accommodate the radiation induced growth and elongation. In
early CANDU designs, channel extension was only sufficient to allow for thermal and pressure-
based expansion. Design changes have substantially increased the channel extension capability.
Fixing one end of the fuel channel now accommodates full-life channel elongation allowing for
extension to occur at the opposite, free end of the channel. Typically, at the midway point
through the reactor core’s operating lifetime, the fuel channel is released at the initially fixed
end and then pushed to its maximum inboard position and fixed at the formerly free end,
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
Nuclear Materials and Corrosion 35
allowing for the full scope of the design extension to be used. Fuel channel elongation is great-
est in the high power channels in the centre of the reactor resulting in a dish-shaped profile of
fuel channel extension. Differential elongation could cause feeder pipes at reactor ends to
contact and chafe each other, which must be avoided. Because of the material condition of the
Zr-2 calandria tubes, they do not elongate to the extent of applying significant loads on the end
shields.
The pressure tubes also sag with increased exposure time due to the elongation described
above and from diametral creep. The diametral creep meant that fuel channels in the middle of
the core, where the combination of neutron flux, pressure and temperature are highest, would
suffer from significant portions of the coolant flow by-passing the fuel bundles, reducing the
heat transfer efficiency and leading to reductions in the margins to dry-out. The remedy was
then to derate – reduce the reactor power. Pressure-tube/calandria-tube sag also meant that
the pressure tubes in some reactors approached the calandria tubes closely, and occasionally
may have contacted one of the horizontal reactivity mechanism control tubes spanning the
calandria. The pressure tube and its matching calandria tube are separated by wire wound
toroidal spacers or garter springs that accommodate relative movement between the two. The
pressure tube will sag more between the spacers than will the calandria tube due to the higher
temperature and pressure operation and the weight of the fuel bundles. Should the spacers
move out of position from vibration during operation, there is a risk that the hot pressure tube
touchs the cool calandria tube inducing a thermal gradient or “cold spot” on the wall of the
pressure tube. The will cause any hydrogen/deuterium in the vicinity to diffuse down the
temperature gradient and form a hydride or hydrogen blister at the surface. Above a certain
size, the blister will crack to accommodate the volume change and may initiate a delayed
hydride crack that could penetrate the tube wall. As these degradation problems worsened with
time of operation, pressure-tube rehabilitation programs were undertaken. REFAB (Reposition-
ing End Fitting And Bearing) involved shifting pressure tubes within the core so that they were at
the start of their travel on the bearings to accommodate elongation, as described above. SLAR
(Spacer Location and Repositioning) involved using electromagnetic induction to find the
spacers separating the pressure tubes and calandria tubes and then shift them to their design
positions to counteract sag and avoid subsequent contact. Severely affected fuel channels could
have their tubes replaced, and in the extreme case LSFCR (Large Scale Fuel Channel Replace-
ment) could be undertaken, in which a full core is replaced. This was done during the early
operation at Pickering, when the pressure tubes suffered delayed hydride cracking (DHC)
because of faulty installation; it is an integral part of reactor refurbishment to double the
operating life of the CANDU plant.
has led to pipe rupture with accompanying injuries and even deaths of plant personnel. Fatal
accidents due to FAC in condensate systems have occurred in at least two nuclear plants – the
Surry PWR in the US in 1986 and the Mihama 3 PWR in Japan in 2004 – and at fossil-fired plants
such as the Pleasant Prairie coal-fired station in the US in 1995. Unexpected and sometimes
excessive pipe-wall thinning from FAC has also been an endemic problem in the outlet feeders in
the primary coolant systems of the CANDU reactors that were in operation before the two
CANDU 6 models in Qinshan, China, that went into service in 2002 and 2003. Some feeders have
had to be replaced as they reached their minimum wall thickness long before their design
lifetime, Although these replaced feeders represent a small fraction of the total number in
service, the necessity of regular inspections to ensure suitable margins still remains for the pipe
wall thickness; feeder FAC represents a considerable cost to plant operators through planning,
conducting and verifying the field inspections in the restricted, high radiation dose area.
The basic mechanism of FAC in power plants is the dissolution and “wearing” of the normally-
protective film of magnetite that develops on the corroding steel in high-temperature water. As
its title suggests, the phenomenon is exacerbated by fluid flow – specifically, turbulence. As it
proceeds, the attack “sculpts” the metal surface into a characteristic pattern of shallow hollows,
called scallops, the size of which is governed by the turbulence (see Figure 8). The magnetite
dissolves at its interface with the coolant (i.e., at the O-C, by the reverse of Equation 17) and is
replenished by corrosion at the metal-oxide interface (M-O) by reactions described above for
general corrosion (in overall terms by Equation 7). Also as described above, not all the corroded
iron can be accommodated as oxide at the M-O – about half diffuses through the oxide to the O-
C. In an FAC environment the coolant is depleted of dissolved iron, no outer layer of magnetite
can precipitate and the diffused iron is transported to the bulk coolant along with that produced
by the magnetite dissolution. The transport to the bulk is effected by mass transfer, which is
governed by the convective processes in the coolant – i.e., by the turbulence. Since the diffusion
of iron through the oxide film governs the corrosion rate, the thickness of the film attains a
steady-state which then controls the FAC at a constant rate.
This simple view of FAC, in which there are two processes in series – the dissolution of the
magnetite film and the transport of iron to the bulk coolant – has been described by Equation
21 [Berge et al., 1980]:
R=
(
kmkd C s −C b ) (0)
0.5km +kd
where: R is the FAC rate (gFe/cm2.s) , km is the mass transfer coefficient (cm/s), kd is the magnet-
ite dissolution rate constant (cm/s), Cs is the magnetite solubility (gFe/cm3) and Cb is the concen-
tration of iron in the bulk coolant (gFe/cm 3). High alkalinity reduces FAC in feedwater systems
by reducing magnetite dissolution (by reducing Cs and kd) – although at the higher temperatures
in primary coolant systems increasing alkalinity tends to increase magnetite dissolution and is
expected to increase FAC accordingly. The effects of flow and pH in the mechanism of FAC are
shown in Figure 9.
(
R = 2kd C s −C b ) (0)
(
R = km C s −C b ) (0)
However, mass transfer cannot be the sole mechanism responsible for FAC, since dependences
on flow rate much greater than those conventionally described by empirical mass-transfer
correlations are frequently encountered; moreover, FAC often occurs in circumstances where
the dissolution of the magnetite is much slower than mass transfer and should control the rate,
leading to the untenable situation of the process’s being described by Equation 22, which has no
flow dependence at all. These observations have led to the postulate of a mechanism for FAC
wherein rapidly-flowing coolant that is unsaturated in dissolved iron dissolves the magnetite (as
in the conventional description) but the dissolution loosens the nano-crystals of oxide at the O-C
which are then stripped from the surface (eroded or spalled) by the force of the fluid shear
stress at the pipe wall [Lister and Uchida, 2010]. A schematic view of the overall mechanism,
which also involves some of the reactions of magnetite and hydrogen along with the diffusion of
dissolved iron through the (now single-layered) oxide film as described earlier for general
corrosion, is presented in Figure 10.
The mathematical model describing this mechanism was first applied to a CANDU primary
coolant system, for which measured values of kd [Balakrishnan, 1977] were so much less than
km that the conventional explanation of FAC via Equation 21 was clearly inadequate. The FAC in
several outlet feeders at the Point Lepreau CANDU was modelled, leading to predictions of wall
thinning rate around the first couple of bends downstream of the end-fitting that corresponded
very well to plant measurements. At the same time, the oxide spalling terms led to realistic
estimates of crud levels (concentrations of suspended oxide particles) in the primary coolant.
After replacement of the dissolution terms in the model with precipitation terms and insertion
of appropriate coolant flow rates and temperatures, the corrosion and oxide build-up on inlet
feeders were also predicted very well, [Lister and Lang, 2002].
Traces of some transition metals (copper, molybdenum and especially chromium) in the carbon
steel have long been known to reduce FAC rates; concentrations of Cr as low as a fraction of a
percent have been demonstrated to lower FAC rates drastically [Bouchacourt, 1987]. Unfortu-
nately, the existence of a lower limit of Cr content of 0.03 – 0.04%, below which FAC rates are
not affected, has been propounded and is apparently incorporated into some examples of FAC
software. Recent work, however, has demonstrated a reduction of ~60% in FAC rate between
steels containing 0.001% Cr and those containing 0.019% Cr [Lister and Uchida, 2010].
The FAC of CANDU outlet feeders has now been mitigated in replacement piping and in new
reactors by specifying a carbon steel with a higher chromium content [Tapping, 2008]. The
original material had been specified with a low cobalt content to minimise the build-up of out-
core radiation fields from 60Co during reactor operation, and this resulted in a low chromium
content since no Cr concentration was specified; for example, the Point Lepreau feeders were
made of A106 Grade-B steel with 0.019% Cr. Replacement material has been A106 Grade-C steel
with a Cr content of ~0.33% and this has led to a reduction in FAC rate of around 50%, which
should be enough to assure the integrity of the piping for the lifetime of the plant.
The lower temperatures in secondary coolants and feedwater systems lead to higher magnetite
solubilities and correspondingly higher FAC rates than in primary coolants (both solubility and
FAC rate peak at ~130-150oC, irrespective of pH or flow – see Figure 9). Thus, even with a steel
containing 0.3% Cr and carrying feedwater dosed with amines, the 56 cm-diameter piping at the
Mihama-3 PWR at 140oC corroded at an average rate of 0.3-0.4 mm/year over the 20 years or so
of operation before rupturing when the wall thickness reached about 2 mm. The mechanisms of
FAC in feedwater systems of Mihama and elsewhere, including the effects of steel composition,
have been successfully modelled (Phromwong et al., 2011).
A metal in contact with a solution establishes an electrical potential with respect to the solution.
Such a potential cannot be measured directly, since a conductor introduced into the solution to
serve as a measuring electrode to indicate the potential difference with the metal will establish
its own potential. The best we can do is then to measure the metal’s potential with respect to an
electrode that is designated a standard. Such a standard is the “standard hydrogen electrode”
(SHE), which is platinum metal in a solution of hydrogen ions at unit activity (i.e., an acid at pH
0) in contact with hydrogen gas at unit activity (i.e., at 1 atm pressure or partial pressure). The
SHE is given the potential zero, and the potentials of metals in equilibrium with solutions of
their own ions at unit activity are listed against the SHE potential (see Table 5). This list is the
galvanic series for industrially-important metals, and those with high potentials are termed
more “noble” than those “active” ones with low potentials. An active metal can displace a more
noble metal from solution – so in principle, a metal with a negative potential can displace
hydrogen from solution as it dissolves or corrodes; a familiar example is the coating of an iron
nail with copper as it is dipped into copper sulphate solution. Note, however, that some active
metals such as aluminum and chromium are corrosion-resistant in many aqueous and atmos-
pheric environments. This is because they form a very protective oxide that resists corrosion and
makes their behavior more noble (they “passivate”).
Two dissimilar metals in contact in an aqueous environment can therefore act as an electro-
chemical cell, in which the more noble metal acts as the cathode and the more active metal acts
as the anode; i.e., the more active metal dissolves – it corrodes. The greater the difference in
the potentials, the greater the reaction rate. This is the principle of batteries such as the Daniel
cell, in which electrodes of copper and zinc immersed in sulphate solution generate a potential
difference of ~1.1 V as the Zn anode oxidizes and dissolves while Cu species are reduced and
precipitated as metal at the Cu cathode. These processes generate an electric current in an
external circuit. Galvanic coupling of metals is to be avoided in power plants, otherwise the
more active metal will tend to corrode adjacent to the contact point. The severity of the corro-
sion depends upon the conductivity of the solution and the integrity of the joint between the
metals. Oxide films may act as insulators, for example, and reduce the galvanic effect. On the
other hand, galvanic processes can be used to protect metals from general corrosion. Galvanis-
ing steel by coating with zinc, for example, promotes a galvanic process, since the more active
zinc becomes the anode when the couple is immersed in a solution and lowers the potential of
any areas of exposed steel, protecting them cathodically. Similarly, components prone to
corrode in aqueous environments may be protected cathodically by connecting them to an
electrical source or by attaching a sacrificial anode of more active metal to lower their potential.
It is important to note that in most galvanic couples it is the cathodic component that controls
the reaction rate and therefore the corrosion rate. Consequently, if dissimilar metals must be in
contact, the area of the cathode should be small relative to that of the anode. It follows that to
protect an active metal in contact with a more noble one by coating, painting, etc., the cathode
(more noble component) should be the one coated. Horror stories abound of components such
as carbon steel heat exchanger shells corroding rapidly adjacent to tube sheets of more noble
metals such as titanium because the steel was coated as a protective measure rather than the
titanium.
In summary, measures to minimize galvanic corrosion include: selecting metals as close togeth-
er as possible in the galvanic series; avoiding small-anode/large-cathode combinations (e.g.,
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
42 The Essential CANDU
choosing fasteners of more noble material); insulating dissimilar metals (e.g., sleeving bolts in
flanged joints, as well as using insulating washers); applying coatings carefully, and keeping them
in good condition (especially those on anodes); avoiding threaded joints where possible; design-
ing for the anodic members (making them thicker, easily replaceable, etc.); and, installing a third
metal that is anodic to both in the couple.
(a) (b)
Figure 11. Examples of transgrannular (TGSCC) (a) and intergrannular (IGSCC) (b) stress
corrosion cracking in stainless steel and brass respectively (after Fontana 1986)
There are three factors required for inducing SCC: the environment must be sufficiently aggres-
sive, which involves temperature since high temperatures generally increase a material’s suscep-
tibility; the composition and microstructure must be susceptible, which includes effects such as
sensitisation as discussed earlier; and, the metal must be under tensile stress, which may be
residual stress from manufacturing and/or operational stress from contained pressure. Note,
however, that threshold levels of these factors do not necessarily exist if there is a long enough
The inside surface of Zircaloy sheathing of nuclear fuel elements can crack during operation
under the influence of mechanical strain and of fission products, particularly iodine, released
during irradiation. The CANLUB process for coating the insides of CANDU fuel sheaths with a
thin layer of graphitic material was designed to counteract SCC by acting as a lubricant and to
some extent as a getter for iodine. It has made CANDU fuel tolerant to a range of conditions
imposed by power ramping and is applicable to both UO 2 and ThO2 fuels (Hastings et al., 2009).
The alloys most susceptible to cracking in nuclear coolants have been the austenitic steels such
as the 300-series stainless steels used for LWR piping and component cladding and the austenit-
ic nickel alloys such as Alloy 600 (Inconel-600) used for steam generator tubing and pressure
vessel penetrations. Thus, in the first years of operation of BWRs, the coolant in the reactor
recirculating system was treated with “normal water chemistry” – NWC, which was nominally
pure water that became oxidizing with ~200 ppb dissolved oxygen because of radiolysis in the
core. The recirculation piping (made of type ASA 304 stainless steel) was then found to be prone
to IGSCC. Extensive pipe replacements were necessary using, where possible, stress-relieved
material containing low amounts of carbon to minimize the presence of sensitized material in
service, especially in components where cold work and/or welding were used in fabrication.
Lately, to make the coolant less oxidizing and therefore less aggressive to the austenitic steels
around the core circuit, the chemistry has been changed to “hydrogen water chemistry” – HWC,
which involves injecting hydrogen into the feedwater to counteract the radiolysis in the core. A
level of ~2.0 ppm has been used to reduce the electrochemical corrosion potential (ECP) of the
steel from the region of +100 to +300 mV with respect to the standard hydrogen electrode
(SHE), attained under NWC conditions, to -230 mV (SHE) or lower – the measured threshold for
SCC of stainless steel under BWR conditions. To achieve such low ECPs on all susceptible com-
ponents in the reactor vessel without raising the hydrogen additions to unacceptable levels,
General Electric’s NobleChemTM treatment has been applied, involving the addition of noble
metal salts to the coolant to create a catalytic environment on surfaces (Hettiarachchi, 2005).
Note that in CANDU reactors, the main use for the austenitic stainless steels is in the moderator
system (the calandria vessel and the piping) and, at the low temperature of the circulating heavy
water (<60oC), there have been no incidences of SCC since it was recognized early in the design
of the CANDU reactors that the low carbon versions (L-grade) of the austenitic stainless steels
were to be specified to avoid known problems associated with sensitization, especially during
welding.
Early steam generators in the PWRs and the CANDUs at Bruce A and the demonstration CANDU
NPD were tubed with Alloy 600, which was known to be somewhat resistant to TGSCC
(transgranular stress-corrosion cracking) from chlorides, although research had indicated that
under some circumstances at high temperature it could crack in pure water (Coriou et al., 1960).
Unfortunately, most of those tubes had generally received only a cursory heat-treatment during
manufacture; they had been “mill-annealed” (MA) and as a result were supplied in a sensitized
state that in many instances led to IGSCC during operation. Early failures occurred on the
primary side in further-stressed locations such as the tight-radius U-bends and the rolled area
near the tubesheet. Also, IGSCC occurred on the secondary side because of contact with high
concentrations of alkaline impurities in crevices with tube support plates and under “sludge
piles” on the tube sheet. Full replacement of most of the PWR steam generators tubed with MA
Alloy 600 became necessary, so that now only a few remain, the rest having been replaced with
those tubed with thermally-treated (TT – to relieve stresses) Alloy 690 – a nickel alloy containing
more chromium and less nickel. In CANDUs and several European PWRs, Alloy 800 has been
preferred for SG tubing. The Alloy 600 SGs in Units 1 & 2 at Bruce A have been replaced with
those tubed with Alloy 800 following the refurbishment projects. This contains more chromium
and iron than Alloy 600 and, having less than 50% nickel, is not strictly speaking a nickel alloy,
although it is usually classified as such for comparison with the others. It has been relatively
resistant to SCC.
Stainless steels and austenitic alloys containing moderate to high concentrations of carbon (i.e.,
>0.03%) are vulnerable to corrosion of their grain boundaries if they have undergone a heating
process such as welding that raises the temperature to the region of 500-800oC. Heating to this
range “sensitises” the material by preferentially precipitating the chromium in the grain bounda-
ries as chromium carbide (Cr23C6), thereby leaving the metal surface above the grain boundaries
depleted in chromium that would otherwise form the passivating oxide based on Cr 2O3. As
shown in Figure 12, the grain boundaries are then subject to corrosion via intergranular attack
(IGA).
In particularly aggressive environments, IGA can be severe enough to loosen metal grains which
then fall out, leaving a roughened and even more vulnerable surface exposed. In welded materi-
al, the attack is often called weld decay.
Figure 12. Typical sensitization mode and IGA of Type 304 stainless steel (after Fontana 1986)
Note that some situations may tolerate sensitised material; thus, sensitised stainless steel may
be used in non-aggressive environments such as those found in architectural applications. For
exposures to potentially aggressive conditions, however, sensitised material should not be used.
A low-carbon grade of material (e.g., type ASA 304L stainless steel, with L indicating <0.03% C) is
normally specified and since the carbon content is much reduced there is little available to
precipitate as the carbide.
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
Nuclear Materials and Corrosion 45
Austenitic material in general is usually supplied in the solution-quenched (also called solution-
annealed or quench-annealed) condition, indicating that it was heated to above the carbide-
precipitation temperature to dissolve the carbides into the metal matrix and then quenched to
cool rapidly through the precipitation range of temperature so that carbide has no time to
precipitate. Note that subsequent welding can re-sensitise the material, in which case the
component must be solution-quenched again. There are also “stabilised” alloys such as type ASA
347 or type ASA 327 stainless steels which, respectively, contain small amounts of the strong
carbide formers niobium or titanium. These have been heat-treated to precipitate the carbon as
the niobium or titanium carbide at a temperature above the range where the chromium carbide
would precipitate, leaving no carbon to combine with the chromium.
A B
Figure 13. Initial (A) and final (B) stages in the development of crevice corrosion of a metal M
(Fontana, 1986)
In the 1980s, the basic mechanism of the denting of the steam generators of Westinghouse
design, which had drilled-hole support plates of carbon steel, was the corrosion of the steel
forming the continuous crevices around the tubes. The heat transfer and boiling within the
crevices drew in impurities such as chlorides and when these concentrated, especially in the
presence of oxygen, aggressive acid conditions attacked the steel. The resulting growth of
corrosion-product magnetite in the crevices exerted enough force to compress (“dent”) the
tubes and deform the plate itself. Several steam generators have had to be replaced because of
denting. The prime example in CANDUs is the crevice corrosion of the inner surfaces of pressure
tubes beneath fuel bearing pads, exacerbated by localized boiling which concentrates solutes
such as LiOH and leads to aggressive conditions.
The similarity of the mechanism of pitting with that of crevice corrosion can be seen in the
illustration in Figure 14. Note that the precipitation of corrosion products (e.g., hydroxides in the
illustrations) can occur at the mouth of the crevice and around the rim of the pit and in the
latter example can grow into tubes or tubercules. Pits usually occur on upward-facing surfaces,
less frequently on vertical surfaces and rarely on downward-facing surfaces, indicating an effect
of gravity on the occluded high-density solution.
Pitting in particular can be extremely damaging. The pit mouths are often quite small and may
be accompanied by extensive undercutting, culminating in perforation in severe cases, and pits
may run into each other to create a rough surface degradation called general wastage (Figure
15). Beneath deposits, pits can go undetected and escape cursory inspections.
Figure 15. An undercut pit and surface wastage from overlapping pits
The pitting of heat exchanger tubes under silt deposits in an environment of static aerated
cooling water polluted with chlorides is a pervasive problem in most industries, including
nuclear power generation. Another common example in reactor systems is the pitting of the
secondary side of steam generator tubes beneath sludge piles on the tubesheet. This was a
particular problem with the German PWRs that had steam generators tubed with Alloy-800 and
operated with chemistry controlled with additions of sodium phosphate; the concentration of
aggressive species beneath the sludge led to pitting, in some cases extending to wastage. The
steam generators at the CANDU 6 at Point Lepreau, also tubed with Alloy 800, plugged many
tubes because of pitting during the period of dosing with phosphate. The change from phos-
phate to all-volatile treatment seems to have arrested the degradation.
V
K= (0)
W
AECL at Chalk River performed an extensive series of fretting-wear tests on steam generator
tube samples in contact with tube support samples. The factor having the greatest effect on
tube damage was temperature; K at a steam generator operating temperature of 265°C was 20
times higher than at 25°C. Other factors, namely chemistry (ammonia, hydrazine, phosphate or
boric acid), type of tube support (flat bar or broached hole), tube material (Alloy 800 or Alloy
690) or support material (type 410 or type 321 stainless steel) had relatively little effect. These
results led to the suggestion that an average value of K of 20×10 -15 Pa-1 and a conservative value
of 40×10-15 Pa-1 may be used over a range of work rates for typical steam generator geometries
and operating conditions (Guérout and Fisher, 1999).
Fretting wear also affects in-core components. In PWRs, it has been estimated that over 70% of
fuel leaks are caused by fretting between the Zircaloy fuel rods and support grids – the so-called
GRTF, grid-to-rod fretting (EPRI, 2008). The failures usually occur on final-cycle fuel assemblies,
which are located at the core periphery. Similar failures occur in the WWER reactors, which have
stainless steel grids.
The localized accelerated corrosion of CANDU pressure tubes because of the crevice effect
beneath fuel bundle bearing pads has already been mentioned. When there is relative motion
between the bearing pad and the pressure tube, resulting from flow-induced vibration for
example, fretting can exacerbate the damage. This has rarely been seen except in reactors
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
Nuclear Materials and Corrosion 49
having 13 fuel bundles, when significant damage is usually at the end of the pressure tube,
where the cross-component of the coolant flow may cause more vigorous vibration. On the
other hand, debris caught beneath fuel bearing pads can lead to significant fretting wear
anywhere along the pressure tube and objects caught between elements within the fuel bundle
can lead to fuel failures.
There are many types of microbe that influence corrosion and they occur in many environments,
especially natural waters. Consuming a variety of nutrients, they can grow under a wide range of
temperatures, pressures and alkalinities/acidities. Their spores are even more resistant to
adverse conditions and can be transported around systems and lie dormant for years before
being revived to germinate, attach to surfaces and create localized colonies that exude corrosive
waste matter (Licina and Cubicciotti, 1989). The biofilms created by the colonies consist of the
so-called exopolymers, largely consisting of polysaccharides that develop as slimes containing
corrosion products and debris carried from elsewhere in the system. They impede the transport
of corrosion inhibitors to the metal surface and to some extent they shield the organisms from
attack by treatment chemicals such as biocides. They can be tenacious and difficult to remove
by fluid forces alone and in some cases – often carbon steel piping systems – can be thick
enough to cause severe pressure drops.
The microbial species may exist in anaerobic (e.g., deaerated) conditions or in aerobic (e.g.,
Nuclear Plant Materials and Corrosion – September 2014
50 The Essential CANDU
aerated) conditions, and in some situations the one type creates local environments that sustain
the other type, giving cycles of corrosion activity. Stagnant or low-flow conditions are conducive
to MIC, so components buried in damp or wet soil and water-containing piping such as fire
dousing systems are particularly vulnerable. Locally stagnant environments, such as under dirt
or deposits and in crevices, also promote MIC. Reactor design features with redundant, static
water systems along with long shut-down periods make nuclear plants particularly susceptible.
Many materials are attacked, including the common metals in reactor systems such as stainless
steels, nickel alloys, carbon steel, copper, and copper alloys. Typical features of attack in carbon
steel are corrosion products deposited as tubercles and in stainless steel and nickel alloys are
small pits, often stained with rust, that can be deep enough to be through-wall and cause small
leaks especially at welds.
Sulphate-reducing bacteria (SRB) are responsible for many failures in water systems. The species
desulfovibrio and desulfomaculum are among the most widespread and economically important
organisms causing corrosion. They are anaerobic because their metabolism involves the con-
sumption of the sulphate ion in deaerated waters, especially under deposits, although they can
survive limited exposures to aerated conditions. They operate in steel systems by promoting the
overall mechanism:
( )
4Fe + SO42− + 4H2O → 3Fe OH +FeS + 2OH −
2
(1)
in which the microbes are instrumental in reducing the SO42- to S2-. The early postulate that the
microbes act by depolarizing the cathodic areas and catalyzing the recombination of adsorbed
hydrogen atoms to molecular H2 has been largely superseded by mechanisms involving the
formation of H2S and the interaction with iron sulphide corrosion products (Videla and Herrera,
2005).
Aerobic species act by creating differential aeration and concentration cells through their
biofilms. In seawater-cooled systems, for example, species such as Pseudomonas proliferate and
can cause extensive damage to carbon steel and stainless steels. Detailed examinations of type
304 stainless steel surfaces pitted by Pseudomonas in seawater have shown more localized
depletion of chromium in the passive films than similar control surfaces exposed in the absence
of the bacteria (Yuan and Pehkonen, 2007).
Counteracting MIC is difficult. System cleanliness is quoted as a desired remedy but it should be
noted that deionised water systems are susceptible. Moreover, removing slimes and biofilms by
flushing is seldom effective, even with pulsating flows, and mechanical scouring with sponge
balls etc. can damage protective films. Biocides are therefore a preferred recourse in many
situations. Videla and Herrera (2005) list common biocides in industrial applications:
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6 Acknowledgements
The following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and excellent com-
ments during the development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of course
the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the authors.
Kit Colman
Mark Daymond
Ed Price
Bob Tapping
Thanks are also extended to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
Chapter 15
Chemistry in CANDU Process Systems
prepared by
Summary:
The efficient and safe operation of a CANDU reactor is highly dependent upon the selection and
proper implementation of chemistry control practices for the major and ancillary process systems
such as the primary and secondary coolants and the moderator. The materials of construction of
the various systems are selected in consideration of the neutron economy while keeping the
proper chemical environment in mind in order to keep corrosion and degradation low and to
ensure desired plant operating lifetimes. This chapter begins with an overview of the basic
chemistry principles required to manage chemistry in CANDU reactors and then provides a
detailed description of the chemistry control practices and the reasons behind their use in the
major and ancillary process systems. The chapter concludes by examining the current practices
of component and reactor lay-up for maintenance shut-downs and refurbishments and a descrip-
tion of heavy water purification and upgrading.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Learning Outcomes ......................................................................................................... 4
2 Chemistry Principles Applied to Reactor Coolants .................................................................... 4
2.1 pH, pD and Apparent pH (pHa)........................................................................................ 5
2.2 Solution Conductivity...................................................................................................... 7
2.2.1 Specific Conductivity................................................................................................... 7
2.2.2 Cationic Conductivity or Conductivity After Cationic Exchange (CACE) ................... 10
2.3 Purification and Ion Exchange Resin ............................................................................. 11
2.3.1 Structure of Ion Exchange Resin ............................................................................... 11
2.3.2 Ion exchange capacity ............................................................................................... 11
2.4 Water Radiolysis............................................................................................................ 12
2.5 Solubility of Gases in Water – Henry’s Law................................................................... 15
3 Primary Heat Transport System ............................................................................................... 17
3.1 Chemistry Control in the PHTS...................................................................................... 17
3.2 Corrosion Issues in the PHTS......................................................................................... 20
3.2.1 Feeder Pipe FAC and Cracking................................................................................... 20
3.2.2 Delayed Hydride Cracking of Zirconium Alloys ......................................................... 21
3.3 Activity Transport .......................................................................................................... 21
4 Secondary Heat Transport System........................................................................................... 23
4.1 Chemistry Control in the Secondary System................................................................. 23
List of Figures
Figure 1. Temperature dependence of pKw / pKD and the neutral pH / pD for the dissociation of
light and heavy water. ............................................................................................................. 7
Figure 2. Simplified flow diagram of a PHT purification loop (courtesy of AECL). ........................ 19
Figure 3. Magnetite solubility calculated from thermodynamic data optimized to the Tremaine &
Leblanc data [Tremaine, 1980]. ............................................................................................ 20
Figure 4. Mass balance on steam generator impurity inventory. ................................................. 26
Figure 5. Alloy 800 Recommended Operating Envelope (Tapping, 2012). .................................. 28
Figure 6. Effect of steam voidage on FAC rate of carbon steel at 200°C under three chemistries
(neutral, pH25°C with ammonia and with ETA) at a flow rate of 0.56 L/min (the effect of
reduced flow rate on FAC with ammonia also indicated). [Lertsurasakda et al., 2013] ....... 30
Figure 7. Normal moderator cover gas system volume and relief ducts (CANTEACH) ................. 35
Figure 8. Schematic diagram of the Calandria vault and reactor assembly.................................. 36
Figure 9. Locations requiring attention during maintenance outages and lay-up of a fossil plant.
[after Mathews, 2013] .......................................................................................................... 40
Figure 10. Oxide/steel volume ratios. ........................................................................................... 41
List of Tables
Table 1. Conductivity at infinite dilution in H2O [CRC, 2014].......................................................... 9
Table 2. Henry’s constants for select gases at 25oC (calculated from IAPWS , 2004). .................. 16
Table 3. Target chemistry parameters in the PHTS. ...................................................................... 18
Table 4. Common radioactive isotopes and their source in the PHTS. ......................................... 22
Table 5. Target chemistry parameters in the secondary system (all-ferrous materials)............... 24
Table 6. Comparison of delta pH for two chemical dosing strategies in a typical steam cycle. ... 29
Table 7. Target chemistry parameters in the moderator system. ................................................. 32
Table 8. Typical Chemistry Parameters of the Calandria Vault and End Shield Cooling System. .. 37
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
This chapter explains the current state-of-the-art of CANDU system chemistry. It begins with an
overview of the basic chemistry principles, as relevant to the major process systems of a CANDU
reactor, and goes on to describe the modes of operation of the primary heat transport circuit,
the secondary heat transport circuit, the moderator system and plant auxiliary systems with
respect to system chemistry. It draws on knowledge of overall system configuration and materi-
als selection as described in chapters 2 and 11 of this text and, through examples of plant
chemistry specifications, creates a detailed knowledge of the reasoning behind the combined
selection of materials and chemistry. The necessity of minimizing corrosion and degradation of
the auxiliary systems supporting the operation of a CANDU reactor are also highlighted along
with a description of current chemistry dosing practices for these systems. Since every reactor
undergoes frequent maintenance outages and a mid-life refurbishment, the lay-up practices
during these outages are important factors affecting the overall lifetime of the plant; current
practices are described. Finally, the isotopic degradation and tritiation of the heavy water
coolant and moderator necessitate the use of clean-up and upgrading, issues that are dealt with
in the final sections of this chapter.
The chemistry of CANDU reactor system coolants is generally kept quite simple with the intent
of maintaining highly pure water with low concentrations of chemical additives to maintain low
corrosion rates on the materials in the systems. Before the specific chemistry control strategies
of the various nuclear and non-nuclear coolant systems are described, it is beneficial to define
several basic chemistry concepts that are particularly relevant to chemistry control in the plant.
These include a reminder of the measure of acidity/alkalinity (pH) and how it is typically used in
heavy water systems as “apparent pH or pHa”, the definition and calculation of the conductivity
of solutions containing dissolved ionic compounds and a discussion of water radiolysis or the
breakdown of water when exposed in a radiation field. Each of these topics will be dealt with in
turn to begin the chapter and will be used throughout the remainder of the chapter in describ-
ing the chemistry of the various reactor systems.
where aH+ is the activity of the hydrogen ion in the aqueous solution, which is dependent upon
the concentration of the hydrogen ion (mH+ - mol/kg), the activity of the standard reference state
(mo = 1 mol/kg) and the ionic activity coefficient (+/-) as shown in equation 2.
mH+
aH+ = γ± (2)
mo
Under dilute conditions, the activity of ions in solution can be approximated by their concentra-
tion since the mean ionic activity coefficient (+/-) is dependent upon the ionic strength of
solution and is nearly unity (1) for concentrations below ~ 10-3 mol/kg.
For neutral, light water (H2O), there is an equilibrium established between the water molecules
and the dissociation products H+ (or H3O+) and OH- as shown in equation 3.
By definition, the equilibrium constant for this chemical dissociation reaction is given by the
ratio of the activities (concentrations) of the product species to that of the reactant (H2O);
Equation 4 defines Kw, the dissociation constant or auto-ionisation constant for water, which has
a value of 10-14 at 25 oC [IAPWS, 2007, Bandura & Lvov, 2006]. The activity of water (aw) is
typically regarded as unity in dilute solutions, thus neutral water, defined as the point where the
activity of H+ equals that of OH-, will give a pH of 7 as calculated through equation 4.
aH+ aOH−
Kw = = 10-14 @ 25oC (4)
aH O
2
Increasing the pH of a solution is as simple as adding hydroxyl anions from a base such as lithium
hydroxide (LiOH), which will shift the equilibrium between H+ and OH-. Lithium hydroxide is a
strong base that is essentially completely dissociated in water up to reactor operating tempera-
tures and thus can be used at low concentrations to achieve considerable changes in pH.
Exercise 1 demonstrates the calculation.
The dissociation of water (and other ionic compounds) is dependent upon temperature. The
Bandura & Lvov correlation, as recommended by the International Association for the Properties
of Water and Steam (IAPWS) is commonly used to relate this temperature dependence, giving
the result shown in Figure 1. In the temperature range 0 – 310 oC the pKw (defined as -log10Kw)
decreases significantly before starting to increase again around 250 oC. This implies that the
In the heavy water systems of the CANDU reactor, the proper equations describing the dissocia-
tion of heavy water would be:
( )
pD = −log10 aD+ (6)
where aD+ is the activity of the deuterium ion in aqueous solution; this is analogous to the
definition of pH in equation 1. As in light water, the activity coefficient under sufficiently dilute
conditions is nearly unity so we can consider the activities of D + and OD- to be equal to their
molal (mol/kg) concentrations. Unfortunately, the direct measurement of pD is usually not
possible since pH electrodes are typically constructed with light-water-based fill solutions and
are calibrated using light water buffers. Thus, for heavy water systems, it is standard practice to
quote a pHa or “apparent” pH, which identifies the observed or measured pH value of the heavy
water using traditional pH electrodes and buffer solutions. A general relation [Mesmer &
Herting, 1978] between the dissociation of heavy water and that of light water leads to the
simple correlation shown in equations 7 and 8:
or, when considering an alkaline solution such as CANDU systems adjusted with LiOH:
This equation is the direct result of the difference between the dissociation of heavy water and
that of light water when considering that pOD ≈ pOH at room temperature. Also shown in
Figure 1 is the pKD expressing the dissociation equilibrium constant for heavy water [Mesmer &
Herting, 1978]. It is apparent that heavy water is less dissociated than light water under equiva-
lent conditions, leading to higher equivalent values of the neutral point of heavy water at the
various temperatures. This difference results in the approximate 0.41 unit shift between pH of
light water and the pD of heavy water.
Figure 1. Temperature dependence of pKw / pKD and the neutral pH / pD for the dissociation of
light and heavy water.
κ
Λm = (9)
c
where is the specific conductance of the electrolyte (S/m or 1/.m) and c is the stoichiometric
molar concentration of the solution. Measuring the conductivity (or resistivity) of an aqueous
solution is typically accomplished by placing two plate electrodes in the solution having fixed
separation between them and with known cross-sectional area and then measuring the absolute
resistance between them. The specific resistivity () follows from the calculation of the cell
resistance shown in equation 10 and specific conductivity () is related through equation 11.
ρ×
R= (10)
A
1
κ= (11)
ρ
The molar conductivity of the solution, and hence the solution specific conductivity, can be
broken down into the sum of the individual contributions of the ions, each one of which will be
dependent upon its concentration and overall mobility. Essentially, the specific conductivity of
the solution is the sum of the specific conductivities of the individual ions:
κ = ∑ κi (12)
i
We define the molar conductivity of the ion in solution (i) in an analogous way as the overall
molar conductivity of the solution, thus:
κi
λ m,i = (13)
ci
In an ideal solution, the molar conductivity would vary linearly with increasing concentration
(and specific conductivity); however, in reality the solution molar conductivity has a non-linear
dependence on solution concentration, particularly in more concentrated solutions. This stems
from the fact that ion-to-ion and ion-to-solvent interactions play larger roles in concentrated
solutions. Thus, the molar conductivity for an individual ion in solution may only be truly
measured if there are no other interfering ions present, i.e. in an infinitely dilute solution.
Inserting equation 13 into 12 and subsequently into 9 yields:
∑c λ
1
Λm = (14)
c i i i
If we note for a M+X- electrolyte, where + and - are the valences of the cation and anion
respectively, that the concentration of each ion will depend upon the total concentration of the
salt in solution, at infinite dilution this results in the simple relation of equation 15:
The ionic molar conductivities at infinite dilution are tabulated in various sources and allow for
the calculation of the solution specific conductivity directly [CRC, 2014]. It should be noted that
the above equations apply for solutions at infinite dilution but may be used directly with small
error up to total solution concentrations of approximately 10-3 mol/L. Table 1 shows the ionic
molar conductivity of cations and anions relevant to the operation of CANDU reactors. Note
that the ionic molar conductivity of each ion is per equivalent since the total migration of an ion
subjected to an electric field will be dependent upon its charge (valence). Note also the com-
paratively large conductivities of H+, D+, OH- and OD-, which is due to the Grotthus “hopping”
mechanism for these ions in aqueous solution where the individual ions themselves do not
physically migrate but they are exchanged through the interconnecting hydrogen-bonded
structure of liquid water. These ions tend to dominate the conductivity of the relatively pure
CANDU process solutions.
Example 15.1- calculating solution conductivity from pH and values at infinite dilution.
Lithium hydroxide is added to the light water in the calandria vault and end shield cooling
system to control the pH and minimize corrosion of the carbon steel components. The pH
specification is 9.5. Calculate the required lithium ion concentration in the water (in ppm) to
attain the pH specification and estimate the solution conductivity assuming no other impurities
are present.
Solution
Since the pH specification is given (9.5), the concentration of H+ and OH- are readily evaluated
from the definition of pH and Kw:
pH = −log10 ([H+ ])
recalling the dissociation of water (Kw, eq. 4), the OH- concentration is:
Kw 10−14
[OH− ] = = = 3.16 ×10−5
[H+ ] 3.16 ×10 −10
mol/kg
In this case, lithium hydroxide is a strong base and completely dissociates into lithium and
hydroxyl ions:
thus, the concentration of lithium must be equal to the hydroxyl concentration in the water, i.e.:
κ = ∑ c iλ i
i
Conductivity values for Li+ and OH- can be attained from Table 1, and since [Li+]=[OH-]:
(
κ = c LiOH λLi∞+ + λ ∞OH− )
Since the units of conductivity are in cm2, the concentration is converted to mol/cm3 for con-
sistency:
mol Scm2
κ = 3.16 ×10−8 38.7 +198 = 7.48 ×10−6 S / cm
cm3 moleq
thus, the conductivity of the cooling water is expected to be 0.748 mS/m. Ans.
While the conductivity of a solution provides an indication of the concentration of impurity ions
that are present, it is not species- or ion-specific; thus, there is no way of determing from a
conductivity measurement what are the individual dissolved ionic species present in the solu-
tion. One way of providing a better indication of the concentration of anionic impurities in an
aqueous solution is to use the cationic conductivity (or conductivity after cationic exchange -
CACE) [IAPWS, 2012], which gives a direct measure of the anionic impurities in the system that
may be aggressive to the corrosion of plant materials. Cationic conductivity is simply the
conductivity of an aqueous solution after it has been passed through a strong acid ion-exchange
column to remove the cations (such as Na+, K+, Ca2+ etc.), which replaces them with the proton
(H+). The solution that elutes from the cation exchange column will contain the same concentra-
tion of anions (Cl-, SO42- etc) as the original sample and can provide a rapid and direct indication
of the rate of increase of these impurities. This gives a very useful online measurement of
impurity ingress, specifically in the case of a condenser leak.
Once fabricated, cation and anion exchange resins appear as small beads (typically ~0.5 – 1.5
mm in diameter) and may be slurried in and out of their process vessels for easy replacement
and regeneration. Traditional resins were specified as “gel-type” as they were effectively a
wrapped-up sphere of polymer chains with significant porosity and tended to break apart if
continuously reused or placed in high flow rate process streams. Newer, “macroporous”, resins
are much stronger and have shown good resilience in harsh environments.
ion exchange resin used as well as its capacity to remove various ions from the water. Ion
exchange capacity is defined as the number of ionic “equivalents” that can be exchanged per
litre of resin used. For example, a strong acid resin in the protonated form (H +) can have an
exchange capacity of around 2 eq/L; thus, for every litre of the resin used in a purification vessel
two equivalents (or moles) of H+ cations are available to exchange with cationic impurities in the
process stream. If sodium (Na+) is used as an example, one litre of this strong cation resin may
remove 2 mols of Na+ cations, or effectively 46 grams of sodium.
The exchange capacity is also dependent upon the particular cation being exchanged with higher
valence cations showing the greater preference for adsorption on the exchange site. An example
of cationic preference is:
Fe3+ > Ca2+ > Ni2+ > Cu2+ > Fe2+ > K+ > NH4+ > Na+ > H+
For a strong base ion exchange resin, an example of anionic preference follows:
SO42- > CO32- > HSO4- > NO3- > Cl- > HCO3- > CHOO- > CH3COO- > F- > OH-
Thus, a ferrous or cuprous cation would tend to displace a sodium cation from the ion exchange
bed or a sulfate anion would displace a chloride or hydroxyl anion. The capacity of an ion-
exchange bed can be described in a manner similar to a chemical equilibrium equation, as
shown in equation 17 using the exchange of the sodium cation with the proton as an example.
The equilibrium constant, in this case called the selectivity coefficient, is given by:
[RNa][H+ ]
K Na = (17)
H
[RH][Na+ ]
where [RNa] and [RH] designate the concentration (mol/L) of the specific cation that is adsorbed
on the resin and [Na+] and [H+] are the incoming sodium ion and proton concentrations in the
solution to be purified. It should be noted that a fresh ion exchange column will have a fixed
number of exchange sites based upon the resin’s exchange capacity and the amount of resin
present; the balance between the [RNa] and [RH] must always be equal to the initial total
exchange capacity. Once most or all of the proton exchange sites available have been used or
taken up by another cation, the resin will start to “throw” the cations of lowest selectivity back
into the process water instead of removing them. This is obviously not a desirable situation as
the intent of the purification system is to remove the impurity cations from the process water
stream; at this point, the ion exchange column or vessel is said to be “spent”.
fuel and limit the corrosion of system components. The pH of irradiated CANDU process sys-
tems is typically adjusted by using lithium hydroxide to produce mildly alkaline conditions and
some irradiated systems are kept under reducing conditions by excluding oxygen to prevent
elevated electrochemical corrosion potential (ECP) and excessive corrosion. For in-core systems,
the water is continuously bombarded by an intense radiation field of high-energy gamma and
neutrons, which breaks the chemical bonds and produces highly reactive radical species. This
process is known as water radiolysis. The radiolysis of pure water results in the production of
hydrogen (H2) (or deuterium D2, for heavy water), oxygen (O2) and hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) (or
deuterium peroxide D2O2 in heavy water) [Spinks & Woods, 1990]. The radiolytic production of
these oxidizing species has a direct impact on the corrosion of system components; they elevate
the ECP, increasing the possibility of stress-corrosion cracking of the alloy steam generator tubes
and, under low-temperature shut-down conditions when the radioactive decay of in-core
components and fuel still produces intense gamma radiation, they promote the pitting of carbon
steel. Radiolytically generated hydrogen peroxide will also degrade ion-exchange resins.
The radiolytic production of hydrogen, oxygen and hydrogen peroxide can be managed by
adding hydrogen to the system. The elementary chemical reactions and kinetics are complicated
but the net result is that the added hydrogen molecules react with the radical species and
mitigate the radiolytic production of oxygen and hydrogen peroxide. The basic mechanisms for
these processes are explained below with the overall result being suppression of the net
radiolytic production of oxidizing species. Further details of the radiation kinetics associated
with water radiolysis can be found in the AECL report by David Bartels [Bartels, 2009] or in the
book chapter by George Buxton [Buxton, 1987].
Upon absorbing the energy dissipated by a particle or photon, water breaks down into several
radical species as primary products of the irradiation process; on a timescale of approximately
microseconds, the overall result is:
H2O + radiation → e−aq ,H+ , ⋅H, ⋅ OH, ⋅HO2 ,H2 ,H2O2 (18)
Reactions of these primary products can re-form water, and produce further hydrogen and
hydrogen peroxide through equations 19 - 21:
Oxygen is produced as a secondary product through reactions of the radical species with the
hydrogen peroxide molecule:
As mentioned above, providing sufficient added hydrogen to the water can mitigate the net
production of oxygen and hydrogen peroxide. Hydrogen reacts with the hydroxide radical
forming a hydrogen atom that readily combines with hydrogen peroxide and/or oxygen, effec-
tively removing them from the solution and mitigating their overall production as shown in
equations 25 - 27. The overall effect is a chain reaction where additional hydroxide radicals are
produced (eq. 27) continuing the reaction chain, provided sufficient hydrogen is present. From a
kinetic standpoint, the concentration of hydrogen in the water needs to be sufficient to make its
rate of reaction with the hydroxyl radical (eq. 25) faster than the rate of reaction of the hydroxyl
radical with hydrogen peroxide (eq. 22). This results in the reduction of the concentration of the
hydrogen peroxide molecule and effectively suppresses the conversion of hydrogen peroxide to
oxygen, removing both species from the solution. When sufficient hydrogen is added to an
irradiated aqueous system, the very simplified chemical relation shown in equation 28 is the net
result of the radiolysis process.
The fact that added hydrogen is required in the water to promote the desired recombination
reactions implies that there must be a minimum hydrogen concentration by which the overall
rate of the reaction in equation 25 is just sufficient to overcome the reaction of the hydroxyl
radical with hydrogen peroxide (equation 22) and hence suppress the production of oxygen.
This minimum concentration is called the “critical hydrogen concentration” (CHC) and has been
measured in flow loops (both fuelled reactor systems and in gamma cells) to be around 0.5
mL/kg (~2x10-5 mol/L). [Elliot & Stuart, 2008]. Operating with the hydrogen concentration
above the CHC with no oxidants initially present leads to a system in net radiolytic suppression
while operation with an initial hydrogen concentration below the CHC (or with the presence of
significant quantities of oxidants or impurities in the water) leads to net radiolysis occurring
within the system.
Impurities dissolved within water will influence the water radiolysis processes. For example,
impurities such as nitrate and nitrite anions will interfere with the water recombination reac-
tions since they tend to react with and consume the hydrogen atoms and hydroxyl radicals
[Yakabuskie, 2010], effectively lowering their concentrations and the overall rate of the oxygen
and hydrogen peroxide consumption reactions (eq. 26 & 27). This will result in an increase in
the quantity of oxygen and hydrogen produced by water radiolysis in the presence of nitrate
and/or nitrite ions. Chloride ions interfere with the hydrogen recombination reactions since
they readily exchange their outer valence electron with the hydroxyl radicals interfering with the
primary recombination reaction (eq. 19). The chloride ion is then regenerated through electron
exchange with water molecules and can continuously impede the desired recombination
processes. Organic impurities from compressor leaks, oil ingress from pumps or other mechani-
cal systems will break down rapidly in a radiation field. High molecular weight organics undergo
polymerization reactions, extending their size and weight leading to plugging of filters and other
flow paths. Lower molecular weight organics decompose producing hydrogen and carbon
dioxide that can rapidly lead to hydrogen excursions and reduction in system pH.
The chemistry specifications for a water-filled, irradiated CANDU system must therefore be
designed to prevent the build-up of the water radiolysis products in the system, or the effects of
water radiolysis must be continuously managed to maintain system chemistry specifications.
Some systems, such as the primary heat transport system and the end shield cooling system, are
operated under net radiolytic suppression by ensuring the hydrogen concentration in the water
is above the CHC. Other systems, such as the moderator, liquid zone control and the spent fuel
bay, are operated with net water radiolysis occurring. For these systems, the hydrogen and
oxygen produced are managed by ensuring impurity concentrations are kept extremely low and
by providing catalytic recombiner units in their cover gas flow paths to ensure flammable
concentrations are not exceeded. Further details of the operation of each of these systems are
found later in this chapter.
The equilibrium established between a gas dissolved in water and its partial pressure in the gas
space above the liquid is given as:
ygas pgas
kH = ≈ (29)
x gas c gas
where ygas is the mole fraction of the given gas in the vapour space and x gas is the mole fraction
in the liquid phase. Since the gases of interest in CANDU process systems are sparingly soluble
the mole fractions are typically equated to partial pressure (pgas) and concentration (cgas) for the
gas phase and liquid phase respectively giving units of pressure (atm or MPa) per molarity
(mol/L). Rearrangement of equation 29 shows that, under low to intermediate partial pressures,
there is a linear dependence between the partial pressure of the gas above the liquid and that
dissolved in it. Thus, by knowing the equilibrium constant, in this case called Henry’s Law
constant, the concentration of gas dissolved in water may easily be evaluated as demonstrated
in Example 15.2. Henry’s law constants at 25oC are shown in Table 2 for some gases commonly
encountered in CANDU process systems. IAPWS has released detailed correlations for determin-
ing the Henry’s Law constant for various gases as a function of temperature [IAPWS, 2004].
Table 2. Henry’s constants for select gases at 25oC (calculated from IAPWS , 2004).
Gas kH in H2O (in D2O)
(atm/M)
O2 775.7
H2 1263
N2 1522
He 2541 (2343)
CO2 29.40
D2 (921.0)
The heavy water storage tank for the primary heat transport system contains D 2O at roughly
room temperature and is purged with a helium cover gas to maintain the hydrogen concentra-
tion below 4% (by volume). The specification for dissolved deuterium in the PHTS is 3 – 10
mL/kg, calculate the equilibrium concentration that would be attained in the cover gas if helium
is not frequently added and purged and the dissolved hydrogen is maintained at the upper limit
of the specification.
Solution
If 10 mL/kg of dissolved deuterium is maintained in the PHTS, Henry’s law can be used to
estimate the equilibrium concentration in the storage tank cover gas. First the dissolved deuter-
ium concentration must be converted to consistent units with Henry’s law (i.e. Molar or mol/L)
using the conversion factor that 1 mol gas = 22.4 L gas at standard temperature and pressure
(STP). Thus:
( )(
pgas = k H c gas = 921atm / M 4.46 ×10−4 M = 0.411 atm )
For a cover gas operating at approximately atmospheric pressure this would amount to a cover
gas concentration of 41.1%, well above the flammability limit of about 8% in helium!
As explained in Chapter 10, the purpose of the Primary Heat Transport System (PHTS) in a
CANDU reactor is to remove the heat generated from the fissioning of the reactor fuel and
transport it to the steam generator for production of steam in the Secondary System. The
materials of construction in the PHTS are numerous due to the different functions of the various
components; the particular materials and their properties are described in detail in Chapter 14.
The materials with the largest surfaces areas in contact with the heavy water coolant of the
PHTS are: zirconium-based alloys in the core of the reactor (Zircaloy-4 fuel cladding, Zr-2.5Nb
pressure tubes), nickel alloys for the steam generator tubing (Alloy 400 [Monel] at Pickering,
Alloy 600 [Inconel] at Bruce, Alloy 800 [Incoloy] at Darlington and the CANDU-6s), type 410
stainless steel for the fuel-channel end fittings and carbon steel for the feeder pipes joining the
fuel channels through the headers to the carbon-steel channel heads in the steam generators.
Thus, as with any complex system, the chemistry control practices are a compromise among the
optimum chemistries for each of the major materials used.
The Zircaloy-4-clad fuel bundles, Zr-2.5Nb pressure tubes and nickel-alloy steam generator tubes
exhibit low general corrosion rates over a wide range of pH and temperature [Cox, 2003]. A
major role of chemical control is therefore to protect against localized corrosion, in particular
the stress-corrosion cracking of the steam generator tubes and the hydriding and cracking of the
pressure tubes. As described earlier in the section on radiolysis, adding hydrogen maintains
reducing conditions and this minimizes the possibility of nickel-alloy cracking, but to minimize
the potential for hydriding of Zr-2.5Nb the hydrogen is kept within strict limits (3-10 mL/kg).
A further role of the chemical control in the PHTS is the protection of the large surface area of
carbon steel. As described in Section 6.1 in Chapter 14, the general corrosion of iron produces
mixed and, at low temperature, often hydrated oxides (Fe2O3, Fe3O4, FeOOH etc.) that become
the thermodynamically stable phases at a pH (at room temperature) greater than 9 or so. It is
well known that carbon steel corrosion is minimized in mildly alkaline, deaerated water. Howev-
er, at low temperature with static water that may occur during a shut-down, oxidising conditions
can induce severe pitting of carbon steel and should be avoided. Note that during reactor
operation the inlet feeders in CANDUs are exposed to coolant saturated in dissolved iron
because of the heat transferred producing steam in the steam generators and the consequent
drop in iron solubility, so they undergo general corrosion and develop thick magnetite films as
the result of magnetite precipitation from the oversaturated coolant. On the other hand, the
outlet feeders see coolant undersaturated in iron because of the heating in the core and as a
consequence undergo flow-accelerated corrosion (FAC), which leads to very thin magnetite films
and loads the system with iron that largely deposits as magnetite in the steam generators.
Oxidising conditions tend to mitigate FAC, but the greater need to avoid localized corrosion of
the alloy components in the core and the steam generators dictates the use of reducing condi-
tions.
involves operating under alkaline conditions and mitigating the radiolytic production of oxidizing
species. Other objectives include minimizing deposition of corrosion products on the fuel
(fouling) and minimizing and controlling the concentration of activiated corrosion products and
fission products (both gaseous and dissolved) in the system. These objectives are accomplished
through dosing and control of the primary coolant’s pH a and deuterium concentration through
regular additions of lithium hydroxide and hydrogen gas. Also, the molecular hydrogen gas
exchanges rapidly in the reactor core with deuterium in the D2O molecules. Although the
additions downgrade the heavy water slightly, this is compensated by periodic isotopic upgrad-
ing of the system’s D2O (see Section 8.1). Each individual plant maintains its own chemistry
practices and operational guidelines but, in general, guidelines for these values are shown in
Table 3.
During steady-state operation, variations in any of the above parameters are typically small in
the absence of system transients or upset conditions. Oxygen concentrations are typically non-
detectable. The alkalinity is controlled through periodic additions of LiOH through the sampling
system return (for elevating pHa) or by providing a periodic bleed flow through the purification
system using an ion-exchange column containing strong acid cation resins (for lowering pHa).
Lithiated mixed-bed ion-exchange columns (where the strong-acid IX resin D+ sites have been
saturated with Li+; both acid and base resins are deuterated) are run as normal purification for
the PHTS to collect cationic and anionic impurities. A simplified flow diagram for a PHT purifica-
tion circuit is shown in Figure 2. The purification system keeps particulate concentration low and
helps to maintain the anioic impurity concentrations below the specification to minimize the risk
of SCC of the stainless steel and alloy components in the system and to minimize the risk of
strain-induced cracking of carbon steel components [Turner & Guzonas, 2010]. It also serves to
keep the radioacitivity of the PHT coolant low as the filters and ion exchage column may capture
activiated corrosion products or ionic fission products released from failed fuel bundles.
Since pHa and conductivity are directly related to [Li +], purity of the PHTS coolant is readily
observed by comparing the measured values to the theoretical values as calculated using the
equations developed earlier in the chapter. If the system is controlled well and has minimal
impurities, then the conductivity and pH a measured should match closely with the calculated
values appropriate to the measured lithium-ion concentration. Deviations in the measured-to-
theoretical value indicate ingress of ionic impurities or problems with system sampling tech-
niques.
The above discussion seems to imply that sampling the high-temperature PHTS system is routine
and simple. While it is routine, collecting and analyzing samples from a high-temperature, high-
pressure system is far from simple. Take, for example, the collection of a sample in an open
polypropylene jar. The sampled water must first be cooled from the operational temperature
and throttled to low pressure. Each of these operations changes the state of the chemical
species present in the sample. Once the valve at the end of the sample line is opened, the
ideally oxygen-free coolant sample is exposed to the atmosphere and will readily absorb nitro-
gen, oxygen and carbon dioxide from the air. Thus, this sample is immediately not appropriate
for obtaining a dissolved oxygen measurement. Additionally, the absorbed CO 2 dissociates in
the sample solution to form carbonate (CO32-) and bicarbonate (HCO3-) anions, which disturb the
equilibrium chemistry established between lithium hydroxide and water. The CO 2 absorption
effectively produces carbonic acid and lowers the pH (or pHa) of the sample, rendering it com-
promised for system monitoring. Thus, differences in pHa, conductivity and [Li+] from PHTS
samples may imply improper sampling techniques, not problems with system chemistry and
care must be taken to identify the root cause. Several standard methods and recommended
practices are available to properly specify and conduct sampling campaigns including the
Technical Guidance Document on corrosion product sampling recently released by IAPWS
[IAPWS, 2014].
Figure 3. Magnetite solubility calculated from thermodynamic data optimized to the Tremaine
& Leblanc data [Tremaine, 1980].
The Point Lepreau CANDU-6 was the first reactor to exhibit FAC of the outlet feeder pipes. The
feeders were on average corroding at rates greatly in excess of what was assumed and predicted
in providing a suitable corrosion allowance and many sections of outlet feeders needed to be
replaced well before the end of their design lifetime. Unlike other CANDU stations that also
observed FAC in the outlet feeder pipes, the Point Lepreau station also had demonstrated
cracking, which necessitated many removals and replacements prior to the refurbishment
outage that began in 2008. The stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) or environmentally assisted
cracking (EAC) observed at Lepreau was very unexpected as carbon steel is not typically suscep-
tible to significant cracking. Theories supporting mechanisms such as hydrogen embrittlement
due to the high corrosion rates and hydrogen production associated with the outlet feeder FAC
were proposed along with a detailed examination of the construction and operational history
[Slade & Genderon, 2005]. Evidence pointed to high residual stresses from the bending, welding
and fabrication process as a primary culprit to the cracking mechanism and the fact that none of
the bends were stress relieved following fabrication. No direct evidence of a connection with
hydrogen embrittlement related to FAC was found, however it is still suspected to have played a
factor. The material for replacement sections of pipe, and that used for new construction and
refurbishment projects, is now specified to contain a higher chromium content (~0.3 wt%) and
has slightly more carbon (~0.35% vs 0.3%) which, in combination act to significantly reduce the
FAC issue and increases the yield strength respectively, thereby creating more margin to protect
against cracking. All new bends are also fully stressed relieved before being placed into service.
year half life. Tritium production and decay in the PHTS heavy water means that, even in the
absence of particulate or ionic impurities, the coolant will be radioactive and the entire PHTS
will have significant concentrations of tritium, typically of the order of 104 Bq/kg of heavy water.
This is several orders of magnitude lower than the steady state tritium concentrations in the
moderator water since only about 3% of the PHTS coolant is in the reactor core at any given time
whereas >95% of the moderator heavy water is continuously being exposed to the high neutron
flux in the reactor core. Thus, all reactor systems that employ heavy water as their coolant will
contain significant tritium activity in all sections of the circuit.
In addition to the production of tritium, the PHTS heavy water coolant will contain trace concen-
trations of dissolved ions and particulates that are the result of the corrosion and wear of the
system materials. These impurities, which include iron, nickel, chromium, cobalt and antimony
can deposit in the core and may become activated by neutron absorption. In addition, zirconi-
um alloy wear products released by the movement of fuel inside the fuel channel during refuel-
ing, and fission products and actinides released from the (infrequent) failure of the fuel cladding,
can be transported out of the core by the coolant. These species are easily deposited, adsorbed
and incorporated into the oxide layers that form on the surfaces of out-of-core components
leading to elevated levels of activity on components removed from the direct radiation field of
the reactor core, the reactor inlet/outlet headers and feeders and inner surfaces of the steam
generator tubes, for example.
Typical activation and fission products observed in the PHT and their half-lives are shown in
Table 4. Note the relatively long half-life of Co-60, which is a major contributor to radiation
fields in out-of-core components. The fission products are generally kept at very low concentra-
tions in the PHT coolant since they are indicators of failed fuel elements, which are removed as
quickly as possible once identified. The radioiodines are of particular concern since they are
readily absorbed in the thyroid of humans and must be contained in the system and disposed of
appropriately.
The Secondary Heat Transport System (commonly called the secondary system or steam cycle)
produces the steam necessary to drive the turbines and electrical generator. The configuration
of the secondary system is described in detail in Chapter 8 but in summary it contains the
condenser, a series of low-pressure feedwater heaters, a deaerator, a series of high temperature
feedwater heaters, the boilers or steam generators, the steam supply piping and control sys-
tems, and the high- and low-pressure turbines with a moisture separator and steam reheater in
between them. While the secondary system at each plant is unique in terms of its exact configu-
ration and the materials used for the various components there are typically two classifications
of system; all-ferrous and copper-containing. The operating chemistry for the secondary system
is dependent upon the type of materials from which the plant is constructed. For example, as
described in the corrosion section in Chapter 14, it is desirable for iron-based materials to
operate with alkaline chemistry to promote the formation of passive oxide films and minimize
corrosion. This is often done with the addition of ammonia or other volatile amines and target
pH values (measured at room temperature) can be up to 10. In a copper-based system or a
system that contains some copper components, copper corrosion is known to be accelerated
considerably by ammonia, especially when oxygen is present, and maximum pH’s must be kept
to about 9.2 – 9.4 and the use of ammonia minimized or excluded all together. Reducing condi-
tions are maintained, mainly to protect the steam-generator alloys from cracking, by the addi-
tion of hydrazine.
Chemistry parameters that are targets for the secondary system chemistry control and are
typically measured at the high pressure feed water heater outlet are shown in Table 5.
The distribution of amine retained in the water phase or stripped to the steam phase is de-
scribed by the distribution coefficient, which is dependent upon both temperature and concen-
tration. The true distribution coefficient is defined as the ratio of the vapour-phase mole
fraction of volatile species (yB) to its liquid phase mole fraction (xB):
yB
DB = (30)
xB
Note that, in the true distribution coefficient, the measure is per fraction of the volatile species.
For ammonia this means the neutral species, NH 3. However, due to the dissociation of ammonia
and other amines in water, the true distribution coefficient is not typically what is measured; the
measurement is the “apparent” distribution coefficient. The apparent distribution coefficient
accounts for the total concentration (or fraction) of ammonia-based species in the liquid phase
including the dissociation products as shown in equation 31. For example, the equilibrium
established between ammonia and the ammonium cation in water is given by equation 32 and
its equilibrium constant in equation 33. If ammonia is stripped to the vapour phase, its liquid
phase concentration will be reduced and will subsequently affect the concentration of the
ammonium cation retained in solution. As with other equilibrium chemical equations that have
been discussed in this chapter, the equilibrium constant for amine dissociation is temperature-
dependent, as are the distribution coefficients, thus the apparent distribution coefficient is a
complicated function of the true distribution coefficient and equilibrium chemistry.
While protection of the entire secondary system is the goal of the chemistry dosing practices,
protection of the materials in the steam generators or boilers is paramount since the boiler
tubes represent the physical barrier between nuclear and non-nuclear sections of the plant. A
boiler contains an array of 1000’s of tubes, tube support plates, tube sheet, and associated
steam driers. Since dissolved species, other than the ammonia or the other amines dosed to
control pH, represent impurities in the feedwater it is important to minimize (or eliminate if
possible) their concentrations entering the boiler. Some impurities of particular importance in
boiler feed water include iron, copper, sodium, chloride and sulphate. The iron (and copper if
the system includes some copper-bearing materials) enters the boiler as corrosion products
released from the predominately carbon steel components in the feed water train and, since
they are not volatile will accumulate in the boiler as steam is produced. Ultimately, boiler sludge
(mainly iron oxides or hydrated oxides) will accumulate on the tube sheet and tube support
plates and must be periodically removed through a physical or chemical cleaning procedure.
This can become difficult if significant copper is retained in the deposits.
Sodium, chloride, sulphate and other inorganic impurities can enter the feedwater system
through leaks in the condenser tubes and must be kept at very low concentrations since all non-
volatile species will tend to concentrate in the boiler, particularly in crevice regions in the tube
sheet or around the tube support plates. The concentration of these species is kept low in the
boiler through a continuous blow-down that removes a small fraction of the circulating water in
the boiler. Example 15.3 demonstrates the calculation on the effectiveness of blow-down to
maintain low levels of contaminants in the boiler. A simple calculation of the feedwater input
flow rate divided by the blow-down rate can give a rough indication of the concentration factor
(CF) that can be achieved in a steam generator crevice. For example, an individual boiler in a
typical CANDU-6 plant will have an incoming flow rate of around 250 kg/s. With a blow-down of
approximately 0.5% of the incoming flow (amounting to 1.25 kg/s) this shows a concentration
factor of 200, meaning that any impurities entering the boiler from the feedwater will be
concentrated 200 times in the bulk water of the steam generator. Regular sampling of the blow-
down stream for sodium, chloride, sulphate and other impurities provides a ready indication of
poor feedwater chemistry.
Impurities in the boiler cause hide-out, whereby they are absorbed and retained in the boiler
crevices or in the deposited sludge piles, which can lead to aggressive chemistry conditions for
the boiler tubes. Alloy 800, the choice material for recent CANDU reactor boiler tubes, has
shown excellent corrosion resistance and little stress corrosion cracking over a wide range of
chemistry conditions. However, if the environment adjacent to the tubes becomes sufficiently
acidic or alkaline due to the ingress and hide-out of ionic impurities, chlorides, sulphate or
sodium for example, the recommended operating envelope for the boiler tubes may be com-
promised. This situation has occurred at various nuclear plants, both CANDUs and PWRs, where
boiler tubes had to be plugged due to through-wall cracking and leakage of primary system
water into the boiler. This is detected by increasing radiation levels in the boiler blow-down or
main steam line.
A sketch of a steam generator with feedwater inlet flow rate (F), steam flow rate (S) and
blowdown flow rate (B) is shown in Figure 4. Assuming steady state operation, feedwater iron
concentration of 5 ppb (mg/kg), feedwater flow rate is 250 kg/s and blowdown rate of 0.5%
(1.25 kg/s), calculate the concentration of iron in the bulk boiler water (C M). If the blowdown
rate was reduced to 0.1%, what effect does that have on bulk boiler water iron concentration?
Solution
A steady state mass balance on the iron inventory using the sketch in Figure 4 results in:
Fe In = Fe Out
F ⋅ CF = S ⋅ Cs + B ⋅ CB
We not that the concentration in the bulk boiler water will be the same as the blow-down
concentration, hence CM = CB. Also, the iron in the boiler water is non-volatile so its concentra-
tion in the steam line will be zero. Applying these conditions and rearranging results in:
F
CM = CB = C
B F
The term F/B is the concentration factor described above and is the ratio of the feedwater flow
rate over the blow-down rate. For the conditions indicated above this results in a concentra-
tion factor (CF or F/B) of 200. Thus:
Reducing the blow-down rate to 0.1% effectively increases the concentration factor by five
leading to CM = CB = 5 mg/kg. Ans.
AECL has developed a recommended operating environment envelope for Alloy 800 boiler tubes
[Tapping, 2012]. The chart, shown in Figure 5, is the result of decades of reactor operating
experience and ongoing research at the Chalk River Laboratories and elsewhere to evaluate the
cracking and degradation propensity of boiler tubes in out-of-specification chemistry conditions.
While a plant may be within the recommended operating envelope for the majority of its
operational lifetime, there will be periods of out-of-specification chemistry due to ingress of
contaminant ions or elevated concentrations of dissolved oxygen. The effects of these, hopeful-
ly short, periods need to be carefully assessed as they may be the initiating events for pitting
and cracking later on in the life of the plant.
Management of FAC in the secondary circuit of power plants is quite advanced and relies upon
computer model predictions (EPRI’s CHECWORKS code for example) to assess critical locations in
the plant and frequent inspections. One of the key factors in protecting the secondary side
piping from FAC is to maintain a suitable alkalinity level at all locations around the steam cycle.
Magnetite solubility is demonstrated to be at a minimum around a pH 25°C of 9.5 or so and
maintaining this specification at every location in the steam cycle is highly desirable to minimize
pipe wall thinning by FAC. However, this is difficult to achieve in the field since chemical dosing
typically occurs at a sole location in the feedwater circuit (usually just downstream of the
condensate extraction pump) and the fact that the two-phase sections of the plant can have a
significantly different chemical composition from that of the feedwater due to the distribution
coefficient of the volatile amine used for plant pH control. In principle, the target is to maintain
a delta pH (pH = pHT – pHneutral@T) greater than 1.0 to ensure that sufficient alkalinity is main-
tained at each location and the solubility of magnetite is kept to a minimum.
Table 6 shows the results of a calculation for the effect of different chemical dosing strategies on
the delta pH throughout a common secondary side feedwater and steam circuit. In case 1,
ammonia is used as the pH-controlling chemical and in case 2 morpholine is used, both achiev-
ing a final feedwater pH25C of 9.6. Note that in case 2, 1 mg/kg of ammonia is also assumed to
be present due to the decomposition of the morpholine (and hydrazine) at the higher tempera-
ture locations in the system; such decomposition typically results in a residual ammonium
concentration between 0.5-1.1 mg/kg. As is demonstrated in the table, both chemical dosing
strategies achieve the same target pH25°C and maintain a sufficient delta pH at the outlet of the
HP heater, thus maintaining suitable protection of the feedwater train from FAC. However, due
to the differences in volatility and distribution coefficients, the delta pH achieved with the
morpholine chemistry in case 2 provides much better protection for the steam extraction lines
and moisture separator.
Table 6. Comparison of delta pH for two chemical dosing strategies in a typical steam cycle.
Case 2: 25 mg/kg Morpholine
Case 1: 2.3 mg/kg Ammonia
+ 1 mg/kg Ammonia
(pH25 = 9.6)
(pH25 = 9.6)
Location pHT pHneutral pH pHT pHneutral pH
HP heater outlet
6.71 5.68 1.03 6.87 5.68 1.19
(final feedwater)
Bulk Boiler water 5.92 5.59 0.32 6.34 5.59 0.74
HP turbine extraction to
6.29 5.67 0.62 6.80 5.67 1.14
HPH2
Moisture Separator/Reheater 6.57 5.78 0.80 7.13 5.78 1.35
LP turbine extraction to DA 6.85 5.89 0.96 7.43 5.89 1.54
LP turbine extraction to LPH3 7.11 6.01 1.11 7.73 5.89 1.54
LP turbine extraction to LPH2 7.45 6.16 1.28 8.11 6.16 1.95
LP turbine extraction to LPH1 7.88 6.38 1.50 8.57 6.38 2.20
Condensate 8.73 6.83 1.89 9.49 6.83 2.65
Similar effects are realized with other amines of lower volatility, such as ethanolamine (ETA),
which has a relative volatility of about 0.15 at 200°C while that of ammonia is about 5.0. Its
effect on FAC compared with that of ammonia and in neutral chemistry is illustrated in Figure 6,
which shows on-line measurements of the FAC rate of carbon steel in an experimental loop. The
operating conditions were two-phase steam-liquid flows at 200°C with ammonia and ETA at the
same pH25°C (9.2) and with no additive. The effect of the additives on reducing FAC below that of
neutral chemistry is immediately realized at zero voidage (% steam by volume) and continues up
to 97% voidage. As the voidage increases from zero the FAC rates with the two additives are
roughly the same and increase together. At about 80% voidage, the FAC rate with ammonia
increases further as the ammonia partitions to the vapour phase, while that for ETA decreases as
the ETA partitions to the liquid phase (the FAC occurs in the liquid film on the walls of the pipe or
component). The diagram also shows how reducing the flow rate also reduces the FAC rate.
Figure 6. Effect of steam voidage on FAC rate of carbon steel at 200°C under three chemistries
(neutral, pH25°C with ammonia and with ETA) at a flow rate of 0.56 L/min (the effect of reduced
flow rate on FAC with ammonia also indicated). [Lertsurasakda et al., 2013]
5 Moderator System
As described previously, the main purpose of the heavy water moderator is to slow down or
thermalize the high energy neutrons produced through the fission reactions to low, thermal
energies so that they more easily induce further fission reactions. A significant amount of heat
is produced as a result of the high-energy neutrons losing their kinetic energy and this must be
dissipated through the external heat exchanger loops. A secondary purpose of the moderator
system is to serve as an additional reactivity control mechanism for the reactor, which is accom-
plished by dosing the heavy water with low concentrations of neutron-absorbing elements,
boron or gadolinium for example. The third purpose of the moderator system is to act as a
reactor safety system through rapid additions of high concentration of neutron poisons (known
as shut-down system 2 – SDS 2). Thus, the moderator system encompasses a large volume of
heavy water contained within the calandria vessel, the associated side recirculation loops for
heat removal and purification, the moderator cover gas system for removing deuterium gas
produced through the water radiolyisis, and the connections to SDS2. A schematic overview of
the moderator systems is shown in Figures 4 and 5 of Chapter 8.
Typical operating parameters for the moderator system are shown in Table 7. Unlike the heat
transport systems where the water is kept alkaline to control and minimize the corrosion of
system components, the heavy water in the moderator is kept slightly acidic to ensure that
gadolinium hydroxide (Gd(OH)3) will not precipitate on the surfaces of the moderator compo-
nents and that SDS-2 can function if required.
(
Gd NO3 ) 3
Gd3+ + 3NO−3 (34)
( )
Gd3+ + 3H2O Gd OH + 3H+
3
(35)
Gadolinum concentrations within the moderator system can range from zero to ~ 1 mg/kg under
typical reactor operating conditions, leading to water conductivities of ~ 0.005 mS/m to ~ 0.10
mS/m. Care must be taken during normal reactor operation to limit the conductivity, and hence,
nitrate concentration in the heavy water to below ~ 0.05 mS/m (corresponding to ~ 1 mg/kg
gadolinium nitrate) since the nitrate anions may form reactive intermediate species with the
water radiolysis products and promote the formation of deuterium gas (D 2) [Yakabuskie et al.,
2010], which can lead to excessive cover gas concentrations and increased workload for the re-
combiner units (the D2 concentration in the cover gas must be kept below 4%). Some operating
reactors have used gadolinium sulfate (Gd2(SO4)3.6H2O) as their preferred salt, which eliminates
the issues of increased deuterium production from interaction of the radiolysis products with
the nitrate ion (sulfate ions do not form reactive intermediates with short-lived radiolysis
products). However, the sulfate salt is sparingly soluble compared to the nitrate salt thus, if
excess reactivity control is required, such as during start-ups with significant amounts of fresh
fuel in the core, the preferred reactivity control shim is boric acid. Sulphur species may also
promote localized corrosion of alloy components.
Boric Acid
Boron 10 is 20% abundant in nature and has a neutron absorption cross-section of 3838 barns.
Boric anhydride or boric acid is soluble in water and can be an efficient alternative to gadolinium
as a reactivity control mechanism. Its dissolution, however, is very slow and so boric acid is only
employed in the operations of the CANDU plant when necessary. This is typically when concerns
of excess deuterium production are encountered through the use of higher concentrations of
gadolinium nitrate such as during startups with significant volumes of fresh fuel.
To ensure a guaranteed shut down state, gadolinium concentrations of greater than 15 mg/kg
are typically required and this is the lower limit for gadolinium in the moderator during GSS.
Typical concentrations are targeted at greater than 20 mg/kg and assurances must be made to
the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission that GSS is achieved and maintained. This assurance is
typically accomplished by manually sampling the moderator and analyzing for gadolinium
concentration at least twice per day.
Gadolinium Oxalate
In 2008 during a planned station outage at a unit of the Pickering B plant, while the unit was
placed in GSS it was observed that the Gd concentration in the moderator was decreasing at an
alarming rate. The over-poisoned condition for the GSS requires assurances that the Gd concen-
tration in the moderator is maintained above 15 mg/kg at all times and the measured loss rate
of Gd was approximately 2 mg/kg per day. The utility, with the assistance of experts from AECL
Chalk River traced the unexpected Gd depletion to precipitation as gadolinium oxalate
(Gd2(C2O4)3), a salt known to be very insoluble in water. Oxalate is normally not present in the
moderator heavy water systems and, upon investigation, its formation was attributed to a
known leak of CO2 from the annulus gas system through the rolled joints at one of the end
fittings, a condition that had been assessed in 2005 and monitored routinely through measure-
ment of total inorganic carbon (TIC). Elevated CO2 concentrations in the moderator heavy water
produce carbonate anions, which are readily converted to oxalate through combination with
primary water radiolysis radicals such as shown in equations 36 & 37.
−
CO2(aq) + e(aq) ⋅CO2 (36)
Under typical reactor operating conditions, with little gadolinium present in solution, the oxalate
anions would readily decompose back to CO2. However, under GSS with appreciable concentra-
tion of gadolinium in solution and a high enough concentration of TIC (from the ongoing CO2
leak in the rolled joint), the oxalate anion could readily combine with the gadolinium present as
quickly as it was produced, leading to precipitation of the gadolinium oxalate salt throughout the
moderator system, as shown in equation 38.
2Gd3+ + 3C 2O2−
4 (
→ Gd2 C 2O4 ) 3(s)
(38)
The Gd depletion is of concern for maintaining the reactor in GSS but the fate of the oxalate
precipitate throughout the calandria vessel and on the calandria tubes is of greater concern as it
could prevent the reactor from becoming critical upon startup and must be removed. Several
research programs were initiated to formulate a chemical cleaning strategy to remove the
precipitated gadolinium oxalate; however, none were ultimately needed as the precipitate in-
core was found to be readily oxidized and converted to the soluble nitrate salt through action of
the shut-down gamma fields and ultra violet radiation (Cerenkov radiation) in the drained (air-
filled) and humid calandria vessel. The remaining precipitate from out-core surfaces was easily
removed through filtration upon moderator refill and reactor start up [Evans, 2010].
Oxalate production in the moderator system has also been demonstrated to occur by radiolytic
processes involving total organic carbon (TOC), primarily from oil ingress. Two operating CANDU
units have recently experienced issues with radiolytic decomposition of hydrocarbon lubricants
within the moderator system, which will produce decomposition gases such as hydrogen and
carbon dioxide as well as create particulate material through polymerization reactions that is
highly efficient at plugging filters [Ma, 2010]. These issues with elevated TIC and TOC in the
moderator system have led to more strict guidelines and chemistry control practices since the
implications of oxalate formation have been realized.
The head space in the calandria vessel is separated from the bulk of the moderator heavy water
through a series of calandria relief ducts, as depicted in Figure 7. It is extremely important that
the moderator level be maintained within the relief ducts as these provide the conduit for the
deuterium and oxygen gases to diffuse into the head-space and to the helium cover gas. Since
the surface area for moderator heavy water to cover gas exchange is limited when water level is
maintained within the relief ducts, bulk diffusion rates can be minimized and kept within
controllable margins. If the moderator level were to fall below the relief ducts a large surface
area would then present itself for the D2 and O2 to readily migrate into the gas phase, leading to
a rapid increase in cover gas concentrations and potential for exceeding flammability limits.
Figure 7. Normal moderator cover gas system volume and relief ducts (CANTEACH)
The helium cover gas is maintained at slightly above atmospheric pressure (~ 110 kPa absolute)
and is circulated by several compressors, operating in parallel, through the head-space and on to
the catalytic re-combiner units (RCUs). The hydrogen (deuterium) RCUs are usually AECL-
patented components that contain a supported platinum or palladium catalyst. The re-
combination reaction that ensures deuterium concentrations are kept low in the cover gas
follows equation 39. As can be seen, the reaction requires a 1/2x stoichiometric concentration
of oxygen in order to fully recombine the deuterium gas to heavy water; however, it is common
practice to dose the helium cover gas with oxygen in excess to ensure sufficient recombination
occurs. By ensuring the cover gas oxygen concentration is between 1-2%, sufficient excess is
continually maintained and deuterium concentrations are kept to very low values and are often
undetectable.
D2 + 12 O2 catalyst
→D 2O (39)
6 Auxiliary Systems
6.1 Calandria Vault and End Shield Cooling System
The Calandria Vault and End-Shield Cooling system is a light-water system that acts as a biologi-
cal shield from the gamma radiation and neutrons present in the core of the reactor. In this
system, radiation energy is dissipated as heat that is removed from the water in external heat
exchangers. Schematic diagrams of the system are shown in Figure 8 and the system is de-
scribed in more detail in Chapter 8. The system comprises two distinct circuits; the calandria
vault that surrounds the reactor calandria vessel, which is enclosed in concrete; and the end
shields on either face of the reactor through which the fuel channels protrude. The end shields
are packed with carbon steel balls that stop most of the neutrons and gamma emanating from
the reactor core (note, in some CANDUs the end shield is a solid carbon steel plate with integral
cooling ports). The system operates at nearly atmospheric pressure and contains a circulated
nitrogen cover gas. Any gas that is produced from water radiolysis will diffuse into the cover gas,
which needs to be purged periodically to avoid the build up of flammable concentrations of
hydrogen and oxygen.
Typical operating specifications for the calandria vault and end shield cooling system are shown
in Table 8. Alkalinity is controlled by addition of lithium hydroxide to ensure low corrosion rates
of the system materials and the specifications for dissolved hydrogen and dissolved oxygen in
the system are set to ensure flammability limits are not exceeded. If the nitrogen cover gas for
the system reaches the control limit for hydrogen (4%), the system is purged with fresh nitrogen
to ensure safe operation is maintained.
Table 8. Typical Chemistry Parameters of the Calandria Vault and End Shield Cooling System.
Parameter Typical Specification Range
pH 9.0 – 10.0
[Li+] 0.07 – 0.7 mg/kg
conductivity 0.24 – 2.4 mS/m
Anionic impurities < 1.0 mg/kg
H2 (vol. % in cover gas) < 4%
O2 (vol. % in cover gas) < 2%
Under normal circumstances, the end shield cooling system operates with a small excess of
dissolved hydrogen produced through the corrosion of system materials. This results in the net
radiolytic production of hydrogen and oxygen being suppressed. Some CANDU reactors have
had chronic issues with build up of hydrogen in the cover gas, which requires a frequent purging
to ensure that flammable concentrations are not reached. The increased hydrogen production
has been linked to the presence of dissolved oxygen in the water due to the addition of higher–
than-normal quantities of air-saturated make-up water. Dissolved oxygen is consumed through
recombination with the dissolved hydrogen, but when there is insufficient dissolved hydrogen
net water radiolysis will recommence to produce hydrogen and more oxygen, which exacerbates
the process. Once net radiolysis is occurring on a long-term basis, simply addressing the aerated
make-up water ingress issue has been shown not to reduce the hydrogen production.
The CANDU industry has investigated the possibility of mitigating excessive hydrogen production
in the calandria vault and end shield cooling system and has demonstrated that adding an
oxygen scavenger, such as hydrazine, to the system will mitigate the hydrogen production and
return the system to net radiolytic suppression [Stuart, 2012]. The dissolved oxygen reacts with
hydrazine to form nitrogen and water, which is a process that is fast at low temperatures as it is
mediated by the radiation field. Note that simply adding dissolved hydrogen to the water would
also promote a radiolysis recombination reaction, however, since the Calandria Vault and End
Shield Cooling system operates at atmospheric pressure, this method is not feasible and hydra-
zine additions are becoming common practice in operating reactors.
interfere with the hydrogen recombination reactions and catalyze oxygen and peroxide produc-
tion. Thus, nitrogen in the cover gas (indicative of air ingress) is highly undesirable, since it will
produce nitrate anions in the presence of a radiation field and subsequently produce nitric acid
that can lead to low pH conditions and corrosion of the system materials as well as promote high
production rates of hydrogen.
The typical operating specifications for the liquid zone control system are focused on water
purity as measured through liquid conductivity. For high purity make-up water, it is often
possible to achieve conductivities in the range of 0.006 – 0.008 mS/m, and most utilities will try
to keep the system operating within these limits or at least below 0.01 mS/m. By doing so,
water radiolysis is minimized and the cover gas purge can be done as frequently as necessary to
maintain the cover gas hydrogen concentration below 4%.
Oxygen may also be injected into the CO2 annulus gas to a concentration of approximately 2-4%.
This is beneficial as it promotes protective ZrO2 films on the pressure tubes and calandria tubes
and helps to ensure that the garter springs or calandria tube to pressure tube spacers (Alloy
X750 – a nickel superalloy) are maintained in a suitably oxidized state, also promoting passive
oxide film formation. If no oxygen is present, the garter springs can become extremely brittle as
the reduced oxides or elemental nickel present under these conditions can promote cracking in
the material. This is exacerbated by radiation embrittlement due to the high neutron fluxes to
which the garter springs are exposed. Oxygen injection to the annulus gas also promotes the
recombination with deuterium to form D2O, helping to ensure the deuterium concentrations are
kept below the flammability limits.
not corrode excessively and accumulate particulate corrosion products that can accumulate as
sludge in the normally stagnant system. Short-term decay heat removal is supplied by the high-
pressure and medium-pressure ECC systems that have their own distinct water supplies. For
longer-term core cooling, the emergency cooling water is supplied via a tank inside the vacuum
building in the multi-unit CANDUs or from the dousing tank in the roof of the containment
building of single-unit stations.
In the event of a LOCA, when a reactor PHTS is vented to the building, water from the dousing
tank is sprayed into the building to condense the steam and reduce the pressure. The supply
tank is connected to the sump below the reactor building that collects water draining from the
system for re-injection via the emergency injection pumps. The system chemistry is maintained
moderately alkaline and is deoxygenated with hydrazine, which will decompose over time to
ammonia producing the alkalinity required to maintain low corrosion rates of the ECC piping and
injection nozzles. Recent regulations have focused on ECC chemistry, particularly the effect of
debris or corrosion products clogging the strainers of the injection pumps. Of primary concern
are high-pH conditions, where the corrosion of aluminum components in contact with the ECC
water (the sump strainers for example) has been the focus of considerable research effort
[Edwards et al, 2010]. At too high a pH, aluminum components may corrode excessively and
form precipitates that could block the strainers. For this reason, an upper limit on dousing
system pH is typically set around 9.5.
7 Lay-up Practices
Inevitably, every power plant needs to be shut down for regular maintenance outages. In the
case of a CANDU, a mid-life refurbishment outage (after ~ 25-30 years operation) is required to
remove and replace the Zr2.5Nb pressure tubes that tend to stretch and sag due to the opera-
tional temperatures and high atomic displacements caused by the continuous neutron bom-
bardment under load. A regular maintenance outage may last from 2 – 8 weeks depending
upon the scope of work required and refurbishment outages are planned for at least two years.
During any of these plant outages, the systems are typically depressurized and frequently
drained to facilitate the required maintenance work and subsequent inspections. These
maintenance activities can allow air ingress into the closed-loop systems that are intentionally
kept de-aerated to minimize corrosion during operation. The duration and extent of the oxidiz-
ing conditions that are produced when the systems are shut down can play large roles in their
behaviour during startup and subsequent steady power operation. Thus, it is now considered
extremely important to provide a suitable lay-up condition to the plant during regular mainte-
nance outages and is paramount for protecting non-refurbished components during an extend-
ed shut down during a mid-life refurbishment. Degradation mechanisms and problem locations
in the feedwater and steam circuit of fossil plants are described by Mathews and are shown
schematically in Figure 9 [Mathews, 2013]
Figure 9. Locations requiring attention during maintenance outages and lay-up of a fossil
plant. [after Mathews, 2013]
volume during the maintenance outage is recommended to promote good mixing and repre-
sentative sampling.
Heavy water (D2O) is essential to the operation of a CANDU reactor. It is used in place of light
water (H2O) as a moderator and coolant due to its superior neutron moderating properties
(deuterium’s neutron absorption cross-section is orders of magnitude lower than hydrogen’s)
making it feasible to fuel the reactor with uranium containing the natural abundance of the
fissile U-235 isotope (~0.7%). Heavy water or, more specifically, the deuterium isotope, is
naturally abundant in the environment at about 0.015% (atomic percentage) as both the D2O
and the HDO molecule, all in chemical equilibrium as shown in equation 40. The moderator and
PHT systems both require heavy water that is greater than 98% in isotopic for D2O. For reactor
safety purposes in the event of a pressure tube rupture where the PHT water enters and mixes
with the moderator, the PHT isotopic content is typically kept slightly lower than the moderator,
98.6% vs > 99% for example, which will dilute the moderator in the accident scenario lowering
the overall moderation.
8.1 Upgrading
Separation techniques are numerous and include fractionation through distillation and various
processes involving atomic exchange through chemical sorbants and equilibrium systems. All of
these processes rely on the fact that the mass of the deuterium atom is twice that of the
hydrogen atom, making properties such as vapour pressure slightly different from those of
compounds containing the hydrogen atom alone. The separation factor for the deuterium-
hydrogen isotopes is defined as the ratio of the deuterium fraction in the desired phase (liquid,
x) over its fraction in the other phase (gas, y), as shown in equation 41. For a light-water/heavy-
water mixture, the separation factor can be estimated through the vapour pressure of each of
the components as shown in equation 42 for the normal boiling point of natural water [Bene-
dict, 1980].
α=
( )
x 1− x
(41)
y (1− y)
pH O
αHD = 2
= 1.026 (42)
pD O
2
The primary method for heavy water production is known as the GS dual-temperature exchange
process. It involves the equilibrium exchange of the deuterium atom between water and
hydrogen sulfide gas in a staged absorption column as shown in equation 43. Two towers are
employed whereby a fresh water feed to the cold tower, which has a higher separation factor for
deuterium ( αc ≈ 2.32 ) since it will be retained preferentially in the liquid phase, is stripped of
some of its hydrogen content to a deuterium-rich hydrogen sulfide gas (HDS), which is effectively
leached of its deuterium content. The feed gas to the cold column is produced in the high
temperature column, where the separation factor (ratio of the fraction of D in liquid to D in the
gas) is lower ( αh ≈ 1.80 ), thereby producing the D-rich gas for feed to the primary, cold exchange
column. The basic principles of operation of the GS process are depicted in Figure 11 (from
Benedict et al., 1980). With an appropriate number of stages in the absorption columns, water
can be fairly economically enriched to about 25% - 30% D2O. From this concentration, final
upgrading using conventional distillation is economically feasible.
The distillation of water to produce a heavy water product is extremely energy intensive, since
large volumes are required to compensate for the low isotopic content of natural water. Thus,
once primary upgrading has been accomplished from processes such as the GS dual-
temperature exchange described above, energy requirements are much reduced, particularly
when conducted under vacuum conditions. All CANDU plants will contain a distillation facility
for upgrading the D2O isotopic content since it can be diluted during operation through addition
of chemicals containing the hydrogen atom (H2, LiOH, N2H4, NH3 etc.) and through neutron
absorption producing tritium (H-3 or T). The overall efficiency of the fission process relies upon
specified isotopic content in the moderator and coolant thus the process water must be periodi-
cally upgraded.
8.2 Clean-up
Like the make-up water that feeds the secondary system and the reactor auxiliaries and is
conditioned to ensure low corrosion rates of the materials of construction and adequate system
lifetimes, the heavy water used in CANDU plants must be very pure. The basic methods of
filtration and ion exchange all apply to heavy water as they do for light water, with the exception
that the isotopic content of the heavy water must also be taken into consideration (the H2O
content in the heavy water may be considered an impurity).
As described above, D2O production and upgrading facilities may produce heavy water at
isotopic concentrations greater than 99.5% quite readily. Impurities introduced during the
upgrading process may include corrosion products from the materials of construction of the
distillation towers and packing columns (Fe, Ni, Cu etc) as well as contaminant cations and
anions (Na+, Ca2+, Cl-, SO42- etc) from ingress of humidity or contamination during transfer
operations. These may be removed through ion-exchange; however, it is imperative that the
ion-exchange resin first be converted to a deuterated form (exchange of the H + sites with D+) to
minimize the downgrading in isotopic from cation exchange.
Tritium Removal
Some plants, notably the Darlington station in Ontario, include a tritium reduction facility in
order to ensure low environmental releases and to minimize the tritium activity in the operating
plant. Tritium removal plants follow the same isotopic removal principles as upgrading the
deuterium content to produce heavy water, except that the separation factor for D/T is very
close to unity under near atmospheric and/or vacuum conditions. At the Darlington facility,
separation is aided by a series of catalytic exchange columns that facilitate the equilibrium
exchange between tritiated heavy water and the carrier deuterium gas. The catalytic exchange
process follows equation 44 and typically can reduce the tritium concentration in the input
heavy water by a factor of ten [CANTEACH]. The tritium now contained in the deuterium gas
stream is concentrated to >99.9% through a series of cryogenic distillation columns operating at
temperatures of ~ 25 K absolute. A schematic flow sheet of the Darlington facility is shown in
Figure 13. These cryogenic temperatures ensure that any humidity or traces of nitrogen and
oxygen are removed (25 K is well below their boiling points) leaving a pure deuterium/tritium
gas that is easily separated through the density/buoyancy effects utilized in distillation. The
resulting pure tritium gas is encapsulated through reaction with titanium sponge, producing a
titanium hydride and immobilizing the radioactivity. The hydride may then be stored until the
tritium decays to suitable levels or sold for profit.
Figure 12. Schematic diagram of the Darlington tritium removal facility. (Busigin & Sood)
The chemistry of process systems is controlled in order to optimize the performance of the
variety of materials that make up the systems. There is therefore a strong link to the Chapter 14
on Materials and Corrosion.
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11 Acknowledgements
The following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and excellent com-
ments during the development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of course
the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the authors.
Gordon Burton
Dave Guzonas
Craig Stuart
Thanks are also extended to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
CHAPTER 16
Regulatory Requirements and Licensing
prepared by
Dr. Victor G. Snell & Dr. Nikolas K. Popov
Summary:
This chapter covers the overall aspects of nuclear reactor regulation, with emphasis on Canada,
but also covering other regimes such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe. It
explains the need for regulation; how regulators work; how they are structured; and the types of
requirements they set. Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom are used as specific
examples in these areas, with detailed material on Canadian licensing processes, requirements,
and guides.
Disclaimer: This Chapter captures the elements of nuclear power reactor regulation as of ~2013,
when the Chapter was drafted. Although regulatory concepts change slowly, detailed licensing
requirements can change fairly frequently, and some of the details in this Chapter could be
superseded by the time the book is used. The reader is advised to consult the most up-to-date
regulatory documents if the intended use at the time is critical. The information in this Chapter
is current as of late 2012 or early 2013.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 4
1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 4
1.2 Learning Outcomes ............................................................................................................. 5
2 Generic Regulatory Requirements .......................................................................................... 5
2.1 Why is a Regulator Needed?............................................................................................... 5
2.2 What a Regulator is Not ...................................................................................................... 6
2.3 How a Regulator Exercises its Responsibilities ................................................................... 7
2.4 How a Regulatory Review is Done ...................................................................................... 9
2.5 Regulatory Independence and Social Policy ..................................................................... 10
3 Regulatory Approaches......................................................................................................... 12
4 Case Studies .......................................................................................................................... 13
4.1 Three Mile Island .............................................................................................................. 13
4.2 Fukushima ......................................................................................................................... 14
4.3 Chernobyl.......................................................................................................................... 15
4.4 Olkiluoto............................................................................................................................ 16
5 Pre-Project Licensing Review ................................................................................................ 16
6 International and National Examples.................................................................................... 18
6.1 International Organizations .............................................................................................. 18
6.2 National Regulatory Organizations ................................................................................... 22
7 Nuclear Material Safeguards................................................................................................. 32
7.1 Objectives and Evolution .................................................................................................. 32
7.2 Safeguards Treaty Detection Fundamentals ..................................................................... 34
List of Figures
Figure 1 Steps in the development of a nuclear power program ................................................. 12
Figure 2 Hierarchy of IAEA safety documents............................................................................... 19
Figure 3 Simplified organization chart of the USNRC ................................................................... 23
Figure 4 Generic hierarchy of regulatory documents ................................................................... 24
Figure 5 Structure of the ONR....................................................................................................... 29
Figure 6 “Farmer” curve................................................................................................................ 30
Figure 7 HSE concept of tolerable risk .......................................................................................... 30
Figure 8 Safeguards state evaluation is a continuous process [IAEA2007b] ................................ 33
Figure 9 Elements of safeguards [IAEA1998a] .............................................................................. 36
Figure 10 Design aspects of safeguards in LWR reactors (Type II) [IAEA1998a] ........................... 37
Figure 11 Design aspects of safeguards in CANDU reactors [IAEA1998a] .................................... 38
Figure 12 CNSC organization ......................................................................................................... 41
Figure 13 Structure of regulatory documents in Canada.............................................................. 42
Figure 14 Design and documentation completeness phases ....................................................... 63
List of Tables
Table 1 IAEA guides related to regulation ..................................................................................... 19
Table 2 U.K. frequency / dose targets for accidents off-site......................................................... 31
Table 3 Single / dual failure dose limits ........................................................................................ 55
Table 4 Consultative document C-6 dose limits............................................................................ 56
Table 5 New plants in Canada: dose limits.................................................................................... 56
Table 6 Selected key CSA codes and standards............................................................................. 59
1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to:
1. describe the need for, and concepts underlying, nuclear regulation
2. cover specific requirements in Canada in some detail, and examples from other ju-
risdictions where the differences are instructive.
Whereas the first aspect covers “why”, the second aspect covers both “why” and “what”.
1.1 Overview
Regulatory oversight of nuclear power plants is an essential aspect of the application of the
technology, albeit not generally considered a specific engineering discipline. Regulation affects
reactor design and operation by setting requirements at both a high level (safety goals, system
requirements, operations performance metrics, etc.) and in more detail, and through regulatory
review of design and operation.
Section 2 looks at overall regulatory requirements. It begins by explaining the need for regula-
tion. It then looks at generic aspects such as regulatory structure and independence, which
tend to be broadly similar in advanced nuclear-power-capable countries. It discusses how a
good regulator works through drafting standards and guides and through independent review,
but emphasizes that the operator is ultimately responsible for safety. It describes licensing
milestones (site licence, construction licence, operating licence, decommissioning licence, and
licence to abandon), which are common to most countries.
In Section 3, different regulatory approaches are briefly contrasted, varying from risk- or goal-
driven at one end to highly prescriptive at the other.
Section 4 gives a number of case studies of regulatory behaviour (in the same spirit as Chapter
13, of learning from real experience)—not to suggest that the regulator was primarily responsi-
ble for an event, but that weaknesses in the overall regulatory approach led to inattention on
the part of the industry to certain risks.
Section 5 discusses a recent tool for facilitating the licensing of a new design: a pre-project
licensing review.
Section 6 gives some international and national examples of organizations which influence or
apply regulatory requirements. Specifically, we summarize the consensus developed by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as reflected in its guides and touch briefly on re-
gional organizations. Then we discuss examples of prescriptive (United States) and non-
prescriptive (United Kingdom) approaches.
Safeguards are described in Section 7. Security is also covered briefly in Section 8.
Sections 9 and 10 cover the Canadian approach. This can be considered as a balanced ap-
proach, mixing prescriptive requirements and overall goals. The mandate and organization of
the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is presented in Section 9. The structure of
Canadian Nuclear Regulations and the CNSC’s Regulatory Documents and Regulatory Guides is
summarized. Certain key Regulatory Documents affecting design and operation are presented
in more detail. The licensing process in Canada for both existing and new nuclear power plants
is described in Section 10; this includes a summary of the environmental assessment process.
Three supplementary sections follow. Section 11 gives some problems for the student to work
through. Section 12 is an Appendix giving some examples of U.K. Safety Assessment Principles
as typical of a non-prescriptive approach. Section 13 is an Appendix listing the information that
is typically required in Canada when applying for construction and operating licences for nuclear
power plants.
Reactor regulation is a very broad field, and we can cover only the essentials in this chapter.
Most sections in the text list references to documents or published papers that the interested
reader can pursue for more detail: see Section 14 for the list of references. Section 15 con-
cludes the chapter with a glossary of terms.
similar technologies, so that social risks are rationalized. This hardly ever happens because the
mandate of regulators is usually restricted to a specific technology. Nuclear power tends to be
regulated more strictly (i.e., lower risks and more risk aversion) than comparable technologies.
There are many reasons for this which we do not have space to explore, but which have been
touched on briefly in Chapter 13, and which include voluntary versus involuntary risk, perceived
risk versus benefit, association of radiation with atomic weapons and cancer (the “dread”
factor), and public unfamiliarity with the technology. The interested reader is referred to the
literature on this subject. [Starr1969] and [Slovic1987] are good places to start.
One of the key functions of a regulator is that through the potential of independent verification
of any aspects of a licensee’s work, the regulator influences all a licensee’s internal processes,
because any piece of safety-related work can be audited. In particular, the simple existence of
regulatory oversight stops the licensee from internally accepting deficient safety cases or
accepting too readily that their assumptions are right and that they have thought of everything.
In other words, oversight encourages the building and maintaining of an adequate safety
culture. Regulatory oversight provides a critical independent challenge to a licensee’s premises,
assumptions, and positions and affects far more than the actual items that a regulator reviews.
1 This is a Russian proverb (Доверяй, но проверяй) originally applied to US-USSR relations during the Cold War.
2 Federal, provincial, and even municipal government bodies may require many other regulatory approvals, which
are outside the scope of this chapter.
Operation
Decommissioning
Site abandonment (i.e., return to unrestricted usage).
In addition, most regulators perform on request a preliminary review of an NPP design even
before a construction licence application, to reduce the risk of licensing issues arising during the
project stage when they are difficult and expensive to address. In Canada, this is called a pre-
licensing vendor design review [CNSC2012]. In the United States, it is called design certification
[USNRC2012], and in the United Kingdom, generic design assessment [HSE2008]. This topic is
discussed in Section 5. Note that there are differences in the depth, scope, and implications of
these approaches in different countries.
A regulatory review is usually performed against a set of published standards, requirements,
and “expectations” (typically through laws, regulations, and guides). Laws are laws of the land,
set by the national government; regulations are requirements set by the government (which in
some countries are also laws of the land); and guides are non-mandatory “good practices”
issued by the regulatory agency. The licence itself is a legal instrument and typically contains
additional specific requirements that must be met. In addition, the regulator may require, or
the operator may volunteer, compliance with other national standards. In Canada, these are
developed by the Canadian Standards Association (CSA). Every country has its own set of
requirements, but now there is more and more international coordination, initially after the
severe accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, and now post-Fukushima3.
Usually, there is some risk basis for regulatory requirements, which are generally a mix of risk-
informed and prescriptive requirements based on past experience, as discussed in the accident
case studies in Chapter 13.
In many countries, but not all, regulatory deliberations and decisions are made openly, with
many opportunities for public input.
Given the power of the regulator, most regulators set up checks and balances to remain fair.
Most regulators are structured somewhat like a corporation, with a Commission at the top
supported by a small dedicated group of people, and a large separate specialized technical staff
which assesses the safety case in detail and presents its conclusions and recommendations to
the Commission. The Commission makes the final decision, not the staff. The Commission
reports directly to, or is accountable to, the national government in a way that is independent
of the proponent. Some regulators have independent advisory committees (e.g., the United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) has an Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe-
guards (ACRS) consisting of highly respected technical experts). Such committees are inde-
pendent of the staff, so that technical inputs to the Commission come from more than one
source [USNRC2012a]. This is a “typical” description—there are differences in the organization
of regulators in different countries because the regulatory structure is the responsibility of each
national government.
National and international peer reviews of regulators use the yardstick of international best
practices to encourage improvement, e.g., as implemented by the IAEA through its Integrated
3 Post-Fukushima refers to the changes in nuclear safety regulations and requirements in response to the nuclear
accident in the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP in Japan in March 2011.
4 Often the Safety Report is equated with the documentation required for a licensing milestone (called the safety
case in some countries), but this is not correct—many more documents are reviewed, as described in Figure 14.
The Safety Report as a minimum consists of a detailed design description, a deterministic safety analysis, a
summary of the probabilistic safety assessment, a description of programmatic aspects such as quality assurance
Regulatory Requirements and Licensing – September 2014
10 The Essential CANDU
Issuing requirements and guidance for the scope, content, and quality of the safety
case. This ensures that the licensee or proponent is aware beforehand of what is re-
quired and desired. Typical material includes high-level requirements such as safety
goals or dose limits ([HSE2006], [CNSC2008]); lower-level requirements such as the
scope of safety analysis [CNSC2008b]; and guidance on acceptable methods
[CNSC2012b]. Most jurisdictions also issue requirements on design (e.g., [HSE2006],
[CNSC2008], [USNRC2012b] with various levels of prescriptive detail.
Issuing Review Guides for regulatory staff use so that their reviews are consistent
and complete. Some of these are published ([HSE2002], [USNRC2012c],
[CNSC2013]), while others remain internal.
Performing an initial acceptance review of the safety case, for completeness.
Detailed specialist review of the safety case, using such tools as:
o Line-by-line review using the Review Guides;
o Independent calculations using the same computer codes as the licensee, or us-
ing independent codes;
o Expert elicitation, including use of outside panels or individuals and independent
analysis by consultants;
o Assessment against written international standards (e.g., IAEA), industry stan-
dards (e.g., those from the Canadian Standards Association (CSA)), or against the
licensee’s own procedures;
o Quality assurance review and audit, including management and safety culture;
o Review of the completeness and appropriateness of the research and develop-
ment support for any step in NPP implementation, including design, site licens-
ing, etc.;
o Visits to the site;
o Consultation with international bodies and fellow regulators;
o Independent experiments or independent analysis of industry experiments;
o Questions arising from the above to the licensee and discussion and review of
the answers.
o Extensive technical meetings with the proponent.
The staff review results are consolidated.
The position is communicated to the Commission in formal meetings, at which the li-
censee has the opportunity to present its position. The meetings are public, along
with the information that is reviewed and discussed at the meetings. It is the Com-
mission that gives the approval to proceed with the relevant milestone.
and human factors, and demonstrations of compliance with regulatory requirements. See [USNRC, 1978] and
[IAEA, 2004] for examples of the format of a Safety Report; the former is far more widely used. Details of the
probabilistic safety assessment are usually submitted along with the Safety Report.
beneficial because it ensures that regulatory staff have deep hands-on knowledge of the tech-
nology they are to regulate. Often personnel movement occurs internationally, which helps
internationalize and harmonize regulatory experience.
At the top level of the regulator, the Commission Chairman, and usually the Commission mem-
bers, are appointed by the government, and therefore the process is political (in the sense of
reflecting the will of the people through their elected representatives). The government
provides ultimate oversight of the regulatory body, but rarely formally intervenes in licensing
decisions.
Regulatory decisions must balance risks, not eliminate them (risk elimination is an impossibility
in almost any technology). Moreover, although most regulators say they evaluate only safety
and do not explicitly acknowledge benefits, in fact they have a responsibility to account for the
fact that an activity may have significant net social benefit. In this sense, regulation sets (or
reflects) social policy. Hence, regulatory approval means that the project poses an acceptable
level of risk. Very few regulators use only risk as a regulatory tool (i.e., based just on the prob-
abilistic safety analysis (PSA)); see Chapter 13 for a discussion on PSA. Many regulators use or
accept a risk framework to sharpen decisions—this is called risk-informed decision making
(RIDM) and is a combination of PSA insights and traditional deterministic requirements. This is
a broad topic—for more detail, see [Apostolakis2004], [Bujor2010], [CSA1997], and
[USNRC2002]. In certain cases, usually when a retrofit is being considered, a cost-benefit case
prepared by the proponent may be considered to ensure that the cost is not disproportionate to
the benefit; see [HSE2001], [CNSC2000].
Finally, regulators must have adequate resources and experience, but they do not have to
replicate all the resources of the designer or operator; cf. our example of a financial audit. To
ensure adequate financial resources, regulators are given strong government support at the
early stage of their development, whereas later most of their daily operations are on a cost-
recovery basis from the licensees.
The above description applies to countries with an established nuclear industry. A country just
embarking on a nuclear program, but with no nuclear infrastructure, faces special challenges in
developing appropriate expertise and organizations ([IAEA2012b], [Popov2012]).
Four mechanisms have been used. These are not exclusive and are often used in combination.
1. The typical mechanism in the past has been to start with a research reactor and to use it
to develop staff for design, operating, and regulatory functions from that base. This
route was followed by Canada, where the power reactor program benefited from staff
trained in the research reactors (NRU, NRX) at Chalk River. Indeed, the Atomic Energy
Control Board (AECB), established in 1946 under the Atomic Energy Control Act, had re-
sponsibility for making regulations and for the Chalk River research project until Atomic
Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) was created in 1952 under the AECB. Two years later,
the Canadian Government formalized the separation of the designer/operator of the
Chalk River site from the regulatory agency [Sims1980].
2. A second mechanism has been to use the vendor of a power reactor to help create the
required infrastructure in the country purchasing the reactor by technology transfer and
training of operating personnel. The regulatory staff in the purchasing country are de-
veloped under an agreement with the regulator of the vendor’s host country. This can
go as far as “importing” experienced regulatory staff.
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12 The Essential CANDU
3. A third mechanism is to use IAEA documents and assistance. This organization has de-
veloped a comprehensive set of requirements and guides covering all aspects of com-
mercial nuclear applications, including the organization and management thereof. The
IAEA also gives assistance to countries developing a nuclear program, such as training
courses in nuclear regulation [IAEA2002c].
4. A fourth mechanism is to hire technical support organizations (TSOs) to provide techni-
cal assistance to the developing regulatory body. These are neutral official organizations
which are either part of the regulatory body or are separate, for example a national
laboratory. See [IAEA2010] for recent developments.
Figure 1 from [IAEA2011] gives an idea of the steps and timescale involved in a new national
nuclear power program.
3 Regulatory Approaches
The approaches taken by regulatory agencies across the world tend to fall into four general
categories (based on the proven approach used by the regulator in the past; of course, this
assertion is oversimplified, and many regulators allow alternative approaches that can be a mix
of the four listed below):
1. A largely risk-based approach (e.g., the early U.K. Farmer curve [Farmer1967], and
Argentina [Barón1998])
2. A risk-informed, largely non-prescriptive approach with specification of goals or re-
sults, not the process (early Canada, some early IAEA, current U.K.);
3. A risk-informed, but more prescriptive approach (current Canada, IAEA);
4. A highly prescriptive approach, with specified detailed requirements (e.g., USNRC
and the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations).
Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages.
Regulatory Requirements and Licensing – September 2014
Regulatory Requirements and Licensing 13
A risk-based approach is logical, quantifies and balances risk, and leaves major design and
operating decisions up to the proponent, who decides how to meet the risk goals. It thereby
accommodates and even fosters innovation and evolution. On the other hand, it can lead to
uncertainty in licensing because demonstration of numerical risk can be subjective or limited by
lack of knowledge. It may not account sufficiently for previously unknown failures, which might
be addressed more effectively by a more prescriptive defence-in-depth approach. In particular,
cross-linked or common-cause failures (see Chapter 13) are difficult to identify completely in a
PSA, so that the contribution to risk from these causes can be underestimated.
A mixed approach, which uses both risk-based and prescriptive approaches to various degrees,
captures most of the benefits (and some of the disadvantages) of both extremes and generally
has served Canada and the United Kingdom well. In particular, it is effective in providing de-
fence against accidents not previously identified, without too much misallocation of resources
to truly rare low-risk events.
A highly prescriptive approach in principle leads to well-defined licensing rules and more
regulatory certainty and tends to produce an apparently conservative design. However, it can
shift the burden of proof of safety from the designer/operator to the regulator. If the de-
signer/operator is required mainly to follow detailed rules set by the regulator, and if the
regulator misses something, part of the responsibility for safety has shifted subtly from the
proponent to the regulator. Furthermore, de-emphasis of risk leads to some resource misallo-
cation to severe but rare events, as opposed to more frequent ones with apparently milder
consequences. We shall cover a case study of this situation (Three Mile Island) in the next
section.
Much of the world, especially those countries using designs originating from U.S. light-water
reactor (LWR) technology, follows the U.S. regulatory approach, largely because the regulatory
approach was adopted along with the LWR technology.
4 Case Studies
This section considers a few case studies of regulatory behaviour. Where possible, the regula-
tory agency’s self-evaluation (or that of an independent body) is used, rather than the authors’
opinions. The case studies are presented not as a criticism of a particular organization, but as
lessons learned about effective regulatory behaviour, as was done for design and operational
safety in the case studies in Chapter 13. Some of these examples are also covered in Chapter
13, but with an emphasis on design and operation, rather than regulation.
Success is marked by the lack of accidents and “near misses”, and just as an accident cannot be
laid solely at the feet of a regulator, neither can the lack of accidents be solely ascribed to the
quality of regulation. As Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima were studied from the
technical point of view in Chapter 13, we shall now look at these accidents from the regulatory
point of view.
The President of the United States appointed a Commission headed by John G. Kemeny. Their
report [Kemeny1979] was very broad. Their concentration was on human aspects: “The equip-
ment was sufficiently good that, except for human failures, the major accident at Three Mile
Island would have been a minor incident.” Of interest here are their findings on the U.S. regula-
tory structure at the time, which are summarized as follows:
The regulations were too voluminous and complex, required immense effort for
compliance, and equated compliance with safety;
The preoccupation with the most severe accident (the largest-break LOCA) took at-
tention away from more likely, but slower-developing accidents, which were there-
fore not analyzed in depth;
There was too much preoccupation with equipment performance rather than human
performance;
There was no requirement to look beyond the single events specified by the USNRC,
for example to multiple failures;
The role of systems classified as “non-safety-related” in causing accidents was not
recognized;
There was no systematic way of evaluating prior operating experience or looking for
patterns;
There were serious deficiencies in internal communication in the USNRC.
An additional review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Special Inquiry Group [Rogo-
vin1980] covered very similar ground, albeit with more comments on the USNRC internal
decision-making processes.
Subsequent to TMI, and based on the findings of the Kemeny Commission, severe accidents,
emergency preparedness, plant performance monitoring, and human factors were given far
more prominence on the regulatory side. Insights from PSA were used more widely, not only to
reveal severe accident vulnerabilities, but also to flag requirements that attracted inordinate
resources compared to the risk they mitigated. The industry formed cooperative groups such as
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) to promote high standards of safety and
reliability through plant evaluations, training and accreditation, events analysis, and information
exchange and assistance.
4.2 Fukushima
The Fukushima Dai-ichi sequence of events was covered in Chapter 13. A beyond-design-basis
tsunami caused a loss of all electrical power in four units, resulting in severe core damage or
melting and possible containment failure in the three reactors that contained fuel.
With respect to the Japanese regulator (the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)), the
National Diet of Japan Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission [Japan2012]
concluded that “root causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported
faulty rationales for decisions and actions”, and in particular that the inadequacy of the design
basis for Fukushima was known to both the utility and the regulator, but was not acted on. The
regulator lacked separation from the utility. The Commission recommended formation of a new
regulatory body which would be independent, transparent, professional, consolidated, and
proactive.
The Japanese Government also established the “Investigation Committee on the Accident at
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company”, an independent commit-
tee largely composed of academics. Their final report [Japan2012a], although more technical
than the Diet report, raised the same issues and called for reorganization of the regulatory
body. They also noted NISA’s attention to short-term rather than long-term issues. In addition
they focussed on NISA’s performance after the event, in emergency measures off-site, and in
public communication.
As of this writing (early 2014), the Japanese regulatory body has been reorganized and renamed
the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA).
Regulators worldwide have applied the technical lessons learned, as outlined in Chapter 13. In
terms of national response, in particular, the radiation threshold levels that were used for
evacuation were based on the Linear No Threshold (LNT) hypothesis, which implies an unrealis-
tically high level of risk for individual doses of radiation <100 mSv, although no effects on human
populations have actually been observed at that level. Although there were no deaths due to
radiation from the accident (and there are not expected to be), the evacuation itself resulted in
many unnecessary deaths [Tanigawa2012].
4.3 Chernobyl
The Chernobyl sequence of events was covered in Chapter 13. A test which involved running
down the main reactor coolant system (RCS) pumps while at low power ended up in a power
transient due partly to the voiding of the core, but mainly to the reverse action of the shutdown
system, destroying the reactor core and bypassing the containment.
The International Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), which provides independent advice to the
IAEA Director-General, performed very extensive analyses of the Chernobyl accident
[IAEA1992]. This reference includes as an Appendix the Report by a Commission to the USSR
State Committee for the Supervision of Safety in Industry and Nuclear Power, which covered the
technical facts and the role of the regulatory structure. It noted that:
There were known violations of the safety standards and regulations in force at the
time in the design of Chernobyl Unit 4, but the design was approved and authoriza-
tion given for construction by all the relevant authorities and regulatory bodies. 5
This deficiency resulted from a lack of a well-organized group of experts endowed
with its own resources, rights, and responsibilities for its decisions;
The USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety could not be
regarded as an independent body because it was part of the same state authority re-
sponsible for the construction of nuclear power plants and for electricity generation.
The regulatory bodies had no legal basis, no economic methods of control, and no
human and financial resources.
The operating organization did not have ultimate responsibility and decision-making
authority for safety.
5 Note added by authors: there are always outstanding regulatory issues when a plant is given a licence—what is
important is that the process to determine which issues are acceptable should be an open and robust one.
4.4 Olkiluoto
It is not just accidents than can reveal a regulatory problem. Cost and schedule overruns
because of poor communication between the vendor/operator and the regulator can be very
damaging to a nuclear build project. This has been exemplified by the construction of the third
nuclear power plant unit at Olkiluoto in Finland. The reactor is based on the European pressur-
ized-water reactor (EPR) and is the first of its kind to have started construction. It was meant to
start operation in 2009, but as of this writing (early 2014), it is projected to come into service in
2016. This delay has been accompanied by a cost overrun of almost double the turnkey price of
~3.5 billion euros.
Because the matter is currently in legal dispute, the parties have not published much objective
analysis of what went wrong. However, the Finnish regulator (STUK) did comment publicly on
several occasions, listing lessons learned as follows, from [STUK2006], [Laaksonen2008], [Laak-
sonen2009], [Tiippana2010], [IAEA2012]:
“too ambitious original schedule for a plant that is first of its kind and larger than any
NPP built earlier;
inadequate completion of design and engineering work prior to start of construction;
shortage of experienced designers;
lack of experience of parties in managing a large construction project;
world-wide shortage of qualified equipment manufacturers”.
The operator TVO, and particularly the vendor AREVA, have offered their own perspective,
in which one of the causes mentioned is evolution of Finnish regulations during the
construction process, which introduced additional uncertainty into the licensing process.
Of particular interest to the thrust of this chapter is the need for mutual understanding be-
tween the regulator and the operator on how the regulatory practices are to be applied:
“The licensee and the regulator need to discuss early enough on how the national safety
requirements should be best presented in the call for bids.
- just making reference to national requirements and regulatory guides is not adequate to
ensure that requirements are correctly understood by vendors”.
With respect to the last point: In Finland, before a project is committed, the Government makes
a “Decision in Principle”, for part of which the regulator reviews the basic design requirements
and main safety features of each proposed alternative design and gives a formal preliminary
safety assessment. STUK confirmed in this assessment that “no safety issues can be foreseen
that would prevent the proposed plant(s) from meeting Finnish nuclear safety regulations”.
Although the regulator can apply caveats to this statement in terms of changes that would be
required, it is not based on a very detailed review.
regulatory requirements of the country in which it is to operate. Such a review ensures that the
vendor understands the regulatory requirements and enables regulatory questions to be
flushed out and answered earlier. The review is very thorough and is similar in many ways to
the construction licence review, but focussing mainly on design details rather than operation.
The format of such a review, and the extent to which it is binding on the regulator, depend on
national legal and cultural practices. We describe briefly three examples.
In Canada, a designer can request a Pre-Licensing Vendor Design Review, which [CNSC2012]
“…is to inform the vendor of the overall acceptability of the reactor design…
A Pre-Licensing Vendor Design Review evaluates whether:
o the vendor understands Canadian regulatory requirements and expectations;
o the design complies with, as applicable, CNSC regulatory documents RD-3376,
Design of New Nuclear Power Plants or RD-367, Design of Small Reactor Facili-
ties, and related regulatory documents and national standards;
o a resolution plan exists for any design issues identified in the review”.
The review is not binding on the CNSC (i.e., the CNSC can request repeated in-depth reviews on
the same topics during construction licence review, and CNSC review results may be subject to
change from pre-licensing to the construction licence review).
In the United States, Standard Design Certification is a legal process covered by Part 52 to Title
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations [USNRC2012]. The design submitted and the review are
both comprehensive, although some detailed design normally performed in the project phase
may be more conceptual (e.g., details of control and instrumentation design). When com-
pleted, the product is a standard reactor design certified by the Commission, independent of a
specific site, through a rulemaking action (Subpart B of Part 52). This rulemaking action can
certify portions of a reactor design for 15 years.
Separately, a licensee can apply for an early site permit for approval of a site for one or more
nuclear power facilities. This is also separate from the filing of an application for a construction
permit or a combined licence (see below) for the facility. A specific design is not required for an
early site permit, but the design eventually chosen must fit within the safety and environmental
parameter envelope requested and specified in the early site permit.
As a third option, a licensee can request a combined licence, which is a combined construction
permit and operating licence for a nuclear power facility.
A licensee can use any combination of these tools. For example, a licensee can obtain an early
site permit based on the environmental and safety performance envelope of a set of designs;
can obtain certification of a specific design that meets the envelope; and can then ask for a
combined construction and operating licence for the certified design on the approved site.
Standard design certification and early site permits are legally binding, subject to conditions
(specified during the certification process) to be met by the detailed project design.
In the United Kingdom, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and the Environment Agency
6 Note that the CNSC document titles are in the process of changing; this document has been renamed and revised
as REGDOC 2.5.2. Other CNSC regulatory documents are being revised and renamed as REGDOCs.
(EA) offer a generic design assessment (GDA) of new reactors. The purpose is [HSE2008] an
“assessment of the safety case for a generic design, leading to issue of a design acceptance
confirmation if the outcome is positive”. It consists of four phases: the first is preparation of the
safety case by the proponent, and the next three are reviews by ONR and EA at increasing levels
of detail, namely: 1) fundamental safety overview; 2) overall design safety review; and 3)
detailed design assessment. A design acceptance confirmation is then issued, subject to possi-
ble conditions and exceptions, if the design is considered acceptable. Once completed, a GDA
ensures that within the scope of the design, ONR review results are binding. ONR may extend
the review during the construction licence review, but the results of the prior GDA remain
binding.
6.1.1 IAEA
The origins and purposes of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are described in
Chapter 13, to which the reader is referred.
Its current document structure with respect to nuclear safety and regulation includes a hierar-
chy of Principles, Standards, and Guides, as shown in Figure 2, from [IAEA2012a]. Although
these have no legal or regulatory force unless they are formally adopted on a national level,
they are seen as setting minimum international requirements for safety and regulation. The
structure and nomenclature in Figure 2 are self-explanatory, with Safety Fundamentals and
Safety Requirements being mandatory (if adopted) and Safety Guides being recommendations
and guidance on how to comply with the Requirements. As of this writing (early 2014), they
have been formally adopted in countries such as China and the Netherlands; are used directly to
establish national requirements in Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, India, Korea, and the
Russian Federation; are used as a reference for review of national standards by most nations;
and are also used as inputs by international organizations such as the Western European
Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA) (Section 6.1.2).
Report Title
Number
SSG-16 Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme (2012)
GS-G-1.1 Organization and Staffing of the Regulatory Body for Nuclear Facilities (2002)
GS-G-1.2 Review and Assessment of Nuclear Facilities by the Regulatory Body (2002)
GS-G-1.3 Regulatory Inspection of Nuclear Facilities and Enforcement by the Regulatory
Body (2002)
GS-G-1.4 Documentation for Use in Regulating Nuclear Facilities (2002)
GS-G-1.5 Regulatory Control of Radiation Sources (2004)
GS-G-3.5 The Management System for Nuclear Installations (2009)
SSG-12 Licensing Process for Nuclear Installations (2010)
SSG-16 Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme
GS-G-4.1 Format and Content of the Safety Analysis Report for Nuclear Power Plants (2004)
Some of the key principles reflected in these Requirements and Guides are:
a regulator’s purpose is the verification and assessment of safety in compliance with
regulatory requirements;
it has sufficient resources to perform its job;
it is effectively independent from other organizations that could influence its deci-
sions;
it has qualified and competent staff;
its management system is aligned with its safety goals;
it may solicit expert advice, but does not delegate decisions;
it communicates professionally with interested parties and with the public;
regulatory control is stable and consistent;
it authorizes all facilities unless specifically exempt;
authorization is supported by a demonstration of safety submitted by the applicant;
regulatory review occurs before authorization and over the facility lifetime;
review is commensurate with risks;
it inspects facilities;
it has legal enforcement powers and can require corrective action;
it issues, reviews, and promotes regulations and guides;
it maintains records;
it promotes a safety culture (see Chapter 13);
it ensures that emergency preparedness arrangements and emergency plans are in
place.
Finally, there is a growing international consensus on high-level numerical safety goals. Safety
goals are defined and discussed in Chapter 13 (Section 4), and the reader is referred there for
details. Almost all regulators who specify safety goals do so implicitly or explicitly on the
following basis: the goals are set so that the predicted health effects of normal operation and
accidents in nuclear power plants are small compared to other social risks. Although IAEA itself
has not specified numerical safety goals, its senior advisory body (INSAG, in [IAEA1999]) has
proposed the following targets:
For existing nuclear power plants:
o Frequency of occurrence of severe core damage < 10 –4 events per plant operat-
ing year;
o Probability of large off-site releases requiring short term off-site response < 10–5
events per plant operating year.
For future nuclear power plants:
o Frequency of occurrence of severe core damage < 10 –5 events per plant operat-
ing year;
o Practical elimination7 of accident sequences that could lead to large early radio-
active releases.
These targets have been used by many other international and national bodies.
7 i.e., if it is physically impossible for the conditions to occur or if the conditions can be considered with a high
degree of confidence to be extremely unlikely to arise [IAEA, 2004a]
Note also that the frequency of the design basis earthquake (DBE) has recently been changed in
most jurisdictions from 10-3 / year to 10-4 / year, meaning that the DBE that new plants are
required to withstand is significantly more severe.
extreme natural events. The consequential loss of safety functions included loss of electrical
power, including station black-out, loss of the ultimate heat sink, and a combination of both.
Each EU country (or country applying for EU membership) completed these stress tests for its
own plants and reported the results back to the European Nuclear Safety Regulators’ Group
(ENSREG), an independent expert body formed by the European Commission, for evaluation.
6.2.1 USNRC
6.2.1.1 Background
In the United States, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC), transferring atomic energy from military to civilian control (see [Buck1983] for a history).
Its early years were devoted to nuclear weapons production and research, including the military
submarine program, whose reactors became the inspiration for the U.S. PWR commercial power
reactor design. The revised Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gave the Atomic Energy Commission the
responsibility for regulating and licensing commercial atomic activities. Research, military use,
regulation, licensing, and development of the nuclear power industry were all under the same
organization, and although it set up separate divisions, the conflicts of interest became more
and more apparent, until in 1974 the regulatory functions were transferred to the newly-
formed U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), which began operations on January 19,
1975.
6.2.1.2 Organization
The USNRC has had enormous influence on regulatory practice in the world because the wide-
spread use of LWR technology was accompanied by the LWR regulatory philosophy. Indeed,
because almost all the reactors licensed in the United States have been PWRs or BWRs8, the
regulatory requirements tend to be specific to these designs.
The USNRC is headed by a five-member Commission appointed by the U.S. President for stag-
gered five-year terms. The President designates one member to serve as Chairman. The
Commission formulates policies and regulations governing nuclear reactor and materials safety,
issues orders to licensees, and adjudicates legal matters brought before it. The Executive
8 The United States have also licensed a fast-breeder power reactor (Fermi 1) and high-temperature gas-cooled
reactors (Peach Bottom and Fort St. Vrain).
Director for Operations (EDO) carries out the policies and decisions of the Commission and
directs the activities of the program offices.
The Commission is supported by a large technical staff, as well as powerful advisory committees
who can challenge both the proponent and the staff, e.g., the Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards, or ACRS. Typically, the ACRS consists of well-known and respected scientists and
experts, often world-renowned professors drawn from universities. It has its own independent
support staff. There is no current equivalent in Canada, although at one point the Reactor
Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which later became the Advisory Committee on Nuclear
Safety (ACNS), had a similar role with the then-AECB, albeit on a smaller scale.
The actual trial-level adjudicatory body of the USNRC is the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel (ASLB). The Panel is composed of administrative judges who are lawyers, engineers, and
scientists, and administrative law judges who are lawyers. It is chaired by the Chief Administra-
tive Judge. The Panel conducts all licensing and other hearings as directed by the Commission,
primarily through individual Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards or single presiding officers
appointed by either the Commission or the Chief Administrative Judge. Individual licensing
boards conduct public hearings on contested issues that arise in the course of licensing and
enforcement proceedings and uncontested hearings on construction of nuclear facilities.
borders. USNRC also has a large and powerful R&D Division which conducts experimental and
analytical work of very broad scope, along with development of their own computer tools,
independently of utilities and design organizations.
large part of the core. In CANDU (as discussed in Chapter 13) the nearby moderator can remove
heat from the fuel through the pressure tube and has the effect of tempering the metal-water
reaction rate.
As another example, consider Appendix A to 10CFR 50, the General Design Criteria
[USNRC2012b]. This Appendix consists of 64 basic requirements which underpin much of the
technical approach to safety in the United States. Compliance is mandatory. Although high-
level, many are focussed on LWRs, as stated in the introduction:
“These General Design Criteria establish minimum requirements for the principal design
criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants similar in design and location to plants for
which construction permits have been issued by the Commission. The General Design
Criteria are also considered to be generally applicable to other types of nuclear power
units and are intended to provide guidance in establishing the principal design criteria
for such other units.”
Many of the GDCs are generic; for example
“Criterion 16—Containment Design. Reactor containment and associated systems shall
be provided to establish an essentially leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled release
of radioactivity to the environment and to assure that the containment design condi-
tions important to safety are not exceeded for as long as postulated accident conditions
require.”
Some are clearly specific to LWRs, for example:
“Criterion 11—Reactor Inherent Protection. The reactor core and associated coolant sys-
tems shall be designed so that in the power operating range the net effect of the prompt
inherent nuclear feedback characteristics tends to compensate for a rapid increase in re-
activity.”
The underlying purpose of Criterion 11 is that a fast reactivity excursion in an LWR, caused for
example by a rod ejection, must be compensated for (not necessarily terminated, as discussed
in Chapter 13) by negative (Doppler) feedback since (because of the short prompt neutron
lifetime) engineered shutdown systems may not be able to act quickly enough (see Chapter 13).
It is often misinterpreted as a blanket requirement for a negative void reactivity.
At the same level in Figure 4 are plant licences, rules (U.S. term for regulations), and orders.
lems or postulated accidents, and on data needed by staff in its review of applications for
permits or licences. Although nominally optional, exceptions taken to regulatory guides in the
United States (and most other countries) require thorough justification and significant extra
regulatory review.
application placed in publicly accessible paper and electronic repositories9. This includes the
plant Safety Report, the NRC Safety Evaluation Reports, letters between the NRC and the
applicant, records of meetings, and other documents. The NRC also holds numerous public
meetings during the licensing process.
In addition, conditions may be placed on the licence, which have the same legal force as the
licence itself. A generic set of conditions is described in 10CFR § 50.54, “Conditions of licenses”.
Many areas are covered, e.g., quality assurance, minimum staffing levels, licence amendment or
revocation, responsibility of the operator, process for making changes, security, and emergency
planning.
Finally, the USNRC has the authority to impose penalties for violations of regulatory require-
ments. It uses three primary enforcement sanctions:
1. Notice of Violation: This identifies a requirement and how it was violated and normally
requires a written response.
2. Civil Penalties: A civil penalty is a monetary fine up to $130,000 per violation per day.
3. Orders: Orders modify, suspend, or revoke licenses or require specific actions by licen-
sees or persons.
6.2.2.1 Organization
The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is responsible for all nuclear regulation in the United
Kingdom. It was formed on April 1, 2011, as an agency of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
ONR combined the safety and security functions of HSE’s former Nuclear Directorate, including
Civil Nuclear Security, the U.K. Safeguards Office, and the Radioactive Materials Transport team.
In turn, HSE is a non-departmental public body (NDPB), which is defined as a “body which has a
role in the processes of national Government, but is not a Government Department or part of
one, and which accordingly operates to a greater or lesser extent at arm’s length from Minis-
ters” [UK2009]. It is sponsored by the Department for Work and Pensions. At the top level, it
has a Board, which also contains its Executive Management Team. The work is organized along
program lines, as shown in simplified form in Figure 5.
On April 1, 2014, ONR became a Public Corporation under the 2013 Energy Act. ONR is now the
enforcing authority for licensed sites in Great Britain, as well as the licensing authority.
9 Some records are not disclosed, e.g., records which must be kept secret in the interest of national defence or
foreign policy; internal personnel records; trade secrets and commercial or financial information; records compiled
for law-enforcement purposes. For a comprehensive list, see 10CFR § 9.17, “Agency records exempt from public
disclosure”.
The reader should consult [HSE2006] for the full set of numerical targets.
10 Note that “nuclear material” includes all fissionable isotopes that can be used as nuclear fuel or explosive
material, whereas “non-nuclear material” includes all material of strategic importance, such as heavy water,
zirconium tubes, etc.
The technical aim of safeguards is to use technical means to detect and verify safeguards
implementation and to provide for reporting of deviations.
For further background, see [IAEA1983], [IAEA1998a], [IAEA2011a], [IAEA2011b], [IAEA2007b].
State;
b) Determining the effectiveness of the State safeguards program;
c) Providing statements to the State about the IAEA verification activities.
b) For on-load refueled reactors, fuel movements and refueling operations are carried out
at high frequency (daily), but with a small number of items moved per refueling.
LWRs are refueled off-load, refueling operations occur with an open vessel, and transfers occur
in channels filled with transparent water shielding. This design combination permits direct
visual observation. Transparent shielding is impractical for refueling operations in on-load
refueled reactors, and therefore observation by other means is required. In these NPPs, detec-
tion of variations in radiation fields from continuously operating instrumentation together with
optical surveillance provide the information needed on refueling sequences for safeguard
purposes. Regardless of the NPP design, all fuel is properly labelled by visible and non-visible
marking to be read by modern optical and laser devices.
Figure 10 shows the position of optical surveillance devices in the reactor building and the fuel-
storage pool building in the LWR reactor design.
Application of the general principles for safeguards is common to all pressure-tube PHWRs.
Most IAEA experience in handling PHWRs has been obtained on CANDU reactors.
Figure 11 shows the position of optical surveillance devices in the reactor building and the fuel-
storage pool building in the CANDU reactor design.
CANDU NPPs have horizontal fuel channels and are heavy-water moderated and cooled. The
refueling system uses two refueling machines, one at each end of the core, to insert new fuel at
one end and to accept spent fuel at the other. CANDU NPPs require appropriate shielding of the
refueling machines and operations to protect personnel. Consequently, the positioning of the
fueling machines in front of the reactor channels, and the refueling itself, are carried out by
remote control.
8 Nuclear Security
Nuclear security has become far more important in the last couple of decades, due largely to
changes in the external political environment after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in
the United States. Each utility implements security at its sites, and in Canada, regulation of
nuclear security is part of the mandate of the CNSC.
Top-level requirements are set by the Nuclear Security Regulations [GovCan2010]. This Act
Regulatory Requirements and Licensing – September 2014
Regulatory Requirements and Licensing 39
covers the security of both certain nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.
Nuclear materials are divided into three categories related to their security impact: for example,
a quantity of non-irradiated plutonium >2 kg is Category I; between 500 g and 2 kg is Category
II; and between 15 g and 500 g is Category III. Possession in each category requires a licence,
and the security obligations for each case are defined in the regulations.
For nuclear facilities in Canada, it is up to the CNSC Commission to establish and update the
design basis threat which is taken into account by the utility in determining its security provi-
sions. In addition, the utility must conduct an annual facility-specific threat and risk assess-
ment. Nuclear facilities must be located within a protected area enclosed by a barrier. Category
I materials are further protected by an inner-area structure or barrier whose function is to
detect and delay unauthorized access before the on-site nuclear response force can successfully
intervene.
In addition, the operator must identify vital areas. These are areas inside the protected area
containing equipment, systems, devices, or a nuclear substance, the sabotage of which would or
would likely pose an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of persons arising from expo-
sure to radiation. The operator is then required to implement the appropriate physical protec-
tion measures.
The Act also sets out requirements for persons authorized to enter protected and inner areas
and for security personnel. The CNSC has supplemented and expanded the Nuclear Security
Regulations through a number of Regulatory Documents and Guides. Most of those pertaining
to high-security sites such as nuclear power plants contain prescribed information and are not
publicly available, and therefore they are not referenced here.
Further details of security regulations, implementation techniques, and verification methodolo-
gies are beyond the scope of this textbook and are not available to the general public.
11 Some of the descriptive material has been drawn from the Web site of the CNSC over the period from July 2011
to January 2013.
Executive Advisor
Commission Secretariat
Office of Audit,
Evaluation & Ethics
transfer one given—unless, in the opinion of the Commission, the applicant or, in the
case of an application for an authorization to transfer the licence, the transferee:
(a) is qualified to carry on the activity that the licence will authorize the licensee to carry
on; and
(b) will, in carrying on that activity, make adequate provision for the protection of the
environment, the health and safety of persons, and the maintenance of national security
and measures required to implement international obligations to which Canada has
agreed.”
The next level in Figure 13 is Regulations, which are published in the Canada Gazette and
include:
General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations [GovCan2008]
Radiation Protection Regulations [GovCan2007]
Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations [GovCan2012a]
Class II Nuclear Facilities and Prescribed Equipment Regulations
Uranium Mines and Mills Regulations
Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations
Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations
Nuclear Security Regulations [GovCan2010]
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Import and Export Control Regulations [GovCan2010a]
CNSC Cost Recovery Fees Regulations
Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Rules of Procedure
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission By-Laws
We have provided references above for some of the key Regulations in the nuclear power-
reactor field.
In addition, when required, the CNSC puts forward proposals for new regulations or proposed
amendments to existing regulations:
Regulations Amending the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations and the Uranium
Mines and Mills Regulation
Amendments to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Import and Export Control Regulations
Amendment to Class II Nuclear Facilities and Prescribed Equipment Regulations
Regulations Amending Certain Regulations made under the Nuclear Safety and Con-
trol Act (Miscellaneous Program)
Amendments to the Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations.
responsibility of various participants in the Canadian nuclear industry. The underlying purpose
of the Act is to require nuclear operators to carry insurance to cover liability should an accident
occur. The operator is absolutely liable for damage irrespective of the cause of the accident:
that is, claimants do not have to prove negligence on the part of the operator—they need only
prove that they have suffered damage. Operators must obtain liability insurance for damages
up to a maximum of $75 million (but see next paragraph); if the consequences exceed that
amount, the federal government appoints an independent Nuclear Damage Claims Commission
that will receive claims, assess damages, and recommend the level of compensation that should
be paid. The responsibility to pay claims exceeding $75 million rests with the federal govern-
ment. The Act does not set a limit on what the government pays.
As of this writing (early 2014), Bill C-22 (the Energy Safety and Security Act) has been tabled in
the House of Commons to replace the Nuclear Liability Act. It raises the absolute liability limit
to $1 billion for both nuclear energy and offshore oil and gas. It is expected that this bill will be
enacted by the House of Commons.
9.4 Licences
The third level in Figure 13 also includes licences. These are mandatory legal documents which
set forth the requirements and limitations for activities undertaken during the life cycle of a
nuclear activity. For example, a Power Reactor Operating Licence typically covers (among other
items):
Authorization to operate the nuclear power plant for a specified period;
Reporting of events to the CNSC;
Control of the exclusion zone within which no permanent dwelling is permitted and
temporary access is controlled;
References to some of the CNSC Regulatory Documents listed in Section 9.5, which
therefore become mandatory;
References to some of the CSA Standards listed in Table 6, which therefore become
mandatory;
Maintaining minimum operating-crew size and composition, including obtaining op-
erating licenses for key staff;
Complying with the requirement to use a set of Operating Policies and Principles, in-
cluding Operating Limits;
Complying with reactor power limits, including bundle and channel power limits
Limits on permissible changes without CNSC prior consent. Specifically, this forbids
changes which “introduce hazards different in nature or greater in probability than
those considered by the Final Safety Analysis Report and Probabilistic Safety Assess-
Regulatory Requirements and Licensing – September 2014
Regulatory Requirements and Licensing 45
ment”. Such a clause binds the results of the safety assessment performed by the
operator to the licence;
Using only those fuel-bundle designs approved by the CNSC;
Complying with requirements for an emergency plan for the facility;
Complying with the limits on releases of radioactive material in normal operation
(derived release limits);
Following requirements for a maintenance program; and
Complying with requirements for radiation protection, site security, and safeguards.
The licence is accompanied by, and references, a rather lengthy “Licence Conditions Handbook”,
which provides:
compliance verification criteria to meet the conditions listed in the licence;
information regarding delegation of authority and current versions of documents;
implementation timelines for specific licence conditions; and
an explanation of each regulatory requirement specified in the licence.
In effect, the Licence Conditions Handbook extends the scope of the licence.
Examples are documents describing the design, safety analyses, and all aspects of
operation to which the licensee makes reference; conduct of operations; and con-
duct of maintenance.
The licensing basis sets the boundary conditions for acceptable performance at a regulated
facility or activity and thus establishes the basis for the CNSC’s compliance program with
respect to that regulated facility or activity.
We now summarize selected regulatory documents. Note that document numbers and titles
are shown in terms of the currently issued documents (and not in terms of the new classifica-
tion scheme shown in Section 9.5.2).
12 While this Chapter was being finalized, CNSC issued an update to RD-337 – called REGDOC 2.5.2 – which adds
lessons learned from Fukushima. See [CNSC2014].
tics, radiation protection principles and acceptance criteria, exclusion zones, and facility
layout.
iv. General design considerations
This section contains general requirements for all technical disciplines and reactor engi-
neering areas. It covers:
structure, system, and component classifications;
plant design envelope and operating plant states;
guidance for consideration of all important hazards and initiating events that need to
be considered in the design;
design rules, limits, and reliability for safety (such as common-cause failures, single
failures, fail-safe requirements, etc.);
pressure-retaining systems and components;
equipment classification (seismic, fire, environmental, etc.);
instrumentation and control;
safety support systems;
civil structures;
human factors;
commissioning;
security;
safeguards;
decommissioning.
v. System-specific requirements
This section covers requirements specific to most important systems and functions, in-
cluding the reactor core, heat-transport system, steam-supply system, means of shut-
down, emergency core cooling system, containment, emergency power supply, heat
transfer to an ultimate heat sink, emergency heat-removal system, control facilities,
waste management and control, fuel handling and storage, and radiation protection.
vi. Safety analysis
The safety analysis sections cover the most important aspects of safety analysis, namely
analysis objectives, hazards analysis, deterministic analysis, and probabilistic analysis.
The topic is covered in RD-310 in more detail [CNSC2008b].
vii. Environmental protection and mitigation
This section covers environmental protection design and requirements, as well as re-
quirements for released radioactive and hazardous substances.
viii. Alternative approaches
RD-337 is intended to be technology-neutral for water-cooled reactor designs. It is rec-
ognized that specific technologies may use alternative approaches.
The CNSC considers alternative approaches to the expectations in this document where:
The alternative approach would result in an equivalent or superior level of safety;
Application of the expectations in this document conflicts with other rules or re-
quirements;
Application of the expectations in this document would not serve the underlying
purpose, or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose; or
Application of the expectations in this document would result in undue hardship
Regulatory Requirements and Licensing – September 2014
50 The Essential CANDU
or other costs that significantly exceed those contemplated when the regulatory
document was adopted.
One example of an alternative approach is consideration of best estimate and uncertainty
analysis instead of a conservative analysis; see Chapter 13.
and risk-effective. Such life-extension assessments are similar to, but much broader in scope
than, periodic safety reviews.
This document is a key document for utilities that operate nuclear power plants because it
states the requirements for reporting of operational issues. The document groups the require-
ments into two groups: reporting unscheduled events, and reporting scheduled events.
information.
The document describes the design, operating, and testing requirements for the shutdown
systems. It includes definition of the minimum allowable performance standards and require-
ments in several important areas, such as performance, environmental qualification, availability,
separation and independence, actuation instrumentation, status monitoring, and seismic
provisions.
9.5.15 Emergency core cooling systems for CANDU nuclear power plants: R-9
This regulatory document [CNSC1991b] is one of the original series of AECB documents. It was
superseded by RD-337, except in areas in which it is consistent with RD-337, but provides more
information.
The document describes the design, operating, and testing requirements for the emergency
core cooling system. It includes definition of the minimum allowable performance standards
and requirements in several important areas, such as core cooling, environmental qualification,
availability, separation and independence, actuation instrumentation, leakage control, inadver-
tent operation, shielding, status monitoring, and seismic provisions.
It required that the two shutdown systems be independent, reliable, diverse, and individually
capable of meeting regulatory dose limits13. Therefore, it could be assumed that at least one
system would operate as designed when required (i.e., there was no need to postulate simulta-
neous unavailability of both systems after an accident).
For the licensing of Darlington, as discussed in Chapter 13, Consultative Document C-6 was
used. This expanded the number of accident classes to five, as follows:
13 This is an oversimplification of R-10. R-10 actually specifies that for single failures, “at least” one shutdown
system had to meet dose limits, whereas for dual failures, each shutdown system had to be individually capable of
so doing. The distinction was removed in later practice, so that each shutdown system alone had to meet require-
ments for all design basis accidents.
Plant licences refer to the Final Safety Analysis Report, which in turn references the appropriate
classification scheme.
14 Expected frequency ranges are not part of C-6; they were used by Ontario Hydro in the licensing of Darlington
to classify events not listed in C-6.
in place.
CSA N285.4 Periodic Inspection of CANDU Nuclear Power Plant Components 2009
CSA N285.5-13 Periodic Inspection of CANDU Nuclear Power Plant Containment 1998
Components (2013)
CSA N286-05 Management System Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants 2005
(2010)
CSA N286.7 Quality Assurance of Analytical, Scientific, and Design Computer 1999
Programs for Nuclear Power Plants (2007)
CSA N287.1 General Requirements for Concrete Containment Structures for July 1993
CANDU Nuclear Power Plants (2009)
CSA N287.7-08 In-Service Examination and Testing Requirements for Concrete 2008
(R2013) Containment Structures for CANDU Nuclear Power Plants (2013)
CSA N288.5-11 Effluent Monitoring Programs at Class I Nuclear Facilities and 2011
Uranium Mines and Mills
CSA N288.6-12 Environmental Risk Assessments at Class I Nuclear Facilities and 2012
Uranium Mines and Mills
CSA N288.1 Guidelines for Calculating Derived Release Limits for Radioactive 2008
Material in Airborne and Liquid Effluents for Normal Operation
of Nuclear Facilities
CSA N290.1 Requirements for the Shutdown Systems of CANDU Nuclear 1980
Power Plants (2006)
CSA N290.15- Requirements for the Safe Operating Envelope of Nuclear Power 2010
10 Plants
CSA N291 Requirements for Safety-Related Structures for CANDU Nuclear 2008
Power Plants
CSA N293 Fire Protection for CANDU Nuclear Power Plants 2007
15 Some of the descriptive material has been drawn from the Web site of the CNSC.
As shown in Figure 14, from [CNSC2012], following the preliminary design, detailed design is
conducted. After the detailed design and appropriate documentation have been prepared, the
licensee applies for a construction licence. During the regulatory review for the construction
licence, further detailed design activities related to the construction phase may be conducted.
After the regulatory body issues an operating licence, the licensee will continue to provide
ongoing design support activities.
Section 13 gives as an example the information that must be submitted in Canada for construc-
tion and operating licences.
At any time during operation, if a design or procedural change is considered for implementation
which deviates from the safety case or from any prior licence issued by CNSC, an approval
process for the particular change must be conducted and CNSC approval obtained before
implementing the change.
16 The first hearing is known as “Day 1” and the second as “Day 2”, although they may last more than one day
each.
Safety and Control Act, relevant regulations, CNSC requirements and expectations, international
and domestic standards, and applicable international obligations.
The CNSC reviews the submitted application and judges whether the information contained in
the application is acceptable and whether the licence applicant is qualified and will make
adequate provision for safety, etc., in carrying out the licensed activity (in accordance with 24(4)
of the NSCA). If the CNSC accepts this information, it becomes the reference safety case for the
plant and will form part of the licensing basis at the construction licence stage. The information
provided with the licence application, including the documents to which the application makes
reference, constitutes the construction safety case. The requirements for the safety case are
listed in detail in [CNSC2012c].
The information required in support of the application to construct a nuclear power plant
includes, for example:
a description of the proposed design for the nuclear power plant, taking into consid-
eration the physical and environmental characteristics of the site;
environmental baseline data on the site and surrounding area;
a preliminary safety analysis report showing the adequacy of the design;
measures to mitigate the effects on the environment and the health and safety of
persons that may arise from construction, operation, or decommissioning of the fa-
cility;
information on potential releases of nuclear substances and hazardous materials and
proposed measures to control them;
programs and schedules for recruiting and training operations and maintenance
staff;
and in general, those safety control areas listed in Section 9.5.2.
After the construction licence application has been received, the CNSC performs a comprehen-
sive assessment of the design documentation, the preliminary safety analysis report, the
construction program, and any other information required by the regulations. The assessment
focusses on determining whether the proposed design and safety analysis, along with other
required information, meet regulatory requirements.
Specifically, the evaluation involves rigorous engineering, scientific analysis, and engineering
judgment, taking into consideration the CNSC’s experience and knowledge of the best practices
in nuclear plant design and operation, as gained from existing power plants in Canada and
around the world. This review may take place in parallel with the Environmental Assessment
and site preparation licensing process. At the end of this process, CNSC staff makes a recom-
mendation for a decision on the licence application, through an integrated assessment report.
Occasionally, the recommendations include proposed changes to the regulatory framework to
accommodate evolving nuclear technologies. A recommended compliance plan for each licence
is also developed, and the mitigation measures included in the follow-up program, if applicable,
are included in the licence.
In addition to reviewing the information included in the application, the CNSC also verifies that
any outstanding issues from the site preparation stage have been resolved. The CNSC staff’s
conclusions and recommendations from these reviews are documented in reports submitted to
the Commission; the Commission then makes the final decision on the issuance of the construc-
tion licence. As noted earlier, the Commission will not issue a licence unless it is satisfied that
the applicant will make adequate provisions to protect health, safety, security and the environ-
ment, and to respect the international obligations to which Canada has agreed. As such, it is
the responsibility of the applicant to show that there are no major safety issues outstanding at
the time the Commission considers the application for a construction licence.
During the construction phase, the CNSC carries out compliance activities to verify that the
licensee is complying with the NSCA, with associated regulations, and with its licence. Such
compliance activities focus on confirming that plant construction is consistent with the design,
that the licensee is demonstrating adequate project oversight and confirming that quality
assurance requirements are met, and that the licensee is respecting any requirements of the EA
follow-up program.
In the latter part of construction, regulatory attention turns towards the inactive commissioning
program (without fuel loaded) and associated activities, whose purpose is to demonstrate to
the extent practicable that all systems, structures, and components function in accordance with
their design specifications.
Radiation protection;
Conventional health and safety;
Emergency management and fire protection;
Waste management;
Safeguards;
Packaging and transport;
Community relations and public information;
Financial guarantees;
Nuclear liability insurance;
Open action items.
In addition to assessing the information included in the application to operate the nuclear
power plant, the CNSC also verifies that any outstanding issues from the construction licensing
stage have been resolved.
The CNSC staff’s conclusions and recommendations from these reviews are documented in
reports submitted to the Commission, which then makes the final decision on issuance of the
operating licence.
The Licence to Operate will enable the operator to begin active commissioning. The purpose of
the commissioning activities is to demonstrate that the plant has been constructed in accor-
dance with the design and that the systems, structures, and components important to safety
are functioning in accordance with their design specifications. The initial operating licence is
typically issued with conditions (hold points) to load nuclear fuel, permit reactor start-up, and
operation at power in steps up to the design rating of the plant. All the relevant commissioning
tests must be satisfactorily completed before the hold points can be released.
During the subsequent long-term operation of the plant, the CNSC carries out compliance
activities in order to verify that the licensee is complying with the NSCA, associated regulations,
and its licence terms. If the compliance activities identify any non-compliance or adverse trend,
there is a range of possible actions that the CNSC can take, from a request for licensee action to
prosecutions.
Enforcement actions;
Orders (legal instruments);
Licence amendments initiated by CNSC staff;
Licence amendments or renewals initiated by licensees; and
Commission meetings and hearings.
11 Problems
1. Tokai-Mura, 1999: Locate the following material: International Atomic Energy Agency,
Report on the Preliminary Fact Finding Mission Following the Accident at the Nuclear
Fuel Processing Facility in Tokaimura, Japan; IAEA report, 1999. You may also find or use
other documents as well. Assess the accident in terms of regulatory effectiveness, using
some of the ideas in this chapter. Propose lessons learned. Which aspects of regulatory
performance were also apparent after the Fukushima accident?
2. Compare the approaches taken by the USNRC and the CNSC with respect to large Loss of
Coolant Accident (LOCA) regulatory acceptance criteria.
a. Find out what the acceptance criteria are and where they are documented.
Note: not all Canadian criteria are set by the CNSC; you may have to look at
CANDU safety reports.
b. Both Canadian and U.S. practices set limits on sheath oxidation in a LOCA to
prevent embrittlement on rewet by Emergency Core Cooling (ECC). Compare the
two criteria and explain the rationale in each case.
c. Find the requirements on shutdown systems for both the United States and
Canada. What is the typical reliability of the shutdown system in each case?
How are postulated impairments of the shutdown system handled in each case?
3. Review the U.S. General Design Criteria (GDC) in 10CFR, Appendix A to part 50. Which
design criteria (if any) would be intrinsically difficult for CANDU to meet? If you find any
such criteria, what is the safety concern that these GDCs address, and how is that
concern addressed in CANDU design?
4. Locate the U.K. Safety Assessment Principles issued by HSE. Compare and contrast the
requirements for safety systems with those in CNSC document RD-337. Which ideas are
common? Which are different? (Compare the underlying requirement, not the exact
wording).
Licence to Construct
An application for a licence to construct a Class I nuclear facility shall contain the following
information in addition to the information required by section 3:
(a) a description of the proposed design of the nuclear facility, including the manner in which
the physical and environmental characteristics of the site are taken into account in the de-
sign;
(b) a description of the environmental baseline characteristics of the site and the surrounding
area;
(c) the proposed construction program, including its schedule;
(d) a description of the structures proposed to be built as part of the nuclear facility, including
their design and their design characteristics;
(e) a description of the systems and equipment proposed to be installed at the nuclear facility,
including their design and their design operating conditions;
(f) a preliminary safety analysis report demonstrating the adequacy of the design of the nuclear
facility;
(g) the proposed quality assurance program for the design of the nuclear facility;
(h) the proposed measures to facilitate Canada's compliance with any applicable safeguards
agreement;
(i) the effects on the environment and the health and safety of persons that may result from
the construction, operation and decommissioning of the nuclear facility, and the measures
that will be taken to prevent or mitigate those effects;
(j) the proposed location of points of release, the proposed maximum quantities and concen-
trations, and the anticipated volume and flow rate of releases of nuclear substances and
hazardous substances into the environment, including their physical, chemical and radiologi-
cal characteristics;
(k) the proposed measures to control releases of nuclear substances and hazardous substances
into the environment;
(l) the proposed program and schedule for recruiting, training and qualifying workers in respect
of the operation and maintenance of the nuclear facility; and
(m) a description of any proposed full-scope training simulator for the nuclear facility.
Licence to Operate
An application for a licence to operate a Class I nuclear facility shall contain the following
information in addition to the information required by section 3:
(a) a description of the structures at the nuclear facility, including their design and their de-
sign operating conditions;
(b) a description of the systems and equipment at the nuclear facility, including their design
and their design operating conditions;
(c) a final safety analysis report demonstrating the adequacy of the design of the nuclear
facility;
(d) the proposed measures, policies, methods and procedures for operating and maintain-
ing the nuclear facility;
(e) the proposed procedures for handling, storing, loading and transporting nuclear sub-
stances and hazardous substances;
(f) the proposed measures to facilitate Canada's compliance with any applicable safeguards
agreement;
(g) the proposed commissioning program for the systems and equipment that will be used
at the nuclear facility;
(h) the effects on the environment and the health and safety of persons that may result
from the operation and decommissioning of the nuclear facility, and the measures that
will be taken to prevent or mitigate those effects;
(i) the proposed location of points of release, the proposed maximum quantities and con-
centrations, and the anticipated volume and flow rate of releases of nuclear substances
and hazardous substances into the environment, including their physical, chemical and
radiological characteristics;
(j) the proposed measures to control releases of nuclear substances and hazardous sub-
stances into the environment;
(k) the proposed measures to prevent or mitigate the effects of accidental releases of nu-
clear substances and hazardous substances on the environment, the health and safety of
persons and the maintenance of security, including measures to
(i) assist off-site authorities in planning and preparing to limit the effects of an acciden-
tal release,
(ii) notify off-site authorities of an accidental release or the imminence of an accidental
release,
(iii) report information to off-site authorities during and after an accidental release,
(iv) assist off-site authorities in dealing with the effects of an accidental release, and
(v) test the implementation of the measures to prevent or mitigate the effects of an ac-
cidental release;
(l) the proposed measures to prevent acts of sabotage or attempted sabotage at the nu-
clear facility, including measures to alert the licensee to such acts;
(m) the proposed responsibilities of and qualification requirements and training program for
workers, including the procedures for the requalification of workers; and
(n) the results that have been achieved in implementing the program for recruiting, training
and qualifying workers in respect of the operation and maintenance of the nuclear facil-
ity.
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15 Glossary
ACNS Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (Canada, historical)
ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (USA)
AEC Atomic Energy Commission (USA)
AECA Atomic Energy Control Act (Canada)
AECB Atomic Energy Control Board (Canada)
ALARA As Low as Reasonably Achievable
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practical (UK)
ASLB Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (USA)
BDBA Beyond Design Basis Accident
BSL Basic Safety Limit (UK)
BSO Basic Safety Objective (UK)
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
CEAA Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
CFR Code of Federal Regulations (USA)
CNSC Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
C/S Containment and Surveillance
CSA Canadian Standards Association
DBA Design Basis Accident
DIV Design Information Verification
EA Environment Agency (UK)
EA Environmental Assessment (Canada)
ECC Emergency Core Cooling
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
ENSREG European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group
EU European Union
GAR Global Assessment Report
GDA Generic Design Assessment (UK)
GDC General Design Criteria (US)
GAI Generic Action Item
Regulatory Requirements and Licensing – September 2014
Regulatory Requirements and Licensing 81
16 Acknowledgements
We gratefully thank the following reviewers for their hard work and excellent comments during the
development of this Chapter. Their feedback has much improved it. Of course the responsibility for any
errors or omissions is entirely the authors’.
Glenn Archinoff
Joe Boyadjian
Dave Newland
Terry Rogers
We also thank Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
Chapter 17
Fuel
Prepared by
Mukesh Tayal and Milan Gacesa – Independent Consultants
Learning Objectives
The principal learning objectives of this chapter are:
To gain a general understanding of the major mechanisms affecting fuel behaviour under
normal operating conditions;
To understand the underlying sciences of the relatively more important phenomena involving
fuel, including fission gas release, internal gas pressure, thermal stresses, element defor-
mation, environmentally assisted cracking, lateral vibrations of fuel elements, and fatigue
of the bundle assembly weld; and
To be able to perform calculations in the above subject areas to enable predictions.
Summary
Nuclear fuel, like conventional fuel, is responsible for generating heat and transferring the heat
to a cooling medium. Unlike conventional fuel, nuclear fuel presents the additional challenge of
retaining all the by-products of the heat-generating reaction within its matrix. Conventional fuel
releases almost all its combustion by-products into the environment. Experience has shown that
at times the integrity of CANDU fuel can be challenged while performing these roles. Eighteen
failure mechanisms have been identified, some of which cause fission by-products to be released
out of the fuel matrix. Other chapters in this book deal with preventing fission by-products
which escape from the fuel matrix from reaching the public. CANDU reactors can locate and
discharge fuel assemblies that release fission by-products into the coolant at power to minimize
the effect of fuel defects on plant operation and the public. Acceptance criteria are established
against which a fuel design is assessed to verify its ability to fulfill the design requirements
without failing. A combination of analyses and tests is used to complete the verification as-
sessments.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 4
2 Overview ................................................................................................................................. 5
2.1 Operating Environment .................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Fuel Design ....................................................................................................................... 6
2.3 In-Reactor Challenges....................................................................................................... 8
3 Power and Burnup ................................................................................................................ 13
4 Collapsible Sheaths ............................................................................................................... 14
4.1 Diametric Collapse.......................................................................................................... 15
4.2 Longitudinal Ridging ....................................................................................................... 16
4.3 Collapse into the Axial Gap............................................................................................. 17
5 Thermal Performance of Fuel ............................................................................................... 18
6 Fission Gas and Internal Pressure ......................................................................................... 19
6.1 Overview......................................................................................................................... 19
6.2 Recoil .............................................................................................................................. 24
6.3 Knockout ......................................................................................................................... 24
6.4 Diffusion of Fission Gas to Grain Boundaries ................................................................. 25
6.5 Internal Gas Pressure...................................................................................................... 25
7 Stresses and Deformations ................................................................................................... 26
7.1 Thermal Stresses in Pellets ............................................................................................. 27
7.2 Changes in Element Diameter and Length ..................................................................... 28
8 Environmentally Assisted Cracking ....................................................................................... 31
8.1 EAC Processes ................................................................................................................. 33
8.2 Defect Threshold ............................................................................................................ 35
8.3 Defect Probability ........................................................................................................... 36
8.4 Mitigation ....................................................................................................................... 38
9 Vibration and Fatigue............................................................................................................ 39
9.1 Alternating Stresses........................................................................................................ 39
9.2 Fatigue of the Endplate and the Assembly Weld ........................................................... 45
10 Fuel Design Verification ........................................................................................................ 46
10.1 Damage Mechanisms ..................................................................................................... 51
10.2 Acceptance Criteria and Integration............................................................................... 54
11 Operating Constraints and Inputs to the Safe Operating Envelope...................................... 59
12 Removal of Fuel Bundles Containing Defects ....................................................................... 60
12.1 Deterioration of Primary Defects in Fuel Elements ........................................................ 60
12.2 Defect Removal Systems................................................................................................. 62
12.3 Confirmation of Defect Removal .................................................................................... 63
13 Closure .................................................................................................................................. 64
14 Problems ............................................................................................................................... 65
15 References............................................................................................................................. 68
16 Further Reading .................................................................................................................... 70
17 Relationships with Other Chapters ....................................................................................... 71
18 Acknowledgements............................................................................................................... 72
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
The principal roles of fuel are to generate heat and to maintain a reasonable geometry so that
the coolant can carry that heat away. In addition, because fuel is a significant source of radio-
logical hazard, appropriate fuel integrity needs to be ensured at all times—including during
fabrication, operation, postulated accidents, and storage.
The science of the first two of these aspects, the generation and removal of heat, has been
discussed in earlier chapters. In the current chapter, we focus on the science of those aspects of
fuel that enable its reasonable integrity during normal operating conditions. Fuel integrity
during accidents and during abnormal occurrences is covered in another chapter.
This chapter uses CANDU-6 (also called C6) fuel for illustration, as shown in Figure 1. The figure
shows a fuel bundle in which fissile uranium is contained in 37 sealed fuel elements which are
held together by two welded endplates. Separation of the hot fuel elements from each other,
and from the pressure tube, is maintained by pads that are brazed to the fuel sheaths [Page,
1976].
radiological hazards is beyond the scope of this chapter and is addressed in another chapter.
2 Overview
Before we can understand the science that underlies fuel integrity and therefore the chosen
design, it is important to obtain sufficient background about the operating conditions for which
nuclear fuel must be designed and the specific design that has been chosen to operate in them.
These factors, in turn, determine which specific scientific disciplines are pertinent to fuel
integrity.
potentially more brittle—need to withstand impact loads. On-power fueling also means
that some irradiated fuel bundles are moved from a low-power axial position in the
channel to (or through) a higher-powered axial location. This can lead to power-ramp
challenges, as described in Section 8.
Refueling: The fuel bundle is loaded and unloaded on-power, remotely, through tight
spaces, through bends, and sometimes through interrupted (discontinuous) supports.
These aspects require tight dimensional control, good dimensional stability, reasonable
flexibility, and allowances for wear.
Power Manoeuvring: The reactor may be required to change its power level periodically
to respond to grid demand. Periodic changes in the power extracted from the fuel add
another dimension to fatigue considerations.
Long Duration: A C6 fuel bundle stays in the reactor core for six months to two years.
Therefore, the challenging conditions described above must be endured continually for
long periods.
other effects, increase parasitic absorption of neutrons; increase fabrication cost; pro-
vide additional resistance to flow and hence require bigger and costlier pumps to gener-
ate the same flow of reactor coolant; lead to greater potential for fatigue and fretting
due to lower resistance of the smaller fuel elements to flow-induced vibrations; and ex-
hibit higher propensity for creep sag of the smaller fuel elements, which could poten-
tially lead to jamming of the fuel bundle in the channel. Increased subdivision also ad-
versely impacts the neutronic-thermal-hydraulic interaction during accidents (coolant
void reactivity), and, taken to the extreme, a much smaller element diameter would re-
duce the available surface area and decrease the efficiency of heat removal by the cool-
ant. Hence, a judicious balance must be struck regarding the degree of subdivision.
Circular Cross Section of Fuel Elements: As a second illustrative example, the circular
cross section of the fuel elements reduces the stress concentration that would other-
wise be introduced by non-circular cross sections. This increases the mechanical
strength of the fuel elements to resist in-reactor loads.
Ceramic, High-Density UO2: A large amount of heat is generated in the uranium fuel un-
der high external coolant pressure; therefore, the uranium must be in a form that will
transmit heat efficiently and maintain structural integrity. Ideally, uranium would be
used in a metallic form (e.g., uranium-aluminum alloy) to promote better heat transfer.
However, uranium metal has two undesirable characteristics: (1) if a fuel sheath were to
rupture and hot water from the coolant were to penetrate the fuel element, uranium
metal would oxidize rapidly and lose its strength; and (2) uranium metal is also dimen-
sionally unstable because of its anisotropy. Hence, uranium in the form of UO2 is a good
compromise. Although the low thermal conductivity of UO2 leads to high temperatures
in the fuel, its high melting point (about 2840°C) provides a large tolerance to melting.
Maximizing the density of UO2 leads to (1) higher fissile content in the element, hence
more energy; (2) improved thermal conductivity and hence lower temperature; and (3)
reduced in-reactor densification and hence higher dimensional stability.
Zircaloy-4: Unlike the enriched uranium used in other types of reactors, CANDU reactors
use natural uranium. The latter has much less 235U to undergo fission. Therefore, to sus-
tain the chain reaction, it is essential that neutrons be conserved and that absorption of
neutrons by structural materials be minimized. For this reason, the structural compo-
nents are made from Zircaloy-4, which has a relatively small cross section for neutron
absorption. In addition, the structural components are kept as thin as possible, includ-
ing sheaths that are allowed to collapse if needed under operating pressure and tem-
perature. Zircaloy-4 also has high corrosion resistance, which is important considering
the high temperatures and the long residence periods in the reactor. Finally, Zircaloy-4
also has suitable mechanical properties.
Thin Collapsible Sheaths: As a fifth illustrative example, the sheaths on CANDU fuel are
purposely kept very thin, mainly to conserve neutrons. Another benefit of a thin sheath
is that it can collapse diametrically under the operating pressure and temperature of the
coolant. This improves heat transfer from the pellet to the coolant, which in turn lowers
pellet temperature and reduces fission gas release. At the same time, the sheath must
be strong enough to carry the in-reactor loads and to avoid forming overly sharp ridges
(called longitudinal ridges, described in more detail in a later section of this chapter)
which can fail by overstrain or by fatigue.
Helium Filling Gas: To minimize damage from several mechanisms such as melting, fis-
sion gas pressure, and environmentally assisted cracking, the operating temperature of
the pellet should be kept as low as reasonably achievable. Towards that end, empty
spaces within a fuel element are filled with gas that has high thermal conductivity. This
is called filling gas, and helium, or helium mixed with argon and air, is generally used for
this purpose. Another advantage of helium is that it has very small atoms that can es-
cape through small faults in joints: if a fuel element is not perfectly sealed by the end-
caps during manufacturing, escaping helium can be detected by appropriate sensors
during fuel fabrication.
Internal Shapes and Spaces: Many internal shapes and spaces are carefully chosen to
balance a number of conflicting objectives, e.g., to reduce stresses, to provide space for
expansion during irradiation, to provide space to store fission gases produced during ir-
radiation, and to promote large-volume, automated, low-cost production. Some such
features include the pellet profile, the profile of the sheath/endcap junction, the endcap
profile, the diametric clearance between the pellets and the sheath, and the axial clear-
ance between the pellet stack and the endcaps. Several of these aspects are further
elaborated upon in later sections of this chapter.
Manufacturing: Some features are driven primarily by considerations of automation in
manufacturing, e.g., resistance welding of endcaps and sheaths and brazing of pads.
Both processes enable fast throughputs. Chapter 18 provides additional details of some
aspects of fuel manufacturing.
Ease of Handling: The length of the bundle was chosen primarily to facilitate on-power
refueling, although both the length and weight of the bundle have ergonomic advan-
tages; one individual can lift and carry the bundle by hand.
Fuel Management: Some important considerations in fuel management are: (a) to main-
tain neutronic reactivity at the desired level; (b) to achieve reasonable burnup; and (c) to
avoid defects due to power ramps. The last aspect is discussed in more detail in a later
section.
These configurations were chosen to facilitate the primary objectives of the fuel bundle: to
produce heat, to maintain its geometry so that the coolant can carry the heat away, to ensure
in-reactor integrity of the fuel elements and the fuel bundle, and to do all this consistently over
a lengthy period.
In several other ways as well, the chosen features reflect careful balances among many conflict-
ing requirements, processes, and forces. Fuel design is a complex multidisciplinary optimization
process involving reactor physics, thermal-hydraulics, heat transfer, structural mechanics,
microstructural processes, geometric stability, and interfacing systems, all under normal, off-
normal, and accident conditions.
The choices described above—thin structural materials, high operating temperatures, axial
movement of the fuel bundle during on-power fueling, large in-reactor mechanical forces, and
material degradation due to irradiation—all combine to pose unique and significant challenges
to the in-reactor integrity of CANDU nuclear fuel under normal operating conditions. An
overview of these challenges is given in the next section.
Number of elements (rods) per bundle (assem- 37 Element length (mm) 493
bly)
Average discharge burnup of fuel bundle 170 Sheath (clad) thickness (mm) 0.4
(MWh/kgU)
Maximum residence period in the reactor 700 Pellet outside diameter (mm) 12
(days)
Overall bundle length (mm) 495 Endplate width, outer ring 4.9
(mm)
Overall maximum bundle diameter (mm) 102 Endplate thickness (mm) 1.6
UO2 Zr-4
Thermo-Physical Data
Theoretical density (g/cm3) 10.97 Density (g/cm3) 6.56
Mechanical Data
Young’s modulus at 1000°C (GPa) 190 Young’s modulus at 300°C (GPa) 80
(at 98% theoretical density) Shear modulus (GPa) 27
Coefficient of linear thermal expan- 12.5 Coefficient of linear thermal expan- 6.72
sion (µm/(m.K)) sion (µm/(m.K))
(at 1000°C) (diametric, at 300°C)
4 Collapsible Sheaths
To minimize unnecessary parasitic absorption of neutrons, CANDU fuel sheaths are kept very
thin—so thin that coolant pressure induces high compressive hoop stresses in them. At suffi-
ciently high compressive hoop stress, the sheath will lose its elastic stability and collapse
diametrically inwards into the diametric gap between the sheath and the pellet until it is sup-
ported by pellets. Figure 4(a) illustrates this phenomenon.
This collapse improves contact between the pellet and the sheath and therefore improves heat
transfer between them. This, in turn, lowers pellet temperature and reduces thermally driven
processes. Some such processes, such as diffusion and release of fission gas, decrease expo-
nentially with reduced local temperature. Therefore, even a modest decrease in local pellet
temperature leads to a disproportionately large reduction in these processes. For this reason,
designers of CANDU fuel prefer to promote diametric collapse of the sheath.
At the same time, excessive diametric or axial collapse can risk sheath failure from overly high
local strains. These conditions are called longitudinal ridging and axial collapse respectively (see
Figures 4(b) and 4(c)) and must be avoided. Therefore, a delicate balance must be struck
between promoting sufficient collapse to improve pellet-to-sheath heat transfer and avoiding
overstrain due to excessive collapse. This trade-off is explained in the following sections.
because fission gas diffusion increases exponentially with higher temperature. At the beginning
of life, the internal pressure is low, the sheath is elastically unstable, the sheath is in contact
with the pellet, and pellet-to-sheath heat transfer is good. This helps reduce the diffusion and
release of fission gas. By the time internal gas pressure builds up sufficiently to provide elastic
stability to the sheath, the element rating has usually decreased with burnup. Therefore, by
then, good heat transfer is not as critically important.
[Courtesy of COG]
Figure 5 Illustrative permanent strain at the tip of a longitudinal ridge
Initially, the strain increases rather gradually. Beyond a critical strain, however, a further in-
crease in pressure increases the sheath strain fairly rapidly. The point at which this occurs is
called the critical strain and has been experimentally found to be 0.5%. It is good practice to
design CANDU fuel to stay below this strain value at the longitudinal ridge. Fuel designed in this
way has never exhibited sheath failures at longitudinal ridges.
Experiments have established that the following parameters are relatively more important in
influencing ridge strain: differential pressure, diametric clearance, sheath thickness, sheath
diameter, yield strength, and Young’s modulus.
Fission gas is produced within grains. If the grain boundary acts as a sink, a gradient develops in
the concentration of gas across the grain's radius. This concentration gradient drives the rate of
diffusion from the grain to the boundary.
At the grain boundary, the gas accumulates in bubbles (Figures 8(b) and 10), which become
progressively bigger as more gas reaches the grain boundaries.
B: Bubbles; T: Tunnels
[Source: Hastings, 1983]
Figure 10 Grain boundary bubbles and tunnels
In parallel, high temperature can also cause the grains to grow (Figures 8(c) and 11), either
through equi-axial grain growth (Figure 12) or, at even higher temperatures, through columnar
grain growth (Figure 13). The boundaries of the growing grains collect the gas that was previ-
ously contained in the areas swept by grain growth. This gas is added to the inventory of gas at
grain boundaries. This process is called grain boundary sweep.
6.2 Recoil
Recoil is one of the mechanisms that releases fission fragments outside the pellet. To a first
approximation, fission fragments travel through UO 2 in a straight line. They lose energy as they
encounter (primarily) electrons in the material. When the initial kinetic energy of the fission
fragment has been fully dissipated in this process, the fission fragment stops as a fission prod-
uct. This occurs in about 10 µm. However, if the fission fragment reaches a surface of the pellet
before expending all its energy, it escapes the pellet. Therefore, recoil is a contributing factor in
fission product release from near a surface of the pellet (~10 µm), especially at low temperature
[Olander, 1976].
6.3 Knockout
Knockout is another athermal mechanism for fission product release that occurs at low temper-
ature. As a fission fragment travels through the pellet, it may occasionally collide with nuclei of
other atoms in the lattice. The latter are called “knock-ons”. Knock-ons are usually uranium or
oxygen atoms in the fuel, but occasionally a knock-on can be a fission gas atom lodged in the
lattice. A knock-on acquires kinetic energy from the collision, and it also travels in a straight line
and loses energy as it travels. A primary knock-on generally travels a distance of about 200 Å
(Angstroms) before coming to rest. If the knock-on reaches a surface of the pellet before
stopping, it escapes the pellet. If the knock-on was a fission fragment, this process results in
release of fission products [Olander, 1976].
c(r )
f
6D
a r ,
2 2
(1)
where c is the local concentration, r is the radial distance from the grain centre, a is the grain
radius, f is the fission rate, is the yield, and D is the diffusivity. Concentration means the
number of nuclides per unit volume of the grain. By integrating the above equation, we can
obtain the volume-average concentration cav.
Diffusion due to a concentration gradient results in the following rate of nuclide flow per unit
area of grain surface, q:
c
q D at r a . (2)
r
The leak rate LEAK is defined as the rate of nuclide diffusion from the grains per unit grain
volume. Therefore [Tayal et al., 1989],
3 c
LEAK D at r a . (3)
a r
By differentiating Equation (1), substituting the results into Equation (3), and then substituting
the expression for cav into Equation (3), we get:
15 Dcav
LEAK . (4)
a2
Equation (4) describes the rate at which fission gas diffuses to the grain boundary during steady
state.
failures. Therefore, internal gas pressure is a consideration in selecting some details of the
internal design of a fuel element, such as pellet shape and axial gap.
Internal gas pressure is driven by the combined volumes of filling gas and fission gas. These
gases are stored in a variety of locations within a fuel element, e.g., in dishes, in pellet/sheath
radial gaps, in axial gaps, in pellet cracks, and in surface roughnesses of the pellet. Furthermore,
the local temperature at each storage location differs significantly because of the steep tem-
perature gradients within the fuel element.
To calculate the internal pressure, one usually divides the fuel element into many regions, each
with a nearly constant temperature. Then the ideal gas law is used to integrate the impacts on
internal gas pressure:
p1v1 T1 p2v2 T2 , (5)
where p, v, and T represent pressure, volume, and temperature respectively and subscripts 1
and 2 refer to two different states.
Exercise:
Consider a fuel element which was initially filled with 2 ml of helium at standard temperature
and pressure (STP). During irradiation, 10 ml (at STP) of fission gas was released to the open
space. Let us assume for simplicity that at operating power, the open space in the fuel can be
divided into three zones of essentially constant temperature, each with a volume:
0.4 ml at 1,900 K;
1 ml at 1,500 K; and
0.6 ml at 1,000 K.
This fuel element’s internal gas pressure can be calculated as follows. Recall that at STP, the
temperature is 273 K and the pressure is 0.1 MPa. Therefore, corresponding to the filling gas
volume of 2 ml at STP, the “voidage” (V/T) is (2/273) = 0.00733 ml/K.
On-power, the same gas is now stored at an effective voidage of (0.4/1900 + 1/1500 + 0.6/1000)
= 0.00148 ml/K. In other words, the on-power voidage is about (0.00148/0.00733), or one-fifth
the off-power voidage. Therefore, from the ideal gas law, the on-power pressure of the filling
gas is (0.1 * 0.00733/0.00148) = 0.5 MPa.
Including the fission gas, the total STP volume of gas is (2+10) = 12 ml. On-power, because 2 ml
(STP) of filling gas develops a pressure of 0.5 MPa, 12 ml (STP) of filling gas plus fission gas will
develop a pressure of (0.5 * 12/2) = 3 MPa.
would be very expensive to limit these always to trivial values through massively over-
conservative designs. At the same time, it is essential to keep them reasonably below harmful
levels. Some such considerations are described in this section.
[Courtesy COG]
Figure 16 Thermal stresses in a pellet
Note that the hoop stress is compressive in the inner part of the pellet and tensile in the outer
part of the pellet. The tensile hoop stresses lead to radial cracking in the outer parts of the fuel
pellet, as can be observed in Figure 15. The radial cracks add to the storage space for fission
gas, reducing internal gas pressure. They also increase pellet expansion and hence sheath
stress, encouraging detrimental environmentally assisted cracking (described in Section 8).
All three major components of stress are compressive in the central part of the pellet. This
leads to compressive hydrostatic stresses, which reduce the size of fission gas bubbles at the
grain boundaries. Moreover, the stresses are well into the plastic range. This can potentially
lead to permanent deformations in the pellet. High local temperatures plus high local stresses
can also lead to high rates of creep, leading to relatively rapid relaxation of stress. High local
creep plus local plasticity are also believed to cause "dish filling" at high local temperatures.
levels in the coolant to increase quickly. For the above reasons, it is particularly important to
have a good understanding of this damage mechanism and of ways to quantify and control it.
To date, EAC has manifested in CANDU fuels through three main routes:
EAC failures in the sheaths at interfaces between neighbouring pellets (called circumfer-
ential ridges) as a result of excessive pellet expansion during increases in power (called
power ramps). Figure 20 shows an illustrative example [Penn et al., 1977].
EAC failures in sheaths near their welds with endcaps as a result of excessive pellet ex-
pansion during power ramps. Figure 21 shows an illustrative example of a typical crack
near the sheath/endcap junction [Floyd et al., 1992].
EAC failures in the sheaths near their junctions with endcap welds as a result of exces-
sive gas pressure accumulated during abnormally long residences of fuel in the reactor
[Floyd et al., 1992]. Such defects appear similar to those shown in Figure 21.
EAC is also called by other names in the scientific literature. In Canada, it is also called “stress
corrosion cracking” (SCC). In the LWR community, it is usually called “pellet/clad interaction”
(PCI). Both these names were coined shortly after the initial rash of power-ramp defects and
were based on initial understanding of their mechanisms. Subsequently, much additional
knowledge about the mechanism has been uncovered in a myriad of tests around the world. As
a result, several labels very similar to EAC were proposed in later literature. In light of this
additional information, a re-think in the early 2000s concluded that EAC is an appropriate label
for this mechanism.
Figure 22 illustrates some key terms associated with EAC during power ramps.
[Courtesy COG]
Figure 20 Power ramp cracks originating at a circumferential ridge
[Courtesy COG]
Figure 21 Power ramp cracks near a sheath/endcap junction
Figure 22 Key terms for environmentally assisted cracking during power ramps
shape over the channel length. Therefore, during on-power refueling, a previously irradiated
fuel bundle can go from a relatively lower initial power to (or through) a relatively higher final or
intermediate power. This causes power ramps in irradiated fuel elements.
The resultant pellet expansion strains and stresses the sheath, in the process breaking any
protective layer of ZrO2 that might have built up during initial irradiation. By then, the Zircaloy
has also been embrittled by two processes: (a) by fast neutrons experienced during many
months of irradiation at the low-power axial position, and (b) by hydrides, which can either
promote or hinder initiation and growth of cracks depending on their orientation. In addition,
by then, previous irradiation has also released fission products inside the fuel element, some of
which are corrosive (such as iodine, cesium, and cadmium). Some fraction of these corrosive
fission products is believed to react chemically with the CANLUB layer that is applied on the
inside of the sheath, reducing the amount of fission products that are available to attack Zir-
caloy. The balance of the fission products is available for chemical attack on Zircaloy while the
Zircaloy is also experiencing high stresses and strains due to the power ramp. These situations
create a potentially potent combination for EAC: high stresses and strains, concurrent with
embrittled Zircaloy, and also concurrent with a corrosive internal environment.
Figure 23 provides a specific example of some of the processes described above. It is based on
in-reactor measurements of ridge strains during a power ramp to about 55 kW/m [Smith et al.,
1985]. Specifically, this fuel element was first irradiated in a base irradiation at about 30 kW/m
to about 4 MW•d/kgU. Then it was inserted into an experimental rig that could measure sheath
diameters during irradiation. The power in the experimental rig was first increased from 0 to
about 30 kW/m, where it was held constant for about 30 days. Then the power was increased
again, this time to about 55 kW/m.
On the plot in Figure 23 for ridge strain vs. element power, we have also superposed the strain
at which ZrO2 breaks and the strain at which Zr-4 becomes plastic [Tayal et al., 2008-2]. One can
see that ZrO2 breaks very early during the ramp and therefore is unlikely to play a significant
role in protecting the sheath from chemical attack by fission products. We can also see that
defects start much later than when the sheath has become plastic. During the plastic part of
loading, stresses increase but little, yet significant plasticity is required before EAC failures occur
in CANDU fuel. Therefore, the primary mechanical driver of EAC is not stress alone, but rather a
combination of stress and strain.
To maintain fuel integrity, the above combination needs to be managed to acceptable levels.
This is done in part by designing and operating fuel below defect thresholds for EAC, as de-
scribed in the next section.
Figure 24 contains not one, but two lines. As noted earlier, the lower line is called the defect
threshold; it is the line below which no defect occurs. The upper line is one above which no fuel
bundle stays intact. The region in between contains some scatter: some bundles in that region
fail, whereas others stay intact.
Empirical evidence suggests that for all practical purposes, the defect threshold represents a
trivial likelihood of defect, essentially zero. Nevertheless, in statistical theory, probabilities
usually have asymptotic ends, that is, a probability is never zero, nor is it ever 100%. Therefore,
the defect threshold shown in Figure 24 is usually assigned a low arbitrary probability such as
1%. Likewise, the upper line in Figure 24 is usually assigned an arbitrarily high defect probability
close to 100%.
Figure 25 shows an illustrative increase in defect probability as a fuel bundle experiences power
ramps that exceed the defect threshold [Penn et al., 1977]. Theoretically, the probability should
be an “S”-shaped curve with asymptotic ends. For practical purposes, however, empirical
evidence shows that the asymptotic parts near the two ends are small and that for the most
part, the defect probability increases essentially linearly with increasing distance from the
defect threshold (see Figure 25).
The distance between the two lines shown in Figure 24 is about 5 kW/m; however, when the
data from other burnups are also considered, the overall separation between the two lines for
all burnups is closer to 10 kW/m. Therefore, to a first approximation, and if one ignores small
asymptotic regions near the two extremes, for every increment of one kW/m above the defect
threshold, the defect probability increases by about 10 percentage points until it reaches 100%.
The portion of the ramp that is above the defect threshold is sometimes also called the “excess
ramp”. In the illustrative example below, the “excess ramp” is 8 kW/m.
Exercise: Consider a non-CANLUB fuel bundle where the steady-state power in the outer
element changes from 35 kW/m to 50 kW/m at 140 MWh/kgU. This gives it a ramp of (50 – 35)
= 15 kW/m. From Figure 24, the defect threshold at this initial power is 7 kW/m. Therefore, the
actual ramp is (15 – 7) = 8 kW/m above the defect threshold. Therefore, this fuel bundle has a
(8*10%) = 80% chance of fuel defects through EAC.
8.4 Mitigation
Based on past experience, the fuel industry has adopted certain strategies to mitigate EAC
defects. Some illustrative examples are given below.
CANLUB: CANLUB significantly increases the defect threshold. It is believed that the ef-
fectiveness of CANLUB increases with thickness. However, it is also believed that after a
certain thickness, additional increases in CANLUB thickness likely yield diminishing re-
turns. At the same time, there is concern that very thick layers of CANLUB may poten-
tially release excessive hydrogen into the sheath. Therefore, a CANLUB layer of a se-
lected optimal thickness is applied to the inside of the sheath [Wood and Hardy, 1979].
Fuel Management: The key operating parameters for EAC—size of the power ramp, ini-
tial and final powers, and burnup—are all controllable to some degree through refueling
strategy. Therefore, optimal refueling strategies have been devised to avoid EAC failures
in CANDU reactors. A compelling example comes from the Pickering reactors, where
early EAC failures were eliminated in part by improved refueling schemes.
Sheath/Endcap Junction: A significant contribution to EAC defects at sheath/endcap
junctions arises from the stress concentration at re-entrant corners of these junctions.
Therefore, the detailed design of the sheath/endcap junction must be carefully con-
trolled, including the radius of the re-entrant corner, the pellet profile at the end of the
fuel stack, and the axial distance between the pellet stack and the re-entrant corner.
Element Rating: Smaller ramps and lower heat generation rates reduce the threat from
EAC, as shown in Figure 24. These can be achieved by, for example, spreading a bundle’s
power among more fuel elements, e.g., by using more but smaller-diameter fuel ele-
ments within a fuel bundle. CANDU fuel has indeed evolved in this direction, starting
with a fuel bundle that used 19 fuel elements, then moving to one that used 28, to 37
elements, and to the CANFLEX design that uses 43 fuel elements [Hastings et al., 1989].
Detailed Internal Design: Sheath strain and fission gas release can also be influenced by
the detailed internal design of the fuel element, such as pellet density and clearances
between the sheath and the pellets.
the uniformly distributed load p. However, p is usually not known. Instead, the mid-span
deflection δ can be estimated more easily through other means. Therefore, p can be replaced in
Equation (10) by the mid-span deflection δ using the following additional information:
v at x 2 . (11)
This results in the following equation for the moment carried by the assembly weld and the
endplate as a function of the mid-length deflection of the fuel element:
W 32 J (2 10 J S )
. (12)
To calculate the moment through the above equation, one needs to know the spring constant S
of the endplate, which is discussed in the next subsection.
(GC ) 2 .
1
(15)
If the beam’s response to W is represented as a torsional spring, its spring constant S is:
T
2 GC 2 .
1
S (16)
z 0
The above spring constant can be used in Equation (12) to calculate the moment carried by the
assembly weld.
C 0.26ct ,
3
(20)
where c is the width of the beam and t its thickness.
that of the sheath plus that of the pellet multiplied by a “pellet interaction factor” G which
reflects the varying levels of pellet/sheath interaction.
Another complication is that UO2 is brittle and therefore cannot support significant tensile
loads. Therefore, the resulting equation for pellet flexural rigidity is fairly complex, as described
for example in [Tayal et al., 1984]. For simplicity, here we treat the impact of pellet cracking by
means of a pellet cracking factor ∝ which reduces the net contribution of the pellet to the
overall flexural rigidity of the fuel element. As an illustrative number, the examples below use a
pellet cracking factor ∝ of 0.1.
Therefore, the net flexural rigidity J of the fuel element can be described as:
J J s GJ p
(21)
Es r14 r24 E p rp4 G
4 4
where J is the flexural rigidity of the fuel element, Js the flexural rigidity of the sheath, Jp the
flexural rigidity of the pellet, Es the Young’s modulus of the sheath, r1 the outer sheath radius, r2
the inner sheath radius, Ep the Young’s modulus of the pellet, rp the pellet radius, ∝the pellet
cracking factor, and G the pellet interaction factor.
The pellet interaction factor G varies between 0 and 1. Under the conditions of the experiment
shown in Figure 28, the pellet interaction factor G is zero when the fuel element is at zero
power. When the fuel element is first brought to full power, G increases to 1 because the
interfacial pressure between the pellet and the sheath is high. During continued operation at
full power, G gradually decreases to 0 as the interfacial pressure between the pellet and the
sheath relaxes. Therefore, the pellet/sheath interfacial pressure has a major impact on the
pellet interaction factor.
For a given lateral deflection of the fuel element, stresses in the endplate and in the assembly
weld are higher for higher levels of pellet/sheath interaction. Therefore, the upper end of the
pellet interaction factor range gives conservative results for such stresses.
9.1.6 Stresses
The above Equations (12), (16), (19)–(21) provide all the information needed to calculate the
moment carried by the assembly weld and the endplate. This moment can be converted into
nominal stresses using the classical equations given below [Timoshenko et al., 1970].
Nominal shear stress τ in the endplate:
τ = 1.87 W / (ct2). (22)
Nominal normal stress σ in the assembly weld:
σ = 32 W / (πd3), (23)
where d is the weld diameter.
To the nominal stresses given by the above equations, one would need to add the effects of
stress concentrations due to the rapid change in geometry near the end of the fuel element.
This topic is covered as part of fatigue strength in Section 9.2.
MPa.
Exercise:
Consider the potential of fatigue from lateral vibrations of the fuel element assessed in Section
9.1.6.
Assembly weld: The alternating stress is 2 MPa. The fatigue strength is 22 MPa.
Endplate: For comparison to fatigue strength, the classical von Mises formulation for effective
stress tells us that shear stress needs to be multiplied by the square root of 3 to be comparable
to normal stress. Therefore, the effective alternating stress in the endplate is (2.5 * √3) = 4.4
MPa. In comparison, the fatigue strength is 28 MPa.
For both the assembly weld and the endplate, the alternating stresses are much lower than the
corresponding fatigue strengths. Therefore, the weld and the endplate are not at risk of fatigue
failures from this level of vibration.
Bent-tube passage Bench test done at room temperature and atmospheric pressure to verify
that a prototype bundle, when not damaged, can pass through the “bent-
tube” gauge, which simulates the most restrictive passage in a fuel chan-
nel.
Bundle strength – Single-bundle test done in stagnant water at reactor pressure and tem-
shield plug sup- perature to verify that a prototype bundle, supported by a simulated shield
port plug, can withstand the maximum reactor load in the fuel channel under
normal conditions without failing. Test bundle failure is indicated when:
(1) the bundle fails the bent-tube gauge test and/or (2) shows permanent
deformation in any of its components that exceeds the as-built dimen-
sional tolerances for that component and/or (3) develops cracks in any of
its structural components or joints between components.
Bundle strength – Single-bundle test done in stagnant water at reactor pressure and tem-
single side stop perature to verify that a prototype bundle, supported (abnormally) by a
support single side stop, can withstand the maximum reactor load in the fuel
channel during refueling without failing. Test bundle failure is indicated
when the bundle fails the bent-tube gauge test. Applies to C6-type reac-
tors.
Refueling Impact Out-of-reactor test done in a representative full-length fuel channel using
circulating light water at reactor operating temperature and pressure, to
verify that prototype bundles can withstand the maximum impact loads
expected in the fuel channel during refueling without failing. Test bundle
failure is indicated: (1) when the bundle fails the bent-tube gauge test
and/or (2) shows permanent deformation in any of its components that
exceeds the as-built dimensional tolerances for that component and/or (3)
develops cracks in any of its structural components or joints between
components. Applies to C6-type reactors.
Fuel – December 2014
48 The Essential CANDU
Sliding wear Single prototype bundle test done in stagnant light water at reactor
operating temperature and pressure to verify that: (1) bearing pad wear in
the test bundle does not exceed the bearing pad wear allowance and (2)
projected lifetime pressure-tube damage, caused by sliding bearing pads of
the test bundle, does not exceed the channel’s lifetime material loss
allowance, also taking into account possible channel damage by other
means.
Bundle rotation Out-of-reactor test done in a representative full-length fuel channel and/or
pressure drop a partial-length channel, using circulating light water at reactor operating
temperature and pressure and/or at room temperature and low pressure,
to determine the variation in hydraulic pressure drop generated across the
endplate-to-endplate junction between two abutting prototype bundles as
a function of their relative radial (mis)alignment.
Fueling machine Out-of-reactor test done in a representative full-length fuel channel, using
compatibility circulating light water at reactor operating temperature and pressure, in
conjunction with a production fueling machine, to verify that the fueling
machine can charge and discharge prototype fuel bundles into the chan-
nel.
Critical heat flux Out-of-reactor test done in a representative full-length fuel channel using
circulating light water at reactor operating temperature and pressure and
electrical heaters to simulate the geometry and power produced by fuel
bundles, to determine the spectrum of channel thermal-hydraulic and
power conditions in the range of interest to reactor operation, which lead
to a step change in heater surface temperature, referred to as “dryout”.
Power ramp Irradiation test done on prototype bundles cooled by circulating water at
irradiation reactor operating temperature and pressure, to verify that a test bundle
can survive, defect-free, the most severe power ramps expected in a
reactor. Typically, this would involve: (1) irradiation of a test bundle at
relatively low power for some fraction of its residence in the reactor, and
then (2) an increase in power for the remainder of its residence in the
reactor, such that the burnup accumulated at the initial power and the
increased power surpasses the equivalent conditions of all bundles in the
power reactor. Using C6 as an illustrative example, the low-power irradia-
tion would reflect power and burnup in positions 1 to 4 in a high-power
channel, and the size of the ramp would reflect, in an appropriately
conservative manner, the power ramps in bundles 1 to 4 during or after
their shift to positions 9 to 12. Such tests can be performed in, for exam-
Irradiation of Irradiation test done on prototype elements which contain the novel
special materials material (e.g., an inert matrix for burning of actinides) cooled by circulating
water at reactor operating temperature and pressure, to verify that the
elements containing the special material will be defect-free at the end of
their irradiation period. Such a test can be done, for example, in “de-
mountable” bundles in a vertical channel of the NRU test reactor called a
“hot loop”, in which test specimens are cooled by light water.
At the same time, fully representative tests are not always practical in some situations, for
example because of equipment, cost, schedule, or combinations thereof. As specific illustrative
examples, let us consider the following:
Comprehensiveness: As one illustrative example, a CANDU fuel designer needs to con-
firm, among other aspects, that a fuel bundle has adequate mechanical strength to resist
the mechanical loads imposed on it during discharge from the fuel channel. The test fa-
cility, to verify this experimentally, would need to provide for all the important effects in
this scenario, meaning that (a) the test facility should be shielded so that it can accom-
modate irradiated fuel so that reduction in ductility due to prior irradiation can be ac-
counted for; (b) it should be long enough to accommodate a string of approximately 12
fuel bundles; (c) it should produce power to simulate the effect of on-power interaction
of the pellets and the sheath on load shedding; (d) it should be connected to a pump of
sufficiently large capacity to provide the necessary flow for the hydraulic drag load; and
(e) it should contain a representative fuel support configuration to simulate the appro-
priate load concentrations. We currently do not have a shielded facility that meets all
these requirements, and building a new one would be very expensive and time-
consuming. For this reason, such tests have been done in the past in unshielded out-of-
reactor facilities using non-irradiated fuel bundles. Although such tests are useful, they
do miss the order-of-magnitude drop in ductility of the fuel bundle’s structural materials
that occurs during irradiation, and hence they may not always determine the actual
adequacy of an irradiated fuel bundle’s mechanical strength. Another similar situation
that is also not covered by existing test facilities is the effect of gravity on long-term irra-
diation-enhanced creep sag of fuel in a horizontal orientation. These situations can be
rectified through analyses.
Scatter: As another illustrative example, consider the need to verify whether or not a
new fuel design meets the expected power ramp challenges in a new operating enve-
lope for which the EAC defect threshold is not well known ahead of time (a priori). For a
new operating envelope and fuel design, one would not know a priori which specific
ramp is the most demanding. Therefore, one would need to test many ramps, and to
cover the expected scatter in the results, one would need to test a statistically significant
number for each condition. This would require testing many bundles for a large number
of ramps, and for each ramp, significant in-reactor irradiation would be required to ac-
cumulate the required burnup. Because only limited facilities for in-reactor irradiation
are available, the full test matrix could require large amounts of time and expense.
Again, analyses can help reduce the cost as well as the timeline.
Margins: Knowledge of available margins is needed for a variety of purposes, e.g., to es-
tablish a safe operating envelope or to deal quickly with abnormal situations. To deter-
mine the margin available in a design solely from tests, one would need to perform a
large number of experiments. Again, time and expense for these can be reduced
through analyses.
For these conflicting reasons, some situations are better addressed through tests, whereas
others require a judiciously balanced combination of tests and analyses. Appropriate combina-
tions of tests and analyses must be tailored to a variety of factors such as (a) features of the
specific change in design, (b) completeness and level of knowledge of relevant damage mecha-
nisms, and (c) specific features, capabilities, and capacities of available test facilities and analyti-
cal tools. For example, different combinations of tests and analyses have been used to verify
the CANFLEX fuel design [Hastings et al., 1989], the ACR fuel design [Reid et al., 2008], and the
37M fuel design [Daniels et al., 2008]. In the following sections, we describe a fuel design
verification process that combines tests and analysis.
To craft an optimal program of comprehensive design analyses, a sound knowledge is needed of
credible damage mechanisms during the conditions for which fuel integrity needs to be ascer-
tained. A few selected damage mechanisms have been described in detail in earlier sections of
this chapter. An overview compilation of all currently known credible and significant damage
mechanisms is given in the next subsection.
Zircaloy-UO2 is another system with a low-melting-point alloy. Hence, strictly speaking, UO2
does not have to heat the Zircaloy all the way to its melting point to form a liquid alloy.
Melting of Zircaloy or its alloys
Insufficient cooling may potentially melt the Zircaloy, impeding its ability to contain fission
products.
The fuel sheath also contains Zircaloy/beryllium eutectic and other alloys in that neighbour-
hood. Their melting points are lower than that of the parent Zircaloy, and therefore insufficient
cooling may potentially melt these alloys. This could detach the pads from the sheaths, destroy-
ing their functionality.
Crevice corrosion
Crevice corrosion can potentially occur in crevices such as between bearing pads and the
pressure tube or between pads and the sheath. The crevices restrict the flow of coolant.
Coolant can boil off in the near-stagnant conditions in the crevice, which in turn can increase
the concentration of chemicals such as lithium in the crevice. Lithium, in the form of lithium
hydroxide, is added to the coolant to control its pH. The resulting elevated concentration of
lithium can potentially accelerate Zircaloy corrosion.
Overheating by contact
If a heated surface such as the sheath contacts a neighbouring surface such as another sheath
or the pressure tube, there is potential for reduced local cooling and hence overheating of the
fuel, the pressure tube, or both.
Jamming
This mode refers to the possibility that in-service on-power dimensions of the fuel bundle may
become such that the fuel bundle cannot pass—easily or at all—through the fuel channel. For
example, this can potentially occur due to interlocking of multiple spacers or due to excessive
distortion.
Damage to pressure tubes
Bearing pads can cause fretting, sliding wear, and crevice corrosion in pressure tubes.
Fuel element failure due to T1: Local temperature in all parts of the pellet shall stay below the
fuel melting melting point of the pellet, with a minimum acceptable margin.
Fuel element failure due to T2: Local temperature in all parts of the sheath and the endcap
sheath melting shall stay below the local melting point of the material, with a
minimum acceptable margin.
Fuel element failure due to T3: Underneath a bearing pad or spacer pad, the temperature at
crevice corrosion the sheath outer surface shall be less than that required to cause
crevice corrosion of the sheath, with a minimum acceptable
margin.
Fuel or pressure tube T4: Fuel bundle dimensional changes (e.g., due to irradiation,
failure due to overheating loads, creep, bowing, etc.) shall maintain a minimum acceptable
by contact clearance between neighbouring sheaths or endcaps and also
between the pressure tube and its sheath/endcap.
Fuel sheath failure due to S1: The excess of internal pressure over coolant pressure shall be
less than the pressure that causes cracking in the fuel sheath or in
Fuel – December 2014
Fuel 55
Fuel sheath failure due to S2: Stresses and strains (or related powers and ramps) during
environmentally assisted power increases in fuel elements at circumferential ridges and at
cracking due to power sheath/endcap junctions shall be less than the appropriate defect
ramps thresholds (with a minimum acceptable margin), including the
effects of pellet chips, if any.
Fuel failure due to static S3: Local principal strain (elastic plus plastic) shall be less than the
mechanical overstrain available ductility minus the minimum acceptable margin, and
local creep strain shall be less than the creep rupture strain, with
a minimum acceptable margin.
Fuel failure due to uncon- S4: Axial and related loads on the fuel bundle shall be less than
trolled loss of geometry the bundle buckling strength, with a minimum acceptable margin.
Fuel failure due to fatigue S5: Cumulative fatigue damage from repeated cycles of alternat-
ing stresses and strains shall be less than the allowable fatigue
life, with minimum acceptable factors of safety on the magnitude
of cyclic strain and on the number of cycles.
Fuel mechanical rupture S6: Strain energy density during impact shall be less than that
due to impact of loads such required to crack or break any metallic component of the fuel
as refueling and/or bundle, with a minimum acceptable margin.
start/restart
Formation of a local S8: The combined thickness of oxide and crud on the fuel sheath
hydride lens due to oxide outer surface shall be less than the amount required for spalling
and crud from the surface, with a minimum acceptable margin.
Failure due to insufficient S9: The volume-average concentration of hydrogen (in the form of
ductility during post- soluble atomic hydrogen and equivalent hydrides and deuterides,
irradiation handling including their orientation) over the cross section of load-bearing
components shall be less than the amount required to retain
sufficient ductility, with a minimum acceptable margin.
Failure due to excessive C1: Maximum length of the fuel string (e.g., in the fuel channel)
interaction loads along the shall be less than the minimum available cavity (e.g., between the
Failure from damage by C2: Net dimensions, including dimensional changes, throughout
interfacing equipment fuel bundle residence in the reactor shall be within specified
limits for interfacing equipment.
Fuel sheath failure due to C3: At spacer pads, total wear from all sources such as lateral
fretting of pads vibrations, axial vibrations, fretting, sliding, and erosion shall be
less than that which brings any part of a spacer in contact with a
neighbouring sheath, with a minimum acceptable margin.
Fuel bundle jamming C4: To enable passage of fuel through the reactor in all fuel
handling operations, the axial force required to move the bundle
shall be within design allowance, including all pertinent consid-
erations such as on-power deformations, in-service contacts with
neighbouring components, and changes in material properties.
Protection of pressure tube C5: Depth of crevice corrosion, sliding wear, and fretting wear in
from bearing pads the pressure tube from fuel bearing pads shall be within specified
allowances.
Many complex processes occur in a fuel element. Therefore, in real life, one seldom has com-
plete knowledge of all credible combinations of important variables involving design, manufac-
turing, and operating conditions that might fail the fuel, nor the luxury of performing an essen-
tially infinite number of experiments that would cover them all. Therefore, in real life, we must
deal satisfactorily, not only with what is known, but also with what is not.
In some situations, we know what we don’t know—the known unknowns. In other situations,
we don’t even know what we don’t know—the unknown unknowns. “Known unknowns” are
usually included in assessments through quantified uncertainties. However, “unknown un-
knowns” are usually addressed through margins contained within acceptance criteria.
Figure 29 illustrates the concept of margin within an acceptance criterion; the figure labels it as
"Minimum Acceptable Margin". Such a margin reflects expert judgment about the “unknown
unknowns” in a given technology area. Therefore it can change with time as additional knowl-
edge becomes available and/or as improved technologies for design, production, and/or as-
sessments are developed and incorporated into the product.
Table 5 Illustrative list of computer codes used at AECL for fuel analyses
Program Description
ABAQUS This finite-element code is used for structural analyses of fuel strings, espe-
cially in the presence of non-linearities of intermediate level. Typical examples
include: (a) determination of stresses in the fuel string resting on side stops
and experiencing hydraulic drag load, and (b) impact stresses during loading of
fresh fuel bundles. For an overview and further details of this code, contact
Dassault Systèmes, France.
ASSERT This sub-channel code is used to assess thermal-hydraulic conditions in the fuel
channel, including the effects of heat transfer between the fuel and the cool-
ant. Key results include distributions of flow and voids, pressure drop, and
critical heat flux. For an overview and further details of this code, contact
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Canada.
BEAM This code provides a fast and simple tool to assess several aspects of the
mechanical behaviour of a fuel element. Key results include axial and lateral
stiffnesses of a fuel element, frequencies of lateral vibrations and resulting
elastic stresses, collapse pressure of a sheath, and buckling strength of a fuel
element. An overview is available from M. Tayal et al., “Assessing the Me-
chanical Performance of a Fuel Bundle: BEAM Code Description”, Proceedings,
Third International Conference on CANDU Fuel, Canadian Nuclear Society,
Pembroke, ON, 1992, October 4-8.
BOW This finite-element code is used to assess the lateral deformations of fuel
elements and bundles, e.g., bow, sag, and droop. An overview is available from
M. Tayal, “Modelling the Bending/Bowing of Composite Beams such as Nuclear
Fuel: the BOW Code”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 116, pp. 149-159
(1989).
ELESTRES This finite-element code is used to calculate several thermal, mechanical, and
microstructural responses of a fuel element. Key results include sheath and
pellet temperatures; fission gas release and internal pressure; and sheath
strain as a result of expansion, contraction, and hourglassing of pellets and the
sheath. An overview is available from M. Tayal, “Modelling CANDU Fuel under
Normal Operating Conditions: ELESTRES Code Description”, Report CANDEV-86-
110, published by CANDU Owners’ Group; also Report AECL-9331, published by
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, February 1987.
FEAST This finite-element code is used to model detailed local stresses, strains, and
deformations such as at circumferential ridges, at sheath/endcap junctions,
and in a sheath above an axial gap. An overview is available from M. Tayal,
“FEAST: A Two-Dimensional Non-Linear Finite-Element Code for Calculating
Stresses”, Proceedings, Seventh Annual Conference of the Canadian Nuclear
Society, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, June 8–11, 1986.
Program Description
FEAT This finite-element code is used to model local temperatures such as the
effects of end-flux peaking and local temperatures pertinent to crevice corro-
sion and braze voids. An overview is available from M. Tayal, “The FEAT Finite-
Element Code to Calculate Temperatures in Solids of Arbitrary Shapes”, Nuclear
Engineering and Design, Vol. 114, pp. 99-114 (1989).
LONGER This code calculates conditions related to sheath collapse. Key results include
pressure for elastic instability, critical pressure for excessive longitudinal ridges,
and pressure for axial collapse. An overview is available from U. K. Paul et al.,
“LONGER: A Computer Program for Longitudinal Ridging and Axial Collapse
Assessment of CANDU Fuel”, Proceedings, 11th International Conference on
CANDU Fuel, Canadian Nuclear Society, Niagara Falls, Ontario, 2010.
LS DYNA This finite-element code overlaps the functionality of ABAQUS code and can
also be used for analyses of strength, impact, and vibration of fuel strings. For
an overview and further details of this code, contact Livermore Software
Technology Corporation, U.S.A.
NUCIRC For purposes of fuel analyses, this thermal-hydraulic code is used to calculate
critical channel power. For an overview and further details of this code,
contact Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Canada.
derived from fuel assessments, and similar constraints derived from assessments of all other
systems are then used in safety analysis to establish the plant’s safe operating envelope.
ture. Therefore, the hydrogen often accumulates in localized areas such as at the relatively
cooler outer surface of the sheath. When the local concentration of hydrogen exceeds the local
solubility limit, the excess hydrogen precipitates as hydrides, which are called secondary hy-
drides. Once hydrides have formed, they can grow by preferentially absorbing additional
hydrogen from within the pellet/sheath gap. High levels of hydrides embrittle Zircaloy, leaving it
less able to resist stresses and strains.
A number of pertinent factors may vary along the length of the fuel element, for example the
local temperature, the local rate of decomposition, and the local oxidation kinetics of UO2 and
of Zircaloy. For this reason, secondary hydriding generally occurs at some distance away from
the primary hole.
Sheath Stresses: The volume of compound hydride is about 16% larger than the volume of the
parent Zircaloy. This creates geometric incompatibility among neighbouring materials, which in
turn leads to large stresses in the hydride and in the Zircaloy surrounding the hydride. When
these stresses become high enough, they can cause cracks in the layer of zirconium oxide which
exists on the inside surface of the sheath. This in turn enables additional hydrogen to enter the
sheath. Moreover, the hydrides can produce cracks that pass—either fully or partly—through
the sheath wall. All cracks enable further ingress of hydrogen; through-wall cracks also enable
more water to enter the fuel element.
Oxidation and Swelling of UO2: Reaction of water and UO2 results in higher concentrations of
uranium oxides, commonly labelled UO(2+x). The higher oxides have lower density, and there-
fore lower thermal conductivity and higher nominal volume, than UO2. The lower thermal
conductivity increases the temperature and hence the thermal expansion of the pellet, which
combines with the higher nominal volume to swell the pellet. The expanding pellet then in-
creases the width of the crack in the Zircaloy sheath.
These processes can lead to a hole, often caused by a loss of material from the outside surface
of the sheath, called a “blister”. Figure 30(a) provides an illustrative example. Holes due to
secondary damage are often much bigger than holes from primary damage and hence can
release significant radioactivity, and even some UO 2, into the coolant. For this reason, it is
prudent to discharge a fuel bundle that contains a failed fuel element before significant secon-
dary damage to the sheath occurs. Fortunately, the process of forming secondary defects often
takes some time, and CANDU reactors are unique in being able to: (1) detect fuel element
defects that release radioactive fission products into the coolant, (2) identify the fuel channels
that contain bundles with defective fuel elements, (3) discharge these bundles before the
defects in the fuel-element sheath become too big, and (4) do all this without shutting the
reactor down. The next section summarizes the techniques to do this.
The second and third methods provide indirect confirmation that a bundle containing a defec-
tive element has been removed by monitoring gamma activity near the spent fuel handling
system or in fuel bays. At Bruce, dry sipping techniques [MacDonald et al., 1990] are used to
monitor airborne gamma activity in the air chamber that separates the heavy water side of the
spent fuel transfer mechanisms from the light water environment of the fuel bay. A higher-
than-normal signal that lingers after bundles have been transferred usually indicates the pres-
ence of a defective element.
Two other techniques have also been developed at CANDU-6 stations to confirm that fuel
bundles containing defective elements have been discharged from the core. One technique
depends on the radiation levels of fission products in the heavy water inside the fueling ma-
chine. Before discharge of irradiated fuel bundles to a bay, heavy water from the fueling ma-
chine is transferred to a nearby drain tank. The presence of a defect is indicated when gamma
fields near the tank trigger an alarm that monitors gamma in the area. Another technique
developed in the inspection bay at Point Lepreau is based on “wet sipping”, or measuring the
gamma activity of water samples near recently discharged bundles. Again, a defect is confirmed
if gamma activity is unusually high.
Monitoring delayed neutron activity at the outlet end of a fuel channel during refueling also
provides some confirmation that a fuel bundle containing a defective element is being dis-
charged from the core [Manzer, 1985]. At CANDU-6 sites, special refueling procedures are
sometimes used which involve allowing the fuel bundles inside the channel to move slowly with
the flow while monitoring the DN signal of the channel. When the signal drops to below “pre-
defect” levels, this indicates that the fuel bundle containing the defect has been pushed outside
the core boundary.
13 Closure
To restate a point made in Section 2.3, the defect rate is remarkably low in CANDU fuel—almost
in the range of impurities found in most substances. An IAEA survey has reported the following
world-wide fuel defect rates between 1994 and 2006 [IAEA, 2010]:
94 failed rods per million discharged (ppm) in WWERs;
87 ppm in PWRs;
65 ppm in BWRs; and
3.5 ppm in Canada.
These figures affirm the basic soundness of practices built into all major aspects of CANDU
fuel—from research to development, design, fabrication, and operation and the feedbacks
among them.
14 Problems
Section 2
Q2.1 – Why is a CANDU fuel “element” able to produce 30 times more heat than an electric
element of a similar size?
Q2.2 – List at least six conditions that occur during at-power operation of CANDU fuel that
challenge the integrity of the fuel.
Q2.3 – Name the components of a typical CANDU fuel bundle.
Q2.4 – Why is the uranium that is used in CANDU fuel bundles in the form of uranium dioxide,
rather than uranium metal, for instance?
Q2.5 – Why is helium used to purge the air out of fuel elements during fabrication?
Q2.6 – For a fixed bundle power, the only means that the fuel designer has at his disposal to
change the individual element rating is to use more or fewer elements. Using more elements
(subdivision) permits the coolant to be nearer the source of the heat at more locations, leading
to lower UO2 temperature and reduced threats from many thermally driven damage mecha-
nisms. What are some of the negative effects of subdivision?
Q2.7 – Experience and fundamental engineering considerations have shown that CANDU fuel
bundles can experience 18 different modes of failure in a reactor. Name the three general
groups into which the modes are grouped and provide the principal characteristic of each
group.
Section 3
Q3.1 – What does “burnup” measure, and what units is it expressed in?
Q3.2 – A CANDU fuel element contains UO2 pellets 20 mm in diameter and having a density of
10.5 g/cm3. At 60 kW/m, how long does it need to accumulate a burnup of 40 MWh/kgU? Why
does this need so much longer than the fuel element of Section 3?
Section 4
Q4.1 – A fuel element has the following characteristics: diameter = 15 mm; sheath thickness =
0.5 mm; Young’s modulus = 80 GPa; Poisson’s ratio = 0.37. Is it elastically stable at 6 MPa? At 7
MPa? At 8 MPa?
Section 6
Q6.1 – What is fission gas?
Q6.2 – Why is it important to maintain fission gas pressure as low as possible?
Q6.3 – Describe the processes involved in the generation, accumulation and release of fission
gas into “open” spaces inside the fuel sheath.
Q6.4 – What design features does the fuel designer have at his disposal to control or minimize
fuel element internal gas pressure?
Q6.5 – Using the equations presented in Section 6.5, determine the effect of storing the fission
gas at pellet centerline temperature compared to that of the pellet interface with the sheath.
What do we learn?
Q6.6 – A fuel element’s free space is 3 ml, and it contains 15 ml of gas at STP. Assuming that all
the gas is stored at a uniform temperature of 1400 K, what is the internal pressure of the fuel
element? [Hint: Use Equation 5].
Section 7
Q7.1 – Describe three defect types in CANDU fuel that may be caused by excessive stress.
Q7.2 – Describe in qualitative terms the reasons that cracks develop in uranium dioxide pellets
at operating conditions.
Q7.3 – A temperature profile is parabolic in a pellet of radius 6 mm. Is the hoop stress tensile or
compressive at: 1 cm? 2 cm? 3 cm? 4 cm? 5 cm?
Section 8
Q8.1 – Describe qualitatively the conditions that might lead to environmentally assisted crack-
ing.
Q8.2 – Provide examples of EAC defects that have been observed in CANDU fuel elements.
Q8.3 – Recognizing the three different effects that can cause EAC defects in CANDU fuel ele-
ments, provide a qualitative description of reactor operation that could lead to EAC defects.
Q8.4 – What parameters from operating reactors have been correlated to provide an indication
of potential fuel failure due to EAC? Draw a figure to show the relationship.
Q8.5 – Describe the mitigating parameters that have been adopted by CANDU designers and
operators to minimize EAC defects.
Q8.6 – A non-CANLUB fuel bundle experiences a power ramp from 25 kW/m to 50 kW/m at 140
MWh/kgU. What is its probability of having a defect? What would the defect probability be if it
were CANLUB fuel?
Section 9
Q9.1 – Describe the coolant conditions that may lead to fuel vibration.
Q9.2 – Describe the type of damage that fuel can experience as a result of vibration.
Q9.3 – A C6 fuel element has the same dimensions as in the illustrative example of Section
9.1.6, with the exception that its assembly weld has inadvertently been manufactured with a
diameter of 3 mm. Coincidentally, it is also destined to be loaded into a channel where the
amplitude of lateral vibration is expected to be 30 micrometers. What nominal stresses are
expected in the endplate and in the assembly weld? Are fatigue failures likely by this mecha-
nism?
Section 10
Q10.1 – How many damage mechanisms have been shown to affect CANDU fuel?
Q10.2 – How many thermal damage mechanisms (“T” series) are there? Provide a brief descrip-
tion of each.
Q10.3 – How many structural damage mechanisms (“S” series) are there? Provide a brief
description of each.
Q10.4 – How many compatibility damage mechanisms (“C” series) are there? Provide a brief
description of each.
Q10.5 – List the design acceptance criteria for CANDU fuel.
Q10.6 – With the aid of a diagram, show the relationship of acceptance criteria to other rele-
vant parameters, e.g., the material damage limit.
Q10.7 – What is the purpose of assigning margins in relation to acceptance criteria?
Q10.8 – List the qualification tests and assessments used to qualify CANDU fuel bundles.
Section 11
Q11.1 – Name at least one plant operating constraint that is related to ensuring fuel integrity.
Are there others?
Q11.2 – How are plant operating constraints defined by system designers such as fuel designers
used to ensure safe plant operation?
Section 12
Q12.1 – What is the most common defect type that occurs in CANDU fuel during plant opera-
tion?
Q12.2 – What are the principal characteristics of the most common defect type that makes its
detection possible while the plant is in operation?
Q12.3 – What is secondary hydriding? Explain the mechanism and how it affects the integrity of
the fuel element.
Q12.4 – Explain why it is important to remove a defective fuel element from an operating
reactor as soon as the defect is detected.
Q12.5 – Name the three systems used in CANDU reactors to assist in the detection and removal
of defective fuel while the reactor is at power and explain briefly how each is used.
Q12.6 – Name three techniques used to confirm that a bundle containing a defective fuel
element has been discharged from the channel and explain briefly how each works.
15 References
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I. J. Hastings, A. D. Lane, and P. G. Boczar, “CANFLEX: An Advanced Fuel Bundle for CANDU”,
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J. H. K. Lau, M. Tayal, E. Nadeau, M. J. Pettigrew, I. E. Oldaker, W. Teper, B. Wong, and F. Iglesias,
“Darlington N12 Investigation: Modelling of Fuel Bundle Movement in Channel under Pres-
sure Pulsing Conditions”, Proceedings, 13th Annual Conference, Canadian Nuclear Society
(1992).
B. J. Lewis, “Fundamental Aspects of Defective Nuclear Fuel Behaviour and Fission Product
Release”, Journal of Nuclear Materials, Vol. 160, pp. 201–217 (1988).
J. J. Lipsett and W. B. Stewart, “Failed Fuel Location in CANDU-PHW Reactors using a Feeder
Scanning Technique”, IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol. NS-23, No. 1, pp. 321-324
(1976).
R. D. MacDonald, M. R. Floyd, B. J. Lewis, A. M. Manzer, and P. T. Truant, “Detecting, Locating,
and Identifying Failed Fuel in Canadian Power Reactors”, Report AECL-9714, published by
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Canada (1990).
(2000).
M. Tayal, P. Reid, M. Gacesa, A. Sun, E. Suk, and D. Gossain, “ACR-1000 Fuel Acceptance Criteria
for Normal Operation and for Anticipated Operational Occurrences”, Proceedings, Tenth In-
ternational Conference on CANDU Fuel, Canadian Nuclear Society, Ottawa, Canada (2008-
1).
M. Tayal, A. Sun, M. Gacesa, P. Reid, P. Fehrenbach, B. Surette, and E. Suk, “Mechanism for
Power Ramp Failures in CANDU Fuel”, Proceedings, 10th International Conference on
CANDU Fuel, Canadian Nuclear Society (2008-2).
S. P. Timoshenko, Strength of Materials, Part 2, McGraw-Hill, Second Edition (1961).
S. P. Timoshenko and J. N. Goodier, Theory of Elasticity, McGraw Hill, Third Edition (1970).
J. C. Wood, D. G. Hardy, and A. S. Bain, “Power Ramping Fuel Performance and Development”,
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Report AECL-6676 (1979).
16 Further Reading
Design Verification
P. G. Boczar, "CANDU Fuel Design Process", Ninth International Conference on CANDU Fuel,
Belleville, Canada, Canadian Nuclear Society, 2005.
J. Chang, S. Abbas, A. Banwatt, M. DiCiano, M. Gacesa, A. Gill, D. Gossain, J. Hood, F. Iglesias, L.
Lai, T. Laurie, Y. Ornatsky, U. K. Paul, A. Sun, M. Tayal, S. G. Xu, J. Xu, and P. Reid, "Proof of
Design Adequacy for the ACR-1000 Fuel Bundle", 10th International Conference on CANDU
Fuel, Ottawa, Canada, October 5-8, 2008.
History (Early)
J. A. L. Robertson, “Fuel for Thought”, Nuclear Journal of Canada, Vol. 1, Issue 4; pp 332-341.
Also published in Proceedings of the Engineering Centennial Conference, Montreal, 18-22
May, 1987.
Irradiation Tests and Performance
F. R. Campbell, L. R. Borque, R. Deshaises, H. E. Sills, and M. J. F. Notley, “In-Reactor Measure-
ments of Fuel-to-Sheath Heat Transfer Coefficients Between UO2 and Stainless Steel”,
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Report AECL-5400, 1977.
T. J. Carter, "Experimental Investigation of Various Pellet Geometries to Reduce Strains in
Zirconium Alloy Cladding", Nuclear Technology, Vol. 45, No. 2, September 1979, pp. 166-
176.
M. R. Floyd, J. Novak, and P. T. Truant, "Fission-Gas Release in Fuel Performing to Extended
Burnups in Ontario Hydro Nuclear Generating Stations", IAEA Technical Committee Meeting
on Fission Gas Release and Fuel Rod Chemistry Related to Extended Burnup, Pembroke,
Canada. Also Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Report AECL-10636 (1992).
M. R. Floyd, Z. He, E. Kohn, and J. Montin, "Performance of Two CANDU-6 Fuel Bundles Contain-
ing Elements with Pellet-Density and Clearance Variables", 6th International Conference on
CANDU Fuel, Niagara Falls, Canada. Also Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Report AECL-
12033, 1999.
Fuel – December 2014
Fuel 71
18 Acknowledgements
The following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and excellent com-
ments during the development of this chapter; their feedback has much improved it.
Peter Boczar
Lawrence Dickson
Rosaura Ham-Su
Paul Chan
Kwok Tsang
Of course the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the authors.
Thanks are also extended to Media Production Services, McMaster University, for producing the
figures, and to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the final copy.
Chapter 18
Fuel Cycles
prepared by
Mukesh Tayal and Milan Gacesa – Independent Consultants
Summary
Most commercial reactors currently use the once-through fuel cycle. However, because there
is still a significant amount of useful material (and available energy) in the fuel discharged
from these reactors, many fuel cycles are possible in which some fuel components are recy-
cled for further reactor use. In addition, several other fuel cycles are also possible using tho-
rium, which is much more abundant on Earth than the uranium that is the primary source of
commercial nuclear power today. The CANDU reactor is designed to use natural uranium
fuel, which is less expensive and more efficient in the use of uranium than any known alterna-
tive. Some of the features that enable a CANDU reactor to operate on natural uranium also
make it eminently capable of using alternative fuels. In spite of increased fuel cost, the use of
alternative fuel cycles in a CANDU reactor can lead to benefits such as significant extensions
of humanity’s energy resources, reduced capital costs of nuclear power plants, reduced vol-
ume and duration for long-term storage and disposal of nuclear waste, longer life of some
components of nuclear power plants, increased efficiency of the thermal cycle, and reduced
severity of some postulated accidents. Several alternative fuel and fuel cycles are described
in this chapter, including the enriched uranium fuel cycle, the recovered-uranium cycle, the
MOX cycle, the thorium cycle, the DUPIC cycle, the tandem cycle, low void reactivity fuel, and
actinide burning fuel. In addition to increasing fuel cost, alternative cycles impose operating
requirements that are more challenging than those experienced when using natural-uranium,
low-burnup fuel. Incremental technical challenges in the following subject areas are de-
scribed here: internal gas pressure, power ramps, corrosion, deuterides and hydrides, depos-
its, end-temperature peaking, bowing, and high burnup structure in the pellet.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 4
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Learning outcomes.......................................................................................................... 4
2 Neutronics of Fuel Cycles ........................................................................................................ 5
2.1 Definitions ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Dynamics of Depletion .................................................................................................... 6
3 Overview of Some Possible Fuels and Fuel Cycles .................................................................. 8
3.1 Reprocessing ................................................................................................................... 9
3.2 Natural Uranium Fuel Cycle .......................................................................................... 10
3.3 Enriched Uranium Fuel Cycle ........................................................................................ 10
3.4 Recovered-Uranium Cycle ............................................................................................. 11
3.5 MOX Cycle ..................................................................................................................... 11
3.6 Thorium Cycle ............................................................................................................... 11
3.7 DUPIC Cycle ................................................................................................................... 12
3.8 Tandem Cycle ................................................................................................................ 12
3.9 Low Void Reactivity Fuel ............................................................................................... 12
3.10 Actinide Burning Fuel .................................................................................................... 13
3.11 Breeding Cycles ............................................................................................................. 13
4 Key Drivers for Advanced Fuel Cycles ................................................................................... 13
4.1 Increase the Sustainability of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle ................................................... 13
4.2 Improve Fuel Cycle Economics ...................................................................................... 14
4.3 Improve the Health and Environmental Impacts of the Fuel Cycle .............................. 15
4.4 Improve Safety Characteristics...................................................................................... 15
4.5 Improve the Proliferation Resistance of Fuel Cycles ..................................................... 15
5 Resource Extension: A Major Incentive ................................................................................ 15
6 Other Considerations ............................................................................................................ 18
7 Pertinent Features of the CANDU Reactor ............................................................................ 19
8 Natural Uranium Fuel Cycle .................................................................................................. 20
8.1 Production of Ceramic UO2 Powder.............................................................................. 20
8.2 Fuel Bundle Manufacturing .......................................................................................... 21
9 Details of Selected Alternative Fuels and Fuel Cycles ........................................................... 25
9.1 Natural Uranium Equivalent (NUE) Fuel ....................................................................... 25
9.2 Extended Burnup Fuel................................................................................................... 26
9.3 Thorium Fuel ................................................................................................................. 42
9.4 Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel ............................................................................................... 46
9.5 Breeder Fuel .................................................................................................................. 48
10 Synergy between CANDU Reactors and LWRs ...................................................................... 48
11 Closure .................................................................................................................................. 49
12 Problems ............................................................................................................................... 50
13 References ............................................................................................................................. 53
14 Relationships with Other Chapters ....................................................................................... 56
15 Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... 56
List of Tables
Table 1 Energy output per megagram of mined uranium............................................................. 16
Table 2 Years of uranium availability ............................................................................................. 17
List of Figures
Figure 1 Transformation of specific isotopes .................................................................................. 7
Figure 2 Generalized isotope transformation processes ................................................................ 8
Figure 3 CANDU fuel manufacture: assembly flow chart ............................................................. 22
Figure 4 Illustrative notch at the sheath/endcap junction ........................................................... 27
Figure 5 Illustrative effect of irradiation on ductility of Zircaloy ................................................... 27
Figure 6 Illustrative effect of burnup on power ramp defect threshold ....................................... 28
Figure 7 Waterside corrosion in the sheath .................................................................................. 30
Figure 8 Illustrative distribution of hydrides in the sheath at about 25 MWd/kg HE ................... 31
Figure 9 Concepts for end-flux peaking ........................................................................................ 33
Figure 10 Illustrative peaking of flux at the end of a 28-element fuel bundle ............................. 34
Figure 11 EFP: neutron flux and heat transfer .............................................................................. 34
Figure 12 End-temperature peaking: illustrative isotherm ........................................................... 35
Figure 13 Model for element bowing ........................................................................................... 37
Figure 14 Illustrative circumferential variation in flux of thermal neutrons................................. 38
Figure 15 Off-centre grain growth ................................................................................................ 38
Figure 16 Increase of bowing during continued irradiation ......................................................... 39
Figure 17 High burnup structure near the rim of a pellet ............................................................ 40
Figure 18 Illustrative heat generation rate across the radius of the pellet .................................. 41
Figure 19 Thermal conductivities of unirradiated pellets ............................................................. 43
Figure 20 Illustrative structures in irradiated pellets .................................................................... 44
Figure 21 High fission area (HFA) in an irradiated MOX fuel pellet .............................................. 47
1 Introduction
The term “fuel cycle” commonly refers to all the steps through which the nuclear fuel goes
from mining, to use in a reactor, to discharge, possible recycle, and eventual disposal. There-
fore, a fuel cycle consists of certain steps in the front end, which involves preparation of the
fuel; other steps in the service period, in which the fuel is used during reactor operation; and
still other steps in the back end which are necessary to manage, contain, and either reproc-
ess or dispose of spent nuclear fuel safely.
1.1 Overview
This chapter focusses primarily on selected aspects of the “front ends” and the “service peri-
ods” of illustrative fuel cycles that use natural uranium, enriched uranium, plutonium, tho-
rium, and their combinations. The discussion covers simplified neutronics, fuel manufactur-
ing, and selected considerations of associated in-reactor fuel performance. The remaining
aspects of fuel cycles are covered elsewhere in this book.
The simplest fuel cycle involves a single pass of the fuel through the reactor; this is called the
once-through cycle. Current CANDU reactors run on the once-through natural uranium fuel
cycle. A significant amount of useful material (and available energy) still exists in the fuel
which is discharged from LWR reactors. Therefore, many fuel cycles are possible in which
some fuel components are recycled for further reactor use, particularly in a CANDU reactor.
In addition, several other fuel cycles are also possible by using thorium, which is much more
abundant on Earth than the uranium that is the primary source of commercial nuclear power
today.
We can derive a number of benefits by these means, including significant extensions of hu-
manity’s energy resources, reduced capital costs of nuclear power plants, reduced volume
and duration for long-term storage and disposal of nuclear waste, longer life of some com-
ponents of nuclear power plants, increased efficiency of the thermal cycle, and reduced se-
verity of some postulated accidents. However, several other important factors such as cost
also need to be considered, as outlined later in Section 6.
where C < 1.
Including the initial fissile nuclides, the total number of fissile nuclides available for fission is
therefore:
NC N
N
1 C 1 C .
It can be seen that the total number of nuclides available for fission increases with the con-
version ratio. Because C is a function of the aggregate nuclear properties of fuel which can
change with time, the value of C can also change with time.
If C > 1, more fissile nuclides are created than destroyed. C is then called the breeding ratio.
Breeding can therefore be thought of as conversion with C > 1. When breeding occurs, the
breeding gain can be defined as:
G C 1 .
Fuel Burnup
The specific burnup (sometimes called just burnup, ω) equals the fission energy produced per
unit mass of heavy elements in the fuel:
Fission Energy Generated
Total Initial Mass of Heavy Nuclides in Fuel .
The usual units for fission energy are either MWh or MWd. Because 235U is by far the most
frequently used fissile material, initial mass is usually expressed either as kg or T (tonnes) of
U. However, if other fissile materials are used, e.g., plutonium or a mixture of uranium and
plutonium, then the initial mass is usually expressed as kg or T of HE (heavy elements).
and subsequently:
n 239 Pu 240 Pu (3)
where NA, NB, NC are the number of nuclei (#/cm3) for isotopes A, B and C respectively, λ is
the associated decay constant (sec-1), is the neutron flux (#/cm2-sec) and σa , are the
microscopic cross sections (cm2) for neutron absorption and capture respectively. We can
safely assume that the flux is constant over the integration time step and can easily solve this
equation numerically. In general, there are many nuclides to track, so they are all solved for
simultaneously, thereby tracking the depletion and growth of the various fuel nuclides. Note
that the two production processes (3 and 4 above) mean that there is potential for fuel crea-
tion, called conversion or breeding as explained earlier.
The above process yields information on whether or not a given combination and arrange-
ment of materials will achieve criticality and sustain the chain reaction and how much energy
can be so produced. The detailed “physics” evaluations of specific fuel cycles use the same
general principles that are outlined in earlier chapters on physics and are usually accom-
plished mainly by changing the inputs of appropriate “generic” physics codes.
DUPIC cycle, and the Tandem cycle. They are also outlined in this section.
3.1 Reprocessing
Before we delve into various fuel cycles, we first outline reprocessing of LWR fuel as it per-
tains to this chapter.
Considerable quantities of fission products gradually accumulate inside the fuel element dur-
ing irradiation. Some fission products are parasitic in that they absorb neutrons without cre-
ating proportionate heat. This leaves fewer neutrons to continue the chain reaction, and at
some stage, further irradiation of that material risks shutting down the chain reaction.
Therefore that fuel is removed from the reactor and is frequently labelled as “spent” or
“waste” or “discharged”.
Uranium fuel used in LWRs has an initial 235U concentration (enrichment) of between 3% and
5%. After many months (sometimes even a few years) of generating energy in the reactor,
most but not all of the original 235U in typical enriched fuels in LWRs is largely used up (e.g.,
by fission and by radiative capture). Likewise, some fertile nuclides in the fuel, as well as
some fissionable nuclides produced by fertile nuclides, are also used up. However, fission-
able nuclides are not at zero concentration when the fuel is discharged from the reactor.
Spent fuel retains some of the original enriched uranium, and it also contains some fissile
plutonium that is produced by the chain reaction (see equations and discussion in Section 2
and in earlier chapters on physics).
The residual fissile content in spent LWR fuel depends on the starting enrichment and the
discharge burnup; nevertheless, for illustration purposes, let us say that it is typically in the
range of about 1.5% (235U + 239Pu + 241Pu). From the perspective of a CANDU reactor, this is a
much higher fissile concentration than even the usual fresh (non-enriched) CANDU fuel
(0.7%). Even though LWRs cannot continue to “burn” that fuel, CANDU reactors can, due to
the latter’s superior neutron efficiency. This creates an opportunity to generate additional
energy from spent LWR fuel in a variety of ways, as described later in this section.
However, to make effective use of available thermal neutrons, we first need to remove suffi-
cient parasitic neutron absorbers—such as fission products—from spent LWR fuel. This is
done through “reprocessing”.
Very simplistically, let us think of fuel as having the following initial and final states before
and after its irradiation in an LWR:
235
U (3-5%) + 238U → {235U + Pu} (about 1.5%) + 238U + fission products (FPs)
(fresh LWR fuel) (spent LWR fuel)
Let us next focus only on the right-hand side of this expression. Discussions later in this sec-
tion use the terms explained below:
For purposes of this chapter, “conventional reprocessing” or “full reprocessing” means
extracting, separating, and purifying uranium (mostly 235U and 238U) and plutonium
(mostly 239Pu and 241Pu) in spent fuel. This, however, leads to some concerns that col-
lected plutonium can potentially be diverted towards nuclear proliferation. Full repro-
cessing generally consists of the following main steps: (Step #1) Irradiated fuel is dis-
solved; (Step #2) Plutonium and uranium are separated from fission product and then
(Step #3) from each other; and (Step #4) purified for enrichment (in the case of REU) or
(Step #5) recycling as MOX.
In one variant involving partial reprocessing, all fission products are removed from spent
fuel, but plutonium is neither separated from uranium nor extracted separately, and
therefore concerns about proliferation are reduced compared to “full reprocessing”.
This product is used in the “Tandem cycle” (discussed later).
In another variant involving partial reprocessing, no dissolution of spent fuel takes place.
The gaseous fission products are removed by crushing and heating the spent fuel; the
solid fission products are retained in the fuel. The high residual radio-toxicity of this
product significantly reduces its attractiveness for potential diversion, which further di-
minishes concerns about nuclear proliferation. This product is used in the “DUPIC cycle”,
as described later in this chapter.
Plutonium recovered from full reprocessing is used to generate electricity in the “MOX
cycle”.
Uranium that is collected from full reprocessing is called “recovered uranium” (RU). Its
235
U fraction in spent LWR fuel is higher than in natural (as-mined) uranium. RU is used
to generate electricity in the “recovered uranium” cycle.
In summary, a variety of fissile and fertile materials are available from different sources in
multiple forms such as natural uranium, enriched uranium, thorium, various products of full
or partial reprocessing, and others (e.g., dismantled nuclear weapons). This presents oppor-
tunities to design a variety of fuels and fuel cycles in neutron-efficient CANDU reactors, some
of which are outlined in the following sections.
generated by enrichment can be used for a variety of purposes such as: (1) using less expen-
sive coolant (i.e., light water) to reduce capital cost; (2) enabling use of thicker pressure
tubes to reduce their creep rate and thus to extend their service life; (3) enabling use of
burnable neutron absorbers which can reduce the magnitude of a power pulse during a pos-
tulated accident; and (4) reducing the volume of spent fuel through extended burnup.
Enriched uranium fuel could also be used in existing CANDU reactors to achieve other bene-
fits such as higher reactor power (through a flatter radial channel power profile).
can extend the energy from natural uranium (which is the source of the only natural fissile
material) by using the thorium cycle. In addition, thorium cycles provide other benefits, such
as in fuel performance and fuel safety, as explained in a later section devoted specifically to
thorium.
reactor;
By using a breeder reactor to extract energy from 238
U, which constitutes over 99% of
natural uranium, as discussed in Section 9.5.
Section 5 gives a more detailed discussion of resource extension.
4.3 Improve the Health and Environmental Impacts of the Fuel Cycle
The health and environmental impacts of nuclear power can be improved by using enriched
uranium in CANDU reactors and by transmuting hazardous components of the fuel, such as
long-lived actinides, in a reactor. This reduces the mass of these materials that requires long-
term disposal. This in turn reduces the size of the repositories that will be required and re-
duces potential impacts on human health and the environment.
MWy(e)/Mg
* Seawater contains about 0.003 ppm of uranium, for a total of over 4 billion tons of ura-
nium.
[Courtesy D. Meneley; Extracted from a presentation to Canadian Nuclear Society by D. Me-
neley, 2006]
A more dramatic way to extend our energy resources is to breed fissile materials from fertile
materials. This can usually be done in two ways: one, fertile 232Th can be converted into fis-
sile 233U; and two, fertile 238U can be converted into fissile 239Pu, as summarized below.
“The absorption cross-section for thermal neutrons of 232Th (7.4 barns) is nearly three times
that of 238U (2.7 barns). Hence, a higher conversion (to 233U) is possible with 232Th than with
238
U (to 239Pu). Therefore, 232Th is a better ‘fertile’ material than 238U in thermal reactors, but
232
Th is inferior to 238U as a ‘fertile’ material in fast reactors. For the ‘fissile’ 233U nuclide, the
number of neutrons liberated per neutron absorbed is greater than 2.0 over a wide range of
the thermal neutron spectrum, unlike 235U and 239Pu. Therefore, contrary to the 238U-to-239Pu
cycle in which breeding can be obtained only with fast neutron spectra, the 232Th-to-233U fuel
cycle can operate with fast, epithermal, or thermal spectra” [IAEA, 2005].
Thorium resources have not yet been explored as extensively as uranium; nevertheless, ex-
perts estimate that thorium in the Earth’s crust is some three to four times as abundant as
uranium [IAEA, 2005]. Boczar et al. [2010] have estimated that “if all the plutonium from
used natural uranium fuel from existing CANDU reactors operating over their lifetime were to
be used in a mixed thorium/plutonium cycle, two to three times the existing nuclear capacity
in Canada (currently about 15 GWe) could be sustained indefinitely” in a self-sufficient tho-
rium cycle in a CANDU reactor, e.g., a near-breeder. With a breeder, an expanding nuclear
system could be fueled essentially indefinitely (depending on the breeding ratio).
Other experts have estimated that 238U in “waste” CANDU fuel alone that has already been
accumulated in Canada can, after reprocessing and recycling in fast breeder reactors, pro-
duce some 4,000 years of electricity at today’s consumption rates [Ottensmeyer, 2012].
Moreover, additional 238U is available underground. Therefore, in principle, fast breeder re-
actors can provide energy for millennia to come, as shown in Table 2.
At this time, these are only theoretical possibilities. Many technical, economic, and practical
concerns remain about fast breeder reactors, such as the very large fissile inventory needed
to start a fast reactor and the very daunting concerns about proliferation.
6 Other Considerations
In addition to the drivers described above, various other technical and non-technical factors
should be considered in deciding on the most appropriate fuel cycle for a specific power
plant, utility, or country. Although a detailed discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of
this book, five major aspects are summarized below: energy independence, resource utiliza-
tion, resistance to nuclear proliferation, fuel performance, and cost.
Energy Independence
Plants that enrich large quantities of uranium are very expensive and are operational in only
a few nations. Fuel cycles based on natural uranium do not require a nation to build a plant
to enrich uranium, nor do they require a nation to rely on a few other nations for continual
supply of enriched uranium over a very long period. Therefore, natural uranium cycles pro-
mote national energy independence.
Resource Utilization
To produce a given amount of energy, some fuel cycles require less mined uranium than oth-
ers. For example, the combination of heavy water and natural uranium used in current
CANDU reactors requires some 40% less mined uranium per unit energy than fuel cycles that
use light water and enriched uranium. This can be a consideration in countries that do not
have much uranium and would like to stretch their domestic uranium to the extent practical.
Resistance to Nuclear Proliferation
There is concern in some quarters that during reprocessing, potent fissile material can poten-
tially become accessible and hence available for diversion to uses other than electricity gen-
eration. Some fuel cycles such as DUPIC are comparatively more resistant to nuclear prolif-
eration.
Fuel Performance
Overall, current fuels perform very well in current fuel cycles, as noted in Chapter 17. In fuel
cycles that differ significantly from current cycles, satisfactory fuel performance must be de-
signed and demonstrated. Depending on the specific cycle, new R&D may potentially also be
required.
Cost
Generally, enriching and reprocessing fuel is expensive, and the radioactivity and radiotoxic-
ity of spent enriched fuel tends to be higher than that of natural uranium. At the same time,
enriched fuel generally yields higher burnup, which tends to reduce fueling cost (within a
range) and also reduces the volume of spent fuel to be stored. Therefore, this is a complex
topic, and its impact also changes with local conditions and with time.
Fuel Cycles – March 2015
Fuel Cycles 19
In summary, the choice of a specific fuel cycle must consider not only the drivers discussed
earlier, but also other techno-commercial and geo-political aspects, some of which are noted
above.
adjust the moderator and the coolant independently to exploit neutronic characteristics
more effectively. For example, the moderator can be kept at low temperature to promote
neutron efficiency, while the coolant can simultaneously be kept at high temperature to
promote the thermal efficiency of the steam cycle. In another example, the choice of cool-
ant fluid and the moderator-to-coolant-volume ratio can potentially be fine-tuned to reduce
capital cost without adversely affecting fuel cooling, as is done with the Advanced CANDU
Reactor. CANDU reactors are unique among successful contemporary reactor systems in of-
fering this important flexibility to designers.
tributyl phosphate solvent-extraction process. First, the yellowcake is dissolved in nitric acid
to prepare a feed solution. Uranium is then selectively extracted from this acid feed by
tributyl phosphate diluted with kerosene or some other suitable hydrocarbon mixture. Final-
ly, uranium is stripped from the tributyl phosphate extract into acidified water to yield highly
purified uranyl nitrate, UO2(NO3)2. Uranyl nitrate is the starting material for conversion to
uranium dioxide (UO2) powder or to uranium hexafluoride (UF6). Both these conversion
routes conventionally begin with calcining the nitrate to UO3.
A large percentage of the UO3 produced in Canada is converted to uranium hexafluoride
(UF6) destined for enrichment plants for use in LWRs, and the remainder is converted to
natural uranium dioxide (UO2) ceramic-grade powder for use in CANDU reactors. The proc-
esses involved in producing natural uranium (NU) UO2 powder for CANDU fuel pellets are
described in more detail below. The UO3 is dissolved in nitric acid, and the resulting solution
is diluted and reacted with ammonium to precipitate ammonium diuranate (ADU). The liq-
uid is decanted, and the ammonium diuranate slurry is dried to remove the water. The re-
sulting ammonium diuranate powder is dried in a rotating kiln in hydrogen gas to produce
UO2 powder. The powder may then be subjected to further physical “conditioning” to im-
prove its mechanical “reactivity” during pellet sintering. Small batches of each powder lot
may be subjected to sintering trials as part of the final QA acceptance test before it is sent to
manufacturers of CANDU fuel bundles.
At each production stage mentioned above, the uranium compound is subjected to stringent
quality control surveillance to ensure that the final product meets industry technical specifi-
cations with respect to the content of specified impurities as well as certain physical charac-
teristics related to subsequent manufacturability. In-reactor behaviour of CANDU fuel bun-
dles has demonstrated that some aspects of fuel performance (e.g., fission product
behaviour) are related not only to powder characteristics, but also to the process parameters
used in producing the powder.
to the desired diameter, and (3) impart a fine finish to the cylindrical pellet surface.
The ground pellets are sorted by diameter and placed into stacks (Step 6) ready for insertion
into sheath sub-assemblies, which come from the second stream. Pellet stack length is con-
trolled to tight tolerances because it is the principal means for ensuring adherence to the
required axial clearance within the fuel element. Pellet stacks and sheath sub-assemblies are
sorted by diameter and matched to satisfy the diametric clearance requirements. In addi-
tion, to prevent interference with the sheath, the pellets at both ends of the stack may be
tapered, or their diameter may be reduced. Additional discussion on this topic is provided
below.
Some of the greatest challenges in CANDU fuel production occur in the UO2 pellet production
stream. These challenges derive from the pellet technical specifications, some of which are
unique to CANDU fuel. A few of the major challenges are high pellet density; precise dimen-
sional control, especially of pellet diameter; small size of permissible visible surface flaws,
referred to as “chips”; and high quality of surface finish, especially the pellet cylindrical sur-
face (see Chapter 17 for additional discussion on pellet/sheath interaction). These chal-
lenges have been successfully met by manufacturers of CANDU fuel. This is substantiated by
the almost complete absence of defects ascribed to pellet manufacturing deficiencies, the
only notable exception being failures observed in “overstuffed” fuel elements, which were
intentionally manufactured to challenge the extreme limits of the relevant parameters:
maximum pellet density, minimum diameter clearance, and minimum axial clearance. Once
defects were witnessed in “overstuffed” elements, the practice was subsequently discontin-
ued.
The second manufacturing stream, the production of sheath sub-assemblies, starts with re-
ceipt of tubes finished to the required diameter and cut to length (Step 1, RHS of Figure 3).
Some manufacturers (including both Canadian manufacturers) have “vertically integrated”
Zircaloy tubing production into this stream, so that the stream actually starts with receipt of
zirconium tube hollow (TREX), which undergoes several stages of reduction and associated
processing (not shown in Figure 3), culminating in cut-to-length tubes.
In parallel with receipt of tubes, Zircaloy sheet/strip, bar/rod, wire, graphite slurry, and beryl-
lium are also received. The sheet (or wire) is used to manufacture spacers and bearing pads
(appendages). When manufactured from sheet, the appendages are punched and “coined”
into their final shape from the sheet after it is coated with beryllium. When manufactured
from wire, the appendages are cut to length, coined, and subsequently coated with beryl-
lium. The appendages are “tacked” to the tubes with spot welds (Step 2) and heated until
the beryllium coating and the Zircaloy metal in the appendage and tube form an alloy, i.e.,
“braze” (Step 3). Appendage dimensions, the shape of the coined surfaces, the thickness of
the brazing metal, and the location and tacking of the appendages on the tube must be con-
trolled to tight tolerances to enable the manufacturer to achieve the required dimensional
tolerances for the assembled bundle. The manufacturers have successfully met the chal-
lenges of this part of the manufacturing process, as evidenced by the absence of any fuel
failures caused by detached appendages or appendages causing bundle incompatibility
within the fuel channel.
Graphite slurry is diluted with water or an industrial alcohol, applied to the inside of the tube
sub-assemblies, and dried to form a coating of precisely controlled thickness and hydrogen
content referred to as “CANLUB” (Step 4). The effect of CANLUB on in-reactor performance
of fuel elements is discussed in Chapter 17. The ends of the sheath sub-assemblies are ma-
chined (Step 5) to (1) achieve the required final length, and (2) produce the profile required
for end-cap welding. In addition, CANLUB and any debris are removed from the end of the
sub-assembly lest they interfere with the subsequent welding process.
The two process streams (LHS and RHS in Figure 3) come together at the element assembly
step, i.e., the insertion of pellet stacks into the sheath sub-assemblies and the welding of
element end closures (endcaps). Endcaps are machined from bar or rod to match the sheath
sub-assembly weld preparation and to include other features (internal and external) which
are crucial to the final configuration of the element assembly. They are then welded to the
sheath using resistance welding, which is a thermo-electric process.
During resistance welding, the sheath is held by a collet. Heating during resistance welding
softens the sheath locally. The combination of the heating and cooling cycle that occurs dur-
ing the welding cycle and the restraint provided by the collet causes the sheath diameter to
shrink immediately adjacent to the weld. To maintain the minimum required diametric
clearance in this region of the element, the pellets at both ends of the stack have a reduced
diameter (usually tapered to mimic the sheath diameter profile).
After insertion of the pellet stack into the sheath sub-assembly, and before welding of the
end caps, the air trapped inside the sheath sub-assembly is purged with helium (or a mixture
of helium and argon). The end cap is then welded while the weld region is blanketed by inert
gas.
Similarly to the pellet production stream, the Zircaloy component stream has its own unique
CANDU-related challenges, the most unique and critical being the dimensional and process
parameters related to welding of endcaps to sheath sub-assemblies. To appreciate the im-
portance of this operation more fully, it is useful to remember that the largest CANDU reac-
tors have close to one-half million of these welds in the active part of the core and that one
defective weld is cause for concern, requiring urgent action to remove it from the core. In
comparison, LWR reactors have no discontinuities or joints of any type in fuel cladding within
the active part of the core. To make sure that the contribution of endcap welding to defect
statistics in CANDU reactors remains insignificant, defects due to endcap welding must be
maintained at or below the part-per-million (ppm) level, which is extremely challenging.
Careful examination of the fuel manufacturing flow chart, including the relevant component
design and process parameters, reveals more than 15 design and process parameters which
must be maintained within control limits and must come together at the precise moment the
weld is made. It is not surprising that of the very few defects in operating CANDU fuel which
have been ascribed to manufacturing causes, more than 90% are related to endcap welding.
Fuel integrity statistics for CANDU reactors and LWRs are discussed in Chapter 17; notwith-
standing the contribution from endcap welding to defects in CANDU fuel, defects in CANDU
fuel from all causes are significantly fewer than defects in LWR fuel (see Chapter 17).
Following endcap welding, the fuel elements are inserted into an assembly jig and the ele-
ment ends resistance-welded to endplates to form the final fuel assemblies, i.e., the fuel
bundles. End plates are stamped out of an incoming strip. Although this final process in it-
self is not as challenging as some of the processes described above, it is important to note
Fuel Cycles – March 2015
Fuel Cycles 25
that some of the dimensional requirements on the bundle assembly are equivalent in preci-
sion to those which are normally associated with machined components. To achieve this,
manufacturers must have stringent control, not only of the final assembly process, but also
of the processes used to produce the component parts, particularly element sub-assemblies
and endplates.
Manufacturing is the final step in the realization of a product, converting the intent specified
in the design drawings and technical specifications into functioning hardware. For one unit
of energy produced, current CANDU reactors use five to six times the mass of fuel used in
LWRs. Despite this relative disadvantage, fueling cost per unit energy has always been much
lower for CANDU than for LWR. This can be attributed mainly to three factors: (a) CANDU
reactors avoid the high cost of enrichment, (b) CANDU reactors use 40% less mined uranium
per unit of energy produced than LWRs, and (c) CANDU fuel manufacturers have managed to
keep their fabrication costs very low while keeping fuel reliability very high. In addition, Ca-
nadian fuel manufacturers have also been very successful in transferring access to their
technology to all non-Canadian manufacturers of CANDU fuel.
curve of Figure 24 in Chapter 17 to other burnups. The result, Figure 6, illustrates how higher
burnups can decrease resistance to power ramps in non-CANLUB fuel. The decrease is ini-
tially rapid, but slows down after burnup of about 100 MWh/kgU. Similar trends are ex-
pected in CANLUB fuel as well.
9.2.3 Corrosion
Higher burnup is usually associated with longer residence periods. The latter can potentially
increase sheath corrosion. This tends to be much more pronounced at the outer surface of
the sheath, which is in contact with water.
When part of the sheath corrodes, its ability to carry mechanical load decreases. Strength
assessments must account for this loss, and therefore we need to quantify sheath corrosion.
Furthermore, very thick layers of oxide tend to flake, causing a potential for debris and de-
posits in the heat transport system. In addition, flaking often leaves behind non-uniform
patches of oxides. These cause significant axial and circumferential variations in sheath tem-
perature, which in turn cause hydrogen and deuterium to diffuse and concentrate at local
peaks. The shape of the resulting hydrogen- (and deuterium)-rich areas often resembles a
lens, and therefore the product is often called a “hydrogen lens”. If local peaks of hydrogen,
hydrides, deuterium, and deuterides become pronounced, they can embrittle the sheath,
which in turn can significantly challenge its mechanical integrity. For all the above reasons,
the extent of corrosion must be kept within acceptable limits.
In CANDU reactors, lithium hydroxide (LiOH) is added to maintain coolant pH in the 10.5
range, which is intended to minimize deposition of iron-based system corrosion products
(“crud”) on both fuel surfaces and steam generator tubes [Barber et al., 1982]. From out-of-
reactor autoclave tests, several investigators have determined that oxidation of zirconium
alloys is not affected by the LiOH concentrations that are required to maintain coolant pH
near 10.5. Similarly, in-reactor, no acceleration of zirconium-alloy oxidation has been ob-
served in the pre-transition oxidation period, with additions of lithium hydroxide to control
pH in the 10.5 range. However, under very long exposures and high burnups which develop
relatively thick post-transition oxide films, some acceleration of oxidation has been observed
on fuel elements in light water reactors [Garzarolli et al., 1982; Cox, 1985]. The latter has
been attributed to possible concentration of the lithium hydroxide within the thick oxide
films due to temperature rise during heat transfer [Courtesy COG].
Waterside corrosion has indeed been identified in LWRs as a process that warrants the use of
more corrosion-resistant materials in the sheaths of very high burnup fuels. In CANDU reac-
tors, however, the burnup, and therefore the residence period, is far less, and therefore cur-
rent CANDU reactors are still quite far from requiring such an expensive change. Even in en-
riched CANDU fuel with burnup of about 30 MWd/kg, corrosion is not expected to be a
problem.
In summary, there are many detailed nuances in sheath corrosion. Nevertheless, for pur-
poses of this initial introduction, Figure 7 shows an illustrative progression of sheath corro-
sion with burnup. Note the large scatter in the data, which is typical. Also note that the
overall trends are similar in CANDU and PWR sheaths.
except that instead of deuteride platelets, hydride platelets (referred to as “hydrides”) are
formed. Figure 8 shows an illustrative example of hydrides in a sheath that was irradiated to
a burnup of about 600 MWh/kg HE in light water coolant. Note the relatively higher concen-
trations of hydrides near the outer surface because that surface is cooler than the inner one.
9.2.5 Deposits
[This section was contributed primarily by John G. Roberts, JGRChem Inc. and Dr. Craig R.
Stuart, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories].
Deposits are sometimes observed on the external surfaces of fuel bundles and are some-
times also called “crud”. Most deposits on CANDU fuel tend to be magnetite-based com-
pounds. In BWRs, “scale-type” crud contains high concentrations of copper, up to and some-
times even in excess of 50%. In PWRs, deposits tend to be compounds based mainly on
nickel ferrite. Deposits on LWR fuels can also incorporate lithium and boron.
Deposits on fuel are undesirable because they can potentially impede heat transfer. In
BWRs, they have sometimes even caused through-wall holes in the sheath [IAEA, 2010].
Deposits on fuel are very rare in CANDU reactors, but relatively more frequent and also
thicker in BWRs [IAEA, 2010]. The causes of these deposits are rooted mainly in materials
and coolant chemistry, which differ in different types of reactors. This is a very complex sub-
ject, and its detailed treatment is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, pertinent ex-
perts have identified the following four significant differences between the various reactor
types that affect in-core deposits:
a) different materials among reactor types, e.g., carbon steel in the CANDU heat transport
system and stainless steels in LWRs;
b) presence of boron in PWR coolant and its absence in CANDU coolant;
c) higher degree of success in CANDUs in maintaining consistent chemistry over time in the
primary heat transport system (PHTS); and
d) much longer fuel residence period in an LWR (usually a few years) than in a CANDU reac-
tor (usually less than two years).
As for boron in the coolant, recall that CANDU reactors separate the coolant from the mod-
erator using pressure tubes and calandria tubes. This enables CANDU designers to maintain
separate chemistries in the coolant and in the moderator. Each system can then be focussed
on optimally addressing its own respective needs. For instance, in a CANDU reactor, the ad-
ditives required for neutron management are injected into the moderator, not the coolant,
and therefore the chemistry of the PHTS is not affected. In contrast, when boron is added in
an LWR’s moderator-cum-coolant to manage the neutronics, it also has a chemical impact on
the entire primary heat transport system (PHTS), including the steam generators and all the
pipes. If this promotes crud in the PHTS of an LWR, it is then carried by the coolant into the
core, where it can deposit on fuel surfaces. In this way, separation of moderator and coolant
in separate systems is one aspect that contributes to fewer crud deposits on CANDU fuel.
In summary, the lesser quantities of deposits on CANDU fuel than on PWR fuel are due prin-
cipally to different materials in the coolant circuit, lack of boron in the coolant, higher consis-
tency over time in coolant chemistry, and shorter fuel residence period.
9.2.6 End-temperature peaking
Consider two neighbouring fuel bundles in a CANDU channel. Their fuel stacks do not abut
each other; they are separated by the two endplates, endcaps, and axial gaps, as shown in
Figure 9. Because of the absence of UO2 in this region of bundle-to-bundle contact, neutron
absorption cross sections are smaller here than in the bulk of the fuel bundle. Some fraction
of the unabsorbed neutrons from the bundle-to-bundle junction—the “excess” neutrons—
becomes available for capture by neighbouring UO2. This results in an increase in neutron
flux in this region; the flux is higher a few centimetres into the fuel pellets on either side of
this junction than in the axial centre of the bundle. This is called end-flux peaking (EFP) and
is illustrated schematically in Figure 9.
the end region does tend to increase due to end-flux peaking, it increases less than would be
expected from the amount of end-flux peaking alone.
Figure 12 illustrates a typical temperature distribution at high power in the end region during
bundle-to-bundle contact [Tayal, 1989(a)]. Isotherms in the end region are shaped like tear-
drops, a shape determined by the net balance between local generation and local transfer of
heat. Teardrop-shaped voids are indeed observed in UO2 pellets that are irradiated at very
high power levels. In Figure 12, the local thermal flux in the end region is about 10% higher
than at the element’s mid-point. Due to axial heat transfer, the increase in peak local tem-
perature is limited to about 150°C in this case.
channel.
In another experiment in a reactor in Ontario, excessive element bowing caused many cen-
tral bearing pads to press tightly against the pressure tube for a significant duration. This
trapped some coolant water between the bearing pad and the pressure tube. With time, the
trapped, stagnant water boiled off. This increased the local concentration of LiOH in the
coolant (LiOH is used to control coolant pH). At high concentration, an LiOH-water solution is
corrosive. This led to local corrosion in the bearing pads and also likely in the pressure tube.
This process is called crevice corrosion. There is always a potential for crevice corrosion at
the bottom bearing pads; excessive bowing can lead to crevice corrosion at other locations
around the bundle circumference if the bearing pads come into contact with the pressure
tube. Although a small amount of crevice corrosion is acceptable, its extent needs to be lim-
ited to reasonable levels lest it threaten the integrity of the pressure tube.
Excessive bowing can also alter the thermal hydraulics in the channel, which in turn can
complicate the evaluations and confirmations of heat transfer coefficients between the
sheath and the coolant. In light water reactors, excessive bowing of a fuel assembly has led
to concerns about control rod movements and dryout. Therefore, bowing and dryout also
have a mutual feedback cycle. For these reasons, it is important to limit bowing to accept-
able levels. Bowing can increase with time, and therefore it needs to be addressed in high-
burnup fuels.
When CANDU sheaths do bow, spacer pads prevent them from touching each other at their
mid-planes. Likewise, bearing pads at three axial locations reduce the likelihood of a sheath
touching the pressure tube in the absence of a severe local dry patch.
Major Driving Forces
Fabricated fuel elements are not necessarily perfectly straight, i.e., they may be bowed. In
addition, during normal operations, fuel elements initially bow due to non-uniform tempera-
ture around the circumference of a fuel element and also because of mechanical loads (a list
of causes of bowing is given later in this section).
Circumferential variations in temperature lead to differences in thermal expansion around
the sheath circumference. The hotter side of the fuel element becomes relatively longer
than the colder side. The fuel element then deforms laterally (bows) towards the longer side
to accommodate the extra length. Bowing due to thermal effects is illustrated schematically
in Figure 13(a).
following equation [Gere et al., 1997] for unconstrained thermal bowing at the mid-plane, δ:
δ = α ΔT l2/(8d). (12)
As a specific example, let us consider an empty sheath with a diameter of 13 mm, a length of
500 mm, and a coefficient of linear thermal expansion of 6.72 µm/(mm•°C). It experiences a
thermal variation of 5°C around its circumference. Equation 12 predicts that in the absence
of mechanical loads, its initial mid-span thermal bow would be about 0.08 mm.
The pellet operates at a much hotter temperature than the sheath, and its coefficient of
thermal expansion is about twice that of Zircaloy. Hence, a pellet can have a significant im-
pact on the thermal bow of a fuel element, especially if it is in tight diametric contact with
the sheath. Mechanical loads can also have a significant impact on element bow. Their
quantitative treatments are complex and beyond the scope of this chapter; interested read-
ers can explore several detailed papers that have been published on this subject, e.g., Veeder
et al. [1974] and Tayal [1989(b)].
9.2.8 High burnup structure
Very high local burnup can cause the formation of “high burnup structure” (HBS) at the pe-
riphery of the pellets [Baron et al., 2009, 2012], also called the “rim effect” and “cauliflower
structure”. To date, this has been observed mainly in LWR fuels because their burnups tend
to be significantly higher than those of current CANDU fuels. The discussion below is based
largely on Baron et al. [2012].
Figure 17 shows a typical HBS. It is believed to be formed by subdivision of pellet grains
when the local burnup typically exceeds 55–60 MW•d/kg (or 1300–1400 MW•h/kg).
zone is called the seed region, and it is physically separated from the fertile (low-power) tho-
rium part of the fuel, called the blanket”.
“It is possible—but quite difficult—to design thorium fuels that produce more 233U in ther-
mal reactors than the fissile material they consume. Thermal breeding with thorium is only
really possible if neutron economy in the reactor is very good (i.e., low neutron loss through
escape or parasitic absorption). The possibility to breed significant amounts of fissile mate-
rial in slow (thermal) neutron systems is unique to thorium-based fuels and is not possible
with uranium fuels. Irrespective of whether breeding is achieved, more practical thorium
fuel cycles in a CANDU reactor offer a significant reduction in uranium requirements”.
“Another distinct option for using thorium is as a ‘fertile matrix’ for fuels containing pluto-
nium (and even other transuranic elements like americium). No new plutonium is produced
from the thorium component, unlike for uranium fuels, and so the level of net consumption
of this metal is rather high”.
“In fresh thorium fuel, all the fissions (thus power and neutrons) derive from the driver com-
ponent. As the fuel operates, the 233U content gradually increases, and it contributes more
and more to the power output of the fuel. The ultimate energy output from 233U (and hence
indirectly from thorium) depends on numerous fuel design parameters, including fuel bur-
nup attained, fuel arrangement, neutron energy spectrum, and neutron flux (affecting the
intermediate product protactinium-233, which is a neutron absorber)”.
Specific thorium cycles can be designed to suit a country’s specific circumstances.
9.3.2 Margin to melting
As an illustrative example, consider two neighbouring fuel elements, one fueled with UO2,
the other with ThO2. Both are operating at 60 kW/m; the coolant temperature is 300°C. If
end-temperature peaking is ignored, what are the margins to melting in the two fuel ele-
ments?
To work this out, we can use the theoretical background given in Chapters 6 and 7 about the
temperature distribution within a fuel element, along with some assumptions to simplify this
illustrative calculation. Recall that if other parameters are the same, to a first approximation,
the temperature difference between the centre and the surface of the pellet is inversely pro-
portional to the thermal conductivity of the pellet.
Guided by the previous illustrative examples in this book, assume that the UO 2 fuel element
has a central temperature of about 1900°C and that the melting point of unirradiated UO2 is
about 2840°C. Therefore, in the UO2 fuel element, the thermal margin is about 2840 – 1900
= 940°C.
The peak operating temperature in the ThO2 pellet can be approximated as follows:
Guided by the previous illustrative examples, assume that the temperature increase be-
tween the coolant and the pellet surface is about 100°C.
Therefore, the temperature at the surface of the pellet is: 300 + 100 = 400°C.
In the UO2 pellet, the temperature increase from the surface to the centre of the pellet
is 1900 – 400 = 1500°C.
Guided by Figure 19, assume that to a first approximation, the thermal conductivity of
ThO2 is about 30% higher than that of UO2. Therefore in a thoria pellet operating at the
Fuel Cycles – March 2015
46 The Essential CANDU
same power, the temperature increase from the surface to the centre of the pellet is
about 1154°C (=1500°C / (1 + 0.3)).
Therefore, the temperature at the centre of the thoria pellet is 400 + 1154 = 1554°C.
The melting point of ThO2 is about 3350°C [IAEA, 2005], and therefore the margin to
melting in the ThO2 pellet is about 3350 – 1554 = 1796°C.
Therefore, for the same operating power of about 60 kW/m, the margin to melting in ThO2
fuel is 1796°C, which is significantly higher than in UO2 fuel.
9.3.3 Internal gas pressure
Pellet temperature is a main driver of fission gas release. Above a threshold temperature,
fission gas release increases rapidly with local temperature.
In the preceding illustrative example, the UO2 fuel operates a few hundred degrees above
the threshold temperature for fission gas release. This results in significant fission gas re-
lease in UO2 fuel.
Assuming that the threshold temperature is similar in ThO2 and UO2, the ThO2 fuel described
above operates much closer to the threshold temperature for fission gas release. This means
that the ThO2 pellet will release much less fission gas.
The above illustrative examples point to some of the large benefits in operating performance
that are possible with thorium. Along with thorium’s impressive benefits, we do also need to
consider, as noted earlier, the higher costs of some thorium cycles.
homogenous mixtures require less effort, but they also contain agglomerates, meaning that
trade-offs must be considered [Harrison et al., 2010].
For purposes of illustration, two such alternative processes are: [Harrison et al., 2010]:
Alternative Method # 1: A master mix with high Pu concentration is prepared by vibratory
milling of the UO2 and PuO2 powders together. The required amount of this “master mix” is
added to additional UO2 powder to achieve the desired final Pu concentration. This ap-
proach results in discrete “islands”—also called agglomerates—of master mix contained in
the UO2 matrix.
Alternative Method # 2: Same as Alternative Method # 1 above except that only PuO2 is
milled (rather than a mixture of PuO2 plus UO2). The resulting powder is then added to UO2,
resulting in nearly pure PuO2 “islands” distributed within the UO2 matrix.
The two alternative fabrication processes above create islands of relatively higher plutonium
concentration. The islands undergo relatively higher amounts of fission and produce corre-
spondingly higher quantities of fission gases. Figure 21 shows a typical island in a fuel ele-
ment that was fabricated using Alternative Method # 1. The arrow points to the area of high
fission. Similar areas were also observed in pellets produced by the second alternative
method.
neous fuel.
Note that despite the higher gas release and strain noted above, the overall performance of
MOX fuel is quite acceptable in many LWRs worldwide [IAEA, 2003].
tended burnup, through DUPIC, or through plutonium recycling (e.g., MOX), and/or
destroying some of the long-lived actinides removed from spent LWR fuels through re-
processing.
Based on the fissile content of used LWR fuel, one can calculate the number of LWRs from
which the used fuel can be used as fuel by a single CANDU reactor [Boczar et al., 1996].
The quantities used in the example below are not necessarily actual values for a specific
CANDU or LWR reactor, although they are reasonably representative of the two reactor types
and are used to illustrate how the actual quantities would be used to determine the synergy
between an actual LWR and an actual CANDU reactor by substituting real, specific values.
LWR reactor:
capacity: 1000 MW(e)
total uranium in core: 80,000 kgU
amount of U refueled annually: 20,000 kg (one-quarter of the core replaced annually)
235
U contained in spent fuel (annually): 180 kg (0.9% 235U in total U).
CANDU reactor:
capacity: 1000 MW(e)
total uranium in core: 120,000 kg (6000 bundles containing 20 kg U each)
annual requirements:
o annual refueling: 140,000 kg of U (7000 bundles);
o annual 235U requirements: approximately 1,000 kg 235U (0.71% 235U in total of
140,000 kg U).
Synergy:
annual 235U arising from spent LWR fuel: 180 kg
annual 235U requirements for CANDU reactor of equal electrical capacity: 1,000 kg
proportion of 235U used in CANDU fuel that is derived from LWR arising: 0.73% (see Sec-
tion 9.1 above); the remainder of 235U is derived from depleted U from tails of enrich-
ment plants.
CANDU reactor’s annual 235U requirements supplied by LWR: 730 kg (73% of 1,000).
Number of LWRs required to supply 235U for CANDU reactors of equal electrical capacity
(rounded to the nearest whole number): 4 (= 730/180).
The example above assumes that only 235U arisings would be used. If plutonium were also
used, the proportion of LWR per CANDU reactor would be accordingly reduced.
11 Closure
In summary, some illustrative fuels and fuel cycles are the natural uranium cycle, natural-
uranium equivalent fuel, extended burnup fuel, thorium, mixed oxide fuel, DUPIC fuel, low
void reactivity fuel, actinide burning fuel, and breeder fuel.
The natural-uranium fuel cycle that is currently used in CANDU power reactors is simple, reli-
able, and low-cost. It is also very amenable to localization, which promotes national energy
independence.
Alternative fuel cycles offer several potential strategic advantages, such as significantly ex-
Fuel Cycles – March 2015
50 The Essential CANDU
tending humanity’s energy resources, reducing the initial capital cost of a power plant, in-
creasing the lifespan of a CANDU power plant, increasing the thermal efficiency of the steam
cycle, reducing the coolant void reactivity, reducing the volume of spent fuel, and increasing
the power output from a fuel bundle and the reactor.
Many alternative fuel cycles result in more expensive fuel, additional challenges in the front
end, enhanced challenges during the service period, and reduced challenges in the back end.
Therefore, a careful assessment of net benefit is required before implementing any particular
fuel cycle.
12 Problems
Section 1 – Introduction
Q1.1 – Why would one consider fuel cycles other than the once-through cycle?
Section 2 – Neutronics of Fuel Cycles
Q2.1 – Define fissile nuclides and give examples. Which is the only naturally occurring fissile
nuclide?
Q2.2 – Define fissionable nuclide and provide examples.
Q2.3 – Define fertile nuclides and provide examples.
Q2.4 – What is the conversion ratio as related to nuclides?
Q2.5 – In the context of conversion ratio, what is breeding and breeding gain?
Q2.6 – What is burnup as applied to nuclear fuel?
Section 3 – Overview of Some Possible Fuels and Fuel Cycles
Q3.1 – List the fuel cycles which are used, or can be considered for use, in CANDU rectors
and provide a brief rationale for using each.
Section 4 – Key Drivers for Advanced Fuel Cycles
Q4.1 – List the principal advantages of the once-through natural uranium (NU) fuel cycle
used in CANDU compared to fuel cycles using enriched uranium.
Q4.2 – With reference to the three parts of the fuel cycle, provide a general assessment of
the advantages or disadvantages of alternative cycles compared to the once-through
CANDU-NU fuel cycle.
Q4.3 – Compared to the NU fuel cycle used in CANDU, many alternative fuel cycles tend to
increase the cost of fuel and also pose various degrees of additional technical challenge.
Nevertheless, they are considered for use in CANDU because they offer other advantages.
List these advantages and provide a brief explanation of each.
Q8.12 – For one unit of energy produced, current CANDU reactors use five to six times the
mass of fuel as is used in LWRs. Despite that relative disadvantage, fueling cost per unit en-
ergy has always been much lower for CANDUs than for LWRs. List the three reasons for this.
Section 9 – Details of Selected Alternative Fuels and Fuel Cycles
Q9.1 – A fuel manufacturer has purchased REU fuel containing 1% 235U and DU fuel contain-
ing 0.4% 235U. He wishes to blend them to obtain NUE fuel. What should be the fraction of
REU fuel in the blend?
Q9.2 – List the benefits which can be derived from using enriched fuel in a CANDU.
Q9.3 – List the commercial and technical aspects that must be considered in increasing ele-
ment rating, burnup, and bundle power by using enrichment.
Q9.4 – Why is it important to control fuel-element internal gas pressure, and what can fuel
designers do to achieve this?
Q9.5 – A power ramp of 15 kW/m is contemplated in CANLUB fuel at a burnup of 400
MWh/kgU. The pre-ramp power is 20 kW/m. Is this fuel element expected to survive the
power ramp?
Q9.6 – List at least two reasons for keeping sheath corrosion below the allowable limit.
Q9.7 – List the reasons for the reduced amount of corrosion on CANDU fuel compared to
PWR fuel
Q9.8 – In the example of Section 9.2.3, what is the expected thickness of waterside corrosion
in a CANDU sheath at 800 MWh/kgU?
Q9.9 – What causes end-flux (and end-temperature) peaking?
Q9.10 – Pellet/sheath interaction causes an unrestrained thermal bow of 0.6 mm in a fuel
element that has a diameter of 13 mm and a length of 500 mm. What is the equivalent tem-
perature variation around its circumference?
Q9.11 – What are the two main reasons for considering the use of thorium in place of urani-
um?
Q9.12 – Which is the fissile isotope in thorium?
Q9.13 – The preferred method of using thorium is in the form of thorium dioxide, also called
thoria, which is a ceramic. The reasons are analogous to those for using uranium in the form
of UO2 (see Chapter 17). List the properties of thorium dioxide pellets that contribute to
improving their in-reactor performance compared to UO2 pellets.
Q9.14 – Describe three ways that thorium and the fissile driver can be arranged to power a
CANDU reactor.
Q9.15 – (a) What are the two possible sources of plutonium that can be used in CANDU? (b)
Is reprocessing of spent CANDU fuel a likely source of plutonium?
Q9.16– What is a common challenge in the production of MOX?
Q9.17 – Why are “agglomerates” undesirable in MOX pellets?
13 References
D. Barber, D. H. Lister, 1982. “Chemistry of Water Circuits in CANDU Reactors”, Proceedings,
Symposium on Water Chemistry, Report IAEA-SM-264/15 and AECL-8217, 1982.
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15 Acknowledgements
The authors thank Dr. Peter Boczar for permission to borrow heavily from his extensive publi-
cations on fuel cycles. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of this chapter were provided by Dr. Dorin Ni-
chita, Dr. Ben Rouben, and Dr. William Garland. Dr. William Garland also contributed Figures
1 and 2. Dr. D. Baron (EdF, retired) graciously provided material on high burnup structure.
John Roberts and Dr. Craig Stuart contributed key material on fuel deposits. The above con-
tributions are gratefully acknowledged with thanks.
In addition, the following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work and ex-
cellent comments during the development of this chapter; their feedback has much im-
proved it:
Peter Boczar
Bronwyn Hyland
Geoff Edwards
William Garland
Of course the responsibility for any errors or omissions lies entirely with the authors. Thanks
are also extended to Simon Oakley and Media Production Services, McMaster University, for
nicely drawing the figures, and to Diana Bouchard for expertly editing and assembling the
final copy.
In preparation
Author Biographies
Table of Contents
Acronyms
ACNS Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (Canada, historical)
ACR Advanced CANDU Reactor
ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (USA)
AEC Atomic Energy Commission (USA)
AECA Atomic Energy Control Act (Canada)
AECB Atomic Energy Control Board (Canada)
AECL Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
AESOP Atomic Energy Simulation of Optimization (computer code)
ALARA As Low as Reasonably Achievable
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practical (UK)
AOO Anticipated Operational Occurrence
ASDV Atmospheric Steam Discharge Valve
ASLB Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (USA)
ASSERT Advanced Solution of Subchannel Equations in Reactor Thermalhydraulics (computer
code)
ASTM American Society for Testing Materials
BDBA Beyond Design Basis Accident
BDBA Beyond Design Basis Accident
BEAU Best Estimate with Analysis of Uncertainties
BECS Boiler Emergency Cooling System
BLC Boiler Level Control
BLW Boiling Light Water
BPC Boiler Pressure Controller
BSL Basic Safety Limit (UK)
BSO Basic Safety Objective (UK)
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
C/S Containment and Surveillance
CANDU CANada Deuterium Uranium – the generic name for Canadian heavy water power
reactors
CCP Critical Channel Power
CEAA Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
CFR Code of Federal Regulations (USA)
CHF Critical Heat Flux
CHF Critical Heat Flux
CNSC Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
CPR Critical Power Ratio
CRL Chalk River Laboratories
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
CSA Canadian Standards Association
CSDV Condenser Steam Discharge Valve
CSNI Canadian Standards for the Nuclear Industry
DBA Design Basis Accident
DBE Design Base Earthquake
DCC Digital Control Computer