Title: BOGO-MEDELLIN MINING CO., INC. v.

COURT OF APPEALS
Citation: G.R. No. 124699, 31 July 2003

Facts:
The heirs inherited a parcel of land from their father. A railroad track traversed the
land and is being used to haul cane sugar to Bogo-Medellin’s mill. Boco-Medellin was also
able to register the lot in its name in the cadastral survey which is now being disputed by the
heirs. Bomedco countered saying that it was the owner and possessor of the land, it bought the
same from its previous owner. It also contended that the heirs’ claim was already barred by
prescription and laches due to Bomedco's open and continuous possession of the property for
more than 50 years.

Issue/s:
Whether Bomedco acquired ownership of the land and an easement of right of way by
prescription.

Decision of the Court:

No, the mere expiration of the period of easement did not convert Bomedco’s
possession into an adverse one. Acts of possessory character executed by virtue of license or
tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, did not start the running of the period of
prescription. As to the easement of right of way, the railroad tracks of petitioner’s trains are
apparent but is still a discontinuous easement of right of way. Under the Civil Code,
discontinuous easements, apparent or not, may be acquired only by title. Bomedco never
acquired title over the land whether by law, donation or testamentary succession. A party is
deemed to acquire title over the easement of right of way if: First, it subsequently entered into
a contractual right of way with the heirs also known as voluntary easement or Second, it filed
a case against the heirs for conferment of legal easement. The legal easement of right of way
can only be conferred upon meeting the following requisites: (i) it is surrounded by other
immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public highway, (ii) payment of proper indemnity,
(iii) the isolation is not of its own acts and the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and (iv) insofar as consistent with this rule, the distance from
the dominant estate to the highway is the shortest.

Title: GOLDCREST REALTY CORPORATION v. CYPRESS GARDENS

CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION
Citation: G.R. No. 171072, 7 April 2009

Facts:
Goldcrest Realty Corporation built a condominium. The ownership over the project
was subsequently turned over to Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation. Goldcrest
retained ownership over a two-level penthouse in the 9th and 10th floors. Cypress filed a
complaint alleging that Goldcrest encroached on certain common areas pertaining to Cypress
by building an office structure.
Issue/s:
Whether Goldcrest impaired the easement on the portion of the roof deck designated
as a limited common area.

Decision of the Court:

Yes, Goldcrest’s construction and leasing of the office structure are neither necessary
for the use or preservation of the roof deck’s limited area. Second, the weight of the office
structure increased the strain on the condominium’s foundation and on the roof deck’s limited
area. Lastly, the construction of the office structure illegally altered the approved
condominium project plan. Impairment of an easement occurs if the dominant estate violates
any restrictions on its rights to the servient estate: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for
the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the
immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner
than that previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary
for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the easement more
burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary
works on the servient estate; and (7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to
build said works so as to cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient estate.

Title: ESLABAN, JR. v. VDA. DE ONORIO

Citation: G.R. No. 146062, 28 June 2001

Facts:
The National Irrigation Administration, with Eslaban as Project Manager, constructed
a main irrigation canal affecting De Onorio’s property. The parties concluded a Right of Way
Agrement followed by payment of right of way by NIA to De Onorio. De Onorio also
executed a Waiver of Rights and Fees with respect to damages caused by the construction on
her crops. Afterwards, De Onorio demanded the payment of a sum of money for the taking of
her property which was refused by the NIA. The NIA argued that it is exempted from the
paying just compensation because the right of way constituted an encumbrance upon the land
when it was registered by De Onorio. NIA also argued that the Waiver of Rights and Fees
also includes De Onorio’s waiver to any claim for just compensation.

Issue/s:
1.) Whether the construction of right of way existed as an encumbrance at the time
when the land was registered.
2.) Whether the Waiver of Rights and Fee is a waiver of just compensation

Decision of the Court:

No, the Land Registration Act provides that the only servitude which a private
property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the easement of a public
highway, way, private way established by law or any government canal or lateral thereof
where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-
determined. Thus, the same should be pre-existing at the time the registration of the land to
compel the owner to respect it otherwise, expropriation proceedings must be initiated. In this
case, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built several
years after the property had been registered. Thus, prior expropriation proceedings should
have been filed and just compensation be paid to De Onorio

No, by its express terms the Waiver of Rights and Fees only refers to waiver of the
damages to crops resulting from the construction of the irrigation canal. It does not constitute
a waiver of the just compensation for the taking of the property.

Title: OBRA v. BADUA

Citation: G.R. No. 149125, 9 August 2007

Facts:
Obra constructed a fence in the northern portion of his property. Badua and Bucasas
filed a complaint for Easement of Right of Way against Obra. On 7 July 2001, the trial court
dismissed the case ruling that Badua failed to prove that the northern fence prevented an
adequate outlet to the highway since there is an alternative route on the southern portion of
Obra’s property. Sometime after the decision was rendered, Badua and Bucasas filed a
Motion to Enforce the July 7 decision stating that petitioner also fenced off the alternative
southern right of way which was originally the basis for dismissing the case. The trial court in
a 20 March 2001 decision, granted the motion and ruled that Obras is prohibited from closing
the said passage because it was a voluntary easement.

Issue/s:
1.) Whether the trial court can clarify its final and executory decision and effectively
establish an easement on Obra’s property without proper adjudication.

Decision of the Court:

No, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the March 20, 2001 Order. While
the July 7 decision mentioned the existence of an alternative pathway, such was made only to
emphasize that respondents failed to satisfy the requirements for an easement of right of way.
No easement was established because there was no pronouncement on the nature and legality
of the alternative pathway. Furthermore, the conclusion that there was an agreed or voluntary
easement had no basis, the July 7 decision did not reveal any agreement executed by the
parties on the claimed right of way. There was no agreement on the terms and payment of the
proper indemnity.