Environmental Science and Policy 100 (2019) 94–104

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Environmental Science and Policy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci

Plastics at sea: Treaty design for a global solution to marine plastic pollution T
⁎
Ina Tessnow-von Wysocki, Philippe Le Billon
University of British Columbia, 1984 West Mall, V6T 1Z2, Vancouver, Canada

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Treaty design is a key determinant of success for environmental regulatory regimes. Well-designed treaties in-
Plastics centivise participation, reward compliance and deter non-compliance among the parties to the agreement. The
Pollution design process can also positively affect interactions between states and help shift national perspectives and
Oceans interests during negotiations. Based on treaty design evaluations of the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, a review
Treaty
of existing measures to curb plastics at sea, and expert interviews, this study identifies seven treaty design
International regimes
Negotiations
elements likely to improve the success of a future legally binding mechanism to address marine plastic pollution.
These include: a) the adoption of a principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; b) an adequate scope
considering land- and sea-based sources, as well as chemical additives and all stages of the lifecycle of plastics; c)
issue-linkage to international plastics trade; d) a financial mechanism to support implementation measures; e)
built-in flexibility to adapt to changes; f) effective monitoring, reporting and review procedures; and g) en-
forcement through incentivising compliance and deterring non-compliance. Developed out of an inclusive treaty
negotiation process, these elements can help overcome current governance challenges regarding the elimination
of marine plastic pollution.

1. Introduction Kyoto Protocols. Further, it provides an overview of the consequences

An estimated 150 million tonnes of plastics have accumulated in the
world's oceans and the problem has been compounded by overloaded
waste management and recycling systems that are unable to cope with
rising plastic production (Jambeck et al., 2015). Marine plastic pollu-
tion has consequences on the environment and biodiversity, industries
including tourism, shipping and fishing, and represents a potential risk
for food security and human health (Barboza et al., 2018). These ne-
gative effects often span beyond national borders, and as such, a solu-
tion to marine plastic pollution requires international cooperation. Ef-
forts have so far failed to adequately address the problem. A legally
binding mechanism on the global level could overcome some challenges
of marine plastics governance. International law is based on the consent
of all parties to the agreement (Henkin, 1979), but the treaty-making
process allows parties to “weigh the benefits and burdens of commit-
ment and explore, redefine, and sometimes discover their interests”
(Chayes and Chayes, 1993).
This paper suggests that treaty design influences the success of in-
ternational regimes through its ability to incentivise participation, re-
ward compliance and deter non-compliance among parties. The study
involves a literature review of the emergence and maintenance of in-
ternational regimes focused on the treaty designs of the Montreal and
of plastics at sea and existing measures to curb marine plastic pollution.
As literature on the treaty design of a potential Global Plastics Treaty is
limited, interviews provided a valuable addition to the analysis. Experts
from academia, non-profit and for-profit organisations were selected
based on their expertise on marine plastic pollution, international law,
multilateral agreements, and ability to inform about current initiatives.
The analysis points to seven treaty elements that can contribute to a
successful legally binding international mechanism to address marine
plastic pollution: a) the principle of common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities, b) an adequate scope to address the problem by including
land-based and sea-based sources, as well as chemical additives and all
stages of the lifecycle of plastics, c) issue-linkage to international
plastics trade, d) a financial mechanism to support necessary im-
plementation measures, e) flexibility to adapt to changes, f) effective
monitoring, reporting and review procedures, and g) enforcement
through incentivising compliance and deterring non-compliance. These
findings can contribute to the success of future negotiations regarding
the elimination of plastic pollution at sea.
Following this introduction, Section 2 contrasts the relative success
of two international environmental regimes seeking to solve trans-
boundary pollution problems - the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols - and
identifies how their treaty designs contributed to their respective

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: lebillon@geog.ubc.ca (P. Le Billon).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.06.005
Received 9 February 2019; Received in revised form 12 June 2019; Accepted 12 June 2019
1462-9011/ © 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
I. Tessnow-von Wysocki and P. Le Billon
success and failure. Section 3 provides an overview of the impacts of
marine plastic pollution and challenges for global marine plastics
governance. Section 4 examines recent efforts to solve the problem of
marine plastic pollution and displays gaps in the current governance
structure that could be overcome with a global mechanism. Section 5
identifies and discusses seven necessary elements for a future interna-
tional treaty to address marine plastic pollution. The conclusion sums-
up the findings and provides an outlook for an international treaty on
plastic pollution.
2. International treaties to solve transboundary pollution
problems
Several factors contribute to the success or failure of international
regimes for environmental protection in relation to transboundary
pollution problems (Dietz et al., 2003). Success of an international re-
gime is defined here as the achievement of the intended outcome in
addressing the stated problem. This occurs when the regime a) changes
behaviour of states (participation and compliance), and b) has the in-
tended impact. Factors that influence the outcome of an international
regime include economic considerations (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta,
1994), leadership by individual actors (Haas, 1993; Olson, 1965;
Young, 1991; Young and Osherenko, 1993), domestic pressure in favor
or against the agreement from non-state actors, including non-profit
organisations and industry stakeholders (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985;
Falkner, 2005; Kydd and Snidal, 1993; Mayer, 1992; Putnam, 1988;
Reinicke, 1998), as well as available scientific evidence (Oberthür,
1997; Stein, 1990), the perception of urgency of the problem (Haas,
1993; Puchala and Hopkins, 1982; Young, 1989) and reputation
(Henkin, 1979; Oberthür, 1997; Oye, 1986). Additionally, treaty design
can significantly help or hinder the success of international regimes
(Barrett, 2003; Chayes and Chayes, 1995; Hasenclever et al., 1997;
Young and Osherenko, 1993).
The Montreal Protocol serves as an ideal case of a successful inter-
national environmental regime. It was created to phase out the use of
ozone-depleting substances in order to protect the ozone layer, which
provides universal protection from biologically harmful ultraviolet B
(UVB) radiation (Barrett, 2007). The depletion of the ozone layer is a
transboundary issue that affects all states and can only be effectively
stopped through collective effort (Barrett, 2003). The Montreal Protocol
was successfully ratified by all United Nations (UN) members and the
parties complied with the targets of the treaty. Scientific research has
proven increasing ozone layer recovery, which was the intended out-
come of the treaty. The context for a global treaty was favorable,
considering the serious and direct effects to the human population -
including skin cancer - and already available solutions which were
profitable for the companies concerned (Falkner, 2005). Thus, one
factor that led to the successful outcome of the Montreal Protocol was
an advantageous cost-benefit analysis (Barrett, 2007; Sunstein, 2007).
Moreover, the active leadership of actors who were pushing for an
agreement (Barrett, 2007; Benedick, 1998; Haas, 1993) and support
from non-state actors at the domestic level including non-profit orga-
nisations as well as industry stakeholders played a positive role
(Benedick, 1998; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994; Sunstein, 2007). A
perceived urgency for action, as a result of the discovery of a hole in the
ozone layer also contributed to the success of the regime (Chayes and
Chayes, 1995; Cracknell and Varotsos, 2009; Broadhead, 2002; Litfin,
1994; Young, 1989; Young and Osherenko, 1993). Due to the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities and through the financial
mechanism, the treaty was perceived as fair and developing countries
were guaranteed the financial and technological means to comply
(Gonzalez et al., 2015; Green, 2009; Munasinghe and King, 1991).
Trade sanctions were deemed an appropriate measure by all signa-
tories, as each nation had an interest in preventing the relocation of
production to other countries (Barrett, 1999). In this way, parties to the
agreement had an economic advantage over non-parties, which
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Environmental Science and Policy 100 (2019) 94–104
incentivised participation and compliance. Flexibility of the design al-
lowed for increasing ambition in target- and timeframe-setting (Barrett,
1999; 2007; United Nations, 1987, Art. 6; 11.4 [a-c; h; j]). The interplay
between incentives and deterrence managed to overcome the free-rider
problem and led to the success of the regime. The treaty design thus
constituted a necessary condition for success by using the following
treaty elements: a) common but differentiated responsibilities, b) trade
restrictions, c) a financial mechanism, and d) adjustments and
amendments.
The Kyoto Protocol serves as an example of a failed international
regime. It aimed to stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions in the atmosphere in order to avoid exacerbating the negative
effects of climate change. Despite initial participation and commitment
of UN member states to reduce GHG emissions, major parties to the
agreement could not meet their targets, did not ratify the treaty or
withdrew from the agreement altogether (Barrett, 1999; Durand,
2012). Furthermore, overall targets were set too low for the intended
outcome to be achieved and too few countries felt obliged to reduce
their emissions (Barrett, 2007; Rosen, 2015). The context for the Kyoto
Protocol was less favourable than for the Montreal Protocol, as evidence
of climate impacts remained disputed, economic and environmental
impacts were unevenly distributed, and technical alternatives proved
more difficult to implement (Cooper, 1997). Factors of failure were the
disadvantageous cost-benefit analysis (Barrett, 1999, 2003; Nordhaus
and Boyer, 1999; van Kooten, 2003), perceived unfairness through the
exclusion of developing countries from implementation costs (Barrett,
2003; Bova, 2010; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) and the fact that the
issue was perceived as less urgent (Young, 1989) while affecting dif-
ferent regions to a varying extent (Barrett, 2007). An additional factor
was the lack of compliance capacity due to domestic constraints. For
example, in the case of the US, diverging domestic interests failed to
achieve the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate for ratification
(Barrett, 2003). Inadequate targets and timeframes to address the
problem prevented the treaty from achieving the intended outcome
(Barrett, 2003; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Rosen, 2015). Kyoto Pro-
tocol mechanisms enabled parties to achieve their emission reduction
targets through exchanging part of their emission reduction commit-
ment (Emission Trading Scheme), supporting developing countries to
reduce emissions (Clean Development Mechanism), and jointly under-
taking emission reductions within their countries (Joint Implementa-
tion) (UNFCCC, 2018a,b,c). However, the mechanisms were subject to
emission leakage and could not be adequately monitored, and the
supply of unused permits and sink allowances led to a rise in emissions
(Barrett, 2003; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002; Rosen, 2015). By setting
strict targets without cost considerations, the treaty remained “eco-
nomically flawed and politically unrealistic” (McKibbin and Wilcoxen,
2002: 51) and the short period for action encouraged parties to adopt
short-term policies (Rosen, 2015). Furthermore, because it was re-
commended that enforcement mechanisms only be added at a later
stage (United Nations, 1998, Art.18), a state’s non-compliance went
unaddressed (Barrett, 2007). The treaty elements that contributed to
failure of the regime are hence: a) one-sided responsibility, b) an in-
adequate scope to deal with the problem, as well as mechanisms that
allowed for loopholes and complicated monitoring, c) rigidity, in-
centivising short-term policies and preventing innovation, as well as d)
lack of compliance and enforcement mechanisms (Table 1).
3. Plastics at sea
The problem of plastics at sea first emerged on the international
agenda in the 1960s in relation to the ingestion of plastic items by sea
birds and is now understood as one of the major transboundary pollu-
tion issues (Chen, 2015). Global plastic production in 2017 amounted
to about 335 million tonnes (Plastics Europe, 2018) and estimates from
2014 predict a doubling of global plastic production within 20 years
(Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2016). Waste management measures
I. Tessnow-von Wysocki and P. Le Billon Environmental Science and Policy 100 (2019) 94–104

Table 1
Comparison of treaty design elements of the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols.
Source: authors.
Treaty design elements Montreal Protocol Kyoto Protocol

Common but differentiated responsibilities Yes Yes

Time frames Increasing ambition; goal for ultimate elimination of substances Set time frames; control of GHG emissions in certain
time period
Emission measurement Calculation in gross emissions Calculation in net emissions
Issue-linkage Yes No
Trade restrictions
Flexibility (adaptability of measures/ targets) Yes No
Feasibility (technical, bureaucratic and financial Yes No
capability of states to comply) Financial mechanism and technology transfer to guarantee Legal issues for ratification (USA); financial burden on
implementation of measures in developing countries developed countries (Canada, Japan, USA)
Verifiability of compliance (monitoring, reporting Yes Difficult
and review procedures)
Enforcement mechanisms Yes To be added at later stage
Trade Restrictions:
Economic disadvantage for non-parties through trade
restrictions
Adequate scope and targets to address the problem Yes No

Fig. 1. Plastic waste from populations within 50 km of the coast.

Sources: Jambeck et al. (2015), Neumann et al. (2015) and GRID-Arendal and Maphoto/Riccardo Pravettoni (2018), reproduced with permission, available at:
www.grida.no/resources/6931.

cannot cope with the increasing plastic production, which has resulted
in ongoing plastic litter and microplastics entering the oceans (UN
Environment, 2017). The majority of marine litter consists of packaging
and small pieces of unidentifiable plastics or polystyrene (Chen, 2015)
and primarily originates from land-based sources (UN Environment,
2017). These include general public litter, pollution from industry,
harbours, and unprotected landfills and dumps located near the coast or
waterways (Galgani et al., 2015). It is estimated that 4.8 to 12.7 million
tonnes of plastic reached the oceans from land in 2010 (Jambeck et al.,
2015). Around 80% of plastic leakage into the oceans comes from
developing middle-income countries in Asia, including China, In-
donesia, Philippines, Vietnam and Sri Lanka (Jambeck et al., 2015),
where collection and recovery systems are not adequately equipped to
handle the vast amounts of waste (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2016;
see Fig. 1). Rivers are a major transport pathway for marine plastics,
from which an estimated 1.15 to 2.41 million tonnes of plastic waste
enter the ocean per year (Lebreton et al., 2017; see Fig. 2; Schmidt
et al., 2017). Marine litter originating from sea-based sources, parti-
cularly lost or discarded fishing gear such as so-called “ghost nets”,
have also attracted attention (UN Environment, 2017).

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I. Tessnow-von Wysocki and P. Le Billon
Fig. 2. Plastic waste from major polluting rivers and at sea surface.
Sources: Eriksen et al. (2014) and Lebreton et al. (2017)
Marine plastic litter breaks up into smaller pieces when exposed to
ultraviolet UVB radiation in sunlight, oxidative properties of the at-
mosphere, and hydrolytic properties of seawater (Moore, 2008). Plastic
particles smaller than 5 mm are referred to as microplastics, while those
smaller than 100 nm are considered nanoplastics. Small size plastic
litter can be categorised into primary microplastics, namely particles
that were originally manufactured to be that size, such as microbeads,
or secondary microplastics, which are particles resulting from physical,
biological or chemical degradation of larger plastic items, including
textiles and tyres (Baztan et al., 2017; GESAMP, 2016). As most plastics
are age resistant and only minimally degrade biologically (Moore,
2008), they stay in the ocean for long periods of time and can travel
large distances (STAP, 2011). A study by Eriksen et al. (2014) calcu-
lated an estimation of the amount and weight of plastic particles at the
sea surface (see Fig. 2), indicating that this does not include plastics at
shorelines, on the seabed, suspended in the water column, within or-
ganisms or below the surface. The longevity of plastics in the marine
environment is unknown and estimates range from hundreds to thou-
sands of years depending on the type of polymer (Barnes et al., 2009).
Considering the slow degradation and increasing production, the
amount of plastic waste in the oceans is expected to accumulate further
(Simon and Schulte, 2017).
Marine plastic pollution has various economic, social and environ-
mental consequences. It affects a variety of industries, such as fisheries,
aquaculture, shipping, desalination plants, harbours and rescue services
(Raubenheimer, 2016). The problem of lost fishing gear leads to a 10%
loss of the target fish population and could risk the economic viability
of commercial fishing (Moore, 2008). Global economic losses to fish-
eries, tourism and beach cleanup costs are estimated at around US$13
billion annually (UNEP, 2014). Simon and Schulte (2017) point to
economic benefits when tackling the problem, as 95% of plastic
packaging material value, namely US$80-120 billion, is lost per year
due to first-cycle use only (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2016).
Raubenheimer (2016) raises the concern that a cost-benefit analysis
alone cannot adequately reflect the true societal and environmental
costs of marine debris. The problem of marine plastic pollution raises
the issue of intragenerational justice because costs have to be covered
by regions where the plastic waste gets carried to, as well as inter-
generational justice due its longevity (UN Environment, 2017). Over
260 marine species suffer negative effects of marine plastic pollution
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Environmental Science and Policy 100 (2019) 94–104
through entanglement or ingestion (STAP, 2011). Plastic bags are often
mistaken for food by sea turtles, as they resemble jellyfish in the water
(Werner et al., 2016). A total of 557 species are documented with re-
cords of entanglement in, and/or ingestion of marine debris (Kühn
et al., 2015).
Moreover, marine plastic pollution is a potential risk for human
health (Azoulay et al., 2019; Lehner et al., 2019; Revel et al., 2018;
Waring et al., 2018; World Economic Forum, 2018). Various chemicals
used in plastic manufacturing are toxic to animals and humans (Halden,
2010). Additionally, micro- and nanoplastic particles have the ability to
act as vectors for other pollutants, which can result in otherwise inert
and non-toxic particles potentially becoming carriers of toxic com-
pounds (Baztan et al., 2017; Rist and Hartmann, 2018; Rochman et al.,
2015). A study on the effects of microplastics on mice reveals that
microplastics could cause disruptions to energy and lipid metabolisms,
induce oxidative stress, and result in neurotoxic responses (Deng et al.,
2017). Microplastic particles that are ingested by marine species could
reach humans over the food chain (Austrian Environment Agency,
2018). A recent study found the presence of microplastics in two species
of zooplankton, which are known to be located on the bottom of the
food chain (Desforges et al., 2015). The presence of anthropogenic
debris in samples of fishes and shellfish on sale for human consumption
in Indonesia and the US raises concerns for human health (Rochman
et al., 2015). In 2018, microplastic particles were scientifically proven
in human stool, mainly PP (Polypropylene) and PET (Polyethylene
Terephthalate) (Austrian Environment Agency, 2018). Marine plastic
pollution constitutes a major transboundary problem and requires im-
mediate collective action, given its negative economic, social and en-
vironmental impacts and potential human health effects (Gallo et al.,
2018).
4. Ocean governance and pollution control
The problem of marine plastic pollution is not recent and, as will be
discussed below, various measures have already been undertaken at
local, national, regional, and international levels (Chen, 2015). Despite
existing efforts, however, the amount of plastic waste continues to in-
crease and plastic leakage into rivers and oceans persists. The United
Nations Environment Assembly (UN Environment, 2017) describes the
current framework to tackle marine plastic litter and microplastics as
I. Tessnow-von Wysocki and P. Le Billon
“fragmented and uncoordinated” and therefore suggests to either put
effort into revising and strengthening it, or into developing a new fra-
mework. Tiller and Nyman (2018) suggest including the topic of ocean
plastics into the negotiations of the international treaty on the con-
servation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas
beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) since plastics affect biodiversity in
the ‘high seas’ and the negotiations are already underway. Other actors
are calling for a separate agreement on plastics (Hugo, 2018; Simon
et al., 2018). This section provides an overview of existing voluntary
and legally binding efforts in ocean governance and pollution control,
considering sea-based and land-based sources, as well as the control of
chemicals on global, national and local levels. It then points to the
challenges of marine plastics governance that have so far impeded
current efforts to deal with the issue.
4.1. Sea-based plastic pollution control
Since the 1960s, legally binding international agreements in ocean
governance have ensured the establishment of legal zones and jur-
isdiction over various activities, including dumping of wastes (Joyner,
2004). Examples of international conventions to control the discharge
of wastes from sea-based sources include the ‘Convention on the Pre-
vention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter
(The London Convention of 1972)’ and the ‘International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 (MARPOL)’
(Raubenheimer, 2016; Simon and Schulte, 2017). Further, the 1982
‘UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)’ and the 1995 ‘UN Straddling
Fish Stocks Agreement’ are additional global legally binding agree-
ments relevant to marine environment protection (Raubenheimer,
2016). UNCLOS identifies that states shall undertake action “to prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any
source” (United Nations, 1982, Art.194 [1]). Article 207 [1] specifies
that “states shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources”
(United Nations, 1982), whereby “land-based sources” refer here to
“rivers, estuaries, pipelines and outfall structures”. Haward (2018)
suggests taking UNCLOS as an example for a new treaty to prevent
marine plastic pollution. However, the framing is rather general and
does not include specific measures to address production, transport,
consumption, trade and end‐of‐life treatment of plastics and their ad-
ditives (Raubenheimer et al., 2018; Simon and Schulte, 2017). Volun-
tary global efforts include guidelines on ‘Surveying and Monitoring of
Marine Litter’ and a report on ‘Abandoned, Lost or Otherwise Discarded
Fishing Gear’ (Chen, 2015; Löhr et al., 2017). Furthermore, the “Code
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries” encourages the minimisation of
“pollution, waste, discards, catch by lost or abandoned gear” (FAO,
1995, Art. 7 [2.2]).
4.2. Land-based plastic pollution control
Several measures have been undertaken regarding plastic pollution
originating from land. Regional legally binding efforts play a significant
role, such as the Regional Seas Conventions (David Suzuki Foundation
interview, 2018; GIZ, 2018). The Abidjan Convention for West Africa
and the Nairobi Convention for East Africa are moving in the direction
of a Marine Litter Protocol (David Suzuki Foundation interview, 2018).
In Europe, the ‘Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean’ (1995) is a
prominent example, including the ‘Protocol for the Protection of the
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources and
Activities’ (GIZ, 2018). Other relevant regional instruments are EU in-
itiatives on land-based waste management, such as the ‘Packaging and
Packaging Waste Directive’ (1994), and the ‘EU Port Reception Facility
(PRF) Directive’ (2000), obliging ports to develop and implement waste
handling plans (Chen, 2015). More recently, the EU has announced a
ban on single-use cutlery, cotton buds, straws and stirrers from 2021, as
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Environmental Science and Policy 100 (2019) 94–104
well as a reduction of other plastic items that are not included in the
ban by at least 25% by 2025 in each member state (European
Commission, 2018). Some developing countries provide good examples
regarding policy implementation to reduce and prevent plastic pollu-
tion, e.g. through plastic bag bans that were introduced in Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya (Knoblauch et al., 2018; UTas interview,
2018). On local levels, policies have been introduced to ban single-use
items, encourage recycling and put responsibility on producers through
extended producer responsibility (EPR) schemes, as well as prohibit
microbeads (City of Vancouver, 2018; Löhr et al., 2017).
Voluntary efforts to eliminate plastic litter from land-based sources
include the ‘Regional Plan for the Marine Litter Management in the
Mediterranean’ which encourages states to include marine litter pre-
vention into their national action plans and stresses the importance of
improved solid waste management and EPR schemes, as well as eco-
nomic instruments for reducing plastic consumption and implementing
deposit-refund systems (GIZ, 2018). The ‘Honolulu Strategy’ seeks to
reduce the amount and impact of both sea- and land-based litter, as well
as solid waste and accumulated marine debris on shorelines and the
Global Partnership of Marine Litter (GPML) is a multi-stakeholder in-
itiative for the exchange of information to implement adequate mea-
sures (Chen, 2015; Löhr et al., 2017).
Non-state actors engage in education through exhibitions, re-
commendations for daily-life, online platforms, documentaries, school
workshops, and beach cleanups with the purpose of mobilising people,
holding politicians accountable and pushing for solutions (interviews
with David Suzuki Foundation, 2018; Ocean Wise, 2018; Plastic Oceans
Foundation, 2018; Sea Smart, 2018; Zero Waste Canada, 2018). NGOs
support EPR schemes by running residential recycling schemes, un-
dertaking recycling trainings in companies and schools, and introdu-
cing facility certification programs (Zero Waste Canada interview,
2018), as well as supporting recyclable packaging design and recycling
solutions (Recycle BC interview, 2018). NGOs can also serve as bridges
between science and industry to inform practical solutions (Ocean Wise
interview, 2018).
Increasingly, industries and corporations show interest in getting
active on the issue. Under the Canadian presidency in 2018, the G7
established a Plastics Charter emphasising the need for action and
outlining further steps in collaboration with industry stakeholders (G7,
2018). Corporations signed the charter, acknowledging the global
problem and committing to further action on marine plastic pollution
(BASF interview, 2018). As a reaction to Greenpeace Canada’s cam-
paign of brand auditing, some industries have announced further action
(Greenpeace Canada interview, 2018). Some industries, such as textile
industries and packagers, provide funding for research to change their
products and turn to NGOs for more sustainable solutions (Ocean Wise
interview, 2018). Several stakeholders are engaged in addressing the
issue of marine plastic pollution on different institutional levels and a
general willingness to tackle the problem is prevalent throughout the
sectors. Still, the focus lies on recycling whereas reduction efforts are
lacking (Greenpeace Canada interview, 2018).
4.3. Chemical control
The above-mentioned efforts deal with sea-based and land-based
sources of marine plastic pollution, however, they do not consider the
production and manufacturing process of plastics. The Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) include – besides the treatment of waste-
water (SGD 6), conservation of the oceans, seas and marine resources
(SDG 14) and waste management in sustainable cities (SDG 11) – tar-
gets concerning impact reduction from hazardous chemicals, as well as
air, water and soil pollution (SDG 3) and sustainable production and
consumption (SDG 12). The ‘Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal’
(1989) and the ‘Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
(POPs)’ (2004) are existing multilateral environmental agreements that
I. Tessnow-von Wysocki and P. Le Billon
could host the idea of plastics control (David Suzuki Foundation in-
terview, 2018). The Basel Convention (1989) seeks to reduce the gen-
eration and transboundary movement of hazardous and other wastes
and to promote ‘near-source’ disposal (Raubenheimer, 2016). It in-
cludes a legal instrument on transnational plastics trade which can be
strengthened to minimise plastic waste generation (David Suzuki
Foundation interview, 2018). The Stockholm Convention addresses
persistent organic pollutants and was a milestone in international law
(Hagen and Walls, 2005). To some extent, the production, use and
disposal of additives used in the manufacture of plastics can be regu-
lated by the Stockholm Convention, however, this control would only
consider plastics produced with POPs that are listed under the con-
vention and its application could have implications for the recycling
and reuse of products that contain regulated chemicals (UN
Environment, 2017). The voluntary ‘Strategic Approach to Interna-
tional Chemicals Management (SAICM) Global Action Plan’ can manage
chemicals which are not regulated under the Stockholm Convention
and support national reduction target-setting (UN Environment, 2017).
4.4. Challenges for marine plastics governance
Certain challenges for marine plastics governance led to the failure
of existing efforts in eliminating marine plastic pollution. The dur-
ability, diversity of uses and affordability of plastics have led to a sharp
increase in plastic production (Chen, 2015; Dauvergne, 2018; Simon
and Schulte, 2017). Plastic offers many advantages as a preserving,
light material that is now present in our daily lives (ISOE interview,
2018) and is necessary in the health and transportation sectors
(ANCORS interview, 2018). To manage the problem, however, there is
a need for a reduction of the production and use of plastics and a more
sustainable process throughout the whole lifecycle. Yet, experts do not
recommend a mere substitution of plastic items, as this could lead to
further ecological problems (ISOE interview, 2018; Simon and Schulte,
2017). For some, solving the problem of marine plastic pollution will
require changes in the current economic system and rethinking of
current practices (David Suzuki Foundation interview, 2018).
Production, manufacturing, consumption and disposal of plastics
are globally dispersed. There needs to be better coordination between
governments and industry, but also between different ministries within
governments (ANCORS interview, 2018). Marine plastic pollution af-
fects different maritime zones under national sovereignty, but also the
high seas which are beyond national jurisdiction (Raubenheimer, 2016;
UTas interview, 2018). It therefore is a global problem that requires
international cooperation and cannot be solved by few states alone.
There is a lack in transparency on the chemical components and
additives used in plastics (ANCORS interview, 2018; OECD, 2018).
Hazardous additives in primary plastics can contaminate recycled
plastics and pose health risks (OECD, 2018). Transparency is also
lacking in regard to exports and imports of plastic waste, as well as
standards of receiving recycling facilities. To ensure effective and sus-
tainable recycling, such transparency of chemical contents and ad-
ditives of plastics, as well as of transboundary plastic waste movements
is key.
International cooperation is required to address these challenges
and to improve plastic production and use, approach a circular
economy and minimise the proportion of end-of-life plastic entering the
waste stream (UN Environment, 2017). There is a gap in international
hard law in addressing land-based sources of marine plastic pollution
(Vince and Hardesty, 2017; see Fig. 3). Addressing the problem of
marine plastic pollution under the existing frameworks would require
extensive coordination regarding targets, implementation, monitoring,
reporting and compliance measures (UN Environment, 2017). Non-
governmental organisations emphasise that modifications of the above-
mentioned treaties are “unlikely to ever successfully prevent plastic
pollution of the oceans” (Simon and Schulte, 2017: 32), and therefore
call for a new treaty (Hugo, 2018; Simon et al., 2018). A treaty to
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Environmental Science and Policy 100 (2019) 94–104
address marine plastic pollution needs to affect countries’ production
cycles and industrial processes, and thus be an ocean treaty and a
sustainable production and consumption treaty simultaneously (inter-
views with ANCORS, 2018; David Suzuki Foundation, 2018). Such a
combination of a treaty does not exist up to date, and ocean governance
and pollution control are mainly looked at separately. As some key
regions have not introduced binding regulations to tackle the issue, a
new global mechanism would provide long-term legislative security at
the national level, guarantee similar regulations for all competitors in
industry, as well as help ensure greater liability and fairer compensa-
tion for those who stand to lose from restrictions (UN Environment,
2017).
In summary, current efforts to eliminate marine plastic pollution
have not been successful due to the specific challenges of marine
plastics governance. Efforts have been undertaken at local, national,
regional and global scales, involving voluntary, as well as legally
binding regulations to address sea-based sources, land-based sources,
and chemical control separately. However, the challenges of marine
plastics governance require a solution that considers all three areas
simultaneously. A global treaty that combines considerations of ocean
governance and pollution control forms a possible solution as it would
address sources of marine plastic pollution at sea, on land, increase
transparency for chemical additives used in the production of plastics,
and take into consideration the whole global lifecycle of plastics.
5. Global plastics treaty design options
Treaty design matters to the functioning of related institutions and
treaty outcomes (Rosen, 2015). Adequately chosen design elements can
contribute to the success of a treaty. Beyerlin et al. (2007) argue that
sound treaty-making is required to ensure compliance, but will fail
when it is aimed at a wide range of environmental issues and does not
suit to the situation at hand. This section identifies design elements that
need to be included when drafting a Global Plastics Treaty to manage
the problem of marine plastic pollution.
5.1. Common but differentiated responsibilities
Institutional options need to be perceived as equitable and fair by
the participating actors for an agreement to be formed with all relevant
parties being present and active in the negotiation process (Young and
Osherenko, 1993) and the procedure being accepted and equally ap-
plied across member states (Chayes and Chayes, 1995). Plastics are
used in all parts of the world, but production, manufacturing, con-
sumption and disposal are not equally distributed across the globe.
Even though most plastic leakage into the oceans derives from middle-
income countries in Asia, the negotiation process needs to recognise the
high production and consumption of plastic by industrialised countries
(OECD, 2018; see Fig. 1), as well as their significant amount of exports
to developing countries. Around 50% of the plastic waste generated in
Europe is exported where no control over treatment is ensured
(European Commission, 2018).
Developing countries often do not have the financial means to in-
troduce the necessary waste management infrastructure to handle
waste sustainably. Pressing problems of poverty, violence and political
instability can increase the incapability or unwillingness of prioritising
the improvement of waste collection and recycling systems. Negotiators
need to recognise the globalised lifecycle of plastics, the inter-
dependence of international plastics trade for production, consumption
and disposal and address negative externalities in cooperation.
Countries where the plastic waste is disposed of cannot carry full re-
sponsibility of its waste management, rather countries of production
and consumption also have to get involved. The treaty design needs to
respectfully consider history, financial capabilities, as well as local
conditions of the different states to achieve participation.
I. Tessnow-von Wysocki and P. Le Billon Environmental Science and Policy 100 (2019) 94–104

Fig. 3. Fragmented framework of marine plastics governance.

Source: authors.

5.2. Scope the improvement of waste management systems, the introduction of a

For a treaty to be successful, its design needs to guarantee that
meeting the targets will achieve the intended outcome, which requires
addressing the issue within an adequate scope and not incentivising
short-term actions that would prevent long-term solutions (Rosen,
2015). The overall goal of a Global Plastics Treaty would be impact
reduction, as well as prevention and elimination of marine plastic litter
and microplastics (UN Environment, 2017). Targets and implementa-
tion measures need to be based on the best available knowledge. To
manage marine plastic pollution, the treaty design needs to address
plastics entering the ocean from sea-based and land-based sources, as
well as consider all chemicals and additives used within the lifecycle of
plastics (UN Environment, 2017).
Table 2 gives an overview of the main plastic items originating from
sea-, and land-based sources which the treaty design of a potential
Plastics Treaty would need to include to adequately address the pro-
blem of marine plastic pollution, namely lost fishing gear, hard and soft
plastics, as well as microplastics. For each of the categories, mechan-
isms are suggested, building on the findings from academic literature
on existing efforts. It indicates fishing industry regulations, product
design innovation and education in the case of sea-based sources and
functioning circular economy, product design innovation, bans on
certain substances or items, economic mechanisms to incentivise re-
duction of plastics consumption, as well as education about impacts of
plastic pollution to address land-based sources. The solution to micro-
plastics needs to take a different approach, due to their different sources
and small size. Bans of microbeads have already been successfully im-
plemented in the US and Canada (Dauvergne, 2018). Filtering tech-
nologies in waste water treatment facilities can reduce the number of
plastic particles from textiles reaching the oceans, but this technology is
not available to many countries (Ocean Wise interview, 2018). A sig-
nificant source of microplastics is the wear and abrasion of car tyres
(Kole et al., 2017). Further approaches to filter microplastics out of the
oceans are being developed, e.g. using jellyfish mucus (see www.
gojelly.eu). Education has also been identified as an important factor in
raising awareness about possible solutions, including product design
and consumer behaviour change (Barra and González, 2018; Pettipas
et al., 2016; Xanthos and Walker, 2017).
Beyond the categories of plastics involved, the scope of the treaty
needs to consider the whole lifecycle of plastics and ensure sustain-
ability across the different steps of production, manufacturing, con-
sumption and disposal (see Fig. 4). Sustainability of plastics in the

Table 2
Addressing sea- and land-based sources of marine plastic pollution.
Source: authors.
Source Category Mechanism Pollution outcome

Sea-based Lost & abandoned Fishing industry regulations Mitigation

fishing gear (mainly) Product design innovation Prevention
Education Mitigation/ Prevention
Land-based Hard plastics + Soft plastics Improvement of collection and recycling systems Prevention
Circular economy Mitigation/ Prevention
Product design innovation Mitigation/ Prevention
Bans Prevention
Economic mechanisms Mitigation/ Prevention
Education Mitigation/ Prevention
Microplastics Bans Prevention
Product design innovation Mitigation/ Prevention
Technology development Prevention
Education Mitigation/ Prevention

100
I. Tessnow-von Wysocki and P. Le Billon
Fig. 4. Lifecycle of plastics and policy interventions.
Source: authors.
design, production, chemical use and as the end-product is crucial,
which requires transparency of production and treatment, as well as of
resins, products, waste products, and chemical components (ANCORS
interview, 2018). Global industry standards need to include functional
definitions, environmental standards for all lifecycle processes, EPR
schemes, labelling schemes indicating recycled content, appropriate
disposal and hazard potential (Raubenheimer et al., 2018).
While many recommendations exist, the challenge remains how to
adapt them to different local contexts (ISOE interview, 2018). Simon
and Schulte (2017: 33) reiterate the Global Ocean Commission’s call to
eliminate plastic pollution through “timebound, quantitative reduction
targets” and “improved waste management” for the treaty design, based
on identifying the amount of waste that is not properly collected and
setting a goal to increase waste collection rates, as the amount of waste
that enters the ocean is much more difficult to measure. Raubenheimer
(2016) suggests two different approaches: a “Waste Reduction Ap-
proach” as a short- and medium-term solution for a more integrated
waste management system, and a “Usage Reduction Approach” as a
long-term solution for reducing per-capita virgin material use and
closing the loop. The UNEA-3 assessment outlines the “6R approach” of
reducing, redesigning, refusing, reusing, recycling and recovering (UN
Environment, 2017). Sustainable design can be incentivised through an
innovative international certification scheme (UN Environment, 2017).
The international program “Operation Clean Sweep” offers pellet, flake,
and powder containment practices but is currently only voluntary
(ANCORS interview, 2018). International standards for the quality of
plastic types can reduce the production of off-specification plastics and
facilitate the management of inferior plastics, as well as regulated
chemicals (UN Environment, 2017). Moreover, there is a need for
stronger education in chemical synthesis and green chemistry to be
included in university curricula and training courses for professionals,
academics, regulators, and industry personnel, especially in developing
countries (Barra and González, 2018).
5.3. Issue-linkage
A linkage to other issues can support participation and compliance
of states for an agreement. Trade restrictions, as seen in the case of the
Montreal Protocol, can overcome the free-rider problem (ANCORS in-
terview, 2018). When considering trade restrictions, it is important that
these are made credible and do not include additional costs for im-
posing states (Barrett, 2003). The Montreal Protocol could provide a
model for regulating the plastics industry on a global level through
reducing the production of virgin material within the plastics industry,
as well as by regulating the polymers and chemical additives as
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Environmental Science and Policy 100 (2019) 94–104
controlled substances globally (Raubenheimer and McIlgorm, 2017). A
list of common chemical additives and polymer types can assist the
control of the chemical components (Raubenheimer and McIlgorm,
2017). Moreover, issue-linkage in the case of the Montreal Protocol also
provides an example for regulating international trade in non-ha-
zardous plastic waste (Haward, 2018; UN Environment, 2017; UTas
interview, 2018).
5.4. Financial mechanism
Implementing a Global Plastics Treaty requires financial investment.
According to Raubenheimer (2016), the most significant constraint on
domestic implementation of measures to prevent marine plastic pollu-
tion is funding. The design of a Global Plastics Treaty needs a financial
mechanism ensuring that developing countries can stem implementa-
tion costs. Funding could come from a multilateral fund, as it was
successful in the case of the Montreal Protocol. Responsibility to pay
into the multilateral fund, however, cannot be measured at the amount
of waste generated, but rather at the capacity to implement and con-
tribute (Raubenheimer, 2016).
Other ideas to finance the measures to eliminate plastic pollution
include the EPR principle, or ‘polluter pays principle’, for costs asso-
ciated with the recovery and disposal of their products. This concept
incentivises producers to change the design of their products according
to the collection and recycling systems in place (Kunz et al., 2018). EPR
involves the packaging, plastics and retail industry in waste manage-
ment and marine litter prevention by making companies responsible for
appropriate collection and treatment at the products’ end of life (GIZ,
2018). This concept is successful in Norway and includes a) the ob-
ligation of companies to pay into a fund (depending on their amount of
single-use packaging on the market), b) compliance to product design
criteria with a percentage of products having to be recycled within the
country, and c) annual reports on waste generation and the obligation
of reduction (ANCORS interview, 2018). This scheme could be built on
by creating concrete guidelines for testing harm, knowing about the
origin and recyclability of products, while allowing for innovation and
exemptions (e.g. health sector) (ANCORS interview, 2018).
5.5. Monitoring, reporting and review procedures
Monitoring, reporting and review mechanisms are critical for the
success of a Global Plastics Treaty (ANCORS interview, 2018; Simon
and Schulte, 2017). Monitoring to determine sources, movement, and
oceanographic dynamics of marine litter is necessary to assess a treaty’s
impact on national, regional and global scales (Cheshire et al., 2009).
I. Tessnow-von Wysocki and P. Le Billon
Monitoring is required to hold states accountable in case of non-com-
pliance, and to identify progress made and learn from past experiences
(Simon and Schulte, 2017). NGOs and international organisations play
a significant role in reporting on progress, ensuring an effective review
process by providing information and data and are often essential for
evaluation and assessment of states’ performances (Chayes and Chayes,
1995).
5.6. Enforcement
If enforcement cannot be guaranteed, then the targets “only exist on
paper” and will not contribute to change (ISOE interview, 2018).
Marcoux and Urpelainen (2013: 164) argue that many treaties are
lacking existing enforcement mechanisms with states having “collec-
tively chosen to disregard non-compliance”; if a state does not want to
alter its behaviour it might still enter a treaty if it perceives compliance
as unenforceable. Coercive approaches for compliance have largely
been avoided, as punishments are costly for the punished, as well as for
the punishers (Finus, 2001). Because sanctions involve high military,
economic or political costs for sanctioning states, “[..] sanctioning au-
thority is rarely granted by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely
to be ineffective when used” (Chayes and Chayes, 1995: 32–33). On the
national level, enforcement mechanisms are much more effective be-
cause states can use legal measures of national sovereignty to address
non-compliance (David Suzuki Foundation interview, 2018). The pro-
blem of marine plastic pollution requires cooperation at the interna-
tional level, and implementation of solutions domestically with the
involvement of multiple actors (González-Carman et al., 2015;
Raubenheimer, 2016). An international legally binding agreement can
force states to implement measures through their domestic policies
(UTas interview, 2018), such as national policies to ban certain pro-
ducts, improve waste management and recycling infrastructure, im-
plement changes in product design, as well as introduce EPR schemes.
However, the treaty cannot be successful if there is no consequence
in the case of non-compliance. As there is no higher authority to
guarantee enforcement, the treaty needs to be “self-enforcing” (Finus,
2001). Given the challenges of confrontation-based enforcement, ap-
proaches based on cooperation are often more effective, as seen in the
case of the Montreal Protocol (Beyerlin et al., 2007). To overcome the
free-rider problem, incentives for participation and compliance need to
be provided to states. Incentives can be used to avoid defection for
immediate gains or fear of immediate losses (Oye, 1986). In the case of
the Montreal Protocol, issue-linkage to trade was the incentive to
comply and at the same time prevented states from free-riding, as in
this case the disadvantages of non-compliance outweighed the benefits
of free-riding. The key is to draft the treaty in a way that the compliance
mechanism is comprehensive enough to make states prefer compliance
over non-compliance.
5.7. Flexibility
A treaty needs to be able to adapt to changing conditions and cir-
cumstances (Chayes and Chayes, 1995). With advancing research, the
Plastics Treaty needs to be designed flexibly to adapt to new scientific
knowledge and technology. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, the
treaty design allowed for further substances to be added to the protocol
and more radical phase-out time frames with new scientific findings. In
contrast to the Montreal Protocol, which intended to eliminate certain
substances, a Plastics Treaty will not aim at entirely eliminating plas-
tics. Bans on certain substances which cannot be recycled without
complications and/or constitute particular harm to the environment are
reasonable; the focus, however, needs to be on holistic policies to en-
sure a circular economy where reduction and reuse have priority before
recycling (ANCORS interview, 2018). Simon and Schulte (2017) sug-
gest a flexible approach similar to the approach of the Paris Agreement
(United Nations, 2015, Art. 13.3), with states individually choosing
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Environmental Science and Policy 100 (2019) 94–104
national measures to fulfil the set targets (for a contrast between the
Kyoto, Copenhagen and Paris climate governance ‘models’, see Held
and Roger, 2018). The UNEA-3 assessment suggests a mix of binding,
voluntary and self-regulatory measures to tackle the problem, in-
corporating international trade of products, components and waste, as
well as obliging industry to sustainably produce, consume and dispose
of plastics and their chemical additives (UN Environment, 2017).
6. Conclusion
Marine plastic pollution is a key transboundary environmental
problem affecting the environment, biodiversity, coastal communities
and marine industrial sectors, as well as posing potential food security
and human health risks. Stakeholders on local, national, regional and
international levels have undertaken efforts to prevent marine plastic
pollution – but failed to adequately address the issue. Considering the
challenges of marine plastic governance, an international legally
binding instrument could help solve the problem of marine plastic
pollution at a global level. Based on a literature review of factors of
success or failure for environmental treaties, focused on the Montreal
and the Kyoto Protocols, this paper identified treaty design as decisive
for the success of an international regime and listed key design elements
for the success of a Global Plastics Treaty incentivising participation
and compliance through ‘cooperative’ means. Even though ozone de-
pletion, climate change and marine plastic pollution all fall under the
category of transboundary environmental problems, they have distinct
characteristics. There is not one treaty design that guarantees success
because the various issues require distinct approaches. However, this
paper demonstrates the ability of treaty design to steer the regime in the
direction of success or failure. If a treaty is well-designed, implying that
it considers principles of equity and fairness and gives parties to the
agreement an advantage over non-parties, the treaty will incentivise
participation and compliance, as well as deter non-compliance of a
large number of states.
Costs for reversing the negative externalities of marine litter accu-
mulate as plastics continuously enter the ocean and experts in the field
call for immediate action (Dauvergne, 2018; UTas interview, 2018).
The mistake with the Kyoto Protocol was to focus on short-term policies
– the lesson is that policy makers need to take on a long-term per-
spective to adequately address the problem. Many unknowns remain
about marine plastic debris and associated harms, and additional re-
search will help bring about more effective solutions (Mendenhall,
2018). Yet, findings are already sufficiently advanced to encourage
immediate action and many international actors are calling for a legal
instrument to address marine plastic pollution. However, greater efforts
to improve education in sustainable chemistry, as well as waste man-
agement in the top polluter countries, particularly targeting the wa-
tershed areas of major rivers and coastlines, should not wait for a treaty
to become a reality.
This analysis identified seven treaty elements that are likely to
contribute to a successful plastics regime: a) the inclusion of the prin-
ciple of common but differentiated responsibilities, b) a scope addres-
sing sea-based and land-based sources, as well as chemical additives
and all stages of the lifecycle of plastics, c) issue-linkage to international
plastics trade, d) a financial mechanism to support necessary im-
plementation measures, e) effective monitoring, reporting and review
procedures, f) flexibility to adapt to local contexts and new scientific
findings, and g) enforcement through incentivising compliance and
deterring non-compliance.
Because domestic structures and actors play a critical role in the
negotiators’ decision to join or reject an agreement, relevant stake-
holders need to be involved in the negotiation process, including the
private sector, non-profit organisations, as well as academia. As seen
with the Montreal Protocol, engaging different stakeholders from the
onset of negotiations helps to understand the different positions and
expectations, as well as sheds light on possible solutions. Stakeholders
I. Tessnow-von Wysocki and P. Le Billon
from all sectors are willing to cooperate on the issue of marine plastic
pollution but still represent different interests, with their own ex-
pectations, concerns and priorities. Often what hinders the im-
plementation of ideas and innovation are bureaucratic or political is-
sues which can be resolved through dialogue. If the design of a Global
Plastics Treaty is perceived as fair and outlines economically and
technically feasible measures that are verifiable and adequate to ad-
dress the issue, states will be more likely to join and comply to targets
and a successful plastics regime will emerge.
Funding
This work was supported by the University Alliance for
Sustainability.
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