CASE #1:

[G.R. Nos. L-6025-26.  July 18, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
 
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This refers to the petition for bail filed by Defendant Appellant Amado Hernandez on June 26, 1954,
and renewed on December 22, 1955. A similar petition, filed on December 28, 1953, had been
denied by a resolution of this court dated February 2, 1954. Although not stated in said resolution,
the same was due mainly to these circumstances:  The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is
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charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies,
for which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court sentenced
him merely to life imprisonment. Upon the other hand, the defense contends, among other things,
that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. Inasmuch as the issue thus
raised had not been previously settled squarely, and this court was then unable, as yet, to reach a
definite conclusion thereon, it was deemed best not to disturb, for the time being, the course of
action taken by the lower court, which denied bail to the movant. After mature deliberation, our
considered opinion on said issue is as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The first two paragraphs of the amended information in this case read: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“The undersigned accuses (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman alias Amado alias AVH
alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G. Capadocia, (3)
Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias
Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias
Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, (7) Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9)
Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William, (10) Jacobo Espino, (11) Amado
Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias Manue, of the crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies committed as follows: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had
chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring, confederating, and cooperating with each other, as well as with the
thirty-one (31) Defendants charged in criminal cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270, 14315, and 14344 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with others whose
whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and their co-conspirators, being then
officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated with the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO)
formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organization (CLO), an active agency, organ, and
instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), with central offices in Manila and
chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other ‘mass organizations’ in different places
in the Philippines, and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, fully cooperates in, and
synchronizes its activities with the rebellious activities of the ‘Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.)
and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.)
to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of the armed rebellion
against the Republic of the Philippines, as the herein Defendants and their co-conspirators have in
fact synchronized the activities of the CLO with the rebellious activities of the HMB and other
agencies, organs and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines and have otherwise
master- minded or promoted the cooperative efforts between the CLO and HMB and other agencies,
organs, and instrumentalities of the P.K.P. in the prosecution of the rebellion against the Republic of
the Philippines, and being then also high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated
with, the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged in an armed
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines through acts therefor committed and planned to
be further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of which party the ‘Hukbong
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ (HMB), otherwise or formerly known as the ‘Hukbalahaps’ (Huks), is the
armed force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote,
maintain, cause, direct and/or command the ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ (HMB) or the
‘Hukbalahaps’ (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or
otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the
Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said ‘Hukbong
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ or ‘Hukbalahaps’ have risen publicly and taken arms to attain the said
purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police,
constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to
commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and
there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private
and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows, to wit: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Then follows a description of the murders, arsons and robberies allegedly perpetrated by the
accused “as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof.”
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period.”
It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same presupposes the commission of two (2)
or more crimes, and, hence, does not apply when the culprit is guilty of only one crime.
Article 134 of said code reads: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the
territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed
forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives.”
Pursuant to Article 135 of the same code “any person, merely participating or executing the
commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.”
The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for “any person who
promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or
employment, takes part therein”: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1.  “engaging in war against the forces of the government”,

2.  “destroying property”, or
3.  “committing serious violence”,
4.  “exacting contributions or”
5.  “diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated”.
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense,
and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty — prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P20,000. Thus for instance, a public officer who assists the rebels by turning over to them, for
use in financing the uprising, the public funds entrusted to his custody, could neither be prosecuted
for malversation of such funds, apart from rebellion, nor accused and convicted of the complex
crime of rebellion with malversation of public funds. The reason is that such malversation is inherent
in the crime of rebellion committed by him. In fact, he would not be guilty of rebellion had he not so
misappropriated said funds. In the imposition, upon said public officer, of the penalty for rebellion it
would even be improper to consider the aggravating circumstance of advantage taken by the
offender of his public position, this being an essential element of the crime he had perpetrated.
Now, then, if the office held by said offender and the nature of the funds malversed by him cannot
aggravate the penalty for his offense, it is clear that neither may it worsen the very crime committed
by the culprit by giving rise, either to an independent crime, or to a complex crime. Needless to say,
a mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a public officer, should not be placed at a more
disadvantageous position than the promoters, maintainers or leaders of the movement, or the
public officers who join the same, insofar as the application of Article 48 is concerned.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by
“engaging in war against the forces of the government” and “committing serious violence” in the
prosecution of said “war”. These expressions imply everything that war connotes, namely;  resort chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of
liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and
unhappiness that war leaves in its wake — except that, very often, it is worse than war in the
international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a bitterness and
passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a contest between strangers. Being within the purview of
“engaging in war” and “committing serious violence”, said resort to arms, with the resulting
impairment or destruction of life and property, constitutes not two or more offense, but only one
crime — that of rebellion plain and simple. Thus, for instance, it has been held that “the crime of
treason may be committed ‘by executing either a single or similar intentional overt acts, different or
similar but distinct, and for that reason, it may be considered one single continuous offense. (Guinto
vs. Veluz, 77 Phil., 801, 44 Off. Gaz., 909.)” (People vs. Pacheco, 93 Phil., 521.)
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we repeat, one single crime, it follows
necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor
the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, this court has never in the past, convicted any
person of the “complex crime of rebellion with murder”. What is more, it appears that in every one
of the cases of rebellion published in the Philippine Reports, the Defendants were convicted of
simple rebellion, although they had killed several persons, sometimes peace officers (U. S. vs.
Lagnason, 3 Phil., 472;  U. S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil., 509, U. S. vs. Ayala, 6 Phil., 151;  League vs.
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People, 73 Phil., 155).

Following a parallel line are our decisions in the more recent cases of treason, resulting from
collaboration with the Japanese during the war in the Pacific. In fact, said cases went further than
the aforementioned cases of rebellion, in that the theory of the prosecution to the effect that the
accused in said treason cases were guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder and other
crimes was expressly and repeatedly rejected therein. Thus, commenting on the decision of the
People’s Court finding the accused in People vs. Prieto (80 Phil., 138, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329) “guilty
of   the crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries” and sentencing him to death,
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and on the contention of the Solicitor General that Prieto had committed the “complex crime of
treason with homicide”, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Tuason, said: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of
physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law
and under the United States constitution defining treason, after which the former was patterned,
there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the
other does not make treason.
“In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of
action. Its very nature partakes, of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense
under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of
treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code provides. Just as one cannot be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for
smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling
in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a Defendant be made liable for murder as a
separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason  . Where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of
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treason   they cannot be regarded separately under their general denomination.” (Italics supplied.)
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Accordingly, we convicted the accused of simple treason and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
In People vs. Labra, 81 Phil., 377, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159, we used the following language: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“The lower court found Appellant guilty not only of treason, but of murder, for the killing of Tomas
Abella, and, following the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code sentenced him to death,
the maximum penalty provided by article 114.
“The lower court erred in finding Appellant guilty of the murder of Tomas Abella. The arrest and
killing of Tomas Abella for being a guerilla, is alleged in count 3 of the information, as one of the
elements of the crime of treason for which Appellant is prosecuted. Such element constitute a part
of the legal basis upon which Appellant stands convicted of the crime of treason. The killing of
Tomas Abella cannot be considered as legal ground for convicting Appellant of any crime other than
treason. The essential elements of a given crime cannot be disintegrated in different parts, each one
stand as a separate ground to convict the accused of a different crime or criminal offense. The
elements constituting a given crime are integral and inseparable parts of a whole. In the
contemplation of the law, they cannot be used for double or multiple purposes. They can only be
used for the sole purpose of showing the commission of the crime of which they form part. The
factual complexity of the crime of treason does not endow it with the functional ability of worm
multiplication or amoeba reproduction. Otherwise, the accused will have to face as many
prosecutions and convictions as there are elements in the crime of treason, in open violation of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.” (Italics supplied.)
The same conclusion was reached in People vs. Alibotod 82 Phil., 164, 46 Off. Gaz., 1005, despite the
direct participation of the Defendant therein in the maltreatment and killing of several persons.
In People vs. Vilo 82 Phil., 524, 46 Off. Gaz., 2517, we held: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“The People’s Court, however, erred in classifying the crime as treason with murder. The killing of
Amado Satorre and one Segundo is charged as an element of treason, and it therefore becomes
identified with the latter crime, and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.”
(People vs. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz. 3329. See, also People vs. Labra, L-886, 46 Off. Gaz., [Supp. to
No. 1], 159.)” (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect was our decision in People vs. Roble 83 Phil., 1, 46 Off. Gaz., 4207. We stated
therein:chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with murders,
with the result that the penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be imposed on its
maximum degree. Viewing the case from the standpoint of modifying circumstances, the court
believed that the same result obtained. It opined that the killings were murders qualified by
treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation, superior strength, cruelty,
and an armed band.
“We think this is error. The tortures and murders set forth in the information are merged in and
formed part of the treason. They were in this case the overt acts which, besides traitorous intention
supplied a vital ingredient in the crime.” (Italics supplied.)
The accused in People vs. Delgado 83 Phil., 9, 46 Off. Gaz., 4213, had been convicted by the People’s
Court of “the crime of treason complexed with the crime of murder” and sentenced to the extreme
penalty. In our decision, penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, we expressed ourselves as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen. His adherence to the Japanese forces of
occupation and giving them aid and comfort by acting as their spy, undercover man, investigator,
and even killer when necessary to cow and compel the inhabitants to surrender their firearms and
disclose information about the guerrillas has been fully established. His manner of investigation and
maltreatment of some of his victims like Tereso Sanchez and Patricio Suico, was so cruel, brutal and
inhuman that it is almost unbelievable that a Filipino can commit and practice such atrocities
especially on his own countrymen. But, evidently, war, confusion and opportunism can and do
produce characters and monster unknown during peace and normal times.
“The People’s Court found the Appellant guilty of treason complexed with murder. The Solicitor
General, however, maintains that the offense committed is simple treason, citing the doctrine laid
down by this court in the case of People vs. Prieto, (L-399, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329) but accompanied by
the aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, and not
compensated by any mitigating circumstance, and he recommends the imposition of the penalty of
death. We agree with the Solicitor General that on the basis of the ruling of this court in the case of
People vs. Prieto, supra, the Appellant may be convicted only a treason, and that the killing and
infliction of physical injuries committed by him may not be separated from the crime of treason but
should be regarded as acts performed in the commission of treason, although, as stated in said case,
the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an
aggravating circumstance.” (Italics supplied.)
and reduced the penalty from death to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.
Identical were the pertinent features of the case of People vs. Adlawan, 83 Phil., 194, 46 Off. Gaz.,
4299, in which, through Mr. Justice Reyes (A), we declared: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“  we find merit in the contention that Appellant should have not been convicted of the so called
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‘Complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape.’ The killings, robbery, and raping
mentioned in the information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but as mere elements of
the crime of treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with
the general charged they cannot be used in combination with the treason to increase the penalty
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto, L-399, January 29, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz.,
3329.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of treason only.” (Italics supplied.)
In People vs. Suralta, 85 Phil., 714, 47 Off. Gaz., 4595, the language used was: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“  But the People’s Court erred in finding the Appellant guilty of the complex crime of treason with
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murder, because murder was an ingredient of the crime of treason, as we have heretofore held in
several cases. (Italics supplied.)
This was reiterated in People vs. Navea, 87 Phil., 1, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12, p. 252: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“The Solicitor General recommends that the Appellant be sentenced for the complex crime of
treason with murder. We have already ruled, however, that where, as in the present case, the killing
is charged as an element of treason, it ‘becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the
subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.” (Italics supplied.)
The question at bar was, also, taken up in the case of Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (94 Phil.,
477), decided on February 26, 1954. The facts and the rule therein laid down are set forth in our
unanimous decision in said case, from which we quote: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“The Petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during the last world war and at the time
of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was
on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in an
information filed in the People’s Court. But before the accused could be brought under the
jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13, 1947, indicted for violations of Commonwealth Act
No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, before a military court created by authority of the
Army Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three charges, two of which, the first and third, were
those of treason consisting in giving information and aid to the enemy leaving to the capture of
USAFFE officers and men and other persons with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of
the USAFFE to surrender and cooperate with the enemy, while the second was that of having certain
civilians filled in time of war. Found innocent of the first and third charges but guilty of the second,
he was on May, 8, 1947, sentenced by the military court to life imprisonment.
“With the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the People’s Court, the
criminal case in that court against the Petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions of said Act,
transferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and there the charges of treason were
amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the amended information, Petitioner presented a motion to
quash, challenging the jurisdiction of the court and pleading double jeopardy because of his previous
sentence in the military court. But the court denied the motion and, after Petitioner had pleaded not
guilty, proceeded to trial, whereupon, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed in
this court to have the trial judge desist from proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case.
“It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court different from that charged in
the civil court and that even granting that the offense was identical the military court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the People’s Court had previously acquired
jurisdiction over the case with the result that the conviction in the court martial was void. In support
of the first point, it is urged that the amended information filed in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from those charged in the military court. But we note that
while certain overt acts specified in the amended information in the Zamboanga court were not
specified in the indictment in the court martial, they all are embraced in the general charge of
treason, which is a continuous offense and one who commits it is not criminally liable for as many
crimes as there are overt acts, because all overt act ‘he has done or might have done for that
purpose constitute but a single offense.’ (Guinto vs. Veluz, 44. Off. Gaz., 909;  People vs. Pacheco,
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L-4750, promulgated July 31, 1953.) In other words, since the offense charged in the amended
information in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is treason, the fact that the said information
contains an enumeration of additional ovart acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment before
the military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do not in themselves constitute a
new and distinct offense from that of treason, and this court has repeatedly held that a person
cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time also guilty of overt acts specified in the
information for treason even if those overt acts, considered separately, are punishable by law, for
the simple reason that those overt acts are not separate offenses distinct from that of treason but
constitute ingredients thereof.” (Italics supplied.)
Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion of this court, on the question whether said crime
may be complexed with murder, when the former was committed through the latter, and it is so
alleged in the information, had positively and clearly crystalized itself in the negative as early as
January 29, 1948.
We have not overlooked the decision in People vs. Labra (L-1240, decided on May 12, 1949), the
dispositive part of which partly reads: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“Wherefore, the verdict of guilty must be affirmed. Articles 48, 114 and 248 of the Revised Penal
Code are applicable to the offense of treason with murder. However for lack of sufficient votes to
impose the extreme penalty, the Appellant will be sentenced to life imprisonment  ..”  cralaw

Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code and “the offense of treason with
murder,” it should be noted that we affirmed therein the action of the People’s Court, which,
according to the opening statement of our decision, convicted Labra of “treason aggravated with
murder”. Besides, the applicability of said articles was not discussed in said decision. It is obvious,
from a mere perusal thereof, that this court had no intention of passing upon such question.
Otherwise, it would have explained why it did not follow the rule laid down in the previous cases of
Prieto, Labra (August 10, 1948), Alibotod, Vilo, Roble, Delgado and Adlawan (supra), in which the
issue was explicitly examined and decided in the negative. Our continued adherence to this view in
the subsequent cases of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo, without even a passing reference to
the second Labra case, shows that we did not consider the same as reflecting the opinion of the
court on said question. At any rate, insofar as it suggests otherwise, the position taken in the second
Labra case must be deemed reversed by our decisions in said cases of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and
Crisologo.
It is true that treason and rebellion are distinct and different from each other. This does not detract,
however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are
absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Besides there is more reason to apply said rule in the crime of
rebellion than in that of treason, for the law punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised Penal Code)
specifically mentions the act of engaging in war and committing serious violence among its essential
elements — thus clearly indicating that everything done in the prosecution of said war, as a means
necessary therefor, is embraced therein — unlike the provision on treason (Article 114, Revised
Penal Code) which is less explicit thereon.
It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority
may be committed with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil., 162), homicide (People vs. Lojo, 52
Phil., 390) and murder (U. S. vs. Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171;  U. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385), andchan roblesvirtualawlibrary

rape may be perpetrated with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya, 34 Phil., 690), then rebellion may,
similarly, be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The conclusion does not follow, for
engaging in war, serious violence, physical injuries and destruction of life and property are inherent
in rebellion, but not in assault upon persons in authority or agents of persons in authority or in rape.
The word “rebellion” evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted authorities, but, also, civil
war, on a bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils that go with it, whereas, neither rape nor assault
upon persons in authority connotes necessarily, or even generally, either physical injuries, or
murder. 1
In support of the theory that a rebel who kills in furtherance of the insurrection is guilty of the
complex crime of rebellion with murder, our attention has been called to Article 244 of the old Penal
Code of the Philippines, reading: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, seran
castigados respectivamente segun las disposiciones de este Codigo.
“Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores seran penados como tales los jefes principales de la
rebelion o sedicion.”
and to the following observations of Cuello Calon (Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 110), in relation
thereto:chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary
“Se establece aqui que el en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, comete otros delitos
(v.g., roba, mata o lesiona), sera responsable de estos ademas de los delitos de rebelion o sedicion.
La dificultad consiste en estos casos en separar los accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion de los delitos
independientes de estas, y como las leyes no contienen en este punto precepto alguno aplicable, su
solucion ha quedado encomendada a los tribunales. La jurisprudencia que estos han sentado
considera como accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion — cuya criminalidad queda embedida en la de
estos delitos, y, por tanto, no son punibles especialmente — los hechos de escasa gravedad (v.g.,
atentados, desacatos, lesiones menos graves);  por el contrario, las infracciones graves, como el chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

asesinato o las lesiones graves, se consideran como delitos independientes de la rebelion o de la

sedicion.”
It should be noted, however, that said Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines has not
been included in our Revised Penal Code. If the applicability of Article 48 to rebellion was
determined by the existence of said Article 244, then the elimination of the latter would be
indicative of the contrary.
Besides, the crime of rebellion, referred to by Cuello Calon, was that punished in the Spanish Penal
Code, Article 243 of which provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Son reos de rebelion los que se alzaren publicamente y en abierta hostilidad contra el Gobierno
para cualquiera de los objetossiguientes: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

1.  “Destronar al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del Reino, o privarles de su libertad personal u
obligarles a ejecutar un acto contrario a su voluntad.
2.  “Impedir la celebracion dc las elecciones para Diputados a Cortes o Senadores en todo el Reino, o
la reunion legitima de las mismas.
3.  “Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion de alguno de los Cuerpos Colegisladores o
arrancarles alguna resolucion.
4.  “Ejecutar cualquiera de los delitos previstos en el articulo 165.
5.  “Sustraer el Reino o parte de el o algun cuerpo de tropa de tierra o de mar, o cualquiera otra
clase de fuerza armada, de la obediencia del Supremo Gobierno.
6.  “Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros de la Corona de sus facultades constitucionales, o
impedirles o coartarles su libre ejercicio. (Articulo 167, Codigo Penal de 1850. — Veanse las demas
concordancias del articulo 181.)”
Thus, the Spanish Penal Code did not specifically declare that rebellion includes the act of engaging
in war against the forces of the Government and of using serious violence for the purposes stated in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. In view of this express statutory inclusion of the acts of war
and serious violence among the ingredients of rebellion in the Philippines, it is clear that the
distinction made by Cuello Calon between grave and less grave offenses committed in the course of
an insurrection cannot be accepted in this jurisdiction. Again, if both classes of offenses are part and
parcel of a rebellion, or means necessary therefor, neither law nor logic justifies the exclusion of the
one and the inclusion of the other. In fact, Cuello Calon admits that “the difficulty lies in separating
the accidents of rebellion or sedition from the offenses independent therefrom.” Ergo, offenses that
are not independent therefrom, but constituting an integral part thereof committed, precisely, to
carry out the uprising to its successful conclusion — are beyond the purview of Article 244. Indeed,
the above quoted statement of Cuello Calon — to the effect that grave felonies committed in the
course of an insurrection are independent therefrom — was based upon a decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of February 5, 1872, which we find reported in the Codigo Penal de Filipinas, by Jose
Perez Rubio, as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia en sentencia de 5 de Febrero de 1872, tiene declarado:  Que chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

segun los articulos 184 del Codigo Penal de 1830, y 259 del reformado (1870), los delitos particulares
cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion o con motivo de ellas se castigan respectivamente segun las
disposiciones de los mismos Codigos;  y con arreglo al decreto de amnistia de 9 de Agosto de 1876 chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

estan solo comprendidos en aquella gracia las personas sentenciadas, procesadas o sujatas a
responsabilidad por delitos politicos de cualquiera especie -cometidos desde el 29 de Septiembre de
1868;  Que el asesinato del Gobernador Civil de Burgos no fue resultado de movimiento alguno
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

politico, sino de un mero tumulto que imprimio el fanatismo, y cuya unica aparente tendencia era
impedir que aquel funcionario inventariase ciertos objetos artisticos que se decian existentes en la
Catedral:  Que esto lo demuestran las salvajes voces de muerte proferidas por los asesinos contra
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

la persona del Gobernador;  sin que al ejecutar en el mismo recinto del templo los horrorosos chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

hechos que aparecen en la causa, alzasen bandera politica alguna ni dieran otro grito que el, en
aquel momento sacrilego e impio, de ‘Viva la religion: ’ Que la apreciar la Sala sentenciadora los chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

hechos referentes al Gobernador Civil de delito de asesinato, penarlo con arreglo al Codigo y
declarar inaplicable el citado Decreto de Amnistia, no ha cometido el error de derecho señalado en
los casos 1.° 3.° del articulo 4.° de la ley sobre establecimiento de la casacion criminal, ni infringido
los articulos 250 y 259 del Codigo Penal de 1870.” (Page 239;  Italics supplied.) (See, also, “El chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

Codigo Penal”, by Hidalgo Garcia, Vol. I, p. 623.)’

It is apparent that said case is not in point. There was no issue therein on whether murder may be
complexed with rebellion or sedition. The question for determination was whether the killers of the
victim were guilty of the common crime of murder, or should have been convicted only of rebellion
or sedition. The court adopted the first alternative, not because of the gravity of the acts performed
by the accused, but because they had no political motivation. Moreover, the Endnote:  to said chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

quotation from Cuello Calon reads: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Los atentados desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad u otros delitos contra el orden publico cometidos
en la sedicion o con motivo de ella, no son delitos distintos de la sedicion, 3 octubre 1903, 19
noviembre 1906;  la resistencia o acometimiento a la fuerza publica por los sediciosos es accidente
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

de la rebelion, 23 mayo 1890.

“El asesinato de un gobernador cometido en el curso de un tumulto debe penarse como un delito
comun de asesinato, 5 febrero 1872. Sin embargo, la jurisprudencia, tratandose de ciertos delitos, es
vacilante;  asi, v. g., el acometimiento al teniente de alcalde se ha declarado en un fallo
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

independiente de la perturbacion tumultuaria promovida para impedir al alcalde el cumplimiento de

sus providencias, 16 marzo 1885, mientras que un hecho analogo se ha considerado en otra
sentenda ya citada como accidente de la rebelion, 3 Octubre 1903. El acometimiento de los
sediciosos a la fuerza publica es accidente de la sedicion y no uno de los delitos particulares a que se
refiere este articulo, 23 de mayo 1890. Entre estos delitos a que alude el precepto se hallan las
lesiones que puedan causar los sediciosos, 19 noviembre 1906.” (Endnote:  21, II Cuelo Calon, chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Derecho Penal, pp. 110-111.) (Italics supplied.)

Thus in a decision, dated May 2, 1934, the Supreme Court of Spain held: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Considerando que la nota deferencial entre los delitos de rebelion y sedicion, de una parte, y el de
atentado, esta constituida por la circunstancia de alzamiento publico que caracteriza a los primeros,
los cuales, por su indole generica, absorben a los de atentado y demas infracciones que durante su
comision y con su motivo se cometan, y afirmandose como hecho en la sentencia recurrida que el
procesado Mariano Esteban Martinez realizo, en union de otros, el atendado que se le imputa sin
alzarse publicamente, cae por su base el recurso fundado en supuesto distinto.” (Jurisprudencia
Criminal, Tomo 130, p. 551.) (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect are, likewise, the following: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary
“La provocacion y el ataque a la Guardia Civil por paisanos alzadoz tumultuariamente para impedir al
Delegado de un Gobernador civil el cumplimiento de sus providencias, no pueden estimarse
constitutivos de un delito distinto del de sedicion, ni ser, por tanto, perseguidos y penados
separadamente.
“La resistencia o el acometimiento de los sublevados a la fuerza publica constituye, en su caso, una
circunstancia o accidente de la sedicion y no es delito de los que el Codigo Penal en este articulo
(formerly Article 244, now Article 227) supone que pueden cometerse en ella o con su motivo, los
cuales denomina delitos particulares, y manda que se penen conforme a las disposiciones del propio
Codigo. (S. 23-5-890;  G. 23-6-890;  t. 44;  pagina 671)” (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo,
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

p. 2411.) (Italics supplied.)

“La Audiencia condeno como autores de atentado a dos de los amotinados que agredieron al
alcalde, e interpuesto recurso de casacion contra la sentencia, el Tribunal Supremo la casa y anula,
teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el articulo 250 (numero 3.°) del Codigo Penal;
‘Considerando que el acto llevado a cabo por el grupo constituye una verdadera sedicion, sin que sea
licito el dividir este hecho y calificarlo de atentado respecto a las personas que agredieron a dicho
alcalde, porque el acometimiento fue un accidente de la sedicion, de la cual eran todos
responsables, ya se efectuara por los agrupados en conjunto o por uno solo, por ser comun el objeto
que se proponian y no individual;  y al calificar y penar este hecho la Audencia de Gerona, de
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

atentado  , ha incurrido en error de derecho e infringido los articulos 250 y siguientes del Codigo
 cralaw

Penal, por no haberlos aplicado, y el 263, numero 2.°, en relacion con el 264, numeros 1.° y 3.°, por
su aplicacion  ” (Sent. 3 octubre 1903. — Gac. 12 Diciembre) (Enciclopedia Juridica Española, Tomo
 cralaw

xxviii p. 250).
These cases are in accord with the text of said Article 244, which refers, not to all offenses
committed in the course of a rebellion or on the occasion thereof, but only to “delitos particulares”
or common crimes. Now, what are “delitos particulares” as the phrase is used in said article 244? We
quote from Viada: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“Las disposicion del primer parrafo de este articulo no puede ser mas justa;  con arreglo a ella, los chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

delitos particulares o comunes cometidos en una rebelion er sedicion no deberan reputarse como
accidentes inherentes a estas, sino como delitos especiales, a dicha rebelion y sedicion ajenos, los
que deberan ser respectivamente castigados con las penas que en este Codigo se las señalan. Pero,
que delitos deberan considerarse como comunes, y cuales como constitutivos de la propia rebelion o
sedicion? En cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece esta cuestion dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho que no
este comprendido en uno y otro de los objetos especificados en los seis numeros del articulo 243
sera extraño a la rebelion, y si se hallare definido en algun otro articulo del Codigo, con arreglo a
este debera ser castigado como delito particular. Pero tratandose de la sedicion, comprendiendose
como objetos de la misma, en los numeros 3.°, 4.° y 5.° del articulo 250, hechos que constituyen
otros tantos ataques a las personas o a la propiedad, cuales se consideran como accidentes
inherentes a la propria sedicion, y cuales deberan reputarse como delitos particulares o comunes?
En cuanto a los casos de los numeros 4.° y 5.°, estimanos que el objeto politico y social que se
requiera para la realizacion de los actos en aquellos comprendidos es el que debe servirnos de
norma y guia para distinguir lo inherente a la sedicion de lo que es ajeno o extraño a ella. Cuando no
exista ese objeto politico y social, el acto de odio o venganza ejercido contra los particulares o
cualquiera clase del Estado, y el atentado contra las propiedades de los ciudadanos o corporaciones
mentados en el numero 5.° del articulo 250, no seran constitutivos del delito de sedicion, sino que
deberan ser apreciados y castigados como delitos comunes, segun las disposiciones respectivas de
este Codigo — y por lo que toca a los actos de odio o venganza ejercidos en la persona o bienes de
alguna Autoridad o sus agentes, estimamos que deberan reputarse como delitos comunes todos
aquellos hechos innecesarios  2 para la consecucion del fin particular que se propusieran los
sediciosos — y como esenciales, constitutivos de la propia sedicion todos aquellos actos de odio o
venganza que sean medio racionalmente necesario para el logro del objeto especial a que se
encaminaran los esfuerzos de los sublevados. Asi, en el caso de la Cuestion 1 expuesta en el
comentario del articulo 258, es evidente que el fin que se propusieron los sediciosos fue no pagar el
impuesto a cuya cobranza iba a proceder el comisionado;  pero para lograr este objeto, como lo chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

lograron, fue preciso hacer salir del pueblo al ejecutor, y a este efecto, lo amenazaron, lo
persiguieron y llegaron hasta lesionarle. Esas amenazas y lesiones no pudieron apreciarse, ni las
aprecio tampoco la Sala sentenciadora, como delito comun, sino como accidente inherente a la
misma sedicion, por cuanto fueron un medio racionalmente necesario para la consecucion del fin
determinado que se propusieron los culpables.
“Pero cuando tal necesidad desaparece, cuando se hiere por herir, cuando se mata por matar, el
hecho ya, no puede ser considerado como un accidente propio de la sedicion, sino como un delito
especial, al que debe aplicarse la pena al mismo correspondiente.” (III Viada, pp. 311-312.) (Italics
supplied.)
Cuello Calon is even more illuminating. He says: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“La doctrina cientifica considera los delitos llamados politicos como infracciones de un caracter
especial distintas de los denominados delitos comunes. De esta apreciacion ha nacido la division de
los delitos, desde el punto de vista de su naturaleza intrinseca, en delitos politicos y delitos comunes
o de derecho comun.
“Se reputan delitos comunes aquellos que lesionan bienes juridicos individuales (v. gr., los delitos
contra la vida, contra la honestidad, contra la propiedad, etc.)
“La nocion del delito politico no parece tan clara. Desde luego revisten este caracter los que atentan
contra el orden politico del Estado, contra su orden externo (independencia de la nacion, integridad
del territorio, etc.), o contra el interno (delitos contra el Jefe del Estado, contra la forma de
Gobierno, etc.). Pero tambien pueden ser considerados como politicos todos los delitos,
cualesquiera que sean incluso los de derecho comun, cuando fueron cometidos por moviles
politicos. Deben, por tanto, estimarse como infracciones de esta clase, no solo las que
objetivamente tengan tal caracter por el interes politico que lesionan, sino tambien las que,
apreciadas subjetivamente, manifiestan una motivacion de caracter politico.
“Asi podria formulares esta definicion:  es delito politico el cometido contra el orden politico del
chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

Estado, asi como todo delito de cualquiera otra clase determinado por moviles politicos.” (Cuello
Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo I, pp. 247-249.)
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common
crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or
motive. If a crime usually regarded as common like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance “to the Government the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part
thereof,” then said offense becomes stripped of its “common” complexion, inasmuch as, being part
and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
Conformably with the foregoing, the case of murder against the Defendant in U. S. vs. Lardizabal (1
Phil., 729) — an insurgent who killed a prisoner of war because he was too weak to march with the
retreating rebel forces, and could not be left behind without endangering the safety of the latter —
was dismissed upon the ground that the execution of said prisoner of war formed part of, and was
included in, the crime of sedition, which, in turn, was covered by an amnesty, to the benefits of
which said Defendant was entitled.
True, in U. S. vs. Alfont (1 Phil., 115), the commander of an unorganized group of insurgents was,
pursuant to Article 244 of our old Penal Code, convicted of homicide for having shot and killed a
woman who was driving a vehicle. But the complex crime of rebellion with homicide was not
considered in that case. Apart from this, the accused failed to established the relation between her
death and the insurrection. What is more, it was neither proved nor alleged that he had been
prompted by political reasons. In other words, his offense was independent from the rebellion. The
latter was merely the occasion for the commission of the former.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned decisions of this court and the Supreme Court of Spain in
cases of treason, rebellion and sedition, are in line with the trend in other countries, as well as in the
field of international relations. Referring to the question as to what offenses are political in nature, it
was said in In re Ezeta (62 Fed. Rep., 972):chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“What constitutes an offense of a political character has not yet been determined by judicial
authority. Sir James Stephens, in his work, History of the Criminal Law of England (Volume 2, p. 71),
thinks that it should be ‘interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for
extradition crimes if those crimes were incidental to and formed a part of political disturbances.’ Mr.
John Stuart Mill, in the house of commons, in 1866, while discussing an amendment to the act of
‘extradition, on which the treaty between England and France was founded, gave this
definition:  Any offense committed in the course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

political commotion.’ Hansard’s Debates Vol. 184, p. 2115. In the Castioni Case, supra, decided in
1891, the question was discussed by the most eminent counsel at the English bar, and considered by
distinguished judges, without a definition being framed that would draw a fixed and certain line
between a municipal or common crime and one of political character. ‘I do not think,’ said Denman,
J., ‘it is necessary or desirable that we should attempt to put into language, in the shape of an
exhaustive definition, exactly the whole state of things, or every state of things, which might bring a
particular case within the description of an offense of a political character.’ In that case, Castioni was
charged with the murder of one Rossi, by shooting him with a revolver, in the town of Bellinzona, in
the canton of Ticino, in Switzerland. The deceased, Rossi, was a member of the state council of the
canton of Ticino. Castioni was a citizen of the same canton. For some time previous to the murder,
much dissatisfaction had been felt and expressed by a large number of inhabitants of Ticino at the
mode in which the political party then in power were conducting the government of the canton. A
request was presented to the government for a revision of the constitution of the canton and, the
government having declined to take a popular vote on that question, a number of the citizens of
Bellinzona, among whom was Castioni, seized the arsenal of the town, from which they took rifles
and ammunition, disarmed the gendarmes, arrested and bound or handcuffed several persons
connected with the government, and forced them to march in front of the armed crowd to the
municipal palace. Admission to the palace was demanded in the name of the people, and was
refused by Rossi and another member of the government, who were in the palace. The crowd then
broke open the outer gate of the palace, and rushed in, pushing before them the government
officials whom they had arrested and bound. Castioni, who was armed with a revolver, was among
the first to enter. A second door, which was locked, was broken open, and at this time, or
immediately after, Rossi, who was in the passage, was shot through the body with a revolver, and
died, very soon afterwards. Some other shots were fired, but no one else was injured. Castioni fled
to England. His extradition was requested by the federal council of Switzerland. He was arrested and
taken before a police magistrate, as provided by the statute, who held him for extradition.
Application was made by the accused to the high court of justice of England for a writ of habeas
corpus. He was represented by Sir Charles Russell, now lord chief justice. The attorney general, Sir
Richard Webster, appeared for the crown, and the solicitor general, Sir Edward Clarke, and Robert
Woodfal, for the federal council of Switzerland. This array of distinguished counsel, and the high
character of the court, commends the case as one of the highest authority. It appeared from an
admission by one of the parties engaged in the disturbances ‘that the death of Rossi was a
misfortune, and not necessary for the rising.’ The opinions of the judges as to the political character
of the crime charged against Castioni, upon the facts stated, is exceedingly interesting, but I need
only refer to the following passages. Judge Denman says: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary
“The question really is whether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man was acting as one of a
number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political character with a political object, and as
part of the political movement and rising in which he was taking part.’
“Judge Hawkins, in commenting upon the character of political offenses, said: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

‘I cannot help thinking that everybody knows there are many acts of a political character done
without reason, done against all reason;  but at the same time one cannot look too hardly, and chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot in their political excitement. We know that in heat, and in
heated blood, men often do things which are against and contrary to reason;  but none the less an chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

act of this description may be done for the purpose of furthering and in furtherance of a political
rising, even though it is an act which may be deplored and lamented, as even cruel and against all
reason, by those who can calmly reflect upon it after the battle is over.’
“Sir James Stephens, whose definition as an author has already been cited, was one of the judges,
and joined in the views taken as to the political character of the crime charged against Castioni. The
prisoner was discharged. Applying, by analogy, the action of the English court in that case to the four
cases now before me, under consideration, the conclusion follows that the crimes charged here,
associated as they are with the actual conflict of armed forces, are of a political character.
“The draft of a treaty on International Penal Law, adopted by the congress of Montevideo in 1888,
and recommended by the International American Conference to the governments of the Latin-
American nations in 1890, contains the following provisions (Article 23): chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

‘Political offenses, offenses subversive of the internal and external safety of a state or common
offenses connected with these, shall not warrant extradition. The determination of the character of
the offense is incumbent upon the nations upon which the demand for extradition is made;  and its chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

decision shall be made under and according to the provisions of the law which shall prove to be
most favorable to the accused: ’ chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“I am not aware that any part of this Code has been made the basis of treaty stipulations between
any of the American nations, but the article cited may be at least accepted as expressing the wisdom
of leading jurists and diplomats. The article is important with respect to two of its features:  (1) chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

provides that a fugitive shall not be extradited for an offense connected with a political offense, or
with an offense subversive of the internal or external safety of the state;  and (2) the decision as to chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

the character of the offense shall be made under and according to the provisions of the law which
shall prove most favorable to the accused. The first provision is sanctioned by Calvo, who, speaking
of the exemption from extradition of persons charged with political offenses, says: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

‘The exemption even extends to acts connected with political crimes or offenses, and it is enough, as
says Mr. Fuastin Helio;  that a common crime be connected with a political act, that it be the
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

outcome of or be in the outcome of or be in the execution of such, to be covered by the privilege

which protects the latter’ Calvo, Droit Int. (3me ed.) p. 413, section 1262.
“The second provision of the article is founded on the broad principles of humanity found
everywhere in the criminal law, distinguishing its administration with respect to even the worst
features of our civilization from the cruelties of barbarism. When this article was under discussion in
the international American conference in Washington, Mr. Silva, of Colombia, submitted some
observations upon the difficulty of drawing a line between an offense of a political character and a
common crime, and incidentally referred to the crime of robbery, in terms worthy of some
consideration here. He said: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

‘In the revolutions, as we conduct them in our countries, the common offenses are necessarily mixed
up with the political in many cases. A colleague General Caamaño (of Ecuador) knows how we carry
on wars. A revolutionist needs horses for moving, beef to feed his troops, etc.;  and since he does chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

not go into the public markets to purchase these horses and that beef, nor the arms and saddles to
mount and equip his forces, he takes them from the first pasture or shop he find at hand. This is
called robbery everywhere, and is a common offense in time of peace, but in time of war it is a
circumstance closely allied to the manner of waging it.’ International American Conference, Vol. 2, p.
615.” (Italics supplied.)
We quote the following from Endnote: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary  (23) on pages 249-250, Vol. I, of Cuello Calon’s aforesaid
work on “Derecho Penal.”
“En algunos Codigo y leyes de fecha proxima ya se halla una definicion de estos delitos. El Codigo
penal ruso, en el articulo 58, define como ‘delitos contra revolucionarios’ los hechos encaminados a
derrocar o debilitar el poder de los Consejos de trabajadores y campesinos y de los gobiernos de la
Union de Republicas socialistas sovieticas, a destruir o debilitar la seguridad exterior de la Union de
Republicas Sovieticas y las conquistas economicas, politicas y nacionales fundamentales de la
revolucion proletaria.’ El Codigo Penal italiano de 1930 considera en eu articulo 8.° como delito
politico ‘todo delito que ofenda un interes politico del Estado o un derecho politico del ciudadano.’
Tambien se reputa politico el delito comun deteminado, en todo o en parte por motivos politicos. En
la ley alemana de extradicion de 25 diciembre 1929 se definen asi:  ‘Son delitos politicos los chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

atentados punibles directamente ejecutados contra la existencia o la seguridad del Estado, contra el
jefe o contra un miembro del gobierno del Estado como tal, contra una corporacion constitucional,
contra los derechos politicos las buenas relaciones con el extranjero.’ parrafo 3.°, 2.
“La 6a. Conferencia para la Unificacion del Derecho penal (Copenhague, 31 agosto — 3 septiembre
1935) adopto la siguiente nocion del delito politico: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“1.  Por delitos politicos se entienden los dirigidos contra la organizacion y funcionamiento del
Estado o contra los derechos que de esta organizacion y funcionamiento provienen para el culpable.
“2.  Tambien se consideran como delitos politicos los delitos de derecho comun que constituyen
hechos conexos con la ejecucion de los delitos previstos en seccion 1.°:  como los hechos dirigidos chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

a favorecer la ejecucion de un delito politico o a permitir al autor de este delito sustraerse a la

aplicacion de la ley penal.
“3.  No se consideraran delitos politicos aquellos a los que su autor sea inducido por un motivo
egoista y vil.
“4.  No se consideraran delitos los que creen un peligro para la comunidad o un estado de terror.”
(Italics supplied.)
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition
that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their
character as “common” offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which
they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
There is one other reason — and a fundamental one at that — why Article 48 of our Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would
be imposable upon the movant, namely:  (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding
chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor;  and (2) for the crime of chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme
penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48, said penalty would have to be
meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if
construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of
sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts
performed by him were punished separately. In the word of Rodriguez Navarro: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75
del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.” (II Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo de España, p. 2168.) 3
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal
Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya
dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
“En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo,
hasta el limite que represente la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los
delitos.
“Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado.”
(Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrino Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163.)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the
imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not
exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The
absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of
said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict
a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing
that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48
could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the
penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is
readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed
less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of
sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the
penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the
separate penalties for each offense.
Did the framers of Article 48 have a different purpose in dealing therein with an offense which is a
means necessary for the commission of another? To begin with, the culprit cannot, then, be
considered as displaying a greater degree of malice than when the two offenses are independent of
each other. On the contrary, since one offense is a necessary means for the commission of the other,
the evil intent is one, which, at least, quantitatively, is lesser than when the two offenses are
unrelated to each other, because, in such event, he is twice guilty of having harbored criminal
designs and of carrying the same into execution. Furthermore, it must be presumed that the object
of Article 48, in its entirety, is only one. We cannot assume that the purpose of the lawmaker, at the
beginning of the single sentence of which said article consists, was to favor the accused, and that,
before the sentence ended, the former had a change of heart and turned about face against the
latter. If the second part of Article 48 had been meant to be unfavorable to the accused — and,
hence, the exact opposite of the first part — each would have been placed in, separate provisions,
instead of in one single article. If the first part sought to impose, upon the culprit, a penalty less
grave than that which he would deserve if the two or more offenses resulting from his single act
were punished separately, then this, also, must be the purpose of the second part, in dealing with an
offense which is a necessary means for the commission of another.
The accuracy of this conclusion is borne out by the fact that, since 1850, when the counterpart of
our Article 48 was inserted in the Penal Code of Spain, or for over a century, it does not appear to
have been applied by the Supreme Court thereof to crimes of murder committed in furtherance of
an insurrection.
Incidentally, we cannot accept the explanation that crimes committed as a means necessary for the
success of a rebellion had to be prosecuted separately under the provisions of Article 259 of the
Penal Code of Spain, which is the counterpart of Article 244 of our old Penal Code. To begin with,
these articles are part of a substantive law. They do not govern the manner or method of
prosecution of the culprits. Then again, said precepts ordain that common crimes committed during
a rebellion or sedition, or on the occasion thereof, “shall be respectively punished according to the
provisions of this Code.” Among such provisions was Article 90 (later Article 71, then Article 75) of
the Spanish Penal Code, and Article 89 of our old Penal Code, of which Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines is a substantial reproduction. Hence, had the Supreme Court of Spain
or the Philippines believed that murders committed as a means necessary to attain the aims of an
uprising were “common” crimes, the same would have been complexed with the rebellion or
sedition, as the case may be.
The cases of People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 64) and People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 82) have not escaped
our attention. Those cases involved members of the constabulary who rose publicly, for the purpose
of performing acts of hate and vengeance upon the police force of Manila, and in an encounter with
the latter, killed some members thereof. Charged with and convicted of sedition in the first case,
they were accused of murder in the second case. They pleaded double jeopardy in the second case,
upon the ground that the facts alleged in the information were those set forth in the charge in the
first case, in which they had been convicted. This plea was rejected upon the ground that the organic
law prohibited double jeopardy for the same offense, and that the offense of sedition is distinct and
different from that of murder, although both were the result of the same act.
The question whether one offense was inherent in, or identified with, the other was not discussed or
even considered in said cases. Besides, the lower court applied, in the murder case Article 89 of the
old Penal Code — which is the counterpart of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code — but this Court
refused to do so. Again, simply because one act may constitute two or more offenses, it does not
follow necessarily that a person may be prosecuted for one after conviction for the other, without
violating the injunction against double jeopardy. For instance, if a man fires a shotgun at another,
who suffers thereby several injuries, one of which produced his death, may he, after conviction for
murder or homicide, based upon said fatal injury, be accused or convicted, in a separate case, for the
non-fatal injuries sustained by the victim? Or may the former be convicted of the complex crime of
murder or homicide with serious and/or less serious physical injuries? The mere formulation of
these questions suffices to show that the limitation of the rule on double jeopardy to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense does not constitute a license for the separate prosecution of two
offenses resulting from the same act, if one offense is an essential element of the other. At any rate,
as regards this phase of the issue, which was not touched in the Cabrera cases, the rule therein laid
down must necessarily be considered modified by our decision in the cases of People vs. Labra (46
Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159) and Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (supra), insofar as inconsistent
therewith.
The main argument in support of the theory seeking to complex rebellion with murder and other
offenses is that “war” — within the purview of the laws on rebellion and sedition — may be “waged”
or “levied” without killing. This premise does not warrant, however, the conclusion — drawn
therefrom — that any killing done in furtherance of a rebellion or sedition is independent therefrom,
and may be complexed therewith, upon the ground that destruction of human life is not
indispensable to the waging or levying of war. A person may kill another without inflicting physical
injuries upon the latter, such, for instance, as by poisoning, drowning, suffocation or shock. Yet it is
admitted that he who fatally stabs another cannot be convicted of homicide with physical injuries.
So too, it is undeniable that treason may be committed without torturing or murdering anybody. Yet,
it is well-settled that a citizen who gives aid and comfort to the enemy by taking direct part in the
maltreatment and assassination of his (citizen’s) countrymen, in furtherance of the wishes of said
enemy, is guilty of plain treason, not complexed with murder or physical injuries, the later being —
as charged and proven — mere ingredients of the former. Now then, if homicide may be an
ingredient of treason, why can it not be an ingredient of rebellion? The proponents of the idea of
rebellion complexed with homicide,. etc., have not even tried to answer this question. Neither have
they assailed the wisdom of our aforementioned decisions in treason cases.
The Court is conscious of the keen interest displayed, and the considerable efforts exerted, by the
Executive Department in the apprehension and prosecution of those believed to be guilty of crimes
against public order, of the lives lost, and the time and money spent in connection therewith, as well
as of the possible implications or repercussions in the security of the State. The careful consideration
given to said policy of a coordinate and co-equal branch of the Government is reflected in the time
consumed, the extensive and intensive research work undertaken, and the many meetings held by
the members of the court for the purpose of elucidating on the question under discussion and of
settling the same.
The role of the judicial department under the Constitution is, however, — clear — to settle
justiceable controversies by the application of the law. And the latter must be enforced as it is —
with all its flaws and defects, not affecting its validity — not as the judges would have it. In other
words, the courts must apply the policy of the State as set forth in its laws, regardless of the wisdom
thereof.
It is evident to us that the policy of our statutes on rebellion is to consider all acts committed in
furtherance thereof — as specified in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised:  Penal Code — as chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

constituting only one crime, punishable with one single penalty — namely, that prescribed in said
Article 135. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the penalties provided in our old Penal
Code (Articles 230 to 232) were much stiffer, namely: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1.  Life imprisonment to death — for the promoters, maintainers and leaders of the rebellion, and,
also, for subordinate officers who held positions of authority, either civil or ecclesiastical, if the
purpose of the movement was to proclaim the independence of any portion of the Philippine
territory;
2.  Reclusion temporal in its maximum period — for said promoters, maintainers and leaders of the
insurrection, and for its subordinate officers, if the purpose of the rebellion was any of those
enumerated in Article 229, except that mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
3.  Reclusion temporal:  (a) for subordinate officers other than those already adverted to;  and
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(b) for mere participants in the rebellion falling under the first paragraph of No. 2 of Article 174;  chan

and
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4.  Prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period — for
participants not falling under No. 3.
After the cession of the Philippines to the United States, the rigors of the old Penal Code were
tempered. Its aforementioned provisions were superseded by section 3 of Act No. 292, which
reduced the penalty to imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years and a fine not exceeding
$10,000, or P20,000, for “every person who incites, sets on foot, assists or engages in any rebellion
or insurrection   or who gives aid and comfort to any one so engaging in such rebellion or
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insurrection.” Such liberal attitude was adhered to by the authors of the Revised Penal Code. The
penalties therein are substantially identical to those prescribed in Act 292. Although the Revised
Penal Code increased slightly the penalty of imprisonment for the promoters, maintainers and
leaders of the uprising, as well as for public officers joining the same, to a maximum not exceeding
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, it reduced the penalty of imprisonment for mere participants to
not more than eight (8) years of prision mayor, and eliminated the fine.
This benign mood of the Revised Penal Code becomes more significant when we bear in mind it was
approved on December 8, 1930 and became effective on January 1, 1932. At that time the
communists in the Philippines had already given ample proof of their widespread activities and of
their designs and potentialities. Prior thereto, they had been under surveillance by the agents of the
law, who gathered evidence of their subversive movements, culminating in the prosecution of
Evangelista, Manahan (57 Phil., 354;  57 Phil., 372), Capadocia (57 Phil., 364), Feleo (57 Phil., 451),
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Nabong (57 Phil., 455), and others. In fact, the first information against the first two alleged that
they committed the crime of inciting to sedition “on and during the month of November, 1930, and
for sometime prior and subsequent thereto.”
As if this were not enough, the very Constitution adopted in 1935, incorporated a formal and solemn
declaration (Article II, section 5) committing the Commonwealth, and, then the Republic of the
Philippines, to the “promotion of social justice”. Soon later, Commonwealth Act No. 103, creating
the Court of Industrial Relations, was passed. Then followed a number of other statutes
implementing said constitutional mandate. It is not necessary to go into the details of said legislative
enactments. Suffice it to say that the same are predicated upon a recognition of the fact that a good
many of the problems confronting the State are due to social and economic evils, and that, unless
the latter are removed or, least minimized, the former will keep on harassing the community and
affecting the well-being of its members.
Thus, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning of the century, has been one of
decided leniency, in comparison with the laws enforce during the Spanish regime. Such policy has
not suffered the slightest alteration. Although the Government has, for the past five or six years,
adopted a more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of violators of said law and in their
prosecution the established policy of the State, as regards the punishment of the culprits has
remained unchanged since 1932. It is not for us to consider the merits and demerits of such policy.
This falls within the province of the policy-making branch of the government the Congress of the
Philippines. However, the following quotation from Cuello Calon indicates the schools of thought on
this subject and the reason that may have influenced our lawmakers in making their choice: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“Durante muchos siglos, hasta tiempos relativamente cercanos, se reputaban los hechos que hoy
llamamos delitos politicos como mas graves y peligrosos que los crimenes comunes. Se consideraba
que mientras estos solo causan un daño individual, aquellos producen profundas perturbaciones en
la vida collectiva llegando a poner en peligro la misma vida del Estado. En consonancia con estas
ideas fueron reprimidos con extraordinaria severidad y designados con la denominacion romana de
delitos de lesa majestad se catalogaron en las leyes penales como los crimenes mas temibles.
“Pero desde hace poco mas de un siglo se ha realizado en este punto una transformacion profunda
merced a la cual la delincuencia politica dejo de apreciarse con los severos criterios de antaño
quedando sometida a un regimen penal, por regla general suave y benevolo.
“El origen de este cambio se remonta, segun opinion muy difundida, a la revolucion que tuvo lugar
en Francia en el año 1830. El gobierno de Luis Felipe establecio una honda separacion entre los
delitos comunes y los politicos, siendo estos sometidos a una penalidad mas suave y sus autores
exceptuados de la extradicion. Irradiando a otros paises tuvieron estas tan gran difusion que en casi
todos los de regimen liberal-individualista se ha llegado a crear un tratamiento desprovisto de
severidad para la represion de estos hechos. No solo las penas con que se conminaron perdieron
gran parte de su antigua dureza, sino qua en algunos paises se creo un regimen penal mas suave
para estos delicuentes, en otros se abolio para ellos la pena de muerte. Tan profundo contraste
entre el antiguo y el actual tratamiento de la criminalidad politica en la mayoria de los paises solo
puede ser explicado por las ideas nacidas y difundidas bajo los regimenes politicos liberalesacerca de
estos delitos y delincuentes. Por una parte se ha afirmado que la criminalidad da estos hechos no
contiene la misma inmoralidad que la delincuencia comun, que es tan solo relativa, qua depende del
tiempo, del lugar, da las circumstancias, de las instituciones del pais. Otros invocan la elevacion de
los moviles y sentimientos determinantes de estos hechos, el amor a la patria, la adhesion ferviente
a determinadas ideas o principios, el espiritu de sacrificio por el triunfo de un ideal.
“Contra su trato benevolo, del que no pocas veces se han beneficiado peligrosos malhechores, se ha
iniciado hace algun tiempo una fuerte reaccion (vease Cap. XV, 3.°, b), que llego a alcanzar
considerable severidad en las legislaciones de tipo autoritario, y que tambien ha hallado eco, en
forma mas suave, en las de otros paises de constitucion democratica en los que, especialmente en
los ultimos años, la frecuencia de agitaciones politicas y sociales ha originado la publicacion de
numerosas leyes encaminadas a la proteccion penal del Estado.” (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo
1, pp. 250-252.)
Such evils as may result from the failure of the policy of the law punishing the offense to dovetail
with the policy of the law enforcing agencies in the apprehension and prosecution of the offenders
are matters which may be brought to the attention of the departments concerned. The judicial
branch cannot amend the former in order to suit the latter. The Court cannot indulge in judicial
legislation without violating the principle of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the
foundation of our republican system. In, short, we cannot accept the theory of the prosecution
without causing much bigger harm than that which would allegedly result from the adoption of the
opposite view.
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against Defendant-
Appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said Defendants, as means “necessary”
4 for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion;  that the crime charged in the aforementioned
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amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies;  that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge
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cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000;  and that, in conformity chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment,
said Defendant may be allowed bail.
It is urged that, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court should deny the motion under
consideration, because the security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction
appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Amado V. Hernandez is strong. However, as
held in a resolution of this court, dated January 29, 1953, in the case of Montano vs. Ocampo (G.R. L-
6352): chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“  to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong;  it must also appear that in case
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of conviction the Defendant’s criminal liability would probably call for a capital punishment. No clear
or conclusive showing before this Court has been made.”
In fact, in the case at bar, Defendant Amado V. Hernandez was sentenced by the lower court, not to
the extreme penalty, but to life imprisonment. Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too
transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be denied upon mere general principles
and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major
preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very
first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs
(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the
protection of several aspects of freedom. Thus, in line with the letter and spirit of the fundamental
law, we said in the aforementioned case of Montano vs. Ocampo: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise absolute right
guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has been toward a fair and liberal
appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the evidence in the determination of the degree of proof and
presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right.”
x x x                    x x x                    x x x
“In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important factor to be taken
into account. The sole purpose of confining accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is
to secure his presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is
only on the theory that the proof being strong, the Defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity,
rather than face the verdict of the jury. Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed
should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution.
“The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the Defendant’s official and social standing
and his other personal circumstances, seem remote if not nil.”
This view applies fully to Amado V. Hernandez, with the particularity that there is an additional
circumstance in his favor — he has been detained since January 1951, or for more than five (5)
years, and it may still take some time to dispose of the case, for the same has not been, and is not in
a position to be, included, as yet, in our calendar, inasmuch as the briefs for some Appellants —
other than Hernandez — as well as the brief for the Government, are pending submission. It should
be noted, also, that the decision appealed from the opposition to the motion in question do not
reveal satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the accused showing, sufficiently, that his provincial
release, during the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the security of the State.
Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of Defendant- Appellant Amado V. Hernandez is
hereby granted and, upon the filing of a bond, with sufficient sureties, in the sum of P30,000, and its
approval by the court, let said Defendant-Appellant be provisionally released. It is SO ORDERED.
Paras, C.J., Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo and Reyes. J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., concurs in the result.
 
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Amado V. Hernandez and others were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime
of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies. The body of the information charged that
he and his co-Defendants conspired and that “as a necessary means to commit the crime of
rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof,” “have then and there committed acts
of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public property to
create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the
aforesaid purpose,” and recited the different crimes committed by the Defendants. After trial Amado
V. Hernandez was found guilty and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment from which judgment and
sentence he appealed. The appeal is pending in this Court.
Upon the ground that there is no complex crime of rebellion with murder, the penalty provided for
to be imposed upon persons found guilty of rebellion being prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000 only, 1 the majority grants the petition for bail filed by the Appellant.
Section 1, paragraph 16, Article III, of the Constitution provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Italics
supplied.)
The pertinent sections of Rule 110 provide: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 3.  Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. — After judgment
by a justice of the peace and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the Defendant shall be
admitted to bail as of right.
SEC. 4.  Noncapital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. — After conviction by the
Court of First Instance Defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the court.
SEC. 5.  Capital offenses defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an offense
which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be
admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
SEC. 6.  Capital offenses not bailable. — No person in custody for the commission of a capital offense
shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
SEC. 7.  Capital offenses - burden of proof. — On the hearing of an application for admission to bail
made by any person who is in custody for the commission of a capital offense, the burden of
showing that evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution.
SEC. 13.  Bail on appeal. — Bail upon appeal must conform in all respects as provided for in other
cases of bail.
According to this Rule, a Defendant in a criminal case after a judgment of conviction by the Justice of
the Peace Court and before conviction by the Court of First Instance is entitled to bail. After
conviction by the Court of First Instance he, upon application, may still be bailed in non-capital
offenses but at the discretion of the court. When the information charges a capital offense
the Defendant is not entitled to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course this means before
conviction. After conviction for a capital offense, the Defendant has absolutely no right to bail,
because even before conviction a Defendant charged with capital offense is not entitled to bail if the
evidence of guilt is strong. So that should a Defendant charged with a capital offense apply for bail
before conviction, the prosecution must establish and show that the evidence of the Defendant’s
guilt is strong if the application for bail be objected to. After conviction of a Defendant charged with
a capital offense there is no stronger evidence of his guilt than the judgment rendered by the trial
court. The judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. Until after the evidence shall have been
reviewed and the reviewing court shall have found that the trial court committed error in convicting
the Defendant of the crime charged, the judgment and sentence of the trial court in such criminal
case must be taken at its face value and be given full faith and credit by this Court.
Without a review of the evidence presented in the case, the majority has taken up and discussed the
question whether, under and pursuant to the provisions of article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, the
complex crime of rebellion with murder may arise or exist or be committed and has reached the
conclusion that murder as an incident to rebellion, is integrated, imbibed, incorporated, or absorbed
in, or part and parcel of, the last mentioned crime. For that reason it is of the opinion that, as the
information filed against Amado V. Hernandez does not charge a capital offense, he may be
admitted to bail at the discretion of the Court.
Even if the majority opinion that the crime charged in the information is rebellion only — a non-
capital offense — be correct, still the granting of bail after conviction is discretionary, and I see no
plausible reason for the reversal of this Court’s previous stand, because the security of the State is at
stake.
For these reasons I dissent.
 
MONTEMAYOR, J., dissenting: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Unable to agree to the resolution of the majority, I am constrained to dissent therefrom, not so
much from the part thereof granting the motion for bail, as where it holds not only that there can be
no complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson, etc., but that these crimes
when committed during and on the occasion of a rebellion, are absorbed by the latter. The new
doctrine now being laid down besides being, to my mind, quite radical and in open and clear
contravention of public policy, is fundamental and of far-reaching consequences, and I feel it my
duty not only to voice my dissent but also to state the reasons in support thereof.
The resolution cites and quotes Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code to support its theory that the
five acts enumerated therein particularly those of engaging in war against the forces of the
government, destroying property and committing serious violence, cover all the murders, robberies,
arsons, etc., committed on the occasion of or during a rebellion;  and it proceeds to assert that the
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expressions used in said article, such as engaging in war against the forces of the government and
committing serious violence imply everything that war connotes such as physical injuries and loss of
life. In this connection, it is of profit and even necessary to refer to Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code defining and describing how the crime of rebellion is committed.
“Art. 134.  Rebellion or insurrection — How committed. — The crime of rebellion or insurrection is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.”
According to the above article, rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
government for the purpose or purposes enumerated in said article. In other words, the commission
of rebellion is complete and consummated if a group of persons for the purposes enumerated in the
article, rise publicly, take up arms and assemble. It is not necessary for its consummation that
anybody be injured or killed, be it a government soldier or civilian, or that innocent persons be
forcibly deprived of their properties by means of robbery or that their stores and houses be looted
and then burned to the ground. Stated differently, murders, robberies, arsons, etc., are not
necessary or indispensable in the commission of rebellion and, consequently, are not ingredients or
elements of the latter.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code providing for “Penalty for complex crimes” reads thus: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“ART. 48.  Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.” (As
amended by Act No. 4000.)
For better understanding, I deem it advisable to ascertain and explain the meaning of the phrase
“necessary means” used in Article 48. “Necessary means” as interpreted by criminologists, jurists
and legal commentators, does not mean indispensable means, because if it did, then the offense as a
“necessary means” to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would
be an ingredient thereof. That would be true in the offense of trespass to dwelling to commit
robbery in an inhabited house, or the infliction of physical injuries to commit homicide or murder.
The phrase “necessary means” used in Article 48, merely signifies that for instance, a crime such as
simple estafa can be and ordinarily is committed in the manner defined and described in the Penal
Code;  but, if the “estafador” resorts to or employs falsification, merely to facilitate and insure his
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committing the estafa, then he is guilty of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification. So, if one
desiring to rape a certain woman, instead of waiting for an opportunity where she could be alone or
helpless, in the fields or some isolated place, abducts her by force and takes her to a forest to ravish
her;  or he enters her home through a window at night and rapes her in her room, then he is guilty
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of the complex crime of abduction with rape or rape with trespass to dwelling. The reason is that the
commission of abduction of trespass to dwelling are not indispensable means or ingredients of the
crime of rape. They are but means selected by the culprit to facilitate and carry out perhaps more
quickly his evil designs on his victim. Says the eminent Spanish commentator, Groizard, on this
point: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary
“Una cosa analoga acontece respecto de los delitos conexionados con una relacion de medio a fin.
Tambien en ellos la unidad de acto moral, que da vida al delito, hace logica la imposicion de una sola
pena. Preciso es, sin embargo, distinguir el caso en que el delito medio sea medio necesario de
realizar el delito fin, del caso en que sea puramente medio, pero no medio indispensable. En aquel,
el delito medio no es, en realidad, sino una condicion precisa, una circumstancia sine qua non, un
elemento integral de la accion punible concebida como fin. Sin pasar por uno, seria imposible llegar
al otro. La voluntad, libre e inteligente, tiene entonces por unico objeto llegar al delito fin. Si al
recorrer su camino ha de pasar, indispensablemante, por la comision de otro hecho punible, no dos,
sino un delito habra que castigar, toda ves que uno fue el mal libremente querido, no siendolo el
otro por si, sino en tanto que era necesario para obtener, la realizacion del mal proposito
concebido.”
x x x                    x x x                    x x x
“Asi, hay que reconocer que es plausible que, cuando un delito es medio de realizar otro, se
imponga al culpable la pena correspondiente al mayor en su grado maximo;  pero que no los es si chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

resulta que ha sido medio necesario. Por lo contrario, para que sea justo el aumento de pena, con
arreglo a la doctrina general acerca del delito y las circunstancia agravantes, es preciso que existan y
no se aprovechen otros procedimientos, otros recursos, mas o menos faciles para consumar el
delito. Entonces la responsibilidad se hace mayor eligiendo un medio que sea un delito en si. El que
puede, haciendo uso de su libertad y de su inteligencia, escoger entre varios procedimientos para
llegar a un fin, y se decide por uno que por si solo constituye delito, de este delito no necessario para
la realizacion del proyectado como fin, debe responder tambien.”
x x x                    x x x                    x x x
“Ejemplo:  el allanamiento de domicilio como medio de llegar al delito de violacion. No es
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condicion necesaria, para que la violacion pueda realizarse, el entrar en la morada ajena contra la
voluntad de su dueño. Sin esa circunstancia, el delito puede existir. Ahora bien;  si el criminal chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

acepta como medio de llegar a la violacion el allanamiento de domicilio, este delito y el de violacion
deben ser castigados observandose en la aplicacion del castigo una unidad de penalidad que guarde
cierta analogia con la unidad de pensamiento que llevo en culpable a la ralizacion de ambos delitos.
Para estos y analogos casos, la razon aprueba la imposicion de la mas grave de las penas en su grado
maximo.” (Groizard, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Tomo II, pp. 495-496.)
Applying the above observations to the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134, the same may be
committed by merely rising publicly and taking arms against the government, such as was done on
several occasions as alleged in the information for rebellion in the present case where a group of
Hukbalahaps, entered towns, overpowered the guards at the Presidencia confiscated firearms and
the contents of the municipal treasurer’s safe, exacted contributions in the form of money, food-
stuffs and clothing from the residents and maintained virtual control of the town for a few hours.
That is simple but consummated rebellion. Murder, robbery, arson, etc., are not necessary or
indispensable to consummate the crime of rebellion.
But in other cases, this group or other groups of dissidents in order to facilitate achieving their
objective to overthrow the government, according to the findings of the trial courts in several cases
of rebellion, resorted to looting and robberies to raise funds to finance their movement, sometimes
killing civilians who refused to contribute or to be recruited to augment the forces of the rebels or
who were suspected of giving information to the government forces of the movements of the
dissidents. Sometimes, homes of town and barrio residents are set on fire and burned to the ground
in reprisal or in order to strike terror into the hearts of the inhabitants, so that they would be more
amenable to the rule and the demands of the rebels. At other times, civilians were kidnapped for
purposes of ransom, and some hostages killed when the ransom was not paid or was not
forthcoming. In the raid on Camp Macabulos in Tarlac, besides shooting down soldiers and officers,
buildings were set on fire, inducing the hospital, as a result of which, patients including a Red Cross
nurse were killed. In another case, a passenger bus containing about forty civilian passengers in Sta.
Cruz, Zambales, was held up by these armed dissidents;  the passengers were robbed of their chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

money and jewelry and fourteen of them were shot to death. The party of Mrs. Aurora Quezon while
on its way to the town of Baler, was ambushed in Bongabong, Nueva Ecija by the dissidents and
several members of the party, including herself, her daughter, her son-in-law, Mayor Bernardo of
Quezon City, and others were killed, and their persons despoiled of jewelries and belongings. It is
clear that all these acts of murder, vandalism, banditry and pillage cannot be regarded as ingredients
and indispensable elements of the crime of rebellion. The aforecited acts and cases, the
enumeration of which is far from complete, are not based on mere suspicion or hearsay. They are
alleged as facts in the numerous counts contained in complaints or informations for rebellion with
multiple murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc. in several separate cases in the Courts of First
Instance, some still pending trial-but quite a number already decided and now pending appeal
before us. There must be much truth to these charges and counts because in the case against Huk
Supremo Luis Taruc, William Pomeroy et al., (criminal case No. 19166 C.F.I., Manila) Pomeroy
pleaded guilty to all the thirty counts against him;  so did Taruc after seven counts had been
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eliminated from the thirty contained in the information. Among the twenty three counts remaining
to which Taruc pleaded guilty were the holding up of forty civilians in a passenger bus in Sta. Cruz,
Zambales, and the night raid on Camp Macabulos where hospital patients and a Red Cross nurse
were killed.
Since the above mentioned crimes of multiple murder, robbery, kidnapping, etc., are not ingredients
of rebellion nor indispensable to its commission but only means selected and employed by the
offenders to commit rebellion and achieve their goal, a complex crime is committed under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code.
Going back to the theory of the majority in the resolution that the phrase engaging in war and
committing serious violence used in Article 134, covers the crimes of murder, robbery, arson, etc.,
committed during a rebellion, I emphatically disagree. Engaging in war and levying war, against the
government, are general terms employed in the United States statutes to define rebellion and
treason. They are used interchangeably and have the same meaning in our law on rebellion and
treason, (Articles 114, 134, 135, Revised Penal Code) which are based on Act 292 of American origin.
They do not necessarily mean actual killing of government troops, much less of innocent civilians.
“Levying War. — The assembling of a body of men for the purpose of effecting by force a
treasonable object;  and all who perform any part, however, minute, or however remote from the
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scene of action, and who are leagued in the general conspiracy, are considered as engaged in levying
war, within the meaning of the constitution.” (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Vol. 2, p. 1938.)
This Tribunal defines “levying war” in the case of U.S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil., 478-9, thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Whatever differences there may have been among the early judges as to whether an armed
resistance to the enforcement of a public law (see Act No. 292, section 5, 1) constituted a levying of
war or not, and war or was not treason, yet they were all unanimous in holding that acts of violence
committed by an armed body of men with the purpose of overthrowing the Government was
“levying war against the United States,” and was therefore treason, whether it was done by ten men
or ten thousand. (See United States vs. Hanway, 2 Wall., jr., 139;  26 Fed. Cases, 105.) chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

x x x                    x x x                    x x x
“As the act of engaging in a rebellion is levying war, and therefore treason, the same act seems to be
punished by both sections and in different ways.” (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil., 48-9.)
Just as a citizen can commit treason by adhering to the enemy and committing treasonable overt
acts such as pointing out and helping arrest guerrillas, accompanying enemy soldiers on patrol and
giving valuable information to the enemy, without himself killing anyone of his countrymen, this
although Article 114 uses the phrase levying war to define-treason, so, although Article 135 uses the
phrase “engaging in war”, a group of individuals may also commit rebellion by merely rising publicly
and taking arms against the government without firing a single shot or inflicting a single wound.
But the majority says that serious violence mentioned in Article 134 may include murder. To me, this
view is untenable. From serious violence to the capital offense of murder, certainly, is a far cry.
Besides, serious violence can also be on things. In my opinion, the different acts mentioned in Article
135, among them, destroying property, committing serious violence, exacting contributions or
diverting public funds, instead of giving license and unlimited leave to rebels and dissidents to
engage in mass murder, looting and wholesale destruction of property, on the contrary, serve to
limit and restrict the violations of law that may be included in and absorbed by rebellion. Article 135
mentions those acts which generally accompany a public armed uprising. When rebels raid a town or
barrio, manhandling of civilians who obstruct their movements or fail to carry out their orders such
as to lend their carabaos and carts for transportation purposes, or to contribute food, clothes,
medicines, money etc., may be expected. The rebels may employ force to disarm the policeman
guarding the Presidencia and if he offers resistance beat him up or, once inside, break down the
door of the treasurer’s office, blow up his safe and carry away the money contents thereof. All these
acts involve violence, even serious violence on persons and things, including diversion of public
funds. But knowing that these law violations, relatively not serious, are generally unavoidable in
public armed uprisings involving hastily assembled persons and groups with little discipline’ the law
tolerates them, considering them as part of the rebellion. But when rebels rob innocent civilians,
kidnap them for purposes of ransom, even kill them merely because they fail to pay the ransom, and
civilian houses are put to the torch, endangering the lives of the inmates;  when civilians are killed
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for refusing to contribute, or on mere suspicion of their giving information to the government, I
cannot believe that these brutal act are condoned by the law and are to be included in the crime of
rebellion.
The majority leans heavily on our decisions in several treason cases wherein we refused or failed to
convict of the complex crime of treason with multiple murder. To me, those cases are neither
controlling nor applicable for several reasons. Almost invariably, indictment in those treason cases
alleged the killings committed by the indictees as ingredients and elements of treason. They are
mentioned as the overt acts to establish and prove treason. Naturally, the court held that being
ingredients of the crime of treason they cannot be considered as distinct and separate offenses for
the purpose of applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Another reason is that, treason being a
capital offense, this court did not see any immediate necessity for considering and applying the
theory of complex crime because the result would in many cases be practically the same. In other
words, treason might yet be said to absorb the crime of homicide, even of murder, because as
regards the penalty, they are of the same category. Still another reason, not an unimportant one is
that at that time, opinion among the members of this Tribunal on the question of complex crime of
treason with homicide, sedition with murder and rebellion with murder, arson, robbery, etc., had
not yet crystalized, one way or the other. So, we preferred to avoid ruling on the issue, specially
since by considering the commission of murder, robbery, etc., in treason as aggravating the crime,
we would achieve the same result as regards the penalty to be imposed.
But in the case of People vs. Perfecto Labra, G.R. No. 1240, May 12, 1949, this court through Mr.
Justice Bengzon, accepted the view of the Solicitor General that under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, Labra was guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder, as shown by the
dispositive part of our decision in that case, which is quoted below:
chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“Wherefore, the verdict of guilt must be affirmed. Article 48, 114 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code
are applicable to the offense of treason with murder. However, for lack of sufficient votes to impose
the extreme penalty, the Appellant will be sentenced to life imprisonment.”
The only reason why the death penalty was not imposed in said case was because of lack of
sufficient votes but evidently, the Justices were agreed as to the application of Article 48 of the Penal
Code regarding complex crimes.
Then in the treason case of People vs. Barrameda, 85 Phil., 789, 47 Off. Gaz., 5082, on the strength
of our decision in the case of Labra, the Solicitor General recommended that Barrameda be also
convicted of the complex crime of treason with multiple murder and sentenced to death. This
Tribunal accepted the Solicitor General’s recommendation and imposed the death penalty in the
following language: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“We entertain not the least doubt as to the guilt of the Appellant. His very counsel de oficio who
made an analysis of the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and painstakingly stated
them in detail in his brief, agrees that his client is guilty although he prays that the sentence of life
imprisonment be affirmed. The Solicitor General, however, recommends that the penalty of death
be imposed upon the Appellant. Considering that the treason committed by the Appellant was
accompanied not only by the apprehension of Americans (U. S. citizens) and their delivery to the
Japanese forces which evidently later executed them, but also by killing with his own hands not only
one but several Filipinos, his own countrymen, and that in addition to this, he took part in the mass
killing and slaughter of many other Filipinos, we are constrained to agree to said recommendation.
However, unpleasant, even painful is the compliance with our duty, we hereby impose upon
the Appellant Teodoro Barrameda the penalty of death which will be carried out on a day to be fixed
by the trial court within thirty (30) days after the return of the record of the case to said court.”
With the two aforecited cases, it may not be said that the Supreme Court has always held that there
can be no complex crime of treason with murder.
The theory of the majority is that the crime of rebellion with the maximum penalty of twelve years
and fine, absorbs the other crimes of murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., as long as the latter
are committed in the course and in furtherance of the former. The idea of one crime absorbing a
more serious one with a more severe penalty does not readily appeal to the reasonable and logical
mind which can only comprehend a thing absorbing another smaller or less than itself in volume, in
importance, in value or in category. That is why Judge Montesa in the three cases, People vs.
Hernandez, People vs. Espiritu, and People vs. Medina, criminal cases Nos. 15481, 15479 and 1411
respectively, of the Court of First Instance, Manila, in his decision convicting the accused therein, in
disposing of the theory of absorption, urged upon him by counsel for the defense to the effect that
the crime of rebellion absorbs the crime of murder, robbery, arson, etc., made the following
observations: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“The theory of absorption tenaciously adhered to by the defense to the effect that rebellion absorbs
all these more serious offenses is preposterous to say the least, considering that it is both physically
and metaphysically imposible for a smaller unit or entity to absorb a bigger one.” (Montesa, J.,
People vs. Hernandez G.R. No. 15481, P. 78.)
We need not go into an academic discussion of this question because as a matter of law, my opinion,
criminal jurisprudence, expounding the criminal law namely the Penal Code and the Penal Code of
Spain, on which it is based, expressly and clearly declare that the common crimes of murder,
robbery, arson, etc., committed in the course or by reason of rebellion, are separate crimes, not to
be merged in or absorbed by rebellion and should be prosecuted separately. Article 259 of the Penal
Code of Spain, of 1870 on which our Penal Code promulgated in 1887, was based, provides as
follow:chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebellion o sedicion o con motivo de ellas, seran
castigados respectivamente, segun las disposiciones de este Codigo.
“Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores, seran penados como tales los jefes principales de la
rebelion o sedicion.” (Groiazrd, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Tomo III, Articulo 259, p. 649.)
In commenting on Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code, Viada says: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“‘La disposicion del primer parrafo de este articulo no puede ser mas justa;  con arreglo a ella, los chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

delitos particulares o comunes cometidos en una rebellion o sedicion no deberan reputarse como
accidentes inherentes a estas, sino como delitos especiales a dicha rebellion y sedicion ajenos, los
que deberan ser respectivamente castigados con als penas que en este Codigo se les señalan. Pero
que delitos deberan considerarse como comunes, y cuales como constitutivos de la propia rebelion o
sedicion? En cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece este cuestion dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho que no
este comprendido en uno u otro de los objetos especificados en los seis numeros del Articulo 243
sera extraño a la rebelion, y si se este debera ser castigado como delito particular.’“ (Viada, Codigo
Penal, Tomo II, 198-199.)
Peña, another commentator, referring to Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Gode, has the following to
say:
chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“La disposicion de este articulo es sobradamente justa, pero cuando se entendera que el hecho es
independiente de la insurgencia? Tratandose de la rebelion no hay problema, pues todos los fines
que se indican en el Articulo 214 se distinguen facilmente de un asesinato, un robo, una violacion,
etc. El problema puede surgir con la sedicion, en cuyos tres ultimos numeros, dice un autor, se
tipifican conductas que muy bien pueden ser subsimidas en otros lugares del Codigo. El T.S. parece
que sigue este principio general:  las infracciones graves se consideran como delitos
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independientes, en cambio los hechos de menor gravedad puedan ser considerados como
accidentes de la rebelion. En este sentido, el T.S. ha declarado que son accidentes de la rebelion, los
desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad y otros delitos contra el orden publico, asi como la resistencia o
acometiendo a la fuerza publica (23 Mayo 1890). El abuso de superioridad tambien es inherente el
alzamiento tumultuario (19 noviembre 1906.)” (Peña Deredes Penal, Tomo II pp. 89-90.)
Another commentator, A. Quintano Ripolles, says of Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code,
counterpart of Article 244 of our old Penal Code: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“La concurrencia de delitos consignada en este articulo no puede ser mas justa, bien que la dificultad
persista siempre para determinar cuales han de ser los particulares accidentales y cuales los
integrantes de la propia subversion. Una doctrina demasiado simplista, que ha sido a menudo
seguida por la Jurisprudencia, es la de estimar que, absorbiendo el delito mas grave al que lo es
menos, todo el que por debajo del de rebelion o sedicion sera anulado por este. Para los del la
misma naturaleza, la cosa es incuestionable, pero no para los que la tengan diversa, entendiendo
por la estraña e imprecisa expresion de (particulares) a las infracciones comunes o no politicas.” (A.
Quintano Ripolles, Comentarios al Codigo Penal Vol. II, pp. 101-102;  cursivas con neustras.) chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

Another distinguished legal commentator gives his view on the same Article 259: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Se establece aqui que en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, comente otros delitos (v.
g., roba, mata o lesiona), sera responsable de estos ademas de los delitos de rebelion o sedicion. La
dificultad consiste en estos casos en separar los accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion de los delitos
independientes de estas, y como las leyes no contienen en este punto precepto alguno aplicable, su
solucion ha quedado encomendada a los tribunales. La jurisprudencia que estos han sentado
considera como accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion — cuya criminalidad queda embebida en la de
estos delitos, y, por tanto, no son punibles especialmente — los hechos de escasa gravedad (v: g., chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

atentados, desacatos, lesiones menos graves);  por el contrario, las infracciones graves, como el
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asesinato o las lesiones graves, se consideran como delitos independientes de la rebelion o del la
sedicion.” (Cuello Calon, Vol. 2 Derecho Penal p. 110.)
Finally, Groizard, another eminent commentator of the Penal code of Spain, in commenting on the
same Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870, says the following: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“No necesita ninguno el parrafo primero de este articulo. Aunque no se hubiera escrito en el Codigo,
harian los Tribunales lo que dice. Seria necesario para que asi no sucediera el que fuera la rebelion
un motivo de exencion de responsabilidad criminal para las demas clases de delitos.” (Groizard
Tomo 3, 650.)
It will be seen that Spanish jurists and legal commentators are, with reference to Article 259 of the
Spanish Penal Code of 1870, unanimous in the opinion that this provision of the Criminal Law is just
and fair because one should not take advantage of his committing the crime of rebellion by
committing other more serious crime such as murder, robbery, arson, etc., with impunity. The above
much commented Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code has its counterpart in Article 244 of our old
Penal Code in practically the same wording and phraseology: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“ART. 24.  All other crimes committed in the course of a rebellion of seditious movement, or on
occasion thereof, shall be punished in accordance with the rules of this Code.
“If the perpetrators of such crimes cannot be discovered, the principal leaders of the rebellion or
sedition shall be punished therefore as principals.”
In this jurisdiction, we have faithfully observed and applied this penal provision. In the cases of U. S.
vs. Cabrera, et al., 43 Phil., page 64 and page 82 for sedition and multiple murder respectively,
wherein members of the Philippine constabulary attacked and killed several policemen in the City of
Manila, this Court convicted said soldiers, first, of sedition and later, of multiple murder, clear proof
that the murders committed in the course of and by reason of the sedition were not included in and
absorbed by sedition, this despite the fact that our law on sedition then, section 5 of Act No. 292,
uses the words — rise publicly and tumultuously, in order to attain by force or outside of legal
methods any of the following objects are guilty of sedition. In the multiple murder case, the
sergeants and corporals of the constabulary, who took part in the killing of the city policemen, were
sentenced to death. This court in that case said: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a
crime against public order;  murder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a crime directed against
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the existence of the State, the authority of the government, and the general public tranquility;  chan

murder is a crime directed against the lives of individuals. (U. S. vs. Abad (1902) 1 Phil. 437.)
roblesvirtualawlibra ry

Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state;  chan

murder at common law is where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any human
roblesvirtualawlibra ry

being, in the peace of the sovereign, with malice aforethought, express or implied.
“The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in point
of law, however, nearly they may be connected in point of fact. Not alone are the offenses “eo
nomine” different, but the allegations in the body of the informations are different. The gist of the
information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in order to attain
by force and outside of legal methods the object of indicting an act of hate and revenge upon the
persons of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in the city of
Manila;  the gist of the information in the murder case is that the constabulary, conspiring
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together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons and gravely wounded three others. The crimes
of murder and serious physical injuries were not necessarily included in the information for
sedition;  and the Defendants could not have been convicted of these crimes under the first
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information.” (Phil. Vol. 43, pages 99-100.)

There is an insinuation made in the majority resolution, that the American Law on sedition and
rebellion, the origin of our present law on the subject, is more benign and liberal than its
counterpart in the Spanish Penal Code, defining and penalizing sedition and rebellion, and that
under American jurisprudence, rebellion and sedition include crimes like murder, robbery, arson,
etc., committed in the course thereof. But it will be noticed that of the nine Justices who signed the
decision in the case of People vs. Cabrera for multiple murder, five, including Mr. Justice Malcolm,
who penned the decision, were Americans, supposed to be steeped in American Law and the
common law, and yet they all held that sedition where force is expected to be used, did not, include
murder. It is evident that the insinuation made in the majority resolution is not exactly borne out by
the Cabrera case.
The majority asks why in the past, especially up to 1932, when our Revised Penal Code was
promulgated no one had ever been prosecuted, much less convicted of rebellion or sedition
complexed with murder, robbery, etc., if it is true that there is such a complex crime of rebellion
with murder. For that matter, one may even ask why the constabulary soldiers in the Cabrera case
were not charged with the complex crime of sedition with murder. The reason and the answer are
obvious. Until 1932, the year of the promulgation of our Revised Penal Code, our old Penal Code
included Article 244, the counter-part of Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code, to the effect that
common crimes like murder, robbery, arson, committed on the occasion or by reason of a rebellion
or sedition, are to be prosecuted separately. That was why insurgents who committed rebellion or
insurrection with homicide or murder during the first days of the American regime in the Philippines,
could not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murder;  and that explains why
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Cabrera and his co-accused could not be charged with the complex crime of sedition with multiple
murder, but were prosecuted separately for multiple murder.
The majority also asks why the insurgents in the year 1901 and 1902 were charged only with
rebellion but never with murder despite the fact that there was proof that they also had committed
murder in the course of the rebellion or insurrection. The reason to my mind was that, shortly
thereafter, came the proclamation of amnesty issued by President McKinley of the United States,
which amnesty covered not only the crime of rebellion but also other violations of the law
committed in the course of the rebellion.
Then came our Revised Penal Code promulgated in 1932. It is a revision of our old Penal Code of
1887. One of the purposes of the revision was simplification, and elimination of unnecessary
provisions. In proof of this, while our Penal Code of 1887 contained 611 articles, our Revised Penal
Code contains only 367 articles. Among the articles of the old Penal Code not included in the Revised
Penal Code, is Article 244. Does the omission or elimination of Article 244 mean that now, common
crimes like murder, robbery, arson, etc., committed in the course of a rebellion or sedition are
absorbed by rebellion or sedition? Hardly. It cannot be that the committee on revision and our
legislators abandoned the idea and the theory contained in said Article 244, because as I have
already explained, all the Spanish commentators and jurists commenting on this particular provision
of the Spanish Penal Code are agreed that it is a just and reasonable provision, so that sedition and
rebellion may not be utilized as a cloak of immunity in the commission of other serious crimes. To
me, the reason for the omission is that it was really unnecessary. As Groizard said in his commentary
already reproduced, even if that provision were not embodied in the penal code, the court would
still apply said provision:
chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“No necesita ninguno el parrafo primero de este articulo. Aunque no se hubiera excrito en el Codigo,
harian los Tribunales lo que dice. Seria necesario para que asi no sucediera el que fuera la rebelion
un motivo de exencion de responsabilidad criminal para las demas clases de delitos.” (Groizard
Tomo 3, 650.)
The members of the committee on revision of our old Penal Code who must have been familiar with
the opinion and comments of eminent Spanish jurists, particularly the above comment of Groizard
undoubtedly, deemed the provision of Article 244 superfluous and unnecessary, and so omitted it in
the revision. However, this omission of Article 244 of our Penal Code in the new, has an important
effect. No longer shall we be obliged to prosecute murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc.,
committed in the course of and by reason of a sedition or a rebellion, separately. The prosecution is
now free to combine these common crimes with the crimes of sedition or rebellion and charge a
complex crime. And that is what has been done in the prosecution of the numerous cases of
rebellion.
This idea, this theory of complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, etc., is not such a strange,
extravagant or fantastic proposition or idea. We are not the only ones holding this view. Out of
seven separate cases, all involving the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and etc.,
decided in the Court of First Instance, not long ago, cases No. 14070 — People vs. Lava;  No. 15841 chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

— People vs. Hernandez;  No. 2878 — People vs. Capadocia;  No. 10400 — People vs. Salvador
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No. 2704 — People vs. Nava;  No. 19166 — People vs. Pomeroy and the same case 19166 —
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People vs. Taruc, only one judge, Hon. Gregorio Narvasa, of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
held that there is no complex crime of rebellion with murder, and his holding was based mainly if not
entirely on the decisions of this Tribunal in the treason cases which as I have already explained, are
not controlling or applicable. In the other cases, five judges of Courts of First Instance, Judges
Ocampo, Castelo, Barcelona, Gatmaitan, and Montesa, held that there is such a complex crime of
rebellion with murder and actually convicted the accused of said complex crime. Again, in the case of
People vs. Umali, et al., criminal case No. 11037 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province,
Judge Gustavo Victoriano, convicted the accused of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, etc. Recently, in several criminal cases pending in Pangasinan, involving the complex crimes
of rebellion with multiple murder, etc., Judge Morfe of the Court of First Instance of that province
acting upon motions to quash the informations on the ground that there was no such complex crime
of rebellion with murder and consequently, the informations were not in accordance with law, for
charging more than one offense, in a well reasoned and considered order, denied the same and held
that there is a complex crime of rebellion with murder. Of course, these opinions of judges of the
lower courts are not binding on this tribunal but surely, they are persuasive and cannot be ignored.
At least, they show that there are others, learned in the law, who subscribe to the theory of complex
crime of rebellion with murder, arson, etc.
Our decision in the case of People vs. Umali, (96 Phil., 185), promulgated on November 29, 1954, is
another proof that murders committed in the course of sedition or rebellion are not absorbed by the
latter. In said case, this court in a unanimous decision found the Defendants therein guilty of
sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries and sentenced them
accordingly. The question may again be asked, if there is such a complex crime of sedition with
murder, arson, etc., why were Umali and his co-accused not convicted of this complex crime? The
answer is found in a portion of our decision in that case which we quote: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense or offenses committed. Appellants were
charged with and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated
murder, arson and robbery. Is there such a complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, etc.?
While the Solicitor General in his brief claims that Appellants are guilty of said complex crime and in
support of his stand ‘asks for leave to incorporate by reference’ his previous arguments in opposing
Umali’s petition for bail, counsel for Appellants considered it unnecessary to discuss the existence or
non- existence of such complex crime, saying that the nature of the crime committed ‘is of no
moment to herein Appellants because they had absolutely no part in it whatsoever’. For the present,
and with respect to this particular case, we deem it unnecessary to decide this important and
controversial question, deferring its consideration and determination to another case or occasion
more opportune, when it is more directly and squarely raised and both parties given an opportunity
to discuss and argue the question more adequately and exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for
the moment that there is no such complex crime of rebellion with murder;  etc., and that chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

consequently Appellants could not have been legally charged with it, much less convicted of said
complex crime, and the information should therefore, be regarded as having charged more than one
offense, contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113, section 2(e), of the Rules of Court, but
that Appellants having interposed no objection thereto, they were properly tried for and lawfully
convicted if guilty of the several and separate crimes charged therein, we have decided and we rule
that the Appellants may properly be convicted of said several and separate crimes, as hereinafter
specified. We feel particularly supported and justified in this stand that we take, by the result of the
case, namely, that the prison sentence we impose does not exceed, except perhaps in actual
duration, that meted out by the court below, which is life imprisonment.”
The majority resolution invokes and applies the principle of the so called pro reo in connection with
Article 48 of our Revised Penal Code on complex crimes, to the effect that said article should not be
applied when the resulting penalty exceeds the sum total of the several crimes committed
constituting the complex crime. According to the majority, the theory of pro reo is that the principle
of complex crime was adopted for the benefit of the accused and not to his prejudice;  so, it is to
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be applied when the maximum of the penalty for the more serious crime is less in severity or
duration of imprisonment than the sum total of the several crimes committed, but not otherwise.
This is a novel theory in this jurisdiction. To my knowledge it has never been advanced before. All
along and during all these years, the courts of this country not excluding this august tribunal had
been applying the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and its source, Article 89 of our
Penal Code of 1887, regardless of whether or not the resulting penalty was prejudicial to the
accused. As a matter of fact, in most cases the resulting penalty imposed by this tribunal in complex
crimes was much more severe and of longer duration (imprisonment) than the sum total of the two
or more crimes committed. In the numerous cases decided by this court involving the complex crime
of estafa through falsification, the maximum of the penalty for the more serious crime of falsification
was imposed although it exceeded the total of the penalties for estafa and for falsification. In cases
of rape with physical injuries the maximum of the penalty for the crime of rape was imposed
although it exceeded in duration and severity the total of the penalty for rape and that for the
relatively light penalty for physical injuries. In the case of People vs. Parulan (88 Phil., 615), involving
the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, this tribunal applied the provision of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code and would have sentenced the accused to death, were it not for one dissenting
vote based not on the applicability of Article 48, but on the question of jurisdiction. Said this
court:chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“La pena que debe imponerse al acusado Parulan es la del delito mas grave de secuestro en su grado
maximo, o sea, pena capital. Pero el Magistrado Sr. Tuason, consecuente con su opinion disidente en
Parulan contra Rodas, supra, no puede confirmar la pena capital impuesta por el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Manila que segun el no tenia jurisdiccion sobre la presente causa. En vista de este voto
disidente, el presidente del tribunal Sr. Paras y tres magistrados aunque creen que el acusado
Parulan, por las pruebas presentadas, merece pena capital, con todo no pueden votar por la
comfirmacion porque el delito se cometio antes de la aprobacion de la Ley de la Republica No. 296,
que solo exige ocho votos para la imposicion de la pena capital. Antomaticamente, por ministerio de
la ley debe imponerse a Parulan la pena inmediatamente inferior a la de muerte, que es la de
reclusion perpetua con las accesorias.” (88 Phil., p. 624.)
Then in the case of People vs. Guillen * 47 Off. Gaz., 3433, involving the complex crime of murder
and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with a single act of hurling a hand
grenade at President Roxas, this tribunal in a per curiam decision, ignoring the aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime, applied the maximum of the penalty for
the more serious crime of murder in accordance with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced the accused to death. Other instances and cases may be cited ad libitum to show that in
this jurisdiction and in this tribunal, the principle of pro reo was never entertained, much less
accepted.
Origin of pro reo principle
Up to the year 1908, the Spanish Penal Code had the following provisions for complex crimes: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya
dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
“En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave, aplicandola en su
grado maximo.”
The above provisions were copied in our Penal Code of 1887 under Article 89 which reads thus: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“The provisions of the next preceding article are not applicable to cases in which a single act
constitutes two or more crimes, or when one offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
“In these cases, only the penalty of the more serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum degree.”
On January 3, 1908, the Spanish Penal Code was amended, particularly paragraph 2 of Article 90
thereof so as to add to said paragraph the following clause: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“Hasta el limite que represente la suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente ambos delitos.”
so that since January 1908, Article 90 of the Spanish Penal Code reads: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya
dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
“En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave, aplicandola en eu
grado maximo hasta el limite que represente la suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente ambos delitos.”
The amendment is the provision for the so called pro reo rule. But we never accepted much less
followed said innovation in the Philippines. We did not amend Article 89 of our old Penal Code
particularly paragraph 2 thereof so as to add the clause:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Hasta el limite que represente la suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente ambos delitos.”
inserted by the amending Spanish Law of January 3, 1908 to the second paragraph of Article 90 of
the Spanish Penal Code. Furthermore, when we drafted and promulgated our Revised Penal Code in
1932 (Article No. 3815) we ignored and did not accept the amendment to the Spanish Penal Code
that favored one accused of a complex crime as regards the penalty, so that now our law on the
subject is contained in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which as amended by Act No. 4000,
reads as follows:
chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“ART. 48.  Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (As amended by Act
No. 4000.)
The majority resolution makes a more or less extensive dissertation and citation of authorities on the
law of extradition, intended to show that common crimes such as murder, etc., committed on the
occasion of or in the course of the commission of political crimes like sedition and rebellion, are not
subject to extradition. We believe that these citations and these arguments are neither relevant nor
applicable. All we can say is that a murder committed in the course of a rebellion or sedition may be
considered a political crime in contemplation of the extradition law and that a person accused of
said murder is not subject to extradition. But a crime may be considered political from the
standpoint of the extradition law and yet may be regarded by the country where committed as a
common crime separate and distinct from the rebellion or sedition in the course of which it was
committed, and, consequently, subject to prosecution. Moreover, the fact that a murder committed
in the course of a sedition or rebellion is excluded from the scope of the extradition agreement
between nations, is proof and argument that were it not for its exclusion, the member nations of the
extradition agreement, where murders are committed in the course of a rebellion or sedition may
and would extradite the offenders, on the theory that said murders are separate from and are not
absorbed by the rebellion or sedition;  otherwise, there would be no need for excluding such
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crimes of murder, arson, etc., committed during a rebellion or sedition, from the scope of the
extradition law. And among such nations which consider these common crimes of murder, etc., as
separate from rebellion or sedition during which they were committed, are Spain, as shown by
Article 259 of its Penal Code, and the Philippines as illustrated in the cases of U.S. vs. Cabrera and
People vs. Umali, supra. Groizard lists down several countries that consider common crimes
committed during a rebellion or sedition as subject to prosecution: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Codigo del Canton de Zurich.

S. 75.  Si con motivo de la sedicion o como consecuencia fueren cometidos otros delitos, estos
seraan castigados conforme a las disposiciones penales para los mismos fijadas.
“Codigo de Peru.
ART. 145.  Los reos de rebelion, sedicion o asonada son responsables de los delitos especiales que
cometen, observandose lo dispuesto en el Articulo 45.
ART. 146.  Si no pudiese averiguarse quien de los sublevados cometio el delito especial, se hara
responsable a los autores del tumulto.
“Codigo del Chile.
ART. 131.  Los delitos particulares cometidos en un sublevacion o con motivo de ella, seran
castigados respectavamente con las penad designadas para ellos, no obstante le dispuesto en el
articulo 129. — Si no pueden decubrirse los autores, seran considerados y penados como complices
de tales delitos los jefes principales o subalternos de los sublevados que hallandose en la posibilidad
de impedirlos no lo hubieren hecho.
“Codigo del Paraguay.
ART. 380.  Los delitos particulares cometidos en la sedicion o con motivo de ella, seran castigados
con la pena que les corresponda por las leyes respectivas.
“Codigo de la Republica Argentina.
ART. 231.  Los que cometen delitos comunes con motivo de la rebelion motin o asonada o con
ocasion de ella, seran castigados con la pena que corresponde a esos delitos.
“Codigo de Honduras.
ART. 224.  (Como el nuestro.)
(Groizard, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Vol. 3, Articulo 259, p. 650.)
In justice to the Defendants-Appellants in the present case, I wish to explain and make clear that in
mentioning and describing the serious crimes of murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., alleged to
have been committed in the course of the rebellion or by reason thereof, I am not referring
particularly to the charge or charges and counts alleged against them. Their case is now pending
appeal in this tribunal and their guilt or innocence of said charges or counts will be decided in due
time. And so, I am not imputing or attributing to them the serious violations of law I have mentioned
in this opinion. Rather, I am making general reference to the informations filed in other cases,
especially in the informations against Luis Taruc and William Pomeroy which case is not only decided
but also is closed.
In conclusion, I hold that under the law and under general principles rebellion punished with a
maximum penalty of twelve (12) years and fine cannot possibly absorb a much more serious crimes
like murder or kidnapping which are capital offenses and carry the maximum penalty of death. It is
hard for the mind to grasp the idea that a person committing one lone murder may be headed for
the electric chair;  but if perpetrates several murders, kidnappings, arsons, and robberies and
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during their perpetration, was still committing another crime, that of trying to overthrow his own
government by force, then all he gets is twelve years and fine. Since, the serious crimes like multiple
murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., committed during the rebellion are not ingredients of, nor
are they indispensable to the commission of rebellion, and were but means freely selected by the
rebels to facilitate their commission of rebellion or to achieve and speed up their realization of their
object, which was to overthrow the government and implant their own system said to be of
communistic ideology, then under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the complex crime of
rebellion with murder, etc., was committed.
Judging by the numerous acts of atrocity contained in the several informations filed against the
rebels in different cases, not only government soldiers and officers, but innocent civilians by the
hundreds were murdered. Stores and homes were looted;  not only public buildings, like
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presidencias and government hospitals, but also private buildings and homes were burned to the
ground. And as a result of these acts of terrorism, entire barrios were abandoned and landowners,
especially owners of landed estates, evacuated to the provincial capitals or to the cities for personal
security. And it seems that these acts of banditry and pillage still continue though on a smaller scale.
Settled public policy or the policy of the Government as regards rebellion and the crimes against
persons and property committed by the rebels is clear. With their taxes, the citizens are maintaining
a large army to put down the rebellion. Substantial rewards ranging from P500 to P100,000 are
offered for the apprehension of the rebels, specially the leaders. A rebel leader with a P100,000
price on his head, after a campaign of several years by the army, and after the loss of lives of many
soldiers and civilian guides, is finally captured. The government pays down the P100,000 to those
responsible for the capture and charges him with the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, kidnapping, etc., — a capital offense. Pending trial, he asks to be released on bail and under
the doctrine being laid down by us, he is set at liberty, free to go back to the hills to resume his
dissident activities where he left off, by merely posting a bond corresponding to a maximum
imprisonment of twelve years (P12,000) and a fine the amount of which is left to the discretion of
the trial court. If he jumps his bail and assuming that the full amount of the bond is confiscated, still,
the Government which paid P100,000 for his capture is the loser. It will have to wage another
campaign to recapture him and perhaps offer another reward for his apprehension. This would
illustrate the wide divergence between the policy of the Government and the present ruling of the
Court. That is not as it should be. The three departments of the Government, the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judicial Department, though independent of each other, should function as a
team, harmoniously, and in cooperation, all for the public welfare. They cannot work at cross
purposes. All three should be guided by the settled public policy of the state and this applies to the
courts. In the case of Rubi vs. provincial board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., pp. 718-19, this court speaking
about the relation between interpretation of the law by the courts and public policy, said: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead
to the determination that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should assume
towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord,
Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter 510) the Chief of Justice of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee writes: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

‘We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new
question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on the theory, when not
determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of
analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip
the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as
a general rule or principle.’
“Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that “constitutional law,
like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances. (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911] 222 U.S., 1.) If in
the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the court must take “a
chance,” it should be, with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the
general governmental policy, and with a view to the court’s performing its duty in no narrow and
bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and
effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.”
Now, by the majority resolution, this Court would spread the mantle of immunity over all these
serious crimes against persons and property on the theory that they are all covered by, included in,
and absorbed by the crime of rebellion. Under this protective mantle extended by us, instead of
curbing and discouraging the commission of these common serious crimes in accordance with public
policy, the commission of said crimes would be encouraged. No longer would evil-minded men,
outlaws, bandits, hesitate to kill and rob and kidnap, because by pretending to be rebels or to be
engaged in rebellion, their acts of atrocity would be covered by rebellion, for which they would get,
at most, twelve (12) years and fine. No longer would the spectre of the death penalty and the
electric chair hang sword of Damocles-like over the heads of would be kidnappers, murderers and
arsonists because by merely claiming to have committed another additional crime, rebellion, under
the doctrine laid down by the majority resolution, capital punishment for all capital crimes they have
committed or may commit, is automatically reduced to twelve (12) years and fine. It is evident that
the effect of the interpretation by this Court of the law on complex crimes, in relation to rebellion
and the common serious crimes committed during and in the course thereof, runs counter to the
settled public policy on the subject.
Sad, indeed, is the role being played by this Tribunal in laying down a doctrine of such far reaching
consequences and in my opinion of such baneful not to say disastrous effects on peace and order
and personal security, diametrically and utterly opposed to settled public policy, when after all, we
have now the opportunity and the choice of accepting and adopting another view, another
interpretation of the law on complex crimes, to be more reasonable, more logical and certainly,
more in accordance with public policy, and more in keeping with peace and order, personal security
and the public welfare.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
Endencia, JJ., concurs.
 
LABRADOR, J., dissenting: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I fully agree with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor in so far as he holds that the
complex crime of rebellion with murder exists under our law. I also concur with the opinion of Mr.
Justice Padilla in so far as he holds that the petition for bail should be denied because of the danger
that the release of the Petitioner-Appellant may cause to the security of the State. As
the Appellant has been convicted by the Court of First Instance, he may be admitted to bail in the
sound discretion of the court. In the interest of security the discretion should not be exercised in
favor of the granting of bail.
CASE #2:

G.R. No. 231658

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO,

EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners
vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND
MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 231771

EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LIN CUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A.

COBRADO, CARL ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY JIM BALANGIDG, RENATO REYES, JR.,
CRISTIN A E. PALABAY, AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVE
ANTONIO L. TINIO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE
i\RLENED.BROSAS,KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO,
MAE PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D.
LIM, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,
DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL EDUARDO ANO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 231774

NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI,

ZAHRIA P. MUTI-MAPANDI, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY (OFFICER-INCHARGE) CATALINO S.
CUY, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHEF OF STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M.
AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD M.
DELA ROSA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON,
JR., Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04 September 2016 declaring a
state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao;

WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that 'x x x In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the President) may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law x x x';

WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provides that
'the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the
territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of
their powers or prerogatives';

WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent
acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack on the military outpost in Butig,
Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in
Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees;

WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in
Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain
government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and
started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly
attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and
deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to
maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; and

WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to
sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other
parts of Mindanao.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby proclaim as
follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao group of islands for
a period not exceeding sixty days, effective as of the date hereof.

SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be suspended in the
aforesaid area for the duration of the state of martial law.

DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand
and Seventeen.

Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to
Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.

The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless
violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.

Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing rebellion for decades. In
more recent years, we have witnessed the perpetration of numerous acts of violence challenging
the authority of the duly constituted authorities, i.e., the Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing,
the Mamasapano carnage, and the bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan,
among others. Two armed groups have figured prominently in all these, namely, the Abu Sayaff
Group (ASG) and the ISIS-backed Maute Group. 1

The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the
high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted.
These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the
government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the
government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties. As
narrated in the President's Report:
On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior leader of the ASG,
and Maute Group operational leaders, Abdullah and Omarkhayam Maute, was confronted with
armed resistance which escalated into open hostility against the government. Through these
groups' armed siege and acts of violence directed towards civilians and government authorities,
institutions and establishments, they were able to take control of major social, economic, and
political foundations of Marawi City which led to its paralysis. This sudden taking of control was
intended to lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province in
Mindanao.

Based on verified intelligence reports, the Maute Group, as of the end of 2016, consisted of
around two hundred sixty-three (263) members, fully armed and prepared to wage combat in
furtherance of its aims. The group chiefly operates in the province of Lanao del Sur, but has
extensive networks and linkages with foreign and local armed groups such as the Jemaah
Islamiyah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur and the ASG. It adheres to the ideals being espoused by
the DAESH, as evidenced by, among others, its publication of a video footage declaring its
allegiance to the DAESH. Reports abound that foreign-based terrorist groups, the ISIS (Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria) in particular, as well as illegal drug money, provide financial and logistical
support to the Maute Group.

The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on public display the groups' clear intention to
establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the
President, foremost - of their powers and prerogatives. 2

In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on May 23, 2017
in Marawi City which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of
writ of habeas corpus, to wit:

• At 1400H members of the Maute Group and ASG, along with their sympathizers, commenced
their attack on various facilities - government and privately owned - in the City of Marawi.

• At 1600H around fifty (50) armed criminals assaulted Marawi City Jail being manage by the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).

• The Maute Group forcibly entered the jail facilities, destroyed its main gate, and assaulted on-
duty personnel. BJMP personnel were disarmed, tied, and/or locked inside the cells.

• The group took cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles (i.e., two [2] prisoner vans
and private vehicles).

• By 1630H, the supply of power into Marawi City had been interrupted, and sporadic gunfights
were heard and felt everywhere. By evening, the power outage had spread citywide. (As of 24
May 2017, Marawi City's electric supply was still cut off, plunging the city into total black-out.)

• From 1800H to 1900H, the same members of the Maute Group ambushed and burned the
Marawi Police Station. A patrol car of the Police Station was also taken.

• A member of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit was killed during the takeover of the Marawi
City Jail. The Maute Group facilitated the escape of at least sixty-eight (68) inmates of the City
Jail.

• The BJMP directed its personnel at the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas to evacuate.

• By evening of 23 May 2017, at least three (3) bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo,
and Sauiaran, fell under the control of these groups. They threatened to bomb the bridges to pre-
empt military reinforcement.
• As of 2222H, persons connected with the Maute Group had occupied several areas in Marawi
City, including Naga Street, Bangolo Street, Mapandi, and Camp Keithly, as well as the following
barangays: Basak Malutlot, Mapandi, Saduc, Lilod Maday, Bangon, Saber, Bubong, Marantao,
Caloocan, Banggolo, Barionaga, and Abubakar.

• These lawless armed groups had likewise set up road blockades and checkpoints at the Iligan
City-Marawi City junction.

• Later in the evening, the Maute Group burned Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of
Maria Auxiliadora, the nun's quarters in the church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony.
Hostages were taken from the church.

• About five (5) faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation had been reportedly killed by
the lawless groups.

• Other educational institutions were also burned, namely, Senator Ninoy Aquino College
Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School.

• The Maute Group also attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the DAESH flag there,
among other several locations. As of 0600H of 24May 2017, members of the Maute Group were
seen guarding the entry gates of Amai Pakpak Hospital. They held hostage the employees of the
Hospital and took over the PhilHealth office located thereat.

• The groups likewise laid siege to another hospital, Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital, which
they later set ablaze.

• Lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines and commandeered
one of its armored vehicles.

• Latest information indicates that about seventy-five percent (75%) of Marawi City has been
infiltrated by lawless armed groups composed of members of the Maute Group and the ASG. As
of the time of this Report, eleven (11) members of the Armed Forces and the Philippine National
Police have been killed in action, while thirty-five (35) others have been seriously wounded.

• There are reports that these lawless armed groups are searching for Christian communities in
Marawi City to execute Christians. They are also preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes
and forcing young male Muslims to join their groups.

• Based on various verified intelligence reports from the AFP and the PNP, there exists a
strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities,
perpetrating killings of government personnel, and committing armed uprising against and open
defiance of the government. 3

The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the President to
conclude that -

These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the
groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or
province covering the entire Mindanao.

The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further
expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members
throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the
brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to
remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government.
There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his
power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control
over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over executive departments,
bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully
executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local govemments. 4

According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other criminals,
brought about undue constraints and difficulties to the military and government personnel,
particularly in the performance of their duties and functions, and untold hardships to the
civilians, viz.:

Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending their
reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP
have been prevented from performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of
several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The bridge and
road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver
basic services to its citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the
government from restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and
government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered.

The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by
foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which
embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the deterioration of public order and
safety in Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of
Mindanao. 5

The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it
plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the
possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.

The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of its terrain and the
easy access it provides to other parts of Mindanao. Lawless armed groups have historically used
provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages.

Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals,
and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing
goal: absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and
decisive action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national
integrity.
6

The President ended his Report in this wise:

While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going
rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled. 7

In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the military and police
authorities conducted briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives relative to the
declaration of martial law.

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No.
388  expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to
8

be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the
Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same". The Senate thus
resolved as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, by way of the sense of the
Senate, that the Senate finds the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory,
constitutional and in accordance with the law. The Senate hereby supports fully Proclamation No.
216 and finds no compelling reason to revoke the sarne. 9

The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments. The House of
Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 1050  "EXPRESSING THE FULL
10

SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE

AS IT FINDS NO REASON TO REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 216, ENTITLED 'DECLARING
A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO"'.

The Petitions

A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)

On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano,

Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition  Under the Third
11

Paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual
basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It
argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion  since there is no proof that
12

its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws,
or its territory.  It labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other
13

outlying areas as mere propaganda1  and not an open attempt to remove such areas from the
14

allegiance to the Philippine Government and deprive the Chief Executive of the assertion and
exercise of his powers and prerogatives therein. It contends that the Maute Group is a mere
private army, citing as basis the alleged interview of Vera Files with Joseph Franco wherein the
latter allegedly mentioned that the Maute Group is more of a "clan's private militia latching into
the IS brand theatrically to inflate perceived capability".  The Lagman Petition insists that during
15

the briefing, representatives of the military and defense authorities did not categorically admit nor
deny the presence of an ISIS threat in the country but that they merely gave an evasive
answer  that "there is ISIS in the Philippines".  The Lagman Petition also avers that Lt. Gen.
16 17

Salvador Mison, Jr. himself admitted that the current armed conflict in Marawi City was
precipitated or initiated by the government in its bid to capture Hapilon.  Based on said
18

statement, it concludes that the objective of the Maute Group's armed resistance was merely to
shield Hapilon and the Maute brothers from the government forces, and not to lay siege on
Marawi City and remove its allegiance to the Philippine Republic.  It then posits that if at all,
19

there is only a threat of rebellion in Marawi City which is akin to "imminent danger" of rebellion,
which is no longer a valid ground for the declaration of martial law. 20

Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual
basis because the President's Report containef "false, inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic
accounts". 21

It labels as false the claim in the President's Report that the Maute Group attacked Amai Pakpak
Medical Center. Citing online reports on the interview of Dr. Amer Saber (Dr. Saber), the
hospital's Chief, the Lagman Petition insists that the Maute Group merely brought an injured
member to the hospital for treatment but did not overrun the hospital or harass the hospital
personnel.   The Lagman Petition also refutes the claim in the President's Report that a branch
22

of the Landbank of the Philippines was ransacked and its armored vehicle commandeered. It
alleges that the bank employees themselves clarified that the bank was not ransacked while the
armored vehicle was owned by a third party and was empty at the time it was commandeered.  It 23

also labels as false the report on the burning of the Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation
and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School. It avers that the Senator Ninoy Aquino College
Foundation is intact as of May 24, 2017 and that according to Asst. Superintendent Ana Alonto,
the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School was not burned by the terrorists.  Lastly, it points out
24

as false the report on the beheading of the police chief of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, and the
occupation of the Marawi City Hall and part of the Mindanao State University. 25

Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual
basis since the President's Report mistakenly included the attack on the military outpost in Butig,
Lanao del Sur in February 2016, the mass jail break in Marawi City in August 2016, the
Zamboanga siege, the Davao market bombing, the Mamasapano carnage and other bombing
incidents in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, as additional factual bases for the
proclamation of martial law. It contends that these events either took place long before the
conflict in Marawi City began, had long been resolved, or with the culprits having already been
arrested.26

Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual
basis considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or
any ranking official  before making the proclamation.
27

Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President's proclamation of martial law lacks
sufficient factual basis owing to the fact that during the presentation before the Committee of the
Whole of the House of Representatives, it was shown that the military was even successful in
pre-empting the ASG and the Maute Group's plan to take over Marawi City and other parts of
Mindanao; there was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the
number of foreign fighters allied with ISIS was "undetermined"  which indicates that there are
28

only a meager number of foreign fighters who can lend support to the Maute Group. 29

Based on the foregoing argumentation, the Lagman Petition asks the Court to: (1)"exercise its
specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No.
216"; and (2) render "a Decision voiding and nullifying Proclamation No. 216" for lack of sufficient
factual basis.30

In a Resolution  dated June 6, 2017, the Court required respondents to comment on the Lagman
31

Petition and set the case for oral argument on June 13, 14, and 15, 2017.

On June 9, 2017, two other similar petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231771 and 231774 were
filed and eventually consolidated with G.R. No. 231658. 32

B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition)

The Cullamat Petition, "anchored on Section 18, Article VII"  of the Constitution, likewise seeks
33

the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient
factual basis that there is rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants its declaration.  34

In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No. 216 relates to
events happening in Marawi City only an not in the entire region of Mindanao. It concludes that
Proclamation No 216 "failed to show any factual basis for the imposition of martial law in
the entire Mindanao,"  "failed to allege any act of rebellion outside Marawi City, much less x x x
35

allege that public safety requires the imposition o martial law in the whole of Mindanao". 36

The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and other rebel
groups to sow terror and cause death and damage to property"  does not rise to the level of
37

rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the whole of Mindanao.  It also posits that there is no
38

lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City. 39

Moreover, the Cullamat Petition assails the inclusion of the phrase "other rebel groups" in the last
Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216 for being vague as it failed to identify these rebel
groups and specify the acts of rebellion that they were supposedly waging. 40

In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations, and falsities in the
Report of the President to Congress, particularly the attack at the Amai Pakpak Hospital, the
ambush and burning of the Marawi Police Station, the killing of five teachers of Dansalan College
Foundation, and the attacks on various government facilities. 41

In fine, the Cullamat Petition prays for the Court to declare Proclamation No. 216 as
unconstitutional or in the alternative, should the Court find justification for the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Marawi City, to
declare the same as unconstitutional insofar as its inclusion of the other parts of Mindanao. 42

C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition)

The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for Review of the Sufficiency of [the] Factual
Basis of [the] Declaration of Martial Law and [the] Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus,"  labels itself as "a special proceeding"  or an "appropriate proceeding filed
43 44

by any citizen"  authorized under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
45

The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort  and should be invoked
46

by the President only after exhaustion of less severe remedies.  It contends that the
47

extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to

call out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law.  It maintains that the President has no
48

discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be dictated
only by, and commensurate to, the exigencies of the situation. 49

According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as to require
the imposition of martial law.  It asserts that the Marawi incidents "do not equate to the existence
50

of a public necessity brought about by an actual rebellion, which would compel the imposition of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus".  It proposes that
51

"[m]artial law can only be justified if the rebellion or invasion has reached such gravity that [its]
imposition x x x is compelled by the needs of public safety"  which, it believes, is not yet present
52

in Mindanao.

Moreover, it alleges that the statements contained in the President's Report to the Congress, to
wit: that the Maute Group intended to establish an Islamic State; that they have the capability to
deprive the duly constituted authorities of their powers and prerogatives; and that the Marawi
armed hostilities is merely a prelude to a grander plan of taking over the whole of Mindanao, are
conclusions bereft of substantiation. 53

The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the declaration of martial law, and without
waiting for a congressional action, a suit may already be brought before the Court to assail the
sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.

Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency ofthe factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
Mohamad Petition insists that the Court may "look into the wisdom of the [President's] actions,
[and] not just the presence of arbitrariness".  Further, it asserts that since it is making a negative
54

assertion, then the burden to prove the sufficiency of the factual basis is shifted to and lies on the
respondents.  It thus asks the Court "to compel the [r]espondents to divulge relevant
55

information"  in order for it to review the sufficiency of the factual basis.
56
In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to review, "compel
respondents to present proof on the factual basis [of] the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao"  and declare as
57

unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for lack of sufficient factual basis.

The Consolidated Comment

The respondents' Consolidated Comment  was filed on June 12, 2017, as required by the Court.
58

Noting that the same coincided with the celebration of the 119th anniversary of the
independence of this Republic, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) felt that "defending the
constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216" should serve as "a rallying call for every Filipino to
unite behind one true flag and defend it against all threats from within and outside our shores". 59

The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court with the
authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial
law.  The OSG, however, posits that although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the
60

exercise of such authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the
vehicle, mode or remedy through which the "appropriate proceeding" mentioned therein may be
resorted to. The OSG suggests that the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section 18,
Article VII may be availed of using the vehicle, mode or remedy of a certiorari petition, either
under Section 1 or 5, of Article VIII.  Corollarily, the OSG maintains that the review power is not
61

mandatory, but discretionary only, on the part of the Court.   The Court has the discretion not to
62

give due course to the petition. 63

Prescinding from the foregoing, the OSG contends that the sufficiency of the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216 should be reviewed by the Court "under the lens of grave abuse of
discretion"  and not the yardstick of correctness of the facts.  Arbitrariness, not correctness,
64 65

should be the standard in reviewing the sufficiency of factual basis.

The OSG maintains that the burden lies not with the respondents but with the petitioners to prove
that Proclamation No. 216 is bereft of factual basis.  It thus takes issue with petitioners' attempt
1âwphi1

to shift the burden of proof when they asked the Court "to compel [the] respondents to present
proof on the factual basis"  of Proclamation No. 216. For the OSG, "he who alleges must
66

prove"  and that governmental actions are presumed to be valid and constitutional.
67 68

Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed from the
trajectory or point of view of the President and base on the facts available to him at the time the
decision was made.  It argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be
69

examined not based on the facts discovered after the President had made his decision to

declare martial law because to do so would subject the exercise of the President's discretion to
an impossible standard.  It reiterates that the President's decision should be guided only by the
70

information and data available to him at the time he made the determination.  The OSG thus
71

asserts that facts that were established after the declaration of martial law should not be
considered in the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law.
The OSG suggests that the assessment of after-proclamation facts lies with the President and
Congress for the purpose of determining the propriety of revoking or extending the martial law.
The OSG fears that if the Court considers after-proclamation-facts in its review of the sufficiency
of the factual basis for the proclamation, it would in effect usurp the powers of the Congress to
determine whether martial law should be revoked or extended. 72

It is also the assertion of the OSG that the President could validly rely on intelligence reports
coming from the Armed Forces of the Philippines;  and that he could not be expected to
73

personally determine the veracity of thecontents of the reports.  Also, since the power to impose
74

martial law is vested solely on the President as Commander-in-Chief, the lack of

recommendation from the Defense Secretary, or any official for that matter, will not nullify the
said declaration, or affect its validity, or compromise the sufficiency of the factual basis.
Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the facts cited by
the President in Proclamation No. 216 and in his Report to the Congress by merely citing news
reports that supposedly contradict the facts asserted therein or by criticizing in piecemeal the
happenings in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news articles are "hearsay evidence, twice
removed,"  and thus inadmissible and without probative value, and could not overcome the "legal
75

presumption bestowed on governmental acts". 76

Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden to prove that Proclamation No. 216 has
sufficient factual basis. It maintains that the burden rests with the petitioners. However, the OSG
still endeavors to lay out the factual basis relied upon by the President "if only to remove any
doubt as to the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216". 77

The facts laid out by the OSG in its Consolidated Comment will be discussed in detail in the
Court's Ruling.

ISSUES

The issues as contained in the revised Advisory  are as follows:

78

1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774 are the
"appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
sufficient to invoke the mode of review required of this Court when a declaration of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is promulgated;

2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus:

a. is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;

b. is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National

Defense;

c. is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported;

3. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately;

4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;

a. What are the parameters for review?

b. Who has the burden of proof?

c. What is the threshold of evidence?

5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers,
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law;

6. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null
and void:
a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or

b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region;

7. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of
the President to Congress are sufficient [bases]:

a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or

b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao 1 region;

8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and
the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; and

9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will:

a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or

b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in
Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.

After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and supplemental
memoranda.

OUR RULING

I. Locus standi of petitioners.

One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional question is brought
before [the Court] by a party having the requisite 'standing' to challenge it."  As a general rule,
79

the challenger must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."  Over the years, there has
80

been a trend towards relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime example of which is found
in Section 18 of Article VII which provides that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to
assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite for standing to challenge the validity
of the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer." 81

Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of the
Republic;"  similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all
82

women, all of legal [age], and residents of Marawi City".  In the Lagman Petition, however,
83

petitioners therein did not categorically mention that they are suing's citizens but merely referred
to themselves as duly elected Representatives.  That they are suing in their official capacities as
84

Members of Congress couLd have elicited a vigorous discussion considering the issuance by the
House of Representatives of House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support to President
Duterte and finding no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such resolution, the House of
Representatives is declaring that it finds no reason to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the martial law declaration, which is in direct contrast to the views and arguments being
espoused by the petitioners in the Lagman Petition. Considering, however, the trend towards
relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as well as the transcendental issues involved in the
present Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-restraint  and will not venture into this
85

matter. After all, "the Court is not entirely without discretion to accept a suit which does not
satisfy the requirements of a [bona fide] case or of standing. Considerations paramount to [the
requirement of legal standing] could compel assumption of jurisdiction."  In any case, the Court
86

can take judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition are all citizens of
the Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a requirement for them to be elected as
representatives. We will therefore consider them as suing in their own behalf as citizens of this
country. Besides, respondents did not question petitioners' legal standing.

II. Whether or not the petitions are the

"appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph
3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
sufficient to invoke the mode of review required
by the Court.

All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing.

During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis.  It is a special and specific jurisdiction of
87

the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. 88

The Court agrees.

a) Jurisdiction must be
specifically conferred by the
Constitution or by law.

It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the
law.  Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some
89

legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it
for resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction
cannot be implied from the language of the Constitution or a statute.  It must appear clearly from
90

the law or it will not be held to exist.

91

A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants
authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

b) "In an appropriate
proceeding" does not refer to a
petition for certiorari filed under
Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII

It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an
appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5
of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamationor suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18,
Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's
exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in
a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18,
Article VII.

c) Purpose/significance of
Section 18, Article VII is to
constitutionalize the pre-Marcos
martial law ruling in In the Matter of
the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.

The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987
Constitution to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of
the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang,  to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of
92

martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political
question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review.

"In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history
of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct
relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper
subjects of inquiry."  Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas), a member of the Constitutional
93

Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution, explained:

The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had enabled President Ferdinand
Marcos to impose authoritarian rule on the Philippines from 1972 to 1986. Supreme Court
decisions during that period upholding the actions taken by Mr. Marcos made authoritarian rule
part of Philippine constitutional jurisprudence. The members of the Constitutional Commission,
very much aware of these facts, went about reformulating the Commander-in-Chief powers with
a view to dismantling what had been constructed during the authoritarian years. The new formula
included revised grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them,
the scope of the powers, and review of presidential action.  (Emphasis supplied)
94

To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castaneda  that the authority to
95

decide whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is lodged with the President and his decision thereon is final and conclusive
upon the courts. This ruling was reversed in the 1971 case of Lansang where it was held that the
factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is not a political question and is within the ambit of judicial review.  However,
96

in 1983, or after the declaration of martial law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the
Court, in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,  abandoned the ruling in Lansang and reverted
97

to Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional power of the President to

suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to judicial inquiry.98

Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987
Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine.

d) Purpose of Section 18,

Article VII is to provide additional
safeguard against possible abuse by
the President on the exercise of the
extraordinary powers.

Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the
President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the
Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII.  This is
99

clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on
whether the President could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress.
Thus:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.

The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is
vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has
strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular, phrase. May we be informed
of his good and substantial reasons?

MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous
interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I
understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations,
the President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a
maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the
judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even
during those first 60 days.

MR. SUAREZ. Given our traumatic experience during the past administration, if we give
exclusive right to the President to determine these factors, especially the existence of an
invasion or rebellion and the second factor of determining whether the public safety requires it or
not, may I call the attention of the Gentleman to what happened to us during the past
administration. Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by Ferdinand E. Marcos in his capacity as
President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon him purportedly under Article
VII, Section 10 (2) of the Constitution, wherein he made this predicate under the "Whereas"
provision:

Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of the
Communists and other armed aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic of the
Philippines by armed violence and force have assumed the magnitude of an actual state of war
against our people and the Republic of the Philippines.

And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General Order No. 3, also promulgated by
Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972 wherein he said,
among other things:

Whereas, martial law having been declared because of wanton destruction of lives and
properties, widespread lawlessness and anarchy and chaos and disorder now prevailing
throughout the country, which condition has been brought about by groups of men who are
actively engaged in a criminal conspiracy to seize political and state power in the Philippines in
order to take over the government by force and violence, the extent of which has now assumed
the proportion of an actual war against our people and the legitimate government ...

And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
declare martial law in our country without justifiable reason. Would the Gentleman still insist on
the deletion of the phrase 'and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of
the Congress'?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr.Marcos, he is undoubtedly an

aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would
be another Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true,
as the Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis
because the paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme Court may review,
in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof
and must promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.

I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance the interests
of the country. And here we are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or
rebellion as against the rights of citizens. And I am saying that there are enough safeguards,
unlike in 1972 when Mr. Marcos was able to do all those things mentioned. 100

To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not only
placed the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by
allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such
proclamation or suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably
conferred upon any citizen a demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of
said proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to
examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis and to render its
decision thereon within a limited period of 30 days from date of filing.

e) Purpose of Section 18,

Article VII is to curtail the extent of
the powers of the President.

The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent
of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not
placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive
Department.

During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, President Cecilia
Muñoz Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 Constitution. She said:

The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the people for a six-
year term with no reelection for the duration of his/her life. While traditional powers inherent in
the office of the President are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions
which curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.

The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos caused the
imposition of martial law for more than eight years and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
even after the lifting of martial law in 1981. The new Constitution now provides that those powers
can be exercised only in two cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety demands it, only for
a period not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the power to revoke such suspension
or proclamation of martial law which congressional action may not be revoked by the President.
More importantly, the action of the President is made subject to judicial review, thereby again
discarding jurisprudence which render[s] the executive action a political question and beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.

For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution nor abolish civil courts or legislative assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military
tribunals over civilians, or suspend the privilege of the writ. Please forgive me if, at this point, I
state that this constitutional provision vindicates the dissenting opinions I have written during my
tenure in the Supreme Court in the martial law cases. 101

f) To interpret "appropriate
proceeding" as filed under Section 1
of Article VIII would be contrary to
the intent of the Constitution.
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the
expanded jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers
of the Constitution to place additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for,
invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of
Article VIII. In other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.

g) Jurisdiction of the Court is

not restricted to those enumerated in
Sections I and 5 of Article VIII

The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article
VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be found in the last paragraph
of Section 4, Article VII.  The power of the Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or
102

ruling of the Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7,
Article IX(A).
103

h) Unique features of the third

paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
make it sui generis.

The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should
be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different
rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue
to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency
powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable
under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which
this Court has to promulgate its decision.

A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought and
defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of
opposing judgments, and of executing."  In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding"
104

appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a
citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the
Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint,
a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

III. The power of the Court to review the

sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.

During the oral argument,  the OSG urged the Court to give! deference to the actions of the two
105

co-equal branches of the Government: on' the part of the President as Commander-in-Chief, in
resorting to his extraordinary powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and on the part of Congress, in giving its imprimatur to Proclamation No. 216
and not revoking the same.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action. In particular, the
President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.
a) The judicial power to review
versus the congressional power to
revoke.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may
revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed td "undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings."  On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available
106

prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court I which does not look
into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could
probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is
automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.

Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power
of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.

b) The framers of the 1987

Constitution intended the judicial
power to review to be exercised
independently from the congressional
power to revoke.

If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest the Court and
Congress with veto powers independently from each other, we quote the following exchange:

MS. QUESADA. Yesterday, the understanding of many was that there would be safeguards that
Congress will be able to revoke such proclamation.

MR. RAMA. Yes.

MS. QUESADA. But now, if they cannot meet because they have been arrested or that the
Congress has been padlocked, then who is going to declare that such a proclamation was not
warranted?

xxxx

MR. REGALADO. May I also inform Commissioner Quesada that the judiciary is not exactly just
standing by. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if the Members are detained, can immediately
be applied for, and the Supreme Court shall also review the factual basis. x x x 107

c) Re-examination of the
Court's pronouncement in Fortun v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo
Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it imperative to re-examine, reconsider, and
set aside its pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo  to the effect that:
108

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that
the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than
initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through
such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of
the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the
Court. 109

xxxx

If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or
suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions
challenging the President's action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. x x x110

By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power and
surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its bounden duty to review. Worse,
the Court considered' itself just on stand-by, waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case
Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified and set aside
in this proceeding. 111

We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and
independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or
default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.

IV. The judicial power to review the sufficiency

of factual basis of the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration
of the President's decision of which among his
graduated powers he will avail of in a given
situation.

The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of: a) calling out the
armed forces; b) suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial
law.  These powers may be resorted to only under specified conditions.
112

The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the powers of the Commander-in-Chief by
revising the "grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the
scope of the powers, and review of presidential action." 113

a) Extraordinary powers of the

President distinguished.

Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves
ordinary police action.  The President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it
114

becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power
to call is fully discretionary to the President;"  the only limitations being that he acts within
115

permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of

discretion.  In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not
116

subject to judicial review." 117

The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or
declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public
safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these
powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3)
review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court." 118

The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase "imminent danger
thereof' as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration
of martial law.  They perceived the phrase "imminent danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of
119

abuse;"  besides, the calling out power of the President "is sufficient for handling imminent
120

danger." 121

The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the
declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has
called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency
remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will
render it more difficult to restore order and enforce the law.  As such, their exercise requires
122

more stringent safeguards by the Congress, and review by the Court. 123

b) What really happens during martial law?

During the oral argument, the following questions cropped up: What really happens during the
imposition of martial law? What powers could the President exercise during martial law that he
could not exercise if there is no martial law? Interestingly, these questions were also discussed
by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:

FR. BERNAS. That same question was asked during the meetings of the Committee: What
precisely does martial law add to the power of the President to call on the armed forces? The first
and second lines in this provision state:

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies...

The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. I think it is the
case of Aquino v. COMELEC where the Supreme Court said that in times of martial law, the
President automatically has legislative power. So these two clauses denied that. A state of
martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the
principle of separation of powers.

The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees? The answer we gave
to that question in the Committee was: During martial law, the President may have the powers of
a commanding general in a theatre of war. In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the
President as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders which have the effect of
law but strictly in a theater of war, not in the situation we had during the period of martial law. In
other words, there is an effort here to return to the traditional concept of martial law as it was
developed especially in American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the theater
of war.124

xxxx

FR. BERNAS. This phrase was precisely put here because we have clarified the meaning of
martial law; meaning, limiting it to martial law as it has existed in the jurisprudence in
international law, that it is a law for the theater of war. In a theater of war, civil courts are unable
to function. If in the actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the
military commander is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts
precisely because the civil courts are closed in that area. But in the general area where the civil
courts are open then in no case can the military courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is
in reference to a theater of war where the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function.

MR. FOZ. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation in that specified
critical area.

FR. BERNAS. That is correct.

MR. FOZ. And it is not something that is brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-
Chief.

FR. BERNAS. It is not brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief. The

understanding here is that the phrase 'nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians' has reference to the practice under the Marcos regime where
military courts were given jurisdiction over civilians. We say here that we will never allow that
except in areas where civil courts are, in fact, unable to function and it becomes necessary for
some kind of court to function. 125

A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power,
which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police
power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government
agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which
remains under the control of the State. 126

In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,  the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's

127

(Justice Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006,
stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may
order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c)
[takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential
Decrees x x x". 128

Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform do not give
him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is because
martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does it supplant the
operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of
Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged
with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion. 129

Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties,  the
130

Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a state of martial law.

c) "Graduation" of powers
refers to hierarchy based on scope
and effect; it does not refer to a
sequence, order, or arrangement by
which the Commander-in-Chief must
adhere to.

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of
'graduated power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial
law."  It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope
131

and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the
Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or
restrict the manner by which the President decides which power to choose.

These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-
in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the
situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of
martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose, initially, which
among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the
part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his
prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity
of the State.132

It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the
President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or
conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the
Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President.

d) The framers of the 1987

Constitution intended the Congress
not to interfere a priori in the
decision-making process of the
President.

The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior concurrence of
the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that judicial review does not include the
calibration of the President's decision of which of his graduated powers will be availed of in a
given situation. Voting 28 to 12, the framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the requirement of
congressional concurrence in the first imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege. 133

MR. PADILLA.x x x

We all agree with the suspension of the writ or the proclamation of martial law should not require
beforehand the concurrence of the majority of the Members of the Congress. However, as
provided by the Committee, the Congress may revoke, amend, or shorten or even increase the
period of such suspension. 134

xxxx

MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first
imposition of martial law there is no need for concurrence of the Members of Congress because
the provision says 'in case of actual invasion or rebellion.' If there is actual invasion and rebellion,
as Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is a need for immediate response because there
is an attack. Second, the fact of securing a concurrence may be impractical because the roads
might be blocked or barricaded. x x x So the requirement of an initial concurrence of the majority
of all Members of the Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion might be impractical as I can
see it.

Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or lift the suspension.

And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question and no longer a
political one in that it is subject to judicial review at any point in time. So on that basis, I agree
that there is no need for concurrence as a prerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. x x x 135
xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with Section 15, we delete the phrase 'and,
with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the Members of the Congress...'

MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or also the declaration of martial law.

MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that this would be an
exclusive prerogative of the President?

MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But even that period of 60 days may be
shortened by the Congress or the Senate because the next sentence says that the Congress or
the Senate may even revoke the proclamation. 136

xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. x x x

The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is
vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has
strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase. May we be informed of
his good and substantial reasons?

MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous
interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I
understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations,
the President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a
maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the
judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even
during those first 60 days.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos[,] he is undoubtedly an
aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be
another Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as
the Gentleman mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis because
the paragraph being on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof
and must promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.

I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance the interests
of the country. And here we are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or
rebellion as against the rights of citizens. x x x

MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doing what Mr. Marcos had done?

MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be another Marcos. What
we are looking for are safeguards that arereasonable and, I believe, adequate at this point. On
the other hand, in case of invasion or rebellion, even during the first 60 days when the intention
here is to protect the country in that situation, it would be unreasonable to ask that there should
be a concurrence on the part of the Congress, which situation is automatically terminated at the
end of such 60 days.

xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we provide for a legislative
check on this awesome power of the Chief Executive acting as Commander-in-Chief?

MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we have a presidency that cannot act under those
conditions.

MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the concurrence of the proper or appropriate authority?

MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very unlikely that the concurrence of
Congress would be available; and, secondly, the President will be able to act quickly in order to
deal with the circumstances.

MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to expediency?

MR. MONSOD. I do not believe it is expediency when one is trying to protect the country in the
event of an invasion or a rebellion.137

The foregoing exchange clearly manifests the intent of the Constitution not to allow Congress to
interfere a priori in the President's choice of extraordinary powers.

e) The Court must similarly

and necessarily refrain from
calibrating the President's decision of
which among his extraordinary
powers to avail given a certain
situation or condition.

It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation

of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It was precisely this
time element that prompted the Constitutional Commission to eliminate the requirement of 1
concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition by the President of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety
requires it, and is no longer under threat or in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and
urgency for the President to act quickly to protect the country.  The Court, as Congress does,
138

must thus accord the President the same leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved
exclusively by the Constitution to the Executive Department.

j) The recommendation of the

Defense Secretary is not a condition
for the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other
high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain
reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare
martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or
rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the
decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego.
Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.

g) In any event, the President

initially employed the most benign
action - the calling out power -
before he declared martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.

At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the declaration of
martial law on May 23, 201 7, the President had already issued Proclamation No. 55 on
September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in
Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on
the foregoing presidential actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no obligation or
requirement on his part to use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis, still
the President made the conscious anddeliberate effort to first employ the most benign from
among his extraordinary powers. As the initial and preliminary step towards suppressing and
preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided to use his calling out power
first. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve; on the contrary, it only worsened. Thus,
exercising his sole and exclusive prerogative, the President decided to impose martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the belief that the armed hostilities in
Mindanao already amount to actual rebellion and public safety requires it.

V. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 may

be considered vague and thus void because of (a)
its inclusion of "other rebel groups"; and (b) the
absence of any guideline specifying its actual
operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region.

Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by the insertion
of the phrase "other rebel groups"  in its Whereas Clause and for lack of available guidelines
139

specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region, making the
proclamation susceptible to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, or confusion.

This argument lacks legal basis.

a) Void-for-vagueness doctrine.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."  "[A] statute or act may be
140

said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance, the statute] is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle." 141

b) Vagueness doctrine applies

only in free speech cases.
The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases.  A facial
142

challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because
of possible "'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A
person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague
law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The
overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence." 143

It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only to free-speech
cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.  Justice Mendoza
144

explained the reason as follows:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible 'chilling effect' upon protected speech. The theory is that ' [w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.' The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

xxxx

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing 'on their faces' statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that'one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges
in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied'
to a particular defendant.' x x x
145

Invalidation of statutes "on its face" should be used sparingly because it results in striking down
statutes entirely on the ground that they might beapplied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected.  "Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the
146

usual requirement of 'actual case and controversy' and permit decisions to be made in a sterile
abstract context having no factual concreteness." 147

c) Proclamation No. 216

cannot be facially challenged using
the vagueness doctrine.

Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted.
Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights
that may be facially challenged.  What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
148
As held by the Court in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,  the facial review of Proclamation
149

No. 1017, issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declaring a state of national
emergency, on ground o vagueness is uncalled for since a plain reading of Proclamation No.
10171 shows that it is not primarily directed at speech or even speech-related1 conduct. It is
actually a call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Like Proclamation No. 1017, Proclamation No. 216 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

d) Inclusion of "other rebel

groups " does not make Proclamation
No.216 vague.

The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 open to broad
interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained.

In People v. Nazario,  the Court enunciated that:

150

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.' It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a
saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for 'three or more persons to assemble on any
sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.' Clearly,
the ordinance imposed no standard at all 'because one may never know in advance what annoys
some people but does not annoy others.'

Coates highlights what has been referred to as a 'perfectly vague' act whose obscurity is evident
on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language -
but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased - in which case, it may be
'saved' by proper construction. 151

The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the
context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other
rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas
clauses.

e) Lack of guidelines/
operational parameters does not
make Proclamation No. 216 vague.

Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the ground that it
has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region.
Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the
proclamation. In Part III, we declared that judicial review covers only the sufficiency of
information or data available to or known to the President prior to, or at the time of, the
declaration or suspension. And, as will be discussed exhaustively in Part VII, the review will be
confined to the proclamation itself and the Report submitted to Congress.

Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the
implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders
issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the
said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights
violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court
wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved
exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.

VI. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No.

216 will (a) have the effect of recalling
Proclamation No. 55; or (b) also nullify the acts
of the President in calling out the armed forces to
quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts
of the Mindanao region.

a) The calling out power is in a

different category from the power to
declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55.

The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration of a state
of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55
dated September 4, 2016, where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National 1
Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in
the Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating
elsewhere in the Philippines.

In Kulayan v. Tan,  the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in a different
152

category from the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
declare martial law:

x x x Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing
with the revocation or review of the President's action to call out the armed forces. The distinction
places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification. 153

In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently
of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law,
although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as
in this case.

Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his calling out the
Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.

As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,  the President's exercise of his
154

power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
may only be examined by the Court as to whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.155

In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the Integrated Bar of the ' Philippines had failed to
sufficiently comply with the requisites of locus standi, as it was not able to show any specific
injury which it had suffered or could suffer by virtue of President Joseph Estrada's order
deploying the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metropolis. 156
This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the Court's
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege ofthe writ of habeas corpus is concerned. In fact, by
constitutional design, such review may be instituted by any citizen before the Court,  without
157

the need to prove that he or she stands to sustain a direct and personal injury as a consequence
of the questioned Presidential act/s.

But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the declaration of
martial law in this case, such ruling could not affect the President's exercise of his calling out
power through Proclamation No. 55.

b) The operative fact doctrine.

Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of the
President done pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact doctrine," the unconstitutional statute
is recognized as an "operative fact" before it is declared unconstitutional. 158

Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the
Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: 'When the courts declare a law to
be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.' The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the
orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers
no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications,
however. As the American Supreme Court stated: 'The actual existence of a statute prior to such
a determination [of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
the invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, - with respect to particular
regulations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.

The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the Constitution is supreme and
provides the measure for the validity of legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the
legislative nor the executive branch, and for that matter much less, this Court, has power under
the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its
provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null.

The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ which has the final
say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid leads to a more appreciative
attitude of theemerging concept that a declaration of nullity may have legal consequences which
the more orthodox view would deny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty, executive
order, or ordinance was in 'actual existence' appears to be indisputable. What is more
appropriate and logical then than to consider it as 'an operative fact?' (Emphasis supplied) 159

However, it must also be stressed that this "operative fact doctrine" is not a fool-proof shield that
would repulse any challenge to acts performed during the effectivity of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, purportedly in furtherance of quelling rebellion or
invasion, and promotion of public safety, when evidence shows otherwise.

VII. The Scope of the Power to Review.

a) The scope of the power of

review under the 1987 Constitution
refers only to the determination of the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus.

To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Lansang,  which was decided under the 1935 Constitution,  held that it can inquire into, within
160 161

proper bounds, whether there has been adherence to or compliance with the constitutionally-
imposed limitations on the Presidential power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.  "Lansang limited the review function of the Court to a very prudentially narrow test of
162

arbitrariness."  Fr. Bernas described the "proper bounds" in Lansang as follows:

163

What, however, are these 'proper bounds' on the power of the courts? The Court first gave the
general answer that its power was 'merely to check - not to supplant - the Executive, or
to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. More specifically, the
Court said that its power was not 'even comparable with its power over civil or criminal cases
elevated thereto by appeal...in which cases the appellate court has all the powers of the courtof
origin,' nor to its power of quasi-judicial administrative decisions where the Court is limited to
asking whether 'there is some evidentiary basis' for the administrative finding. Instead, the Court
accepted the Solicitor General's suggestion that it 'go no further than to satisfy [itself] not that the
President's decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and
justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act
arbitrarily.' 164

Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, by
providing only for judicial review based on the determination of the sufficiency of the factual
bases, has in fact done away with the test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang.

b) The "sufficiency of factual

basis test".

Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987
Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the
Constitution. Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power to
declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's
decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had
sufficient factual bases.

We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review by the
introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test.

As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to

suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the
review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the
determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such,
must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he
made the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the proclamation as
well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation
existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events
should be from the present depends on the President.

Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as
these are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.
As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to the
President.  As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what to include and
165

what not to include in the proclamation and the written Report taking into account the urgency of
the situation as well as national security. He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports and
confidential information that may prejudice the operations and the safety of the military.

Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the
written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus since these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all,
they may be used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the
sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.

In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the
Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the
accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require
precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede
the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President
to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that
only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not
only place the President in peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of
emergency powers upon him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio
in Fortun, to "immediately put an end to the root cause of the emergency".  Possibly, by the time
166

the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late
in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not
impossible, to curtail.

Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of military officers
as credible evidence that the President ca appraise and to which he can anchor his
judgment,  as appears to be the case here.
167

At this point, it is wise to quote the pertinent portions of the Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. in Fortun:

President Arroyo cannot be blamed for relying upon the information given to her by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, considering that the matter of the
supposed armed uprising was within their realm of competence, and that a state of emergency
has also been declared in Central Mindanao to prevent lawless violence similar to the
'Maguindanao massacre,' which may be an indication that there is a threat to the public safety
warranting a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ.

Certainly, the President cannot be expected to risk being too late before declaring martial law or
suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution, as couched, does not require precision
in establishing the fact of rebellion. The President is called to act as public safety requires. 168

Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need to proclaim
martial law even only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for purposes of the
Court's review, if subsequent events prove that the situation had not been accurately reported to
him.

After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand
during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the
Court's review is concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60
days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is made; and,
this Court may investigate the factual background of the declaration. 169

Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case. Falsities of
and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not
enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there
are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion that there is
an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.

In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in
declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient
factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an examination on whether the President
acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to
and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

VIII. The parameters for determining the

sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the declaration
of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

a) Actual invasion or rebellion,

and public safety requirement.

Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the
exercise of such power."  Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's
170

declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be
struck down.

As a general rule, a word used in a statute which has a technical or legal meaning, is construed
to have the same technical or legal meaning.  Since the Constitution did not define the term
171

"rebellion," it must be understood to have the same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). 172

During the July 29, 1986 deliberation of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, then
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado alluded to actual rebellion as one defined under Article 134
of the RPC:

MR. DE LOS REYES. As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer
imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that there should be actual shooting or actual
attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for example? Let us take for example a contemporary
event - this Manila Hotel incident, everybody knows what happened. Would the Committee
consider that an actual act of rebellion?

MR. REGALADO. If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an armed public uprising
for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by the means employed under Article 135. x x x 173

Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer to rebellion as defined under
Article 134 of the RPC. To give it a different definition would not only create confusion but would
also give the President wide latitude of discretion, which may be abused - a situation that the
Constitution see k s to prevent. 174
Article 134 of the RPC states:

Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. - The crime of rebellion or insurrection is

committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine
Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(l) there is a (a) public
uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or
movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the
territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed
forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers and prerogatives." 175

b) Probable cause is the

allowable standard of proof for the
President.

In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there
is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is
being committed.  To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise
176

of his emergency powers. Along this line, Justice Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the
standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of
declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most
expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of
rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because
unlike other standards of proof, which, in order to be met, would require much from the President
and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency powers, the requirement of probable
cause is much simpler. It merely necessitates an "average man [to weigh] the facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He [merely] relies on common sense [and] x x x needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed x x x by the accused." 177

To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l)
actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur;
and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or
invasion.

Having laid down the parameters for review, the Court shall nowproceed to the core of the
controversy - whether Proclamation No. 216,Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending
the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao, lacks sufficient factual
basis.

IX. There is sufficient factual basis for the

declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus.

At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the determination
of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the
factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It
must also be reiterated that martial law is a matter ofurgency and much leeway and flexibility
should be accorded the President. As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the
information he received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

We restate the elements of rebellion for reference:

1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking up arms against the Government; and

2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: (a) to remove from the allegiance to
said Government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of
land, naval or other armed forces or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
178

Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City.  However, they insist
179

that the armed hostilities do not constitute rebellion in the absence of the element of culpable
political purpose, i.e., the removal from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws:
(i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers and prerogatives.

The contention lacks merit.

a) Facts, events and

information upon which the President
anchored his decision to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

Since the President supposedly signed Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017 at 10:00
PM,  the Court will consider only those facts and/or events which were known to or have
180

transpired on or before that time, consistent with the scope of judicial review. Thus, the following
facts and/or events were deemed to have been considered by the President in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, as plucked from and extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself:

1. Proclamation No. 55 issued on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on

account of lawless violence in Mindanao; 181

2. Series of violent acts  committed by the Maute terrorist group including:

182

a) Attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur m February 2016, killing
and wounding several soldiers;

b) Mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016 of the arrested comrades of the
Maute Group and other detainees;

3. On May 23, 2017: 183

a) Takeover of a hospital in Marawi;

b) Establishment of several checkpoints within Marawi;

c) Burning of certain government and private facilities;

d) Mounting casualties on the part of the government;

e) Hoisting the flag of ISIS in several areas; and

f) Capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and
damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao; and the
Report  submitted to Congress:
184

1. Zamboanga siege; 185

2. Davao bombing; 186

3. Mamasapano carnage; 187

4. Cotabato bombings; 188

5. Sultan Kudarat bombings; 189

6. Sulu bombings; 190

7. Basilan bombings; 191

8. Attempt to capture Hapilon was confronted with armed resistance by combined forces of ASG
and the Maute Group; 192

9. Escalation of armed hostility against the government troops; 193

10. Acts of violence directed not only against government authorities and establishments but
civilians as well; 194

11. Takeover of major social, economic and political foundations which paralyzed Marawi City; 195

12. The object of the armed hostilities was to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a
DAESH/ISIS wilayat or province; 196

13. Maute Group has 263 active members, armed and combat-ready; 197

14. Extensive networks or linkages of the Maute Group with foreign and local armed groups; 198

15. Adherence of the Maute Group to the ideals espoused by ISIS; 199

16. Publication of a video showing Maute Group's declaration of allegiance to ISIS; 200

17. Foreign-based terrorist groups provide financial and logistical support to the Maute Group; 201

18. Events on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City, particularly:

a) at 2:00 PM, members and sympathizers of the Maute Group and ASG attacked various
government and privately-owned facilities; 202

b) at 4:00 PM, around fifty (50) armed criminals forcibly entered the Marawi City Jail; facilitated
the escape of inmates; killed a member of PDEA; assaulted and disarmed on-duty personnel
and/or locked them inside the cells; confiscated cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and
vehicles; 203

c) by 4:30 PM, intem1ption of power supply; sporadic gunfights; city-wide power outage by
evening; 204
d) from 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM, Maute Group ambushed and burned the Marawi Police Station;
commandeered a police car; 205

e) BJMP personnel evacuated the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas; 206

f) control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, was taken
by the rebels;207

g) road blockades and checkpoints set up by lawless armed groups at the Iligan-Marawi
junction;
208

h) burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nuns' quarters in
the church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony; 209

i) taking of hostages from the church; 210

j) killing of five faculty members of Dansalan College foundation; 211

k) burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and Marawi Central Elementary Pilot
School;212

1) overrunning of Amai Pakpak Hospital; 213

m) hoisting the ISIS flag in several areas; 214

n) attacking and burning of the Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital; 215

o) ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the Philippines and commandeering an armored

vehicle;
216

p) reports regarding Maute Group's plan to execute Christians; 217

q) preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes; 218

r) forcing young Muslims to join their group;  and 219

s) intelligence reports regarding the existence of strategic mass action of lawless armed groups
in Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities, perpetrating killings of government personnel1
, and committing armed uprising against and open defiance of the Government. 220

b) The President's Conclusion

After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at the following
conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report:

1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and
prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao,
constituting the crime of rebellion."
221

2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public uprising against the duly
constituted government and against the people of Mindanao, for the purpose of removing
Mindanao - starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur - from its allegiance to the
Government and its laws and depriving the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to
enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to the great
damage, prejudice, and detriment of the people therein and the nation as a whole." 222

3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention to establish an
Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the President,
foremost - of their powers and prerogatives. " 223

4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the
groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or
province covering the entire Mindanao." 224

5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to
further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members
throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the
brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to
remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the
Government." 225

6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of
his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their
control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over executive
departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are
faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local governments." 226

7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending
their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the
BJMP have been prevented from performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation
of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The bridge
and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to
deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the
government from restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and
government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered." 227

8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by
foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which
embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the deterioration of public order and
safety in Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of
Mindanao." 228

9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local
criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege f Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-
standing goal: absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift
and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our
national integrity." 229

Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and
prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of
rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists.
The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of
which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory
and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached
after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his
burden of proof.

After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As Justice
Carpio decreed in his Dissent in Fortun:

x x x [T]he Constitution does not compel the President to produce such amount of proof as to
unduly burden and effectively incapacitate her from exercising such powers.

Definitely, the President need not gather proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is the standard
of proof required for convicting an accused charged with a criminal offense.x x x

xxxx

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the highest quantum of evidence, and to require the President
to establish the existence of rebellion or invasion with such amount of proof before declaring
martial law or suspending the writ amounts to an excessive restriction on 'the President's power
to act as to practically tie her hands and disable her from effectively protecting the nation against
threats to public safety.'

Neither clear and convincing evidence, which is employed in either criminal or civil cases, is
indispensable for a lawful declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This amount of
proof likewise unduly restrains the President in exercising her emergency powers, as it requires
proof greater than preponderance of evidence although not beyond reasonable doubt.

Not even preponderance of evidence, which is the degree of proof necessary in civil cases, is
demanded for a lawful declaration of martial law.

xxxx

Weighing the superiority of the evidence on hand, from at least two opposing sides, before she
can act and impose martial law or suspend the writ unreasonably curtails the President's
emergency powers.

Similarly, substantial evidence constitutes an unnecessary restriction on the President's use of

her emergency powers. Substantial evidence is the amount of proof required in administrative or
quasi-judicial cases, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion.

I am of the view that probable cause of the existence of either invasion or rebellion suffices and
satisfies the standard of proof for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ.

Probable cause is the same amount of proof required for the filing of a criminal information by the
prosecutor and for the issuance of an arrest warrant by a judge. Probable cause has been
defined as a 'set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested.'

In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He
relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify
conviction.

Probable cause, basically premised on common sense, is the most reasonable, most practical,
and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-
existence of rebellion, necessary for a declaration of martial law x x x230

c) Inaccuracies, simulations,
falsities, and hyperboles.

The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and the
Report are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not persuade. As mentioned, the
Court is not concerned about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to
do so would unduly tie the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation.

Specifically, it alleges that the following facts are not true as shown by its counter-evidence. 231

FACTUAL STATEMENTS COUNTER-EVIDENCE

(1) that the Maute group attacked Amai
Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the DAESH flag
there, among several locations. As of 0600H
of 24 May 2017, members of the Maute Group
were seen guarding the entry gates of the
Amai Pakpak Hospital and that they held
hostage the employees of the Hospital and
took over the PhilHealth office located thereat
(Proclamation No. 216 and Report);
Statements made by:
(a) Dr. Amer Saber, Chief of the Hospital
(b) Health Secretary Paulyn Ubial;
(c) PNP Spokesperson Senior Supt. Dionardo
Carlos;
(d) AFP Public Affairs Office Chief Co. Edgard
Arevalo; and
(e) Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra
denying that the hospital was attacked by the
Maute Group citing online news articles of
Philstar, Sunstar, Inquirer, and Bombo
Radyo. 232

2. that the Maute Group ambushed and
burned the Marawi Police Station
(Proclamation No. 216 and the Report);
Statements made by PNP Director General
Ronald dela Rosa and Marawi City Mayor
Majul Gandamra in the online news reports of
ABS-CBN News and CNN
Philippines  denying that the Maute group
233

occupied the Marawi Police Station.

3. that lawless armed groups likewise Statement made by the bank officials in the
ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines on-line news article of Philstar  that the
234

and commandeered one of its armored Marawi City branch was not ransacked but
vehicles (Report); sustained damages from the attacks.
4. that the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot Statements in the on-line news article of
School was burned (Proclamation No. 216 and Philstar  made by the Marawi City Schools
235

the Report); Division Assistant Superintendent Ana Alonto

denying that the school was burned and
Department of Education Assistant Secretary
Tonisito Umali stating that they have not
received any report of damage.
5. that the Maute Group attacked various Statement in the on-line news article of
government facilities (Proclamation No. 216 Inquirer  made by Marawi City Mayor Majul
236

and the Report). Gandamra stating that the ASG and the Maute
Terror Groups have not taken over any
government facility in Marawi City.
However, the so-called counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the
internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof It
was not even shown that efforts were made to secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances
proved futile. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice
removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than
proving the truth of the matter asserted.  This pronouncement applies with equal force to the
237

Cullamat Petition which likewise submitted online news articles  as basis for their claim of
238

insufficiency of factual basis.

Again, it bears to reiterate that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in
these cases. As long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report
indubitably showing the presence of an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety
requires the declaration and/or suspension, the finding of sufficiency of factual basis, stands.

d) Ruling in Bedol v.
Commission on Elections not
Applicable.

Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections,  news reports may be
239

admitted on grounds of relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity. Petitioners' reliance on this

case is misplaced. The Court in Bedol made it clear that the doctrine of independent relevant
statement, which is an ·exception to the hearsay rule, applies in cases "where only the fact that
such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial."  Here, the
240

question is not whether such statements were made by Saber, et. al., but rather whether what
they said are true. Thus, contrary to the view of petitioners, the exception in Bedol finds no
application here.

e) There are other independent

facts which support the finding that,
more likely than not, rebellion exists
and that public safety requires it.

Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the
Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that
more likely than not, actua1 rebellion exists, and public safety requires the declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To be precise, the alleged false
and/or inaccurate statements are only five out of the severa1 statements bulleted in the
President's Report. Notably, in the interpellation by Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the
second day of the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that he was not aware or that he
had no personal knowledge of the other incidents cited.  As it thus stands, there is no question
241

or challenge with respect to the reliability of the other incidents, which by themselves are ample
to preclude the conclusion that the President's report is unreliable and that Proclamation No. 216
was without sufficient factual basis.

Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's imposition of
martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly inaccurate, simulated, false
and/or hyperbolic.

X. Public safety requires the declaration of

martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.

Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid,
there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In
his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute
Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise against
civilians and their properties.  In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats
242

were issued;  road blockades and checkpoints were set up;  schools and churches were
243 244

burned;  civilian hostages were taken and killed;  non-Muslims or Christians were
245 246

targeted;  young male Muslims were forced to join their group;  medical services and delivery of
247 248

basic services were hampered;  reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement
249

were hindered;  and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.
250 251

These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had already escalated to a
level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the last paragraph of his Report, the President declared:

While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going
rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled. 252

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ f habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied
with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that
rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

XI. Whole of Mindanao

a) The overriding and

paramount concern of martial law is
the protection of the security of the
nation and the good and safety of the
public.

Considering the nation's and its people's traumatic experience martial law under the Marcos
regime, one would expect the framers of the 1987 Constitution to stop at nothing
from not resuscitating the law. Yet it would appear that the constitutional writers
entertained no doubt about the necessity and practicality of such specie of extraordinary power
and thus, once again, bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief the power to declare martial law
albeit in its diluted form.

Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are
necessary for the protection of the security of the nation; suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is "precautionary , and although it might [curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it]
is for the purpose of defending and protecting the security of the state or the entire country and
our sovereign people".  Commissioner Ople referred to the suspension of the privilege of the writ
253

of habeas corpus as a "form of immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing potential internal

enemies" "especially in areas like Mindanao." 254

Aside from protecting the security of the country, martial law also guarantees and promotes
public safety. It is worthy of mention that rebellion alone does not justify the declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the public safety requirement
must likewise be present.

b) As Commander-in-Chief, the
President receives vital, relevant,
classified, and live information which
equip and assist him in making
decisions.

In Parts IX and X, the Court laid down the arsenal of facts and events that formed the basis for
Proclamation No. 216. For the President, the totality of facts and events, more likely than not,
shows that actual rebellion exists and that public safety requires the declaration of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Otherwise stated, the President
believes that there is probable cause that actual rebellion exists and public safety warrants the
issuance of Proclamation No. 216. In turn, the Court notes that the President, in arriving at such
a conclusion, relied on the facts and events included in the Report, which we find sufficient.

To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from being
exhaustive or all-encompassing. At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that as
Commander-in-Chief, the President has possession of documents and information classified as
"confidential", the contents of which cannot be included in the Proclamation or Report for reasons
of national security. These documents may contain information detailing the position of
government troops and rebels, stock of firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and
operations, names of suspects and sympathizers, etc. , In fact, during the closed door session
held by the Court, some information came to light, although not mentioned in the Proclamation or
Report. But then again, the discretion whether to include the same in the Proclamation or Report
is the judgment call of the President. In fact, petitioners concede to this. During the oral
argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assertion of facts [in the Proclamation and
Report] is the call of the President."
255

It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence reports and classified documents. "It
is for the President as [C]ommander-in[C]hief of the Armed Forces to appraise these [classified
evidence or documents/]reports and be satisfied that the public safety demands the suspension
of the writ."  Significantly, respect to these so-called classified documents is accorded even
256

"when [the] authors of or witnesses to these documents may not be revealed." 257

In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he also has the
right, prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and confidential data, concomitant
with his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

c) The Court has no machinery

or tool equal to that of the
Commander-in-Chief to ably and
properly assess the ground
conditions.

In contrast, the Court does not have the same resources available to the President. However,
this should not be considered as a constitutiona1 lapse. On the contrary, this is in line with the
function of the Court, particularly in this instance, to determine the sufficiency of factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216. As thoroughly discussed in Part VIII, the determination by the Court of the
sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the
Report and Proclamation. In fact, the Court, in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,  cautioned
258

not to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." In this regard, "the Court
will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the [E]xecutive [D]epartment;"  in turn, the
259

Executive Department will have to open its findings to the Court,  which it did during the closed
260

door session last June 15, 2017.

d) The 1987 Constitution

grants to the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, the discretion
to determine the territorial coverage
or application of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the
Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire
Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law.

This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department,

particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and
live information necessary for and relevant in calibrating the territorial application of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that the
President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of
what is happening on the ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of
application, which is 60 days, unless sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the
territorial scope or area of coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any part thereof,"
depending on the assessment of the President.

e) The Constitution has

provided sufficient safeguards against
possible abuses of Commander-in-
Chief's powers; further curtailment of
Presidential powers should not only
be discouraged but also avoided.

Considering the country's history, it is understandable that the resurgence of martial law would
engender apprehensions among the citizenry. Even the Court as an institution cannot project a
stance of nonchalance. However, the importance of martial law in the context of our society
should outweigh one's prejudices and apprehensions against it. The significance of martial law
should not be undermined by unjustified fears and past experience. After all, martial law is critical
and crucial to the promotion of public safety, the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and
ultimately, the survival of our country. It is vital for the protection of the country not only against
internal enemies but also against those enemies lurking from beyond our shores. As such,
martial law should not be cast aside, or its scope and potency limited and diluted, based on bias
and unsubstantiated assumptions.

Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several safeguards which
effectively watered down the power to declare martial law. The 1987 Constitution "[clipped] the
powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of [the] experience with the previous regime."  Not 261

only were the grounds limited to actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at
60 days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto
powers of the Court and Congress.

Commissioner Monsod, who, incidentally, is a counsel for the Mohamad Petition, even exhorted
his colleagues in the Constitutional Convention to look at martial law from a new perspective by
elaborating on the sufficiency of the proposed safeguards:

MR. MONSOD. x x x

Second, we have been given a spectre of non sequitur, that the mere declaration of martial law
for a fixed period not exceeding 60 days, which is subject to judicial review, is going to result in
numerous violations of human rights, the predominance of the military forever and in untold
sufferings. Madam President, we are talking about invasion and rebellion. We may not have any
freedom to speak of after 60 days, if we put as a precondition the concurrence of Congress. That
might prevent the President from acting at that time in order to meet the problem. So I would like
to suggest that, perhaps, we should look at this in its proper perspective. We are only looking at
a very specific case. We are only looking at a case of the first 60 days at its maximum. And we
are looking at actual invasion and rebellion, and there are other safeguards in those cases. 262

Even Bishop Bacani was convinced that the 1987 Constitution has enough safeguards against
presidential abuses and commission of human rights violations. In voting yes for the elimination
of the requirement of prior concurrence of Congress, Bishop Bacani stated, viz.:

BISHOP BACANI. Yes, just two sentences. The reason I vote II yes is that despite my concern
for human rights, I believe that a good President can also safeguard human rights and human
lives as well. And I do not want to unduly emasculate the powers of the President. Xxx 263

Commissioner Delos Reyes shared the same sentiment, to wit:

MR. DE LOS REYES. May I explain my vote, Madam President.

x x x The power of the President to impose martial law is doubtless of a very high and delicate
nature. A free people are naturally jealous of the exercise of military power, and the power to
impose martial law is certainly felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude. But as presented by the
Committee, there are many safeguards: 1) it is limited to 60 days; 2) Congress can revoke it; 3)
the Supreme Court can still review as to the sufficiency of factual basis; and 4) it does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution. To repeat what I have quoted when I interpellated
Commissioner Monsod, it is said that the power to impose martial law is dangerous to liberty and
may be abused. All powers may be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult,
we think, to point out any other hands in which this power will be more safe and at the same time
equally effectual. When citizens of the State are in arms against each other and the constituted
authorities are unable to execute the laws, the action of the President must be prompt or it is of
little value. x x x  (Emphasis supplied)
264

At this juncture, it bears to stress that it was the collective sentiment of the framers of the 1987
Constitution that sufficient safeguards against possible misuse and abuse by the Commander-in-
Chief of his extraordinary powers are already in place and that no further emasculation of the
presidential powers is called for in the guise of additional safeguards. The Constitution
recognizes that any further curtailment, encumbrance, or emasculation of the presidential powers
would not generate any good among the three co-equal branches, and to the country and its
citizens as a whole. Thus:

MR. OPLE. The reason for my concern, Madam President, is that when we put all of these
encumbrances on the President and Commander-in-Chief during an actual invasion or rebellion,
given an intractable Congress that may be dominated by opposition parties, we may be actually
impelling the President to use the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot by just declaring a
revolutionary government that sets him free to deal with the invasion or the insurrection. x x
x  (Emphasis supplied)
265

f) Rebellion and public safety;

nature, scope, and range.

It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against
the government;"266 and that by nature, "rebellion is x x x a crime of masses or multitudes,
involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a priori, within predetermined bounds."  We
267

understand this to mean that the precise extent or range of the rebellion could not be measured
by exact metes and bounds.

To illustrate: A contingent armed with high-powered firearms publicly assembled in Padre Faura,
Ermita, Manila where the Court's compound is situated. They overpowered the guards, entered
the Court's premises, and hoisted the ISIS flag. Their motive was political, i.e., they want to
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine government a part of the territory of the Philippines,
particularly the Court's compound and establish it as an ISIS-territory.

Based on the foregoing illustration, and vis-a-vis the nature of the crime of rebellion, could we
validly say that the rebellion is confined only within the Court's compound? Definitely not. The
possibility that there are other rebels positioned in the nearby buildings or compound of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH) or the Manila Science High Schoo1 (MSHS) could not be
discounted. There is no way of knowing that all participants in the rebellion went and stayed
inside the Court's compound.

Neither could it be validly argued that the armed contingent positioned in PGH or MSHS
is not engaged in rebellion because there is no publicity in their acts as, in fact, they were merely
lurking inside the compound of PGH and MSHS. However, it must be pointed out that for the
crime of rebellion to be consummated, it is not required that all armed participants should
congregate in one place, in this case, the Court's compound, and publicly rise in arms against
the government for the attainment of their culpable purpose. It suffices that a portion of the
contingent gathered and formed a mass or a crowd and engaged in an armed public uprising
against the government. Similarly, it cannot be validly concluded that the grounds on which the
armed public uprising actually to6k place should be the measure of the extent, scope or range, of
the actual I rebellion. This is logical since the other rebels positioned in PGH, MSHS, I or
elsewhere, whose participation did not involve the publicity aspect of rebellion, may also be
considered as engaging in the crime of rebellion.

Proceeding from the same illustration, suppose we say that the President, after finding probable
cause that there exists actual rebellion and that public safety requires it, declares martial law and
suspends the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Metro Manila, could we then say that the
territorial coverage of the proclamation is too expansive?

To answer this question, we revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine the
territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative
whether to put the entire Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. There is no
constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the particular place where the
armed public uprising actually transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial law is
an urgent measure since at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As such, the
President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not wait
for another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat. If
that is the case, then the President would have to wait until every remote corner in the country is
infested with rebels before he could declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is
not the scenario envisioned by the Constitution.

Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose martial law
only within the Court's compound because it is where the armed public uprising actually
transpired, he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded from
expanding the coverage of martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is not
confined within predetermined bounds.

Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, "involves
the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public
from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters."  Public safety is
268

an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not
be physically measured by metes and bounds.

Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not necessarily be limited
to the particular vicinity where the armed public uprising actually transpired, is because of the
unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime. "The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a
vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of
rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves[,] are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion."  Rebellion absorbs "other acts committed in its pursuance".  Direct
269 270

assault,  murder,  homicide,  arson,  robbery,  and kidnapping,  just to name a few, are
271 272 273 274 275 276

absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed in furtherance of rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a
basis of a separate charge."  Jurisprudence also teaches that not only common crimes may be
277

absorbed in rebellion but also "offenses under special laws [such as Presidential Decree No.
1829]  which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense".  "All crimes, whether
278 279

punishable under a special law or general law, which are me e components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be
isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. 280

Thus, by the theory of absorption, the crime of murder committed in Makati City, if committed in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion being hypothetically staged in Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila,
is stripped of its common complexion and is absorbed in the crime of rebellion. This all the more
makes it difficult to confine the application of martial law only to the place where the armed public
uprising is actually taking place. In the illustration above, Padre Faura could only be the nerve
center of the rebellion but at the same time rebellion is also happening in Makati City.

In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct
proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public
safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise
measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be
drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these
limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial
scope of martial law.

Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place
where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in
danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from
Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from
different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where
there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make
the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.

g) The Court must stay within

the confines of its power.

The Court can only act within the confines of its power.  For the Court to overreach is to infringe
1âwphi1

upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial application
belongs to the President. "The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the
principle of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican
system." 281

To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery to
determine the strategical value of other places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion and
restore peace. It would be engaging in an act of adventurism if it dares to embark on a mission of
deciphering the territorial metes and bounds of martial law. To be blunt about it, hours after the
proclamation of martial law none of the members of this Court could have divined that more than
ten thousand souls would be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and that the
military would have to secure those places also; none of us could have predicted that Cayamora
Maute would be arrested in Davao City or that his wife Ominta Romato Maute would be
apprehended in Masiu, Lanao del Sur; and, none of us had an inkling that the Bangsamoro
Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) would launch an attack in Cotabato City. The Court has no
military background and technical expertise to predict that. In the same manner, the Court lacks
the technical capability to determine which part of Mindanao would best serve as forward
operating base of the military in their present endeavor in Mindanao. Until now the Court is in a
quandary and can only speculate whether the 60-day lifespan of Proclamation No. 216 could
outlive the present hostilities in Mindanao. It is on this score that the Court should give the
President sufficient leeway to address the peace and order problem in Mindanao.

Thus, considering the current situation, it will not serve any purpose if the President is goaded
into using "the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot"  by attempting to impose another
282

encumbrance; after all "the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is essentially an executive act." 283

Some sectors, impelled perhaps by feelings of patriotism, may wish to subdue, rein in, or give the
President a nudge, so to speak, as some sort of reminder of the nation's experience under the
Marcos-styled martial law. However, it is not fair to judge President Duterte based on the ills
some of us may have experienced during the Marcos-martial law era. At this point, the Court
quotes the insightful discourse of Commissioner Ople:

MR. OPLE. x x x

xxxx

Madam President, there is a tendency to equate patriotism with rendering the executive branch
of the government impotent, as though by reducing drastically the powers of the executive, we
are rendering a service to human welfare. I think it is also important to understand that the
extraordinary measures contemplated in the Article on the Executive pertain to a practical state
of war existing in this country when national security will become a common bond of patriotism of
all Filipinos, especially if it is an actual invasion or an actual rebellion, and the President may
have to be given a minimum flexibility to cope with such unprecedented threats to the survival of
a nation. I think the Commission has done so but at the same time has not, in any manner,
shunned the task of putting these powers under a whole system of checks and balances,
including the possible revocation at any time of a proclamation of martial law by the Congress,
and in any case a definite determination of these extraordinary powers, subject only to another
extension to be determined by Congress in the event that it is necessary to do so because the
emergency persists.

So, I think this Article on the Executive for which I voted is completely responsible; it is attuned to
the freedom and the rights of the citizenry. It does not render the presidency impotent and, at the
same time, it allows for a vigorous representation of the people through their Congress when an
emergency measure is in force and effect. 284

h) Several local armed groups

have formed linkages aimed at
committing rebellion and acts in
furtherance thereof in the whole of
Mindanao.

With a predominantly Muslim population, Marawi City is "the only Islamic City of the South."  On 285

April 15, 1980, it was conferred the official title of "Islamic City of Marawi."  The city's first name,
286

"Dansalan," "was derived from the word 'dansal', meaning a destination point or rendezvous.
Literally, it also means arrival or coming."  Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the
287

Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point
of reference of all roads in Mindanao.

Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion,
both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of
Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces
adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;"  there is also the
288
plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to
May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various places in
Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and
the murder of military and police personnel,  must also be considered. Indeed, there is some
289

semblance of truth to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.

Other events also show that the atrocities were not concentrated in Marawi City. Consider these:

a. On January 13, 2017, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded in Barangay Campo
Uno, Lamita City, Basilan. A civilian was killed while another was wounded. 290

b. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three Indonesians near Bakungan Island, Taganak,
Tawi-Tawi. 291

c. On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED in Barangay Danapah, Albarka, Basilan
resulting in the death of two children and the wounding of three others.292

d. From March to May 2017, there were eleven (11) separate instances of IED explosions by the
BIFF in Mindanao. These resulted in the death and wounding of several personalities. 293

e. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its kidnap victim, Juergen Kantner in Sulu. 294

f. On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabaga, Bohol resulting in firefights between rebels and
government troops. 295

g. On April 13, 2017, the ASG beheaded Filipino kidnap victim Noel Besconde. 296

h. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni Siraji and beheaded him three days later. 297

There were also intelligence reports from the military about offensives committed by the ASG
and other local rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi has already spilled
over to other parts of Mindanao.

Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established
among rebel groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as
confined only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that happened
during the Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the
countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others.  The Court
298

cannot simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds,
the President has reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial law, as well as the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most
necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances.

i) Terrorism neither negates

nor absorbs rebellion.

It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has been ongoing for decades. While
some groups have sought legal and peaceful means, others have resorted to violent extremism
and terrorism. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader
scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various
means by which terrorism can be committed.  However, while the scope of terrorism may be
299

comprehensive, its purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow
and create a condition of widespread fear among the populace in order to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear is traditionally
achieved through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading, among others. In contrast,
the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e., (a) to remove from the
allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part
thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or
Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.

In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the
malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the
Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand,
the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand,
the crime is terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err in
believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime of rebellion.

In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as
terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that
"[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of
constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government." Thus, as long as
the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of
terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial ' law
or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. After all, the extraordinary powers of the
President are bestowed on him by the Constitution. No act of Congress can, therefore, curtail or
diminish such powers.

Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states that rebellion and
terrorism are mutuallty exclusive of each other or that they cannot co-exist together. RA 9372
does not expressly or impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while rebellion is one of the
predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have different elements. 300

Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.

At the end of the day, however ardently and passionately we may believe in the validity or
correctness of the varied and contentious causes or principles that we espouse, advocate or
champion, let us not forget that at this point in time we, the Filipino people, are confronted with a
crisis of such magnitude and proportion that we all need to summon the spirit of unity and act as
one undivided nation, if we are to overcome and prevail in the struggle at hand.

Let us face up to the fact that the siege in Marawi City has entered the second month and only
God or Allah knows when it would end. Let us take notice of the fact that the casualties of the
war are mounting. To date, 418 have died. Out of that were 303 Maute rebels as against 71
government troops and 44 civilians.

Can we not sheathe our swords and pause for a while to bury our dead, including our differences
and prejudices?

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No.

216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
CASE #3:

G.R. Nos. 172070-72             June 1, 2007

VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B. ECHANIS, and REY

CLARO C. CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
vs.
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ,
STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA, and STATE PROSECUTOR MERBA A. WAGA,
in their capacity as members of the Department of Justice panel of prosecutors
investigating I.S. Nos. 2006-225, 2006-226 and 2006-234, JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, in his capacity as Chief,
Philippine National Police, P/CSUPT. RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, JR., and P/SUPT.
YOLANDA G. TANIGUE, Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 172074-76             June 1, 2007

LIZA L. MAZA, JOEL G. VIRADOR, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASIÑO,

CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, and RAFAEL V. MARIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, in his capacity as Chief State Prosecutor, the Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors composed of EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, AILEEN
MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, IRWIN A. MARAYA and MERBA A. WAGA (Panel), RODOLFO B.
MENDOZA, in his capacity as Acting Deputy Director, Directorate for Investigation and
Detective Management (DIDM), YOLANDA G. TANIGUE, in her capacity as Acting
Executive Officer of DIDM, the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and the PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 175013             June 1, 2007

CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the
Secretary of Justice and overall superior of the Public Prosecutors, HONORABLE
ENCARNACION JAJA G. MOYA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 146, and HONORABLE ELMO M. ALAMEDA, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners’
prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and prosecution of
petitioners’ cases.
 The Facts

Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-
76, Liza L. Maza (Maza), Joel G. Virador (Virador), Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo), Teodoro A.
Casiño (Casiño), and Rafael V. Mariano (Mariano),1 are members of the House of
Representatives representing various party-list groups.2 Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 are
private individuals. Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under Article 134 in relation to
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases pending with the RTC Makati.

G.R. No. 175013 (The Beltran Petition)

Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No.

1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police officers3 arrested
Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in
Camp Crame, Quezon City. Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did
not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was
subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in
Quezon City on 24 February 2006, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA
Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who
claimed to have been present at the rally. The inquest prosecutor4 indicted Beltran and filed the
corresponding Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC).5

The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where, on 27 February 2006, he was
subjected to a second inquest, with 1st Lt. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for Rebellion.
A panel of State prosecutors6 from the DOJ conducted this second inquest. The inquest was
based on two letters, both dated 27 February 2006, of Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of
Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza). Tanigue is the Acting Executive Officer of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Philippine National Police (PNP), while Mendoza is
the Acting Deputy Director of the CIDG. The letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action the
results of the CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76,
San Juan, and several others as "leaders and promoters" of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow
the Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which
have formed a "tactical alliance."

On 27 February 2006, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause
to indict Beltran and San Juan as "leaders/promoters" of Rebellion. The panel then filed an
Information with the RTC Makati. The Information alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and other
individuals "conspiring and confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously form a tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong
Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members as Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan
(KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and thereby rise publicly and take up arms
against the duly constituted government, x x x."7 The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
06-452, was raffled to Branch 137 under Presiding Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (Judge
Delorino).

Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of probable cause against
him.8 Before the motion could be resolved, Judge Delorino recused herself from the case which
was re-raffled to Branch 146 under Judge Encarnacion Jaja-Moya (Judge Moya).

In its Order dated 31 May 2006, Branch 146 sustained the finding of probable cause against
Beltran.9 Beltran sought reconsideration but Judge Moya also inhibited herself from the case
without resolving Beltran’s motion. Judge Elmo M. Alameda of Branch 150, to whom the case
was re-raffled, issued an Order on 29 August 2006 denying Beltran’s motion.
Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 175013 to set aside the Orders dated 31 May 2006 and 29
August 2006 and to enjoin Beltran’s prosecution.

In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that Beltran’s inquest for Rebellion
was valid and that the RTC Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such felony.

G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 (The Maza and Ladlad Petitions)

Based on Tanigue and Mendoza’s letters, the DOJ sent subpoenas to petitioners on 6 March
2006 requiring them to appear at the DOJ Office on 13 March 2006 "to get copies of the
complaint and its attachment." Prior to their receipt of the subpoenas, petitioners had quartered
themselves inside the House of Representatives building for fear of being subjected to
warrantless arrest.

During the preliminary investigation on 13 March 2006, the counsel for the CIDG presented a
masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes (Fuentes), who claimed to be an eyewitness
against petitioners. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before respondent prosecutor Emmanuel
Velasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to media members present during the proceedings.
The panel of prosecutors10 gave petitioners 10 days within which to file their counter-affidavits.
Petitioners were furnished the complete copies of documents supporting the CIDG’s letters only
on 17 March 2006.

Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel for lack of
impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under which petitioners were
investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media
regarding petitioners’ case,11 and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the
preliminary investigation. The DOJ panel of prosecutors denied petitioners’ motion on 22 March
2006. Petitioners sought reconsideration and additionally prayed for the dismissal of the cases.
However, the panel of prosecutors denied petitioners’ motions on 4 April 2006.

Petitioners now seek the nullification of the DOJ Orders of 22 March 2006 and 4 April 2006.

Acting on petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ, the Court issued a status quo
order on 5 June 2006. Prior to this, however, the panel of prosecutors, on 21 April 2006, issued a
Resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioners and 46 others with Rebellion. The
prosecutors filed the corresponding Information with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-944 (later consolidated with Criminal Case No. 06-452 in Branch 146),
charging petitioners and their co-accused as "principals, masterminds, [or] heads" of a
Rebellion.12 Consequently, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 filed a supplemental petition to
enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.

In his separate Comment to the Maza petition, the Solicitor General submits that the preliminary
investigation of petitioners was not tainted with irregularities. The Solicitor General also claims
that the filing of Criminal Case No. 06-944 has mooted the Maza petition.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

1. In G.R. No. 175013, (a) whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid
and (b) whether there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion; and

2. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, whether respondent prosecutors should be enjoined
from continuing with the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.13
 The Ruling of the Court

We find the petitions meritorious. On the Beltran Petition

The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void.

Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without
warrant.14 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances
when such warrantless arrest may be effected, thus:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful.— A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

xxxx

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran, without
a warrant,16 for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only
have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other.
Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest
proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void.
None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion.
Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just
committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed
Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard
Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.17

Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993, the initial duty of the inquest
officer is to determine if the arrest of the detained person was made "in accordance with the
provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113."18 If the arrest was not properly
effected, the inquest officer should proceed under Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which provides:

Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.— Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not
made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:

a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;

b) note down the disposition on the referral document;

c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and

d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial
Prosecutor for appropriate action.
Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or
Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary
investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee
and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary
investigation, together with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn
statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)

For the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in
relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare Beltran’s inquest
void.19 Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary investigation had he not asked the trial
court to make a judicial determination of probable cause, which effectively took the place of such
proceeding.

There is No Probable Cause to Indict

Beltran for Rebellion.

Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."20 To accord respect to the
discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not
interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause for otherwise, courts would be
swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor’s findings in such investigations.21 However, in
the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor abused his discretion by ignoring a clear
insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause, thus denying the accused his
right to substantive and procedural due process, we have not hesitated to intervene and exercise
our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the prosecutor’s findings.22 This exception holds true
here.

Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed –

[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or
the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

The elements of the offense are:

1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and

2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either –

(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:

(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or

(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or

(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers and prerogatives.23

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done
in furtherance of a political end.24
The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion
consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone
over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are insufficient to
show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits,
some of which were sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military and some
civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 Febuary
2006,26 and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006,27 none of the affidavits mentions
Beltran.28 In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw
Beltran, Ocampo, Casiño, Maza, Mariano, Virador, and other individuals on board a vehicle
which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that after the passengers
alighted, they were met by another individual who looked like San Juan. For his part, Cachuela
stated that he was a former member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP’s
"10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities; and (3) the
arms he and the other CPP members used were purchased partly from contributions by
Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP.

The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in
an armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that
Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he
was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed
specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of
27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran’s
alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a
rebellion.

In fact, Cachuela’s affidavit stated that Beltran attended the 1992 CPP Plenum as "Chairman,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)." Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does
not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.29 As for the alleged
funding of the CPP’s military equipment from Beltran’s congressional funds, Cachuela’s affidavit
merely contained a general conclusion without any specific act showing such funding. Cachuela
merely alleged that "ang mga ibang mga pondo namin ay galing sa mga party list na naihalal sa
Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN MUNA – pimumunuan nila SATUR OCAMPO at CRISPIN BELTRAN,
x x x."30 Such a general conclusion does not establish probable cause.

In his Comment to Beltran’s petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes’ affidavit, dated 25
February 2006,31 as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided
details in his statement regarding meetings Beltran and the other petitioners attended in 2005
and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed,
among others.

The claim is untenable. Fuentes’ affidavit was not part of the attachments the CIDG referred to
the DOJ on 27 February 2006. Thus, the panel of inquest prosecutors did not have Fuentes’
affidavit in their possession when they conducted the Rebellion inquest against Beltran on that
day. Indeed, although this affidavit is dated 25 February 2006, the CIDG first presented it only
during the preliminary investigation of the other petitioners on 13 March 2006 during which
Fuentes subscribed to his statement before respondent prosecutor Velasco.

Respondent prosecutors later tried to remedy this fatal defect by motu proprio submitting to
Branch 137 of the RTC Makati Fuentes’ affidavit as part of their Comment to Beltran’s motion for
judicial determination of probable cause. Such belated submission, a tacit admission of the
dearth of evidence against Beltran during the inquest, does not improve the prosecution’s case.
Assuming them to be true, what the allegations in Fuentes’ affidavit make out is a case for
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not
Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring
down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under
Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged this, since the felony charged in the Information
against Beltran and San Juan in Criminal Case No. 06-452 is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion
and not Rebellion. The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired
to form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it
nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.

The minutes32 of the 20 February 2006 alleged meeting in Batangas between members of MKP
and CPP, including Beltran, also do not detract from our finding.  Nowhere in the minutes was
1a\^/phi1.net

Beltran implicated. While the minutes state that a certain "Cris" attended the alleged meeting,
there is no other evidence on record indicating that "Cris" is Beltran. San Juan, from whom the
"flash drive" containing the so-called minutes was allegedly taken, denies knowing Beltran.

To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting, maintaining, or heading a
Rebellion. The Information in Criminal Case No. 06-452 itself does not make such allegation.
Thus, even assuming that the Information validly charges Beltran for taking part in a Rebellion,
he is entitled to bail as a matter of right since there is no allegation in the Information that he is a
leader or promoter of the Rebellion.33 However, the Information in fact merely charges Beltran for
"conspiring and confederating" with others in forming a "tactical alliance" to commit rebellion. As
worded, the Information does not charge Beltran with Rebellion but with Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion, a bailable offense.34

On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions

The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted

With Irregularities.

As in the determination of probable cause, this Court is similarly loath to enjoin the prosecution of
offenses, a practice rooted on public interest as the speedy closure of criminal investigations
fosters public safety.35 However, such relief in equity may be granted if, among others, the same
is necessary (a) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner36 or (b) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights.37 The case of the petitioners
in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 falls under these exceptions.

The procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by at least four years, two
months and one day is outlined in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, thus:

Procedure.—The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by
the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting
documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there
are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed
and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath,
or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify
that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If
 the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he
intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for
examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for
examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting
affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his
witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-
affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of
this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent
shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-
affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the
complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.

(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified
from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right
to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer
questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits
and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be
terminated within five (5) days.

(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine
whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. (Emphasis
supplied)

Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court had mandated in an earlier
ruling, "so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any
material damage,"38 respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it. Respondent
prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint
(which, with its attachment, must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied
by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, before a notary public. Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of
Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints39 and accepted the affidavits attached to
the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that
a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule
112.

Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint,
must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall
dismiss the case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to the respondents." Here, after receiving
the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring
them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of the complaints and its
attachments." During the investigation, respondent prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a
masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco
proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’ affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to
members of the media who covered the proceedings. Respondent prosecutors then required
petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days. It was only four days later, on 17 March
2006, that petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments to the CIDG letters. 1a\^/phi1.net
These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors’ statement in the Order of 22 March
2006 that the preliminary investigation "was done in accordance with the Revised Rules o[f]
Criminal Procedure."40 Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating
the complainant’s antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to
members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the
charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent
credence to petitioners’ claim that the entire proceeding was a sham.

A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an
individual the difference between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on
the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus, we have characterized the
right to a preliminary investigation as not "a mere formal or technical right" but a "substantive"
one, forming part of due process in criminal justice.41 This especially holds true here where the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may be non-bailable for those accused
as principals.

Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, respondent prosecutors’ filing of the
Information against petitioners on 21 April 2006 with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati does not moot
the petitions in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76. Our power to enjoin prosecutions cannot
be frustrated by the simple filing of the Information with the trial court.
1a\^/phi1.net

On Respondent Prosecutors’ Lack of Impartiality

We find merit in petitioners’ doubt on respondent prosecutors’ impartiality. Respondent Secretary

of Justice, who exercises supervision and control over the panel of prosecutors, stated in an
interview on 13 March 2006, the day of the preliminary investigation, that, "We [the DOJ] will
just declare probable cause, then it’s up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x."42 Petitioners raised this
issue in their petition,43 but respondents never disputed the veracity of this statement. This clearly
shows pre-judgment, a determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable
cause.

A Final Word

The obvious involvement of political considerations in the actuations of respondent Secretary of

Justice and respondent prosecutors brings to mind an observation we made in another equally
politically charged case. We reiterate what we stated then, if only to emphasize the importance of
maintaining the integrity of criminal prosecutions in general and preliminary investigations in
particular, thus:

[W]e cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving
the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for
political ends, or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of
observing the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike,
whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the
established procedure may be public’s perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be
enhanced.44  1a\^/phi1.net

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. In G.R. No. 175013, we SET ASIDE the Order dated 31
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 146 and the Order dated 29 August
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-
76, we SET ASIDE the Orders dated 22 March 2006 and 4 April 2006 issued by respondent
prosecutors. We ORDER the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150 to DISMISS Criminal
Case Nos. 06-452 and 06-944.

SO ORDERED.
CASE #4:

88 Phil. 25

JUGO, J.:
Matias Almazan was accused before the People's Court of the crime of
treason on five counts. Count 5 was not deemed by the trial court
specifically proved for lack of two witnesses to the overt acts, and the
evidence on said count was considered only as proof of adhesion to the
enemy. The appellant was found guilty on the first four counts and was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law,
to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs. The defendant appealed to this
Court.

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:

Count No. 1

The appellant was formerly a member of the subversive societies known

as "Ganap" and "Sakdal." During the Japanese occupation, he became a
member of the other society known as "Makabayang Kalipunan Ng Mga
Pilipino" or "Makapili" for short. This association was founded under the
auspices of the Japanese Imperial Army, its purpose having been to help
the Japanese forces in their campaign against the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and to combat the guerrilla
underground movement. The members of this society received military
training from the Japanese and actually took part in the campaign
against the resistance movement of the Fil-American forces. This charge
was proved by documentary evidence and the testimony of numerous
witnesses.

Count No. 2

On June 20, 1943, the appellant with one Marcelo Alatiit, accompanied
several Japanese soldiers to the barrio of Malabar, Binan, Laguna, and
there arrested three guerrilla suspects, named Gregorio Corrales,
Macario Alzona, and Juan Romero, and took them to Calamba, Laguna,
delivering them to the Japanese headquarters in that town. This is
proved by the testimony of four witnessses.

Count No. 3

In the evening of August 9, 1943, the appellant Matias Almazan arrested

in their house in barrio De la Paz, Binan, Laguna, Enrique Alcabasa and
his sons Bernardo and Gregorio, who were members of the guerrilla
corps under the command of Colonel Hugh Straughn and delivered them
to the Japanese headquarters in Binan, where they were tortured by the
Japanese, resulting in the death of Enrique two days afterward. This
charge was proved by the testimony of Bernardo and Gregorio Alcabasa.

Count No. 4

In the month of November, 1943, at midnight, the appellant, armed,

went with Marcelo Alatiit and a number of Japanese soldiers to the
barrio of Malaban, Binan, Laguna, and there arrested Felipe Capili,
proceeding to the town of Siniloan where they apprehended three
unknown Filipinos. All of these arrested persons were guerrilla suspects.
They were surrendered by the defendant and his companions to the
Japanese garrison in Calamba. This was proved by the testimony of
Angeles Vicentina, Felipe Capili, and Valentin del Monte.

The appellant admitted that he was a Filipino citizen.

The appellant in his defense, although he admits his membership in the

Ganap Party before the war, denies his affiliation with the Makapili. He
denies having given aid or comfort to the enemy.

He admits that he was present when Corrales, Alzona, and Romero were
arrested on June 20, 1943, but denies having had any participation in
said arrest having been only a curious bystander.

He admits knowing Enrique Alcabasa, but says that he was even

unaware that the latter had been arrested and learned of it only when he,
the appellant, was arraigned.

The witness for the defense, Barsiliso Almazan, corroborating the

defendant, testifies that he was present when Corrales, Alzona, and
Romero were arrested, but the defendant Matias Almazan was not
among those who arrested them.

Felix Kalayag, another witness for the defense, testifies that the appellant
was not with the group that arrested Felipe Capili in November, 1943,
and that the only civilian present on that occasion was the Japanese
named Takama.

The membership of the appellant Matias Almazan in the Makapili

association has been proved by the testimony of Angeles Vicentina,
Pacifico Alzona, Bernardo Alcabasa, Marciano Gallo, Marcial Gomez,
and Calixto Martina, who were barrio mates of the appellant and knew
the latter well. They saw the appellant, fully armed when he was with the
Japanese patrol on several occasions, and when he was drilled by the
Japanese together with the members of the Makapili organization in
Bifian. The appellant acted as a pro-Japanese and a leader of the
Makapilis. The evidence is sufficient to establish the fact that he was an
active member of the Makapili.

The contention of the appellant that he was a mere bystander when

Corrales, Alzona, and Romero were arrested, is disproved by the
testimony of Angeles Vicentina, Faustino Parao, Juan P. Romero, and
Gregorio Corrales. There is no reason to believe that his own barrio
mates would have testified against him if in fact he did not participate
actively in the arrest of those persons. They had no motive to do so;
Juana Amoranto and Barsiliso Almazan, who did not take part in the
arrest, were not charged by said witnesses. The appellant himself admits
that he had no quarrel. with those witnesses.

The denial of the defendant that he took part in the arrest of Enrique
Alcabasa and his sons Bernardo and Gregorio (Count No. 3) is disproved
by the victims Bernardo and Gregorio Alcabasa. Enrique Alcabasa could
not testify because he had been tortured to death by the Japanese.

With regard to the arrest of Capili (Count No. 4), the mere denial of the
accused cannot prevail over the testimony of Angeles Vicentina, Valentin
del Monte, and Felipe Capili himself, all of whom clearly identified the
appellant as one of those who arrested Capili. The appellant says that
Capili had a grudge against him because he refused to lend money to
Capili at a gambling game. This alleged motive is insufficient to lead us
to believe that for that reason Capili, the victim, testified falsely against
him.

Furthermore, with regard to the respective credibility of the witnesses,

we find no reason for disregarding the conclusions of the trial court; on
the contrary, we find them fully supported by the evidence of record.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed,

with costs against the appellant. It is ordered.

Moran,  C,  J.,  Paras, Feria,  Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,

Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

CASE #5:
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006

LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES
IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT.
NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG)
ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge
Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO), Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order)
filed by the above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein
petitioners, against the AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.

The facts are:

On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some
members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of
assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the AFP
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP – mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s Special
Warfare Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala
Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around
the building.

Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the
emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast media,
announced their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,
such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the
"enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military
assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal of support from their
Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They also
called for the resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.

About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a
state of rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all
necessary measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. She then called
the soldiers to surrender their weapons at five o’clock in the afternoon of that same day.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the
soldiers. The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several
hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms
and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually,
they returned to their barracks.

A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the
military personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-
A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against
them.

Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General
Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved
in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.

On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information
for coup d’etat 2 against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually
raffled off to Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently, this case was
consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678, involving the other accused, pending before
Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.

On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No.
03-2784.

On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for
violations of the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended, against the
same military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for disrespect
toward the President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for
disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d) violation
of Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97
for conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.

Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein)
filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume
jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7055. 5

On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) a
motion praying for the suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their
motion to assume jurisdiction.

On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP
Chief of Staff recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be
charged before a general court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the
Articles of War.

Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable
cause against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information. 6

In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped
the charge of coup d’etat against the 290 accused.

Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final
Pre-Trial Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of
absorption," those charged with coup d’etat before the RTCshould not be charged before the
military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges before the
court martial against the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat." The trial court then proceeded
to hear petitioners’ applications for bail.

In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO,
reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the
officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general
court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War.

On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magno’s recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass. The
AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge.
Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that
respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of
War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 9

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11,
2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman)
of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the
military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which
offenses covered by the Articles of War areservice-connected. These are violations of Articles 54
to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law provides that violations of these Articles are properly
cognizable by the court martial. As the charge against petitioners is violation of Article 96 which,
under R.A. No. 7055 is a service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the
court martial.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional issue
that the offense charged before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners alleged
therein that during the pendency of their original petition, respondents proceeded with the Pre-
Trial Investigation for purposes of charging them with violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then
referred the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost two years since the Oakwood
incident on July 27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and this was
done under questionable circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July 26, 2005, herein
petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that they were not arraigned within
the prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the commission of the alleged offense, in
violation of Article 38 of the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed on July 25,
2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period shall end
only at 12:00 midnight of July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was approaching
and it was becoming apparent that the accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly
changed its position and asserted that 23 of the accused have already been arraigned;" 14 and
that petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied by the general court martial in its
Order dated September 14, 2005. 15

In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of
merit. He alleges that "contrary to petitioners’ pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned
on July 13 and 18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29
accused were present" and, "(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the
Charges and Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17

The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of
prohibition.
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law.
Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the
Articles of War, the term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer." Article 2
provides:

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. – The following persons are subject to these articles and
shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons
subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:

(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
of the Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to
active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all
other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said service,
from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.

Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:

SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military
law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or
offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government
ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties,
which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the
offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case,
the offense shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in
the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or
offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended.

In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration
the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local
government ordinances.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the
general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local
ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general
rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-
connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an
exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice,
directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected crimes or
offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to
97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by court martial. This
delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court martial over crimes or offenses
committed by military personnel.

Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of
military justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The
military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline
in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. 18 Military law is established not
merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the
State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a
licentious and undisciplined military body. 19 The administration of military justice has been
universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the world
look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most effective means of
enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an indispensable
part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both
in peace and in war. 20

Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court martial, thus:

All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City,
Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to
defend the Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and abused their
constitutional duty to protect the people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust
the incumbent duly-elected and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing
the peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they are sworn to protect, thereby
causing dishonor and disrespect to the military profession, conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW 96 of the Articles of War.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)

Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides:

ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any officer, member of the Nurse
Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring
ours)

We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected.
This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing
that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as
officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities.Such violation
allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has
a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of
the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal
from the service – imposable only by the military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in
character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the
stringent standard of military discipline.

Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged before
the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been
declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat," hence, triable by said court
(RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests
in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has
conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows
jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action
which can do so. 22 And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment
that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law
"as they find it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in
the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-
martial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the
crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was made without or in
excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.

The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly
specifies what are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act
No. 408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:

Articles 54 to 70:

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.

Art. 56. False Muster.

Art. 57. False Returns.

Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.

Art. 59. Desertion.

Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.

Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.

Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.

Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,

Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National

Defense.

Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.

Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.

Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.

Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.

Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

Articles 72 to 92:

Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.

Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.

Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.

Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.

Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.

Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.

Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.

Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.

Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.

Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.

Art. 83. Spies.

Art. 84. Military Property.–Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage

or wrongful Disposition.

Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property

Issued to Soldiers.

Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.

Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.

Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.

Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.

Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.

Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.

Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.

Art. 92. Dueling.

Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.

Art. 97. General Article.

Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the
foregoing offenses. x x x.

It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95
to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In
fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.

Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this
case is worth quoting, thus:

The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged
crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and
generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25 unlike here where different statutes
are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both
offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected
offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is
not applicable to this case.

Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military
personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline
separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel
carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience,
and the nature of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a
separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed government
personnel.

A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his
reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a
soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander
reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will
collapse.

xxx

This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed
forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military Law and
Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that
ensures the President’s control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this
disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial
(citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted).

xxx

While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so sparingly
and only to release a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil.
401 [1948] or to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The
Court has never suppressed court-martial proceedings on the ground that the offense charged ‘is
absorbed and in furtherance of’ another criminal charge pending with the civil courts. The Court
may now do so only if the offense charged is not one of the service-connected offenses specified
in Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation in the present case.

With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition,
suffice it to say that we cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as
to (a) who among the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment.
These are matters involving questions of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a
trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the
jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis of the
undisputed facts. 26

Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the
unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 27 Stated differently,
prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from
usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. 28

In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial
and in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CASE #6:

G.R. No. 17748             March 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Vicente Sotto for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee

MALCOLM, J.:

As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain members of the Philippine Constabulary to
inflict revenge upon the police of the city of Manila, charges of sedition were filed in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila against the participants in the public disturbance. Convicted in
the trial court of a violation of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, and sentenced either to
the maximum penalty or a near approach to the maximum penalty provided by the punitive
provisions of that law, all of the defendants have perfected an appeal to this court. A statement of
the case and of the facts, an opinion on the pertinent issues, and a judgement, if no reversible
error be found, regarding the appropriate penalty, will be taken up in the order named.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS

On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested a woman who was a member of
the household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia Barracks in this city. The
arrest of the woman was considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage
committed by the policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between members of Manila
police department and member of the Philippine Constabulary.

The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policemen named Artemio Mojica, posted on
Calle Real, in the District of Intramuros, city of Manila, had an encounter with various
Constabulary soldiers which resulted in the shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary.
Private Macasinag was seriously, and as afterwards appeared, mortally wounded.
The encounter between policemen Mojica and other companions of the Manila force and private
Macasinag and other companions of the Constabulary, with its grave consequences for a
Constabulary soldier endangered a deep feeling of resentment on the part of the soldiers at
Santa Lucia Barracks. This resentment was soon converted into a desire for revenge against the
police force of the city of Manila. The officers of the Constabulary appear to have been aware of
the state of excitement among the soldiers the shooting of private Macasinag, Captain Page, the
commanding officer of the Barracks, increased the number of guards, and confined all the
soldiers in the Barracks.

During the afternoon of the next day, December 15, 1920, a rumor spread among the soldiers in
Santa Lucia Barracks to the effect that policeman Mojica was allowed to continue on duty on the
streets of Intramuros and that private Macasinag had died as a consequence of the shot he
received the night before. This rumor contributed in no small degree in precipitating a movement
for reprisal by the Constabulary soldiers against the policemen.

At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day, December 15, 1920, corporal Ingles of the
Fourth Company approached private Nicolas Torio who was then the man in charge of quarters,
and asked him to let the soldiers out through the window of the quarters of the Fourth Company.
Private Torio was easily persuaded to permit private Francisco Garcia of the Second Company to
saw out the window bars of the quarters, in his charge, and to allow soldiers to escape through
the window with rifles and ammunition under the command of their sergeants and corporals.
When outside of the quarters, these soldiers divided into groups for attack upon the city police
force.

One platoon of Constabulary soldiers apparently numbering about ten or twelve, on Calle Real,
Intramuros, fired in the direction of the intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo where an
American policeman named Driskill was stationed, and was taking with a friend named Jacumin,
a field clerk in the United States Army. These two men were shot and died soon afterwards. To
the credit of policeman Driskill be it said, that although in a dying condition and in the face of
overwhelming odds, her valiantly returned the fire with his revolver. Jacumin was killed
notwithstanding that in response to the command of Constabulary, "Hands up!," he elevated both
arms.

A street car happened to stop at this time at the corner of Calles Real and Cabildo. Without
considering that the passengers in the car were innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad
fired a volley into the car, killing instantly the passenger named Victor de Torres and gravely
wounding three other civilian passengers, Gregorio Cailes, Vicente Antonio, and Mariano Cortes.
Father Jose Tahon, a priest of the Cathedral of Manila, proved himself a hero on this occasion
for, against the command of the Constabulary, he persisted in persuading them to cease firing
and advanced in order that he might administer spiritual aid to those who had been wounded.

The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time. Some minutes later, Captain William E.
Wichman, assistant chief of police of the city of Manila, riding in a motorcycle driven by
policeman Saplala, arrived at the corner of Calles Real and Magallanes in Intramuros, and a
volley of shorts by Constabulary soldiers resulted in the instantaneous death of Captain
Wichman and the death shortly afterwards of patrolman Saplala.

About the same time, a police patrol came from the Meisic police station. When it was on Calle
Real near Cabildo, in Intramuros, it was fired upon by Constabulary soldiers who had stationed
themselves in the courtyard of the San Agustin Church. This attack resulted in the death of
patrolmen Trogue and Sison.

Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty and forty in number, had in the meantime,
arranged themselves in a firing line on the Sunken Gradens on the east side of Calle General
Luna opposite the Aquarium. From this advantageous position the Constabulary fired upon the
motorcycle occupied by Sergeant Armada and driven by policeman Policarpio who with
companions were passing along Calle General Luna in front of the Aquarium going in the
direction, of Calle Real, Intramuros. As a result of the shooting, the driver of the motorcycle,
policeman Policarpio, was mortally wounded. This same platoon of Constabulary soldiers fired
several volleys indiscriminately into the Luneta police station, and the office of the secret service
of the city of Manila across Calles General Luna and Padre Burgos, but fortunately no one was
injured.

General Rafael Crame, Chief of the Constabulary, and Captain Page, commanding officer of the
Santa Lucia Barracks, and other soldiers in the streets of Manila, and other soldiers one after
another returned to the Barracks where they were disarmed. No list of the names of these
soldiers was, however, made.

In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1920, Colonel, Lucien R. Sweet of the
Constabulary officers, and later by the fiscals of the city of Manila, commenced an investigation
of the events of the night before. He first ordered that all the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks at
that time, numbering some one hundred and eighty, be assembled on the parade ground and
when this was done, the soldiers were separated into their respective companies. Then Colonel
Sweet, speaking in English with the assistance of Captain Silvino Gallardo, who interpreted his
remarks into Tagalog, made to all of the soldiers two statements.

What occurred on the occasion above described can best be told in the exact language of
Colonel Sweet: "I assembled all four companies in Santa Lucia Barracks and asked them to tell
me which ones had been out the night before and which ones had participated in the shooting,
which they did, and to tell me the names of those who were with them and who were not then
present, which they did. I think there were seventy-two (seventy-three) present and they named
five (four) others." Again the witness said: "At first I asked all those who went out on the previous
night for any purpose whatever to signify the fact by stepping forward and gave them five
minutes to think it over before doing so. To those who stepped forward that had gone out for any
purpose whatever I asked those who took part in the shooting the night before that in justice to
themselves and to the other men who had not taken part in it, and for the good of all concerned,
that they step forward and they did." The names of the four who took part (not five as stated by
Colonel Sweet), but ho were taken to present, were noted by Captain Gallardo.

The statements of the seventy-seven soldiers were taken in writing during the afternoon of the
same day, December 16. The questionnaire prepared by the fiscal of the city of Manila was in
English or Spanish. The questions and answers were, however, when requested by the soldiers,
translated not their dialects. Each statement was signed by the soldier making it in the presence
of either two or three witnesses.

Although the answers to the questions contained these statements vary in phraseology, in
substance they are the same. One of them, the first in numerical order, that of Sergeant
Graciano L. Cabrera, taken in Spanish and interpreted into Tagalog, may be selected into
Tagalog, may be selected as typical of the rest, and is here literally transcribed:

1. Give your name, age, status, occupation, and residence. — Graciano I. Cabrera, 254
years of age, single, sergeant of the first company of the General Service of the
Constabulary, residing in Santa Lucia Barracks.

2. To what company of the Philippine Constabulary do you belong? — First Company,

General Service of the Constabulary.]

3. Where were you garrisoned yesterday afternoon December 15,

1920? — In the Santa Lucia Barracks.

4. Did you leave the barracks at about 7 o'clock yesterday evening? — Yes, sir.
5. For what reason, and where did you go? — We went in search of the policemen and
secret service men of Manila. It has been sometime now since we have been having
standing grudge against now since we have been having a standing grudge against the
police of Manila. The wife of one of our comrades was first arrested by the policemen and
then abused by the same; and not content with having abused her, they gave this woman
to an American; after this incident, they arrested two soldiers of the Constabulary, falsely
accusing them of keeping women of bad reputation; after this incident, came the shooting
of Macasinag, a shooting not justified, because we have come to know that Macasinag
did nothing and the policemen could have arrested him if they desired. Moreover, the
rumor spread among us that the police department of Manila had given orders to the
policemen to fire upon any Constabulary soldier they found in the streets, and we believe
that the rumor was not without foundation since we noticed that after the Macasinag
affair, the policemen of Manila, Contrary to the usual practice, were armed with carbines
or shotguns. For this reason we believe that if we did not put an end to these abuses of
the policemen and secret service men, they would continue abusing the constabulary.
And as an act of vengeance we did what we had done last night.

6. How did you come to join your companions who rioted last night? — I saw that almost
all the soldiers were jumping through the window and I was to be left alone in the
barracks and so I followed.

7. Who asked you to join it? — Nobody.

8. Do you know private Crispin Macasinag, the one who was shot by the Manila police
the night before last on Calle Real? — Yes, Sir, I know him because he was our
comrade.

9. Were you offended at the aggression made on the person of said soldier? — Indeed,
yes, not only was I offended, but my companions also were.

10. State how many shots you fired, if nay, during the riot last night. — I cannot tell
precisely the number of shots I fired because I was somewhat obfuscated; all I can
assure you is that I fired more than once.

11. Do you know if you hit any policeman or any other person?-If so state whether the
victim was a policeman or a civilian. — I cannot tell whether I hit any policeman or any
civilian.

12. State the streets of the city where you fired shots. — I cannot given an exact account
of the streets where I fired my gun. I had full possession of my faculties until I reached
Calle Victoria; afterwards, I became aware that I was bathed with perspiration only upon
reaching the barracks.

13. What arms were you carrying and how much ammunition or how many cartidge did
you use? — I Carried a carbine; I cannot tell precisely the number of cartridges I used;
however, I placed in my pocket the twenty cartridges belonging to me and I must have
lost.

14. How did you manage to leave the barracks? — By the window of the quarter of the
Fourth Company, through the grating which I found cut off.

15. Are the above statements made by you, voluntarily, freely, and spontaneously given?
— Yes, sir.
 16. Do you swear to said statements although no promise of immunity is made to you? —
Yes, sir; I confirm them, being true.

(Sgd.) G. L. CABRERA.

Witnesses:

S. GALLARDO.
LAURO C. MARQUEZ.

The defendants were charged in one information filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila with the crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the same, court, with the
crimes of murder and serious physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before
different judges of first instance.

All of the accused, with the exception of eight, namely, Francisco Ingles, Juan Noromor, P. E.
Vallado., Dionisio Verdadero, and Paciano Caña, first pleased guilty to the charge of sedition, but
later, after the first witness for the prosecution had testified, the accused who had pleaded guilty
were permitted, with the consent of the court, to substitute therefor the plea of not guilty. the
prosecution, in making out it case, presented the seventy-seven confession of the defendants,
introduced in evidence as Exhibits C to C-76, conclusive, and with the exception of those made
by Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Gamus, and Venancio Mira, all were identified by the respective
Constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who intervened in taking them. The prosecution
further relied on oral testimony, including eyewitness to the uprising.

The attorneys for the accused presented two defenses. The first defense was in favor of all the
defendants and was based on the contention that the written statements Exhibits C to C-76 were
not freely and voluntarily made by them. The second defense was in favor of the defendants
Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Roberto Palabay, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz,
Roque Ebol, Francisco Garcia, Benigno Tagavilla, Paciano Caña, Juan Abarques, Genaro
Elayda, Hilario Hibabar, P. E. Vallado, Patricio Bello, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Nemesio
Deceña, Venancio Mira, Baldomero Rodriguez, Juan Noromor, Maximo Perlas, and Victor Atuel,
and was to the effect these men did not take part in the riot.

The court overruled the special defenses and found that the guilt of the accused had been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the defendants were sentenced to serve the maximum
imprisonment of ten years provided by section 6 of Act No. 292. The court, however,
distinguished fines from that of a defendants Francisco Garcia, a private and the eight corporals
E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarques, Pedro V. Matero, Juan
Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, upon each of whom a fine of P5,000 was imposed,
and of the three sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, upon
each of whom a fine of P10,000 was imposed. The costs were divided proportionately among the
defendants.

For the statement of the cases and the facts which has just been made, we are indebted in large
measure to the conspicuously fair and thoughtful decisions of the Honorable George R. Harvey
who presided in the sedition case and of the Honorable Carlos Imperial who presided in the
murder case. As stipulated by the Attorney-General and counsel for the defendants, the proof is
substantially the same in both cases.

In all material respects we agree with the findings of fact as made by the trial court in this case.
The rule is again applied that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgement of the trial
court in passing upon the credibility of the opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstances of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. (U. S. vs. Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil.,
295; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918], 37 Phil., 599.) In the record of the case at bar, no such fact or
circumstance appears.

OPINION

An assignment of five errors is made by counsel for the defendants and appellants. Two the
assignment of error merit little or no consideration. Assignment of error No. 2 (finding its
counterpart in assignments of error 5 and 6 in the murder case), in which it is attempted to
establish that Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Paciano Caña, Juan Abarquez, Mariano
Garcia, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero Rodriguez, Roberto Palabay,
Juan Noromor, Roque Ebol, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Cipriano Lizardo, Francisco Garcia, Genaro
Elayda, Hilario Hibalar, P. M. Vallado, Maximo Perlas, and Benigno Tagavilla, did not leave the
Santa Lucia Barracks in the night of the tragedy, is predicated on the special defense raised in
the lower court for these defendants and three other and which was found untenable by the trial
court. Any further discussion of this question falls more appropriately under consideration of
assignment of error No. 4, relating to the conspiracy between the accused.

Assignment of error No. 3, relating to the finding of the trial court that it had not been shown that
the policemen were not aware of the armed attack of the Constabulary, However, we find that the
evidence supports this conclusion of the trial court.

The three pertinent issues in this case relate to: (1) the Admission of Exhibits C to C-76 of the
prosecution (assignment of error No. 2, murder case); (2) the conspiracy between the accused
(assignment of error No. 4, sedition case; assignment of error No. 3, murder case); and (3) the
conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law (assignment of error No.
5, sedition case).

1. The admission of exhibits C to C-76

Appellants claim that fraud and deceit marked the preparation of the seventy seven confessions.
It is alleged that some of the defendants signed the confessions under the impression that those
who had taken part in the affray would be transferred to Mindanao, and that although they did not
in fact so participate, affirmed that they because of a desire to leave Manila; that other stepped
forward "for the good of the service" in response to appeals from Colonel Sweet and other
officers; while still others simply didn't understand what they were doing, for the remarks of
Colonel Sweet were made in English and only translated into Tagalog, and their declarations
were sometime taken in al language which was unintelligible to them. Counsel for the accused
entered timely objection to the admission in evidence of Exhibits C to C-76, and the Attorney-
General is worn in stating otherwise.

Section 4 of Act No. 619, entitle "An Act to promote good order and discipline in the Philippines
Constabulary," and reading: "No confession of any person charged with crime shall be received
as evidence against him by any court of justice unless be first shown to the satisfaction of the
court that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation, threat,
menace or of promises or offers of reward or leniency," was repealed by the first Administrative
Code. But the same rule of jurisprudence continues without the law. As he been repeatedly
announced by this and other courts, "the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made
freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort". If the confession is freely
and voluntarily made, it constitutes one of the most effectual proofs in the law against the party
making it. (Wilson vs. U. S.[1896], 162 U. S. 613.)The burden of proof that he confession was not
voluntarily made or was obtained by undue pressure is on the accused. (U. S. vs Zara [1912, 42
Phil., 308.)

What actually occurred when the confessions were prepared is clearly explained in the records.
The source of the rumor that the defendant would be transferred to Mindanao if they signed the
confession is not established. One the contrary it is established that before the declaration were
taken, Lieutenant Gatuslao in response to a query had shown the improbability of such a
transfer. With military orders given in English and living in the city of Manila where the dialect is
tagalog, all of the defendants must have understood the substantial part of Colonel Sweet's
remarks. What is more important, there could be no misunderstanding as to the contents of the
confessions as written down. In open court, sixty-nine of the defendants reiterated their guilt. The
officers who assisted in the investigation were of the same service as the defendants in their own
men.

It must also be remembered that each and everyone of the defendants was a member of the
Insular Police force. Because of the very nature of their duties and because of their practical
experience, these Constabulary soldiers must have been aware of the penalties meted out for
criminal offenses. Every man on such a momentous occasion would be more careful of his
actions than ordinarily and whatever of credulity there is in him, would for the moment be laid
aside. Over and above all desire for a more exciting life, over and above the so called esprit de
corps, is the instinct of self preservation which could not but be fully aroused by such stirring
incidents too recent to be forgotten as had occurred in this case, and which would counsel
prudence rather than rashness; secretiveness rather than garrulity.

These confessions contain the statements that they were made freely and voluntarily without any
promise of immunity. That such was the case was corroborated by the attesting witnesses whose
credibility has not been successfully impeached.

We rule that the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution.

2. The conspiracy between the accused

The contention of the appellants is that evidence is lacking of any supposed connivance between
the accused. Counsel emphasizes that in answer to the question in the confession, "who asked
you to join the riot," each of the accused answered, "Nobody." The argument is then advanced
that the appellants cannot be held criminally responsible because of the so called psychology of
crowds theory. In other words, it is claimed that at the time of the commission of the crime the
accused were mere automatons obeying the insistent call of their companions and of their
uniform. From both the negative failure of evidence and the positive evidence, counsel could
deduce the absence of conspiracy between the accused.

The attorney-General answers the argument of counsel by saying that conspiracy under section
5 of Act No. 292 is not an essential element of the crime of sedition. In this law officer for the
people may be on solid ground. However, this may be, there is a broader conception of the case
which reaches the same result.

It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to perform a criminal act, each is
responsible for all the acts of the other done in furtherance of the common design; and " the
result is the same if the act is divided into parts and each person proceed with his part unaided."
(U. S. vs Maza [1905], 5 Phils., 346; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918] 37 Phil., 599; decision of supreme
court of Spain of September 29, 1883; People vs. Mather [1830], 4 Wendell, 229.)

Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances
which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. It be proved that the defendants
pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and another part of the same, so
as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of that same object, one will be justified in the
conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. (5 R. C. L., 1088.)
Applied to the facts before us, it is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the
same purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the police force of the city of Manila. A
common feeling of resentment animated all. A common plan evolved from their military training
was followed.
The effort to lead the court into the realm of psychology and metaphysics is unavailing in the face
of actualities. The existence of a joint assent may be reasonably inferred from the facts proved.
Not along are the men who fired the fatal shots responsible, not along are the men who admit
firing their carbines responsible, but all, having united to further a common design of hate and
vengeance, are responsible for the legal consequences therefor.

We rule that the trail court did not err in declaring that there a c conspiracy between the accused.

3. The conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sediton Law

Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.
The Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise
publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie
objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any
official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government. The trial
court found that the crime of sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had been committed,
and we believe that such finding is correct.

Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act
No. 292 it is and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a
public functionary, and that what really happened in this instance was a fight between two armed
bodies of the Philippine Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of section 5
of the Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. In
one scene there was a fights between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, but it was
an unequal fight brought on by the actions of the accused.

We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused of the violation of section 5,
paragraph 3, of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.

JUDGEMENT

The Treason and Sedition Law provides as a penalty for any person guilty of sedition as defined
in section 5 of the law, punishment by fine of not exceeding P10,000 or by imprisonment not
exceeding ten years, or both. In this connection, it will be recalled that the court sentenced each
of the private soldiers Salvador Gregorio, Juan Noromor, Patricio Bello, Nemesio Deceña,
Baldomero Rodriguez, P. E. Vallado, Pedro Layola, Felix Liron (Cenon), Dionisio Verdadero,
Lorenzo Tumboc, Casiano Guinto, Victor Atuel, Venancio Mira, Benigno Tagavilla, Masaway,
Quintin Desierto, Teofilo Llana, Timoteo Opermaria, Maximo Perlas, Cornelio Elizaga, Roberto
Palabay, Roque Ebol, Benito Garcia, Honorio Bautista, Crisanto Salgo, Francisco Lusano,
Marcelino Silos, Nicanor Perlas, Patricio Rubio, Mariano Aragon, Silvino Ayngco, Guillermo Inis,
Julian Andaya, Crispin Mesalucha, Prudencio Tasis, Silvino Bacani, Petronilo Antonio, Domingo
Peroche, Florentino Jacob, Paciano Caña, Domingo Canapi, Arcadio San Pedro, Daniel Coralde,
Nemesio Camas, Luis Borja, Severino Elefane, Vicente Tabien, Marcos Marquez, Victorino
Merto, Bernabe Sison, Eusebio Cerrudo, Julian Acantilado, Ignacio Lechoncito, Pascual Dionio,
Marcial Pelicia, Rafael Nafrada, Zacarias Bayle, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Juan
Miranda, Graciano Zapata, Felisardo Favinal, Gaspar Andrade, Felix Lamsing, and Vicente
Casimiro, to suffer imprisonment for ten years, and to pay one seventy-seventh part of the costs;
the private Francisco Garcia, who sawed the bars of the window through which the defendants
passed from Santa Lucia Barracks and each of the corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles,
Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarquez, Pedro V. Mateo, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and
Genaro Elayda, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P5,000 and one
seventy-seventy of the costs; and each of the sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno,
and Bonifacio Eugenio, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P10,000 and one
seventy-seventy of the costs. The trial judge appears to have made a reasonable exercise of the
discretion which the law reposes in him.
We cannot bring to a close this disagreeable duty without making our own the pertinent
observations found in the decision of the trial court in this case. Therein, along toward the closed
of his learned opinion, Judge Harvey said:

Rarely in the history of criminality in this country has there been registered a crime so
villainous as that committed by these defendants. The court is only concerned in this
case with crime of sedition. The maximum penalty prescribed by Act No. 292,
imprisonment for ten year and a fine P10,000, is not really commensurate with the
enormity of the offense. Impelled by hatred, employing their knowledge of military
sciences which is worthy of a better cause, and in disregard of the consequences to
themselves and their innocent loved ones, and using the means furnished to them by the
Government for the protection of life and property, they sought by force and violence and
outside of legal methods to avenge a fancied wrong by an armed and tumultuous attack
upon officials and agents of the government of the city of Manila.

Although in view of the sentence which is being handed down in the murder case, affecting these
same defendants and appellants, it would seem to be a useless formality to impose penalties in
this case, yet it is obviously our duty to render judgement appealed from, with one seventy-
seventh of the costs of this instance against each appellant. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J. Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

CASE #7:

G.R. No. L-5803            November 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NARCISO UMALI, ET AL., defendants.
NARCISO UMALI, EPIFANIO PASUMBAL and ISIDRO CAPINO, defendants-appellants.

Jose P. Laurel, Cipriano Primicias, Alejo Mabanag, Manuel Concordia, P.M. Stuart Del Rosario,
Tomas R. Umali, Eufemio E. De Mesa and Edmundo T. Zepeda for appellants.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Narciso Umali, Epifanio Pasumbal, and Isidro Capino are appealing directly to this Tribunal from
a decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon province finding them guilty of the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, and sentencing
each of them to "life imprisonment, other accessories of the law, to indemnify jointly and
severally Marcial Punsalan in the amount of P24,023; Valentin Robles in the amount of P10,000;
Yao Cabon in the amount of P700; Claro Robles in the amount of P12,800; Pocho Guan in the
amount of P600; the heirs of Domingo Pisigan in the amount of P6,000; the heirs of Locadio
Untalan in the amount of P6,000; Patrolman Pedro Lacorte in the amount of P500; Lazaro
Ortega in the amount of P300; Hilarion Aselo in the amount of P300; Calixto Rivano in the
amount P50; Melecio Garcia in the amount of P60; and Juanito Lector in the amount of P90,
each to pay one fifteenth of the costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency due
to the nature of the principal penalty that is imposed upon them."

The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty was said to have been committed
during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of
November 14, 1951, by armed men. It is not denied that such a raid took place resulting in the
burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its
content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of
one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and
Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians; that during
and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house
and two Chinese stories; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by
the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.

To understand the reason for and object of the raid we have to go into the political situation in
Tiaong not only shortly before that raid but one year or two years before it. Narciso Umali and
Marcial Punzalan were old time friends and belonged to the same political faction. In the general
elections of 1947 Umali campaigned for Punzalan who later was elected Mayor of Tiaong. In the
elections of 1949 Punzalan in his turn campaigned and worked for Narciso Umali resulting in the
latter's election as Congressman. However, these friendly relations between the two did not
endure. In the words of Punzalan, Narciso Umali who as Congressman regarded himself as the
political head and leader in that region including Tiaong, became jealous because of his
(Punzalan's) fast growing popularity among the people of Tiaong who looked to him instead of
Umali for political guidance, leadership, and favors. In time the strain in their relations became
such that they ceased to have any dealings with each other and they even filed mutual
accusations. According to Punzalan, in May 1950, Umali induced about twenty-six special
policemen of his (Punzalan's) to flee to the mountains with their arms and join the Huks, this is in
order to discredit Punzalan's administration; that he was later able to contact two of his twenty-
six policemen and tried to persuade them to return to the town and to the service, but they told
him that they and their companions would not surrender except and with through the intervention
of Congressman Umali, and so Punzalan had to seek Umali's intervention which resulted in the
surrender of the 26 men with their firearms; that thereafter Umali wanted to have their firearms,
claiming that they all belonged to him from his guerrilla days when he was a colonel, and that
after liberation he had merely loaned them to the municipal authorities of Tiaong to help keep
peace and order; and that the refusal of Punzalan to grant Umali's request further strained their
relations, and thereafter Umali would not speak to him even when they happened to meet at
parties.

On September 19, 1951, the Chief of Police of Punzalan disarmed four of Umali's men, including
his bodyguard Isidro Capino who were then charged with illegal possession of firearms. Umali
interceded for his men and Col. Gelveson, Provincial Commander, sent a telegram stating that
the firearms taken away from the men were licensed. As a result the complaint was dismissed.
This incident was naturally resented by Umali and spurred him to have a showdown with
Punzalan.

Then the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached and Punzalan ran for reelection. To
oppose him, and to clip his political wings and definitely blast his ambition for continued power
and influence in Tiaong, Umali picked Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader.

The pre-election campaign and fight waged by both factions — Punzalan and Pasumbal, was
intense and bitter, even ruthless. The election was to be a test of political strength and would
determine who was who in Tiaong, — Umali or Punzalan. Umali spoke at political meetings,
extolling the virtues of Pasumbal and the benefits and advantages that would accrue to the town
if he was elected, at the same time bitterly attacking Punzalan, accusing him of dishonesty,
corruption in office, abuse of power, etc. At one of those meetings he told the audience not to
vote for Punzalan because he would not be elected and that even if he won the election, he
would not sit for blood will flow, and that he (Umali) had already prepared a golden coffin for him
(Punzalan). After denying the charges, in retort, Punzalan would say that Umali as a
Congressman was useless, and that he did not even attend the sessions and that his chair in
Congress had gathered dust, even cobwebs.

To help in the Umali-Pasumbal campaign, Amado Mendoza who later was to play the role of star
witness for the prosecution, was drafted. He was a compadre of Pasumbal and had some
experience in political campaigns, and although he was not exactly a model citizen, being
sometimes given to drunkenness, still, he had the gift of speech and persuasion. In various
political meetings he delivered speeches for Pasumbal. He was ever at the back and call of
Umali and Pasumbal, and naturally he frequented the latter's houses or headquarters. The result
of the elections plainly showed that Punzalan was the political master and leader in Tiaong. He
beat Pasumbal by an overwhelming majority of 2,221 votes. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were
keenly disappointed, and according to the evidence, adopted measures calculated to frustrate
Punzalan's victory, even as prophesied by Umali himself in one of his pre-election speeches
about blood flowing and gold coffin.

Going back to the raid staged in Tiaong on November 14, 1951, it is well to make a short
narration of the happenings shortly before it, established by the evidence, so as to ascertain and
be informed of the reason or purpose of said raid, the persons, behind it, and those who took
part in it. According to the testimony of Amado Mendoza, in the morning of November 12th, that
is, on the eve of the election, at the house of Pasumbal's father, then being used as his electoral
headquarters, he heard Umali instruct Pasumbal to contact the Huks through Commander Abeng
so that Punzalan will be killed, Pasumbal complying with the order of his Chief (Umali) went to
the mountains which were quite near the town and held a conference with Commander Abeng. It
would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was going to win in the
elections the next day, and that his death was the surest way to eliminate him from the electoral
fight.

The conference between Pasumbal and Commander Abeng on November 12th was witnessed
and testified to by Nazario Anonuevo, a Huk who was under Commander Abeng, and who later
took an active part in the raid. In the evening of the same day, Mendoza heard Pasumbal report
to Umali about his conference with Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to
the proposition and had even outlined the manner of attack, that the Huks would enter the town
(Tiaong) under Commander Lucio and Aladin, the latter to lead the sector towards the East; but
that Commander Abeng had suggested that the raid be postponed because Pasumbal may yet
win the election the following day, thereby rendering unnecessary the raid and the killing of
Punzalan.

Continuing with the testimony of Amado Mendoza, he told the court that as per instructions of
Umali he went to the house of the latter, in the evening of November 14th, the day following the
election, with the result of the election already known, namely, the decisive victory of Punzalan
over Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come with him, and Pasumbal and the three boarded a
jeep with Pasumbal at the wheel. They drove toward the Tiaong Elementary School and once
there he (Mendoza) was left at the school premises with instructions by Umali to wait for
Commander Abeng and the Huks and point to them the house of Punzalan. After waiting for
sometime, Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands and carbines, arrived
and after explaining his identity and his mission to Abeng, he had led the dissidents or part of the
contingent in the direction of Punzalan's house and on arriving in front of the bodega of Robles,
he pointed out Punzalan's house and then walked toward his home, leaving the Huks who
proceeded to lie flat in a canal. Before reaching his house, he already heard shots, so, he
evacuated his family to their dugout in his yard. While doing so he and his wife Catalina
Tinapunan saw armed men in the lanzones grove just across the street from their house,
belonging to the father of Umali, and among those men they saw Congressman Umali holding a
revolver, in the company of Huk Commander Torio and about 20 armed men. Afterwards they
saw Umali and his companions leave in the direction of Taguan, by way of the railroad tracks.

It would appear from the evidence that the raid was well-planned. As a diversionary measure,
part of the attacking force was deployed toward the camp or station of the Army (part of 8th
B.C.T.) in the suburbs and the camp was fired upon, not exactly to destroy or drive out that Army
unit but to keep it from going to the rescue and aid of the main objective of the raid. The rest of
the raiding party went toward Punzalan's house and attacked it with automatic weapons, hand
grenades, and even with bottles filled with gasoline (popularly known as Molotov's cocktail). It
was evident that the purpose of the attack on Punzalan's house was to kill him. Fortunately,
however, and apparently unknown to the attackers and those who designed the raid, at six
o'clock that morning of November 14th Punzalan and his Chief of Police had left Tiaong to go to
Lucena, the capital, to report the results of the election to the Governor.

The attack on the house of Punzalan was witnessed and described by several persons, including
policemen who happened to be near the house. Policeman Tomas Maguare who was in front of
the house saw Epifanio Pasumbal, Isidro Umali (brother of Congressman Umali) and Moises
Escueta enter the gate of Punzalan's house and take part in the firing. Policeman Pedro Lacorte
who was stationed as guard at the gate of Mayor Punzalan's house recognized defendant Isidro
Capino as one of those firing at the house. Lacorte said that he was guarding the house of
Punzalan when he suddenly heard shots coming from the sides of the house and going over to
the place to investigate, he saw armed men in fatigue and shouting "burn the house of Mayor
Punzalan"; that he was hit on the left check and later Isidro Capino threw at him a hand grenade
and he was hit in the right forearm and in the right eye and became permanently blind in said
eye. Mateo Galit, laundryman who was sitting inside a jeep parked in front of the house of
Punzalan recognized defendant Pasumbal as one of the attackers who, once in the yard said ina
loud voice as though addressing somebody in the house "Pare, come down." Mrs. Punzalan who
was then inside the house related to the court that at about eight in the evening while she was
resting she heard shots and rapid firing. As a precaution she took her children to the bathroom.
Then she noticed that her house was being fired at because the glass window panes were being
shattered and she heard the explosion of a hand grenade inside the house, followed by flares in
the sala and burning of blankets and mosquito nets in the bedrooms and she noticed the smell of
smoke of gasoline. Realizing the great danger, she and the children ran out of the house and
went to hide in the house of a neighbor.

Nazario Añonuevo declared in court that he was a farmer and was picked up and seized by Huk
Commander Tommy sometime in August 1951, and was taken to Mt. Banahaw in Laguna and
mustered in the ranks of the Huks; that just before the elections of November 13, 1951, he saw
Pasumbal come to the mountains near Tiaong and talk to Commander Abeng; that on November
14th by order of Commander Abeng he with other Huks left Mt. Banahaw for Tiaong; that when
they crossed the Osiw River already near Tiaong, they were met by Pasumbal and Capino; that
when they were at the outskirts of the town, he and the party were told by Commander Tommy to
attack the 8th BCT camp in Tiaong to prevent the sending of army help to the town proper; that
he took part in firing on the camp which returned the fire in the course of which he was wounded;
and that because of his wound he could not escape with his companions to the mountains when
the Army soldiers dispersed and drove them out of the town and so he was finally captured by
said soldiers.

As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their participation in and responsibility for the raid was
duly established not only by the going of Pasumbal on November 12th to the mountains following
instructions of Umali, and conferring with Commander Abeng asking him to raid Tiaong and kill
Punzalan, but also by the fact that Pasumbal and Capino in the afternoon or evening of
November 14th met the Huks at the Osiw River as the dissidents were on their way to Tiaong
and later Pasumbal and Capino were seen in the yard of Punzalan firing at the house with
automatic weapons and hand grenades.

What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also established, tho indirectly. We have the
testimony of Amado Mendoza who heard him instructing Pasumbal to contact Commander
Abeng and ask him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is more or less
circumstantial, but nonetheless strong and convincing. No one saw him take part in the firing and
attack on the house of Punzalan; nor was he seen near or around said house. Because of his
important position as Congressman, perchance he did not wish to figure too prominently in the
actual raid. Besides, he would seem to have already given out all the instructions necessary and
he could well stay in the background. However, during the raid, not very far from Punzalan's
house he was seen in the lanzonesan of his father, holding a revolver and in the company of
about 20 armed men with Huk Commander Torio, evidently observing and waiting for
developments. Then he and his companions left in the direction of Taguan.
Umali and Pasumbal, however, claim that during the raid, they were in the home of Pasumbal in
Taguan, about seven kilometers away from Tiaong where a consolation party was being held.
There is ample evidence however to the effect that they arrived in Pasumbal's home only around
midnight. An Army soldier named Cabalona who happened to be in Pasumbal's home arriving
there earlier in the evening and who was invited to take some refreshments said that he did not
see the two men until they arrived about midnight when the Army reinforcements from Lucena
passed by on their way to Tiaong. Thus, we have this chain of circumstances that does not
speak in favor of Umali, or Pasumbal for that matter. But this is not all. There is the rather
strange and unexplained, at least not satisfactorily, behaviour of Umali and Pasumbal that
evening of November 14th. Assuming for a moment as they claim, that the two were not in
Tiaong at the commencement of the raid between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., and during the whole time
the raid lasted, and that they were all that time in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, still,
according to their own evidence, they were informed by persons coming or fleeing from Tiaong
that there was a raid going on there, and that some houses were burning. As a matter of fact,
considering the promixity of Taguan to Tiaong, a distance of about seven kilometers and the
stillness and darkness of the night, the fire and the glow produced by the burning of three houses
and the noise produced by the firing of automatic weapons and the explosion of the hand
grenades and bottles of gasoline, could and must have been seen and heard from Taguan. The
natural and logical reaction on the part of Umali and Pasumbal would have been to rush to
Tiaong, see what had really happened and then render help and give succor to the stricken
residents, including their own relatives. It will be remembered that the houses of the fathers of
Umali and Pasumbal were in Tiaong and their parents and relatives were residing there. And yet,
instead of following a natural impulse and urge to go to Tiaong, they fled in the opposite direction
towards Candelaria. And Umali instead of taking the road, purposely avoided the same and
preferred to hike through coconut groves so that upon arriving in Candelaria, he was wet, and
spattered and very tired. Had they wanted to render any help to Tiaong they could have asked
the police authorities of Candelaria to send a rescue party to that town. Or better still, when the
army reinforcements from Lucena sent at the instance of Punzalan, who at about eight or nine
that evening was returning to Tiaong from Lucena, found at the barrio or sitio of Lusakan near
Tiaong that there was fighting in the town, he immediately returned to Lucena to get army
reinforcements to relieve his town, was passing by Taguan, where they were, Umali and
Pasumbal could have joined said reinforcements and gone to Tiaong. Instead the two continued
on their way to the capital (Lucena) where before dawn, they went and contacted Provincial
Fiscal Mayo, a first cousin of Umali, and Assistant Fiscal Reyes and later had these two officials
accompany them to the Army camp to see Col. Gelveson, not for the purpose of asking for the
sending of aid or reinforcement to Tiaong but presumably to show to the prosecution officials,
specially the Army Commander that they (Umali and Pasumbal) had nothing to do whatsoever
with the raid. Umali said he was trying to avoid and keep clear of Tiaong because he might be
suspected of having had some connection with the raid and might be the object of reprisal. As a
matter of fact, according to Umali himself, while still in Taguan that evening and before he went
to Candelaria, somebody had informed him that Col. Legaspi of the Army was looking for him.
Instead of seeking Col. Legaspi and find out what was wanted of him, he left in the opposite
direction and fled to Candelaria and later to Lucena, and the next day he took the train for
Manila. This strange act and behaviour of the two men, particularly Umali, all contrary to impulse
and natural reaction, and what other people would ordinarily have done under the circumstances,
prompted the trial court in its decision to repeat the old saying "The guilty man flees even if no
one pursues, but the innocent stands bold as a lion." We might just as well reproduce that portion
of the decision of the trial court, to wit:

. . . Considering the fact that Taguan is very near Tiaong so that even taking it for granted
as true, for the sake of argument, that the said accused were really at the party of
Pasumbal on the night in question, that would not prevent them from being in Tiaong
between 8 and 9. Besides, why was it that night the hasag lamp was replaced with
candles when the reinforcements passed through Taguan about midnight of November
14, 1951. Why did Congressman Umali and company instead of going to Tiaong which
was the scene of the attack hurried towards Candelaria, after the reinforcement has
passed and went to the house of Felix Ona walking through a muddy path under the
 coconut groves? Why was Umali afraid to pass through the provincial road and preferred
a muddy road instead? Was he trying to conceal himself? Why did Pasumbal and
company also go to the house of Ona? Why did they go to the house of Felix Ona
instead of going to the house of Manalo who could have given them better protection?
And again why did Congressman Umali and the other co-accused repaired and sought
the company of Fiscal Reyes in going at such an early hour to the Army authorities, did
they fear any reprisal? From whom? Why did Umali go to Manila from Lucena on
November 16, 1951? "The guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent
stands bold as a lion."

At first blush it would appear rather unbelievable that Umali and Pasumbal, particularly the
former should seek the aids of the Huks in order to put down and eliminate their political enemy
Punzalan. It would seem rather strange and anomalous that a member of Congress should have
friendly relations with this dissidents whom the Government had been fighting all these years.
But if we study the evidence, it will be found that the reason and the explanation are there. As
already stated, during the Japanese occupation, to further the resistance movement, guerillas
were organized in different parts of the Philippines. One of these was the guerilla unit known as
President Quezon's Own Guerillas (PQOG) operating in the provinces of Tayabas (now Quezon)
and Laguna. Umali, Pasumbal, Commander Abeng and even Punzalan himself were officers in
this guerilla unit, Umali attaining the rank of colonel, and Pasumbal and Punzalan that of
Lieutenant-colonel, Pasumbal then being known as "Panzer". After Liberation, Abeng joined the
dissidents, and became a Huk Commander. It was not unnatural that Umali and Pasumbal
should continue their friendship and association with Commander Abeng and seek his aid when
convenient and necessary. Umali admitted that he knew Huk Commander Kasilag. Graciano
Ramos, one of the witnesses of the prosecution told the court that way back in May 1950, in a
barrio of San Pablo City he saw Umali confer with Commander Kasilag, which Commander after
the conference told his soldiers including Ramos that Umali wanted the Huks to raid Tiaong, burn
the presidencia and kidnap Punzalan. Of course, the last part of the testimony may be regarded
as hearsay, but the fact is that Umali conferred with a Huk commander as early as 1950. Then
we have the fact that on November 18 of the same year Punzalan wrote to President Quirino
denouncing the congressman Umali for fraternizing with the Huks and conducting a campaign
among them in preparation for the elections the following year. And we may also consider the
fact that the town of Tiaong stands at the foothills of Mt. Banahaw where the dissidents under
Commander Abeng, Tommy, Lucio, Aladin, and others had their hideout, so that it was not
difficult for residents of Tiaong like Umali and Pasumbal to communicate and even associate with
dissidents in that region.

After carefully considering all the evidence in the case, we are constrained to agree with the trial
court that the three appellants are guilty. Besides, the determination of this case, in great
measure, hinges on the credibility of witnesses. The learned trial court which had the opportunity
of observing the demeanor of witnesses on the stand and gauging their sincerity and evaluating
their testimony, decided the Government witnesses, including Amado Mendoza, to be more
credible and reliable. And we find nothing in the record to warrant correction or reversal of the
stand and finding of the trial court on the matter. We have not overlooked the rather belated
retraction of Amado Mendoza made on October 31, 1952, about a year and 9 months after he
testified in court. Considering the circumstances surrounding the making of this affidavit or
retraction, the late date at which it was made, the reasons given by him for making it and the fact
that when he testified in court under the observation and scrutiny of the trial court bearing in mind
that he was the star witness for the prosecution and his testimony naturally extremely important,
and the trial court after the opportunity given to it of observing his demeanor while on the witness
stand had regarded him as a witness, sincere, and his testimony truthful, and considering further
the case with which affidavits of retraction of this nature are obtained, we confess that we are not
impressed with such retraction of Mendoza.

The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense of offenses committed. Appellants
were charged with and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
frustrated murder, arson and robbery. Is there such a complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, etc? While the Solicitor General in his brief claims that appellants are guilty of said
complex crime and in support of his stand "asks for leave to incorporate by reference" his
previous arguments in opposing Umali's petition for bail, counsel for appellants considered it
unnecessary to discuss the existence or non-existence of such complex crime, saying that the
nature of the crime committed "is of no moment to herein appellants because they had absolutely
no part in it whatsoever". For that present, and with respect to this particular case, we deem it
unnecessary to decide this important and controversial question, its consideration and
determination to another case or occasion more opportune, when it is more directly and squarely
raised and both parties given an opportunity to discuss and argue the question more adequately
and exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for the moment that there is no such complex
crime of rebellion with murder, etc., and that consequently appellants could not have been legally
charged with, much less convicted of said complex crime, and the information should therefore,
be regarded as having charged more than one offense, contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and
Rule 113, section 2 (e), of the Rules of Court, but that appellants having interposed no objection
thereto, they were properly tried for and lawfully convicted if guilty of the several, separate crimes
charged therein, we have decided and we rule that the appellants may properly be convicted of
said several and separate crimes, as hereinafter specified. We feel particularly supported and
justified in this stand that we take, by the result of the case, namely, that the prison sentence we
impose does not exceed, except perhaps in actual duration, that meted out by the Court below,
which is life imprisonment.

We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not necessarily the most serious, crime
committed here was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act
of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and
for the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal code under
rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local Government. Rather,
the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of
hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan was then
Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to constitute sedition. As
regards the crime of robbery with which appellants were charged and of which they were
convicted, we are also of the opinion that it was not one of the purposes of the raid, which was
mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his house. The robberies were actually committed
by only some of the raiders, presumably dissidents, as an afterthought, because of the
opportunity offered by the confusion and disorder resulting from the shooting and the burning of
the three houses, the articles being intended presumably to replenish the supplies of the
dissidents in the mountains. For these robberies, only those who actually took part therein are
responsible, and not the three appellants herein. With respect to the crime of multiple frustrated
murder, while the assault upon policeman Pedro Lacorte with a hand grenade causing him
injuries resulting in his blindness in one eye, may be regarded as frustrated murder; the
wounding of Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector should be considered as mere physical
injuries. The crimes committed are, therefore, those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated
murder and physical injuries. The murders may not be qualified by evident premeditation
because the premedition was for the killing of Punzalan. The result was the killing of three others
intended by the raiders (People vs. Guillen, 47 Off). The killing may, however, be qualified by
treachery, the raiders using firearms against which the victims were defenseless, with the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The three murders may be punished
with the penalty of death. However, because of lack of the necessary votes, the penalty should
be life imprisonment.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised by the appellants in their brief.

In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and
physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years
of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the
appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum
of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the
buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more
persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the
window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the
lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy
penalties already imposed and their long duration, we find it unnecessary to fix and impose the
prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums
awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will
stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L.,
JJ., concur.

CASE #8:

G.R. No. L-12686            October 24, 1963

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
KAMLON HADJI, ET AL., defendants,
KAMLON HADJI, defendant-appellant.

Alonto Law Offices for defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM:

Kamlon Hadji, together with a number of other defendants, was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu for different crimes in various cases, to wit: in Criminal Case No. 1162 for
rebellion; in Criminal Cases Nos. 1162-A to 1162-N and 1348 for multiple murder and multiple
injuries; and in Criminal Case No. 1353, together with Ulloh Kaddam, et al., for kidnapping with
murder and attempted murder.

The parties stipulated to have these cases tried jointly whereafter the trial court rendered
judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 1162, the Court hereby sentences the accused
Kamlon, leader of the sedition, to an indeterminate imprisonment of FOUR (4) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of prision mayor as maximum; to pay a fine of
P10,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
proportionate costs.

Each of the accused, Adjudi Asarani and Amsajen Jamah is hereby sentenced to
indeterminate imprisonment of THREE (3) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20)
DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to FIVE (5) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision correccional as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00,
each, and in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment
which, however, shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty; and to pay the
proportionate costs.

Each and everyone of the accused Jumla Abdukari Abdulialim Adin, Ulloh Urong
Angkang Adiad, Angkang Illama, Sahidula Ajad, lbbing Janah, Kakari Damboa, Akbara
Abduhasman, Hatib Hala Amsajen, Hatib Jaron alias Baito Haron, Awah Kamsa; Waliul
 Adjudi; Jaujali Gadjali; Suhalili Jamli; Sinihag Salihan; Sarahan Ibba; is hereby sentenced
to an indeterminate of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTH IMPRISONMENT and ONE
(1) DAY of prision correccional minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and
TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional as maximum; to pay a fine of P3,000.00 and in
case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment which, however,
shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty; and to pay the proportionate costs.

Each and everyone of the accused Amsah Laih, Jundai Halisan, Taraman Adil, Kahiral
Dastan, Boyongan Sabiban, Sakkam Hussin, Baybayan Asao, Abdurahman Sahol,
Palicta Dugong and Kaligogan Ladialawan is hereby acquitted of the charges against him
with the portionate costs de oficio. Their immediate release from custody is hereby
ordered.

Crim. Cases Nos. 1162-A to 1162-N and 1348 are hereby ordered dismissed with
costs de oficio. The release from custody of all the accused in those cases, except those
who are charged or convicted in another case, is hereby ordered.

In Crim. Case No. 1353, the Court hereby sentences the accused Kamlon to the death
penalty for the kidnapping of Jamalul Alling and Hatib Ajibon complexed with the murder
of Jamalul Alling; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P3,000.00, without
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.

The instant appeal pertains solely to Criminal Case No. 1353 for which the accused, Kamlon,
was found guilty and sentenced to the death penalty. A co-accused in this ease, Ulluh, was still
at large at the time the lower court rendered its judgment.

In connection with the conviction of Kamlon, however, it must be stated that the trial judge
recommended the commutation of the penalty imposed to life imprisonment, The trial judge
based his recommendation upon his finding that the defendant agreed to surrender principally
because he was made to believe by the authorities "that he would be paroled." In the words of
the decision of the lower court, "If the Constabulary officers concerned did not promise any
condition to Kamlon for his surrender, said officers deliberately misled the negotiator Arolas
Tulawie and Kamlon into believing that Kamlon's parole would be respected or be enforced after
all outlaws had surrendered. In one word, the officers concerned dealt with Arolas Tulawie and
Kamlon in double talk. They were not frank.

The trial court rendered the judgment of conviction upon the following factual findings:

One morning some two years prior to the trial of this case, the herein defendant, together with
two other armed companions, Ulluh and Angkang, set out to look for two men whom they
suspected were responsible for the disappearance of two of the followers of the defendant. The
search ended when the defendant and his companions chanced upon their quarry, Hatib Ajibun
and Jamalul Alling, in the vicinity of Buhangin Mahaba gathering vines. Thereupon, threatening
to kill unless Ajibun and Alling went with them, Kamlon and his companions seized the pair and
brought them to Tigbas, Luuk District where, at that time, Kamlon was residing. At the market
place of Tigbas, Kamlon made known to his captives the reason for their abduction, and,
although Ajibun and Alling disavowed any knowledge or responsibility for the disappearance of
the two persons Kamlon was seeking to avenge, their protestations of innocence were
disbelieved and altogether unheeded.

Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling were detained overnight. The following day, between 2 and 3
o'clock in the afternoon, they were brought to the market place and, in a store, they were made
to sit on chairs, one beside the other. On being ordered by Kamlon, their hands were then tied to
the roof by Ulluh. Thus seated and with their hands tied to the roof, Kamlon leveled his automatic
carbine at Jamalul Alling and fired, killing him instantly. Kamlon then ordered Ulluh to cut the
neck of the dead man whereupon Ulluh, with a barong or native bolo, did as he was bidden.
Ulluh then brought the headless body and the severed head to his vinta by the shore and
paddled out far into the sea. When he returned, he no longer had with him his gruesome load.

Meanwhile, Kamlon decided to spare Hatib Ajibun from the fate he imposed on Jamalul Alling.
Instead, Ajibun was conducted back to Kamlon's house where he was "tried' by Kamlon for his
alleged participation in the disappearance of two of his followers. The "trial" must have caused
Kamlon to doubt Ajibun's guilt because at its end, he was merely told to raise the sum of P105.00
as fine and thereafter he was set free.

The account of Alling's murder as above established by the trial court was denied, disavowed
and disputed by the defendant. He offered an entirely different version of the killing. According to
Kamlon, the deceased was shot to death, not by him, but by some relatives of a woman who, on
that occasion, Jamalul Alling and Hatib Ajibun were attempting to abduct.

The defendant's version of the killing of Jamalul Alling was sought to be established by the
sisters, Bariha Imam Habilul and Muhayla Iman Habilul, who testified that one day they went to
take a bath at a watering place some 100 brazas from where they were living. While washing
their clothes at the same place and gathering water in bamboo tubes, Bariha suddenly heard
Muhayla shout: "Bariha, you better run away. I am being embraced and held by Ajibun and
Jamalul." Muhayla made the outcry because Jamalul and Ajibun who emerged from the nearby
bushes suddenly took hold of the hands of Muhayla and pulled her towards the eastern part of
the place, a sitio called Buhangin Mahaba. Upon hearing the scream of Muhayla, Bariha ran
away but was able to see Ajibun and Jamalul holding the hands of Muhayla.

Bariha ran and screamed for help. Among those who came to her succor were her uncle, Adu,
and some other men-folk of the village, Biteng, Tanji and Uttung, who forthwith armed
themselves with guns and went after Ajibun and Jamalul.

Meanwhile, at Buhangin Mahaba, Jamalul and Ajibun tried to force Muhayla into a vinta. Ajibun
went inside the vinta and pulled the hands of Muhayla as Jamalul pushed her into the craft in an
effort to place her on board. Muhayla, however, succeeded in frustrating their efforts by pushing
the vinta, and while being engaged in this struggle, she heard her uncle Adu yell: "Muhayla,
duck;" Muhayla ducked by dropping herself on the sea, face downwards, and as her body hit the
shallow water, she heard bursts of gunfire coming from the place where Adu had given out his
order.

After the shots, Muhayla ran towards her uncle. The burst of fire hit Jamalul who fell on the water
almost falling on Muhayla. Ajibun was fired upon, but he was able to paddle himself away out to
the sea.

We cannot find any just or valid cause for rejecting the version accepted by the trial court. While
the defendant had indeed insisted that the prosecution version was false and untrue, he has
failed to demonstrate to this Tribunal exactly in what area of the proceeding or evidence such
fallacy and untruth obtain. This case has resolved itself into a question of who among the witness
at the trial were telling the truth. We can hardly hold ourselves in a better position to answer that
than the trial judge who had his five physical senses to aid him reach the fair, correct and just
conclusion. While we have merely the records to guide Us by, the trial judge saw the witnesses,
heard them speak, watched them move. He was, therefore, in the far advantageous position of
being able to discriminate more competently than Us the prevaricators among the witnesses from
those who testified the truth. Consequently, as the evidence on record sufficiently attest to the
findings of the lower court, We shall not disturb the same.

The defendant contend that the length of time which intervened between the actual commission
of the crime charged and the filing of the same in the trial court — a period of 21 months —
attests to the unreliability of the prosecution witnesses. We are told that if those who testified for
the government did actually witness the defendant commit the murder, they would have forthwith
reported the incident to the authorities and this case would have been filed sooner. It is
vigorously impressed on Us that the delay betrays the truthfulness of the case for the
prosecution.

We cannot sustain the view of the defendant on the last point raised. Although it is true that
undue delay in the prosecution of criminal actions speaks of the suspicious veracity of the state's
claim, the same observation cannot be made where the delay or inaction, long though it may be,
was imposed on the government by causes over which it has no control. In the premises and as
explained by the Solicitor General's Office, "the incident took place 15 days before the last
military operations against Kamlon. People in the area affected were in the grip of fear and felt no
other than for their personal safety. The witnesses could have preferred to remain in silence of
what they knew against Kamlon in the hope, however, that with the military operations about to
be set afoot, retributive justice would catch up with Kamlon and his henchmen that they might
perish in the battle."

The more transcendental aspect of this appeal refers to the view of the defendant that, by the
doctrine enunciated in the cases of People v. Hernandez, et al., 52 O.G. 5506 and People v.
Geronimo, 53 O.G. No. 1, p. 68, "the trial court erred in convicting herein accused for kidnapping
with murder in spite of the fact that said acts of violence were committed in furtherance of
sedition and therefore absorbed in this latter crime."

There is neither law nor jurisprudence which can allow this Court to uphold the defendant's claim
that acts of violence like murder and kidnapping are absorbed by sedition. The aforecited cases
of Hernandez and Geronimo, supra, cannot properly be invoked as authority for that legal
proposition since those two cases involved the crime of rebellion and not sedition.

Indeed, as this Court adheres to and is guided in great measure by the rule of stare decisis, We
deem ourselves unfree at the moment to disregard our rulings in the cases of People v. Cabrera,
43 Phil. 64, and People v. Umali, G.R. No. L-5803, Nov. 29, 1954. In the Cabrera case, this
Court held:

It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as murder.
Sedition is a crime against public order; murder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a
crime directed against the existence of the State, the authority of the government, and
the general public tranquility; murder is a crime directed against the lives of individuals.
(U.S. v. Abad [1902], 1 Phil. 437.) Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of
commotions or disturbances in the state; murder at common law is where a person of
sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the
sovereign, with malice aforethought, express or implied.

The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are perfectly
distinct in point of law however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. Not alone
are the offenses com nomine different, but the allegations in the body of the information
are different. The gist of the information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising
of the constabulary in order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the object of
inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons of the police force of the city of
Manila by firing at them in several places in the city of Manila; that gist of the information
in the murder case is that the Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally
killed eight persons and gravely wounded three others. The crimes of murder and
serious physical injuries were not necessarily included in the information for sedition; and
the defendants could not have been convicted of these crimes under the first information.
(Emphasis supplied)

And, in the case of People v. Umali, supra, after rejecting the government's theory that the crime
committed was rebellion complexed with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery,
but rather sedition and the said common crimes, We proceeded to convict the defendants therein
of the said crime of sedition and the common crimes of murder, frustrated murder, etc. The
dispositive portion of this last cited case read: "In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition,
multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. . . ."

Clearly then, the rule obtaining in this jurisdiction allows for the treatment of the common
offenses of murder etc. as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition.

In citing the cases of Hernandez and Geronimo, supra, it seems to Us that the herein defendant
missed a very significant point. When We held in those two cases that murder and other acts of
violence were absorbed by "rebellion," the common crimes alleged to have been committed in
furtherance of the rebellion were specifically charged in the information and, for that reason, were
consequently necessarily alleged to have been committed for political ends. In the prosecution at
bar, however, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, "the information makes no allegation of
political motivation, and the evidence is totally devoid of any such motivation, for on the contrary,
the proof adduced shows that the killing had no political or social color, but purely motivated by
personal vengeance."

There is yet one significant fact in this case which must be made of record before this Tribunal
hands down Its judgment on appeal. The defendant Kamlon, prior to his prosecution for the case
at bar, had been convicted for rebellion with multiple murder and multiple physical injuries in
Criminal Case No. 763 of the Court of First Instance of Sulu. Soon after his conviction, however,
he was extended a conditional pardon by the late President Elpidio Quirino. There were four (4)
conditions to the pardon, namely: (1) that Kamlon was to report monthly to the nearest
constabulary or Justice of the Peace; (2) that Kamlon would assist the authorities in the
surrender of firearms; and (3) that Kamlon would allow himself to be visited by any authority of
the Government and allow him to question him freely; and (4) that he would cooperate with the
Government in the surrender and apprehension of wanted persons in Luuk.

Instead of honoring the aforementioned conditions, however, Kamlon brazenly violated the same.
He did not only fail to report regularly to the authorities as required; he even violently prevented
legitimate government agents from visiting and questioning him. It was these lawlessness and
defiance which ultimately precipitated and resulted into the various criminal prosecutions
enumerated at the start of this decision, including this one on appeal.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court affirms in full the findings and judgment of the
lower court. The crime committed is kidnapping complexed with murder. We find the death
penalty as well as the indemnity in the amount of P3,000.00 imposed in accordance with law and
affirm the same with costs against the defendant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

CASE #9:

G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,

ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P.
DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.

ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL.
REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding
Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND

DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS

ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO:

ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD,
and P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions,
seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for
brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered
reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.

The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the
decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is
Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.
Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the
several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is
elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the
people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the Court — that should
repeal, change or modify them.

In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:

1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made
without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly
Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the
constitutional rights of the persons arrested;

2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile  1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;

3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possession at the
time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;

4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3

speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.   Therefore, the function 4

of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention,  5 so that if

detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their
questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting
from such arrests also in accordance with law.
  The law expressly
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6

allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states
the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the
said Rule 113, which read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person

may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without
warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural)
was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of
the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized,   and for 7

subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile,   a continuing offense, 8

thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit

such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide magnitude. . . .

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for
the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest,
confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day
before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM
policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part
of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another
opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common"
offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the
same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized
government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of
his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by
actual facts that will be shown hereafter.

Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil
case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be
arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or private
person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who
committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant,
based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion  9

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances

 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on

sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10

probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.  11

These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA
member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day
before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie
Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12

Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named
hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was
truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are:  first — the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed
in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then
being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third — as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital
records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.

 believe that the

In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13

confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in
St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in
compliance with the directives of the law,   and, therefore, came from reliable sources. 14

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by
the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are
deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed
to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not
appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural.   It is therefore clear that the arrest, without 15

warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant,
an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was
filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He
was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting
officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their
arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants
issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in
their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court
against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition.
Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of
the authorities.

More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:

1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA
about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house
occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St.,
Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view
of this information, the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12
August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house
was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not
produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other
communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the
CPP.  16

2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA
courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.

3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found
subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18

4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked
them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19

5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was
subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without
warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being
used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or
occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of
the military agents that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes:  first: search
warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that
he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their
possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA.
And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances,
the corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made
by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and
Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an
unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and

 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to

secure the punishment therefor. 21

arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are
met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions
set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are
indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested.   Not evidence of guilt, but 22

"probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of
their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.  23

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted,

 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can
the arresting officers are not liable. 24

be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention,   for damages under Article 32 of the Civil 25

Code   and/or for other administrative sanctions.

26

In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of
the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November
1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke
at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona.  27 (Emphasis supplied)

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November

 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for
1988. 28

uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting
to sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to
insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech
regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace
officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon
thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously
becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only
for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for
Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.

Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic.
For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers
did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the
resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-
68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in
the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police
agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation.  29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the
arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those
guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to
prevent possible flight.

As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and
detention, as follows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with
the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as
the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the
writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on
30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the
petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said
Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and
Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not
arbitrary or whimsical arrests.

Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed
the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).

Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.

 that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the case of Amelia
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30

Roque, she admitted   that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents
31

found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records,
strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based
their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested
were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the
persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were
predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is
not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln
the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged
perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest
without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will
promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality
of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as
elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released;
but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention
but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the least
delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect.
The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not
on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable
cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records
show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED.
This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9, 1990 and an exhaustive
evaluation of the motions for reconsideration of the said decision, I am inclined to agree with the,
majority's resolution on said motions for reconsideration except for the legality of the warrantless
arrests of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu for the crime of inciting to sedition and petitioner Alfredo
Nazareno for the crime of murder.

In the words of the resolution, Espiritu "was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any
'continuing offense,' but for uttering" the following: "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa
magkagulo na." Apparently, such statement was, in the perception of the arresting officers,
inciting to sedition. While not conceding the validity of such perception, realizing that it is indeed
possible that Espiritu was merely exercising his right to free speech, the resolution nonetheless
supports the authority of peace officers "only for purposes of the arrest."

I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which sanctions
warrantless arrests provided they are made in accordance with law. In the first place, Espiritu
mav not be considered as having "just committed" the crime charged. He allegedly first uttered
seditious remarks at the National Press Club in the afternoon of November 12, 1988. The second
allegedly seditious remark aforequoted was made at around 5:00 o'clock in the same afternoon
(Decision, pp. 23-24). Under these circumstances, the law enforcement agents had time, short
though it might seem, to secure a warrant for his arrest. Espiritu's apprehension may not
therefore be considered as covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which allows warrantless arrests
"when an offense has in fact just been committed."

The same observation applies with greater force in the case of Nazareno who was arrested 14
days after the commission of the crime imputed to him.

Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are not sure what
particular provision of law had beeri violated by the person arrested. True it is that law
en.orcement agents and even prosecutors are not all adept at the However, errneous perception,
not to mention ineptitude among their ranks, especially if it would result in the violation of any
right of a person, may not be tolerated. That the arrested person has the "right to insist during the
pre-trial or trial on the merits" (Resolution., p. 18) that he was exercising a right which the
arresting officer considered as contrary to law, is beside the point. No person should be
subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the law enforcers wrongly perceived his action.

Thirdly, inciting to sedition is not a continuous crime for which the offender may be arrested
without a warrant duly issued by the proper authority. By its nature, a single act of urging others
to commit any of the acts enumerated in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code may suffice to
hold anyone liable for inciting to sedition. While the crime is aimed at anarchy and radicalism and
presents largely a question of policy (Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil, 524 [1951]), it should be
remembered that any of the prohibited acts in Article 142 may infringe upon the fundamental
freedoms of speech and expression. There arises, therefore, the necessity of balancing interests;
those of the State as against those of its individual citizen. Here lies the urgency of judicial
intervention before an arrest is made. Added to this is the subjectivity of the determination of
what may incite other people to sedition. Hence, while the police should act swiftly when a
seditious statement has been uttered in view of the jeopardy it may cause the government,
speedy action should consist not in warrantless arrests but in securing warrants for such arrests.

On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-Subversion Law, it should be

underscored that anyone who undertakes such arrest must see to it that the alleged violator
is knowing member of a subversive organization as distinguished from a nominal one (People vs.
Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382). Thus, a subversive may be arrested
even if has not committed overt act of overthrowing the government such as bombing of
government offices trie assassination of government officials provided there is probable cause to
believe that he is in the roll of members of a subversive organization. It devolves upon the
accused to prove membership by force or ciorcion. Certainly, one may not be in such a roll
without undergoing the concious act of enlistment.

It bears repeating theat warrantless arrests are governed by law and subject to stringent
application. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure now requires that an offense
"has in fact just been committed. "connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under
the old rule where an offense 'has in fact been committed' no how long ago. Similarly, the
arrestor must have 'personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed
it' (instead of just 'reasonable ground believe that the [arrestee] has committed it' under the old
rule)." (Dissenting opinion in Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA
349, 408).

I deem it aptherein to recall other Court rulings provide guidelines in effecting arrests without
warrants. In People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986,144 SCRA 1), the Court
considered as illegal the warrantless arrest of a subversive not based on the arresting officer's
personal knowledge such subversion and held that any rule on arrests witho warrants must be
strictly construed. We categorically state therein that warrantless arrests should "clearly fall
within the situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary was
provided by the Rules" (144 SCRA at 14). Moreover. "it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or
actually (has just) been committed first. That crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator. (Supra, at p. 15).

Earlier, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile (G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538), the Court laid
out the procedure to be observed the moment a person is arrested:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to imform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall
be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arressted, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition on
his behalf, or appointed the court upon the petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of
the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part
shall be inadmissible evidence. (121 SCRA at 554).

These judicial pronouncements must be observed by everyone concerned: the military and
civilian components of the government tasked with law enforcement as well as the ordinary
citizen who faces a situation wherein civic duty demands his intervention to preserve peace in
the community.

I am not unmindful of the fact that abuses occur in arrests especially of offenders of crimes with a
political or ideological element. Such abuses are more often than not, triggered by the difficulty in
finding evidence that could stand judicial scrutiny — to pinpoint a subversive, police officers
usually have to make long persistent surveillance. However, for the orderly administration of
government and the maintenance of peace and order in the country, good faith should be
reposed on the officials implementing the law. After all, we are not wanting in laws to hold any
offending peace officer liable both administratively and criminally for abuses in the performance
of their duties. Victims of abuses should resort to legal remedies to redress their grievances.

If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches of the government may be
exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive changes. This Court, mandated b the
Constitution to uphold the law, can only go as far as inter pruting existing laws and the spirit
behind them. Otherwise, we hail be entering the dangerous ground of judicial legislation.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

The philosophy adopted in our Constitution is that liberty is an essential condition for order, It is
disturbing whenever the Court leans in the direction of order instead of liberty in har cases
coming before us.

People all over the world are fast accepting the theory that only as a society encourages freedom
and permits dissent can it have lasting security and real progress, the theory that enhancing
order through constraints on freedom is deceptive because restrictions on liberty corrode the
very values Govenment pretends to promote. I believe we should move with the people of the
world who are fast liberating themselves.

I, therefore, vote for the strict application of Section 5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 on arrests without
warrant, to wit:
 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants. In case of doubt,
the tendency should be to declare the warrantless arrest illegal.

Insofar as G.R. Nos, 84581-82, G.R. Nos. 84583-84 and G.R. No. 83162 involving Amelia
Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Vicky Ocaya are
concerned, the petitioners were arrested after having been apprehended while in possession of
illegal firearms and ammunitions. They were actually committing a crime when arrested. I concur
in the denial of their motions for reconsideration.

I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727 where Deogracias Espiritu was
arrested while urging jeepnev and bus drivers to join a strike of transport workers on the ground
that that was inciting to sedition.

This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an individual's freedom of

speech. "Inciting to sedition" is a term over which the most learned writers and jurists will differ
when applied to actual cases. I doubt if there are more than a handful of policemen in the whole
country who would know the full dimensions of the fine distinctions which separate the nation's
interest in the liberty to fully anfd freely discuss matters of national importance on one hand and
the application of the clear and present danger rule as the test when claims of national security
and public safety are asserted, on the other. In fact, the percentage of knowledgeability would go
down further if we consider that "inciting to sedition" requires the ability to define, among other
(1) what kinds of speeches or writings fall lander the term "inciting" (2) the meaning of
rising publicly and tumultously; (3,) when does a certain effort amount to force, intimidation.
or illegal method; (4) what constitute the five objects or ends of sedition; and (5) what is a
scurrilous libel against the Philippines. If we allow public speakers to be picked up simply
because what they say is irritating or obnoxious to the ears of a peace officer or critical of
government policy and action, we will undermine all pronouncements of this Court on the need to
protect that matrix of all freedoms, which is freedom of expression. At the very least, a warrant of
arrest after a preliminary examination by a Judge is essential in this type of offense.

Insofar as G.R. No. 81567 is concemed, I join the other dissenting Justices in their observations
regarding "continuing oftenses." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing
offense is to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion. Rebellion,
insurrection, or sedition are political offenses where the line between overt acts and simple
advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely thin. If a court has convicted an accused of
rebellion and he is found roaming around, he may be arrested. But until a person is proved guilty,
I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel
and must be picked up on sight whenever seen. The grant of authority in the majority opinion is
too broad. If warrantless searches are to be validated, it should be Congress and not this Court
which should draw strict and narrow standards. Otherwise, the non-rebels who are critical, noisy,
or obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up with those actually taking up arms against the
Government.

The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well grounded on past events, that the
petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not validate
warrantless arrests. I cannot understand why the authorities preferred to bide their time, await
the petitioner's surfacing from underground, and pounce on him with no legal authority instead of
securing warrants of arrest for his apprehension. The subsequent conviction of a person arrested
illegally does not the warrantless arrest.

In G.R. No. 86332, Romulo Bunye was killed on December 14, 1988. The information that
Narciso Nazareno was one of the killers came to the attention of peace officers only on
December 28, 1988 or fourteen (14) days later. To say that the offense "has in fact just been
committed" even if 14 days have lapsed is to stretch Rule 11 3 on warrantless arrests into
ridiculous limits. A warrant of arrest is essential in this case. I vote to grant the motion for
reconsideration.

The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not reach back into the past and
render legal what was illegal. The violation of the constitutional right against illegal seizures is not
cured by the fact that the arrested person is indeed guilty of the offense for which he was seized.
A government of laws must abide by its own Constitution.

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, I VOTE TO:

(1) DENY the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 84581-82; G.R. No. 84583-84; and G.R.
No. 83162;

(2) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727;

(3) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 86332;and

(4) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 81567.

CRUZ, J., Separate Opinion:

I reiterate my concurrence with the ponencia insofar as it dismissed the petitions of those who

were arrested in flagrante, or subsequently posted bail or chose to remain in the custody of the
military, or voluntarily permitted the search of the house without warrant. I do not think that under
the applicable circumstances the petitioners can validly complain that they are being unlawfully
detained.

But I must again express may dissent to the continued observance of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,
121 SCRA 472, to justify the warrantless arrest and detention of the other petitioners on the
ground that they were apprehended for the continuing offenses of rebellion and other allied
crimes.

We find in the said decision this partltularly disturbing observation, which was quoted with
approval in the original ponencia:

The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion, whether as its fighting armed elements, or
for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the
purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the
issuance of arrest and the granting of bail of the offense is bailable. Obviously, the
absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons
committing overt acts of violence against govenment forces, or any other milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. (Emphasis supplied.)
The treatment suggested envisions an actual state of war and is justified only when a recognition
of beuigerency is accorded by the legitimate government to the rebels, resulting in the application
of the laws of war in the regulation of their relations. The rebels are then considered alien
enemies-to be treated as prisoners of war when captured-and cannot invoke the municipal law of
the legitimate government they have disowned. It is in such a situation that the processes of the
local courts are not observed and the rebels cannot demand the protection of the Bill of Rights
that they are deemed to have renounced by their defiance of the government.

But as long as that recognition has not yet been extended, the legitimate govenment must treat
the rebels as its citizens, subject to its municipal law and entitled to all the rights provided
thereunder, including and especially those guaranteed by the Constitution. Principal among
these — in our country — are whose embodied in the Bill of Rights, particularly those
guaranteeing due process, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, allowing bail, and
presuming the innocence of the accused. The legitimate government cannot excuse the
suppression of these rights by the "exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time remains an
intemal matter governed exclusively by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

Treatment of the rebels as if they were foreign invaders — or combatants — is not justified in the
present situation as our government continues to prosecute them as violators of our own laws.
Under the doctrine announced in Garcia-Padilla, however, all persons suspected as rebels are
by such suspicion alone made subject to summary arrest no different from the unceremonious
capture of an enemy soldier in the course of a battle. The decision itself says that the arrest
"need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses" and "the absence of a
judicial warrant is no impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by the authorities
of the "continuing offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related crimes. International law is
thus substituted for municipal law in regulating the relations of the Republic with its own citizens
in a purely domestic matter.

As for the duration of the offenses, the decision contained the following pronouncement which
this Court has also adopted as its own:

. . . The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit

such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses, aside front their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide manitude. (Emphasis supplied.)

The beginning of the "continuing offense" may be arbitrarily fixed by the authorities, usually by
simply placing the suspect "under surveillance," to lay the basis for his eventual apprehension.
Once so placed, he may at any time be arrested without warrant on the specious pretext that he
is in the process of committing the "continuing offense," no matter that what he may be actuallly
doing at the time is a perfectly innocent act.

In the case of Dural. the arrest was made while he was engaged in the passive and innocuous
act of undergoing medical treatment. The fiction was indulged that he was even then, as he lay
supine in his sickbed, engaged in the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. In further
justification, the Court says that the arresting officers acted on "confidential information" that he
was in the hospital, which information "was found to be true." This is supposed to have validated
the determination of the officers that there was "probable cause" that excused the absence of a
warrant.

My own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify the issuance
of a warrant, not to dispense with it; moreover, probable cause must be determined by the judge
issuing the warrant, not the arresting officer who says it is not necessary.
In the case of Espiritu, the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping, and for allegedly
seditious remarks made by him the day before. The Court says his case is not covered by the
Garcia-Padilla doctrine but approves the arrest just the same because the remarks were
supposed to continue their effects even to the following day. The offense was considered as
having been just committed (to make it come under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court)
despite the considerable time lapse.

It was worse in the case of Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant, and no less
than fourteen days after the killing. In sustaining this act, the Court says that it was only on the
day of his arrest that he was identified as one of the probable killers, thus suggesting that the
validity of a warrantless arrest is reckoned not from the time of the commission of an offense but
from the time of the Identification of the suspect.

Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the latter
"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" or when an
offense "has in fact just been committed." The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the
word "just," which, according to Webster, means "a very short time ago." The arrest must be
made almost immediately or soon after these acts, not at any time after the suspicion of the
arresting officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense was committed.

I am also uneasy over the following observations in the present resolution which I hope will not
be the start of another dangerous doctrine:

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as
revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon
wmch the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by
probable cause, i.e., that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of
certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

I can only repeat my own misgivings when I dissented in the recent case of People vs.
Malmstedt, G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991, where I noted: "The conclusion that there was
probable cause may have been influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused was
carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In other words, it
was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established the probable cause that validated
the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the tree
itself."

I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the illegal
arrests made in the cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights
were wantonly and systematically violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It seems some of us have
short memories of that repressive regime, but I for one am not one to forget so soon. As the
ultimate defender of the Constitution, this Court should not gloss over the abuses of those who,
out of mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of national security.
Whatever their ideology and even if it be hostile to ours, the petitioners are entitled to the
protection of the Bill of Rights, no more and no less than any other person in this country. That is
what democracy is all about.

FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result reached by the majority in the Resolution disposing of the Motion for
Reconsideration.

At the same time, however, I feel compelled to dissent from certain statements made by the
majority principally concerning the applicability of the "continuing crimes" doctrine to the problem
of arrests without warrants. It seems clear that these statements are really obiter dicta, since they
are quite unnecessary for sustaining the actual results reached in the majority Resolution. This
was summarily pointed out in my very brief statement concurring in the result reached in the
original Decision of the Court dated 9 July 1990. The subsequent developments in several of the
cases here consolidated, which are carefully detailed in the majority Resolution, make this even
clearer. Nonetheless, the majority Resolution has taken the time and trouble expressly to
reiterate the "continuing crimes" doctrine as applicable in respect of warrantless arrests.
Although the above statements are obiter, they have been made and, I believe, need to be
addressed to some extent and the inter-relation of the "continuing crimes" doctrine with
constitutional rights explored.

1. We start at the beginning, that is, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizures
of persons. Article III Section 2 of the Constitution reads:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphais
supplied)

Under the above provision, arrests, i.e., the constraint and seizure of the persons of individual
members of society, must, as a general rule, be preceded by the securing of a warrant of arrest,
the rendition of which complies with the constitutional procedure specified in Article III Section 2.
Arrests made without a warrant issued by a judge after complying with the constitutional
procedure, are prima facie unreasonable seizures of persons within the meaning of Article III
Section 2.

2. There are, however, certain well-recognized exceptions to the norm that warrantless arrests
are unreasonable seizures of persons. Those exceptions are, in our day, essentially found in
Section 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Section 5(a) and (b) mark out the
situations where an officer of the law, or a private person for that matter, may lawfully arrest a
person without previously securing a warrant of arrest. The full text of Section 5, Rule 113
follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

3. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b), it is important to recall
that judicial interpretation and application of Section 5(a) and (b) must take those provision for
what they are: they are exceptions to a vital constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
Exceptions to such a norm must be strictly construed so as not to render futile and meaningless
the constitutional rule requiring warrants of arrests before the persons of individuals may be
lawfully constrained and seized. The ordinary rule generally applicable to statutory provisions is
that exceptions to such provisions must not be stretched beyond what the language in which they
are cast fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision, rather
than the exception.   This rule must apply with special exigency and cogency where we deal, not
1

with an ordinary statutory provision, but with a constitutional guarantee.   Exceptions to such a 2

guarantee must be read with especial care and sensitivity and kept within the limits of their
language so to keep vital and significant the general constitutional norms warrantless arrests.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance,   this Court, stressing that: 3

II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one
of the highest duties and privileges of the court. these constitutional guaranties should be
given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent
stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights secured by
them (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237
Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes
authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose
vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U.S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U.S., 14 Fed.
[2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613. (emphasis supplied)

held that:

. . . All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable whith lawful ones are
reasonable.  4

In People vs. Burgos, 5

 this Court reiterated the above rule in the following terms:

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed
by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document. Neither was he commit ting any act which could be described as
subversive. He was, in fact plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd
or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the
rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically
provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right
so often vilated and so deserving of full protection.  6 (emphasis supplied)

4. Section 5(a) relates to situations where a crime is committed or attempted to be committed in the presence of the arresting officer. The fact of the occurrence of the offense, or of the attempt to commit an offense, in the presence of the arresting
officer, may be seen to be the substitute, under the circumstances, for the securing of a warrant of arrest. In such situation, there is an obvious need for immediate, even instantaneous, action on the part of the arresting officer to suppress the breach of
public order and to prevent further breaches then and there. Section 5(a) may, moreover, be seen to refer to overt acts constitutive of a crime taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. The term "presence" in this connection is properly and

 If no overt, recognizably criminal, acts occur

restrictively construed to relate to acts taking place within the optical or perhaps auditory perception of the arresting officer. 7

which are perceptible through the senses of the arresting officer, such officer could not, of
course, become aware at all that a crime is being committed or attempted to be committed in his
presence.   It is elementary that purely mental or psychological phenomena, not externalized in
8

overt physical acts of a human person, cannot constitute a crime in our legal system. For a crime
to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus
reus. If no such overt acts are actually taking place in the presence or within the sensor
perception of the arresting officer, there would, in principle, be ample time to go to a magistrate
and ask for a warrant of arrest. There would, in other words, not be that imperious necessity for
instant action to prevent an attempted crime, to repress the crime being committed, or to capture
the doer of the perceive criminal act, the necessity which serves as the justification in law of
warrantless arrests under Section 5(a).

5. Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must be coincide before a warrantless arrest may
be sustained under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been committed" when the
arresting officer arrived in the scene; and 2) the officer must have "personal knowledge" of facts
indicating tha the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In somewhat different terms,
the first requirement imports that th effects or corpus of the offense which has just been
committed are still visible: e.g. a person sprawled on the ground, dead of gunshot wound; or a
person staggering around bleeding profusely from stab wounds. The arresting officer may not ha
seen the actual shooting or stabbing of the victim, and thereto the offense can not be said to
have been committed "in [his] presence." The requirement of "personal knowledge" on the part of
the arresting officer is a requirement that such knowledge must have been obtained directly from
sense perception the arresting officer. That requirement would exclude informtion conveyed by
another person, no matter what his reputation for, truth and reliability might be.   Thus, where the
9

arresting officer comes upon a person dead on the street and sees a person running away with a
knife from where the victim is sprawled the ground, he has personal knowledge of facts which
render it highly probable that the person fleeing was the doer of the criminal deed. The arresting
officer must, in other words, perceive through his own senses some act which directly connects
the person to be arrested with the visible effects or corpus of a crime which has "just been
committed."

6. The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the requirement that the
time interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer
must be brief indeed. In the first place, the word "just" was fairly recently inserted in Section 5(b)
by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures, no doubt in order to underscore the point here being
made. In the second place, a latitudinarian view of the phrase "has in fact just been committed"
would obviously render pointless the requirement in Section 5(a) that the crime must have been
committed "[in] the presence" of the arresting officer. In G.R. No. 86332, the warrantless arrest of
Alfredo Nazareno 14-days after the occurrence of the killing with which he was charged along
with other persons, cannot by any standard be justified under Section 5(b). In G.R. No. 81567,
Dural was arrested without warrant while being treated in a hospital the day after the shooting of
the policemen in which he was suspected to have been a participant. While 1-day may be
substantially different from 14-days, still it must be pointed out that at the time Dural was arrested
in the hospital, the killing of the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City far away from the St. Agnes
Hospital in Quezon City could not reasonably be said to have been just committed. There was no
showing, nor did the Court require it, that the arresting officers had been in "hot pursuit" of Dural
beginning at the scene of the killing and ending the next day in the hospital.

7. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer
who is determining "probable cause" right at the scene of the crime, is in a sense more exacting
than the standard imposed by the Constitution upon the judge who, in the seclusion of his
chambers, ascertains "probable cause" by examining the evidence submitted before him. The
arresting officer must himself have "personal knowledge"; the magistrate may rely upon the
personal knowledge of the witnesses examined by or for him in issuing a warrant of arrest. In the
present Resolution, the majority begins with noting the requirement of "personal knowledge" in
Section 5(b), but winds up in the next page with a very diluted standard of "reasonable belief and
"good faith" on the part of the arresting officers. The stricter standard is properly applicable to the
officers seizing a person without a warrant of arrest, for they are acting in derogation of a
constitutional right. That the person unlawfully arrested without a warrant may later turn out to be
guilty of the offense he was suspected of in the first place is, course, quite beside the point. Even
a person secretly guilty some earlier crime is constitutionally entitled to be secure from
warrantless arrest, unless he has in fact committed physically observable criminal acts in the
presence of the arresting officer or hadjust committed such acts when the arresting officer burst
upon the scene.
8. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of "continuing crimes,"
shows that doctrine is here being used as a substitute for the requirement under Section 5(a) that
the offense "has in fact just been presence of the arresting officer arrived, but rather because the
person to be arrested is suspected of having committed a crime in the future. The pertinent
portion of the majority Resolution reads:

. . . Dural did not cease to be, or because less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSE OF
ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. . . . That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his
mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another
opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebelion
(or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called
"common" offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which
compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding
objectives of overthrowing organized government is attained. (Emphasis supplied)

9. I respectfully submit that an examination of the "continuing crimes" doctrine as actually found
in our case law offers no reasonable basis for such use of the dotrine. More specifically, that
doctrine, in my submission, does not dispence with the requirement that overt acts recognizably
criminal in character must take place in the presence of the arresting officer, or must have just
been committed when the arresting officer arrived, if the warrantless arrest it to be lawful. The
"continuing crimes" doctrine in our case law (before rendition of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile   does
10

not sustain warrantless arrests of person to be arrested is, as it were, merely resting in between
specific lawless and commit the moment he gets an opportunity to do so.

Our case law shows that the "continuing crimes" doctrine has been used basically in relation to
two (2) problems: the first problem is that of determination of whether or not a particular offense
was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; the second problem is that of
determining whether a single crime or multiple crimes were committed where the defense of
double jeopardy is raised.

10. In respect of the first problem, the gist of our case law is that where some of the ingredients
or elements of an offense taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of one court and some
other ingredients or elements of the same offense occur in the territory of another court, (e.g.,
estafa or malversation) either one of the two courts has jurisdiction to try the offense. Where all
of the essential elements of a crime take place within the territory of one court but "by reason of
he very nature of the offense committed" the violation of the law is deemed to be "continuing,"
then the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the offense continues to be committed, has
jurisdiction to try a person charged with such offense. In the latter case, the offense is deemed to
be continuing because some or all of the elements constituting the offense occurred within
jurisdiction of the second court (e.g., kidnapping and illegal detention; libel; evasion of service of
sentence). The criminal acts are regarded as repeated or as continuing within the province or city
where the defendant was found and arrested.   Clearly, overt acts of the accussed constituting
11

elements of the crime charged must be shown to have been committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court where he is charged.

11. Turning to the second type of problem, the question is normally presented in terms of
whether one crime or multiple crimes were committed by the accused. Where the series of acts
actually alleged and proven to have been committed by the accused constituted only one and the
same crime, the defense of double jeopardy becomes available where a second information is
filed covering acts later in the series. Upon the other hand, where the acts of the accused
constituted discrete, multiple offenses, each act comprising a distinct and separate offense, the
double jeopardy defense is non-available.   The point worth stressing is that in passing upon the
12
issue relating to the unity or multiplicity of offense committed, the overt acts of the accused
constitutive either of the single offense or of the plural offenses, must be shown.

12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its own legitimate
function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and
dissolving the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts
comprising all or some of the elements of the offense charged are shown to have been
committed by the person arrested without warrant, the "continuing crime" doctrine should not be
used to dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or committed elsewhere, continued to be
committed by the person arrested in the presence of the arresting officer. The capacity for
mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where the
crime charged does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and end
in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of a person or kidnapping and illegal
dentention or arson) but rather of such problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation with
or becoming a member of, a subversive association or organization. For in such cases, the overt
constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness of the acts a
function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. Note, for instance, the following
acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive association:"  13

a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records, correspondence, or any other document of the organization;

b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form whatsoever;

c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans or in any other forms;

x x x           x x x          x x x

f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof;

x x x           x x x          x x x

h) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to promote the objectives and purposes of such association or
organization;

x x x           x x x          x x x

k) Participating in any was in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such association or organization;

x x x           x x x          x x x

It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests and seizures makes the law enforcement work of police agencies more
difficult to carry out. It is not our Court's function, however, and the Bill of Rights was not designed, to make life easy for police forces but rather to protect the liberties of
private individuals. Our police forces must simply learn to live with the requirements of the Bill of Rights, to enforce the law by modalities which themselves comply with
the fundamental law. Otherwise they are very likely to destroy, whether through sheer ineptness or excess of zeal, the very freedoms which make our polity worth
protecting and saving.

REGALADO, J.:  Separate Opinion:

While I have heretofore concurred in the  ponencia in the above-entitled cases and I reiterate such concurrence, I wish to unburden myself of some reservations on the
rationale adopted in G.R. No. 86332.
It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28
December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II."

I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which, while authorizing a peace officer or a private person to effect a warrantless arrest,
specifically conditions that grant of authority upon the situation "(w)hen an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it."

It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court were amended in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the particular revision of
paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section consisted in imposing the requirements that the person making the arrest has  personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed.

Now, according to the resolution, "the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila; that at about 5 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso
Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without
warrant, for investigation."

Since, clearly, the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information imparted by one of the suspects, Ramil Regala, the resolution has emasculated the
requirement in Section 5(b) that the person making the arrest must have had personal knowledge of factual indications regarding the complicity or liability of the arrestee
for the crime. Yet, that amendment requiring such personal knowledge must have been designed to obviate the practice in the past of warrantless arrests being effected
on the basis of or supposed reliance upon information obtained from third persons who merely professed such knowledge or, worse, concocted such reports for variant
reasons not necessarily founded on truth.

Further, and obviously as an added deterrent to the possibility that such arrest without a warrant may result from imputations based on dubious motives, it is now
required that the crime must have just been committed. The recency contemplated here, in relation to the making of the warrantless arrest, is the time when the crime
was in fact committed, and not the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the person making the arrest learned or was informed of such
commission. Otherwise, at the risk of resorting to reductio ad absurdum, such warrantless arrests could be validly made even for a crime committed, say, more than a
year ago but of which the arresting officer received information only today.

The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now required by Section 5(b), must have been dictated by the consideration,
among others, that by reason of such recency of the criminal occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer acquiring personal and/or reliable knowledge of such fact
and the identity of the offender is necessarily enhanced, if not assured. The longer the interval, the more attenuated are the chances of his obtaining such verifiable
knowledge. In the case under consideration, the obtention of information of a crime committed fourteen (14) days earlier necessarily undermines the capacity of the
arresting officer to ascertain the reliability of the information he is acting upon and to acquire personal knowledge thereof after such verification.

It may be granted, as an ad hoc proposition, that the arrest of Nazareno was based on probable cause and it was not whimsical, at least, in this instance. It is correct to
say that prevailing conditions affecting national security and stability must also be taken into account. However, for the reasons above elucidated, I take exception to the
conclusion that the conditions in Section 5(b) of Rule 113 had been complied with in this case. It is true that the corresponding information was filed against Nazareno
shortly after his arrest but that, precisely, is another cause for controversy. Definitely, if the rules on arrest are scrupulously observed, there would be no need for the
usual invocation of Ilagan as a curative balm for unwarranted incursions into civil liberties.

SARMIENTO, J.: dissenting:

 the majority has not shown why the arrests in question should after
I reiterate my dissent. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution, 1

all be sustained.

According to the majority, Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 815667) was validly arrested without a
warrant and that his arrest was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 5, paragraph
(b), Rule 113, of the Rules of Court. According to the majority, he, Dural, was after all committing
an offense (subversion being supposedly a continuing offense) and that the military did have
personal knowledge that he had committed it. "Personal knowledge," according to the majority, is
supposedly no more than "actual belief or reasonable grounds . . . of suspicion," and suspicion is
supposedly reasonable:
 . . . when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilty of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.  2

As I said, I dissent.

 is made up of "overt

First, and as I held, subversion, as an offense punished by Executive Order No. 167, as amended by Executive Order No. 276, in relation to Republic Act No. 1700, 3

acts."   In People vs. Ferrer   this Court defined "overt acts" as follows:
4 5

. . . Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally

unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would
suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be
judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused
joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party,
knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e.,
to overthrow the existing government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place
the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.

As Ferrer held, that above "overt acts" constitute the essence of "subversion," and as Ferrer has
taken pains to explain, the law requires more than mere membership in a subversive
organization to make the accused liable. I respectfully submit that for purposes of arrest without a
warrant, that above "overt acts" should be visible to the eyes of the police officers (if that is
possible), otherwise the accused can not be said to be committing any offense within the
contemplation of the Rules of Court, to justify police action, and otherwise, we would have made
"subversion" to mean mere "membership" when, as Ferrer tells us, subversion means more that
mere membership.

I find strained that majority's interpretation of "personal knowledge," as the majority would
interpret it, as no more than "actual belief or reasonable suspicion," that is, "suspicion . . . based
on actual facts . . . [and] founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith . . . "   I submit that 6

personal knowledge means exactly what it says — that the peace officer is aware that the
accused has committed an offense, in this case, membership in a subversive organization with
intent to further the objectives thereof. It is to be noted that prior to their amendment, the Rules
(then Section 6) spoke of simple "reasonable ground" — which would have arguably
encompassed "actual belief or suspicion . . . coupled with good faith" referred to by the majority.
Section 5(b) as amended, however, speaks of "personal knowledge"; I respectfully submit that to
give to "personal knowledge" the same meaning as "reasonable ground" is to make the
amendment as useless exercise.

What, furthermore, we have here was a mere "confidential information" that a "sparrow man" had
been wounded and was recuperating in the hospital, and that that person was Rolando Dural.
Clearly, what we have is second-hand, indeed, hearsay, information, and needless to say, not
personal knowledge.

I would like to point out that in the case of People vs. Burgos   this Court rejected a similar arrest 7

because of lack of personal knowledge, and, as the Court held, "[w]hatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers came in its entirety from the information furnished by
[another] . . ."   I do not see how We can act differently here.
8
I do not find the majority's reliance on the case of United States vs. Santos   to be well-taken. 9

Santos involved a prosecution for coercion (against a peace officer for affecting an arrest without
a warrant). Santos, however, did in fact affirm the illegality of the arrest but absolved the peace
officer on grounds of good faith. Santos did not say that so long as he, the peace officer, was
acting in good faith, as the majority here says that the military was acting in good faith, the arrest
is valid. Quite to the contrary, Santos suggested that notwithstanding good faith on the part of the
police, the arrest is nevertheless subject to question.

As far as the information leading to the arrest of Dural is concerned, the majority would quite
evidently swallow the version of the military as if in the first place, there truly was an information,
and that it was reliable, and that "it was found to be true;"   and as if, in the second place, the 10

hospital authorities (the alleged informants) could have legally tipped the military under existing
laws. We have, it should be noted, previously rejected such a species of information because of
the lack of "compulsion for [the informant] to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal
prosecution."   Here, it is worse, because we do not even know who that informant was.
11

The majority is apparently unaware that under Executive Order No. 212, amending Presidential
Decree No. 169, hospital establishments are required to report cases of acts of violence to
"government health authorities" — not to the military.

I am concerned that if the military were truly armed with reliable information and if it did have
personal knowledge to believe that Dural had committed an offense, there was no reason for the
military to ignore the courts, to which the Constitution after all, gives the authority to issue
warrants. As People vs. Burgos held:

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting
officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the
process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe
that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real
apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no
showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.  12

I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Caspile, and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. Nos. 84581-82; 83162) could
have been lawfully picked up under similar circumstances. As the majority points out, the military had (again) acted on a mere tip-the military had no personal knowledge
(as I elaborated what personal knowledge means). Second, I do not think that the majority can say that since Amelia Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" (As Roque, et
al. allegedly admitted), immediate arrests were "prudent" and necessary. As I said, that Roque, et al. were admitted "NPA's" is (was) the question before the trial court
and precisely, the subject of controversy. I think it is imprudent for this Court to pass judgment on the guilt of the petitioners-since after all, and as the majority points out,
we are talking simply of the legality of the petitioner's arrests.

More important, that Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" is evidently, a mere say-so of the military, and evidently, the Court is not bound by bare say-so's. Evidently, we
can not approve an arrest simply because the military says it is a valid arrest (the accused being "NPA's anyway")— that would be abdication of judicial duty and when,
moreover, the very basis of the claim rests on dubious "confidential information."

According to the majority, we are speaking of simple arrests; we are not talking of the guilt or innocence of the accused. I certainly hope not, after the majority referred to
Rolando Dural as a "sparrow man" and having Amelia Roque, et al. admit to being NPA's."

It is to gloss over at any rate, the nature of arrest as a restraining on liberty. It is to me immaterial that the guilt of the accused still has to be established, since
meanwhile, the accused are in fact being deprived of liberty. Arrest to me, is something to crow about, even if in the opinion of the majority, it is nothing to crow about (a
mere "administrative measure").

I can not, again, accept the validity of the arrests of Deogracia Espiritu or Narciso Nazareno (G.R. Nos. 85727; 86332). Espiritu was supposedly picked up for inciting to
sedition, in uttering supposedly, on November 22, 1988, the following:
Bukas tuloy and welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na. 13

Espiritu however was arrested on November 23, 1988, a day later-and in no way is "inciting to sedition" a continuing offense. Obviously, the majority is not saying that it
is either, but that:

. . . Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu has not lost the right to insist, during the trial on the merits,
that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon
thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, titled the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction).
Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. 14

And obviously, the majority is concerned about whether or not Espiritu's speech was after all, protected speech, but apparently, that is also of no moment, since: (1) that is a matter of defense; (2) we are talking of mere arrests, and as far as arrests are

concerned, "the Court has, in this case, titled in favor of authority," 15

 and (3) we have, anyway, given a reduced bail to the accused.

First, that the accused's statement is in the category of free speech is not only plain to my mind,
it is a question I do not think the majority can rightly evade in these petitions without shirking the
Court's constitutional duty. It is to my mind plain, because it does not contain enough "fighting
words" recognized to be seditious.   Secondly, it is the very question before the Court—whether 16

or not the statement in question constitutes an offense for purposes of a warrantless arrest. It is a
perfectly legal question to my mind and I am wondering why we can not answer it.

What the majority has not answered, as I indicated, is that inciting to sedition is in no way a
continuing offense, and as I said, the majority is not apparently convicted that it is, either. Of
course, the majority would anyway force the issue: "But the authority of the peace officers to
make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
another thing."   First, Espiritu was picked up the following day, and in no way is "the following
17

day" "soon thereafter". Second, we would have stretched the authority of peace officers to make
warrantless arrests for acts done days before. I do not think this is the contemplation of the Rules
of Court.

As in the case of Burgos in People vs. Burgos,   Espiritu was neither "on the verge of flight or 18

escape"   and there was no impediment for the military to go through the judicial processes, as
19

there was none in the case of Burgos.

In the case of People vs. Aminnudin,   this Court held that unless there "was a crime about to be 20

committed or had just been committed," and unless there existed an urgency as where a moving
vehicle is involved, instant police action can not be justified.

"In the balancing of authority and freedom," states the majority, "the Court has, in this case, titled
in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction)."   It is a strange 21

declaration, first, because it is supported by no authority (why the Court should "tilt" on the side
of Government), and second, because this Court has leaned, by tradition, on the side of liberty —
as the custodian of the Bill of Rights — even if we were talking of "simple" arrests.

I do not understand why this Court should "tilt" . . . the scale in favor of authority . . . in this
case,"   as if to say that normally, this Court would have tilted the scales the other way. I do not
22

understand why these cases are apparently, special cases, and apparently, the majority is not
telling us neither. I am wondering why, apart from the fact that these cases involved, incidentally,
people who think differently from the rest of us.

The majority goes on:

 Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest
without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls
under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police
authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of
Bunye II.  23

With all due respect, I do not think that the majority is aware of the serious implications of its pronouncement on individual rights (and statutory construction in general),
and I feel I am appropriately concerned because as a member of the Court, I am co-responsible for the acts of my colleagues and I am afraid that I may, rightly or
wrongly, be in time made to defend such an indefensible pronouncement.

Section 5(b) of Rule 113 is clear and categorical: the offense must have been "just committed" and the authorities must have "personal knowledge."

In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after it was in fact (allegedly) committed. In no way can the authorities be said to have
"personal knowledge" two weeks thereafter; whatever "personal knowledge" they have can not possibly be "personal knowledge" of a crime that had "just been
committed;" whatever "personal knowledge" they have is necessarily "personal knowledge" of a crime committed two weeks before.

In no way can Nazareno's arrest be said to be an arrest sanctioned by the exceptional provisions of the Rules.

I am not saying that the military can not act in all cases, and it is sheer ignorance to suppose that I am saying it, (or worse, that I am "coddling criminals"). I am not
saying that a suspected criminal, if he can not be arrested without a warrant, can not be arrested at all — but that the military should first procure a warrant from a judge
before effecting an arrest. It is not too much to ask of so-called law enforcers.

As it is, the majority has enlarged the authority of peace officers to act, when the Rules have purposely limited it by way of an exception, precisely, to the general rule, mandated by the Constitution no less, that arrests may be done only through a judicial

 — today it is fourteen days, tomorrow, one

warrant. As it is, the majority has in fact given the military the broadest discretion to act, a discretion the law denies even judges 24

year, and sooner, a decade. I submit that a year, a decade, would not be in fact unreasonable,
following the theory of the majority, since the military can claim anytime that it "found out only
later," as the majority did not find it unreasonable for the Capital Command to claim that it "came
to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II"  —and none of 25

us can possibly dispute it.

I would like to stress strongly that we are not talking of a simple "administrative measure" alone
—we are talking of arrests, of depriving people of liberty—even if we are not yet talking of
whether or not people are guilty. That we are not concerned with guilt or innocence is hardly the
point, I respectfully submit, and it will not minimize the significance of the petitioners'
predicament.

With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra, I submit that the majority has, as in the cases of Amelia
Roque, et al., ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged "admission" (actually, an uncounselled
confession) was precisely, the basis for Buenaobra's arrest. It is to beg the question, I
respectfully submit, to approve the military's action for the reason that Buenaobra confessed,
because Buenaobra confessed for the reason that the military, precisely, pounced on him. I am
not to be mistaken for prejudging Buenaobra's innocence (although it is supposed to be
presumed) but I can not imagine that Buenaobra would have voluntarily proclaimed to the military
that he was an NPA courier so that the military could pounce on him.

I respectfully submit that the cases Garcia vs. Padilla   and Ilagan vs. Enrile   have been better 26 27

days. I do not see how this court can continuously sustain them "where national security and
stability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels."   First 28

and foremost, and as the majority has conceded, we do not know if we are in fact dealing with
"Communists." The case of Deogracias Espiritu, for one, hardly involves subversion. Second,
"Communism" and "national security" are old hat — the dictator's own excuses to perpetuate
tyranny, and I am genuinely disappointed that we would still fall for old excuses. Third, Garcia
and Ilagan rested on supposed grounds that can not be possibly justified in a regime that
respects the rule of law — that the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is a valid presidential
document (Garcia) and that the filing of an information cures a defective arrest (Ilagan). Fourth
and finally, it is evident that neither "Communist threat" nor "national security" are valid grounds
for warrantless arrests under Section 5(b) of Rule 113.

I most respectfully submit that Garcia and Ilagan have not only been diluted by subsequent
jurisprudence (e.g., People vs. Burgos, supra), they are relics of authoritarian rule that can no
longer be defended, if they could have been defended, in Plaza Miranda or before our own peers
in the bar.

"What is important," says the majority, "is that every arrest without warrant be tested as to its
legality, via habeas corpus proceedings."   I supposed that goes without saying. But it is also to
29

patronize the petitioners and simply, to offer a small consolation, when after all, this Court is
validating their continued detention.   With all due respect, I submit that it is nothing for which the
30

public should be elated.

A Final Word

As I began my dissent, in this Resolution and the Decision sought to be reconsidered, I reiterate
one principle: The State has no right to bother citizens without infringing their right against
arbitrary State action. "The right of the people," states the Constitution, "to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searchers and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable . . . ."   "The State," the Charter likewise states,
31

"values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights."   The 32

Constitution states the general rule — the majority would make the exception the rule, and the
rule the exception. With all due respect, this is not what constitutionalism is all about.

I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority refers to are, in the first place,
doubtful, the "actual facts and circumstances" being no more than "confidential information"
(manufactured or genuine, we have no way of telling) and in the second place, any information
with which the military (or police) were armed could no more than be hearsay, not personal,
information. I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority insists on can not
justify the arrests in question under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, the rule the majority insists is the
applicable rule.

Apparently, Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule, as far as Deogracias Espiritu and Narciso
Nazareno are concerned; certainly, it is not the Section 5(b) I know. As I indicated, Espiritu was
arrested one day after the act, allegedly, inciting to sedition; Nazareno was picked up fourteen
days after it (allegedly, murder). Yet, the majority would approve the police's actions nonetheless
because the police supposedly "found out only later." I submit that the majority has read into
Section 5(b) a provision that has not been written there.

"More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups," concludes the majority, "what
is important is that the Court be right."  33

Nobody has suggested in the first place, that Umil was and is a question of popularity or palatability. Umil is a question, on the contrary, of whether or not the military (or
police), in effecting the arrests assailed, had complied with the requirements of law on warrantless arrests. Umil is a question of whether or not this Court, in approving
the military's actions, is right.

In spite of "EDSA", a climate of fear persists in the country, as incidences of disappearances, torture, hamletting, bombings, saturation drives, and various human rights
violations increase in alarming rates. In its update for October, 1990, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines found:
An average of 209 arrested for political reasons monthly since 1988, 94% of them illegally;

Four thousand four hundred eight (4,408) political detentions from January, 1989 to September, 1990, 4,419, illegally;

Of those arrested, 535 showed signs of torture; 280 were eventually salvaged, 40, of frustrated salvage, and 109 remained missing after their arrest;

Forty (40) cases of massacres, with 218 killed; 54 cases of frustrated massacre, in which 157 were wounded;

The victims belonged to neighborhood and union organizations;

Since February, 1986, 532 of those illegally arrested were women;

From January to June 1990, 361 children were detained for no apparent reason;

One million ten thousand four hundred nine (1,010,409) have been injured as a consequence of bombing, shellings, and food blockades undertaken by the military since 1988. 34

It is a bleak picture, and I am disturbed that this Court should express very little concern. I am also disappointed that it is the portrait of the Court I am soon leaving.
Nonetheless, I am hopeful that despite my departure, it will not be too late.

Motions denied.

CASE #10:

[G.R. No. L-2990. December 17, 1951.]

OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Carlos P. Garcia, Cosme P. Garcia and B. E. Enerio, for Petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jesus A.

Avanceña, for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; SEDITIOUS LIBEL. — The essence of seditious libel is its

immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses or to
induce people to resort to illegal methods in order to redress the evils which press
upon their minds.

2. ID.; ID.; — A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and
dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which
reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the
disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the
Government.

3. ID.; ID.; CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT; HOW IT MAY LEGALLY BE DONE. — Any

citizen may criticise his government and government officials and submit his
criticism to the "free trade of ideas." However, such criticism should be specific and
therefore constructive specifying particular objectionable actuations of the
government; it must be reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous
condemnation of the entire government set-up.

DECISION
 BENGZON, J.:

Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall write, publish or
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the Philippines or any of the
duly constituted authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies
or riots or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb
the peace of the community.

The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the Court of
First Instance of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because according to said court,

"About the time comprised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive,
in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken,
making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope
suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely
standing on a barrel (Exhibits A, C-I). After securing copies of his photograph,
Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of general
circulation (Exhibits C, F, G, H, I), not only in the Province of Bohol but also
throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or
letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto
Reveniera and addressed to the latter’s supposed wife translation of which letter or
note is hereunder reproduced: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my grave don’t plant a
cross or put floral wreaths, for I don’t need them.

"Please don’t bury me in a lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although
I have committed suicide, I still have the right to be buried among Christians.

"But don’t pray for me. Don’t remember me, and don’t feel sorry. Wipe me out of
your lives.

"My dear wife, if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it
because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world
about this.

"And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the
situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about Julio Guillen and the
banditry of Leyte.

"Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the
Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

"Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one.

"I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I

cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty government.

"I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the
Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self." cralaw virtua1aw library
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above quoted and
caused its publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisaya, Lamdang and
other local periodicals and that he had impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by
signing said pseudonymous name in said note or letter and posed himself as Alberto
Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope
tied to a limb of a tree."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. 1 It calls our government one
of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty) infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e.
dictators.

And the communication reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling

incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government. 2

Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to

weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the public
peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace
but because they are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself
(See 19 Am. Law Rep. 1511). Regarded as seditious libels they were the subject of
criminal proceedings since early times in England (V. op. cit.) .

As explained by Paterson, 3." . . the great factors of government, consisting of the

Sovereign, the Parliament, the ministers of state, the courts of justice, must all be
recognized as holding functions founded on sound principles and to be defended and
treated with an established and well-high unalterable respect. Each of these great
institutions has peculiar virtues and peculiar weaknesses, but whether at any one
time the virtue or the weakness predominates, there must be a certain standard of
decorum reserved for all. Each guarded remonstrance, each fiery invective, each
burst of indignation must rest on some basis of respect and deference towards the
depository, for the time being, of every great constitutional function. Hence another
limit of free speech and writing is sedition. And yet within that limit there is ample
room and verge enough for the freest use of the tongue and pen in passing
strictures on the judgment and conduct of every constituted authority." cralaw virtua1aw library

Naturally, when the people’s share in the government was restricted, there was a
disposition to punish even mild criticisms of the ruler or the departments of
government. But as governments grew to be more representative, the laws of
sedition became less drastic and freedom of expression grew apace. Yet malicious
endeavors to stir up public strife continue to be prohibited.

The United States punished seditious utterances in the act of July 14, 1798
containing provisions parallel to our own article 142. Analogous prohibitions are
found in the Espionage Act of June 1917 and the seditious libel amendment thereto
in May, 1918.

Of course such legislation despite its general merit is liable to become a weapon of
intolerance constraining the free expression of opinion, or mere agitation for reform.
But so long as there is a sufficient safeguard by requiring intent on the part of the
defendant to produce illegal action — such legislation aimed at anarchy and
radicalism presents largely a question of policy. Our Legislature has spoken in article
142 and the law must be applied.

In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the fundamental right
to freedom of speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does
not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one
may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use
of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 4" So
statutes against sedition have always been considered not violative of such
fundamental guaranty, although they should not be interpreted so as to
unnecessarily curtail the citizen’s freedom of expression to agitate for institutional
changes. 5

Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his government and
government officials and to submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to
plead for its acceptance in "the competition of the market." However, let such
criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a
contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up. Such wholesale
attack is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the government. In the
article now under examination one will find no particular objectionable actuation of
the government. It is called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is called shameful, but
no particular omissions or commissions are set forth. Instead the article drips with
male-violence and hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse
animosity towards all public servants headed by President Roxas whose pictures this
appellant would burn and would teach the younger generation to destroy.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to
impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The
infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer’s
simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with its failure to
particularize. When the use of irritating language centers not on persuading the
readers but on creating disturbance, the rationable of free speech can not apply and
the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure
but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only
all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer at least
to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives
dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the
conviction could be upheld. 6

As heretofore stated the publication suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or

riots and tends to stir up the people against the constituted authorities, or to
provoke violence from opposition groups who may seek to silence the writer. 7
Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to be its immediate tendency to stir up
general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to
resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to
repress the evils which press upon their minds. 8

"The idea of violence pervades the whole letter" says Justice Paredes of the Court of
Appeals. "The mere fact that a person was so disgusted with his "dirty government"
to the point of taking his own life, is not merely a sign of disillusionment; it is a clear
act to arouse its readers a sense of dissatisfaction against its duly constituted
authorities. The mention made in said letter of the situation in Central Luzon, the
Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and the banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant
and armed attacks against the law and the duly constituted authorities, cannot but
be interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the open defiance
by the Hukbalahaps against the constituted government, the attempt against the life
of President Roxas and the ruthless depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte,
thus insinuating that a state of lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be very
much better than the maladministration of said President and his men.

To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide
because he had "no power to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in
power." Knowing, that the expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman
as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea
intended by the appellant to be conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and
unpeaceful methods to free the government from the administration of Roxas and
his men.

The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact,
making the findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon us. 9

Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all
Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a majority of Legislators
including the Chief Executive himself). And such suggestion clinches the case
against Appellant.

In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matters with several
persons in a public place uttered these words: "Filipinos must use bolos for cutting
off Wood’s head" — referring to the then Governor-General, Leonard Wood. Perez
was found guilty of inciting to sedition in a judgment of this court published in
Volume 45 of the Philippine Reports. That precedent is undeniably opposite. Note
that the opinion was penned by Mr. Justice Malcolm probably the member who has
been most outspoken on freedom of speech. Adopting his own words we could say,
"Here the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine
Islands. His official position, like the President of the United States and other high
offices, under a democratic form of government, instead of affording immunity from
promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance,
the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common
decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in
the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government
and obedient to the laws." cralaw virtua1aw library

The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question
as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with
costs.

Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Jugo, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

TUASON, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, entitled "Inciting to Sedition",
provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding
2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking any direct part
in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the
acts which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings,
emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end, or
upon any reason or persons who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write,
publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or
the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer
in executing the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and
meet together for unlawful purpose, or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices." cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case of U. S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332, this Court traced the origin and history of
the predecessor of Article 142 and expounded its meaning. Mr. Justice Ladd, who
wrote the decision, said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are defined in that
section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing,
publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the United
States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) the writing,
publishing or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer
in executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies
or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to
disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government; (7)
knowingly concealing such evil practices." cralaw virtua1aw library

Referring to case (2) — scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States
or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands which the Court said may stand
on a somewhat different footing from the rest — the Court went on to say: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the determination of this question we have encountered great difficulty, by

reason of the almost entire lack of American precedents which might serve as a
guide in the construction of the law. There are, indeed, numerous English decisions,
most of them of the eighteenth century, on the subject of libelous attacks upon the
’Government, the constitution, or the law generally,’ attacks upon the Houses of
Parliament, the Cabinet, the Established Church, and other governmental organisms,
but these decisions are not now accessible to us, and, if they were, they were made
under such different conditions from those which prevail at the present day, and are
founded upon theories of government so foreign to those which have inspired the
legislation of which the enactment in question forms a part, that they would
probably afford but little light in the present inquiry. In England, in the latter part of
the eighteenth century, any ’written censure upon public men for their conduct as
such,’ as well as any written censure ’upon the laws or upon the institutions of the
country,’ would probably have been regarded as a libel upon the Government. (2
Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, 348.) This has ceased to be the law
in England, and it is doubtful whether it was ever the common law of any American
State.’It is true that there are ancient dicta to the effect that any publication tending
to ’possess the people with an ill opinion of the Government’ is a seditious libel (per
Holt, C.J., in R. v. Tuchin, 1704, 5 St. Tr., 532, and Ellengborough, C.J., in R. v.
Cobbett, 1804, 29 How. St. Tr., 49), but no one would accept that doctrine now.
Unless the words used directly tend to foment riot or rebellion or otherwise to
disturb the peace and tranquillity of the Kingdom, the utmost lattitude is allowed in
the discussion of all public affairs.’ (11 Enc. of the Laws of England 450.) Judge
Cooley says (Const. Lim., 901): ’The English common law rule which made libels on
the constitution or the government indictable, as it was administered by the courts,
seems to us unsuited to the condition and circumstances of the people of America,
and therefore never to have been adopted in the several States’." cralaw virtua1aw library

After citing the Act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly and historically known
as the "Sedition Act," and after noting that "the term ’government’ would appear to
be used here in the abstract sense of the existing political system, as distinguished
from the concrete organisms of the Government — the Houses of Congress and the
Executive — which are also specially mentioned," the Court reached the opinion that
"this is the (abstract) sense in which the term is used in the enactment under
consideration." The Court pointed out that, "while libels upon forms of government,
unconnected with defamation of individuals, must in the nature of things be of
uncommon occurrence, the offense is by no means an imaginary one," and cited a
case (Republic v. Dennie, 4 Yeates [Pa. ], 267) in which the defendant was indicted
for bringing into contempt and hatred the independence of the United States, the
constitution of this Commonwealth and of the United States; for exciting popular
discontent and dissatisfaction against the scheme of polity instituted; for
condemning the principles of the Revolution, and reviling the characters of the
patriots and statesmen; for endangering, subverting, and totally destroying the
republican constitutions and free governments of the said United States and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

In consonance with the principles laid down, the Court held that the article published
by Dorr, in which he virulently attacked the policy of the Civil Commission in
appointing Filipinos to office, did not come within the purview of the law, although it
"may have had the effect of exciting among certain classes dissatisfaction with the
Commission and its measures." It found that there was nothing in the article which
could "be regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like what may be
called disaffection, or, in other words, a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws." cralaw virtua1aw library

The message which the accused herein caused to be published with his picture
contained no libel or criticism against the instituted system of government as
distinct from the administration. On the contrary, the gist of the message was that
the author was desperate and was going to kill himself because many men in the
government were following the practices of absolute and despotic rulers in other
parts of the world. He wanted President Truman and Mr. Churchill, leading
exponents of such democratic institutions as are consecrated in the Philippine
Constitution, to be informed that President Roxas and others in his administration
were unfaithful to the tenets of constitutional government. He pointed to the
turbulent situation in Central Luzon, the rampant banditry in Leyte, the attempted
assassination of President Roxas by Guillen, etc., not as examples to be emulated
but as the direct outcome of what he claimed widespread graft and corruption in the
Government. He pretended to have decided to take his life because he was impotent
to remedy or suppress this deplorable state of affairs, and he was ashamed of the
way the Government was being conducted. He likened some men in the
Government, whom he did not specify, to Hitler and Mussolini, not that he idolized
those notorious characters but because, he felt, evil forces that undermined the
ideas and ideals of the Constitution were at work in our republic. In short, far from
advocating the overthrow or change of the present scheme of polity, the article
evinced intense feeling of devotion to the welfare of the country and its institutions.

President Roxas was the only official named in the article. But the defendant did not
counsel violence in his reference to the President and the unnamed officials. In his
statement to the effect that he was going to kill himself because he could not kill
President Roxas and the men who surrounded the Executive, it is not a necessary
deduction that he wished others to do it. Let it be remembered that the message
was addressed to the writer’s "wife" and "children" who, it turned out, were
imaginary.

At best, the meaning of the sentence is doubtful and the norm is that, where the
defendant’s intention is ambiguous he should be given the benefit of the doubt. The
courts may not subject an act or utterance to a microscopic examination in an
endeavor to find in it germs of seditious purpose. In prosecutions for sedition utmost
caution is called for lest the freedom of expression be impaired. Although statutes
against sedition have been held not to violate the constitutional guaranty to the
freedom of expression, the courts are warned to so construe or interpret them as
not to abridge that freedom. (33 C. J., 164, citing U. S. v. Apurado Et. Al., 7 Phil.,
422.) It is axiomatic that the Constitution is the paramount law and that legislation
has to be adjusted thereto. Accordingly in the solution of clashes, which frequently
occur, between liberty or free speech and prosecution for sedition, the criterion, it is
submitted, should be the presence or absence of real, not imaginary, danger of the
utterance materializing or inciting others to disloyalty to the Government and its
laws.

There is no inciting to sedition unless, according to Mr. Justice Holmes’ theory

expressed in connection with a similar topic, "the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." In
the very law punishing inciting to sedition there is the requirement that the words
alleged to be seditious or libelous lead or tend to the consummation of the evils
sought to be prevented. Even in the ordinary offenses of threat and defamation,
words are not taken at face value, but their import or gravity is gauged by the
circumstances surrounding each particular case.

The terms "lead" and "tend" are used in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code in
their ordinary signification. Thus understood, lead as a verb means "to draw or
direct by influence" or "to prevail on," and tend means "to conduce to an end."
(Webster’s International Dictionary.)

Judged by these tests, and granting for the present purposes that the defendant did
intend to incite others to sedition, the article was harmless as far as the safety of
the Government and its officers was concerned, and should have been ignored, as
many others more serious than this one have been. The message, like an evil
imagining from which no harm proceeds except to the individual himself, was not
conducive to the attainment of the prisoner’s aims. If words are "the keys of
persuasion" and "the triggers of action," the article under consideration was far from
possessing either of these qualities, taking into consideration the personality of the
man who wrote it and what he "did." The reaction of the readers could not have
been other than that the whole thing was comical if it were not "tragic." The general
reaction, it is fairly safe to say, was one of regret for a man of eccentric and
unbalanced mind or ridicule and curiosity for a grotesque stunt. The witnesses for
the Government themselves, some of whom were constabulary officers stationed at
Tagbilaran, stated that upon reading the article and seeing the author’s picture they
just laughed it off, "thinking that this fellow must be crazy." That was akin to our
own reaction, and there is little or no doubt that it exemplified the general effect
upon the minds of other readers of the article. It is certain that none would commit
a rash act upon a vague suggestion of a man who hanged himself and whom they
had never heard of before, while those who had known him, like the constabulary
officers above mentioned, were aware that the picture was a fake and thought the
subject was a crank.

Attacks more Serious, virulent and inflammatory than the one at bar, by persons
well known in politics and public life and having influence and large following, have
frequently appeared in the press or been launched on the platforms. What the
defendant did or said was very tame and mild by comparison. Nevertheless, those
critics have not been brought to court; and it is to the everlasting credit of the
administration and, in the long run, for the good of the Government, that the parties
reviled and the prosecutors have adopted a tolerant attitude. A well-known author
on criminal law quoting classical writers on the same subject has truly said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Yet while such is no doubt the law, prosecutions of this class have recently fallen, in
England as well as in the United States, for several reasons, into disuse. In the first
place, it is now generally felt that unless criticism be permitted to penetrate even to
the foundations of government, revolution rather than reform may result. Time, says
Bacon, is the greatest of destructives; and truth is to be constantly employed in
repairing the breaches which time makes. The wise conservative, therefore, is often
apparently the most destructive radical; as he is the most prudent repairer who,
when the piers of a bridge are weakened by a storm, advices that the work of
reconstruction should begin at the foundation. To prevent the application of
revolutionary criticism to government is of all modes of government the most
revolutionary. And closely allied with this position is another, that among countries
used to freedom libels only begin to bring the state into contempt when they are
prosecuted by the state as contemptuous. The sedition laws, for instance, were
among the Chief causes of the overthrow of the administration of John Adams; and
their repeal one of the chief causes of the popularity of that of Jefferson. If,
however, seditious libels are to be prosecuted, it is well to keep in mind the noble
words of princes from whose edicts the English common law, imbued as it is in so
many other respects with the spirit of freedom, has much, in reference to the law of
libel, to learn: ’Imppp. Theodosius, Arcarius et Honorius, A.A.A. Rufino P. P. Si quis
modestiae nescius et pudoris ignarus improbo petulantique maledicto nomina nostra
crediderit lacessenda, ac temulentia turbulentus obtrectator temporum nostrorum
fuerit, eum poenae nolumus subiugari neque durum aliquid nec asperum sustinere,
quoniam, si ex levitate processerit, contemnedum est, si ex insania, miseratione
dignissimum, si ab injuria, remittendum.’" (2 Wharton’s Criminal Law Section 1947.)

In somewhat parallel vein is the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes, joined in by Mr.
Justice Brandeis, in U. S. v. Abrams, 250 U. S., 621, 629. Said Justice Holmes: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you

have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all
your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.
To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent,
as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole
heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as
all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation
upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part
of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check
the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death,
unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country. I regret that I cannot put into more impressive words my belief that in their
conviction upon this indictment the defendants were deprived of their rights under
the Constitution of the United States."cralaw virtua1aw library

Moreover, the subject of this prosecution does not reveal personal malice or hatred.
Except for the "Juez de Cuchillo" item which, like words coming from a babe’s
mouth, did not have the weight or chance to sway the listeners, the article was but a
statement of grievances against official abuses and misgovernment that already
were of common knowledge and which more influential and responsible speakers
and writers had denounced in terms and ways more dangerous and revolutionary.

Paras, C.J. and Feria, J. concur.

CASE #11:

[G.R. No. 36278. October 26, 1932.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRISANTO

EVANGELISTA, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

Vicente Sotto for Appellants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. COMMUNIST PARTY; SEDITION AND REBELLION; PURPOSE OF THE

ASSOCIATION. — Under the law of the Philippine Islands, the association formed by
the appellants, Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas, is clearly illegal. Article 188 of the
Penal Code, as substituted by article 24 of the Royal Decree of September 12, 1897
(Alcubilla, Diccionario de Administracion, Apendice de 1897, p. 454), says that illegal
associations are those the object of which is against public morals, to commit some
crime, or to attack the fundamental basis of the social order or alter the regularity of
its functions. The purpose of such association is to incite class struggle and to
overthrow the present government by peaceful means or by armed revolution;
therefore the purpose of such association is to alter the social order and to commit
the crimes of rebellion and sedition. An association having such an object must
necessarily be illegal. (Decision of October 8, 1884, of the Supreme Court of Spain,
7 Hidalgo, Cod. Pen., 531, 532.)

2. ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — The trial court imposed the penalty of confinamiento for the
period of eight years and one day, as provided by paragraph 5, article 190 of the old
Penal Code, as substituted by article 26 of the Royal Decree of September 12, 1897,
in connection with articles 28 and 114 of the same Code. This was no error because
the act took place under the sanction of the old Code and the penalty of
confinamiento therein provided for, is lighter than that provided by the new Code in
its article 147, which is prision correccional and arresto mayor and fine.

DECISION

OSTRAND, J.:

Crisanto Evangelista, Jacinto G. Manahan, Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P. Balgos,

Enrique Torrente, Urbano Arcega, Catalino Monroy, Francisco Rafael, Sotero Senson,
Remigio Tolentino, Dominador B. Reyes, Emilio S. Juan, Alberto Santos, Juan
Lagman, Andres Santiago, Angel Mesina, Felipe Cruz, Maximo M. Gutierrez,
Dominador J. Ambrosio, Cenon Lacanienta, Mateo del Castillo, Norberto Nabong,
Sixto Estrada, Augusto David, Doroteo Cahumban, Jose Ilagan, and Liboro Natividad
were accused in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila of a crime against
the fundamental laws of the State, it being alleged in the information as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 30th day of May, 1931, and for some time prior thereto, the
above named accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affiliate to, compose
and become members of, the so-called Communist Party of the Philippines (Partido
Komunista sa Pilipinas), an illegal association, whose principal purposes and objects
are to bring about, by the use of force, the downfall of the present form of
government and establish of Russia and run by those affiliated to and in sympathy
with said association; to incite a revolt of the laboring class, advocating and urging
struggle between said laboring class and the so-called capitalists, and other similar
objects tending to combat the fundamental basis of the present social order and
alter the regularity of its functions and to the commission of violations of the
existing laws, which above-mentioned association was formed and organized without
the legal authorities having been informed of its aforesaid objects and purposes as
well as of the by-laws thereof; and that at the time and place hereinabove
mentioned, in the furtherance of their conspiracy and in utter disregard of the notice
or warning given by the authorities that they could not hold any meeting anywhere,
the said accused assembled, gathered and congregated under the name and
auspices of the Katipunan ñg mga Anak pawis sa Pilipinas (Association of the Sons of
the Sweat of the Philippine Islands), another association having the same illegal
aims and purposes as the said Communist Party of the Philippines, at El Retoño
Building, in said City of Manila."
cralaw virtua1aw library

After trial the court below convicted the said accused, with the exception of Norberto
Nabong, Sixto Estrada, Augusto David, Doroteo Cahumban, Jose Ilagan, Liboro
Natividad, and Mateo del Castillo, who were acquitted.

Thereafter the convicted accused appealed to this court. The accused were charged
with the crime of illegal association in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila in that on or about the 30th day of May, 1931, and for some time prior
thereto, the said accused affiliated to, and became members of, the so-called
Communist Party of the Philippines whose principal purposes and object were to
bring about by force the downfall of the present form of government and establish in
its place another patterned after the Soviet Government of Russian, and to incite a
revolt of the laboring class.

After trial the court below convicted the said accused, with the exception of Norberto
Nabong, Sixto Estrada, Augusto David, Doroteo Cahumban, Jose Ilagan, Liboro
Natividad, and Mateo del Castillo, who were acquitted.

It appears that the appellants, Evangelista, Manahan, Capadocia, Torrente, Arcega,

Monroy, Rafael, Senson, Tolentino, Reyes, San Juan, Santos, Lagman, Santiago,
Mesina, Cruz, Gutierrez, and Ambrosio, presented themselves as candidates of the
Communist Party for different offices — insular, provincial and municipal — in the
last elections; that the accused Mariano P. Balgos, Cenon Lacanienta and some of
those who campaigned for their candidacies as members of the Communist Party,
delivered speeches at several meetings of the Communist Party, advocating the
ideas and principles of the said Communist Party and urging the laborers to join it.

It also appears that the appellant Enrique Torrente appears in the newspaper known
as Titis, an organ of the Communist Party, as the editor thereof.

The appellants have not denied being members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines; on the contrary, Crisanto Evangelista admitted expressly at the trial that
the he was affiliated to the said party. As witness for the defense, he testified that
the objects and purposes of the Communist Party of the Philippines are set out in its
constitution and by-laws which purposes and objects, according to said constitution
and by-laws, are to overthrow the present form of government by any means
necessary, especially armed revolution.

The appellant, Catalino Monroy, admitted having gone to Russia as delegate of the
Kapisanan nang mga Anak pawis to the Red International Labor Union Congress.

From the foregoing it is clear that the twenty appellants herein are or were members
of the Communist Party of the Philippines, for all of them, with the exception of
Balgos and Lacanienta, presented themselves as candidates in the last general
elections as communists, and said Balgos and Lacanienta, as well as many of those
mentioned, delivered speeches at several meetings held under the auspices of the
said Communist Party, advocating communism and urging the laborers to affiliate to
the said party. If any one of these appellants were not a member of the Communist
Party, it would have been very easy for him to deny it, but no one has so done.

The principal defense set up by the appellants is that the Communist Party of the
Philippines is not an illegal association in that it preaches only a social but not an
armed revolution, but a mere reading of the constitution of the Communist Party will
show that such a pretense is obviously useless. Neither is there any merit in the
appellants’ argument that communist is not prohibited in any part of the civilized
world. And as to the validity of the law prohibiting communism, the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld the law of California prohibiting the display of the
communist red flag as a sign inciting sedition and disorderly opposition to the
government.

Under the law of the Philippine Islands, the association formed by the appellants is
clearly illegal. Article 188 of the Penal Code, as substituted by article 24 of the Royal
Decree of September 12, 1897 (Alcubilla, Diccionario de Administracion, Apendice de
1897, p. 454), says that illegal associations are those the object of which is against
public morals, to commit some crime, or to attack the fundamental basis of the
social order or alter the regularity of its functions. Now, according to appellant
Crisanto Evangelista and the constitution and by-laws of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, the purpose of the party is to incite class struggle and to overthrow the
present government by peaceful means or by armed revolution; therefore the
purpose of the party is to alter the social order and to commit the crimes of rebellion
and sedition. An association having such an object must necessarily be illegal
(decision of Oct. 8, 1884, of the Supreme court of Spain, 7 Hidalgo, Cod. Pen., 531-
532.) The report submitted by Secretary Hughes to the Senate of the United States,
as well as that made by Hamilton Fish, after an investigation of communism, leads
to the same conclusion, namely, that force and violence are inseparable from
communist programs.

The last point made by the appellants is relative to the penalty imposed. The trial
court imposed the penalty of confinamiento for the period of eight years and one
day, as provided by paragraph 5, article 190 of the old Penal Code, as substituted by
article 26 of the Royal Decree of September 12, 1897, in connection with articles 28
and 114 of the same Code. The appellants contend that this is erroneous because
the Revised Penal Code has eliminated this kind of penalty. But there is no merit in
this argument, because the act took place under the sanction of the old Code, and
the penalty of confinamiento, therein provided for, is lighter than that provided by
the new Code in its article 147, which is prision correccional and arresto mayor and
fine.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the twenty
defendants. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers and Imperial, JJ.,

concur.

CASE #12:

[G.R. No. 1513. February 12, 1904. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. CASIANO

SADIAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Juan Sumulong, for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; FORMATION AND SECRET POLITICAL SOCIETY. — The accused,

together with several others, organized a secret political society having for its
purpose the promotion of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and induced others to join the society: Held, that the facts
constitute the offense defined and purchased by section 9 of Act No. 292.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :
The provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte filed an information in the Court of First Instance
of that province, charging Casiano Sadian, Monico Dada, Roman Dacpo, Basilio
Sanchez, and Damian Tabonan with having formed a secret political society, in the
during the latter part of June and early in July, 1903, they met together with others
in the forests of some of the barrios of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, for the
purpose of forming a secret political society entitled "Kanayonan," the purpose of
which was to obtain the independence of the Philippines by means of insurrection,
treason, and rebellion against the Government of the United States of America in
these Islands, this against the provisions of Act No. 292 of the Civil Commission.

The trial having commenced, Ariston Umayan under oath testified that on Sunday,
July 5, 1903, upon going to a house belonging to a brother of his in the barrio called
Pias, Casiano Sadian, Sergio Sadang, and Sergio Sancali came to the house, and
that upon the invitation of Sadang they all went out into a cane field; that shortly
after Casiano Sadian arrived and asked the witness if he desired to join them, and
he, being afraid, said that he did. Whereupon, in proof of his affiliation, Casiano
made an incision in his forearm and then wrote the name of the witness with his
own blood; the witness making his cross under his name; that Sadian then told him
that he was to defend his mother country and fight the Americans; that on this
occasion Sergio Sadang and the five accused were present, and that they
surrounded him, all armed with clubs; that on the following day, the 6th, they took
him into the Cabuit forest, and that shortly after Gavino Umayam arrived in charge
of Valentin Butardo, and that they made a similar incision in his arm, he being
surrounded by the accused, who were at that time armed with bolos and clubs; that
after this operation they went with the witness to Gavino’s hut, and while they were
eating the latter told the witness in private to go and report the facts to the
Constabulary stationed at Badoc, which he did. This witness also testified that
Valentin Butardo, as well as Casiano, asked him if he wanted to fight the Americans,
and that he, being afraid, said that he did; that the leader of them was Sergio
Sadang.

Valentin Butardo testified under oath that the defendants had joined the society or
party organized by him and his brother Canuto, and that they did this voluntarily; he
identified the documents, translations of which appear in the record — the originals
are in other cases. The witness stated that he sought out the accused to induced
them to join his party in preparation for the coming presidential elections, and made
the incision in their arms to bind the obligation so that they should not abandon him
on election day, but denied that he with the others compelled Ariston Umayam and
his brother to join the party, and stated that their names were not on the list, that
they had not taken the oath, and that it was not true that they had gone through
the ceremony of incision.

Sergio Sadang testified under oath that Valentin Butardo was the one who made the
incision in the arm of Areston Umayam when the latter took the oath as a member
of the party which they had organized, but immediately afterwards testified that
Casiano Sadian was the one who made the incision in Umayam’s arm while he, the
witness, but not the other accused, was present. Sergio Sancali testified that he did
not know whether Areston Umayam was a member of said party, and only knew by
hearsay that the accused were members of it.

The facts upon which the accusations are based, and which have been established
by the testimony of a number of witnesses, constitute the crime defined and
punished by section 9 of Act No. 292, dated November 4, 1901. The evidence plainly
shows that Casiano Sadian, with Valentin Butardo, Sergio Sadang, and others,
organized a secret political society for the purpose of fomenting rebellion against the
constituted government of these Islands and to obtain the independence of the
Islands by means of revolution and war, and that with this purpose in view they
endeavored to induce others to join the party and to increase the number of
members, making incisions in their arms and obliging them to take an oath to
defend the country and to fight against the Americans. These acts, fully established
by the evidence, fall within the provisions of section 9 of the Act.

The facts related do not constitute the crime of conspiracy defined and punished in
section 4 of the same Act, as no act of conspiracy falling within the section was
committed by the defendants.

Casiano Sadian, the teniente of the barrio of Gaang, plead not guilty and testified
that Areston Umayam’s statements were not true; that he was not present at the
time to which the witness referred; that he made the incision in the arm of the
witness Valentin Butardo as a sign of fraternity, believing that their purpose in
connection with the election of a president was a proper one, and that several other
persons went through the ceremony of incision, among them the other accused; that
at the time this ceremony was performed an oath was taken to defend the mother
country with the last drop of blood; he denied that he had accompanied Valentin
Butardo in making incisions in the arms of other persons, and that the only persons
who had done this by force and violence were Valentin Butardo, Sergio Sadang, Juan
Navarro, and Ruperto Madamba.

Roman Tabaoan, Roman Dacpo, Monico Dado, and Basilio Sanchez testified that at
the instance of Valentin Butardo they joined the party which he and others had
formed, and that for this purpose they took an oath binding themselves to defend
the country with their lives, but denied having been present when the ceremony of
incision was performed on Ariston Umayam, and that they were unaware that this
ceremony was peculiar to the revolutionists. These four defendants did not appeal
from the judgment of the court below, and therefore as to them the decision of the
court is final, and this appeal is limited to the appellant, Casiano Sadian.

Notwithstanding the denial of the accused Sadian, the evidence of his guilt is more
than sufficient. It shows that she was one of the men who organized the secret
political society entitled "Kanayonan," and that he was one of those actively engaged
in obtaining proselytes among his fellow-townsmen, availing himself of his office as
teniente of the barrio and availing himself of the ignorance of his neighbors. For the
purpose of organizing the society he acted with criminal intent, with full knowledge
and the determined purpose of fomenting a rebellion against the government in
these Islands, and consequently he is subject to the personal and pecuniary penalty
established by section 9 of the Act No. 292.

Therefore, for the reason stated, we are of the opinion that the judgment appealed
must be reversed in so far as it concerns Casiano Sadian, and that latter must be
convicted and condemned to one year’s imprisonment and to pay a penalty of 2,000
insular pesos, and in case of insolvency to suffer imprisonment at the rate of one
day for each 2 1/2 pesos which he may be unable to pay, the subsidiary
imprisonment, however, in no case to exceed the third part of the period of the
principal penalty, in accordance with the provisions of article 50 of the Penal Code.
He is also condemned to the payment of one-fifth of the costs of both instances. The
case will in due time remanded with a certified copy of this decision and of the
judgment to be entered hereon. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard, Mapa, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.

CASE #14:

EN BANC

G.R. No. 8722           September 10, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BUENAVENTURA

BALCORTA, Defendant-Appellant.

Herrero, Gabaldon and Masigan, by Basilio Aromin for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance

of Nueva Ecija, sentencing the defendant, Buenaventura Balcorta,
to three years six months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, and a fine of 625 pesetas, together with the
accessory penalties provided by law.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is alleged that the court does not sustain the guilt of the
appellant. The record, however, clearly shows that the accused
entered a private house, uninvited, where services of the
Methodist Episcopal Church were being conducted by between ten
and twenty persons, and threatened the assemblage with a club,
thereby interrupting of disturbing the divine service. The
punishment meted out to the defendant by the lower court is that
provided for in article 223 of the Penal Code which reads as
follows:

The penalty of prision correccional  in its medium and maximum

degrees and a fine of not less than 625 and not more than
6,250 pesetas  shall be imposed upon any person who, by means
of threats violence, or other equivalent compulsion, shall force
some other person to perform an act of worship or prevent him
from performing such act.

This conclusion of law is assigned as error, it being insisted that

the offense falls under paragraph 1 of article 571, which reads: chanrobles virtual law library
The penalties of arresto  from one to ten days and a fine of from
fifteen to one hundred and twenty-five pesetas  shall be imposed
upon:

1. Any person who shall disturb or interrupt any ceremony of a

religious character in any manner not failing within the provisions
of section 3, chapter 2, title 2 of book 2 of this code.

The twenty-first article of the Spanish constitution of 1869

provided for a state religion, but also guaranteed the privilege of
freely practicing, both in public and private, the forms and
ceremonies of other sects, subject only to the restrictions
imposed by general law and morality. Under this constitution of
Penal Code of Spain, now in effect, was promulgated in 1870. As
a consequence of the removal of all restrictions upon the exercise
of religious beliefs, the Penal Code of Spain, enacted in 1870, in
its chapter on crimes against religion, is wholly impersonal. In
none of its articles (Nos. 236 to 241) is any particular religion
mentioned, but offense against religion, as such, are defined and
penalized. The heading of the chapter is "Crimes relative to the
free exercise of religion ( los cultos)."
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The constitution of 1876, in Spain, which is still in force, after

providing for a state religion, guaranteed that no one in Spanish
territory would be molested for his religious opinions, nor for
observing the forms of his faith, provided due respect were
shown for Christian morals. By this same article, however, only
the followers of the state religion could engage in public
ceremonies or other manifestations. It will be noted that this
article materially modified article 21 of the former constitution.
While everyone could still worship God in his own manner, it was
no longer permissible for cults other than the state religion to
demonstrate their religious beliefs in public.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It was under this constitution that the Penal Code for the
Philippine Islands was promulgated in 1884. As a consequence its
provisions are considerably different from those of the Spanish
Penal Code. Of the eight articles defining and penalizing "Crimes
against religion and worship" (which is the title of the chapter),
six refer specially and solely to crimes against the state religion.
The only crime specifically defined against religious other than
that of the state is for disturbing, by means of violence, threats,
etc., their ceremonies when conducted in cemeteries or other
places were such ceremonies may be lawfully authorized. (Art.
225.)chanrobles virtual law library

The change of sovereignty and the enactment of the fourteenth

paragraph of section 5 of the Philippine Bill caused the complete
separation of church and state, and the abolition of all special
privileges and all restrictions theretofore conferred or imposed
upon any particular religious sect. All became equal in the eyes of
the law, and those articles of the Penal Code defining special
crimes against that denomination which, under the former
sovereign, was the state religion, as well as article 225, defining a
crime against all others than that religion, necessarily became
inoperative. Only those articles of the Penal Code which refer to
all religious equally and without distinction can now be considered
as in effect. They appear to be two in number, viz, article 223
and 571.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Let us first examine article 223, from which, neither by the

specific language used nor by implication, can it be inferred that
nay particular religious doctrine was in the minds of the code
makers. What was the object and purpose of this section? It will
be remembered that at the time this article became law, all faiths
not opposed to Christian morals were, under the constitution of
Spain, tolerated. According to the terms of the constitution,
everyone had the right to worship his Maker in his own manner;
and as a corollary no one could be compelled to indorse a
particular creed. Were it lawful to prevent the one or exact the
other, the terms of the constitution would have become a dead
letter. As is usual with constitutions, no penalty was attached to
this article. It remained for the legislature in the course of its
ordinary legislation to provide for its enforcement. In order to
instil respect for this constitutional provision, it was necessary to
provide a punishment for anyone who sought to interfere with the
religious beliefs of his fellow citizens. A glance at the other
articles of the Penal Code in the chapter we are discussing shows
that none of the crimes defined and punished therein would
respond to a state of facts where both the will and conscience of
a human being were being tampered with upon the subject of
religion. The provisions of article 223 were relied upon to prevent
such practices. The article says that "the penalty . . . shall be
imposed upon any person who . . . shall force some other person
to perform an act of worship . . ." In other words, any attempt,
by coercive methods, to induce a person to worship God in a
manner different from or to an extent greater than that person
desired, constituted an abridgment of his constitutional right to
believe or disbelieve, to regard or disregard the outer forms of a
sect, even though he were a member of that sect. Whatever may
have been the inducement for the passage of this article of the
code, certainly it is in the closest harmony with the principles of
government of the present sovereign, one of which is the
greatest freedom of thought and speech consistent with public
order upon religious matters.  
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The concluding portion of the article is, "or prevent him from
performing such act." History has perhaps demonstrated that it is
a more common form of interference with freedom of religious
thought to prevent a person from worshiping the Supreme Being
according to the dictates of his own conscience than it is to force
him to go through the forms of a religious ceremony in which he
does not believe; but whether the one method or the other is
adopted, it remains interference with religious freedom, which is
incompatible with tolerance of all creeds as provided for in the
Spanish constitution. To prevent a person from performing acts of
devotion which he desires to perform for the sole reason that this
creed does not meet with the approval of him who prevents them
is as much as blow aimed at that constitutional right to religious
as is the first method of requiring a person to perform acts of
devotion against his will or conscience. Thus far the clause
extends. But does it also extend to acts which, while preventing a
person from performing an act of devotion, are not prompted by
religious intolerance but from some other motive? It must be
remembered that the great underlying purpose of this article is to
prevent and punish religious intolerance. There is no reason for
presuming that the code makers had in view mere disturbances
of religious worship, since these offenses are provided for in other
articles of the same chapter. Even less is it to be presumed that
they had in mind offenses which, while perhaps seriously
disturbing or preventing (for the time) religious services, were
committed with some other object in view. We are of the opinion
that an essential element of the crime defined and penalized
under this article is the intent of the guilty person to coercively
the religious beliefs of another person.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The offense defined and punished by article 571, paragraph 1, of
the Penal Code falls under the classification of "Misdemeanors
against the public order." Due to the fact that all the articles in
section 3, chapter 2, of book 2 of the code, with the exception of
article 223 have become inoperative, all offenses against religious
cults which do not amount to an attempt to control the
conscience of persons must now fall within the provisions of this
article. While the punishment therein provided may be, in some
instances, not sufficient, we are of the opinion that, it together
with those provided for "Threats and coercion," will serve as a
sufficient deterrent, and instil a wholesome respect for the
decorum and dignity of an assemblage gathered for religious
devotion. We find it much easier to arrive at this conclusion after
comparing this penalty with those provided in the jurisdiction of
that country from whence came the clause of the Philippine Bill
which insures to all religious orders in this country equal
protection. Mere disturbances of religious worship in the United
States are generally classified as misdemeanors only. The
increased severity of the punishments affixed to such penalties
under the Penal Code is doubtless due to the long religious
training of the nation which enacted the law and its recognition of
a particular faith as a state religion.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, the offense of the defendant falls within the provisions of

article 223 or of article 571. The record fails to disclose the
purpose of the defendant in committing the acts complained of. It
is true that it is shown that the defendant was of the Aglipayan
faith, while the members of the congregation were of a different
sect, but none of the witnesses for the prosecution state that the
defendant made any comment whatever upon religion. He simply
treatened to assault them with a sick he was carrying if they did
not stop the services. Under the circumstances, and considering
that it is not proven that religious hatred prompted the defendant
to act as he did, his offense appears to be simply that of
disturbing or interrupting the religious services. An essential
element of the crime provided for in article 223 was not proved
and the court erred in finding him guilty of the crime therein
defined.  
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It is further alleged that the people thus dispersed by the

defendant were not holding religious services, as they were
simply reading some verses out of the Bible. We have been
unable to find any provision of law which requires religious
services to be conducted in approved orthodox style in order to
merit its protection against interference and disturbances. As
stated in Hull vs. State (120 Ind., 153):

It makes no difference that the method of worship of those

assembled was singular or uncommon. The protection of the
statute is extended to all, irrespective of creed, opinion, or mode
of worship.  
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Persons who meet for the purpose of religious worship, by any

method which is not indecent and unlawful, have a right to do so
without being molested or disturbed.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is

reversed, and the defendant is sentenced to ten days
imprisonment [ arresto menor], and a fine of P20, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the
principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs of the cause.
So ordered.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano,  C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson,  JJ.,  concur.

Moreland, J.,  concurs in the result.