CHAPTER | INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW International Law International law has been defined as the “rules and principles of general application dealing with the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.” It includes not only questions of right between nations but also questions concerning “the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public, done within the dominions of another nation.” International law is therefore that branch of law that deals with the relationship of states as well as the relationship of individuals of different states. It has a public character when international subjects are involved and a private character when individuals, domestic laws, or local events intermingle with each other necessitating a determination of the applicable law. Thus, international law has both a public side as well as a private side to it. An example of public international law is when two or more countries have territorial disputes that are governed by international treaties or conventions. For private international law, it usually comes into play when the laws of State A are different with the laws of State B, or when there is an invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 'Section 101 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987). *Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113.— 2 CONFLICT OF LAWS Branches of International Law International law has two branches: 1, Public international law ~ governs the relationship op states and international entities. law — comprehends laws regulating . Private international k p Y > private jnteractions across national frontiers.’ It deal, with conflict of laws among the laws of two or more States and necessitates a determination of which municipal lay applies to a case. The objective is the harmonization of the laws of several states whenever a conflicts of law situation exists. Distinctions between Public and Private International Law As to source, public international law is based on international] conventions, international custom, the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the varioug nations.‘ Private international law, on the other hand, is based on domestic and municipal laws, which includes the constitution and statutes adopted by individual countries. Public international law is the same for all states which is not necessarily the case with private international law. As to subjects, public international law has states and international organizations as subjects. On the other hand, private international law has individuals and corporations as subjects thereof. Abdullahi v. Pfizer 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) Facts: Pfizer had an experimental antibiotic, Trovan, which it administered to young patients in Nigeria without getting the informed consent of the children nor their guardians. Trovan had adverse side effects on the ——— Law am Secy i L., “Tnternational Law Defined,” in Benchbook on International definition pdt le Marie Amann, ed., 2014), available at www.asil.org/benchbook! ‘Article 38, STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW test patients as some died while others became blind, deaf, paralyzed, or brain-damaged. Abdullahi and other plaintiffs sued Pfizer under the Alien Tort Statute (‘ATS’) before a United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They alleged that Pfizer violated international law for non-consensual medical experimentation. Pfizer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under the ATS and on the basis of forum non conveniens. The district court granted the motion on the ground that plaintiffs failed to identify a source of international law that “provide[s] a proper predicate for jurisdiction under the ATS.” The court justified its decision on the ground that “[a] cause of action for Pfizer’s failure to get any consent, informed or otherwise, before performing medical experiments on the subject children would expand customary international law far beyond that contemplated by the ATS.” With respect to forum non conveniens, the court held that “plaintiffs had failed to submit specific evidence that the Nigerian judiciary would be biased against its own citizens in an action against Pfizer” and that “Nigeria was an adequate alternate forum.” Plaintiffs appealed. Issues: 1. Whether Pfizer violated international Jaw on non-consensual medical experimentation? 2. Whether Nigeria offers an adequate forum for the adjudication of plaintiffs’ claims? Held: 1. Yes, Pfizer violated international law on non-consensual medical experimentation. 2. No, Nigeria has not been shown to be an adequate forum for the adjudication of plaintiffs’ claims. ee * Turning now to this appeal, and remaining mindful of our obligation to proceed cautiously and self-consciously in this area, we determine whether the norm alleged: (1) is a norm of international character that States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation; (2) is defined with a specificity comparable to the 18th- century paradigms discussed in Sosa; and (3) is of mutual concern to States.CONFLICT OF LAWS A. The Prohibition of Nonconsensual Medica} Experimentation on Humans claims are premised on the » ATS i ‘ Appellants pe of customary international law yntation on non-consenting existence of ; Bie ical experime 0 e prohibiting medi, Srrormine whether this prohibition human subjec’®, - orsally accepted norm of customary ij ‘i fe examine the current state of internations! Tali consulting the sources identified sapere 38 of the Statute of the International Court of ty ae CICS Statute”), 20 which the United States and all members of the United Nations are parties. Article 38 identifies the authorities that provide ‘competent proof of the content of customary international law.” These sources consist of- (a) international conven' ions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (©) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; @_ ...judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. . The appellants ground their claims in four sources of international law that categorically forbid medical experimentation on non-consenting human jects: the Nuremberg Code, which states as its Flergacie : that “[tJhe voluntary consent of the human subj is absolutely essential”; (2) the World Medical Assi ae 8 Declaration of Helsinki, which sets forth ethical vrinciples to guide physicians world-wide and provides es les subjects should be volunteers and grant thei : a consent to participate in research; (3) they informed authored by the Council for International On Buidelines of Medical Services (‘CIOMS”), which pe uZAtions voluntary informed consent of [a] prog Tequire “the and (4) Article 7 of the International Coven subject”. on CivilINTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW and Political Rights (‘ICCPR”), which provides that “no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” x x x In sum, it was inappropriate for the district court to forego a more extensive examination of whether treaties, international agreements, or State practice have ripened the prohibition of nonconsensual medical experimentation on human subjects into a customary international law norm that is sufficiently (i) universal and obligatory, (ii) specific and definable, and (iii) of mutual concern, to permit courts to infer a cause of action under the ATS. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-35,124 S.Ct. 2739. We now proceed with such an examination. i, Universality The appellants must allege the violation of a norm of customary international law to which States universally subscribe. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732, 124 S.Ct. 2739; Vietnam Assn for Victims of Agent Orange, 517 F.3d at 117. The prohibition on nonconsensual medical experimentation on human beings meets this standard because, among other reasons, it is specific, focused and accepted by nations around the world without significant exception. The evolution of the prohibition into a norm of customary international law began with the war crimes trials at Nuremberg. The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France “acting in the interest of all the United Nations,” established the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) through entry into the London Agreement of August 8, 1945. According to the Charter, the IMT had the “power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed,” among other offenses, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The IMT tried 22 “major” Nazi war criminals leaving “lower-level” war criminals, including “[l]eading physicians...and leading German industrialists,” to beCONFLICT OF LAWS . . military tribunals nt trials oy eat her Ine thas (the U.S. military tribunals, was enacted in 1945 by the ry through which the ted joint-control over ied in aubsequent tri ue “under the aces authorized the creation . Control Council Law No. seni Allied Control Council, an authori London Agreement signatories any. Germ a st 1947, Military Tribunal 1, staffed by Pan iad 3 and prosecutors and conducted under American judges O' reles, promulgated the Nuremberg American procedural ment against fifteen. tribunal's final judgmen ft coe yore found guilty of war erimes and crimes i ing medical experiments sg nee as Aniag ie nnctiomecl eoeiments that the tribunal cited as a basis for their convictions were the testing of drugs for immunization against malaria, epidemic jaundice, typhus, smallpox, and cholera. Seven of the convicted doctors were sentenced to death and the remaining eight were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. The judgment concluded that “[mJanifestly human experiments under such conditions are contrary to the principles of the law of nations as they result from usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience.” The Code created as part of the tribunal’s judgment therefore emphasized as its first principle that “[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.” The American tribunal’s conclusion that action that contravened the Code’s first principle constituted a crime against humanity is a lucid indication of the international legal significance of the prohibition on nonconsensual medical experimentation. As Justices of the Supreme Court have recognized, “[t]he medical trials at Nuremberg in 1947 deeply impressed upon the world that experimentation with unknowing human subjects Bs ee legally unacceptable.” United States v, ‘anley, 8. 669, 687, 107 S, 550 (1987) » 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d In 1955, the draft Internati 995, tional Covenants on Human Rights was revised to add a second sentence to aeINTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW its prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The addition provided that “[i] n particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation involving risk, where such is not required by his state of physical or mental health.” The clause was later revised to offer the simpler and sweeping prohibition that “no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” ICCPR, supra, at art. 7. This prohibition became part of Article 7 of the ICCPR, which entered into force in 1976, and is legally binding on the more than 160 States-Parties that have ratified the convention without reservation to the provision. By its terms this prohibition is not limited to state actors; rather, it guarantees individuals the right to be free from nonconsensual medical experimentation by any entity— state actors, private actors, or state and private actors behaving in concert. Its status as a norm that states conceive as legally binding—and therefore part of customary international law—is confirmed by Article 2 of the accord, which requires that “[e]ach State Party...undertake[] to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” ICCPR art. 2(1). The international community’s recognition in the ICCPR of its obligation to protect humans against nonconsensual medical experimentation, regardless of the source of the action, is powerful evidence of the prohibition’s place in customary international law. In 1964, the World Medical Association adopted the Declaration of Helsinki, which enunciated standards for obtaining informed consent from human subjects. It provided that in clinical research combined with professional care, “[i]f at all possible, consistent with patient psychology, the doctor should obtain the patient’s freely given consent after the patient has been given a full explanation,” and that non-therapeutic clinical research on a person “cannot be undertaken without his free consent, after he has been fully informed.” World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Helsinki: Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association, art. III(8a), G.A. Res.CONFLICT OF LAWS dcentral.nih.gov/picrendey. laratio: sqeipr6102 blob-type=pat, The, ecrortion has fegirartid=181 nded five times. The cis volann ent since been ammrovides that “subjects must be volunteer we ans the ee d_ inform fae ra, at art. 20. ation Declaration of oa oy research on human beings, also requires a ect must be adequately informed of the each potential sub) ticipated benefits and potential risks aims, eos a oP comfort it may entail and that of tho study, af the subject’s freely-given informeg hers “obtain subje feat consent, preferably in writing. Id. at art. ation itself is non-binding, i ene to oe ered States to regulate human = 7 ti n, often by incorporating its informeq cleans irement into domestic laws or regulations, Caarently, the laws and regulations of at least eighty-four aes including the United States, require the informed consent of human subjects in medical research, That this conduct has been the subject of domestic legislation is not, of course, in and of itself proof of a norm. However, the incorporation of this norm into the laws of this country and this host of others is a Powerful indication of the international acceptance of this norm as a binding legal obligation, where, as here, states have shown that the norm is of mutual concern by including it in a variety of international accords. e (1964). http:/jwww.pubm: This history illustrates that from its origins with the trial of the Nazi doctors at Nuremburg through its evolution in international conventions, agreements, declarations, and domestic laws and regulations, the norm prohibiting nonconsensual medical experimentation on human subjects has become firmly embedded and has secured universal acceptance in the community of nations. Unlike our dissenting colleague’s customary international law analysis, which essentially rests on the mistaken assumption that ratified international treaties are the only valid sources of customary international law for ATS purposes, see Dissent at 200-02, we reach this conclusion as a result of our review of the multiplicity of Sources—including international conventions, whetherINTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW general or particular, and international custom as identified through international agreements, declarations and a consistent pattern of action by national law-making authorities—that our precedent requires us to examine for the purpose of determining the existence of a norm of customary international law. ii, Specificity Sosa requires that we recognize causes of action only to enforce those customary international law norms that are no “less definite [in] content...than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732, 124 S.Ct. 2789. The norm prohibiting nonconsensual medical experimentation on human subjects meets this requirement. The Nuremberg Code, Article 7 of the ICCPR, the Declaration of Helsinki, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, the 2001 Clinical Trial Directive, and the domestic laws of at least eighty-four States all uniformly and unmistakably prohibit medical experiments on human beings without their consent, thereby providing concrete content for the norm. iii. Mutual Concern As we have seen, States throughout the world have entered into two express and binding international agreements prohibiting nonconsensual medical experimentation: the ICCPR and the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. The entry of over 160 States into these agreements and the European Union's passage of the 2001 Clinical Trial Directive demonstrates that States have not only acted independently to outlaw large-scale, non-consensual drug testing on humans, but they have also acted in concert to do so. In other words, acting out of a sense of mutual concern, “the nations [of the world] have made it their business, both through international accords and unilateral action,” to demonstrate their intention to eliminate conduct of the type alleged in the complaints.CONFLICT OF LAWS reasons, we hold that the appellants hay. sufficient to state & cause of action under the pled ia olation of the norm of customary internationg} ha for jpiting medical experimentation on human law pro ‘thout their consent. In such an instance, tg subjects Wither i vor plaintiffs’ claims. The district coun jun oan “hat the norm existed, but concluded that eee izing the norm was legally ingle source recogn!) ’ because no sn syed States and created a Private causg in jon, i infer such a right under the ATs, of aoe i ee ea it simultaneously held that ee a subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ diame. Under Sosa, this approach was not correct. Sosa makes clear that the critical inquiry 1s dated al variety of sources that we are required to consult oan a a customary international law norm that is sufficiently universally accepted, and obligatory for courts to ion to enforce the norm. Nothing is inquiry can be halted if some al law giving rise to the norm For these specific, e recognize a cause of actio in Sosa suggests that thi of the sources of internation: nist r are found not to be binding or not to explicitly authorize a cause of action. Il. Forum Non Conveniens As an alternative to dismissal for failure to state a claim under the ATS, the district court dismissed the actions on the ground of forum non conveniens. Appellants raised this issue on appeal. Ordinarily, we review a forum non conveniens dismissal for abuse of discretion. Although we are not now called upon definitively to review the district court’s application of forum non conveniens, in view of the frequency with which this issue has arisen and remained unsettled in this case, we offer additional guidance to assist the parties and the district court. The three-step analysis set forth in Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71-75 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc), applies. In this litigation, the second step of the analysis, which requires the district court to consider the adequacy of the alternative forum, is pivotal. Dismissal is not appropriate if an adequate and presently available alternative forum does not exist.INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW u A forum in which defendants are amenable to service of process and which permits litigation of the dispute is generally adequate. Such a forum may nevertheless be inadequate if it does not permit the reasonably prompt adjudication of a dispute, if the forum is not presently available, or if the forum provides a remedy so clearly unsatisfactory or inadequate that it is tantamount to no remedy at all. ‘The defendant bears the burden of establishing that a presently available and adequate alternative forum exists, and that the balance of private and public interest factors tilts heavily in favor of the alternative forum. Absent a showing of inadequacy by a plaintiff, “considerations of comity preclude a court from adversely judging the quality of a foreign justice system.” Accordingly, while the plaintiff bears the initial burden of producing evidence of corruption, delay or lack of due process in the foreign forum, the defendant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the adequacy of the forum. Foreign Element The most important component of a conflicts of law problem is the presence of a foreign element. A foreign element is anything which is not domestic and has a foreign component to it. It can be a foreigner, a foreign corporation, an incident happening in a foreign country, or a foreign law chosen by the parties. Without a foreign element, the case is only a domestic problem with no conflicts dimension. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals’ explained the concept of foreign element, thus: A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a foreign element. The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception. °G.R. No. 122191, October 8, 1998,12 CONFLICT OF LAWS ‘The forms in which this foreign element may appear many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that o a contract is an alien or hag g at one of the parties to I ot domicile, or that a contract between nationals of ong State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form, In a case where two parties enter into if lease contract for property located locally, it can be said that this can only be a loca dispute. However, when two parties enter into a sales agreement in an online purchase from a merchant located Nearin this can characterized as involving a foreign element. If a dispute later a arises between the parties, the laws of the state of the merchany of the buyer, or that stipulated in the sales agreement become, pertinent and there will be a need to harmonize these laws determine which one is applicable. From this standpoint, the foreign element can be the foreign law chosen by the parties or it coulq be that where the merchant operates, or it can also be the law of the nationality, or the law of the place of business, of the merchant, There is now a question as to the applicable Jaw as several foreign laws are implicated. Phases in Conflicts Resolution There are three phases in the resolution of a conflicts of law problem. These phases are jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction concerns the authority of a court of law to take cognizance of a case, choice of law refers to the applicable law to the problem, and recognition and enforcement concerns the enforcement of foreign laws and judgments in another jurisdiction. These phases are important for purposes of determining the applicable theories of law as well as the defenses available thereto. These three phases are separate from each other and a defense in one phase is not a defense in other phases. For example, the doctrines of lex loci celebrationis and lex loci contractus are not grounds to question the jurisdiction of the court. In like manner, the defense of forum non conveniens cannot be used as @ defense to choice of law disputes. Thus, it is important to analyze the real issues in a conflicts problem for the purpose of utilizing the appropriate approach to a contractual dispute. Otherwise, the use of certain theories in a conflicts situation may be deemed improper.INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW Hasegawa v. Kitamura G.R. No, 149177, November 23, 2007 Facts: Petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (“Nippon”) entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (“ICA”) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provided that respondent shall extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1, 1999. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager in various projects in the Philippines. On February 28, 2000, petitioner’s general manager, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, informed respondent that the company would no longer be renewing his ICA and that his services would be utilized only until March 31, 2000. Nippon insisted that respondent’s contract was for a fixed term that had already expired. Respondent subsequently sued _ petitioners for specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the claim for improper pre-termination of respondent’s ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, a decision which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (“CA”). The CA held that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. The CA upheld the lower court’s application of the principle of lex loci solutionis. Issue: Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most significant relationship rule, or forum non conveniens? Held: No. They are improper grounds for questioning the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. 13conFLICT OF LAWS judicial resolution op ive phases are tabs consecutive phase three d recognition ang oblemss choice of law, an meat Comeraing Hh ete Where can . ine “questions (oy will the court apply? are the nitiated? (2) Which apa aan oon litigation be i sulting ju ne oice of law and (3) W ically, jurisdiction and Ge oe vhethon me 2 aneencents, Jurisdiction consi two distinct con¢ . i ; choice of to 1 to this state; ch ir to a lication of Da eo he fi oororagestion whether the app) fa law asks the furt i ine the merits of the case P ich will determine the merits of the cs substantive ieee ie power to exercise Jurisdiction ped cl ily giveastate constitutional uthort docs oma awe, While jurisdiction and the choice ¢r to apply forum law. the lex fori will often coinci e minimum contacts i wil nn coincide, the | C1 fe do not always provide the necessary significant for one ion of whether the law ther. The question of whet sfa cate can be applied toa transaction is different fran ofas the question of whether the courts of that state have < A jurisdiction to enter a judgment. ; is first phase is at issue: . In this case, only the : Pees Jurisdiction, however, has Various aspects, lidly exercise its power to adju cate a For a court to validly Hndicate a i jurisdiction over th itroversy, it must have juris ari petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court’s Jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction. 4. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial Proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes an, organizes the court, To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims, in the j conflicts involved: juris enforcement of jINTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 5. In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most significant relationship rule. 6. The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound, Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed. It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved. 7. Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. They determine which state’s law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice- of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for. 16CONFLICT OF LAWS i tion +0 + premature invocal of petitioners a fact that they have between the laws of ining which law should nflict of laws situation of laws rules. Also, invoked to provide the existence of i ane ours. exiat 8 conf Eh lication of the confi Dera reer foreign country 18 w of & D iene Jes for the solution of a case, such law must be pleaded and proved. 9, It should be noted that when a conflicts case, i i i nt, is brought before a court one involving a foreign eleme is ee altrnetinen anne i oe ater een oft (2) dismiss the case ener because of lack of jurisdiction or re fo assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume iar i ion over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) he case and take into account or assume jurisdiction over t apply the law of some other State or States. The courts power to hear cases and controversies. 1S derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns. 10. Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction, Third, the propriety of dismissing a case paced eee requires a factual determination; Smears principle is more properly considered with i Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law ’ i : the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed y respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners toINTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss, Steps in Determining Applicable Law Characterization. This involves identification of the issue in the problem. It is a process of spotting the legal issues as presented by the facts of the case. It is comparable to a lawyer studying a case for the first time and who is trying to develop a theory of the case. An important step in this process is pinpointing the branch of law implicated by the problem. Is it contract, torts, citizenship, succession, etc.? After identifying the branch of law, the next step will be determining whether there is a conflicts of law problem by the presence of a foreign element. If one is involved, he then employs applicable conflicts of law doctrines in determining the applicable law. Ifnone, he just applies the rule, law, or jurisprudence prevailing in the forum. Connecting factors. Here, an analysis is made with respect to which jurisdiction or fora has the most connection to the case. The nationality of the parties, the location of the act or event, the terms of the agreement or contract, and other matters are looked into to determine what legal system between two or more legal systems is applicable. The preparation of a checklist embodying these factors may be very helpful in identifying the applicable legal system. Once the legal system is identified, the applicable branch of law in that legal system will then be applied in resolving the dispute. Choice of Applicable Law Parties to a contract are free to stipulate the applicable law that will govern their contractual relations. This proceeds from Article 1806 of the Civil Code which provides that “[t]he contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” Once chosen, the chosen law shall be applied to govern the duties and responsibilities of the parties to each other. It is not necessary that the chosen law be local law, so long as the choice of law does not violate the public policy or the laws of the forum.CONFLICT OF LAWS we Extraterritoriality ; itori s are generally terri this thet the mind of the lawmaker boundaries of his country Ee aia le ill draft a law and provi fa ‘of another independent state. val wh i en . Laws, however, can be extraterritorial when so Prov de : ion of whether a law is territoria) by the legislature. The question of wh paikineesn ny itorial depends on legislative intent. It is eight the legislature ofa country to provide that its laws apply outsi, de t se rtnial boundaries of the state on mators within the compete i i a is recognized ung, legislature to legislate upon. is is 3 under © aad Jaw, except when this intrudes with the territory, al integrity and sovereignty of another country. inatic is extraterritorial inyo}, ‘The determination of whether a law is ext torial involve, an examination of the legislative intent. Usually, legislative inteng can be determined by looking at the words and phrases used in statute. More often than not, this expression can be explicit, but it may also be implicit in which case, rules of interpretation can he resorted to. Thus, congressional records and debates may be examined to determine whether a law has territorial application or none. An example of a law providing extraterritorial application in i ication. The x ial in application. "eASon is limited to the territ,, oy cts laws. It is unnatura) th that it will apply within, th r an explicit manner are the following: Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said Property may be found.INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 These two provisions of the Civil Code are explicit in providing for extraterritorial application, This is shown by the use of the phrase “eventhough living abroad” in Article 15 and “regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found” in Article 16. These two provisions, though with extraterritorial application, were enacted within the competence of the legislature to legislate upon. Surely, Congress has power over its subjects (citizens) to provide for the application of local laws over their person wherever they are. This does not conflict with the territorial integrity or sovereignty of another country. This is also practiced practically by all states. Small v. United States 544 U.S. 385 (2005) Facts: Small was convicted in Japan for smuggling and was sentenced by a Japanese court to five years’ imprisonment. After serving sentence, Small returned to the United States, and purchased a gun from a Pennsylvania gun dealer. He was then charged for “unlawful gun possession” under a statute that provided that it shall be “unlawful for any person...who has been convicted in any court, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year...to... possess...any firearm.” Small pleaded guilty then challenged his conviction on the ground that his earlier conviction in Japan, being a foreign conviction, fell outside the scope of the unlawful gun possession statute. Issue: Whether the “unlawful gun possession” statute had extraterritorial application such that foreign convictions are covered in its scope? Held: No. Only domestic convictions are covered by the statute. 1. The question before us is whether the statutory reference “convicted in any court” includes a conviction entered in a foreign court.CONFLICT OF LAWS ini e of the statutory 2 In determine notion that Gongtte we find Cee with domestic concerns ie mind” ‘ generally Bs the Court to adopt the legal resumpe’ ee ordinarily intends its statutes to hat eae not extraterritorial! ; 3. For one thing, the phrase Ganiiees ‘one Recesg jon of the “gun possession’ activity tha Prohibites portion f domestic law. For another, considered ag asa aed o convictions differ from domestic convict ong group, eee 3, Past foreign convictions for crimes Fa ipetle | e year’s imprisonment punishable by more than one y' : ra may jnclude a conviction for conduct that lomestic laws woulg permit, for example, for engaging 1n mae conduct that our society might encourage. They would include al system that is inconsistent a conviction from a leg: , t with an American understanding of fairness. And they would include a conviction for conduct that domestic law punishes far less severely. Thus, the key statutory phrase “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” somewhat less reliably identifies dangerous individuals for the purposes of U.S. law where foreign convictions, rather than domestic convictions, are at issue. 4, We have found no convincing indication to the contrary here. The statute's language does not suggest any intent to reach beyond domestic convictions. Neither does it mention foreign convictions nor is its subject matter special, say, immigration or terrorism, where one could argue that foreign convictions would seem especially relevant. To the contrary, if read to include foreign convictions, the statute’s language creates anomalies. , application. 5. For example, the statute creates an exception that allows gun possession despite a prior conviction for an antitrust or business regulatory crime. In doing so, the exception speaks of “Federal or State” antitrust or regulatory offenses. If the phrase “convicted in any court” generally refers only to domestic convictions, this language causes no problem. But if “convicted in any court” includes foreign convictions, the words “Federal or State” prevent the exception from applying where a foreign antitrust or regulatory conviction is at issue.INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 6. In sum, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered the added enforcement advantages flowing from inclusion of foreign crimes, weighing them against, say, the potential unfairness of preventing those with inapt foreign convictions from possessing guns. The statute itself and its history offer only congressional silence. Given the reasons for disfavoring an inference of extraterritorial coverage from a statute’s total silence and our initial assumption against such coverage, we conclude that the phrase “convicted in any court” refers only to domestic courts, not to foreign courts. Congress, of course, remains free to change this conclusion through statutory amendment. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) Facts: Petitioners Kiobel, et al. were Nigerian nationals who sued Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) in federal court for violation of the law of nations. Petitioners claimed that the respondent corporations committed atrocities in suppressing the demonstrations directed towards the operation of the respondent corporations. They claimed that respondents enlisted, supported, and aided the Nigerian Government in attacking villages and beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents and destroying or looting property. The district court dismissed and allowed some of the claims but when the case went on interlocutory appeal before the Second Circuit, the latter dismissed the entire complaint, on the ground that the law of nations did not recognize corporate liability. Petitioners then went to the Supreme Court on certiorari. Issue: Whether and under what circumstances the ATS allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States? Held: None, because the ATS has no extraterritorial application. : a1CONFLICT OF LAWS i hether petitioney, jon here is not wl 1. The questi™ saim under the ATS, but whethe, have stated @ Prop’ occurring in the territory . y mnduct y a claim may reach Respondents contend that claims Ser ‘ATS do not, relying primarily on @ canon of unde i terpretation known 88 the presumption statutory ae territorial application. That canon Provides against extra es no clear indication of a “ statute giv ee application, it has none,” and reflects the extr “presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world. i hingin the text ofthe statute Suggests that at sanded ee of action recognized under it to have extraterritorial reach, The ATS covers actions by aliens for violations of the law of nations, but that does not imply extraterritorial reach—such violations affecting aliens can occur either within or outside the Unite d States. Nor does the fact that the text reaches ‘any civil action” suggest application to torts committed abroad; it is well established that generic terms like “any” or “every” do not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, 3. Nor does the historical background againgt which the ATS was enacted overcome the presumption against application to conduct in the territory of another sovereign. We explained in Sosa that when Congress passed the ATS, “three principal offenses against the law of nations” had been identified by Blackstone: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. The first two offenses have no necessary extraterritorial application. Indeed, Blackstone—in describing them—did so in terms of conduct occurring within the forum nation. 4, The third example of a violation of the law of nations familiar to the Congress that enacted the ATS was Piracy. Piracy typically occurs on the high seas, beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or any other country. This Court has generally treated the high seas the same as foreign soil for purposes of the presumption against extraterritorial application. Petitioners contend that because Congress surely intended the ATS to provide jurisdictionINTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW for actions against pirates, it necessarily anticipated the statute would apply to conduct occurring abroad. Applying U.S. law to pirates, however, does not typically impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign, and therefore carries less direct foreign policy consequences. Pirates were fair game wherever found, by any nation, because they generally did not operate within any jurisdiction. We do not think that the existence of a cause of action against them is a sufficient basis for concluding that other causes of action under the ATS reach conduct that does occur within the territory of another sovereign; pirates may well be a category unto themselves. 4, Finally, there is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms. As Justice Story put it, “No nation has ever yet pretended to be the custos morum of the whole world...” It is implausible to suppose that the First Congress wanted their fledgling Republic—struggling to receive international recognition—to be the first. Indeed, the parties offer no evidence that any nation, meek or mighty, presumed to do such a thing. 5. We therefore conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies toclaims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption. “[T]here is no clear indication of extraterritoriality here,” and petitioners’ case seeking relief for violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United States is barred. 6. On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be required. 23CONFLICT OF LAWS ue Forum Non Conveniens conveniens simply means that the forum ig be that the chosen forum, or the place where the ion to the parties or to the bstantial connecti ee rt ry inconvenient to litigate the suit in the Forum non convenient. It may suit is filed, has no su! dispute that it becomes ve! : ee venue. It may happen that the parties to the case are Not i re located somewh, i the forum, or that the witnesses a é ere aang nena which offers a more convenient forum litigate the case. That jurisdiction could also be an adequate fory: where courts of law are operating and may offer the plaintiffs venue where they could obtain justice. The defense of forum non conveniens is usually interposeq by way of a motion to dismiss. Puyat v. Zabarte® enumerates the instances where a court may desist from exercising jurisdiction: 1. the belief that the matter can be better tried and decideg elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the materia) witnesses have their residence there; 2. the belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum|,] a practice known as forum shopping[,] merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant; 3. the unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non residents or aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded; 4, the inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and 5. the difficulty of ascertaining foreign law. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio et al. G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015 Facts: Respondents Ma. Jopette Rebesencio, Montassah Sacar-Adiong, Rouen Ruth Cristobal, and Loraine Schneider-Cruz were hired by Saudi Arabian Airlines (“Saudia”) and became Permanent °405 Phil. 413 (2001).INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW Flight Attendants. They entered into Cabin Attendant Contracts with Saudia on May 16, 1990 (Ma. Jopette), May 22, 1993 (Montassah and Rouen Ruth), and August 27, 1995 (Loraine). On various dates in 2006, they were terminated from service on the ground that they became pregnant. Saudia justified their termination under their employment contract which provided: (H) Due to the essential nature of the Air Hostess functions to be physically fit on board to provide various services required in normal or emergency cases on both domestic/ international flights beside her role in maintaining continuous safety and security of passengers, and since she will not be able to maintain the required medical fitness while at work in case of pregnancy, accordingly, if the Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall render her employment contract as void and she will be terminated due to lack of medical fitness. (Emphasis supplied) Respondents filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal and for underpayment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day, premium, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay, night shift differentials, medical expense reimbursements, retirement benefits, illegal deduction, lay-over expense and allowances, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Saudia challenged the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter on the ground of forum non conveniens. The Labor Arbiter sustained the challenge and dismissed the complaint. On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission’s Sixth Division reversed, holding that there were no special circumstances that warranted its abstention from exercising jurisdiction. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals merely modified the decision of the NLRC with respect to the award of separation pay and backwages. Issue: Whether Philippine courts or tribunals offer a convenient and adequate forum for the adjudication of respondents’ complaint? 25CONFLICT OF LAWS ibunals ar, J ypine courts or tril e Held: Yes. Philipp djudication of respondenty adequate forum for complaint, + oati i trictl; ith: itigation arises 8 Y with; 1. MA Lanai junediction, such rules as thogg ae een sr ing, litis pendentia, and res judicata co, on forum sh See in the Philippines, the 1997 Rules on ae See provide for willful and deliberate forum Civil se a ground not only for summary dismissal with eae put also for citing parties and counsels in direg Pr ee e imposition of administratiy, ell as for th conten ‘Likewise, the same rules expressly Provide ae a party may seek the dismissal of a Complaint o, leading asserting a claim on the ground “(that oe ie Leary es pending between the same Parties for the same cause,” ie., litis pendentia, or [that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment,” i.e., reg judicata. Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel litigation, While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to address parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions. Forum non conveniens literally translates to “the forum is inconvenient.” It is a concept in private international law and was devised to combat the “less than honorable” reasons and excuses that litigants use to secure procedural advantages, annoy and harass defendants, avoid overcrowded dockets, and select a “friendlier” venue. Thus, the doctrine of forum non conveniens addresses the same rationale that the rule aid forum shopping does, albeitona multijurisdictional scale. . Forum non conveniens, like res judicata, is a concept originating in common law. However, unlike the rule on res judicata, as well as those on litis pendentia and forum shopping, forum non conveniens finds no textual anchor, whether in statute or in procedural rules, in our civil law system, Nevertheless, jurisprudence hasINTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW applied forum non conveniens as basis for a court to decline its exercise of jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens is soundly applied not only to address parallel litigation and undermine a litigant’s capacity to vex and secure undue advantages by engaging in forum shopping on an international scale. It is also grounded on principles of comity and judicial efficiency. 2. Consistent with the principle of comity, a tribunal's desistance in exercising jurisdiction on account of forum non conveniens is a deferential gesture to the tribunals of another sovereign. It is a measure that prevents the former’s having to interfere in affairs which are better and more competently addressed by the latter. Further, forum non conveniens entails a recognition not only that tribunals elsewhere are better suited to rule on and resolve a controversy, but also, that these tribunals are better positioned to enforce judgments and, ultimately, to dispense justice. Forum non conveniens prevents the embarrassment of an awkward situation where a tribunal is rendered incompetent in the face of the greater capability—both analytical and practical—of a tribunal in another jurisdiction. The wisdom of avoiding conflicting and unenforceable judgments is as much a matter of efficiency and economy as it is a matter of international courtesy. A court would effectively be neutering itself if it insists on adjudicating a controversy when it knows full well that it is in no position to enforce its judgment. Doing so is not only an exercise in futility; it is an act of frivolity. It clogs the dockets of a tribunal and leaves it to waste its efforts on affairs, which, given transnational exigencies, will be reduced to mere academic, if not trivial, exercises. Accordingly, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, “a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most ‘convenient’ or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.” The use of the word “may” (i.e. “may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction”) in the decisions shows that the matter of jurisdiction rests on the sound 27CONFLICT OF LAWS i e mere invocation of fory, diceretion of cour". Neither nent of foreign elements non conveniont matically divest a court of jurisdiction, operates a should renounce jurisdiction only “after Rather, a court shied, to determine whether specia] ital facts are require the court’s desistance. AS the are lying forum non conveniens is contingent at Pera determination, it is, therefore, a matter of o defense. ; 8. The second sentence of Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is exclusive in its recital of the grounds for dismissal that are exempt rom the omnibus motion rule: (1) lack of ae over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription. Moreover, dismissal on account of forum non conveniens is a fundamentally discretionary matter, It is, therefore, not a matter for a defendant to foist upon the court at his or her own convenience; rather, it must be pleaded at the earliest possible opportunity. On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived. 4. Consistent with forum non conveniens as fundamentally a factual matter, it is imperative that it proceed from & factually established basis. It would be improper to dismiss an action pursuant to forum non conveniens based merely on a perceived, likely, or hypothetical multiplicity of fora. Thus, a defendant must also plead and show that a prior suit has, in fact, been brought in another jurisdiction. The existence of a prior suit makes real the vexation engendered by duplicitous litigation, the embarrassment of intruding into the affairs of another sovereign, and the squandering of judicial efforts in resolving a dispute already lodged and better resolved elsewhere. : We deem it more appropriate and in the greater interest of prudence that a defendant not only allege supposed dangerous tendencies in litigating in thisINTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW jurisdiction; the defendant must also show that such danger is real and present in that litigation or dispute resolution has commenced in another jurisdiction and that a foreign tribunal has chosen to exercise jurisdiction. 5. Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. Forum non conveniens relates to forum, not to the choice of governing law. That forum non conveniens may ultimately result in the application of foreign law is merely an incident of its application. In this strict sense, forum non conveniens is not applicable. It is not the primarily pivotal consideration in this case. In any case, even a further consideration of the applicability of forum non conveniens on the incidental matter of the law governing respondents’ relation with Saudia leads to the conclusion that it is improper for Philippine tribunals to divest themselves of jurisdiction. Any evaluation of the propriety of contracting parties’ choice of a forum and its incidents must grapple with two (2) considerations: first, the availability and adequacy of recourse to a foreign tribunal; and second, the question of where, as between the forum court and a foreign court, the balance of interests inhering in a dispute weighs more heavily. The first is a pragmatic matter. It relates to the viability of ceding jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal and can be resolved by juxtaposing the competencies and practical circumstances of the tribunals in alternative fora. Exigencies, like the statute of limitations, capacity to enforce orders and judgments, access to records, requirements for the acquisition of jurisdiction, and even questions relating to the integrity of foreign courts, may render undesirable or even totally unfeasible recourse to a foreign court. As mentioned, we consider it in the greater interest of prudence that a defendant show, 29CONFLICT OF LAWS iens, that litigation ha, , m non conventens, nag in pleading / vanothet jurisdiction and that a foreign commenced a fact, chosen to exercise jurisdiction, i . tribunal ha igh i urt’s appraisal of factors weigh into a cou! : a Oe ares inhering in @ dispute: first, the the Lae the parties and their relation have to a . a diction; and second, the public interest that given juris 7 capacity as an agent of the i tribunal, in its s an agent of me a choosing to assume or decline jurisdiction, Thefretis more concerned with the parties, their persona] circumstances, and private interests; the second concerng itself with the state ‘and the greater social order. idering the vinculum, a court must look into the mcoieranceof linkages which the parties. and their transaction may have to either, jurisdiction. Inthis respect, factors, such as the parties’ respective nationalities and placesof negotiation, execution, performance, engagement or deployment, come into play. In considering public interest, a court proceeds with a consciousness that it is an organ of the state. It must, thus, determine if the interests of the sovereign (which acts through it) are outweighed by those of the alternative jurisdiction. In this respect, the court delves into a consideration of public policy. Should it find that public interest weighs more heavily in favor of its assumption of jurisdiction, it should proceed in adjudicating the dispute, any doubt or contrary view arising from the preponderance of linkages notwithstanding. In contrast, this court ruled in The Manila Hotel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that the National Labor Relations Commission was a seriously inconvenient forum. In that case, private respondent Marcelo G. Santos was working in the Sultanate of Oman when he received a letter from Palace Hotel recruiting him for employment in Beijing, China. Santos accepted the offer. Subsequently, however, he was released from employment supposedly due to business reverses arising from political upheavals in China (i.e., the Tiananmen Square incidents of 1989). Santos later filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal impleading Palace Hotel’s GeneralINTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW Manager, Mr. Gerhard Schmidt, the Manila Hotel International Company Ltd. (which was, responsible for training Palace Hotel’s personnel and staff), and the Manila Hotel Corporation (which owned 50% of Manila Hotel International Company Ltd.’s capital stock). In ruling against the National Labor Relations Commission’s exercise of jurisdiction, this court noted that the main aspects of the case transpired in two (2) foreign jurisdictions, Oman and China, and that the case involved purely foreign elements. Specifically, Santos was directly hired by a foreign employer through correspondence sent to Oman. Also, the proper defendants were neither Philippine nationals nor engaged in business in the Philippines, while the main witnesses were not residents of the Philippines. Likewise, this court noted that the National Labor Relations Commission was in no position to conduct the following: first, determine the law governing the employment contract, as it was entered into in foreign soil; second, determine the facts, as Santos’ employment was terminated in Beijing; and third, enforce its judgment, since Santos’ employer, Palace Hotel, was incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with summons. Contrary to Manila Hotel, the case now before us does not entail a preponderance of linkages that favor a foreign jurisdiction. First, there is no basis for concluding that the case can be more conveniently tried elsewhere. As established earlier, Saudia is doing business in the Philippines. For their part, all four (4) respondents are Filipino citizens maintaining residence in the Philippines and, apart from their previous employment with Saudia, have no other connection to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It would even be to respondents’ inconvenience if this case were to be tried elsewhere. Second, the records are bereft of any indication that respondents filed their Complaint in an effort to engage in forum shopping or to vex and inconvenience Saudia. Third, there is no indication of “unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or 31CONFLICT OF LAWS bring the * ia has managed to the prego, — Sree to this court proves this, a trovers} cont Fourth, it cannot be said that the local iudicigy aa for effectuating the ui machinery is eee was properly s¢ i Cay dr rclenr ste its person was valj Me on Saudia and jurisdiction over its pet Validly acquired. Lastly, there is not even room for considering foreign law. Philippine law properly governs the present dispute, 7. All told, the considerations jor assumption of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals as out in America, NTES have been satisfied. First, all the Parties are based in the Philippines and all the material incidents transpired in this jurisdiction. Thus, the Parties may conveniently seek relief from Philippine tribunals, Second, Philippine tribunals are in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts. Third, Philippine tribunals are in a position to enforce their decisions. There is no compelling basis for ceding jurisdiction to a foreign considerations attendant to this case behoove Philippine tribunals to not shy away from their duty to rule on the case,