1) GO VS SUNBANUN

G.R. 168240 FEBRUARY 9, 2011

FACTS:
Respondents filed a suit for damages against Aurora, her husband Yiu Wai Sang, and Yiu-Go Employment
Agency for breach of warranty in the fire insurance policies that the respondents made involving the property
rented by petitioner. The RTC rendered judgment finding only Aurora liable and ordering her to pay moral
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs.

For non-compliance with the formal requirements of a petition, the CA dismissed the certiorari petition
filed by petitioner for being procedurally flawed.

ISSUE:
May the formal deficiencies in the petition before the CA be relaxed in the interest of justice?

HELD:
Yes. The signatures/authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the verification and
certification on non-forum shopping are not necessary. The signatures may be dispensed with as these parties are
not involved in the petition.

Failure to indicate PTR and IBP Official Receipt Numbers are not fatal. The failure of petitioner’s former
counsel, Atty. Ycong, to indicate in the petition before the CA his PTR and IBP numbers for the year 2004 was
obviously an oversight.

However, whenever practicable, personal service and personal filing of pleadings are always the preferred modes
of service. Should one deviate from the general rule, it is mandatory for him/her to submit a written explanation
why the pleading was not personally filed/served. Otherwise, the court has the discretion to consider the paper as
not filed. Therefore, there was no grave abuse on the part of the CA in exercising its discretion to dismiss Aurora’s
petition.
 2) FABIAN VS DESIERTO
GR NO. 129742 SEPTEMBER 16, 1998

FACTS:

Fabian filed an administrative charge for grave misconduct against Agustin committed by him as then DPWH
Assistant Regional Director of Region IV-A. The Ombudsman found Agustin guilty but upon reconsideration, he
was exonerated.

Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
provides that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases,orders, directives, or decisions of the office of the ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court?

HELD:

No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI
of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The constitutional
prohibition was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the Court.
 3) CALACALA VS REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 154415. JULY 28, 2005

Facts:

The Republic was the highest bidder in the public auction but failed for a long period of time to execute an
Affidavit of Consolidation and to seek a writ of possession. Calacala insisted that, by such inaction, the Republic’s
right over the land had prescribed, been abandoned or waived.

Issue:

Does the right to a writ of possession prescribe?

Held:

No. [T]he Republic’s failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten (10) years from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rights petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of
jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a
Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over
the property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring
ownership back to him whose property has been previously foreclosed and sold. x x x

Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligors’ right to redeem
and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality
and mere co konfirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser.
 4) LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. NO. 132601. OCTOBER 12, 1998
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that
same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the
SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant
reprieve.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has acted beyond its jurisdiction by granting the TRO.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each
other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. For the public respondents to contend
that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle
of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
 5) ABC DAVAO AUTO SUPPLY, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 113296. JANUARY 16, 1998
FACTS:
On October 1980, a complaint for a sum of money, attorney’s fees and damages was filed by petitioner before the
CFI of Davao which was raffled to Branch XVI. Rebuttal and sub-rebuttal evidences were heard by Judge Agton,
having assumed office on August 1, 1985. When the judiciary was reorganized under the Aquino administration,
Judge Agton was transferred to another branch of the RTC but within the same Judicial Region. Meanwhile, Judge
Romeo Marasigan, who assumed office on February 3, 1987, was assigned to Branch XVI. On May 1987, Judge
Marasigan acted on respondent’s motion for extension of time to file memorandum. On June 1987 a decision
penned by Judge Agton was rendered in favor of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of Judge Agton is valid
HELD:
YES. Judge Agton could not have possibly lost jurisdiction over the case, because jurisdiction does not attach to
the judge but to the court. The continuity of a court and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by the death,
resignation, or cessation from the service of the judge presiding over it.

●
 6) VALDEZ VS. GSIS
G.R. NO. 146175 JUNE 30, 2008

FACTS:

Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner
Simeon M. Valdez assailing the July 31, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals. Principally, the CSC held that
petitioner’s services rendered in the Manila Economic Cultural Office (MECO), Mariano Memorial State
University (MMSU), Philippine Veterans Investment Development Company (PHIVIDEC) and as OIC Vice-
Governor of Ilocos Norte cannot be credited in the computation of his retirement benefits. The petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision and for the first time raised as an issue the lack of jurisdiction
of the CSC and the CA over the case.

ISSUES:

WON action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper in this case?

RULING:

No.

It is an elementary principle that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be used if the proper remedy is
appeal. Being an extraordinary remedy, a party can only avail himself of certiorari, if there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Here, appeal is the correct mode but was not
seasonably utilized by the petitioner. Resort to this petition for certiorari is, therefore, improper because certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal. Petitions for certiorari are limited to resolving only errors
of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of
judgment. For, it is basic that certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is
not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to
keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where
the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. It is not to be used for any
other purpose, such as to cure errors in proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact, as what
petitioner would like the Court to venture into. A petition for certiorari not being the proper remedy to correct
errors of judgment as alleged in the instant case, the herein petition should be dismissed pursuant to SC Circular
No. 2-90.
 7) ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EXALTACION NAVARRO IN HER
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH XX OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU, AND
EMILIANO BELLEZA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 72074 APRIL 30, 1987

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review and annul the orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, Branch XX, dated, November 7, 1983 and April 25, 1985, which respectively denied the petitioner's
motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 17740.

The issue put forward by the petitioner is whether or not regular courts have jurisdiction to entertain labor cases including
those involving claims for moral and other damages. The petitioner alleges that although the case was filed during the
effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1367 wherein the courts were vested with jurisdiction over claims for moral and other
forms of damages arising from employer-employee relationship, the same jurisdiction was divested when Presidential Decree
No. 1691 superseded Presidential Decree No. 1367 during the pendency of the case.

ISSUE:

How is jurisdiction of a court determined?

RULING:
It is a general rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute enforced at the time of the commencement of the
action (People v. Mariano, 71 SCRA 600; People v. Fontanilla, 23 SCRA 1227).
However, in the case of Bengzon v. Inciong (91 SCRA 248, 256), this Court held:ll

"The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in
another tribunal (Iburan v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234; Insurance company of North America v. United States Lines Company, et al.
17 SCRA 301). The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment (20 Am. Jur. 2d; Section 150). Where a statute changing the
jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the
statute (Mullen v. Renzleman, 31 Okla, 53. 119 P. 641).

Admittedly, at the time when the respondent filed this case with the respondent lower court, the applicable law was Section 1
of Presidential Decree No. 1367. However, on May 1, 1980, during the pendency of this case, Presidential Decree No. 1691
was promulgated which amended provisions under PD 1367.
In conflicts of jurisdiction between the courts and the labor agencies arising from the amendments effected by P.D. 1691 on
P.D. 1367, this Court held in the cases of Ebon v. De Guzman (113 SCRA 52), Aguda v. Vallejos (113 SCRA 69), and
Sentinel Insurance Co., Inc. v. Bautista, (supra), that P.D. 1691 is a curative statute which corrected the lack of jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter at the start of the proceedings and, therefore, should be given a retrospective application to the pending
proceedings. P.D. 1691 merely restored a jurisdiction earlier vested in Labor Arbiters before the enactment of P.D. 1367. It
was intended to correct a situation where two tribunals would have jurisdiction over separate issues arising from the same
labor conflict.

P. D. 1691 should, therefore, be given a retroactive application to this pending case as the precise purpose of the amendment
was to hopefully settle once and for all the conflict of jurisdiction between regular courts and labor agencies (Sentinel Ins.,
Co., Inc., v. Bautista, supra).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of the respondent court are hereby SET ASIDE.
The respondent judge is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 17740 without prejudice to the right of the respondent to refile his
case with the proper labor agency.
 10) GO V. DISTINCTION PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. NO. 194024, APRIL 25, 2012

FACTS:

Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered individual owners of condominium
units in Phoenix Heights Condominium developed by the respondent. Petitioners, as condominium unit-owners,
filed a complaint before the HLURB against DPDCI for unsound business practices and violation of the MDDR,
alleging that DPDCI committed misrepresentation in their circulated flyers and brochures as to the facilities or
amenities that would be available in the condominium and failed to perform its obligation to comply with the
MDDR. In defense, DPDCI alleged that the brochure attached to the complaint was “a mere preparatory draft”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PHCC is an indispensable party

RULING:

An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. It is "precisely ‘when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed.’ The absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even to those present. The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete
determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be
affected by the judgment.

PHCC is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded, as it would be directly and adversely affected by
any determination therein. Evidently, the cause of action rightfully pertains to PHCC.
 11) JESUS VELASQUEZ V. SPOUSES PATERNO CRUZ AND ROSARIO CRUZ
GR NO. 191479, SEPTEMBER 21, 2015

FACTS:

Spouses Cruz owned a parcel of land where Bernabe Navarro was a tenant until 1985, when he relinquished his
tenancy rights. Navarro’s son-in-law—petitioner Jesus Velasquez—entered the farmland without the spouses’
knowledge and consent. From 1985 up to the time of filing of complaint, Velasquez did not pay any rent. He also
converted the farmland into a fishpond.The spouses Cruz leased the farmland to Godofredo Tosco in 1995, but
Velasquez refused to leave the property. Thus, the spouses filed a complaint for recovery of possession with
damages at the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC has the jurisdiction.

RULING:

Yes. The RTC has jurisdiction. For DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be a tenancy relationship
between the parties. Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they
agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result
of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. Its existence
could not be assumed. The element of consent and sharing of harvests are clearly lacking.
 12) IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG
IN THE LATTERS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
G.R. NO. 150274 AUGUST 06, 2006

FACTS:

The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an
administrative complaint for dishonesty, inter alia, against Tel-Equen (petitioner) and several others, relative to the
anomalous payment of P553,900.00 of the bailey bridge components owned by the government which petitioner
was declared guilty. Pending appeal, Secretary Datumanong (respondent) issued the assailed Memorandum Order
dated October 5, 2001 dismissing him from the service.

Hence, the instant petition to cite respondent in contempt of court.

ISSUES:

1) WON Respondent should be cited in contempt of court.

2) WON the retroactive application of procedural laws violate petitioner’s vested rights.

RULING:

1) NO. The Court held that this contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and
sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the
dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. It should not be availed of unless necessary in the interest of
justice.

Further, it ruled that decisions, like that rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman, has reached finality pursuant to
Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act saying that any order or directive or decision of its Office imposing a (1) penalty of
public censure or reprimand, or (2) suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
The assailed memorandum order in the instant case falls within the second instance and should be justified.

2) NO. The Court reiterated the general rule that the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be
considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom. In the case at
bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the
petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal.
 13) RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0 February 11, 2010

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (Petitioner) seeks exemption from the legal fees imposed by the Court
on government-owned and controlled corporations and local government units found on Sec. 22, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court anchoring its petition on Sec. 39 of RA 8291 (GSIS Act) arguing that the purpose of its exemption
is to preserve and maintain the actuarial solvency of its funds and to keep the contribution rates necessary to sustain
the benefits provided by the GSIS Act as low as possible.

Required to comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the petition should
be denied contending that the exemption of the GSIS from "taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds"
is necessarily confined to those that do not involve pleading, practice and procedure.

ISSUE:

May the legislature exempt the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from legal fees imposed by the
Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and local government units?

RULING:

NO. The Court ruled that the payment of legal feel under Rule 141 of the ROC is an integral part of the rules
pursuant to its rule-making power under the Constitution. The Court declared said payment a jurisdictional
requirement for it is needed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject-matter or the nature of the action and not simply
the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading. The only exception to this are the indigent or pauper
litigants which the Court, in proper cases, can waive their right to collect legal fees.

Furthermore, the Court held that GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government
employees in support of its petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of
its individual members. Its capacity to sue and bring actions under Section 41(g) of RA 8291, the specific power
which involves the exemption that it claims in this case, pertains to it and not to its members.
 14) DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB
OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, PETITIONERS,
VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, NAMELY: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
SALVADOR AND CARMEN, ALL SURNAMED DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 43, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ROXAS,
ORIENTAL MINDORO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 141524 SEPTEMBER 14, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court against private respondents which was
dismissed due to prescription. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and,
on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration (MR). The trial court issued
another order dismissing the MR which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal. The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days
late.

Petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals where it was
dismissed. The appellate court ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3,
1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.

Hence, the case at bar.

ISSUE:
WON petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time

RULING:
YES. Petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from July 22, 1998 or the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration.

The Court ruled that in order to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, it deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial
or motion for reconsideration. In the instant case, Petitioners filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five
days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of
appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days.
 16) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION (formerly
SOUTHERN ENERGY QUEZON, INC.)
G.R. NO. 159593 OCTOBER 12, 2006]

FACTS:
Mirant is a VAT registered entity. It filed an application for the refund of input VAT on its purchase of capital
goods and services for the period 1 April 1996 to 31 December 1996 (amounting to P39,330,500.85) pursuant to
the procedures prescribed under Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.
ISSUE:
WON there is sufficient cause to warrant the relaxation of technical or procedural rules in the instant case.
HELD:
None. The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural rules or to except a case from their
operation when compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes good
and sufficient cause that would merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the courts. The general rules of
procedure still apply and the BIR Commissioner cannot be allowed to raise an issue for the first time on appeal. It
is incumbent upon him to present sufficient cause that would qualify his case for such a suspension or exception.
The BIR Commissioner made no attempt to provide reasonable explanation for his failure to raise before the CTA
the issue of MPC being a public utility subject to franchise tax rather than VAT.
 17) VICTORIA REGNER, PETITIONER, V. CYNTHIA R. LOGARTA, TERESA R. TORMIS AND
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 168747 : OCTOBER 19, 2007
FACTS:
Victoria filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Donation against Cynthia and Teresa with the
RTC. Summonses were served for Cynthia and Teresa at the Borja Family Clinic in Tagbilaran City wherein
Melinda worked as a doctor, but Melinda refused to receive the summonses for her sisters and informed the sheriff
that their lawyer would be the one to receive the same. Upon her arrival in the Philippines, Teresa was personally
served the summons. She filed her Answer with counterclaim with the RTC. Petitioner opposed the motion and
filed her own motion to set the case for pre-trial, to which Teresa filed her rejoinder on the ground that their sister,
Cynthia, an indispensable party, had not yet been served a summons. Thus, Teresa prayed for the dismissal of
petitioner's complaint, as the case would not proceed without Cynthia's presence.
ISSUE:
WON the court must acquire jurisdiction over the persons of indispensable parties before it can validly pronounce
judgments.
RULING:
A Court must acquire jurisdiction over the persons of indispensable parties before it can validly pronounce
judgments personal to the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is assured upon the service of summons in the
manner required by law or otherwise by his voluntary appearance. As a rule, if a defendant has not been
summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a personal judgment rendered against such
defendant is null and void.10 A decision that is null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is
not a decision in the contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become final and executory.
 18) MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 161417 FEBRUARY 8, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending that extrinsic fraud prevented her
from participating in the judicial foreclosure proceedings. According to her, she came to know about the judgment
in the case only after the lapse of more than six (6) months after its finality. She claimed that extrinsic fraud was
perpetrated against her because the bank failed to verify the authenticity of her signature on the real estate
mortgage and did not inquire into the reason for the absence of her signature on the promissory notes. She
moreover asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through
her husband without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made.

ISSUE:

WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner.

RULING:

Yes. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is
acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of
the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and
made effective. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court
with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements
 19) TIJAM VS SIBONGHANOY

FACTS:

Defendant Surety Company, in a a decision rendered by the court, is made liable to the writ of execution in which
it asked for affirmative relief to be free from liability of the bond in question, however the question of lack of
jurisdiction of the court of first instance (RTC) was not raised. It was only in 1963 after receiving an adverse
decision that the defendant surety company files a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction alleging that
in 1948, Court of First instance has no jurisdiction over civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the
amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00

ISSUE:

WON the court of first instance has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:

The Court held that while it is true that the value of the subject-matter is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
inferior courts and the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, the court is of the opinion the surety
is now barred by laches for raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time in 15 years. The court
frowned upon the “undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for decision and the accepting the
judgement, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if adverse.
 20) GENESIS INVESTMENT VS HEIRS OF EBARSABAL

FACTS:

This case involves a joinder of cause of action of respondents pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of
the contending parties over the contested property, the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdiction of the
MTC. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the
allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not jurisdiction is within the RTC

RULING:

Provided under Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court that where the causes of action are between the same
parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of the said court and the venue lies therein.