The Oust of Chief Justice Sereno

Submitted to:

Atty. Braga

Submitted by:

Bautista, Rachel Anne Z.

JD I-1
 I. Introduction

Chief Justice Sereno was one of the critics of Duterte administration, as she questioned multiple

occasions President Duterte's assault on rule of law and his war on drugs which is one of the perspectives

behind for her oust. According to the facts of her case, respondent served as a member of the faculty of

the UP College of Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006. She also served as legal counsel for the Republic of the

Philippines for several agencies from 1994 until 2009. On July 2010, Respondent submitted her

application for the position of Associate Justice of the SC. Despite the span of 20 years of employment

with UP from 1986 to 2006 and despite having been employed as legal counsel of various government

agencies from 2003 to 2009, records from the UP Human Resources Development Office, Central

Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Office of Recruitment Selection and

Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) show that the only Statements of Assets,

Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) available on record and filed by Respondent were those for the years

1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002, or only 11 out of 25 SALNs that

ought to have been filed. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal

counsel for the Republic. Neither was a SALN filed when she resigned from U.P. College of Law as of 1

June 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government service as of 16 August 2010.

Respondent was appointed Associate Justice in August 2010 by President Benigno Aquino III.

When the position for Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the opening for

applications and nominations, requiring applicants to submit all previous SALNs up to 31 December 2011

(instead of the usual last two years of public service) and stating that, “applicants with incomplete or out-

of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.”

OSRN required Respondent to submit her SALNs for the years 1995-1999, the period within

which she was employed by UP. Respondent replied through a letter that considering that such

government records in UP are more than 15 years old, “it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve

all those files.” She also assured OSRN that UP has cleared her of all responsibilities, accountabilities,
and administrative charges in 2006. Lastly, she emphasized that her service in the government was not

continuous, having had a break between 2006 (when her service in UP ended) and 2010 (when she was

appointed to the SC). Such letter was not examined or deliberated upon by the JBC. Neither can the JBC

Execom produce minutes of the deliberations to consider the issue of substantial compliance with

documentary requirements. However, despite having submitted only three SALNs (2009-2011), the

Report regarding documentary requirements and SALNs of candidates shows that her name was

annotated with “COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS”, noting her letter that it was infeasible to retrieve all

files. The same annotation was found in another list regarding SALN submissions of 20 candidates,

including Respondent.

The respondent was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III on 25 August 2012. Five years

later, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon with the House Committee of Justice.

Included in the complaint was the allegation that Respondent failed to make a truthful statement of her

SALNs. Such complaint filed in the House spawned a letter dated 21 February 2018 of Atty. Eligio

Mallari to the OSG requesting the latter to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Respondent.

Substantive Issue and its Ruling

Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo

warranto against Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment

complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives. YES

a. SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto. Section 5, Article VIII of the

Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto. This jurisdiction

is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Section 7, Rule 66 of

Rules of Court provides that the venue for an action for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC

when commenced by the Solicitor General. While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant
of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original

jurisdiction in this case is justified considering that the qualification of a Member of the Court is in

question, and the issue is of public concern.

The petition for quo warranto is of transcendental importance. The instant petition is one of first

impression and of paramount importance to the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility and

appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized

through an action for quo warranto.

b. On the argument that Respondent is an impeachable officer such that a quo warranto

petition cannot prosper, the Court held that the origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo

warranto are materially different. While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of

the public official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are

political in nature; while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the

courts. Furthermore, there is no forum-shopping, as alleged by the Respondent, because quo warranto and

impeachment can proceed independently and simultaneously, as they differ as to (1) jurisdiction (2)

grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. The causes

of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on

the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of a public office, while in impeachment, it is

the commission of an impeachable offense. Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are

different. Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be ordered to cease holding a public office,

which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction shall result in the

removal of the Respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. Furthermore, the

impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate.

Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against the Respondent. The proceedings in

the House are merely in the nature of a preliminary investigation whereby probable cause is sought to be

determined.
 Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo

warranto action against impeachable officers: “[T]he Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the

Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office ...” The provision uses

the permissive term “may” which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as

having a mandatory effect. An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of

effecting the removal.

II. Statement of the Problem

Whether the oust of CJ Sereno is against the following;

a. Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution

b. Separation of Powers

The oust of Chief Justice Sereno is against Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution.

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of

the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on

impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft

and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and

employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

In the above provision it is clearly stated that Members of the Supreme Court may be removed

from office by impeachment. The word “may be removed” in the provision should not be interpreted on

its literal meaning. According to Jusctice Leonen, “when construing the meaning of the Constitution, it is

not only the literal meaning of words and phrases that should be taken into consideration” and since it is

the Constitution, it should be taken into account that the authors intended every words according to their

intention and purpose. That is why the Constitution should be construed in the following manner;  (1)
within the entire document, (2) in the light of the textual history as seen in past Constitutions ratified by

our people, (3) within the meaning of precedents of this Court, and (4) in the light of contemporary

circumstances, which may not have been in the contemplation of those who ratified the Constitution, as

well as those who participated in the deliberation and decision of those who voted precedents in the light

of their written opinions, must likewise be considered. As what in the David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal

thus, stated:

“Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of

the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the

framework of the Constitution that

animates each of its components through the dynamism of these components' interrelations. What

is called into operation is the entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution

should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole that each provision must be

understood and effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution contains,

from its foundational principles to its finest fixings”.

Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution expressly provides the mode of removal from office of

the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the

Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. Removal from office of these public officers

shall only be by impeachment, and not through any other mode. In the case of Lecaroz vs.

Sandiganbayan, the court held that: “The above provision proscribes removal from office of the

aforementioned constitutional officers by any other methods…”

Accroding to Justice Carpio, “the provision mandating removal only by impeachment is the

Constitution's strongest guarantee of security of tenure”. The guarantee effectively blocks the use of other

legal ways of ousting an officer. Thus, in re: First Indorsement from Hon. Gonzales, the argument that a

sitting member of this Court may be subjected to disbarment proceedings, which could possibly result in
the sitting Justice being disbarred and thus not qualified for the position, was rejected by this

Court, thus:

“A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as

a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by

impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer”

Impeachment is a legislative process beyond the Court’s power of review, following the principle of

separation of powers.

According to the Constitution, the House of Representatives shall have the sole power to initiate

all cases of impeachment. Under 1973 Constitution which instituted a unicameral legislative body, the

process of impeachment was only vested in the Batasang Pambansa. It was thus both the initiator and trier

of impeachment cases. Next is the senate that has the sole power to try all cases of impeachment. Under

the 1935 Constitution Charter, the power to initiate impeachment proceedings was also exclusively vested

in the House of Representatives, while the power to try an decide all cases of impeachment, in the Senate.

Agreeing to Justice Caguiao, the exclusion of the judicial branch from exercising any power in

the impeachment process has a two-pronged purpose: 1) it insulates the legislature from judicial

encroachment, and 2) ensures the independence of the individual members of the court. To permit the

Court to exercise its judicial powers to determine the fate of its individual members would expose each to

the pressures of conformity at the risk of removal.

Quo warranto cannot proceed against a member of the Supreme Court. The Court’s action on the

Petition erodes judicial independence, and encroaches upon the legislatures’ impeachment powers. This

rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. Without the

protection of this rule, members of the Supreme Court would be vulnerable to all charges which might be

brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or other parties who seek to affect the exercise of judicial
authority by the Court. The House impeaches, and the Senate convicts. “This is the o n l y

method allowed under the Constitution, to remove a member of this Court, or allow any other

method is to re-write the Constitution” as stated by Justice Carpio. Even though quo wrranto is

proper, it has already prescribed. Rule 66, Section 11 expressly provides that a quo warranto action must

be instituted within one year after the cause of such ouster or the right of the petitioner to hold such office

or position arose. In Tumulak v. Egay, on the question of prescription, the Court held that the prescriptive

period for quo warranto actions ensures that the title to public office is not subjected to continued

uncertainty, as the people’s interest requires that such right should be determined as speedily as

practicable.

III. Conclusion

The oust of Chief Justice Sereno was a clear conduct of obstruction of justice, the

Court has construed “may be removed” as permissive in nature, consistent with the basic principle

that words used in law be given their ordinary meaning. Nevertheless, this general principle admits of

exceptions, as when “a contrary intent is manifest from the law itself” or when the act to which it

refers constitutes a public duty or concerns public interest. The phrase was interpreted in a plain

meaning and disregarded the origin, textual history or the real intention of the framers of

the Constitution.

The impeachment mechanism incorporated into the Constitution has been crafted to strengthen

the independence of the highest constitutional officers by freeing them from political pressure. The

steps taken by the Judiciary was as an act of grave abuse of their office as it violates the doctrine of

separation of powers, where the removal of the members of the Supreme Court only vests in the

Congress and not in the hands of the Judiciary where decisions might be imbued with politics and

self-interest, resulting to a prejudged case or unconstitutionality.

Bibliography:

S., D. L. H. (2014). Textbook on the Philippine constitution. Manila: Rex Book Store.

Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, 11 May 2018, Ponente: Associate
Justice Noel Tijam.
Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, 11 May 2018, Dissenting
Opinion: Jusctice Leonen.
Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, 11 May 2018, Dissenting
Opinion: Justice Carpio.
Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, 11 May 2018, Dissenting
Opinion: Justice Caguiao.