JURISDICTION

1. SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., VS. ANGELA V. MADAYAG,

Facts:
In 2001, Madayag filed with the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application for registration of a parcel
of land with an area of 1,492-m2 located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Attached to the
application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the LMS-DENR, Region 1, San
Fernando City. SM opposed the application because allegedly, the lot encroached on the properties it recently
purchased from several lot owners. SM also filed with the DENR a petition for cancellation of the survey plan.
Afterwhich, SM filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceeding in the land registration case
alleging that the trial court should wait for DENR’s resolution of the petition.

After the trial, the RTC suspended the registration proceedings on the ground that the petition for
cancellation of the survey plan filed by SM with DENR is prejudicial to the determination of the land
registration case since a survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in such proceedings. When
Madayag appealed to CA, the latter ratiocinated that the survey plan, which was duly approved by the DENR,
should be accorded the presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and determine all
questions arising from an application for registration.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over land registration proceedings is affected if there is a
petition filed in DENR to cancel the survey plan, one of the mandatory requirements in such proceedings.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that as an incident to its authority to settle all questions over the title of the
subject property, the land registration court may resolve the underlying issue of whether the subject property
overlaps the petitioner’s properties without necessarily having to declare the survey plan as void. Furthermore,
It stated that a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the issuance of a new certificate of
title will alter a valid and existing certificate of title. An application for registration of an already titled land
constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, which is not allowed by law. However, the RTC need not wait
for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in order to determine whether the subject
property is already titled or forms part of already titled property. The court may now verify this allegation
based on the respondent’s survey plan vis-à-vis the certificates of title of the petitioner and its
predecessors-ininterest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves to establish the true identity of the land to
ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land
registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any
adjoining land.

STATUS OF OTHER PRE EXISTING LAND REGISTRATION SYSTEM

2. HEIRS INTESTATE ESTATE OF DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO V. COURT OF APPEALS

This is a claim of a huge parcel of land covering lands in the provinces Nueva ecija, Bulacan, and in
cities including Quezon city.
 This case involves 2 cases, which prior to being decided by the SC were consolidated. The first case was
a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Ocampo, Buhain, and Dela Cruz. In the complaint,
it was alleged that the defendants (Ocampo - Dela Cruz) were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City titles to a portions of the claimed estate. In the end, the lower courts ruled in favor of Ocampo -
Dela Cruz, declaring
that the Torrens titles of the defendants cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad no.
4316.

The 2nd case is a petition for letters of adiministration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano
San Pedro Y Esteban. This involves a prayer to be declared as administrator. This case eventually ended in the
same manner as the first case - the Titulo de Prorpriedad was declared void and of no legal force, therefore the
lands covered by the Titulo are not within the estate of the deceased.

Issue:
W/N the Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and therefore the lands covered or claimed under such
title are not included in the estate of the deceased...

Held:
The Titulo is null and void. It has been defeated by the title of the defendants under the Torrens
system.

It is settled that by virtue of Pd no 892 which tool effect on Feb 16 1976 the syte of registration under
the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands
coverd thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act within 6mos from date of effectivity of the said
decree.

Proof of compliance (Certificate of Title) with the said decree should have been presented during trial.
LRA/ROD

3. PABAUS VS YUTIAMCO NO DIGEST

ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

4. CASE DIGEST: KRIVENKO VS. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA

FACTS:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was
interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deed on
ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of private
ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?

RULING:
 1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber,
and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. This means to say that, under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not
allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as
consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121
which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be
observed that the pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all private lands, whether
strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which
had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the
prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be
transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to
citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or
alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely
by way of reciprocity.

5. CASE DIGEST: BORROMEO VS DESCALLAR

FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love and live
together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names. However, when
the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an
alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, his name was erased but his
signature remained and the property was issued on the name of the Respondent alone. However their
relationship did not last long and they found new love.

Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum
of money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of
assignment it found out that said land was registered in the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint
against respondent for recovery of real property

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not transfer and
assign any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?
 2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make his the
owner thereof.

RULINGS:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the
properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the
house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of
Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale where he
signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the
subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed
properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of
co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar,
respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous
relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove
his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.

2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of
confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere possession of a title does not make one
the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in
her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.

6. RURAL BANK OF ANDA VS ARCH OF LINGAYEN

FACTS:
The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley, Pangasinan. Lot
736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form
part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imelda’s Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot
3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is
the building of Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.
Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on
TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of
Binmaley

In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736 from the
national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure was already bothering
the priests living in the seminary. The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east, west, and
center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day

In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was being
constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of Binmaley, Rolando
Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr.
Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped.
 On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and restore the
concrete fence. On20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the construction of the
building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to discuss with respondent to resolve
the problem concerning Lot 736.

On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On 24 August
1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are valid.

HELD:
The petition has no merit. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not
have title over Lot 736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management Services
in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to their office. Both
respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since Lot 736 has never
been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains part
of the public domain and is owned by the state

RATIO:
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and waters of
the public domain. Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: “All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state.”
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior grant
from the government. Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its
authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and
consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a
portion of Lot 736 is also void.

7. ​REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT

FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial confirmation of her
imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest
have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or
even the government until she filed her application for registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming
the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal
opposition to the petition.

The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration
on the grounds that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable.
Naguit could not have maintained a ​bona fide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as
alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject
land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a ​bona fide c​ laim of
ownership could even start.

RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.

There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject property is alienable and
disposable; (2) that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, and
exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945.

There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation stating the intention
of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and
disposable. However, if there has been none, it is presumed that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property and the possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into ownership through
acquisitive prescription.

To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction of Section 14 (1) would render the
paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public domain which were not
declared as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from
enforcing the said provision as it decides to reclassify lands as alienable and disposable.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now
over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence
agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her
predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.

8A. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of
Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the
land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of
Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot
9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo
Velazco to Malabanan.
 Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for
registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land
be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at
any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its
slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

3. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:
The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable,
subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial
or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty
(30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession,
according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for
public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

8B. NONE

9. DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. v. BASES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

FACTS:
Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims to represent more than
2,000 families who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985
"in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously."

On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 amending
Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298 the areas in Western Bicutan
open for disposition.

Now charging the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) of wrongfully asserting title to
Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting its members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions
among the residents, on November 22, 1999, the latter filed a letter-complaint with the COSLAP to seek its
assistance in the verification survey of the subject 78,466-sq m property, which they claimed is within Lot 1 of
Swo-13-000298 and thus is covered by Proclamation No. 172. They claim that they have been occupying the
area for thirty (30) years "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously for several years,"
and have built their houses of sturdy materials thereon and introduced paved roads, drainage and recreational
and religious facilities. Dream Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not among those transferred to the BCDA
under R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent applications by the occupants should be processed by the Land
Management Bureau (LMB).

On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the final report of the verification survey and a blueprint copy of
the survey plan from Atty. Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical Director for Lands of DENR. Specifically, Item No.
3 of the DENR report states:
3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. is outside Lot-1,
Swo-13-000298 and inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot 13, Swo-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78,466
square meters. Likewise, the area actually is outside Swo-00-0001302 of BCDA.

On the basis of the DENR’s verification survey report, the COSLAP resolved that Dream Village lies
outside of BCDA, and particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302, and thus directed the LMB of the DENR to
process the applications of Dream Village’s members for sales patent, noting that in view of the length of time
that they "have been openly, continuously and notoriously occupying the subject property in the concept of an
owner, x x x they are qualified to apply for sales patent on their respective occupied lots pursuant to R.A. Nos.
274 and 730 in relation to the provisions of the Public Land Act."

The CA in its Decision dated September 10, 2009 ruled that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the
complaint because the question of whether Dream Village is within the areas declared as available for
disposition in Proclamation No. 172 is beyond its competence to determine, even as the land in dispute has
been under a private title since 1906, and presently its title is held by a government agency, the BCDA, in
contrast to the case of Bañaga relied upon by Dream Village, where the disputed land was part of the public
domain and the disputants were applicants for sales patent thereto.
Dream Village’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the appellate court’s Order of July 13, 2010, thus the
petition for Review in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the area occupied by Dream Village, on the basis of the DENR’s verification survey
report, that sits on the abandoned C-5 Road, which lies outside the area of BCDA, declared in Proclamation
Nos. 2476 and 172 as alienable and disposable.

HELD:
NO. The petition is DENIED.

The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302 was abandoned by deviating
it northward to traverse the southern part of Libingan ng mga Bayani does not signify abandonment by the
government of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots would then become alienable and disposable. They
remain under the title of the BCDA, even as it is significant that under Section 8(d) of R.A. No. 7227, a
relocation site of 30.5 has. was to be reserved for families affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is
nowhere claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are part of the said relocation site. These lots
border C-5 Road in the south, making them commercially valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim
that the government has abandoned them to Dream Village.

Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."

Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if
there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

10. REPUBLIC vs. DOLDOL

FACTS:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Opol, Misamis Oriental. On
1963, he filed an application for saltworkpurposes for the said area but the Director of Forestry rejected the
same.Sometime in 1965, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed aresolution reserving a certain lot as
a school site. This lot unfortunatelyincluded the lot of Doldol.Sometime in 1970, the Opol High School filed a
complaint for accionpossessoria with the RTC, the court ruled on school’s power.On appeal, the CA reversed
the decision of teh court ruling that Doldolwas entitledto the portion he occupied, he having possessed the
same for 32years (1959-1991).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land indispute?

HELD:
No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) thatthe land is alienable public land
and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusiveand notorious possession and occupation of the same must either
be sincetime immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. Whenthe conditions set by law
are complied with the possessor of the land, byoperation of law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant,
without thenecessity of title/certificate of tile being issued. The evidence presented shows that the land in
dispute is alienable anddisposable in accordance with the District Forester’s Certification. Doldolthus meets the
first requirement.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to thedisputed land since his
occupation of the same started only in 1955, muchlater than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the
conditions set forthby law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a rightto assert a right
superior to the school given that then Pres. Aquino hadreserved the lot for Opol National School.“The privilege
occupying public lands with a view of pre-emptingconfers no contractual or vested right in the land occupied
and the authorityof the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public,or to reserve
them for public use, prior to divesting by the government of title thereof stands eventhough this may defeat
the imperfect right of settler.Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawfulsettlement on
them can be acquired” (Solicitor General)In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over
theland in dispute

11. OH CHO VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they
openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration
of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because
he was an alien.

ISSUEs:
 Whether or not Oh Cho had title
Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration

HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration
Act.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest.

The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first
predecessor in interest began in 1880.

Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an
alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.

Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration had they applied
for the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was not
complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This possessory
right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never
ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by
prescription.