Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass. Inc. vs. Feliciano 13 SCRA 377 PDF

9/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 013
VOL. 13, MARCH 3, 1965 377

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs.
Feliciano
No. L-24022. March 3, 1965.
ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS

ASSOCIATION,INC., ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON.JOSE
Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., respondents.
Statutes; Rice Importation; Republic Act 2207 authorizing

government rice importation still stands.—The provision of
Republic Act 2207 on government importation of rice still stands
Section 2 of said Act, among other things, provides that should
there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of
rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and
this is certified by the National Economic Council, the President
of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru any
government agency that he may designate.
Same; Same; Republic Act 2207 not impliedly repealed by
Republic Act 3452.—Republic Act 8452 only authorizes
importation during normal times, but when there is a shortage in
the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national
emergency, we have to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws,
therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not
ensue.
Same; Statutory construction; General repealing clause;
Presumption against implied repeal.—A repealing clause in an
Act which provides that “all laws or parts thereof inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly” is certainly not an express repealing clause because
it fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to
be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended
repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be
found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the
presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict
construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore.
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017484d996705e9f0e51003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/24
Statutes; Rice Importation; Republic Act 2207 authorizing rice

importation repealed by Republic Act 3452.—The extraordinary
emergency power to import rice and corn through any government
agency, granted to the President by Section 2 of Republic Act
2207, has been repealed by Section 10 or Republic Act 3452. A
presentation in parallel columns of the two provisions of said Acts
makes it apparent at first sight that said provisions contradict
each other. First in policy: because under Republic Act No. 2207,
the general rule is that no person or entity, public or private, shall
Import rice and corn; while under the latter Act, Republic Act No.
3452, the
378
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano
importation of rice and corn is left to private parties, with no

restriction other than the payment of taxes. Second, in procedure:
under Republic Act 2207, the President, in case of emergency,
may import rice and corn in quantities certified by the National
Economic Council as necessary, through any government agency
that he may designate; while by Act 3252 any government agency
is prohibited from importing rice and corn, said prohibition being
express, absolute, total, and unconditional. Not only this, but
violation of the prohibition is sanctioned by a P10,000 fine and
imprisonment for not more than 5 years (Sec. 15, Act 3452).
Same; Republic Act 3452 authorizes only private parties to
import rice and corn.—The expression in Section 10 of Act 3452:
Sec. 10 x x x “Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration or
any other government agency is hereby prohibited from importing
rice and corn: Provided, further, That the importation of rice and
corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding
taxes”, can only mean that the Administration must desist from
importing, and leave to private parties the task of bringing such
cereals from without in order to make up for whatever shortages
in production should occur.
Same; Statutory Construction; Revision of Laws; Whatever is
excluded in revised law is repealed.—While as a general rule,
implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored, yet
if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a
repeal of the earlier act (Posadas vs. National City Bank of New
York, 296 U.S. 497, 80 Law Ed. 513) in such a revision of the law,
whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed.
Same; Rice Importation; Seeking permission to import rice in

1964 is estoppel to assert that Republic Act 2207 still exists.—The
very fact that the Administration went to and obtained from the
Legislature permission to import 300,000 metric tons of rice
during the calendar year 1964 (Rep. Act No. 3848), and made use
of that permission, is the best proof that the Executive felt that its
former power under Republic Act No. 2207 no longer existed after
the passage of Republic Act No. 3452. Such action places the
Administration in estoppel to assert the contrary. If anything, it
meant that to import rice now, the Executive must first obtain an
enabling law.
Same; Same; Financing of government importation of rice
violates Constitution.—The financing by the Government of its
foreign purchases of rice would violate the Constitutional
restraint against paying money out of the Treasury, “except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Art. VI, sec. 23, par.
3), and no law making such appropriation has been enacted.
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Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc, vs.
Feliciano
ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court, Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Jose C. Zulueta and Ramon A. Gonzales for
petitioners.
Solicitor General for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and

General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration,
wrote the President of the Philippines urging the
immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru
a government agency which the President may designate,
pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic
Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of
1964.
On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said
letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28,
1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On
January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and
Corn Administration as the government agency authorized
to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman
Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said

importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965.
Considering that said importation is contrary to
Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government from
importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds
to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters,
Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his
capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this
Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity
as Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, from conducting the bid scheduled on the
date abovementioned, and from doing any other act that
may result in the contemplated importation until further
orders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear,
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General
were made co-respondents.
Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for
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Feliciano
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which, in

due course, this Court granted upon petitioners’ filing a
bond in the amount of P50,000.00. This bond having been
filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.
Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the
essential allegations of the petition though they adduced
reasons which justify the importation sought to be made.
They anchor the validity of the importation on the
provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still
stand.
It is petitioners’ contention that the importation in
question being undertaken by the government even if there
is a certification by the National Economic Council that
there is a shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity
as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the
same is prohibited by Republic Act 3452 which, in its
Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is
only left to private parties upon payment of the
corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn
Administration, or any other government agency, is
prohibited from doing so.
It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the
importation of rice and corn exclusively to private parties
thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency, but from

this it does not follow that at present there is no law which
permits the government to undertake the importation of
rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in our
opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter
still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Act wherein,
among other things, it provides that should there be an
existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of
such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and
this is certified by the National Economic Council, the
President of the Philippines may authorize such
importation thru any government agency that he may
designate. Here there is no dispute that the National
Economic Council has certified that there is such shortage
present which, because of its gravity, constitutes a national
emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President
lost no time
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Feliciano
in authorizing, after consulting his cabinet, the General

Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to
immediately undertake the needed importation in order to
stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore, no
plausible reason why the disputed importation should be
prevented as petitioners now desire.
The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been
repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable in the light of
the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws.
Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic Act 3452 contains a
repealing clause which provides: “All laws or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.” The question may now
be asked: what is the nature of this repealing clause? It is
certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be
repealed [Sutherland, Statutory Construction, (1943) Vol. 1,
p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended
repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must
be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case,
the presumption against implied repeals and the rule
against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply
ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to
know the existing laws so that, if a repeal is intended, the
proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance Co. v.

Simpson, 8 F (2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P
(2d) 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E. 876].
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that
the intent was not to repeal any existing law (Crawford,
Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the
terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such
inconsistency.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common
objective, refer to different methods applicable to different
circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation
under normal conditions as provided for in Republic Act
2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency
program of the Administration. The philosophy behind the
banning is that any importation of rice during a period of
suffi-
382

Feliciano
ciency or even of a minor shortage will unduly compete

with the local producers and depress the local price which
may discourage them from raising said crop. On the other
hand, a price support program and a partial ban of rice
importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another
step adopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the
two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective,
their methods of approach are different; one is by a total
ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the
same being applicable only to the government during
normal period.
There is another area where the two laws find a common
point of reconciliation: the normalcy of the time underlying
both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation
Republic Act 2207 covers three different situations: (1)
when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local
consumption; (2) when the local produce falls short of the
supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a
national emergency; and (3) when the shortage on the local
supply of rice is of such gravity as to constitute a national
emergency. Under the first two situations, no importation
is allowed whether by the government or by the private
sector. However, in the case of the third situation, the law
authorizes importation by the government.
Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with

situations 1 and 2, but not with 3. Nowhere in said law can
we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in
the local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a
national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only
authorizes importation during normal times, but when
there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to
constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to
Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore, are not
inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates
importation during normal times is bolstered by a
consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress
of House Bill No. 11511 which was presented in answer to
the
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Feliciano
request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby

power to import rice in the Philippines. On this matter, we
quote the following views of Senators Padilla and
Almendras:
“SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452

there is a proviso in Sec. 10 thereof ‘that the Rice and
Corn Administration or any government agency is
hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn.’
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal
conditions.
SENATOR PADILLA: ‘Provided further’, it says, ‘that the
importation of rice, and corn is left to private parties
upon payment of the corresponding tax.’ So therefore,
the position of the Committee as expressed by the
distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No.
3452 is applicable under normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: “Yes”. (Senate Debate, June 16,
1964)
Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic

Act 3452 which gives to the President authority to declare
a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in
the public interest and, during the emergency, to conduct
raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in
any private warehouse or bodega subject to constitutional
limitations, to support the claim that said Act also bans

importation on the part of the government even in case of
an emergency. The contention is predicated on a
misinterpretation of the import and meaning of said
provision. Note that the section refers to an emergency
where there is an artificial shortage because of the
apparent hoarding undertaken by certain unscrupulous
dealers) or businessmen, and not to an actual serious
shortage of the commodity because, if the latter exists,
there is really nothing to raid, seize or confiscate, because
the situation creates a real national emergency. Congress
by no means could have intended under such a situation to
deprive the government of its right to import to stave off
hunger and starvation. Congress knows that such remedy
is worthless as there is no rice to be found in the
Philippines. Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting
hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy cannot produce
the rice
384

Feliciano
needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient

rice stocked in the private warehouses and bodegas such
confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual emergency, in
which case we have to turn to Republic Act 2207.
The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious
parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a
rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have
shown, it is the duty of this Court to adopt such
interpretation that would give effect to both laws.
Conversely, in order to effect a repeal by implication, the
latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and
repugnant to the prior existing law [United States v.
Greathouse, 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix
Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond v. McDonald, 32 Cal.
App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, supra, p. 462]. The old and the new laws
must be absolutely incompatible (Compañia General de
Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere
difference in the terms and provisions of the statutes is not
sufficient to create a repugnancy between them. There
must be such a positive repugnancy between the provisions
of the old and the new statutes that they cannot be made to
reconcile and stand together (Crawford, Construction of
Statute, supra, p. 631). The clearest case possible must

first be made before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn [Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency
is never presumed.
Republic Act 3848 entitled “An Act Providing for the
Importation of Rice During the Calendar Year Nineteen
Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local
Supply” cannot be given any nullifying value, as it is
pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that
“except as provided in this Act, no other agency or
instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to
purchase rice from abroad.” The reason is that it is a mere
temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its title
reads, it is merely an authority to import rice during the
year 1964. The same, therefore, is now functus officio at
least on the matter of importation.
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Feliciano
Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section

4 thereof provides that pending prosecutions for any
violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be
affected by said Act 3848 the implication is that the
aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision
is merely a safeguard placed therein in order that the
prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated with
the enactment of Republic Act 3848 because the latter
provides for penal provisions which call for lesser penalty.
The intention is to except them from the rule that penal
statutes can be given retroactive effect if favorable to the
accused.
To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has
not been impliedly repealed by Republic Act 3452, we wish
to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some
senators during the discussion of House Bill 11511 already
mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill
was presented to accede to the request of the President for
a stand-by power to import in case of emergency in view of
the uncertainty of the law, but that during the discussion
thereof it was strongly asserted and apparently upheld that
such request for authority was not necessary because
Republic Act 2207 was still in force. It is probably for this
reason that said bill, after having been approved by the
Senate, was killed in the conference committee that
considered it. These views, while not binding, are of

persuasive authority and throw light on the issue relative
to the effectivity of Republic Act 2207.
“SENATOR LIWAG: x x x Now Mr. Chairman, is it the

sense of the Committee that in the case of emergency, in
case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under
the provisions of R.A. No. 2207.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your
Honor, in this paragraph (c), Section 2, page 2, that
when we say ‘under the provisions of existing law,’ we
are referring to R.A. No. 2207.
x x x x
SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section

2 paragraph (c) of the amendment by substitution
reads:
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Feliciano
‘Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of

extreme and under the provisions of existing laws.’
I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No.
2207 and Republic Act No. 3452. Does this section in the proposed
bill by substitution recognize the continued existence of the
pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act
No. 3452 on rice importation?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your

Honor, why we struck out the stand-by power on the
part of the President to import rice.
x x x
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee,

Your Honor, because of the existing law—that is,
Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207—that
is the reason your Committee eliminated that stand-by
power of the President to import rice. Because you know,
Your Honor, what is the use of that stand-by power,
inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic
Act No. 2207 the President can designate any
government agency to import rice?
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear

because in the decision of the Supreme Court, as I said,
there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-
existence or implied repeal between these two Acts.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the
gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag, informed
me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view,
but we want to make that clear xxx.
SENATOR PADILLA: ‘Provided, further,’ it says, ‘That the
importation of rice and corn is left to private parties
upon payment of the corresponding taxes.’ So, therefore,
the position of the Committee, as expressed by the
distinguished sponsor is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No.
3452 is applicable under normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in
existence.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
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Feliciano
SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.
x x x x
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two

views already expressed on whether Republic Act No.
2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One
view sustains the theory that there has been a repeal of
Republic Act No. 2207 by Republic Act No. 3452 insofar
as rice importation is concerned. The other view is that
there is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state
clearly which side prevails. I take the view that the two
laws can be reconciled x x x.
Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain

that they are not totally repugnant to each other, that it is possible for
them to stand together except on certain points: First, is importation in
case of a national emergency certified by the National Economic Council
permissible? By reading the two provisos together I would say yes
because there is nothing in .the proviso contained in Republic Act No.
3452 which would be inconsistent with importation during a shortage
amounting to a national emergency.”
Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that

when said House Bill No. 11511 was finally approved by
the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals,
among others, Republic Act No. 2207 (Section 14), but
which bill, as already said, was later killed in the
conference committee. This attitude clearly reveals that
Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with
regard to future importations.
Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary
appropriation to finance the importation in question,
suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National
Rice and Corn Corporation is authorized to borrow, raise
and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out
its objectives. We refer to Section 3(e) of said Act which
empowers said corporation to secure money and to
encumber any property it has as a guaranty, and Republic
Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and Corn
Administration, transferred its functions and powers, to
the latter, including the power to borrow money under
Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough power
with which to finance the importation in question.
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Feliciano
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of

preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby
dissolved. Costs against petitioners.
Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and

Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ.,
concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes.
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
It is regrettable that in their effort to uphold the

Government’s power to import rice, under Section 2 of
Republic Act 2207, the majority opinion seems to have
overlooked that the repeal of statutes is primarily a matter
of legislative intention; and that on its face, Republic Act
No. 3452 was plainly intended to supersede the prior law,
Republic Act No. 2207.
The specific issue, in brief, is whether the extraordinary

emergency power to import rice and corn, granted to the
President by Section 2 of Republic Act 2207, may still be
considered as subsisting at present, notwithstanding the
terms of Section 10 of the subsequent Republic Act No.
3452.
For convenience, we present in parallel columns the
specific provisions of the respective acts:
REP. ACT NO. 2207 REP. ACT NO. 3452

(1959) (1962)
“SEC.2. Prohibition. It shall be “SEC. 10. x x x Provided,
unlawful for any person, that the Rice and Corn
association, corporation or Administration or any
government agency to import other government agency
rice and corn into any point in is hereby prohibited
the Philippines: Provided, from importing rice and
however, That should there be corn: Provided, further,
an existing or imminent That the importation of
shortage in the local supply of rice and corn is left to
the abovementioned private parties upon
commodities of such gravity as payment of the
to constitute a national corresponding taxes.”
emergency, upon (Italics supplied)
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Feliciano
certification
to this effect
by the
National
Economic
Council,
based on the
studies of
the Office of
Statistical
Coordination
of said body,
the President
of the
Philippines
may
authorize the
importation
of the
commodities,
through any
government
agency that
he may
designate in
such
quantities as
the National
Economic
Council may
determine
necessary to
cover the
shortage,
subject to
the taxes,
duties
and/or
special
charges as
now
provided by
law:
Provided,
further, That
contracts for
such
importation
shall be only
on straight-
sales basis,
and awarded
only after a
public
bidding,
with sealed
bids.”
(Italics
supplied)
It is apparent at first sight that the two provisions

contradict each other. First, in policy; because under
Republic Act No. 2207, the general rule is that no person or
entity, public or private, shall import rice and corn; while
under the later Act, Republic Act No. 3452, the importation
of rice and corn is left to private parties, with no restriction
other than the payment of taxes. Second, in procedure;
under Republic Act 2207, the President, in case of

emergency, may import rice and corn in quantities certified
by the National Economic Council as, necessary, through
any government agency that he may designate; while by Act
3452 any government agency is prohibited from importing
rice and corn, said prohibition being express, absolute,
total, and unconditional. Not only this, but violation of the
prohibition is sanctioned by a P10,000 fine and
imprisonment for not more than 5 years (sec. 15, Act 3452).
We cannot see how the majority opinion can contend
that the presidential power to make importations of rice
and corn still subsists, in view of the unqualified terms of
Republic Act 3452. If any government agency is pro-
390

Feliciano
hibited from importing rice and corn by the later law, and
the violation of the prohibition is penalized by fine and
imprisonment, in what manner can the President make the
importation? He cannot do so directly, since Act 2207
specifically requires that it be done “through any
government agency”. How, then, may he import?
It is unnecessary to resort to legal gymnastics in order to
realize why this must be so. Suffice it to note that the
Administration’s power to import rice in certified
emergencies under Act 2207 was but a mere corollary to
the total ban on rice and corn imports under that Act, and
the existence of such exceptional import power necessarily
depended on the continuation of that total prohibition.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2207 clearly shows how
intimate was this dependence between the emergency
imparting authority granted to the government and the
maintenance of the normal non-import policy.
“SEC. 2. Prohibition: It shall be unlawful for any person,

association, corporation or government agency to import rice arid
corn into any point in the Philippines, provided, however, that
should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local
supply of the above-mentioned commodities, of such gravity as to
constitute a national emergency, upon certification to this effect by
the National Economic Council, based on the studies of the Office
of Statistical Coordination of said body, the President of the
Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities,
through any government agency that he may designate, in such
quantities as the National Economic Council may determine

necessary to cover the shortage, subject to taxes, duties and/or
special charges as now provided by law; provided, further, that
contracts for such importation shall be only on straight sales
basis, and awarded only after a public bidding, with sealed bids.”
(Italics supplied)
So closely linked were the policy and the emergency import

power that the latter was not even set apart in a section.
Therefore, repeal of the absolute ban on imports, prescribed
in the opening portion of the section quoted, necessarily
entails the disappearance of the emergency power to
import rice and corn established by the later part of the
same legal provision. Where the basic rule disappears, the
exception thereto must necessarily cease to
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Feliciano
operate, since the exception becomes automatically functus

officio for lack of basis.
The total banning of cereal imports logically, under Act
2207, meant that whenever the domestic crop became
insufficient to satisfy the demand for rice and corn, the
latter had to be brought from outside to fill the gap; and
the legislature decided (in Act 2207) that it should be done
through governmental agencies. But under Republic Act
3452, the total prohibition to import disappeared, and
private parties were authorized to bring in the cereals at
any time; hence, the exceptional importing power of the
Government lost all reason for its existence, because the
private imports allowed by Act 3452 were contemplated
and intended to make up for the difference between
demand and supply, without necessity of government
intervention. In truth, the expression in Section 10 of Act
3452—
“SEC. 10. xxx. Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration
or any other government agency is hereby prohibited from
importing rice and corn; Provided, further, That the importation
of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the
corresponding taxes.” (Italics supplied)
can only mean that the Administration must desist from

importing, and leave to private parties the task of bringing
such cereals from without in order to make up for whatever

shortages in production should occur.
That only private parties, and not the government, can
import the cereals finds confirmation in the legislative
journals. In the Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30,
1962, page 1360, containing the transcript of the Senate
debates on the bill that later became Republic Act No.
3452, the following appears:
“CUENCO AMENDMENT
“Mr. CUENCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 3, line 16, change the period
(.) to colon (:) and add the following: PROVIDED, THAT THE
RICE AND CORN ADMINISTRATION OR ANY OTHER
GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS HEREBY PROHIBITED FROM
IMPORTING RICE AND CORN: PROVIDED, FURTHER THAT
THE IMPORTATION OF RICE AND CORN IS LEFT TO
PRIVATE PARTIES UPON PAYMENT OF THE
CORRESPONDING TAXES.
392

Feliciano
“Mr. OCAMPO. Suppose there is a calamity, Mr. Speaker.

“Mr. CUENCO. Leave that to private parties.
“Mr. OCAMPO. Accepted, Mr. Speaker.
“The SPEAKER. Is there any objection? (After a pause). The
chair does not hear any. The amendment is approved.”
(Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, p. 1360)
The Senate Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962, also contains the
following illuminating remarks:
“SENATOR LEDESMA: So it is on the understanding then, Your

Honor, that we could proceed with the discussion.
“Your Honor, House Bill No. 339, as I have already stated,
specifically provides that appointment of personnel should be in
accordance with the Civil Service Law as well as with the
WAPCO. It seems to me that this provision is very laudable and
very, very reasonable. The second important feature in this
proposed measure is that it prohibits importation by the
government, I think this should be clarified in the sense that, at
the same time, it allows importation by private parties but with
the payment of the corresponding duties. Or rather, under House
Bill No. 339, the general policy which is being set in the proposed
measure is that the government should not resort to importation
but that importation of the cereal is open at all times to any citizen
of this country so long as he pays the corresponding duties and
other taxes which are imposed by our government.” (Senate
Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962)
It is thus clear that if section 18 of Republic Act 3452 providing
that—
“All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly”,
intended to refer to any preceding statute at all, it must

have referred to Republic Act No. 2207. Hence, the
Presidential power to import no longer exists.
In arguing in favor of the Government’s power to import
even now, the majority opinion avers that Republic Act No.
3452 is designed to apply only to normal times and
conditions. This is plainly absurd, for in normal times,
when production equals consumption, no importation need
be authorized, for none will be required.
The majority opinion stresses that Republic Act 3452
does not repeal Act 2207 in express terms. Granting ar-
393
VOL. 13, MARCH 3, 1965 393

Feliciano
guendo that this were true, despite the express prohibition

of government imports in section 10 of the later Act, yet it
does not elucidate why the legislature found it necessary,
or expedient, to enact an entirely different law, instead of
merely providing for the amendment of the prior statute
(R.A. 2207). If both laws were designed to attain the same
end, rice and corn sufficiency for our country, and only a
change of method was intended, why enact two statutes not
only unconnected with each other, but actually
contradictory?
That the two laws are inconsistent with each other
cannot be gainsaid. Under Act 2207, no person or entity,
public or private, could import rice or corn, since under
Section 2 thereof “it shall be unlawful for any person,
association, corporation or government entity to import rice
and corn”; while under Act 3452, on the contrary,
“importation of rice and corn is left to private parties” (sec.
10) at any time, with no other restriction than the payment
of taxes. How can it be said that the two laws, with so
diametrically opposite philosophies, were intended to co-
exist?
Because the two laws covering the same field are plainly
incompatible with each other (since private importation of
rice and corn cannot, at the same time, be unlawful under
Act 2207 and lawful under Act 3452), it is inescapable to
conclude that the later statute (Act 3452) is, and must have
been, intended to revise, supersede, and replace the former
law (Act 2207). The established rule in this jurisdiction in
such a case is that—
“While as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a

later one is not favored, yet if the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute it
will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act (Posadas vs.
National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 80 Law Ed. 351)”
(quoted and applied in In re Guzman, 73 Phil. 52).
1
repealed (In re Guzman, supra, at pp. 52-53).
pines adopted the American doctrine that in such a revi-
________________
1 Rule reiterated in Joaquin vs. Navarro, 81 Phil. 373; In re Resaba, 95 Phil.

247; Beysa vs. Court of First Instance, 52 Off. Gaz., No. 7, p. 3572.
394

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano
sion of the law, whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed (In

re Guzman supra, at pp. 52-53).1
“It has been held that ‘where the legislature frames a new
statute upon a certain subject-matter, and the legislative
intention appears from the latter statute to be to frame a new
scheme in relation to such subject-matter and make a revision of
the whole subject, that whatever is embraced in the new statute
shall prevail, and that whatever is excluded is discarded’. (People
v. Thornton, 186 Ill. 162, 173, 75 N.E. 841.)
“And an author says: ‘So where there are two statutes on tlie
same subject, passed at different dates, and it is plain from the
frame-work and substance of the last that it was intended to cover
the whole subject, and to be a complete and perfect system or
provision in itself, the last must be held to be a legislative
declaration that whatever is embraced in it shall prevail and
whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed.’ “
Or, as more tersely put in Madison vs. Southern Wisconsin

R. Co., 10 A. L. R. 910, at page 915:
“6. A subsequent statute, evidently intended as a substitute for

one revised, operates as a repeal of the latter without any express
words to that effect; and so any distinct provision of the old law,
not incorporated into the later one, is to be deemed to have been
intentionally annulled. Smith, Stat. Constr. sec. 784; Bartlett v.
King, 12 Mass. 537, 7 Am. Dec. 99.”
This rule, expressly adopted by this very Supreme Court,

utterly destroys the contention of the majority opinion that
because the Government’s power under Republic Act 2207,
to make imports of rice and corn in case of certified
emergency, is nowhere expressly repealed by Republic Act
3452, such power must be still deemed to exist. No such
power can now exist for the reason that the Act conferring
it was totally and unconditionally superseded and repealed
by Act 3452. The contradictory philosophies of both Acts
testify to that effect.
The majority also avers that Republic Act No. 3452 does
not contemplate situations where the shortage in local
supply is of such gravity as to constitute a national emer-
395
VOL. 13, MARCH 3, 1965 395

Feliciano
gency. It also asserts that Act 3452 refers only to artificial

shortages through hoarding, and does not cover natural
shortages where the rice and corn crops do not suffice to
meet the demands of consumption. Unfortunately, the
opposite of these assertions is precisely true. Thus,
Section 1 of Act 3452 provides: “The Government shall engage in

the purchase of these basic foods from tenants, farmers, growers,
producers and landowners in the Philippines xxx and whenever
circumstances brought about by any cause, natural or artificial,
should so require, (the Government) shall sell and dispose of these
commodities to the consumers x x x.”
Section 3 of Act 3452—“With a view to regulating the level of
supply of rice and corn throughout the country, the
Administration is authorized to accumulate stocks as a national
reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to
meet any contingencies. x x x.”
Section 12, Act 3462—“The President of the Philippines is
hereby authorized to declare a rice and corn emergency any time
he deems necessary in the public interest. During the emergency
period, the Rice and Corn Administration, upon the direction of
the President, shall, subject to constitutional limitation, conduct

raids, seizures, and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in any
private warehouse or bodega: Provided, That the Rice and Corn
Administration shall pay such confiscated rice and corn at the
prevailing consumer’s price of the Rice and Corn Administration.”
(Italics supplied)
Certainly the words used by the statute, “any cause,

natural or artificial”, “any contingencies”, “rice and corn
emergency” are broad enough to cover all contingencies,
natural deficiency due to insufficient production, as well as
artificial shortages due to hoarding. The terms employed
exempt the legislature from the accusation that it still has
left some emergency unprovided for. What it did deny the
Government was the power to import rice and corn
whenever it so chooses; instead, the law expressly
prescribed “that the Rice and Corn Administration or any
government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice
and corn” (sec. 10, R.A. 3452), a command that, as
previously observed, squarely contradicts and vacates that
permission to import previously granted under Republic
Act 2207. The Government, therefore, may not now bring
396

Feliciano
in rice and corn from abroad, unless special legislative

authorization is first obtained, as was done for 1964 by
Republic Act No. 3848.
The very fact that the Administration went to and
obtained from the Legislature permission to import 300,000
metric tons of rice during the calendar year 1964 (Rep. Act
No. 3848), and made use of that permission, is the best
proof that the Executive felt that its former power under
Republic Act No. 2207 no longer existed after the passage
of Republic Act No. 3452. Such action places the
Administration in estoppel to assert the contrary. Why
should it seek authority to make importation during 1964 if
it still possessed that granted by Republic Act 2207?
Note that, in consenting the Government’s importing
300,000 tons of rice in 1964, the Legislature once more
reaffirmed the prohibition of further government imports
in section 6 of the enabling law, Republic Act No. 3848:
“SEC. 6.—Except as provided in this Act, no other agency or

instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase
rice from abroad.” (Italics supplied)
which is a virtual repetition of the restraint imposed by

Republic Act 3452. In addition, the law imposed the further
condition that the importation be made only upon two-
thirds vote of the National Economic Council, where
Republic Act 2207 specified no particular majority.
The main opinion seeks to minimize the effect of these
reiterated prohibitions by claiming that said section 6 was
intended to operate only for 1964. If that had been the
intention, then section 6 was absolutely unnecessary,
because the authority given by Act 3848 was a limitation in
itself, as it only permitted the importation of 300,000
metric tons for the calendar year 1964. Under such a grant,
any excess beyond the quantity fixed, and any import after
1964, were automatically forbidden. The enactment of
section 6 of Act 3848, therefore, was an actual reassertion
of the policy of outlawing Government imports, as declared
in Republic Act 3452. If anything, it meant
397
VOL. 13, MARCH 3, 1965 397

Feliciano
that to import rice now, the Executive must first obtain an

enabling law.
Moreover, the financing by the Government of its foreign
purchase of rice would violate the Constitutional restraint
against paying money out of the Treasury, “except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Art. VI, sec.
23, par. 3), and no law making such appropriation has been
enacted. Under the Revised Administrative Code, sections
606 and 607, no contract involving the expenditure of
public funds can be made without previous appropriation
therefor, duly certified by the Auditor General. Nor can
these inhibitions be evaded by the ruse of causing a
Government agency to barrow the funds required for the
purpose, considering that any and all government agencies
are flatly forbidden to import rice (Republic Act 3452, sec.
10), and the borrowing of funds to finance importation is
essential for the execution thereof.
Finally, we see no point in the quotations from
statements made in the Senate during the deliberations on
House Bill No. 11511. That bill never became law, and is
not before the Court. The statements quoted are not

binding, this Court having the exclusive prerogative of
construing the legislative enactments.
The effect in the majority decision is, after the
Legislature had expressly prohibited government agencies
to import rice and corn, and after the lawmaking body
refused to pass the bill (House Bill No. 11511) granting the
Executive a stand-by authority to import, a decision of this
Court now reverses this clear policy of the Legislature, and
hands the Executive a blanket power to do what the laws
have expressly forbidden.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—A special statute, providing for a particular

case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent
statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications,
unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although
the terms
398

De Miraflores vs. Hilado
of the general law are broad enough to include the cases

embraced in the special law. (Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Rafferty, 40 Phil. 225, 228; City of Manila vs. Public Service
Commission, 52 Phil. 515; National Power Corporation vs.
Arca, 25 SCRA 931.) In the above Iloilo Palay & Corn
Planters Association case, Republic Act 3452 does not
expressly repeal Republic Act 2207, but only repeals or
modifies those parts thereof that are inconsistent with its
provisions.
The importation of rice authorized by the Executive
Secretary in Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230, was
held illegal because the conditions set forth by the Rice and
Corn Importation Laws (Rep. Act Nos. 2207 and 3452) had
not been complied with therein.
In this later case, it was held that Republic Act 3452
only authorizes importation of rice during normal times,
but when there is a national emergency, Republic Act 2207
applies. These two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent
with each other.
______________
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9/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 013

VOL. 13, MARCH 3, 1965 377

No. L-24022. March 3, 1965.

ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS

Statutes; Rice Importation; Republic Act 2207 authorizing

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

Statutes; Rice Importation; Republic Act 2207 authorizing rice

378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano

importation of rice and corn is left to private parties, with no

Same; Rice Importation; Seeking permission to import rice in

VOL. 13, MARCH 3, 1965 379

ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court, Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and

Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said

380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which, in

Administration or any other government agency, but from

VOL. 13, MARCH 3, 1965 381

in authorizing, after consulting his cabinet, the General

proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance Co. v.

382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ciency or even of a minor shortage will unduly compete

Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with

VOL. 13, MARCH 3, 1965 383

request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby

“SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452

Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic

limitations, to support the claim that said Act also bans

384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient

Statute, supra, p. 631). The clearest case possible must

VOL. 13, MARCH 3, 1965 385

Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section

considered it. These views, while not binding, are of

“SENATOR LIWAG: x x x Now Mr. Chairman, is it the

x x x x

SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section

386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

‘Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee,

SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear

VOL. 13, MARCH 3, 1965 387

SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.

x x x x

SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two

Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain

Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that

388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of

Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

It is regrettable that in their effort to uphold the

The specific issue, in brief, is whether the extraordinary

REP. ACT NO. 2207 REP. ACT NO. 3452

VOL. 13, MARCH 3, 1965 389

It is apparent at first sight that the two provisions

under Republic Act 2207, the President, in case of

390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“SEC. 2. Prohibition: It shall be unlawful for any person,