The Fall of Benin: A Reassessment

Author(s): Philip A. Igbafe

Source: The Journal of African History , 1970, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1970), pp. 385-400
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/180345

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Jtournal of African History, XI 3, (1970), pp. 385-400 385
Printed in Great Britain

THE FALL OF BENIN: A REASSESSMENT'

BY PHILIP A. IGBAFE

DESPITE the fact that Europeans had been in trading contact with Benin
for some four centuries, and despite the increasing use by British consuls
of gun-boats to protect British trade and interests, and to intervene in
the affairs of African states on the Bights of Benin and Biafra2, it was not
until well into the second half of the nineteenth century that the kingdom
of Benin became a matter of official concern to Britain. The consular activi-
ties and 'gun-boat politics'3 were essentially coastal, and the territories
under the effective rule of the Obas of Benin were long untouched by
British commercial and political influences. The first British inroad into
this isolation of Benin came with the visit of Richard Burton in i862,
while he was British consul at Fernando Po. In his subsequent book,
Burton emphasized the moral degeneracy of the people, the decline of their
standard of civilization and the 'bloody customs'. He described Benin as
a place of 'gratuitous barbarity which stinks of death'. Burton's account
was given wide publicity4 and therefore became a threat to the indepen-
dence of Benin.
It is tempting to argue that subsequent consular attempts to visit Benin
were motivated by the desire to confirm the 'uncivilized' practices which
Burton's account publicized. It is true that such accounts stirred the con-
sciences of many in an age when the industrial revolution had made
humanitarianism a fashionable doctrine, and when the trade in tropical
products had replaced the slave-trade as 'legitimate' trade. The events
which followed Burton's visit do not, however, bear out the contention
that the pressure of officials on Benin in the i 89os was due to humani-
tarian considerations. Rather, the increased pressure to bring Benin into
the sphere of consular control was occasioned by commercial considerations.5
The rich products of Benin forests had to be exploited. Penetration into
the Oba's territories was a prerequisite if access to these forests was to be
gained. Freedom to exploit the forests implied the co-operation or sub-
ordination of the powerful ruler at Benin, who was, in any case, not willing

1 It should be pointed out that this article was written before the appearance of
Professor A. F. C. Ryder's Benin and the Europeans, 1485-1897 (London, I969). All F.O.
and C.O. references are to records at the Public Record Office, London. Except when
otherwise stated, other references are to documents at the National Archives, Ibadan,
Nigeria.
2 The most notable of these Consuls was John Beecroft. See K.O. Dike, 'John Beecroft,
I790-i854: Her Britannic Majesty's Consul to the Bights of Benin and Biafra, I849-I854'
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, i, no. I (1956), 5-14.
3 K. 0. Dike: Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta (Oxford,1956), I28.
4 Sir Richard Burton, My Wanderings in West Africa by a F.R.G.S., part II, 'The
renowned city of Benin', (I863). 5 See pp. 388-93 below.
25-2

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 386 PHILIP A. IGBAFE

to surrender his authority or to grant an unconditional freedom of trade

within his dominions to the middlemen and Europeans. The Oba's
regulation of trade by the imposition of trade dues and embargoes was
interpreted by the consuls as part of his fetish practices. The traders on
the coast backed the consuls in urging stern measures against the Oba.
The extension and growth of trade in Benin territories and the destruc-
tion of the Oba's rule were therefore, for the British consuls and traders,
indissolubly bound up together. This was the full circle of conflict between
Benin and the British in the closing decade of the nineteenth century.
If humanitarian considerations were foremost in official minds, it is
difficult to see why the threat to the independence of Benin which Burton's
visit implied was not followed up. Benin did not receive any official visit
again for thirty years, until Captain H. L. Gallwey, the commissioner and
Vice-Consul of the Benin River district of the Oil Rivers Protectorate
visited the Oba, with whom he signed a treaty in I892.6 A possible argu-
ment may be that after i862 the general climate of opinion regarding
territorial acquisitions which led to the Parliamentary Select Committee
of I865 accounted for the apparent lukewarmness, and then the Berlin
West African Conference which gave the lower Niger territories to Britain
may have engendered some complacency. It is significant, however, that
the officials and traders on the spot thought and acted differently; between
I884 and I890 a number of unsuccessful attempts were made by different
consuls to reach Benin.7
Captain H. L. Gallwey was appointed as the first permanent Vice-
Consul to the Benin River district in 1891.8 His policy was one of direct
contact with the producers in the interior in order to increase the volume
of trade. After spending the whole of I89I making exploratory journeys
along the creeks and into the interior of the Urhobo markets, Gallwey
visited Benin in I892. Perhaps Gallwey felt that the Oba of Benin had to
be made to recognize British interests on the Benin River, which had already
resulted in Consul Hewett's treaty with Chief Nana of the Itsekiri. Free-
dom of trade for all traders on the river was one of these interests.
Vice-Consul Gallwey's visit to Benin was significant in several respects.
It was the first official visit after Burton's, and the real harbinger of the
events which finally brought Oba Ovonramwen of Benin to his downfall.
Secondly, Gallwey succeeded in reaching Benin, whereas Hewett, Blair
and Annesley had failed in I884, I885 and I890 respectively.9 Thirdly,
Gallwey also succeeded in pushing through a treaty whose opening article
contains the usual fiction that in signing the treaty Her Britannic Majesty's

6 F.O. 84/2I94, Macdonald to F.O. no. 26 of i6 May I892. See p. 387 below for the
terms of this treaty. 7 See below.
8 British Museum, London, State Paper Room, Accounts and Papers I895, LXXI, i:
'Report on the Administration of the Niger Coast Protectorate i89i-August I894, Cmd.
7596.'
9 F.O. 2/85, Moor to F.O. no. 39 of I2 Sept. I895 contains Moor's comments on these
attempted visits to Benin; Ben Prof 7/6, i.

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 THE FALL OF BENIN: A REASSESSMENT 387

representatives were merely complying with Ovonramwen's wishes. Lastly,

and this is most significant, the treaty with the 'X' marks in place of the
signatures of the Oba and his chiefs marked the beginning of the end of the
independence of Benin.10 It was a huge diplomatic success for Gallwey
and the cause which he represented. He had, by the treaty, provided
Britain with the legal grounds for subsequently holding Oba Ovonramwen
accountable for practices which were adjudged obstructionist and hostile
to British commerce and the British policy of penetration into the interior
of the country.1"
Contrary to popular views, the treaty did not mention, at least speci-
fically, anything about human sacrifices, bloody customs or the slave-trade,
except in so far as these might, by some strenuous stretch of the imagina-
tion, have been implied in the last part of Article V, which, inter alia,
mentions in a vague way the Oba's agreement to co-operate with British
officials in the interest of 'order, good government and the general progress
of civilization'. On the other hand, the treaty was eloquently specific on
the commercial issues which prompted Gallwey's visit, and also on the
issue of political control of the Oba, since this was necessary to secure
economic subordination as well. The treaty compelled the Oba to accept
the advice of British consular and other officials in the internal government
of his kingdom, in the adjudication of disputes, in his external relations
with neighbouring chiefs, and in 'the development of the resources of the
country' (Articles II, IV and V). Civil and criminal jurisdiction in Benin
over' British subjects' and other foreigners 'enjoying British protection' was
reserved for Her Majesty's consuls or other representatives (Article III).
Freedom of trade 'in every part of the king's territories' was forced on the
Oba, including the building of 'factories and houses' in those parts (Article
VI).12 The Oba's territories were similarly opened to all forms of religious
missions (Article V11).13 These were far-reaching concessions from a
hitherto independent ruler of vast dominions.
It is pertinent to state here that in the question of signing 'treaties of
protection' with British officials, African rulers had scarcely any choice in
the matter. Ovonramwen, like other African rulers, was made to sign the
'book' on the explanations given by Captain Gallwey. In fact, as
Gallwey himself explains, the Oba refused to touch the pen, though he
allowed his name to be written and his advisers to sign the treaty.14 It is
certain that the Oba did not invite Captain Gallwey to Benin City in I892,
10 F.O. 84/2I94, Macdonald to F.O. no. 26 of i6 May I892 contains the details of this
treaty.
11 The treaty with Oba Ovonramwen was not, broadly speaking, different from those
signed with other African rulers in the Niger Coast Protectorate except that the Oba did
not object to any of the articles as Nana and Jaja had done in their own cases. This raises
the point whether the Oba at all understood the implications of the Treaty.
12 F.O. 84/2I94, Macdonald to F.O. no. 26 of i6 May I892; Henry Ling Roth, Great
Benin, its Customs, Art and Horrors (Halifax, I903), appendix i. 13 Ibid.
14 F.O. 84/2I94, Gallwey's Report on visit to Ubini (Benin City), the Capital of the
Benin Country, 30 March I892, in Macdonald to F.O. no. 26 of i6 May I892.

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 388 PHILIP A. IGBAFE

neither did he, as Article I of the treaty asserts, ask for the protection of
Her Majesty's Government. Like this fictitious first article, it was usually
stated that the terms had been explained to, and understood by, the
African rulers, but there was no means of cross-checking the accuracy of
the interpreters, particularly in a case such as this where the interpretation
was through the medium of two languages and in two stages. Gallwey's
explanations were translated by Ajaie (Ajayi) into 'the Acure (Akure)
tongue (a country bordering on Benin)15 for the Oba's chief adviser who
then passed this on to the King'. Surely the Oba could not have under-
stood the treaty clearly as the virtual end of his independence, and still
be 'more than anxious to sign the " Book" '16 or be a party to the lop-sided
bargain.
That Gallwey visited Benin for commercial and partly political reasons
is borne out by the terms of the treaty just discussed. This is further
buttressed by Consul-General Macdonald's covering letter to the Foreign
Office in which he sent the original copy of the treaty.'7 As Macdonald
points out, 'there is no doubt that the Benin territory is a very rich and
most important one. Minerals, gum arabic, gum copal, palm oil, kernels,
etc., exist in large quantities '.18 Curiously enough, Macdonald then shifts his
emphasis to the fetish practices of the Oba, about which the treaty is
conspicuously silent. It is clear from the context, however, that in Macdon-
ald's estimation the fetish power of the Oba had to be broken if the com-
mercial privileges won by the treaty were to be preserved, for as he says:
trade, commerce and civilisation, however, are paralysed by the form of fetish
government which unfortunately prevails throughout the kingdom... I hope
before long to be able to put a stop to this state of affairs and I look upon the
treaty so ably effected by Captain Gallwey as the first step towards carrying out
this much to be desired end.19

For Macdonald the fetish government in Benin was a hindrance to trade

and to the exploitation of the rich products of the Benin forests which
he listed in his dispatch. It is clear, therefore, that if subsequent steps
against Benin seemed directed towards making the Oba abolish his
practices, it was not due to humanitarian considerations per se, but because
commercial needs drew attention to these practices, the abolition of which
was thought necessary for the promotion of 'trade, commerce and civiliza-
tion'. Realizing that the Oba and his priests would not easily abandon their
centuries-old customs, Macdonald predicted that in the final analysis a
solution to the problem might only be effected by 'a display and probable
use of force on the part of the government of the Oil Rivers protectorate.'20
The stage was thus being set for the overthrow of Ovonramwen, even if it
meant a resort to arms. It only needed a few incidents, the persistent pro-
tests of the traders against the Oba's economic policy and principles, a
15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.
17 F.O. 84/2194, Macdonald to F.O. no. 26 of i6 May I892. 18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. 20 Ibid.

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 THE FALL OF BENIN: A REASSESSMENT 389

zealous Consul-General devoted to the cause of trade expansion, and a

little spark to produce the conflagration. All these ingredients were present
in the Benin-British conflict in the years after I892.
In the first place, Oba Ovonramwen's character and policies were such
as to justify Macdonald's expectations that force would have to be used
against him. Ovonramwen's policy also gave the consuls and traders a
rallying point for opposition to his continued rule in Benin. In spite of the
shrinkage of his dominions occasioned by the attacks of other indigenous
powers on the peripheral peoples of his kingdom,21 Ovonramwen retained
sufficient power to keep his subject peoples firmly under his control, main-
taining court in the tradition of his ancestors and preserving the stature and
dignity associated with Benin kingship. Confronted with the problem of
internal stability soon after his accession about i888, Ovonramwen
rounded up all disaffected malcontents, purged the city twice of dissident
elements22 and, according to traditional sources, disciplined Akure in
about 1889,23 and was about to bring rebellious Agbor to obedience in
i89624 when the events of the massacre and punitive expedition occurred.
It may be relevant to explain here that Oba Ovonramwen's internal diffi-
culties were part of the usual and almost inevitable dislocations and
readjustments attendant on the accession of a new Oba. A new accession
always provided an opportunity for court intrigues, factions and squabbles
in the notable conflicts between brothers over the succession, in spite of
the tradition of primogeniture in the Benin political system.25
In respect of commerce, Ovonramwen consistently pursued the policy
of his ancestors.26 Under him, Benin's pattern of trade largely remained
as it had been for centuries-trade organized under royal monopoly of
some products carried on with the Itsekiri middlemen who had direct
access to the European traders. The Oba still permitted the activities of
the trading associations, which were made up largely of the higher palace
nobility.27 The Oba also insisted on what can be called 'customs duties'
from the middlemen, and closed the markets if they refused payment-a
procedure which usually drew protests from, and made trade conditions
21 The Nupe invasions of Afenmai and part of Ishan in the second half of the nine-
teenth century are the best example (BP 473/I6). Minutes by W. B. Rumann at the
meeting in Ubiaja between James Watt and the people 20 July I9I7; Ben Prof 715, I.
'Notes on Agbor District' by J. N. Hill.
22 Oba Akenzua II, 'Historical facts, being a review of the "Benin Community",
Intelligence Report, May I2th I938' (unpublished typescript at the S.D.A.'s Office,
Benin City); J. U. Egharevba, A Short History of Benin (Ibadan University Press, I960),
50. The dissident elements were those who opposed Oba Ovonramwen's accession.
See footnote 25 below. 23 Egharevba, Short History of Benin, 50.
24 Macrae-Simpson, Intelligence Report on the Agbor, Oligie and Emuhu clans of
Agbor District, Asaba Division, Benin Province, p. I7.
25 Egharevba, Short History of Benin, 5o, discusses Ovonramwen's efforts to deal with
all those who opposed his accession. This opposition to the Oba and the attempt to
establish his authority were not peculiar to his reign.
26 CSO I/I3, 6. Moor to F.O. no. 50 of I5 June I896.
27 Two palace officials, the Uwangwe and Eribo, were, for example, in charge of the
water-side trade in European goods.

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 390 PHILIP A. IGBAFE

difficult for, the European traders on the coast. It was the tragedy of
Ovonramwen's position that, robbed of the erstwhile traditional com-
mercial independence of his predecessors by the treaty with Gallwey, he
still tried to carry on the practices of his forbears, and in so doing ran against
the vested interests of the British, who had been strengthened in their
opposition by that same treaty of I892. Even after that treaty, Oba Ovon-
ramwen continued to demand customs duties, or what were called 'presents',
from the Itsekiri middlemen, and to close the trade with them if the
presents were withheld or if he needed more presents. The Oba could
still place an embargo on palm kernels, which were a product under royal
monopoly.28 It may be pointed out here that the question of dues was
for the Itsekiri middlemen a matter of simple economics. The heavier
the dues paid to the Oba, the lower the margin of profitability on the
commodities bought from the Oba's territories. With the British traders
on the coast who were anxious to trade, and officials who were impatient
with the Oba's demands for presents and who regarded such demands as
blackmail, extortion and obstructions to free trade, the Itsekiri found
useful allies. Even when they were prepared to comply with the Oba's
demands, they were prevented by the consular officials.29 Thus these
officials enabled and supported the Itsekiri middlemen to repudiate the
Oba's age-long traditional practice of fixing dues at his discretion. In fact,
Oba Ovonramwen had the trade of Benin with the middlemen well in hand,
insisting on trade dues in spite of the I892 treaty granting freedom of trade
to all nations within his territories. It is apparent that either the treaty
meant nothing at all to the Oba, or that he did not feel that freedom to
trade in his territories precluded the payment of customs duties. It appeared
that Oba Ovonramwen and the British officials were speaking in different
terms, for he was held by these officials to be violating the terms of the
I892 treaty. These officials were strongly supported in their stand by the
traders on the coast, who urged a firmer action against Benin.
The character and policies of Oba Ovonramwen compelled persistent
attempts by vice-consuls to get at him in the period after 1892. The
traders on the Benin River and at the coast wrote a series of petitions against
the Oba, urging that he had either to live up to his treaty obligations or
face the force of British arms. A private letter from Consul-General
Macdonald to Percy Anderson at the Foreign Office on 9 September I89I
had raised high hopes that, if well managed, the trade in Benin would
28 See CSO I/I3, 6; F.O. z, ioz, Phillips to F.O. no. I05 of i6 Nov I896. Acting
Consul-General Phillips reported that the Oba 'has permanently placed a ju-ju on
Kernels, the most profitable product of the country... he has closed the markets and he
has only occasionally consented to open them on receipt of presents from Jekri Chiefs'.
In the same year the Oba had contemptuously rejected presents worth ?40 from Itsekiri
middlemen as being too small. He received the presents only when they were doubled.
The Oba also refused to start a rubber industry even on receipt of a ?30 present, and he
could also have extracted i,ooo corrugated iron sheets from the Itsekiri as a condition for
re-opening trade if the Consul-General had not intervened.
29 See above, footnote 28.

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 THE FALL OF BENIN: A REASSESSMENT 39I

double itself in the first year.30 It is no wonder that after a quick survey of
inland markets Gallwey visited Benin to get a treaty signed. In December
I894 Vice-Consul Gallwey reported to Consul-General Macdonald on the
'unsatisfactory state of affairs in the King of Benin's dominions'*31 This
unsatisfactory state referred, of course, to the Oba's stoppage of trade
throughout his territories. There were also stories of human sacrifices in
line with those which MacTaggart of the Royal Niger Company had to
relate when he visited Benin in October I894. In January I895 Gallwey
again reported to Macdonald, at Old Calabar, his negotiations, through
royal messengers, with the Oba of Benin, who he said had agreed to open
the trade in every product throughout his territories as well as to abolish
human sacrifices.32 Gallwey surprisingly added, ... . I now consider there
will be no necessity to send a punitive expedition to Benin City '.33 This
statement is significant in revealing that by I895 the consular officials, in
line with Macdonald's earlier statement at the time of the I892 treaty, had
actively begun to consider sending a punitive expedition against Benin.34
Continuing the pressure of consuls on Benin, Vice-Consul Copland
Crawford made an attempt in September I895 to go into the Benin terri-
tories. According to Acting Consul-General Moor's explanation, 'the object
of the expedition was to open up the country for trade which is now prac-
tically at a standstill in that portion of the Benin district though flourishing
most satisfactorily in other parts, and further to proceed beyond the
territories of the king of Benin to explore and open up the country'.35
Moor also discussed the ineffectiveness of the earlier journeys of consuls
and traders, since these were only visits to the Oba in Benin, which left
large areas of country unopened. It was Moor's belief that the Oba's
territory was 'thickly populated and highly productive but the tyranny
and oppression of its rulers prevent any civilizing influences extending into
it and render life and property so insecure as to prevent nearly all trade '36.
Moor's hostility to the form of government in Benin, like Macdonald's,
was largely due to its effects on trade. It was a source of anger to Sir
Ralph Moor, therefore, that there were still stories of human sacrifices
going on in Benin, and that the treaty of I892 was inoperative as far as
the Oba was concerned. The failure of Copland Crawford to reach Benin
because of the Oba's unwillingness to receive a government agent was
ascribed to the new yams festival at which, the officials believed, human
sacrifices were made.37 This is not surprising, because once the consuls
identified human sacrifices with the obstruction to trade, it became usual

30 CSO 1/13, i. of 9 Sept. I89I. Extract from a private letter to Sir Percy Anderson
at the Foreign Office. 31 Cal. Prof. 6/i, vol. IL.
32 Ibid., Gallwey to Macdonald, i8 Jan. I895.
33 Ibid. 34 see above, p. 388.
-3 F.O. 2/85, Acting Consul-General Moor to F.O. no. 39 of I3 Sept. I895.
36 Ibid. Compare this with Macdonald's statement on page 388 above. Here again the
Oba's rule in Benin was detestable because of its effects on trade.
37 F.O. 2/85, Moor to F.O. no. 39 of I2 Sept. I895.

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 392 PHILIP A. IGBAFE

to regard any event in Benin which retarded trade as involving human

sacrifices. Like Macdonald before him, Moor advocated the use of force
against Benin. 'At the first opportunity steps should be taken for opening
up the country if necessary by force.' 38 The only fly in the ointment was
that the Niger Coast Protectorate government had not sufficient men.
Moor therefore suggested the requisition of help from the colony of Lagos
in the same manner as the Lagos Colony government was helped during
the Ijebu expedition of I892.39 Where Macdonald had advocated the use
of force only as a last resort, Moor thought pacific measures would be
ineffective. His idea was that the subsequent trade expansion which would
follow an expedition against Benin would be sufficient to offset the expenses
to be incurred in the military operations. He went as far as to suggest
the months of January, February and March as the best suited for such
operations.40
While the consuls were thus increasing pressure on the Oba to live up to
their trading expectations, the traders were in their turn encouraging them to
take firmer action against the Oba. On 30 September I895 James Pinnock
of Liverpool sent to Sir Claude Macdonald, who was on leave in London,
extracts from a letter received from his agent at Sapele.41 In unmistakable
terms, Pinnock exhibited the fury of the trader eager to expand his business,
and urged governmental action against an African ruler whose trade
policies were inimical to European interests. James Pinnock had been a
merchant and trader on the Benin River and its vicinity for thirty-five
years. At the time he wrote his letter, his business stood in danger of being
paralysed by the commercial policy of the Oba of Benin. Pinnock asserted
that since Copland Crawford's attempt to visit Benin, the Oba had 'entirely
closed all the markets, trade and roads leading to both Sapele and Benin'.
He added further that he had 'received a cable to stop all outward shipments
from Europe to Benin owing to the above '.42 Though Pinnock realized
the many difficulties to be overcome in dealing with the Oba, whom he
called 'the outrageous savage ruling at present at this so-called city of
Benin', he argued that to ignore the Oba's trading policies and human
sacrifices constituted a blot on the British West African Colony of Lagos,
only about ioo miles away, as well as on the Niger Coast Protectorate
government, with its post only fifty miles from Benin. The solution
offered by Pinnock was for 'this demon in Human form, the petty king of
Benin' to be 'deposed or transported elsewhere, peace and order main-
tained, the roads and country opened up, teeming as it does with every
natural wealth of the great hinterland of the world. '43
In April I896 the representatives of the four principal trading firms
on the Benin River (The African Association Limited, James Pinnock
38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.
40 These are the dry-season months preceding the onset of the rainy season when
movement of troops is difficult.
41 The letter from James Pinnock's agent was dated at Sapele, 23 Aug I895.
42 Ibid. 43 Ibid.

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 THE FALL OF BENIN: A REASSESSMENT 393

and Company Limited, Alex Miller Brothers, and Bey and Zimmer),
questioning the Oba's right to demand presents from the middlemen
or to close trade during the oil season, implored the Vice-Consul for the
Benin River district to take firm action against Ovonramwen, who had
'again stopped all trade without any apparent cause or grievance against
the middlemen . They felt that by I896 the Oba had become particularly
demanding, and insistent on the remittance of presents by closing his
markets at random to compel more presents.45
In addition to the pressure of the consuls and traders on Benin, demands
from the Foreign Office, which dictated the action of the consuls in some
respects, indicated the urgency of positive action in going into the Oba's
territories. In a Foreign Office dispatch of 5 March I896, the Marquess of
Salisbury asked for a report from the Niger Coast Protectorate government
on the steps being taken to win the people's confidence46 and to develop
trade, particularly with the interior. Even if the Protectorate officials had
been quiescent over the demands of the traders to move into the interior
and take action against independent African rulers who resisted British
penetration, the dispatch from the Foreign Office was an unmistakable
pointer to what was expected of them. It was a signal for a determined
advance into the interior in the interest of trade expansion. As that advance
had already been taken in hand, the dispatch only served to increase the
determination of consuls to go into the interior, not only on the Benin
River, but also at all points in the Niger Coast Protectorate, even where
this implied the use of force.
Moor's reply revealed that even before the Foreign Office asked for this
report, a comprehensive plan for the economic control of the hinterland
was already in execution. This plan included the establishment of permanent
posts in the interior to serve as jumping-off spots for further pene-
tration, the despatch of indigenous travellers to explore inland, the estab-
lishment of native councils of chiefs for the settlement of disputes in order
to reduce tribal feuds which could be disruptive of trade, and the sending
of peaceful expeditions to all directions. Another aspect of the elaborate
plan was the economic survey of all areas visited, with special attention
being paid to the undeveloped resources available in such areas.47 As
a matter of general policy, Moor had stated in his dispatch that 'in the
event of the foregoing peaceable means proving of no avail, it then becomes
necessary to resort to force '.4 It can easily be seen therefore that in the
44 CSO i/i2, 6. The petition, which was originally forwarded to Vice-Consul Copland
Crawford, was forwarded to the Foreign Office by Acting Commissioner and Consul-
General Phillips in his despatch no. 105 of i6 Nov. I896.
45 CSO I/I3, 6, Phillips to F. 0. no. I05 of i6 Nov. I896 (attachment).
46 CSO I/I4, 6, Salisbury to Moor no. I9 of 5 Mar. I896.
47 CSO I/I3,6, F.O. 2, IOI, Moor to F.O. no. 50 of I4 June I896. See also W. N. M.
Geary, Nigeria under British Rule (London, 1927), II 2.
48 CSO I/I3, 6, Moor to F.O. no. 50 of 14 June I896. For a discussion of Moor's
general policy, as well as that of Claude Macdonald, see T. N. Tamuno, 'The develop-
ment of British administrative control of Southern Nigeria, I900-I9I2' (London Ph.D.

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 394 PHILIP A. IGBAFE

above plan, Benin, whose Oba refused to receive official visits from consuls
and who was accused of open defiance of the treaty terms of I892, was
bound to occupy a prominent place in the official mind and schemes.
Before concluding his discussion on these steps aimed at inland pene-
tration, the tone of Moor's dispatch became rather specific and parti-
cularized. Benin was the one spot which was defying all efforts of the
protectorate government to penetrate into the hinterland. As Moor stated:
in the Benin and Warri districts all development except of existing trade is
completely prevented by the attitude of the king of Benin, who still declines to
receive government officers or to allow them to enter his country in any direction
peaceably. He punishes severely those of his people who even in outlying districts
venture to receive them and arbitrarily stops trade from time to time without
assigning any reason. At the present time trade has absolutely been stopped in
Benin by his orders... Without giving up his evil practices the king knows that
he cannot admit the government into his country.49

Moor then went on to advocate the use of force as he had done in Septem-
ber I895. 'I now consider', he wrote, 'that if the efforts now being made
continue unsuccessful until the next dry season, an expeditionary force
should be sent about January or February to remove the king and his
jujumen from the country. 50 Moor had calculated on an expedition
against Benin in January or February I897. Could it then be that Acting
Consul-General Phillips's mission to Benin had something to do with this
plan when, after asking for the Foreign Office's permission to use force
against Benin in November i896, he set out before getting a reply on a
suspicious and risky trip to Benin in January i897? It is difficult now to
answer this question positively. By the middle of I896 the issues were
almost joined. The constant attempts by consular officials to get into
touch with the Oba of Benin, the clamour of the traders for action against
the adamant ruler, the Foreign Office demand for a report on the steps
being taken in the protectorate to go into the interior, the advocacy of the
use of force by successive Consuls-General, all pointed to an imminent
clash. The time for the expedition had been suggested. The only missing
link was the sanction of the Foreign Office, which was vital before any
military attack on Benin could be undertaken.
It was at this juncture that on I5 October I896, James R. Phillips took
over duties as acting Commissioner and Consul-General of the Niger Coast
Protectorate from Captain Gallwey, who was acting when Sir Ralph
Moor left the protectorate on leave.5' Soon after assuming duties, Phillips
visited the Benin River district in the company of Gallwey and Locke
(D.C., Warri). After long discussions with Itsekiri chiefs and trading firms,
he claimed to have obtained 'a very clear idea of the state of affairs in that

thesis, I 962). Tamuno carries on the discussion of the actual mechanism of British
administrative control to the time of Walter Egerton. See also J. C. Anene; Southern
Nigeria in Transition (C.U.P. I966), Chaps. v & vi. 49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. 51 CSO I/I3, 6, Phillips to F.O. no. I02 of io Nov. I896.

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 THE FALL OF BENIN: A REASSESSMENT 395

part of the Protectorate in which Benin City is situated '.52 Considering the
events between I892 and I896 discussed earlier, it is easy to visualize what
picture must have been presented to Phillips of the 'state of affairs' in Benin
district. After reviewing the whole situation during this period, Phillips
came to the inevitable conclusion-to use force against Oba Ovonramwen
of Benin. 'I am certain' [he wrote]

that there is only one remedy, that is to depose the king of Benin from his stool.
I am convinced from information which leaves no room for doubt as well as
from experience of native character, that pacific means are now quite useless,
and that the time has now come to remove the obstruction. I therefore, ask his
Lordship's permission to visit Benin City in February next to depose and remove
the king of Benin and to establish a native council in his place and take such fur-
ther steps for the opening up of the country as the occasion may require.53

With the poor understanding of the indigenous people characteristic of a

foreigner, Phillips erroneously believed that the people would be glad to
be rid of a king who was a 'despot' and a 'tyrant'. He even worked out
details of the military arrangements.54 Financially, Phillips was optimistic
that the large store of ivory in the king's house would be sufficient to offset
the cost of the operations for the deposition of Oba Ovonramwen.
In spite of the strong case for military action against Benin, the Foreign
Secretary remained unconvinced of the wisdom of despatching an armed
expedition to Benin in February I897. The reason for this decision, which
was given in a cablegram of 8 January I897, was repeated in a dispatch of
9 January. There were insufficient troops for the expedition.55 But even
before the reply left the Foreign Office, Phillips had already, as later events
showed, staked his life and that of many Protectorate officials and carriers
on a visit to Benin City against the remonstrances of the Itsekiri traders56
and the advice of Chief Dogho,57 in spite of the Oba's refusal to receive
him, and in utter disregard for the traditions and susceptibilities of the
Benin people.
On 2 January I 897, Phillips set out from Sapele for Benin, accompanied by
several Protectorate officials and representatives of European trading firms.58
52 CSO I/I3, 6, Phillips to F.O. no. I05 of i6 Nov. I896. 53 Ibid.
54 The force against Benin was to be made up of 250 troops, one maxim, two seven-
pounder guns, one rocket apparatus of the Niger Coast Protectorate force and I5o Lagos
Hausa soldiers. Phillips made all calculations as to ammunition, supplies and rations.
55 CSO I/I4, 7, F.O. to Acting Consul-General Phillips no. 2 of 9 Jan. I897.
56 CSO I/I3, 7, Gallwey to F.O. iI Jan I897.
57 B.M. S.P.R., Accounts and Papers, I898, LX, 9I, 'Papers relating to the Massacre
of British Officials near Benin, and the consequent Punitive Expedition', Cmd. 8677.
Dogho is given as Dore in the records. Chief Dogho was a British agent who was adjudged
by Moor as the most trustworthy Itsekiri chief on the Benin River. See Obaro Ikime,
'Chief Dogho: the Lugardian system in Warri I97-I932', Journal of the Historical
Society of Nigeria, III, no. 2 (I965).
58 The party included Major Copland Crawford, Vice Consul of Warri and Benin
Districts; Mr Locke, District Commissioner, Warri; Capt Boisragon; Capt Maling;
Kenneth Campbell; Dr Eliott; Mr Gordon of the African Association; and Mr Powis of
Miller Brothers. There were also clerks, cooks, orderlies, store-keepers. See CSO I/I3, 7,
Gallwey to F.O., ii and 2I Jan. I897.

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 396 PHILIP A. IGBAFE

On reaching Gilli-Gilli on the night of 2 January, the messengers

sent earlier to the Oba brought back his thanks, and a refusal on
his part to see the party on account of his preoccupation with tradi-
tional festivities.59 However, he promised that he would be prepared to
receive Phillips and one Itsekiri chief about a month later.60 Obviously,
the Oba must have been frightened by the reported size of the party, because
in I894 MacTaggart of the Royal Niger Company had reached Benin with
armed troops,6' and in i895 Copland Crawford had reached Ughoton
(Gwatto) 'on a friendly visit' with a small force, both visits occurring
shortly after the deportation of Chief Nana in September I894. A party of
the Consul-General and only one Itsekiri chief would assure Ovonramwen
of his personal safety. Refusing to listen to Itsekiri traders' warnings of
Benin soldiers taking up positions along the Ughoton (Gwatto) Creek,
Phillips decided to move on, and he accordingly sent the messengers back
to inform the Oba of his intention. On getting to Ughoton on 3 January,
Phillips was again implored by the Oba's messengers to delay his journey.
He again refused all entreaties. On 4 January the expedition left
Ughoton and, marching in single file, the party ran into an ambush near
the village of Ugbini and, with the exception of Alan Boisragon and Mr
Locke, all the members of the party fell before the fusillade of the Benin
soldiers.
Much has been made out of the fact that Phillips set out without any
force and that at Ughoton he had even sent back the Protectorate's drum
and fife band lest they be mistaken for soldiers. Many have argued he was
going on a 'pacific mission'. Such commentators argue that the message
from the Oba that his festival would not permit him to receive European
visitors touched the humanitarian side of Phillips's character.62 This does
not explain why Phillips set out before he had received a reply from
the Foreign Office. Nor is it easy to reconcile Phillips's November I896
advocacy of force as the only remedy to the Benin problem with the
attitude of a man of peace in January I897. A logical explanation seems to
be that Phillips was going on a reconnaissance survey. Phillips's haste to
Benin can be explained too by his quite naive belief that nothing untoward
would happen to the party. He did not believe the Binis were a fighting
race.63

59 'Papers relating to Massacre... ', no. 54, Gallwey to F.O. 2I Jan I897.
60 CSO 1/13, 7, Gallwey to F.O. ii Jan. I897.
61 CSO 1/13, 4, p. 86, Moor to F.O. 26 Oct. I894.
62 R. H. Bacon, Benin the City of Blood (London, I897), 17. The assumption here
again is that the festival meant a holocaust of human beings. The Oba was celebrating the
Ague festival, which was one of rededication. This did not involve human sacrifices.
See also W. N. M. Geary: Nigeria Under British Rule (London, 1927), II4.
63 F.O. 2/I02, Phillips to F.O. no. 105 of i6 Nov I896. Phillips wrote that 'there is
nothing in the shape of a standing army. ... and the inhabitants appear to be if not a peace
loving at any rate a most unwarlike people whose only exploits during many generations
had been an occasional quarrel with their neighbours about trade or slave raiding and it
appears at least improbable that they have any arms to speak of except the usual number of

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 THE FALL OF BENIN: A REASSESSMENT 397

The attitude of the Benin people needs to be examined. While the

Binis could be portrayed as killing members of Phillips's party 'in cold
blood', it must be emphasized that they manifested only a natural reaction
to dangerous and threatening circumstances, one which could have been
exhibited by any other people in a similar situation. Phillips's journey was
made at a time comparable to the period of lull before the outbreak of a
violent storm. The storm had been gathering for years with the pressure
of traders, consuls and a few visits of armed white men to Benin. All these
engendered a deep feeling of suspicion which Phillips's insistence only
deepened. The British record with other African rulers could not inspire
confidence in the mind of an independent African ruler like Ovonramwen
and his people. The cunning and treacherous manner in which Jaja of
Opobo had been dealt with by Consul Johnston smacked of so much
perfidy that Vice-Consul Gallwey described it as 'not cricket' and 'contrary
to our ideas of fair play '.4 Nana's deportation in I894 for reasons similar
to Jaja's made the Benin people doubly anxious about the safety of their
Oba. Evidence at the Oba's trial in September I897 showed clearly that
the people did not believe the professions of peace by the Phillips party and
that, since the capture of Nana, there had been a long expectation of war
in Benin.65 A historian writing in retrospect can see how accurately the Benin
people were interpreting the official mind, for, as has been pointed out
already, the deposition of Oba Ovonramwen was uppermost in Phillips's
mind and had been under contemplation as far back as I895-barely a year
after Nana's deportation.
One direct result of the tragic end of Phillips's attempted visit to Benin
was the mounting of a massive punitive expedition, so that echoes of the
fall of Benin would be heard throughout the Benin territories and adjacent
lands 'for hundreds of miles '.66 This was to produce the 'desired effect'
in the opinion of British officials, though they were eventually to realize
that punitive expeditions and patrols were to be the indispensable instru-
ments for the consolidation of British rule in those territories.67 The
Foreign Office gathered a force from scattered areas of the empire for the
purpose of dealing with Benin. Moor's leave was cancelled immediately,
and he was ordered back to the Protectorate. Sufficient troops were left
trade guns... When Captain Gallwey visited the city the only canon he saw were half a
dozen old Portuguese guns. They were lying on the grass unmounted'. Compare this with
the opinion of his immediate predecessor, Ralph Moor, who was convinced that 'the
people in all the villages are no doubt possessed of arms' (F.O. 2/84, Moor to F.O. no. 39
of I2 Sept. I895).
64 H. L. Gallwey, 'West African fifty years ago', Journal of the Royal African Society,
XL (1942).

65 F.O. 2/123, Moor to F.O., no. I20 of i8 Oct. I897 (Attachments). See also Moor's
comments dated z6 Dec. I896 on Phillips's dispatch no. 105 of I6 Nov I896.
66 CSO 1/13, 7, Moor to F.O. no. I3 of 8 Feb. I897.
67 C.O. 444, 520, and F.O. 2 have several volumes containing reports on these patrols,
escorts, and punitive expeditions. See also P.A. Igbafe, 'Benin under British administra-
tion I897-1938: a study in institutional adaptation' (Unpublished Ibadan Ph.D. Thesis,
I967), chap III.

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 398 PHILIP A. IGBAFE

at Brass, Degema and Old Calabar as a precaution against local risings in

sympathy with Benin. Spies and messengers were drafted into the Benin
territory to report on the movements of the Oba and chiefs.68 The Itsekiri
traders were won over, and carriers demanded from them on promise of
compensation. Similarly, the co-operation of the Royal Niger Company was
sought, particularly with regard to the treatment of fugitives.
Nine ships of Her Majesty's naval squadron were used for a three-point
attack on Benin69 through the Ologbo creek, the Jamieson River line to
Sapoba, and through the Gwatto (Ughoton) Creek. Warigi was the base
of operations. Moor arrived there on 9 February I897, and on the ioth the
advance on Benin began. Capturing Sapoba on the i ith and Ologbo on
the I2th, the troops advanced from Ologbo on the I4th, with the Benin
soldiers keeping up a running fight and contesting every turn. On
i8 February the troops captured Benin after firing some rocket tubes into
the city and charging cheerfully over the last 200 yards after the flight of
the Benin soldiers who had earlier put up a stiff resistance.70
The gruesome pictures painted of the city after its capture registered a
notorious mark of savagery on the name of Benin. The accounts have
accorded to late nineteenth-century Benin such uncomplimentary appel-
lations as the 'City of Blood' or the 'City of Skulls'. The troops looted the
city, and ivory from the palace alone had been sold for ?8oo by the middle
of March I897. Much of the bronze and carved ivory and other antiquities
were removed to Europe to adorn the British Museum71 or enrich private
collections.72 The troops burnt most of Benin City on I9 and 2o February,73
culminating in the great fire of 2i February. The Oba and his chiefs fled
the city, but came back in August with the exception of a few leaders who
had taken part in the massacre. The Oba was deposed after a trial whose
conclusion was foregone, but on 9 September the Oba gave the officers
the pretext for deporting him by refusing to come out to signify consent
to Moor's plans to take him on a tour of the Protectorate. The Oba finally
left Benin City on I3 September I897.
Though the Oba's fall brought Benin under the effective political control
of the Niger Coast Protectorate administration, it is significant that its
economic consequences initially over-shadowed all others. Steps were
immediately taken to open up all the approach roads to the city, while the
development, expansion, and control of the rubber industry was seriously

68 CSO I/13, 7, Gallwey to F.O. no. 6 of 2I Jan. I897.

69 These ships were H.M.S. St George, Theseus, Phoebe, Forte, Philomel, Barossa,
Widgeon, Magpie and Alecto.
70 B. M. S.P.R., Accounts and Papers, I898, LX, 9I, 'Papers relating to the massacre. . .
Moor to Salisbury, no. 654, 24 Feb, I897.
71 See C. H. Read and 0. M. Dalton; Antiquities from the City of Benin and Other
Parts of West Africa (London, I899).
72 The sale of Benin antiquities is still in progress. In the week ending 23 Mar. I968
a Benin bronze taken to England during the I897 expedition was sold for Jio,ooo (West
Africa, 23 Mar. I968).
73 B.M. S.P.R.; Accounts and Papers, I898, LX 9I, 'Papers relating to the Massacre. ..'

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 THE FALL OF BENIN: A REASSESSMENT 399

taken in hand. The first step in this direction was the enactment of regula-
tions against the indiscriminate tapping of rubber,74 and for the control of
destructive tappers who overran Benin forests from the Lagos Colony
area shortly after February I897.75 The earliest reports on the newly
conquered districts stressed in a very marked degree the economic benefits
from, and the large quantity of rubber prevalent in Benin districts. The
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce was requested by the Niger Coast
Protectorate government to take up the immense trading opportunities in
the newly acquired districts. It is not surprising that by January I898 some
trading firms were virtually asking for monopoly rights on the Benin river.76
These various steps developed into the systematic exploitation of Benin
forest products through the grant of timber concessions to European firms
and, at much a later date, the creation of forest reserves. These economic
changes constitute an important but a different aspect of Benin history
under British administration.
Looking back at the whole episode of the fall of Benin, it can be argued
that as early as the I840s, events had been moving steadily in the direction
of more European involvement in the politics and trade of the Niger
coastal states. The costly Niger Expedition of I84I had been followed by
the labours of Dr Baikie and the annual trip up the river by H. M. S.
Investigator, while in I849 consular jurisdiction had been established on
the Bights of Benin and Biafra.77 To establish British mercantile occupa-
tion in the interior of the Niger territories and open up a new field for
British enterprise, the Company of African Merchants Limited struggled
between I863 and i865 to obtain a parliamentary subsidy similar to
MacGregor Laird's.78 In this it was opposed by numerous other companies
trading to West Africa.79 This struggle kept alive the interests of
British commercial and political circles in that part of Africa. Between
April and June I885 the British and the Germans entered into an agree-
ment defining their spheres of interests in the Gulf of Guinea.80 On
5 June I885 the British declared a protectorate- the Oil Rivers Protectorate
-over the Niger districts.81 The grant of a Royal Charter to the National
African Company on io July i886, while heralding the advent of company
rule in the lower Niger region, had also carried the sphere of British influence

74 CSO 1/13, 7, Moor to F.O., no. 74 of 29 June I897; Moor to Roupell, 27 Sept.
i897, in BD 3/I, 2, p. 25/97; CSO 1/13, II, no. 49 of 5 Mar. I899. See also C.O. 444, 3,
Moor to S of S, no. 40 of I7 Feb. I899; C.O. 520/9, Probyn to Chamberlain, no. 338 of
17 Oct. I90I; and C.O. 520/45, Egerton to Elgin, no. I77 of 14 Apr. 1907.
75 CSO 1/13, 7, p. I69; H. F. Marshall, Intelligence Report on Usehin District,
Benin Division, Benin Province, 1939, p. 6.
76 Cal. Prof. 6/i, vol. iv. 7 Footnote i above.
78 B.M. S.P.R., Accounts and Papers (io), I864, XLI, p. 571, 'Corresponden
subject of an application from the Company of African Merchants (Limited), for a
subsidy towards establishing steamers on the River Niger'.
79 Ibid. The main opposing companies were The African Association of Liverpool,
the Anglo-African Company, the Merchants of Bristol and the Merchants of London.
80 B.M. S.P.R., Accounts and Papers (13), I899, LX III, p. 426, C 9372.
81 Ibid., C.O. 657, 6, Annual General Report, 1920, p. 2.
26 AFR II

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 400 PHILIP A. IGBAFE

farther into the hinterland. A second notice in the London Gazette on

i8 October I887 enlarged the territories covered by the Oil Rivers Pro-
tectorate. Another London Gazette notice, on I3 May I893, broadened the
Oil Rivers Protectorate into the Niger Coast Protectorate.82 Between I884
and I893 numerous treaties had been made by the National African
Company and Royal Niger Company with African chiefs.83 The Benin
kingdom had been drawn into the orbit of British influence by the Gall-
wey treaty of I892. Though these developments, as well as the British
presence on the coast and along the Benin River, did not seriously threaten
the Benin Kingdom until I897, they were significant signposts which
pointed unmistakably to the fact that the independence of Benin could
not long survive the pressures and devastating blows of British economic
imperialism of the late nineteenth century. The Benin kingdom, like
Pepple's Bonny, Jaja's Opobo, Nana's Itsekiri and Prempeh's Ashanti, had to
be reconciled with the developments of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century.

SUMMARY

The Benin kingdom did not come into the British official reckoning until well
into the second half of the nineteenth century, despite the fact that various
European nations had been engaged in commercial contact with Benin for four
centuries. During the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, Benin
City fell to British troops after a dramatic build-up of rapidly succeeding events
culminating in the punitive expedition of February I897. These events, as the
evidence in this article reveals, were prompted by economic rather than humani-
tarian considerations.
The Benin kingdom fell mainly because, in an age when the traders and the
British consular officials had reasons impelling them to penetrate into the hinter-
land, Oba Ovonramwen was clinging to traditional policies of economic exclusive-
ness and monopolistic practices which inflicted economic losses on the revenues
of the individual traders, the Itsekiri middlemen and the Niger Coast Protec-
torate government.
The increasing fear of concerted European designs on his kingdom further
strengthened the Oba's adherence to his closed-door policy, which in turn
increased the consuls' determination to bring him under their economic and poli-
tical control. This situation precipitated the events which culminated in the
capture of Benin City by British forces in February I897.
As with other powerful African rulers in the Niger Delta and on the West African
Coast, the British had to settle accounts with the Oba of Benin, who had to be
reconciled with the developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. The fall of Benin cannot therefore be rightly divorced from the general
British economic imperialism on the Niger Coast during the second half of the
nineteenth century.

82 B.M. S.P.R. Accounts and Papers (I3), I899, LXIII.

8 Ibid. pp. 433-52 contains the number, nature and form of these treaties.

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