Nitafanv.
CIR, 152 SCRA 284 (1987) Issue: W/N members of the Judiciary are exempt from income
(in relation to Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia v. David)
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A.
SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL
OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
RESOLUTION
Facts:
- Herein Petitioners are the duly appointed and
qualified judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53
of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region.
- They seek to prohibit the respondents, Commissioner
of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court from making any deduction of taxes
from their salaries.
- They are contending that any tax withheld from their
compensations as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease of their salaries, wherefore contrary to the
provision of the Constitution and therefore a violation
of their right and privileges.
- On June 4, 1987, prior to the legal issue raised by the
Petitioners, the Court had dealt with the matter
administratively in response to representations that
the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the
withholding of taxes from the salaries of members of
the Bench. But later on, the Court en banc reaffirmed
with the Chief Justice’s previous directive to the Fiscal
Management and Budget Office of the SC to continue
with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the
salaries of all the members of the judiciary.
- From the affirmation of the Court could have had
resolve the issue as to why they have deductions in
their salaries already.
- But because of the filing of the petition had prompt
the Court to settle the legal issue raised herein.
but such rate must be higher than that which they are
taxes.
Held:
- SC dismissed the petition for prohibition.
- The Court discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer
and Endencia vs. David that declared the salaries of
the members of the Judiciary is exempted from
payment of tax because it was considered as
diminution of their salaries during their continuance
in office.
Rationale:
After the debates, interpellations and opinions expressed
regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was
finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it,
was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect.10 The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.12 1avvphi1
Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987
Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced
hereunder:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed
by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased.
It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a
law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges
receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be
applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would
be a strained construction to read into the provision an
exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission.
Perfecto vs. Meer
- Justice Perfecto was required by the BIR to pay his
income tax upon his salary as a member of the court.
After paying (802) he instituted an action in Manila CFI
contending that the assessment was illegal as his
salary being taxable would reduce it and that
constitute a violation of the Constitution.
- CFI decided in favor of Perfecto then the defendant
(BIR) appealed.
- SC affirmed with the decision of CFI.
- SC held that the taxation must be resisted as this will
be an infringement of the fundamental charter.
Endecia vs. David
- This was a joint appealed from the decision of Manila
CFI declaring RA 590 unconstitutional (RA 590 was
reenacted by the Congress to clearly give limitation to
the exemption of the member of the bench) and
ordering the appellant (Collector of BIR) to refund the
collected taxes of Justice Endecia (Associate Justice of
CA) and Justice Jugo (Presiding Justice of the CA).
- Under the doctrine held in Perfecto vs. Meer, the
collection of taxes from salaries of the members of the
Judiciary is a diminution of their compensation and
therefore a violation of the Constitution.
- SC affirmed with the decision of the lower court.
- SC ruled that RA 590 was unconstitutional as this was
clearly violating a Constitutional prohibition.
 Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.
Facts:
- Petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay is the Supreme
head of the Philippine Independent Church, he filed a
writ of prohibition against the respondent Juan Ruiz
the Director of Posts to enjoin the latter from issuing
and selling postage stamps as commemorative from
the celebration of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
- The petitioner for what he considers a civic duty,
requested Vicente Sotto, a member of the Philippine
Bar to denounce the matter to the President of the
Philippines. He contends that the selling and issuance
of postage stamps which were the commemorative of
the 33rd Eucharistic Congress by the respondent
violates the provisions of Article VI Section
23(subsection 3) of the Philippine Constitution.
Issue: W/N the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation
of the Constitution.
Held: No. The SC denied the petition.
Rationale:
The subsection 3, Section 23 of Article VI of the Constitution
speaks of “benefit.” If the Catholic Church may benefit from
the issuance of the stamps then it forbids the act. However, it
is not. It was not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church and it was not inspired by any sectarian feeling
to favor any religion. The object of it is to obtain additional
income for the Government. No money derived from the sale
of the stamps would go to the Catholic Church. The circumstances, the Court had come to a conclusion
Government only planned to take advantage of a religious that there has been no constitutional infraction.
event of international importance to replenish its funds.
Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition
of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its
influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to
an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of
their Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in
order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote
the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of
justice, liberty and democracy,” they thereby manifested their
intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon
Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized
here as elsewhere.
- However, in the case at bar, it appears that the
issuance of postage stamps in question was rather
under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine
Legislature.
- And based on the case, the issuance of the postage
stamps has been approved by the authority of the
President and that under the Act No. 4052, in order to
dispose the amount appropriated in the matter
indicated and deemed advantageous to the
Government and that the only purpose of selling the
stamps was “to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourist in the country.” The officials concerned
merely took advantage of the event considered of
international importance “to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people.”
- And upon very serious reflection, examination of Act.
No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending
 Abakada Guro Partylist v. Ermita, GR No. 168056, 168207,
168461, 168463, 168730, 1 September 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Facts:
- R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three (3) legislative
bills (House Bill No. 3555 & 3705 and Senate Bill No.
1950)
- The HB No. 3555 was first introduced on the first
reading on January 7, 2005 in substitution of HB No.
1468 which was introduced by Rep. Eric D. Singson on
August 8, 2004. This bill was certified by the President
on January 7, 2008 for immediate enactment and on
January 27, 2005, this was approved by the House of
Representatives on the 2nd and 3rd reading.
- On the other hand, HB No. 37053 which substituted
HB No. 3105 introduced by Rep. Salacnib Baterina and
HB no. 3381 introduced by Rep. Jacinto Paras where
the “mother bill” emanates from HB No. 3555. This
was approved on February 2, 2005 and certified by
the President on Feb. 8, 2005 and was approved by
the House of Representatives on the second and third
reading on Feb. 28, 2005.
- Meanwhile, the Senate Committee approved Senate
Bills No. 1337 (Sponsored by Sen. Recto) 1838 and
1873 (Sponsosored by Sens. Drilon, Flavier &
Pangilinan), taking into considerations the HB Nos.
3555 and 3705 which was enacted by the House of
Representatives. The bill was then certified by the
President on Mar. 11, 2005 and was approved by the
Senate on 2nd and 3rd reading on April 13, 2005.
- On March 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request
of the House of Representatives for a committee
conference to settle the disagreeing provisions of the
proposed bills.
- After having been settled and met and discussed in
full conference the issues regarding the disagreeing
provisions of the bills, on May 10, 2005, it was then
recommended to the Senate and May, 11, 2005 to the
House of Representatives for approval.
- On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of consolidated
House and Senate version was then transmitted to the
President who signed it into law on May 24, 2005,
thus became the R.A. No. 9337.
- When R.A No. 9337 became effective on July 1, 2005
the Court issued a TRO enjoin the respondents from
enforcing and implementing the law.
- Before the R.A No. 9337 took effect, herein
petitioners (ABAKADA GURO Partylist, et. al., Sen.
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., et. al., Association of Pilipinas
Shell Dealers, Inc., et. al., several House of
Representatives led by Rep. Escudero and Gov.
Enrique Garcia) filed petitions for prohibitions or
certiorari.
Issue: W/N the R.A No. 9337 is unconstitutional as it violated
the provisions of the Constitution with regards to its
procedural course.
Held: No. The SC dismissed the petitions and lifted the issued
TRO.
Rationale:
There being differences and/or disagreements on the
foregoing provisions of the House and Senate bills, the
Bicameral Conference Committee was mandated by the rules
of both houses of Congress to act on the same by settling said
differences and/or disagreements.
The term “settle” is synonymous to “reconcile” and
“harmonize.” To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing
provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a)
adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate
bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the
provisions in the Senate bill would be carried into final form of
the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the
disagreeing provisions.
The power of internal regulation and discipline are intrinsic in
any legislative body. In resolving the differences with the
Senate, the House panel shall, as much as possible adhere to
and support the House Bill. If the indifferences with the Senate
are so substantial that they materially impair the House Bill,
the panel shall report such fact to the House for the latter’s
appropriate action.
__________________________________________________
The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the
Conference Committee Report prior to the voting thereon. The
House shall vote on the Conference Committee Report in the
same manner and procedure as it votes on a bill on third and
final reading.
Rule XII, Section 35 of the Rules of the Senate states:
Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the
House of Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint
resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference
committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten (10)
days after their composition. The President shall designate the
members of the Senate Panel in the conference committee
with the approval of the Senate.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed
and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in, or
amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by a
majority of the members of each House panel, voting
separately.
A comparative presentation of the conflicting House and
Senate provisions and a reconciled version thereof with the
explanatory statement of the conference committee shall be
attached to the report.
...
The creation of such conference committee was apparently in
response to a problem, not addressed by any constitutional
provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves
in disagreement over changes or amendments introduced by
the other house in a legislative bill. Given that one of the most
basic powers of the legislative branch is to formulate and
implement its own rules of proceedings and to discipline its
members, may the Court then delve into the details of how
Congress complies with its internal rules or how it conducts its
business of passing legislation? Note that in the present
petitions, the issue is not whether provisions of the rules of
both houses creating the bicameral conference committee are
unconstitutional, but whether the bicameral conference
committee has strictly complied with the rules of both houses,
thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by
Congress.
City of Baguio v. Marcos, GR L-26100, 28 February 1969
Facts:
- On April 12, 1912, the Director of Lands in the Court
of First Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of
cadastral proceedings (a land registration/ titling
proceeding) Civil Case No.1. A decision on November
13, 1922 was rendered; the land involved (Baguio
Townsite) was among those declared public lands.
- On July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned cadastral
court to reopen said civil case. He claims that the land
(Baguio Townsite) be registered in his name upon the
grounds that 1) he and his predecessors have been in
continuous possession and cultivation of the land
since Spanish times 2) his predecessors were illiterate
Igorots, thus were not able to file their claim to the
land in question.
- On the other hand, (Dec. 18, 1961) Francisco G.
Joaquin Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr. and Teresita J.
Buchholz, as tree farm lessees of the land in question,
opposed the reopening. Their contentions are: 1) The
reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year
period provided by R.A. 931; 2) Petition to reopen the
case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land,
they have a standing to appear in the reopening
proceedings.
- On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio also opposed the
reopening.
- On May 18, 1962, the cadastral court denied the
petitioner’s intervention on the case as this was final
declaratory relief judgement that tree farm leases
were null and void.
- Petitioner then move to reconsider contending that
they are not parties to the action in the said
declaratory relief therefore it is not binding in them
(May 18, 1962) and on Sept. 14, 1962, the cadastral
court reversed its own ruling and allowed petitioners
to cross-examine the witnesses of Respondent Lutes.
- On Oct. 16, Lutes replied and move to dismiss the
private petitioner’s opposition.
- On Aug. 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed the
private respondents opposition and that the motion
to reconsider was rejected (Nov. 5, 1962)
- On Jan. 6, 1964, the City of Baguio lodge a motion to
dismiss the petition to reopen. This motion was
adopted as its own by the Reforestation
Administration. The court, however, denied the City’s
motion for lack of merit.
- On Nov. 13, 1964, the petitioners elevated the case to
Court of Appeals. Praying for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus with preliminary injunction. They are
questioning the cadastral court’s jurisdiction over the
case but the Court held that even the petitioners are
not bound to the declaratory judgement, they had no
right to oppose the reopening. The petitioners moved
to reconsider but it was denied.
- The Petitioners herein file a petition to SC to seek
redress over the case.
Issue: W/N the cadastral court has jurisdiction over the
petition to reopen a cadastral proceeding.
Held: SC granted the petition and declared the cadastral
court orders to be null and void.
Rationale:
Under R.A. No. 931, it authorizes the court proceedings of
claims to parcels of land declared public land by virtue of
judicial decisions rendered within the forty years.
The orders of the cadastral court is a clear violation of R.A
No. 931 as according to the law it recognizes the lessee’s
right and may intervene in an action as the lessee’s have a
sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.
It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore
transcribed, authorizes "the filing in the proper court,
under certain conditions, of certain claims of title to
parcels of land that have been declared public land, by
virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years
next preceding the approval of this Act." The body of the
statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of land
that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the
public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted
within the forty years next preceding the approval of this
Act." There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency
between title and body.
To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the
language of R.A. 931 aforesaid — from which surfaces a
seeming inconsistency between the title and the body —
attended Commonwealth Act 276, the present statute's
predecessor. That prior law used the very same language
in the body thereof and in its title. We attach meaning to
this circumstance. Had the legislature meant to shake off
any legal effects that the title of the statute might have,
it had a chance to do so in the reenactment of the law.
Congress could have altered with great facility the
wording of the title of R.A. 931. The fact is that it did not.
The office of statutory interpretation, let us not for a
moment forget, is to determine legislative intent. In the
words of a well-known authority, "[t]he true object of all
interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and will of the
law-making body, to the end that it may be enforced." In
varying language,"the, purpose of all rules or maxims" in
interpretation "is to discover the true intention of the
law." They "are only valuable when they subserve this
purpose." In fact, "the spirit or intention of a statute
prevails over the letter thereof." A statute "should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary, the letter of the law." By this, we do
not "correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry
out and give due course to" its true intent.
It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task
of construing an obscure expression in the law or where
exact or literal rendering of the words would not carry out
the legislative intent, 19 the title thereof may be resorted
to in the ascertainment of congressional will. Reason
therefor is that the title of the law may properly be
regarded as an index of or clue or guide to legislative
intention. 20 This is especially true in this jurisdiction. For
the reason that by specific constitutional precept, "[n]o
bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill." 21 In such case, courts "are compelled by the
Constitution to consider both the body and the title in
order to arrive at the legislative intention."

In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the drafting

of a statute should never be permitted to hamstring
judicial search for legislative intent, which can otherwise
be discovered. Legal technicalities should not abort the
beneficent effects intended by legislation.