Family Code Case Doctrines

Executive Order No.
209 - Family Code
Article 1 - Marriage
Marriage is a special contract regulated and controlled by the state, not by the will of the
parties
Stipulations undermining marriage are contrary to law, morals and good customs
Marriage demands respect and dignity.
A married person still enjoys the right to privacy of communication and correspondence
Persons living together as husband and wife are presumed to be married.
A man and a woman living as husband and wife are presumed to be married.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment.
Doubts in the validity of a marriage should be resolved in its favor
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract
Marriage is immutable.
Marriage is a special contract regulated and controlled by the state, not by the will
of the parties
a) It is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights,

duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon
the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations.
Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is
deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any
shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make. The reciprocal rights arising
from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to
time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by
marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon
principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties.
Eloisa Goitia vs. Jose Campos Rueda, G.R. No. 11263, November 2, 1916
b) Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is

deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every member of the
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia (2017.1) 1
community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are
governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal
grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage.
Joel Jimenez vs. Remedios Cañizares, G.R. No. L-12790, Aug. 31, 1960
Office of the Court Administrator v. Tormis, A.C. No. 9920, August 30, 2016, citing Beso
v. Daguman, 380 Phil. 544 (2000)
c) The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage
to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage
relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain
and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
Enrico L. Pacete vs. Glicerio V. Carriaga, Jr., G.R. No. L-53880, March 17, 1994
Stipulations undermining marriage are contrary to law, morals and good customs
a) Between spouses
There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation

agreement are contrary to law, morals and good customs. Those stipulations
undermine the institutions of marriage and the family.
Leonardo S. Biton vs. Andres Momongan, G.R. No. L-2555, September 3, 1935
The spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that
one of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the
policy of the laws on marriage.
William H. Brown vs. Juanita Yambao, G.R. No. L-10699, October 18, 1957
Rep. of the Phils. vs. Gregorio Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993
The Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the
marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the Family Code provides
that marriage is "an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." It is an institution of
public order or policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made
inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.
Edwin A. Acebedo vs. Eddie P. Arquero, A.M. No. P-94-1054, March 11, 2003
Conjugal arrangement between members of Jehovah’s Witnesses sect in light
of "compelling state interest" doctrine
In applying the "compelling state interest" test, the first inquiry is whether
respondent's right to religious freedom has been burdened. The second step is to
ascertain respondent's sincerity in her religious belief. plpecdtai
Alejandro Estrada vs. Soledad S. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
b) Between employer and employee
The danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT&T
is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable
social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. Hence,
while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical
consequences, it may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital
bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of
marriage.
PT&T vs. NLRC and Grace de Guzman, G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997
Marriage demands respect and dignity.

Marriage is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
Josefina Mortel vs. Anacleto F. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956
Lilian F. Villasanta vs. Hilarion M. Peralta, G.R. AC-UNAV, April 30, 1957
Santa Pangan vs. Dionisio Ramos, A.C. No. 1053, August 31, 1981
We cannot overemphasize that having an extra-marital affair is an afront to the

sanctity of marriage, which is a basic institution of society. Even our Family Code
provides that husband and wife must live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Our laws, in implementing this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family underscore their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
Leus v. St. Scholastica's College Westgrove, G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015, citing
Santos v. NLRC, 350 Phil. 560 (1998)
A married person still enjoys the right to privacy of communication and

correspondence
A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection [the privacy of
communication and correspondence] is ever available to him or to her.
Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996
Persons living together as husband and wife are presumed to be married.
Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of

any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of
decency and law. The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest
known in law. The law presumes morality, and not immorality: marriage, and not
concubinage, legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption that persons
living together as husband and wife are married to each other.
People of the Phils. vs. Elias Borromeo, G.R. No. 61873, October 31, 1984
A man and a woman living as husband and wife are presumed to be married.
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded
on the following rationale: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world
is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law . . . ."
Mora Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, G.R. No. L-18081, March 3, 1922
Matilde Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, G.R. No. L-49084, October 10, 1985
Maria del Rosario Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57062, January 24, 1992
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment.
This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes
the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution" Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special
contract of permanent union" and case law considers it not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment."
Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
Doubts in the validity of a marriage should be resolved in its favor
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of the marriage.
Rep. of the Phils. vs. Lolita Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage
rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. Presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar vs. Rey C. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a

basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State
can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the
concern of the family members alone. Whether or not a marriage should continue to
exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of
only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance,
incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.
Marietta B. Ancheta vs. Rodolfo S. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004
Marriage is immutable.
The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as

the foundation of the family. It is this inviolability which is central to our traditional
and religious concepts of morality and provides the very bedrock on which our society
finds stability. Marriage is immutable and when both spouses give their consent to
enter it, their consent becomes irrevocable, unchanged even by their independent
wills.
Florence Malcampo-Sin vs. Philipp T. Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001
Art. 3 (2) - Marriage license
A marriage license is indispensable to the validity of marriage.

Requirement of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement in every
marriage.
Lack of marriage license number in marriage contract does not prove non-issuance of
license.
A marriage license wrongfully obtained does not invalidate marriage.
Absence of marriage certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal
requirement for procuring a marriage license.
Civil registrar’s certification of "due search and inability to find" a record showing that a
marriage license number has been issued, is adequate to prove its non-issuance.
Marriages exceptional in character do not require a marriage license.
Rationale for not requiring a marriage license in marriages exceptional in character.
Use of same marriage license in church wedding ratified and fortified the earlier civil
ceremony.
It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage.
A marriage license is indispensable to the validity of marriage.
Since there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does
not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement, a marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. The records reveal that
the marriage contract bears no marriage license number and as certified by the Local
Civil Registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. This certification
issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage. The
marriage between petitioner and the deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
Susan Nicdao Cariño vs. Susan Yee Cariño, G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001
Requirement of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement

in every marriage.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil

Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3) in relation to Article 58. The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the
State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of
affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution"
Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution,"
and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. This is why
the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" and
case law considers it not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment.
Lack of marriage license number in marriage contract does not prove non-issuance
of license.
The contention that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses
because the copies of the marriage contract presented did not state the marriage
license number, is flawed. At most, the evidence adduced could only serve to prove
the non-recording of the marriage license number but certainly not the non-issuance of
the license itself.
Ireneo G. Geronimo vs. CA and Antonio Esman, G.R. No. 105540, July 5, 1993
A marriage license wrongfully obtained does not invalidate marriage
A marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained. This must be so, for the local civil registrar who issues the
marriage license is not required to inquire into the authority of the officer
administering the oath, and neither is the person solemnizing the marriage required to
investigate as to whether or not a marriage license, which appears to have been issued
by a competent official, was legally obtained. What the law declares as null and void
are marriages solemnized without a marriage license.
Eduardo Eigenman vs. Marydeen Guerra and Froilan Guerra, 61 O.G. (31) 4722
Absence of marriage certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the

formal requirement for procuring a marriage license.
A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal

capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. The absence
of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal
requirement for procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an
irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a
marriage license issued without that certificate.
Grace J. Garcia vs. Rederick A. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
Civil registrar’s certification of "due search and inability to find" a record showing
that a marriage license number has been issued, is adequate to prove its
non-issuance.
The certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that a marriage license number was issued to the parties is
adequate to prove its non-issuance. The certification of "due search and inability to
find" issued by the civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find"
sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the
contracting parties.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals and Angelina M. Castro, G.R. No. 103047,
September 2, 1994
Marriages exceptional in character do not require a marriage license.
The argument that the marriage was void because the parties had no marriage
license, is misplaced because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to this effect
was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional
in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed
adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.
Tomasa vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135216, August 19, 1999
Rationale for not requiring a marriage license in marriages exceptional in

character.
However there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period
of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in
such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names,
the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.
Use of same marriage license in church wedding ratified and fortified the earlier
civil ceremony.
The couple had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid
marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two
ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony
does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same
parties to the marriage, for the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify
the first.
Ofelia P. Ty vs. Court of Appeals and Edgardo M. Reyes, G.R. No. 127406, November
27, 2000
It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage.
It has been held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner.
Mercedita Mata Arañes vs. Judge Salvador M. Occiano, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390, April
11, 2002
Office of the Court Administrator v. Tormis, A.C. No. 9920, August 30, 2016
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the
ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of
a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point
to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity
accorded to a marriage license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not
appear regular on its face.
OCA vs. Anatalio S. Necessario, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013
Art. 3 (3) - Marriage ceremony
Exchange of vows is presumed to have been made based on testimonies that a

wedding took place.
An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies
of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for
having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be
unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for
people not to notice its absence. The law favors the validity of marriage, because the
State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a
matter of constitutional concern.
Leoncia Balogbog and Gaudioso Balogbog vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83598,
March 7, 1997
While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing"
into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3 (3) of the Family Code and
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
Ronulo v. People, G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014
Under Article 3 (3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage
is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner
admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the
"blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge

that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking.
The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner's knowledge of the
absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
[T]he lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present case.
For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage
certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3 (3) of the Family
Code, as discussed above.
Art. 6 - Form of solemnization of marriage
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage
ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3 (3) and 6 of the
Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55
of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law
with no substantial amendments.
Article 6 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite
for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for
the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take
each other as husband and wife."
Pertinently, Article 3 (3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly
defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the
rule was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the
marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the
minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the
personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and
second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take
each other as husband and wife.
Art. 7 - Who may solemnize a marriage
Good faith and Christian motives cannot be made as an excuse to solemnize marriage
without license.
Solemnizing marriage out of human compassion may not amount to gross ignorance of the
law.
Jurisdiction of priests, justices and judges.
A judge is not authorized to solemnize marriages outside of his jurisdiction.
Judge who solemnized marriage without marriage license acted in gross ignorance of the
law.
Illegal solemnization of marriage by a judge constitutes misconduct
Good faith and Christian motives cannot be made as an excuse to solemnize

marriage without license.
For solemnizing marriage without the required marriage license, respondent

has dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the “embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence” and to his promise to be “faithful to the
law.” He cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at
most, would serve only to mitigate his liability and could never justify violation of the
law.
Marilou Nama Moreno vs. Jose C. Bernabe, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-94-963, July 14,
1995
Solemnizing marriage out of human compassion may not amount to gross

ignorance of the law.
The judge’s act of solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage

license is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.
11, 2002
Jurisdiction of priests, justices and judges.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the
faithful is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by
his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who
are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article
3 of the Family Code, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating person to administrative liability.
Rodolfo G. Navarro vs. Hernando C. Domagtoy, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-96-1088, July
19, 1996
A judge is not authorized to solemnize marriages outside of his jurisdiction.
Considering that respondent Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.

Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.
Zenaida S. Beso vs. Juan Daguman, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, January 28, 2000
Judge who solemnized marriage without marriage license acted in gross ignorance
of the law.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without

the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance
of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent
judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
11, 2002
Illegal solemnization of marriage by a judge constitutes misconduct
The judge’s acts of solemnizing marriage without a license, failure to affix his
signature in the marriage contract and violation of requirements under Art. 23 of the
Family Code, indicate that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's
concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status.
Juvy N. Cosca vs. Hon. Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr., Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92-721,
September 30, 1994
Art. 8 - Venue of marriage ceremony
Non-compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code will not invalidate marriage.
Instances when marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers or courtroom.
Non-compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code will not invalidate marriage.
Article 8 of the Family Code, which is a directory provision, refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer. Non-compliance will not invalidate the marriage.
19, 1996
Instances when marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers or courtroom.
A marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances:
1. at the point of death;
2. in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or
3. upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this

effect.
Art. 13 - Death certificate or judicial decree of absolute divorce
[A] divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,

provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment,
our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact.
Ando v. DFA, G.R. No. 195432, August 27, 2014, citing Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No.
138322, October 02, 2001
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption [Processual presumption

means that where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.] . . . the recognition of divorce is
entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between
Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it
follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
Art. 16 - Additional requirements where parental consent or parental advice

is needed
[T]he Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California
properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that
real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
Art. 21 - Certificate of legal capacity
Certificate of legal capacity is prima facie evidence of alien's legal capacity to

marry.
A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of the legal
capacity of an alien applicant for a marriage license.
Art. 22 - Marriage certificate/contract
Marriage certificate is prima facie evidence that all legal formalities have been complied
with.
Marriage certificate is best evidence of marriage.
Certified copy of marriage contract is the best evidence of its contents.
Marriage certificate proves only the administration of the sacrament, not the veracity of
statements therein on kinsfolk and/or citizenship.
Marriage certificate constitutes prima facie proof of its contents.
Marriage certificate is not indispensable to establish the fact of marriage.
Absence of marriage certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal
requirement for procuring a marriage license.
Failure to sign marriage contract does not render the marriage a nullity.
Mere private act of signing a marriage contract does not constitute a valid marriage.
Failure to present marriage contract is not proof that no marriage took place.
Failure of solemnizing officer to send copy of marriage certificate to municipal secretary
does not invalidate marriage.
Truth or falsehood of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage certificate is not an
essential requirement for marriage.
Validity of marriage cannot be collaterally attacked.
Marriage certificate is prima facie evidence that all legal formalities have been
complied with.
The marriage certificate attesting that a marriage ceremony was performed by a

minister gives rise to the presumption that all legal formalities required by law had
been complied with and fulfilled. If the minister was not authorized to perform such
marriage ceremony it was incumbent upon the defendants to show such lack of
authority on the part of the minister.
Eulogia Bigornia de Cardenas vs. Leoncio Cardenas, G.R. No. L-8218, December 15,
1955
Marriage certificate is best evidence of marriage.
The best evidence is the marriage certificate itself absent any showing that it
was lost or destroyed.
People of the Phils. vs. Antonio Evangelista, G.R. No. 132044, October 5, 2001
Certified copy of marriage contract is the best evidence of its contents.
The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in

custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage
contract plainly indicating that a marriage was celebrated should be accorded the full
faith and credence given to public documents. This should be given greater credence
than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent
for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does
not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
Veronico Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Marriage certificate proves only the administration of the sacrament, not the
veracity of statements therein on kinsfolk and/or citizenship.
While baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered documents, they

are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified which in this case were the baptism and marriage, respectively, of Leoncio
Chan — but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with
respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship."
Norberto Paa vs. Quintin Chan, G.R. No. L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967
Marriage certificate constitutes prima facie proof of its contents.
Being a public document, the marriage certificate constitutes prima facie proof
of its contents. The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the
entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the
preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach
of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the
publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might
have occurred.
Maria Jeanette C. Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Marriage certificate is not indispensable to establish the fact of marriage.
A marriage certificate is not indispensable to establish the fact of marriage in

order to charge a wife of parricide because the presumption that two persons are
married subsists by reason of the fact that they had been living together for about
thirteen years as evidenced by the birth of their eldest child and that they had other
children thereafter.
People of the Philippines vs. Nemesio Talingdan, G.R. No. L-32126, July 6, 1978
Absence of marriage certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the

formal requirement for procuring a marriage license.
A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal

capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. The absence
of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal
requirement for procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an
irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a
marriage license issued without that certificate.
Failure to sign marriage contract does not render the marriage a nullity.
Bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity
of the contracting parties and their consent", the latter being manifested by the
declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage
and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife" —
which in this case actually occurred, We think the signing of the marriage contract or
certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing the act. No
statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an essential requisite —
not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we believe it is. The fact of
marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite another.
Signing of the marriage contract is a formal requirement of evidentiary value, the
omission of which does not render the marriage a nullity.
Arsenio and Ricarda de Loria vs. Felipe Apelan Felix, G.R. No. L-9005, June 20, 1958
Mere private act of signing a marriage contract does not constitute a valid
marriage.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract (no marriage ceremony at
all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer), bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone,
without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
the husband might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
Lucio Morigo vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004
Failure to present marriage contract is not proof that no marriage took place.
Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the

failure to present it is not a proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage.
Leoncia Balogbog and Gaudioso Balogbog vs. CA, G.R. No. 83598, March 7, 1997
Failure of solemnizing officer to send copy of marriage certificate to municipal

secretary does not invalidate marriage.
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father
and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since
it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not
present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the
requisites."
Angelita Jones vs. Felix Hortiguela, G.R. No. 43701, March 6, 1937
Truth or falsehood of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage certificate is

not an essential requirement for marriage.
Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage
certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient
proofs of [one's] liability for bigamy.
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 191425, September 7, 2011
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union,

it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
Vda. de Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014, citing Añonuevo v.
Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, G.R. No. 178221, December 1, 2010
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract,
both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence
of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have
thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of
the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol

evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded
the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, . . . which
may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is
accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or
non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the
contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for
the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
xxx xxx xxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis,

necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or
extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity
is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents
but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when
available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence
presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
Vda. de Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014, citing Vda. de Jacob
v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693 (1999)
Validity of marriage cannot be collaterally attacked.
Considering that the subject public instrument in this case refers to the marriage
certificate, we find it apropos to point out that the validity of marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked since under existing laws and jurisprudence, the same may be
questioned only in a direct action. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. In declaring that the one
who solemnized the subject marriages had no authority to do so would indirectly
result in the declaration that said marriages are void. This is what our jurisdiction
intends to prevent.
Corpuz, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 212656-57, November 23, 2016
Art. 23 - Duties of solemnizing officer
A judge must ensure that the marriage is properly documented.

Failure of solemnizing officer to send copy of marriage certificate to municipal secretary
does not invalidate marriage.
It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage.
A judge must ensure that the marriage is properly documented.
From the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should
exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in
its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure
that the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family
Code. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the
cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events.
Although it is true that marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code merit
exemption from a marriage license, respondent judge should have complied with the
mandate of personally ascertaining the circumstances of cohabitation of the parties.
Records reveal that the declarations embodied in the required joint affidavit of
cohabitation of the parties do not actually represent the accurate circumstances of their
alleged cohabitation.
In cases where one or both of the contracting parties are foreigners, Article 21
of the Family Code provides that a certificate of legal capacity to marry is necessary
before the acquisition of a marriage license. As the solemnizing officer, respondent
judge should have ensured that pertinent requirements were secured before the
issuance of the marriage license. Thus, the absence of a certificate of legal capacity to
marry should have prompted her to question the propriety of the issuance.
Failure of solemnizing officer to send copy of marriage certificate to municipal

secretary does not invalidate marriage.
a) The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural
father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since
it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not
present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the
requisites."
Angelita Jones vs. Felix Hortiguela, G.R. No. 43701, March 6, 1937
b) The law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of
such marriage certificate and punishing him for its omission implies his obligation to
see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit
upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, the priest’s omission, if any, which
apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila
and its environs.
Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria vs. Felipe Apelan Felix, G.R. No. L-9005, June
20, 1958
It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage.
It has been held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner.
11, 2002
Art. 26 - Divorce
Basic legal principles on divorce.

Severance of the marital bond dissociates the former spouses from each other.
The marriage tie, when severed as to one party, ceases to bind the other.
The legal effects of a divorce obtained abroad must still be determined by Philippine
courts.
Divorces obtained by aliens abroad are recognized in the Philippines if valid according to
their national law.
Divorce is valid if obtained by husband at the time he ceased to be a Filipino citizen.
The divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according
to Philippine law on evidence.
The power of judicial notice with respect to foreign marital laws must be exercised with
caution
Requisites before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts.
Article 26, par. 2, allows a Filipino citizen divorced by a spouse to also remarry.
Basic legal principles on divorce.
The following basic legal principles are laid at the outset: Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between
two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of
Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.
The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even

under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.
Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the
void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective
marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the
annulment of the marriage.
Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted
by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first
marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a
foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against
the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the

respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It
affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the
death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as long as this
public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the
marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.
Severance of the marital bond dissociates the former spouses from each other.
The divorce obtained by an alien husband in his country and its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines insofar as he is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Thus, he had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit because at that time, there would no longer be a family
nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither
would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to
be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there
would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil vs. Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30,
1989
The marriage tie, when severed as to one party, ceases to bind the other.
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation
of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Alice Reyes Van Dorn vs. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. L-68470, October 8,
1985
The legal effects of a divorce obtained abroad must still be determined by

Philippine courts.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,

provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However,
the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under the Rules.
Wolfgang O. Roehr vs. Maria Carmen D. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
Divorces obtained by aliens abroad are recognized in the Philippines if valid

according to their national law.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces,
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Alice Reyes Van Dorn vs. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. L-68470, October 8,
1985
Paula T. Llorente vs. Court of Appeals and Alicia F. Llorente, G.R. No. 124371,
November 23, 2000
Divorce is valid if obtained by husband at the time he ceased to be a Filipino

citizen.
The ruling in the case of Tenchavez v. Escano (122 Phil. 752 [1965] ) that provides
that “a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present civil code is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction” is NOT applicable when the husband was no longer a Filipino citizen
when he obtained the divorce.
Paula T. Llorente vs. Court of Appeals and Alicia F. Llorente, G.R. No. 124371,
November 23, 2000
The divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
according to Philippine law on evidence.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,

provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However,
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of
the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The power of judicial notice with respect to foreign marital laws must be exercised
with caution
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Requisites before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would
be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Cipriano Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
Article 26, par. 2, allows a Filipino citizen divorced by a spouse to also remarry.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O.
No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
Art. 26 (2) - Divorce
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code —
which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner — allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability
of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 155635 &
163979, November 7, 2008
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016, citing Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 642 Phil.
420 (2010)
The intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, February 6, 2007
Alice Reyes Van Dorn vs. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr., et al., G.R. No. L-68470, October 8,
1985
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227

effectively incorporated into the law this Court's holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien
spouse's assertion of marital rights after a foreign court's divorce decree between the
alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already
severed the marital bond between the spouses. The legislative intent is for the benefit
of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts
created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or
her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her
to remarry.
Gerbert R. Corpuz vs. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas, et al., G.R. No. 186571, August 11,
2010
Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode
of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
2010
Under the [second] paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing
trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio, it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that
the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016, citing Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723
(2001)
An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than
that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.
2010
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words,
only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
2010
Art. 33 - Muslim and ethnic marriages
Provision governing marriages between non-Christians does not apply to marriage

between a Protestant and a Catholic.
Shari’a courts do not have original and exclusive jurisdiction over marriages celebrated
under both civil and Muslim laws.
Wives in marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid marriage are not precluded from
proving that property acquired during their cohabitation with their Muslim husband, is
their exclusive property
Family Code determines fitness of a mother, who is no longer a Muslim, to take custody
of her children.
Provision governing marriages between non-Christians does not apply to marriage

between a Protestant and a Catholic.
Article 78 of the Civil Code, the governing law at that time, provided that
marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces
may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. Therefore, the
marriage between complainant and respondent cannot be validated because the
records show that the former is a Protestant while the latter is a Catholic.
Estrellita J. Tamano vs. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998
Shari’a courts do not have original and exclusive jurisdiction over marriages
celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
The shari'a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when
it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the
Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec.
19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129.
Estrellita J. Tamano vs. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998
Wives in marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid marriage are not precluded

from proving that property acquired during their cohabitation with their Muslim
husband, is their exclusive property.
Co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man
and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Therefore, the
co-ownership contemplated in this provision cannot apply to Hadji Abdula's marriages
celebrated subsequent to a valid and legally existing marriage, since from the point of
view of the Civil Code Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to marry. However, the wives
in such marriages are not precluded from proving that property acquired during their
cohabitation with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property, respectively. Absent such
proof, however, the presumption is that property acquired during the subsistence of a
valid marriage — and in the Civil Code, there can only be one validly-existing
marriage at any given time — is conjugal property of such subsisting marriage.
Neng "Kagui Kadiguia" Malang vs. Corocoy Moson, G.R. No. 119064, August 22, 2000
Family Code determines fitness of a mother, who is no longer a Muslim, to take

custody of her children.
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof is not restricted to

Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether
a non-Muslim woman is worthy to have custody of her children. What determines her
capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a
healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into
consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents.
Sabrina Artadi Bondagjy vs. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy, G.R. No. 140817, December 7, 2001
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim
law is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise
solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called
combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and
the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are
Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the
application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are
Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the
Civil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if
the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the
Civil Code.
Marietta D. Zamoranos vs. People of the Phil., et al., G.R. Nos. 193902, 193908 &
194075, June 1, 2011, citing Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazali's Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines
One of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to
severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.
Marietta D. Zamoranos vs. People of the Phil., et al., G.R. Nos. 193902, 193908 &
194075, June 1, 2011
Art. 34 - Marriage license not necessary when parties have cohabited for 5
years
Rationale for dispensing with marriage license.

Requisites for application of legal ratification of marital cohabitation.
The 5-year cohabitation period must be exclusive and continuous.
Parties cannot invoke failure to comply with requisites of marriage as ground to nullify the
same.
Cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not sever the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage
Rationale for dispensing with marriage license.
There are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace
in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the
source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
Requisites for application of legal ratification of marital cohabitation.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the

following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be

present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together
for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had

ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment
to their marriage.
Herminia Borja-Manzano vs. Judge Roque R Sanchez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, March
8, 2001
Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34 are,

doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general
rule should be strictly but reasonably construed. The affidavits of cohabitation should
not be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the
Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect
union valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. The parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during the
entire period and not only at the time of the marriage.
The 5-year cohabitation period must be exclusive and continuous.
The five-year common-law cohabitation period should be computed on the

basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union. It should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period, counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity —
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity —
that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common-law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years
and have no legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The judge, as solemnizing
officer, must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of any legal
impediment to marry each other. The judge must also execute a sworn statement that
he personally ascertained the parties' qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Tupal v. Rojo, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842, February 24, 2014
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the

Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties' affidavit
of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties' marriage. As a
solemnizing officer, the judge's only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to
examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without
legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize
the parties' affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge's
official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties' requirements for
marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot
objectively examine and review the affidavit's statements before performing the
marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the
affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he
solemnized the marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose
marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected
with their official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Parties cannot invoke failure to comply with requisites of marriage as ground to

nullify the same.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its

requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a
pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit
of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the

misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage
without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be
acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a
marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation
requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract. We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous
and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on
marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent
and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses. In Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals, we had the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy
should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences
of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment."
Santiago v. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not sever the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for a judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Herminia Borja-Manzano vs. Judge Roque R Sanchez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, March
8, 2001
Purpose of Provision
The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of
this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license.
Reinel Anthony B. De Castro vs. Annabelle Assidao-De Castro, G.R. No. 160172,
February 13, 2008
Art. 35 (3) - Marriages solemnized without a marriage license
A marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void and the subsequent

issuance of the license cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to the
marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
[T]hat a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2)."
Article 35 (3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement
under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. Again, this marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized
without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
As to the motive of [petitioner] in seeking to annul his marriage to [respondent], it

may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit.
Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove
that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was
[respondent] who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of [petitioner] and
[respondent] is void ab initio.
Syed Azhar Abbas vs. Gloria Goo Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Art. 36 - Psychological incapacity
Characteristics of psychological incapacity

Article 36 must be read with Articles 35, 37, 38, 41, 45 or 55 to determine the import of
"psychological incapacity."
Misrepresentations point to one's own inadequacy to cope with marital obligations,
kindred to psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the marriage.
The provision on psychological incapacity should be interpreted on a case-to-case basis.
Guidelines in interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Guideline No. 2 requires testimony of psychiatrist or medical doctor to prove
psychological incapacity.
Examination by physician or psychologist is not a prerequisite for declaration of
Guidelines in evaluating the testimonies of psychologists and psychiatrists
An expert witness would have strengthened the claim of psychological incapacity.
Petition need not allege root cause of psychological incapacity.
Petition alleging physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity complies
with the requirement of the new Rules.
Psychological incapacity refers to a mental, not physical, incapacity.
Senseless and protracted refusal of a spouse to fulfill marital obligation of procreation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity.
"Irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" do not constitute psychological
incapacity.
Sexual infidelity, per se, does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Sexual infidelity is not sufficient proof of psychological incapacity.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
To be tired and give up on one's situation and on one's spouse are not signs of
psychological illness.
Wife's lack of attention to children, immaturity and lack of “intention of procreative
sexuality” do not constitute psychological incapacity.
Immaturity, sexual promiscuity and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
Psychological defect cannot be presumed from the mere fact of abandonment.
Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation.
Norms for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.
Psychological incapacity justifies judicial declaration freeing the parties from
consequences stemming from the marriage.
An inveterate pathological liar is unable to commit to the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses.
Psychological conditions that hamper performance of marital obligations do not mean that
the husband and wife suffer from psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders.
Disagreements on money matters is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void.
Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law.
"Psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.
Art. 36 does not contemplate mere refusal, neglect, difficulty or ill will on the part of the
errant spouse.
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Manifestations of psychological incapacity.
Mismanagement of family finances does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Annulments of the Catholic church are not controlling or decisive
Findings of the RTC on existence or non-existence of psychological incapacity is final and
binding; A marriage that is null and void ab initio is not accorded protection
Definition of "psychological incapacity
Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
Marriages entered into for considerations other than love, are equally valid
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law
Jocelyn M. Suazo vs. Angelito Suazo, et al., G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010
Susie Chan-Tan vs. Jesse C. Tan, G.R. No. 167139, February 25, 2010
Jordan Chan Paz vs. Jeanice Pavon Paz, G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010
Edward N. Lim vs. Ma. Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim, G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010
Characteristics of psychological incapacity
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a)

gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the marriage. It
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015
Article 36 must be read with Articles 35, 37, 38, 41, 45 or 55 to determine the
import of "psychological incapacity."
[I]n determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must
be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38,
and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab
initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these
various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. Neither it is
to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption,
civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment
and the like.
Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris vs. Brix Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006
Republic of the Phil. vs. Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008
Misrepresentations point to one's own inadequacy to cope with marital obligations,

kindred to psychological incapacity.
Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if
the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates
the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It
would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent
and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3)
vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated
consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to
her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological
incapacity under Article 36.
Leonilo Antonio vs. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Psychological incapacity refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the marriage.
The psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The burden of proving the nullity of marriage is on the petitioner.
Renne Enrique Bier vs. Ma. Lourdes A. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such,
the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Thus, it has consistently been held that psychological
incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It
must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Republic v. Romero II, G.R. Nos. 209180 & 209253, February 24, 2016
Verily, all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits
associated with certain personality disorders and there is hardly any doubt that the
intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases. Thus, to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the
psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) have juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
Republic v. Romero II, G.R. Nos. 209180 & 209253, February 24, 2016
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Brenda B. Marcos vs. Wilson G. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders,
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
must be fully explained[.]
Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006
Republic of the Phil. vs. Laila Tanyag-San Jose, et al., G.R. No. 168328, February 28,
2007
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and

assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. As this Court repeatedly declares, Article
36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code. Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity,
and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers
only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Rosa Yap Paras vs. Justo J. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007
Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under

Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality disorders, there is
hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
Nilda V. Navales vs. Reynaldo Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008
The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates

"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is
one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological
incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
the marriage.
Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be

reluctant to perform one's duties is another. To hark back to what has been earlier
discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality
and significance to the marriage.
Republic v. De Gracia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014
Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the
Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions
of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to
gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code
Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided
to adopt the provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law
"allow some resiliency in its application." Illustrative of the "less specificity than
expected" has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any
examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the
provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee
desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision
itself having been taken from the Canon Law.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty", "refusal" or

"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that
the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
Republic v. Pangasinan, G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016, citing Marable v. Marable,
G.R. No. 178741, January 17, 2011
In sum, a person's psychological incapacity to comply with his or her essential

obligations, as the case may be, in marriage must be rooted on a medically or
clinically identifiable grave illness that is incurable and shown to have existed at the
time of marriage, although the manifestations thereof may only be evident after
marriage.
Republic v. Pangasinan, G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016
Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by
law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it
must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017
The provision on psychological incapacity should be interpreted on a case-to-case

basis.
The Civil Code Revision Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.
Joselita Salita vs. Hon. Delilah Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994
But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and
applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less
specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every
court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in recognition of the
verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
Guidelines in interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the

Family Code are handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68

up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of

the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to

harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that
to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards
the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable
base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, G.R. No.
108763, February 13, 1997
Republic of the Phil. vs. Crasus L. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to
every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate
of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its
enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its
application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own
facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next
one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage;
hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court."
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for

the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise
in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to
inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent
and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave,
antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial

antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage." Finally, the "psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." The Court explained:
(a) Gravity — It must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Judicial Antecedence — It must be rooted in the history of the party

antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and
(c) Incurability — It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 159220,
September 22, 2008
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be

characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thus, the
incapacity "must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved." In this connection, the burden of
proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner, pursuant to Republic v. Court of
Appeals, or the Molina case.
Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016, citing Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 10 Phil. 21 (1995) and Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 676 (1997)
Guideline No. 2 requires testimony of psychiatrist or medical doctor to prove

The wife failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root
cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to
the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for

the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise
in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to
inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent
and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave,
antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Examination by physician or psychologist is not a prerequisite for declaration of

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage,

may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a
conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If
other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed
state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be
weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as

conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of
other evidence to establish causation. The expert's findings under such circumstances
would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. This is so,
considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted
by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her
psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties' upbringing and psychodynamics.
[E]ven if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the
granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical
examination of [the husband] was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence
presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did
not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to
show the psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should
emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos. But where, like here, the
parties had the full opportunity to present the professional and expert opinions of
psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be presented and be weighed by the
trial courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the
marriages. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must
always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties
but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
Arabelle J. Mendoza vs. Republic of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 157649, November 12,
2012
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the

psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have
automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must
always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties
but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
Guidelines in evaluating the testimonies of psychologists and psychiatrists
Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity
of marriage, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side —
the petitioner — whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. . . . To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on
the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondent's exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her testimony and
report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars. . .
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it
was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. . . . If a psychological disorder
can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof
cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence, however, appears
on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondent's early
life and associations, and about events on or about the time of the marriage and
immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no more
than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meagre facts that the
petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists
to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser
qualities of the respondent's life were examined and given focus; none of these
qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities. . . The evidence fails to
mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage . . .
To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have failed, not because
of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic
incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological
incapacity.
Viñas v. Parel-Viñas, G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015, citing 612 Phil. 1061 (2009)
An expert witness would have strengthened the claim of psychological incapacity.
[I]n order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a
mere fabrication, evidence other than [the wife's] lone testimony should have been
adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is not a
conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert witness
would have strengthened [the wife's] claim of [the husband's] alleged psychological
incapacity. [Her] omission to present one is fatal to her position. There can be no
conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the
"defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al., G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006
It is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity
of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
"despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015, citing Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R.
No. 161793, February 13, 2009
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage

based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. The probative force of the
testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but
rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve
as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.
Petition need not allege root cause of psychological incapacity.
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that "expert opinion need not
be alleged" in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral
sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since
the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause
of the psychological incapacity.
Diana M. Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003
Petition alleging physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity

complies with the requirement of the new Rules.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work,
respond to and control the human body. Scientists still do not understand everything
there is to know about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of
many psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward,
physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to
allege are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity.
Diana M. Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003
Psychological incapacity refers to a mental, not physical, incapacity.
Correlated with existing precepts in our law on marriage, "psychological

incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand,
an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." plpecdtai
We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that must concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to
render help and support. We have also held that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
meaning and significance to the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity as a
ground for nullification of marriage, a person's psychological affliction must be grave
and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply with the
essential objects of marriage, including the rights and obligations between husband
and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must be
incurable.
2012
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of

the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical —
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who
imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully
substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party
alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
Senseless and protracted refusal of a spouse to fulfill marital obligation of

procreation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of
this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. Thus,
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997
Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by

themselves constitute psychological incapacity.
Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not

by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not
merely due to private respondent’s youth and self-conscious feeling of being
handsome.
Lucita Estrella Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the

Philippines, the Court ruled that the respondent's act of living an adulterous life
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the respondent's
unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Ligeralde v.
Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010
"Irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" do not constitute

This case is of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wife's outbursts

and overbearing ways, who finds his wife's obsession with cleanliness and the tight
reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect
for his person and his position as a Judge. However, these inadequacies do not amount
to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
totality of the evidence shows simple case of a married couple drifting apart,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love
and wanting a way out. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
Juanita Carating-Siayngco vs. Manuel Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004
It has been held that mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity nor does failure of the
parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. These differences
do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code and are not manifestations thereof which may be a ground for declaring their
marriage void. If at all, these are difficulties that couples ordinarily deal with in the
course of their marriage.
Republic v. Pangasinan, G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016
The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not
inclined to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is
romantically-involved with another man. She has not been maintaining lines of
communication with Glenn at the time the latter filed the petition before the RTC.
Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of
Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the
latter's acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity.
Viñas v. Parel-Viñas, G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity

and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In order for
sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's
unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality,
completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his
spouse. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself.
Sexual infidelity, per se, does not constitute psychological incapacity.
The only essential marital obligation which the husband was not able to fulfill,
if any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It
must be shown that his unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality
which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and
blood.
Juanita Carating-Siayngco vs. Manuel Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004
Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal
separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Cesar Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the

respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered
personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to be
faithful to her spouse.
Ricardo P. Toring vs. Teresita M. Toring, et al., G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010
Sexual infidelity is not sufficient proof of psychological incapacity.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Jaime F. Villalon vs. Ma. Corazon N. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to
establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological

incapacity.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with

psychological incapacity. Marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Supreme
Court commiserates with the wife in her unhappy marital relationship with her
husband, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should
the Court.
Lorna Guillen Pesca vs. Zosimo A. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001
The medical report failed to show that [the husband's] actions indicated a
psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or
clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his
dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his
misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of
immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that was
incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with
psychological incapacity. Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal
offenses manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a
ground only for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
2012
To be tired and give up on one's situation and on one's spouse are not signs of
psychological illness.
To be tired and give up on one's situation and on one's spouse are not necessarily
signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When
these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go
their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our
laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation — a
relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties;
or where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness
existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of
marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.
Renato Reyes So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, 5 June 2009
Wife's lack of attention to children, immaturity and lack of "intention of procreative

sexuality" do not constitute psychological incapacity.
Even if taken as true, the husband's testimony basically complains about three
aspects of the wife's personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their
children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of procreative sexuality." None
of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes "psychological incapacity."
Leni O. Choa vs. Alfonso C. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002
Immaturity, sexual promiscuity and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

The wife’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by

themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or
sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds
for legal separation.
David B. Dedel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004
[The wife’s] immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. To rule
that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, which
inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity.
Republic of the Phil. vs. CA (Ninth Division), et al., G.R. No. 159594, November 12,
2012
The respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated

with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner
must be able to establish that the respondent's unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which made her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Ligarde v.
Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010
Psychological defect cannot be presumed from the mere fact of abandonment.
The husband’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was

never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. This could
have been done through an expert witness. Psychological defect cannot be presumed
from the mere fact that he abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of
the marriage. As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to
be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was
no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Lolita Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004
[A]bandonment [of the conjugal home to live with another man] was not one of the
grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute
psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article
55 (10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, [the wife’s] sexual infidelity was not a
valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a
manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
2012
Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation and divorce
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds

need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.
Norms for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person

regardless of nationality.
In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules
merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity
were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the
norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Lolita Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004
Psychological incapacity justifies judicial declaration freeing the parties from

consequences stemming from the marriage.
The inviolability of marriage depends on whether the marriage exists and is

valid. If it is void ab initio, the "permanence" of the union becomes irrelevant, and the
Court can step in to declare it so. Article 36 of the Family Code is the justification.
Where it applies and is duly proven, a judicial declaration can free the parties from the
rights, obligations, burdens and consequences stemming from their marriage.
An inveterate pathological liar is unable to commit to the basic tenets of

relationship between spouses.
Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as

embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins
the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. [I]t is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar
would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on
love, trust and respect.
Leonilo Antonio vs. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Psychological conditions that hamper performance of marital obligations do not

mean that the husband and wife suffer from psychological incapacity.
We cannot see how their personality disorder would render the husband and wife
unaware of the essential marital obligations or to be incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to a
marriage. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their performance
of their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological
incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty is not
synonymous to incapacity.
Rodolfo A. Aspillaga vs. Aurora A. Aspillaga, G.R. No. 170925, October 26, 2009
Psychological incapacity is confined to the most serious cases of personality

disorders.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty", "refusal" or

"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. The intention of the law is
to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
meaning and significance to the marriage.
[T]he expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based

on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
2012
To the Court's mind, [the wife's] refusal to live with [her husband] and to assume
her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the
nullification of the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically
incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. . . .
[P]sychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality
and significance to the marriage.
Disagreements on money matters is not a ground to declare a marriage null and

void.
While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of
one's marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a
marriage null and void. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even normal, occurrence
between husbands and wives.
Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. Article 36 refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. The malady must be so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
It must be reiterated, however, that the remedy [for a failed marriage] is not always
to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36
of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; rather, it must be limited to
cases where there is a downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse.
Republic v. Romero II, G.R. Nos. 209180 & 209253, February 24, 2016, citing Republic
v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
"Psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of

psychoses.
"Psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to

comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability
Art. 36 does not contemplate mere refusal, neglect, difficulty or ill will on the part
of the errant spouse.
The remedy for a marriage that has failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations,
not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. It is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The State, fortunately or
unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree that divorce should be available in this
country. Neither should an Article 36 declaration of nullity be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Unless the evidence presented clearly
reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was
incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have
validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of
the marital tie.
Enrique A. Agraviador vs. Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador, et al., G.R. No. 170729,
December 8, 2010
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a

"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage
is not a null and void marriage.
Noel B. Baccay vs. Maribel C. Baccay, et al., G.R. No. 173138, December 1, 2010
Manifestations of psychological incapacity.
The husband's pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological

incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic
financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not
connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
Ma. Socorro Camacho-Reyes vs. Ramon Reyes-Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18,
2010
Mismanagement of family finances does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Irresponsibility in managing the family's finances does not rise to the level of a
psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most, the
wife's mismanagement of the family's finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal or
neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the family's
financial support.
Ricardo P. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010
Annulments of the Catholic church are not controlling or decisive
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article

36 would be legislating from the bench. . . . [I]nterpretations given by the NAMT
[National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal] of the Catholic Church in the Philippines
are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 676-678 (1997)
Findings of the RTC on existence or non-existence of psychological incapacity is

final and binding; A marriage that is null and void ab initio is not accorded
protection
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence
of a party's psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such
findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not
shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation where the findings of
the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during
trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment. It is
not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and
substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the
Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that
the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be
accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no
legal existence.
Definition of "psychological incapacity."
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of

the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior
to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was
about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological
incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations
of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family
Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the
Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end
they decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to
have the law "allow some resiliency in its application." Illustrative of the "less
specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family Code Revision
Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited
the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis,
because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive
effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.
[A]s the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the
term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code "has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances," and could not be taken and construed independently of "but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage."
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015, citing Santos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church
Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the
Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT (National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal) of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence.
Thus: Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that
to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is
decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void . . . .
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of
the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT (National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines) was not the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of
the Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who
suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.
In Santos v. Santos, the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of
the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight
on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It went out to state that a part of the
provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law .
..
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Santos v. Santos,
310 Phil. 21, 37 (1995)
In Najera v. Najera, the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether
to consider an annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the
only ground recognized in our law. In the said case, the NAMT decision was also
based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar
to, and only annulments under the third paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be
considered. . .
To repeat, the decision of the NAMT was based on the second paragraph of
Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Najera v. Najera,
609 Phil. 316, 336 (2009)
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article

36 would be legislating from the bench. As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines
are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.
Marriages entered into for considerations other than love, are equally valid
That he married [his wife] not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter's
parents, does not mean that [the husband] is psychologically incapacitated in the
context of Article 36 of the Family Code. In Republic v. Albios, the Court held that:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State
does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead.
Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to
love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law
It must be reiterated, however, that the remedy [for a failed marriage] is not always
to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36
of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; rather, it must be limited to
cases where there is a downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse.
Art. 40 - Absolute nullity of a previous marriage
Article 40 applies to remarriages after effectivity of Family Code regardless of the date of
first marriage.
Declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is necessary for purposes of remarriage.
However, no judicial decree of nullity is needed when marriage took place and all children
were born before Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before effectivity of Family Code.
No judicial declaration of absolute nullity is necessary for purposes other than remarriage.
Issuance of marriage license after marriage ceremony gives rise to the conclusion that the
marriage was contracted without a license.
Pendency of case for declaration of nullity is not a prejudicial question to concubinage
case.
Only competent courts, not parties themselves, are authorized to judge nullity of marriage.
Parties to marriage are not permitted to judge for themselves its nullity.
No matter how obvious the absence of an element, intervention of courts must be resorted
to.
Legality of marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law.
Pendency of annulment case does not give rise to a prejudicial question.
No declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary for purposes other than remarriage.
Declaration of nullity of previous marriage does not validate second marriage.
When crime of bigamy had been consummated, declaration of nullity of second marriage
on ground of psychological incapacity is of no moment.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of void marriage, one may be convicted of
bigamy.
Outcome of annulment case had no bearing upon the criminal case for bigamy.
Among legal consequences of void marriages is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
Subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of first marriage is immaterial if bigamy had
been consummated.
No judicial declaration of nullity is needed when parties merely signed a marriage contract
on their own.
Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador Against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico,
A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010
Article 40 applies to remarriages after effectivity of Family Code regardless of the

date of first marriage.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the

Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides,
under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure.
Lupo Almodiel Atienza vs. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr., Adm. Matter No.
MTJ-92706, March 29, 1995
Maria Apiag vs. Esmeraldo G. Cantero, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-95-1070, February 12,
1997
[A]rticle 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because

Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." . . . The fact
that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws.
Merlinda Cipriano Montañez vs. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October
22, 2012 citing Jarillo vs. People, G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010
Declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is necessary for purposes of
remarriage.
The Family Code settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on
whether or not a judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary for purposes of
remarriage. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Roberto Domingo vs. Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad Avera, G.R. No. 104818,
September 17, 1993
The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to

contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code . . . The
reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:
. . . The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines
took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a

marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the
nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial

declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
If petitioner's contention would be allowed, a person who commits
bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision
is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note
that in petitioner's case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was
declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken
by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioner's
argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this
case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying
his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such
cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon
the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately
act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly,
petitioner's strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Lasanas v. People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014, citing Teves v. People, G.R. No.
188775, August 24, 2011
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial

declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage
without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of
the nullity of the first marriage.
Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016
However, no judicial decree of nullity is needed when marriage took place and all
children were born before Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before effectivity of Family
Code.
A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before
any party thereto can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void.
This was expressly provided under Article 40 of the Family Code. However, if the
marriage took place and all the children were born before the promulgation of Wiegel
vs. Sempio-Diy (August 19, 1986) and before the effectivity of the Family Code, the
doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante (June 2, 1977), that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages, applies.
Maria Apiag vs. Esmeraldo G. Cantero, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-95-1070, February 12,
1997
No judicial declaration of absolute nullity is necessary for purposes other than

remarriage.
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare

a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.
Issuance of marriage license after marriage ceremony gives rise to the conclusion
that the marriage was contracted without a license.
Petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there
was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the
date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the
marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the
marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
Filipina Y. Sy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000
Pendency of case for declaration of nullity is not a prejudicial question to

concubinage case.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is

not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Meynardo L. Beltran vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000
Only competent courts, not parties themselves, are authorized to judge nullity of
marriage.
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the
validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Rolando Landicho vs. Hon. Lorenzo Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, Feb. 23, 1968
Parties to marriage are not permitted to judge for themselves its nullity.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all
intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for concubinage.
Meynardo L. Beltran vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
22, 2012
No matter how obvious the absence of an element, intervention of courts must be

resorted to.
Article 40 of the Family Code requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of

a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it
is not for the parties to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or
not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because
there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted. No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is,
the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the
Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render.
Imelda Marbella-Bobis vs. Isagani D. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
Legality of marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the
law.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be

successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the
requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The
legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the
law.
Imelda Marbella-Bobis vs. Isagani D. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
Pendency of annulment case does not give rise to a prejudicial question.
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption of marriage exists. The pendency of the civil case
for annulment did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the
alleged commission of the crime, the marriage was, under the law, still valid and
subsisting.
Arthur Te vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000
No declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary for purposes other than

remarriage.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
Declaration of nullity of previous marriage does not validate second marriage.
It does not follow that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the "death benefits" would now be awarded to respondent
Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case
of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does
not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
When crime of bigamy had been consummated, declaration of nullity of second

marriage on ground of psychological incapacity is of no moment.
A declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State's penal laws
are concerned. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage. Thus, as soon as the second marriage was celebrated during the subsistence
of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. There
is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and
void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage
that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State's penal laws protecting the
institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special
contract between spouses, and punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the
permanent character of the special bond between spouses.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of void marriage, one may be convicted of

bigamy.
A judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is now necessary before one

can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, one may be charged with, and
convicted of, bigamy.
Vincent Paul G. Mercado vs. Consuelo Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000
As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al. that
parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the
first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling
in wording Article 40 of the Family Code.
Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016, citing Landicho v. Relova, 130
Phil. 745 (1968)
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35 (4) of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
Iwasawa v. Gangan, G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013
[R]espondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first

marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution
for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite — usually the marriage license — and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provision on bigamy.
22, 2012 citing Jarillo vs. People, G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010
Outcome of annulment case had no bearing upon the criminal case for bigamy.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage to private
respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner's innocence or guilt in
the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Among legal consequences of void marriages is incurring criminal liability for

bigamy.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar
as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said
marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived
or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of first marriage is immaterial if

bigamy had been consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. Thus, even if the husband
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point
is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, the husband’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to his first wife had no bearing upon the determination of his
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted.
Salvador S. Abunado vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004
No judicial declaration of nullity is needed when parties merely signed a marriage

contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract, without a marriage

ceremony performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer, bears no semblance to
a valid marriage. Thus, it needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone,
without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration
of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
Lucio C. Morigo vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004
Art. 41 - Subsequent marriage of absentee's spouse
Remarriage of abandoned spouse, not of deserting spouse, is contemplated under Art. 83

(a) of Civil Code.
Declaration of presumptive death is necessary for validity of subsequent marriage.
Judicial declaration of absence is not necessary when prescribed period of absence is met.
Conditions before a subsequent bigamous marriage may be deemed valid.
Belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries
and efforts.
A judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is required for the benefit of the
spouse present and of the State.
Only with a declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.
Remarriage of abandoned spouse, not of deserting spouse, is contemplated under

Art. 83 (a) of Civil Code.
The first exception (when the absent spouse has not been heard from for seven
consecutive years and the present spouse has no news that he/she is alive) under Art.
83 of the Civil Code on illegality of subsequent marriages, refers to the subsequent
marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse,
after the period of seven years has lapsed.
Nenita Bienvenido vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111717, October 24, 1994
Declaration of presumptive death is necessary for validity of subsequent marriage.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which
has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a
missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.
19, 1996
Republic of the Phil. vs. Robert P. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013
Judicial declaration of absence is not necessary when prescribed period of absence

is met.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as

long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the
marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83 of the
Civil Code, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court."
Antonia Armas vs. Marietta Calisterio, G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000
Conditions before a subsequent bigamous marriage may be deemed valid.
Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage
may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a)
The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive
years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in
Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike
the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which
purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of
judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation
to Article 40, of the Family Code.
Antonia Armas vs. Marietta Calisterio, G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be

shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been
missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid
down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
(3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4)
that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
Republic v. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
Belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness
inquiries and efforts.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse
present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by
present spouse.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 159614, December 9, 2005
Republic v. Granada, G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012
The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove
that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period
required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure
to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present
spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded
belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead. This strict standard approach ensures that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to
conveniently circumvent the laws in light of the State's policy to protect and
strengthen the institution of marriage. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts
but instead should see to it that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is
met.
Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015
In Nolasco . . . [t]he Court held that the present spouse's methods of investigation
were too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was already dead. It stated that the
pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate with their
common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015, citing Republic v.
Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993
Recently, in Republic v. Cantor, the Court considered the present spouse's efforts to
have fallen short of the "stringent standard" and lacked the degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence . . . In the Court's view, the wife merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws,
neighbors and friends. She, thus, failed to conduct a diligent search. Her claimed
efforts were insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already
dead.
Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015, citing Republic v.
Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013
A judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is required for the benefit
of the spouse present and of the State.
The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is
for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and
convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found
incredible. The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State.
Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of
the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require
that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance
only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. The laws regulating
civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the
validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the
community.
Eduardo P. Manuel vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
Only with a declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent

spouse can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.
The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to

society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse after the lapse of the period provided for
under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent
court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse
contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first
spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old
jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties
believed the other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation
determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment
and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals. Only with such proof can
marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.
Eduardo P. Manuel vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
[A] petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code. . . . Taken together,
Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for
declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court
therein shall be immediately final and executory. . . . In sum, under Article 41 of the
Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party
may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Yolanda Cadacio Granada, G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage.
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous

subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present:
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent

spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent

spouse.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a

court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief
that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting
marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage
contracted in good faith is protected by law. Therefore, the party who contracted the
subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his
subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage still applies.
If . . . [the husband] was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her
presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage
would be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35 (4) of the Family
Code. This is because the circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief"
under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule
against bigamous marriages to apply.
Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without
doubt, failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the impediment was
already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is
the rule that "whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence." . . . Edna cannot be
considered as the legal spouse of Edgardo as their marriage took place during the
existence of a previously contracted marriage. . . . It is of no moment that the first
wife, Rosemarie, did not participate or oppose Edna's claim. Rosemarie's
non-participation or her subsequent death . . . did not cure or legitimize the status of
Edna.
Social Security Commission v. Azote, G.R. No. 209741, April 15, 2015
A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to challenge a trial court's declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of The Family Code of the Philippines.
Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be

shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under
Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is
danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the

absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the

declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. (Underscoring supplied)
Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016, citing Republic v.
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case
invites extended discussion), the holding is that the —
mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack
of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the
absentee spouse or invocation of the] general presumption on absence under
the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the
premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of
"well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a due showing of
proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the
absent spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is
[either] still alive or is already dead.
xxx xxx xxx
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends
upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak,
remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement,
the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one).
The present spouse merely conducted a "passive search" because she simply made
unsubstantiated inquiries from her in-laws, from neighbors and friends. For that
reason, this Court stressed that the degree of diligence and reasonable search required
by law is not met (1) when there is failure to present the persons from whom the
present spouse allegedly made inquiries especially the absent spouse's relatives,
neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is failure to report the missing spouse's
purported disappearance or death to the police or mass media, and (3) when the
present spouse's evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse chose not
to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed dead. The rationale for
this palpably stringent or rigorous requirement has been marked out thus:
. . . [T]he Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying

their marriage, has consistently applied the "strict standard" approach. This is
to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws.
Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the
stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. . . .
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative

if we consider the State's policy to protect and strengthen the institution of
marriage. Since marriage serves as the family's foundation and since it is the
state's policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution,
marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. . .
.
. . . [I]t has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required
in petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed
by the lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this Court, on
review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that
anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify
this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict
standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code."
(Citations omitted)
Art. 42 - Subsequent marriage
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by [Article 42] of

the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the
reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of
the subsequent marriage.
SSS vs. Teresita Jarque Vda. de Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being
terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. . . . In other
words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance. The filing of an affidavit
of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage
to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead.
[A] close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the
subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the
non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always
immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent
or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage
only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or
presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been
annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance
is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is
no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in
the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming such fact of
reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of

presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that
the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of
the marital relations with the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages,
is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not
properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.
[M]ere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties
to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate
the subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court
action[.]" "Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption
that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse's
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as
legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law."
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014, citing Social Security System v.
Vda. de Bailon, 520 Phil. 249 (2006)
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the

termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was
declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court
had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing
"an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration
of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage."
Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is

valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate,
and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in
valid marriages." If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against
prosecution for bigamy.
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent
marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to
the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or wife." This means that even if [the absent spouse] is a
real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action
to nullify the second marriage, this remedy is not available to her. Therefore, for the
purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the
effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere
filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. [The absent spouse]'s choice
to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
Art. 45 - Annulment of marriage
Distinction between "annul' and "null and void".

Annulment of marriage cannot destroy its juridical consequences.
Lawyer's act of advertising himself as "Annulment of Marriage Specialist" erodes sanctity
of marriage
Non-disclosure of premarital relationship is not one of grounds for annulment.
Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant (4
months) by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of
marriage.
There is no fraud when the wife was already in the 7th month of pregnancy at the time of
marriage.
A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally.
Distinction between "annul" and "null and void".
The terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal connotations and
implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or
of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with, whereas null and void is
something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled
presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated
through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status
or condition which already exists from the very beginning.
Federico C. Suntay vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 132524, December 29,
1998
Annulment of marriage cannot destroy its juridical consequences.
The annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the
society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical
consequences which the marital union produced during its continuance.
Sy Joc Lieng vs. Petronila Encarnacion, G.R. No. 4718, March 19, 1910
Lawyer's act of advertising himself as “Annulment of Marriage Specialist” erodes

sanctity of marriage
In advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he

erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still
considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our
society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in
four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people,
who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving
their marriage bonds, to do so.
Ismael G. Khan vs. Rizalino T. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003
Non-disclosure of premarital relationship is not one of grounds for annulment.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is

not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to . . . chastity" shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of
premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the
marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was
solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and
not herself alone, is interested.
Aurora A. Anaya vs. Fernando O. Palaroan, G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970
Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant (4 months) by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground
for annulment of marriage.
The wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of
her marriage. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy,
the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the
enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable
and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the
abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the
abdomen more general and apparent. If, as claimed by husband, the wife is "naturally
plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she
was pregnant at the time of their marriage, more so because she must have attempted
to conceal the true state of affairs.
Fernando Aquino vs. Conchita Delizo, G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960
There is no fraud when the wife was already in the 7th month of pregnancy at the
time of marriage.
In an action for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, the

husband's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held
to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced
stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage.
Godofredo Buccat vs. Luida Mangonon de Buccat, G.R. No. 47101, April 25, 1941
A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally.
[A] voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.

Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
SSS vs. Teresita Jarque Vda. de Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006
Article 45 (5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.
Article 45 (5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the
complete act of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the
part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect
in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions
or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused
by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of
making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.
Art. 45 (5) - Physical incapability of consummating the marriage
Lone testimony of husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual

intercourse is insufficient.
Although the wife's refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show

indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because women of this country
are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination
unless compelled to by competent authority. This the court may do, without doing
violence to and infringing upon her constitutional right. A physical examination in this
case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being
compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony
of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and
wife.
Joel Jimenez vs. Remedios Cañizares, G.R. No. L-12790, August 31, 1960
Art. 46 - Voidable marriage
A voidable marriage is deemed valid until set aside by final judgment.

Other forms of psychoses merely render marriage contract voidable.
A voidable marriage may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.
Free cohabitation or prescription ratifies a voidable marriage.
A voidable marriage can be assailed only during lifetime of the parties.
A voidable marriage can be assailed only by its parties.
Conjugal partnership governs property relationship in a voidable marriage.
A voidable marriage is not a defense in a charge of bigamy.
A voidable marriage is deemed valid until set aside by final judgment.
A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until
it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.
Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had
never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of
the marriage from being totally wiped out.
Federico C. Suntay vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 132524, December 29,
1998
Salvador S. Abunado vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004
Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000
Bobis vs. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy, G.R. No. L-53703, August 19, 1986
Other forms of psychoses merely render marriage contract voidable.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.
A voidable marriage may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a

voidable one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.
Tomasa vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135216, August 19, 1999
Free cohabitation or prescription ratifies a voidable marriage.

A voidable marriage can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation
or prescription.
A voidable marriage can be assailed only during lifetime of the parties.
Voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid.
A voidable marriage can be assailed only by its parties.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it

Conjugal partnership governs property relationship in a voidable marriage.
The property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal

partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
A voidable marriage is not a defense in a charge of bigamy.
In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled

(and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were
contracted prior to the decree of annulment), the complete nullity, however, of a
previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can
outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy.
Art. 47 - Persons authorized to file action for annulment
The Family Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife; Exceptions.
Only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file an action to declare the
absolute nullity of a marriage.
The Family Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage.
Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions

for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage
relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit
"at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage.
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or wife; Exceptions.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line
to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only
to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but,
being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to
proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. The following actions for declaration
of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of

the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the
Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Isidro Ablaza vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010, citing Carlos
v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic (G.R. No.
169766, March 30, 2011), this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that
only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
"does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy. . . .
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the
investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the
judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."
Minoru Fujiki vs. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, et al., G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file an action to
declare the absolute nullity of a marriage.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. It is clarified, however, that the absence
of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license
to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. The
plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the
party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. The omission to
implead the wife and daughter was not immediately fatal to the present action,
however, considering that Section 11, Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the
same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made "on
motion of any party or on (the trial court's) own initiative at any stage of the action
and on such terms as are just."
Isidro Ablaza vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010, citing Carlos
v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008
Art. 48 - Collusion
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger
of collusion
The State is mandated to actively intervene in the procedure for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Non-intervention of prosecuting attorney is not fatal where husband vehemently opposed
annulment proceedings.
Earnest efforts towards a compromise need not be looked into when the complaint for
legal separation has been withdrawn.
In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the Solicitor General shall issue a
certification before a decision is handed down.
Lack of participation of the State was not cured by the lower court's dismissal of the
petition.
The Solicitor General's intervention in the proceedings for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriages ensures that the interest of the State is represented.
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the

danger of collusion
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires

vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection
of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. A grant of annulment of marriage or
legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases
for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of
preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the
court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting
attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney
or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and
fabricated.
Marietta B. Ancheta vs. Rodolfo S. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004
The State is mandated to actively intervene in the procedure for declaration of

nullity of marriage.
A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code

requires the application of procedural and substantive guidelines. While compliance
with these requirements mostly devolves upon the wife, the State is likewise mandated
to actively intervene in the procedure. Should there be non-compliance by the State
with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the case to the lower court for proper
trial.
Non-intervention of prosecuting attorney is not fatal where husband vehemently

opposed annulment proceedings.
The husband's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the

conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. Thus, the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not
fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
Emilio Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996
Earnest efforts towards a compromise need not be looked into when the complaint
for legal separation has been withdrawn.
The husband’s filing of notice of withdrawal of his complaint for legal

separation rendered the case moot and academic. Thus, it is not necessary to resolve
the controversial issue of whether in an action by the husband for legal separation
against the wife, it should be alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise had
been made.
Consuelo Madrigal-Vasquez vs. Judge Corazon J. Agrava, G.R. No. L-32219, February
25, 1982
In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the Solicitor General shall issue
a certification before a decision is handed down.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
Republic of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, G.R. No.
108763, February 13, 1997
Lack of participation of the State was not cured by the lower court's dismissal of
the petition.
While the fiscal filed with the trial court a manifestation stating that he found
no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participate therein. Other than
entering his appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing more was heard from
him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal to contribute
to the proceedings. It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition,
the evil sought to be prevented (i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about,
hence, the lack of participation of the State was cured. Not so. The task of protecting
marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation
and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well.
The Solicitor General's intervention in the proceedings for annulment or

declaration of nullity of marriages ensures that the interest of the State is represented.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him
or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity
of marriages. . . The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the
parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the
Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of
such intent, rather than thwart it.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Crasus L. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005
Failure of the RTC to require the appearance of the Public Prosecutor or Solicitor
General in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages does
not nullify the Compromise Agreement.
The purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor
General is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. While the
appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the
failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the Compromise
Agreement.
Virgilio Maquilan vs. Dita Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007
Art. 55 - Legal separation
Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality as grounds for legal

separation.
Petition for legal separation is independent from the counterclaim to declare nullity of
same marriage.
Death of one party to an action for legal separation causes the death of the action itself.
Action for legal separation is abated by death of the plaintiff even if property rights are
involved.
Dissolution and liquidation of property regime are necessary consequences of the final
decree of legal separation.
Allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made is deemed
unnecessary as notice of dismissal rendered the legal separation case moot and academic.
Decree of legal separation on the ground of concubinage may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence.
Conviction for concubinage need not be first secured before action for legal separation can
prosper.
The RTC, designated as Family Court, has the exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
relating to marital status and property relations of couples.
Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality as grounds for

legal separation.
If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Leouel Santos vs. CA and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995
Petition for legal separation is independent from the counterclaim to declare

nullity of same marriage.
The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of
the same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not
inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration
of nullity by the counterclaim, for legal separation presupposes a valid marriage, while
the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a precondition.
Carmen Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio S. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972
Death of one party to an action for legal separation causes the death of the action
itself.
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the
bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this
jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its
Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal
separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of
one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur
cum persona.
Action for legal separation is abated by death of the plaintiff even if property rights
are involved.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a
decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims
are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.
Dissolution and liquidation of property regime are necessary consequences of the

final decree of legal separation.
Article 106 of the Civil Code mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the
property regime of the spouses upon finality of the decree of legal separation. Such
dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. This legal
effect of the decree of legal separation ipso facto or automatically follows, as an
inevitable incident of, the judgment decreeing legal separation — for the purpose of
determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets. The clear mandate of this
provision is that the decision of the trial court decreeing the legal separation between
the spouses had long become final and executory and the division of the conjugal
property in a "supplemental decision" is a mere incident of the decree of legal
separation.
Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-38287, October 23, 1981
Allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made is deemed
unnecessary as notice of dismissal rendered the legal separation case moot and
academic.
Notice of dismissal of complaint rendered the legal separation case moot and
academic and that it is not necessary to resolve the controversial issue of whether in
an action by the husband for legal separation against the wife, it should be alleged that
earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made, as supposedly required in
Article 222 of the Civil Code and Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
Because of that notice of dismissal, the wife obtained the relief which she had sought
by means of her motion to dismiss.
Consuelo Madrigal-Vasquez vs. Judge Corazon J. Agrava, G.R. No. L-32219, February
25, 1982
Decree of legal separation on the ground of concubinage may be issued upon proof
by preponderance of evidence.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued

upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No
criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco
vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when
absolute divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal
separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such former law,
that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a
criminal action. That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers
of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a
modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.
Froilan C. Gandionco vs. Hon. Senen C. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 79284, November 27,
1987
Conviction for concubinage need not be first secured before action for legal
separation can prosper.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued

upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation.No
criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
1987
The RTC, designated as Family Court, has the exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases relating to marital status and property relations of couples.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family
Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others,
complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property relations of the husband
and wife or those living together. The Rule on Legal Separation provides that "the
petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior
to the date of filing or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be
found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner."
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012
Art. 55 (10) - Abandonment
Meaning of "abandon".
Meaning of "abandonment".
Physical separation of parties and husband's refusal to give support sufficed to constitute
abandonment.
Physical separation, without financial and moral desertion, is not abandonment.
Meaning of 'abandon".
The word "abandon", in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely; to forsake
or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under
a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and the publicity with which some thing or
body is thus put in the control of another, and hence the meaning of giving up
absolutely, with intent never again to resume or claim one's rights or interests. When
referring to desertion of a wife by a husband, the word has been defined as "the act of
a husband in voluntarily leaving his wife with intention to forsake her entirely, never
to return to her, and never to resume his marital duties towards her, or to claim his
marital rights; such neglect as either leaves the wife destitute of the common
necessaries of life, or would leave her destitute but for the charity of others."
Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino de la Cruz, G.R. No. L-19565, January 30, 1968
Meaning of "abandonment".
a) Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent

never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the
meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do so. There must be
absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of
perpetual separation. This idea is clearly expressed in the provision, which states that
"a spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal
dwelling without any intention of returning."
Prima Partosa-Jo vs. Court of Appeals and Ho Hang, G.R. No. 82606, December 18,
1992
b) The word "abandonment," when referring to the act of one consort of

leaving the other, is "the act of the husband or the wife who leaves his or her consort
willfully, and with an intention of causing perpetual separation." Thus, to constitute
abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be absolute cessation of marital
relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.
Physical separation of parties and husband's refusal to give support sufficed to

constitute abandonment.
The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the husband
to give support to the wife, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the
judicial separation of their conjugal property.
Prima Partosa-Jo vs. Court of Appeals and Ho Hang, G.R. No. 82606, December 18,
1992
Physical separation, without financial and moral desertion, is not abandonment.
To entitle the wife to any of the extraordinary remedies as a result of

abandonment, the abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also
amount to financial and moral desertion. Although an all-embracing definition of the
term "abandonment" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, its meaning can be
determined from the context of the law well as from its ordinary usage. The concept
of abandonment may be established in relation to the alternative remedies granted to
the wife when she has been abandoned by the husband, namely, receivership,
administration by her, or separation of property, all of which are designed to protect
the conjugal assets from waste and dissipation rendered imminent by the husband's
continued absence from the conjugal abode, and to assure the wife of a ready and
steady source of support. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning
of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the
society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor
ceases to give support to his wife.
Art. 56 (1) - Condonation
Condonation, defined.
A single voluntary marital intercourse is sufficient to constitute condonation.
Husband's failure to search for his wife does not constitute condonation.
When condonation of wife’s offense does not entitle her to a divorce.
Condonation, defined.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for

legal separation or, the conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a
matrimonial offense which the latter has committed.
Benjamin Bugayong vs. Leonila Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
A single voluntary marital intercourse is sufficient to constitute condonation.
Any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and
with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will
amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted
by evidence. Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily
is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it
is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Benjamin Bugayong vs. Leonila Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
Husband's failure to search for his wife does not constitute condonation.
The husband's failure actively to search for his wife and take her home after the
latter had left him does not constitute condonation or consent to her adulterous
relations. She "left" him after having sinned and after he had discovered her dates
with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home.
Hers was the obligation to return.
Jose de Ocampo vs. Serafina Florenciano, G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960
When condonation of wife’s offense does not entitle her to a divorce.
The wife can defeat the husband's suit for a divorce by proof that he has
pardoned her, but the effect of such condonation of the wife's offense is not to entitle
her to a divorce from her husband by reason of adultery committed by him,
notwithstanding her own condoned act of adultery.
Agueda Benedicto vs. Esteban de la Rama, G.R. No. 1056, December 8, 1903
Art. 56 (2) - Consent
Failure of husband to file case for adultery is not proof of his consent.
The mere fact that the injured husband allowed seven months to pass without
instituting criminal proceedings against his wife and her paramour is not sufficient
proof of his consent.
Francisco Gali vs. Faustino Sahagun, G.R. No. 1229, August 19, 1903
Adriano Mortiga vs. Vicente Serra and Maria Obleno, G.R. No. 2045, September 20,
1905
Art. 56 (5) - Collusion
Collusion, defined.
Rationale for state intervention in uncontested proceedings for legal separation or
annulment of marriage.
Collusion, defined.
a) Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between
husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be
represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress
evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce.
This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a
ground for denying the divorce. There would be collusion if the parties had arranged
to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not,
or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of
grounds therefor.
Jose de Ocampo vs. Serafina Florenciano, G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960
b) Collusion in matrimonial cases is "the act of married persons in procuring

a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a
matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce
proceedings"
Rationale for state intervention in uncontested proceedings for legal separation or

annulment of marriage.
a) The policy calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages), is to
emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in
which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not be
made to depend upon the parties themselves .It is consonant with this policy that the
inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may
indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
b) The prohibition expressed in the laws and rules is predicated on the fact
that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much
the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital
interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The
prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that
marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when
the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer
to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital
bonds.
Romulo Tolentino vs. Helen Villanueva, G.R. No. L-23264, March 15, 1974
Art. 63 (2) - Forfeiture of the share of the offending spouse in the net profits
[S]ince it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties . . .
are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the .
. . listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party,
his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63 (2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be
confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property
which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing Abalos
vs. Macatangay, Jr., 482 Phil. 877-894 (2004)
Art. 68 - Duties of husband and wife
Duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together
Right of parties to cohabitation is sanctioned by mutual affection, not court order
The wife is not entitled to support if she establishes her residence apart from the husband
Wife may acquire residence separate from her husband if the latter has given cause for
divorce
Courts cannot compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium
Procreation is one of the essential marital obligations
Marital Rape
Duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are
physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many
residences. If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the
wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together."
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995
It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this
rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both
spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and
wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of
spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's
feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening
marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to
advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will
step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State
policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested
wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital
obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively
or violently.
People v. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014
Right of parties to cohabitation is sanctioned by mutual affection, not court order.
It would be unrealistic for the courts to compel or urge married couples to live
together when they are speaking of impossibility of cohabitation. For while marriage
entitles both parties to cohabitation or consortium, the sanction therefor is the
spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate
or court order. This is due to the inherent characteristic and nature of marriage in this
jurisdiction.
Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno vs. Angel Cuaderno, G.R. No. L-20043, November 28,
1964
The wife is not entitled to support if she establishes her residence apart from the
husband.
Although the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance and that the wife is entitled
to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her
husband where even without legal justification she establishes her residence apart
from that provided for by the former. In such event, there is no plausible reason why
she should be allowed any support from the husband.
Pilar Atilano vs. Chua Ching Beng, G.R. No. L-11086, March 29, 1958
Wife may acquire residence separate from her husband if the latter has given cause
for divorce.
If the wife can acquire a separate residence when her husband consents or
acquiesces, there is no reason why the law will not allow her to do so when the
husband unlawfully ejects her from the conjugal home in order that he may freely
indulge in his illicit relations with another woman. Under no other circumstance could
a wife be more justified in establishing a separate residence from that of her husband.
For her to continue living with him, even if he had permitted it, would have been a
condonation of his flagrant breach of fidelity and marital duty. Furthermore, in this
case no longer was there an "identity of persons and of interest between the husband
and the wife." It is clear, therefore, that a married woman may acquire a residence or
domicile separate from that of her husband, during the existence of the marriage,
where the husband has given cause for divorce.
Diego de la Viña vs. Antonio Villareal, G.R. No. 13982, July 31, 1920
Courts cannot compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium
It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course
where the property-rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But the Court disinclined to sanction the doctrine that
an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution
of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for
no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof.
Mariano B. Arroyo vs. Dolores C. Vazquez de Arroyo, G.R. No. 17014, August 11, 1921
Alfonso Lacson vs. Carmen San Jose-Lacson and the CA, G.R. No. L-23482, August
30, 1968
Procreation is one of the essential marital obligations.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. While the law provides
that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love respect
and fidelity the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate of court order" Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA and Gina Lao-Tsoi, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997
Marital Rape
It is true that the Family Code obligates the spouses to love one another but this
rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy as expressions of love that are both
spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and
wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of
spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's
feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening
marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to
advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will
step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State
policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested
wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital
obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively
or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in
terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof,
infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give
undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of
persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other
persons or other classes in like circumstances.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape
their wives. A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By
marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy
over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to
marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in
sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He
can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal
constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and

biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails
mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual
cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
Art. 73 - Either spouse may exercise legitimate profession and business
Wife who enters into contract is solely liable for damages awarded.
Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the
wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the
consent of the husband. Thus, since it was only the wife who entered into the contract,
she is solely liable for the damages awarded, pursuant to the principle that contracts
produce effect only as between the parties who execute them.
Nancy Go, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114791, May 29, 1997
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically
address one form of violence committed against women — economic abuse.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a

woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the
following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from

engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except
in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code; . . .
Republic v. Yahon, G.R. No. 201043, June 16, 2014
Art. 74 - Property relations between husband and wife
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made

before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that
the modification is judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.
Art. 76 - Modifications in the marriage settlement
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be
modified except prior to marriage. . . . Post-marriage modification of such settlements
can take place only where: (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was
dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were
legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c)
judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the
other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d) there
was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a
petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains.
Efren Pana vs. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012
Art. 87 - Donations between husband and wife
Prohibition against donations between spouses likewise applies to donations

between persons living together in illicit relations.
The purchase and subsequent registration of the realty in the paramour's name
was tantamount to a donation by the husband to her. Such donation was void, because
it was "made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time
of the donation." The prohibition against donations between spouses must likewise
apply to donations between persons living together in illicit relations; otherwise, the
latter would be better situated than the former.
Milagros Joaquino vs. Lourdes Reyes, G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004
Erlinda A. Agapay vs. Carlina V. Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997
Cirila Arcaba vs. Erlinda Tabancura vda. de Batocael, G.R. No. 146683, November 22,
2001
Art. 91 - What constitutes community property
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the
wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property
each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except
those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the
couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that
common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in
the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may
have originally owned.
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing Abalos v.
Macatangay, Jr., 482 Phil. 877-894 (2004)
Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is

community property for the law itself defines what constitutes community property.
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute
community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code. .
.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in
Article 92, it therefore forms part of the absolute community property of Shirley and
Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition before their
marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's name appears in the TCT as owner,
the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
Art. 94 - Liabilities of absolute community of property
Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 164401, June 25, 2008
Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely entered into the contract of
sale with petitioner and acknowledged receiving the entire consideration of the
contract under the Deed of Absolute Sale, Shirley could not be held accountable to
petitioner for the reimbursement of her payment for the purchase of the subject
property. Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community of property
shall only be "liable for . . . [d]ebts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited .
. . ." As correctly stated by the appellate court, there being no evidence on record that
the amount received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family, respondent
cannot be made to reimburse any amount to petitioner.
Art. 96 - Administration of community property
Husband's management of conjugal property is a mere privilege given him by law.
The husband's management of the conjugal estate is not a natural right like his
right to do as he pleases with his private affairs. It is a mere privilege or preference
given him by law on the assumption that he is better able to handle the administration.
It results that when his supposed superiority over the woman in this regard; when
indeed, as in this case, his ability as manager totally disappears, the raison d' etre of
the privilege vanishes, and it is only just and proper that his co-partner should take
control.
Robert C. Peyer vs. Felix Martinez, G.R. No. L-3500, January 12, 1951
Article 124 of the Family Code which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a
reproduction of Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse.
Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However,
both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse . . . before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors." . . . The execution of the SPA is the acceptance
by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between
the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
Arturo Sarte Flores vs. Sps. Enrico, Jr. and Edna Lindo, G.R. No. 183984, April 13,
2011
"[A]ssuming arguendo that the signature of plaintiff-appellee Paz on the Kasulatan

ng Bilihan ng Lupa was not forged, her signature alone would still not bind the
subject property, it being already established that the said transaction was made
without the consent of her husband plaintiff appellee Alfredo."
Cotoner-Zacarias v. Spouses Revilla, G.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014
Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1, 1990. Rogelio, on his own
and without the consent of herein respondent as his spouse, sold the subject property
via a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 — or during the subsistence of
a valid contract of marriage. Under Article 96 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as The Family Code of the Philippines, the said disposition of a communal
property is void . . . It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family Code that
Rogelio could not sell the subject property without the written consent of respondent
or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is void.
Art. 99 - Termination of absolute community regime
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property

automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph
of Article 99 of the Family Code. . .
Art. 102 - Dissolution of the absolute community regime
Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In
other words, the computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions
under Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we
cannot but refer to Article 102 (4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that
for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No.
(2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102 (4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall
be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution." Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102 (4) applies to both the
dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code,
and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the
Family Code. Where lies the difference? . . . [T]he difference lies in the processes
used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the
Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory
is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the
exclusive properties of each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community
are paid out of the absolute community's assets and if the community's properties are
insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for
the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to
each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which
shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the
net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in value between the
market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we first
find the market value of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution.
From the totality of the market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and
obligations of the absolute community and this result to the net assets or net remainder
of the properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the market value
of the properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net profits.
Art. 102 (4) - Dissolution of the absolute community regime: Computation of

net profits
[A]mong the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal
partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right
to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only [the
father]'s share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of [the child]. Article 102
(4) of the Family Code provides that "[f]or purposes of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said
profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time
of its dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of [the child]is not [the father]'s
share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal
partnership property.
Mario Siochi vs. Alfredo Gozon, et al., G.R. Nos. 169900 & 169977, March 18, 2010
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code. . . . It
is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity
of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal
Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband and Wife) of
the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void.
Heirs of Sps. Protacio, Sr. and Marta Go vs. Ester L. Servacio, et al., G.R. No. 157537,
September 7, 2011
Art. 105 - Conjugal partnership of gains: General provisions
September 7, 2011
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall
apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice
to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the
Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is
that they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party claiming that they
are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must
first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed
conjugal.
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015
While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16, 1978, it is still
the Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships, however, which will govern the
property relations between Deogracio and Virginia even if they were married before
the effectivity of the Family Code.
Conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the
Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of
Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband and Wife) of the Family
Code. This is clear from Article 105 of the Family Code.
Domingo v. Spouses Molina, G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016
Art. 109 - Exclusive property of each spouse
Character of paraphernal property cannot be changed by subsequent declarations.

Paraphernal property of the wife may not be attached or levied upon for the obligation of
her husband.
Cadastral court's finding prevails over presumption that properties acquired during
marriage are conjugal.
Property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains, regardless of in whose name the same is registered.
The phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of wife’s civil status and not construed to
mean that her husband is also a registered owner.
Property whose title is in the name of the wife alone is paraphernal.
Paraphernal property cannot be attached by reason of a debt contracted by the husband.
Husband cannot lawfully dispose of wife's paraphernal property.
Offspring of animals which are paraphernal property are considered community property.
Increase in value of paraphernal property due to nature and time is not partnership
property.
Husband is not authorized to alienate property belonging exclusively to his wife.
Damages awarded for personal injury suffered by one of the spouses is exclusive property.
Character of paraphernal property cannot be changed by subsequent declarations.
Where the husband has been a party to an act of purchase of immovable

property in the name of his wife which recited that the purchase was made with
paraphernal funds, and that the property was to be and remain paraphernal property,
neither he nor his heirs can be permitted to go behind the deed and contest the wife's
title to the property by claiming that it is conjugal. Since the property is the
paraphernal property of the wife, the same having been acquired by her prior to her
marriage and having been purchased with her exclusive or private funds, any
declaration to the contrary made by her, as well as that of her child, cannot prevail nor
change the character of the property in question.
Pacifico C. del Mundo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-25788, April 30, 1980
Paraphernal property of the wife may not be attached or levied upon for the
obligation of her husband.
The levy by the sheriff on property by virtue of a writ of execution may be

considered as made under authority of the court only when the property levied upon
unquestionably belongs to the judgment debtor. If he should attach any property other
than those of said debtor, he acts beyond the limits of his authority. Stated otherwise,
the court issuing a writ of execution is supposed to enforce its authority only over
properties of the judgment debtor, and should a third party appear to claim the
property levied upon by the sheriff, the procedure laid down by the rules is that such
claim should be the subject of a separate and independent action. A money judgment
is enforceable only against property unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor.
One man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.
Sps. Julian and Rosa Sy vs. Hon. Jaime D. Discaya, G.R. No. 86301, January 23, 1990
Novernia P. Naguit vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137675, December 5, 2000
Cadastral court's finding prevails over presumption that properties acquired

during marriage are conjugal.
Properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal. However,

this prima facie presumption cannot prevail over the cadastral court's specific finding,
reached in adversarial proceedings, that the property was inherited by the wife from
her mother.
Jessie V. Pisueña vs. Heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, G.R. No. 132803,
August 31, 1999
Property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains, regardless of in whose name the same is registered.
As a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless of in whose

name the same is registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. The fact that the grant was solely in the name of the wife did not make the
property paraphernal property. What was material was the time the fishpond lease
right was acquired by the grantee, and that was during the lawful existence of the
marriage.
Olimpia Diancin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119991, November 20, 2000
The phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of wife’s civil status and not
construed to mean that her husband is also a registered owner.
Title is registered in the name of the wife alone because the phrase "married to
Rogelio Ruiz" is merely descriptive of her civil status and should not be construed to
mean that her husband is also a registered owner. Furthermore, registration of the
property in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz" is
not proof that such property was acquired during the marriage, and thus, is presumed
to be conjugal. The property could have been acquired by the wife while she was still
single, and registered only after her marriage. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts.
Corazon G. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals and Consuelo Torres, G.R. No. 146942, April 22,
2003
Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. On the basis alone of the
certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that said property was acquired during the
marriage and that it is conjugal property. Since there is no showing as to when the
property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife
alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said
spouse.
Corazon G. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals and Consuelo Torres, G.R. No. 146942, April 22,
2003
Paraphernal property cannot be attached by reason of a debt contracted by the

husband.
An estate partaking of the nature of paraphernal property belonging to the wife

can not be attached by reason of a debt contracted by the husband, at the request of a
creditor of the latter, nor sold and adjudged to him there being no legal reason
whereby the wife should be bound to make any payment or loan to the said creditor;
therefore, the proceedings by virtue of which the woman who owned the estate was
deprived of the property for the payment of a debt for which she was in no way
responsible, are entirely null and void.
Marcela Alvaran vs. Bernardo Marquez, G.R. No. 4465, September 10, 1908
Husband cannot lawfully dispose of wife's paraphernal property.
Whatever may have been agreed in a conciliatory action between a third person
and the husband of the lawful owner of a property can not deprive the latter, as a wife,
of her interest in said property to which such third person pretends to have acquired
certain rights without the intervention of the wife and without her consent to such
action; the husband could not lawfully dispose of said estate which is paraphernal
property, nor could he assign the same to a third person to the prejudice of his wife
who was the owner.
Ildefonsa Vargas vs. Agatona Egamino, G.R. No. 2994, November 18, 1908
Offspring of animals which are paraphernal property are considered community

property.
The marriage having lasted for more than thirty years, and some of the
carabaos being the offspring of others which were purchased during the marriage,
such animals are not paraphernal property of the widow for even such offspring is
considered as community property nor were they the private property of the deceased
husband.
Narciso Marigsa vs. Ildefonsa Macabuntoc, G.R. No. L-4883, September 27, 1910
Increase in value of paraphernal property due to nature and time is not partnership
property.
The sum representing the difference between the original assessed value of the
paraphernal property and before the improvements thereon and the assessed value of
the same with the improvements thereon, at the time of the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, cannot be considered partnership property because such improvements
were not due to industry and labor of the surviving spouse. Furthermore, the land as
well as the coconut trees are, by nature and time, susceptible to increase in value: the
land, through the development of the town, of commerce and of industry; the coconut
groves, through the growth of the coconut trees from the time they are planted until
they bear, and also through the development of commerce and of the coconut oil
industry. This increase in value due to nature and time is not considered partnership
property under the law on the ground that it is neither produced with funds from the
conjugal partnership nor with the work or industry of any of the spouse.
Sinforoso Ona vs. Serapia De Gala, G.R. No. 37756, November 28, 1933
Husband is not authorized to alienate property belonging exclusively to his wife.
If the property acquired during the marriage with money belonging exclusively
to the wife is considered as her own, it is unquestionable that it does not belong to the
class of community property. Therefore the husband is not authorized to alienate,
encumber, or make contracts in regard thereto, without the knowledge and consent of
its lawful owner, and a sale or conveyance thereof by the husband, who is not its
owner, is null and void.
Asuncion Gefes vs. Silvestre Salvio, G.R. No. 11387, February 7, 1917
Damages awarded for personal injury suffered by one of the spouses is exclusive
property.
Damages awarded for personal injury suffered by the wife is considered

paraphernal property.
Aleko E. Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company, G.R. No. 42551, September 4, 1935
Art. 116 - Conjugal partnership
All property of the marriage is presumed conjugal.

A phrase in the title descriptive of the civil status of one spouse should not be construed to
mean that the other spouse is also a registered owner.
Constructive trust is deemed created when conjugal property is titled in the name of
common-law wife.
Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
Alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property without wife's consent before effectivity
of Family Code is voidable.
Survivorship pension of spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within 3
years before the latter’s retirement or death is no longer automatically forfeited.
Consent of both spouses needed in the sale of conjugal property.
All property of the marriage is presumed conjugal.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this

presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.
Evangeline D. Imani vs. Metrobank, G.R. No. 187023, November 17, 2010
The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome
the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the
spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered,
are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by
the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the
name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption
remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses."
[O]n the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that said
property was acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property. Since there
is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title
is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e.,
belonging exclusively to said spouse. The only import of the title is that Corazon is the
owner of said property, the same having been registered in her name alone, and that
she is married to Rogelio Ruiz.
Corazon G. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146942, April 22, 2003
A phrase in the title descriptive of the civil status of one spouse should not be
construed to mean that the other spouse is also a registered owner.
The property subject of the mortgage is registered in the name of "Corazon G.

Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." Thus, title is registered in the
name of Corazon alone because the phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should not be construed to mean that her
husband is also a registered owner. Furthermore, registration of the property in the
name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz" is not proof that
such property was acquired during the marriage, and thus, is presumed to be conjugal.
The property could have been acquired by Corazon while she was still single, and
registered only after her marriage to Rogelio Ruiz. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts.
The statement in the title that the property is "registered in accordance with the
provisions of Section 103 of the Property Registration Decree in the name of JOSE B.
TAN, of legal age, married to Eliza Go Tan" does not prove or indicate that the
property is conjugal.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, et al. vs. Sps. Jose B. Tan, et al., G.R. No.
163712, November 30, 2006
Constructive trust is deemed created when conjugal property is titled in the name
of common-law wife.
Property acquired by a man while living with a common-law wife during the
subsistence of his marriage is conjugal property, even when the property was titled in
the name of the common-law wife. In such cases, a constructive trust is deemed to
have been created by operation of Article 1456 of the Civil Code over the property
which lawfully pertains to the conjugal partnership of the subsisting marriage. It was
at the time that the adjudication of ownership was made following the husband's
demise (not when he merely allowed the property to be titled in his paramour's name)
that a constructive trust was deemed to have been created.
Josephine B. Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89667, October 20, 1993
Marino Adriano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124118, March 27, 2000
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
Before [the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties
acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal] can apply, it must first be
established that the property was in fact acquired during the marriage. In other words,
proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation
of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
Alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property without wife's consent before

effectivity of Family Code is voidable.
Without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of

conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code is not void, but merely
voidable.
Vicente G. Villaranda vs. Sps. Honorio and Ana Maria Y. Villaranda, G.R. No. 153447,
February 23, 2004
Survivorship pension of spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within

3 years before the latter's retirement or death is no longer automatically forfeited.
The present GSIS law (R.A. No. 8291) does not presume that marriages
contracted within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham
marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. It does not automatically forfeit
the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS
member within three years before the member's retirement or death. The law
acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to
receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a
sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and
defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
GSIS vs. Milagros O. Montesclaros, G.R. No. 146494, July 14, 2004
Consent of both spouses needed in the sale of conjugal property.
Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to
[petitioner] required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that "the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership".
Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that "(t)he wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law".
Titan Construction Corp. vs. Manuel A. David, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 169548, March 15,
2010
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,

unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption. The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal
nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the
manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal
funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.
Elenita M. Dewara vs. Sps. Ronnie and Gina Lamela, et al., G.R. No. 179010, April 11,
2011
Art. 120 - Ownership of improvements made on separate property of a spouse
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code,
provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made
on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through
the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the
property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall
belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property
shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
Francisco Muñoz, Jr. vs. Erlinda Ramirez, et al., G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010
Art. 121 - Liabilities of conjugal partnership
How Article 21 should be applied.

Obligations contracted by husband on behalf of family business are presumed to redound
to the benefit of conjugal partnership
Contract of surety or accommodation agreement entered into by husband requires proof to
establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership
Property registered in the name of the wife is deemed paraphernal property in the absence
of proof that the same was acquired during the marriage
Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership
All property acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the
property is registered, is presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise
Conjugal partnership bears the indebtedness and losses incurred by husband in the
legitimate pursuit of his career or profession
Property acquired with salaries of husband belong to conjugal partnership even if
registered in paramour's name
Conjugal property is determined by law and not by will of one of the spouses.
Without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code is not void, but merely voidable.
Obligations contracted by husband on behalf of the family business is presumed to
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
Spouses are solidarily liable with each other if conjugal properties are not enough to
answer for liabilities enumerated in Art. 121
How Article 21 should be applied.
Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals has explained how
Article 121 should be applied:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the
benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the
very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the
loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It
is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed.
Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or
entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit
of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation
agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented
to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Philippine National Bank v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483, October 5, 2016, citing Ayala
Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 942 (1998)
Obligations contracted by husband on behalf of family business are presumed to

redound to the benefit of conjugal partnership
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." No actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to
the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature
of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial,
if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed.
Ayala Investment & Devt. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118305, February 12,
1998
There are two scenarios considered: one is when the husband, or in this case,
the wife, contracts a loan to be used for the family business and the other is when she
acts as a surety or guarantor. If she is a mere surety or guarantor, evidence that the
family benefited from the loan need to be presented before the conjugal partnership
can be held liable. On the other hand, if the loan was taken out to be used for the
family business, there is no need to prove actual benefit. The law presumes the family
benefited from the loan and the conjugal partnership is held liable.
Philippine National Bank v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483, October 5, 2016
Contract of surety or accommodation agreement entered into by husband requires

proof to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized
as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when
a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Ayala Investment & Devt. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118305, February 12,
1998
That the shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would
appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained and that the
petitioner-husband's career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the
infusion of fresh capital cannot be argued because these are not the benefits
contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The benefits must be those
directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of
the loan itself.
Alfredo Ching vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004
Property registered in the name of the wife is deemed paraphernal property in the
absence of proof that the same was acquired during the marriage
The property subject of the mortgage is registered in the name of "Corazon G.

Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." Thus, title is registered in the
name of Corazon alone because the phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should not be construed to mean that her
husband is also a registered owner. Since there is no showing as to when the property
in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is
determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse.
The only import of the title is that Corazon is the owner of said property, the same
having been registered in her name alone, and that she is married to Rogelio Ruiz.
Corazon G. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146942, April 22, 2003
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership
Registration of the property in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age,
married to Rogelio Ruiz" is not proof that such property was acquired during the
marriage, and thus, is presumed to be conjugal. The property could have been
acquired by Corazon while she was still single, and registered only after her marriage
to Rogelio Ruiz. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
The presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties acquired during
the marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the instant case. Before such
presumption can apply, it must first be established that the property was in fact
acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the marriage
is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership. Thus, on the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed
that said property was acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property.
Corazon G. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146942, April 22, 2003
All property acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose
name the property is registered, is presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise
Tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under
Article 116 of the Family Code. All property acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, regardless in whose name the property is registered, is presumed conjugal
unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the
certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the
spouses only. Article 116 of the Family Code expressly provides that the presumption
remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses."
Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will of one
of the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of
conjugal property.
Procopio Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Conjugal partnership bears the indebtedness and losses incurred by husband in the
legitimate pursuit of his career or profession
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as long as he

believes he is doing right to his family, he should not be made to suffer and answer
alone. So that, if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or
profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must
equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately acted to the
prejudice of his family.
G-Tractors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Luis and Josefina Narciso, G.R. No.
57402, February 28, 1985
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or
profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to
be his exclusive and private debts.
Sps. Joe and Estrella Ros vs. PNB-Laoag Branch, G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011
The obligation was contracted by the husband in the purchase of leather used in
his shoe manufacturing business. It is well settled that the debts contracted by the
husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes
to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez and Damaso P. Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, G.R. No.
L-22320, May 22, 1968
Property acquired with salaries of husband belong to conjugal partnership even if

registered in paramour's name
Though registered in the paramour's name, property acquired with the salaries
and earnings of a husband belongs to his conjugal partnership with the legal spouse.
The registration of the property in petitioner's name was clearly designed to deprive
the legal spouse and compulsory heirs of ownership. By operation of law, the
paramour is deemed to hold the property in trust for them. Therefore, she cannot rely
on the registration in repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-known exception
to the principle of conclusiveness of a certificate of title.
Conjugal property is determined by law and not by will of one of the spouses.
Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will
of one of the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the
character of conjugal property. The clear intent of the husband in placing his status as
single is to exclude his wife from her lawful share in the conjugal property. The law
does not allow this.
Without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code is not void, but merely voidable.
According to Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent.
This provision, however, must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the same
Code. The latter states that an action to annul an alienation or encumbrance may be
instituted by the wife during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned. Videlicet, the lack of consent on her part will not make the husband's
alienation or encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but
merely voidable.
Vicente G. Villaranda vs. Sps. Honorio and Ana Maria Villaranda, G.R. No. 153447,
February 23, 2004
Obligations contracted by husband on behalf of the family business is presumed to

redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the
benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of
the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial,
if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where
the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes,
and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
Sps. Joe and Estrella Ros vs. PNB-Laoag Branch, G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011,
citing Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118305,
February 12, 1998
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on [the wife] may
be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered. . . . Article 121 . . . allows
payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife . . . out of the partnership
assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding article have been covered." No prior liquidation of those assets is required.
This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of
the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for
the purposes above-mentioned."
Spouses are solidarily liable with each other if conjugal properties are not enough
to answer for liabilities enumerated in Art. 121
The last paragraph of Article 121 of the Family Code is instructive. . . The last
paragraph points to the "subsidiary but solidary liability of the separate properties" of
the spouses for liabilities enumerated in the Article. This Article, similar to Article 94
of the Family Code governing the Absolute Community of Property regime, explicitly
holds the spouses solidarily liable with each other if the conjugal properties are not
enough to answer for the liabilities. In this case, if the conjugal properties of the
spouses are not enough to answer for the loan, petitioner can recover the remaining
unpaid balance from the separate properties of either respondent or his wife.
Art. 122 - Payment of a Spouse's Personal Debts
Article 122 applies to debts that were contracted by a spouse and redounded to the
benefit of the family. It applies specifically to the loan that respondent's wife Lilia
contracted, but not to the mortgage.
Art. 124 - Administration of conjugal partnership property
A spouse's consent is indispensable for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal

properties.
Disposition of conjugal property by husband requires written consent of wife.
Court authorization is warranted if the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated.
Joint management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act
together
Rules on judicial guardianship proceedings, not summary judicial proceedings, apply
where non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.
Husband’s management of conjugal property is a mere privilege given him by law.
Sale with assumption of mortgage executed by husband without wife's consent must be
annulled in its entirety.
Sale of conjugal property by husband without consent of his wife is voidable.
A spouse's consent is indispensable for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal

properties.
The Family Code is clear: the written consent of the spouse who did not
encumber the property is necessary before any disposition or encumbrance of a
conjugal property can be valid.
Disposition of conjugal property by husband requires written consent of wife.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise,
the disposition is void. For the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both
husband and wife must concur. Mere awareness of a transaction by the wife is not
consent.
Thelma A. Jader-Manalo vs. Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, G.R. No. 147978, January
23, 2002
Hapitan v. Spouses Lagradilla, G.R. No. 170004, January 13, 2016
Court authorization is warranted if the spouse who does not give consent is
incapacitated.
If the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being

withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if the
same is warranted by the circumstances. However, court authorization under Art. 124
is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is
incapacitated.
Thelma A. Jader-Manalo vs. Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, G.R. No. 147978, January
23, 2002
Joint management or administration does not require that the husband and wife
always act together
The administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and the
wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent
of both spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that
the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full
power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases as
provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. Hence, the husband alone could have
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued
against the conjugal property without being joined by his wife. The signing of the
certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. A rigid
application of the rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husband's
signing the certification in his behalf and that of his wife is too harsh and is clearly
uncalled for.
Sps. Antonio and Alfreda Docena vs. Hon. Ricardo P. Lapesura, G.R. No. 140153,
March 28, 2001
Rules on judicial guardianship proceedings, not summary judicial proceedings,

apply where non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.
The rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the
proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one
where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent
is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the
non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In such case,
the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court.
Jose Uy vs. Court of Appeals and Teodoro L. Jardeleza, G.R. No. 109557, November
29, 2000
Husband’s management of conjugal property is a mere privilege given him by law.
The husband's management of the conjugal estate is not a natural right like his
right to do as he pleases with his private affairs. It is a mere privilege or preference
given him by law on the assumption that he is better able to handle the administration.
It results that when his supposed superiority over the woman in this regard; when
indeed, as in this case, his ability as manager totally disappears, the raison d' etre of
the privilege vanishes, and it is only just and proper that his co-partner should take
control.
Robert C. Peyer vs. Felix Martinez, G.R. No. L-3500, January 12, 1951
Sale with assumption of mortgage executed by husband without wife's consent must
be annulled in its entirety.
In the annulment of sale with assumption of mortgages executed by the

husband without the consent of the wife, the alienation or encumbrance must be
annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal
property is concerned. The rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the
same thus — the plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the
contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be
annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the
contract shall "prejudice" the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the
statute. It is not the legitimate concern of this Court to recast the law.
Tomasita Bucoy vs. Reynaldo Paulino, G.R. No. L-25775, April 26, 1968
Sale of conjugal property by husband without consent of his wife is voidable.
There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law. A sale of real property of the
conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of his wife is voidable.
The action for annulment must be brought during the marriage and within ten years
from the questioned transaction by the wife. Where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation — there is room only for
application.
Heirs of Christina Ayuste vs. Court of Appeals and Viena Malabonga, G.R. No. 118784,
September 2, 1999
Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes vs. Sps. Cipriano and Florentina Mijares, G.R. No.
143826, August 28, 2003
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife.
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
Sps. Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas vs. Sps. Victor and Elena Alinas, G.R. No. 158040,
April 14, 2008
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Miguela C. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802, March 11,
2005
Sps. Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125172, June 26,
1998
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the

effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the
same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the
consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse's inability, the
authority of the court.
Sps. Wilfredo and Patrocinia Ravina vs. Mary Ann P. Villa Abrille, et al., G.R. No.
160708, October 16, 2009
In this case, [the husband] was the sole administrator of the property because [the
wife], with whom [the husband] was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the
property, [the husband] still cannot sell the property without the written consent of
[the wife] or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is
void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted
the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of
the property, that other spouse's written consent to the sale is still required by law for
its validity.
[A]rticle 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of
conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such
Titan Construction Corp. vs. Manuel A. David, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 169548, March 15,
2010
2011
Art. 125 - Any spouse may not donate a conjugal property without the consent
of the other
[Under] Article 125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by
one spouse without the consent of the other spouse.
Art. 126 - When conjugal partnership terminates
The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora died in
1968, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code (now Article 126 (1) of the Family
Code).
Art. 127 - The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the
regime of conjugal partnership; exceptions
2011
Art. 129 - Procedure for dissolution of conjugal partnership
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in
the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal
nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are
assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of
each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial)
resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.
Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest
until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of
the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal
obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their
respective heirs.
Article 129 of the [Family] Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's
properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved . . .
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the
properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing
the couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties. . . .
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership
during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the
conjugal partnership; and if the community is enriched at the expense of
the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such
properties to their respective owners shall be made.
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the
spouses shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But if the
conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations,
the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband
and of the wife shall be returned to each of them.
Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void
marriages on the spouses' property relations.
Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014
The applicable law . . . in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liability is concerned, is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 147
of the Family Code.
Art. 130 - Liquidation of conjugal partnership property upon death of a

spouse
September 7, 2011
While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the
conjugal property without prior liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule
does not apply since the provisions of the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Art. 135 - Causes for judicial separation of property
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made

before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that
the modification is judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.
Art. 142 - Transfer of administration of exclusive property by one spouse to

the other
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of
the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate
property and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. . . . This
means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership
over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage
settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into absolute community
of property in 1988 when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their
acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
Art. 143 - Separation of property in marriage settlements
Voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of creditors of the conjugal

partnership of gains.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected
voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. . . However, the Court
must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all
creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest
pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.
Virgilio Maquilan vs. Dita Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007
Art. 147 - Co-ownership in unions without marriage
Requisites for co-ownership under Article 147

When no legal impediment to marry exists between common-law spouses, co-ownership
applies.
When a legal impediment to marry exists, only actual contributions shall be owned in
common.
Art. 147 or 148 govern property relations of parties in a void marriage.
A constructive trust is deemed created when property is titled in the name of common-law
wife during subsistence of a pre-existing marriage.
Paramour named in certificate of title is not deemed owner where lawful heirs stand to be
deprived.
Even if it is only the man who works, the property acquired during the man-and-wife
relationship belongs to the two of them through a fifty-fifty sharing.
Common-law wife must show that she really contributed to the acquisition of the property
during cohabitation.
A woman's "real contribution" refers to her contribution to the family’s material and
spiritual goods.
The woman traditionally holds the family purse even if she does not contribute to filling
that purse with funds.
There must be evidence that the woman actually contributed to the acquisition of property.
Common-law couple with legal impediment to marry, own proportionately the property
acquired by them in common.
Wives in marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid marriage are not precluded from
proving that property acquired during their cohabitation with their Muslim husband, is
their exclusive property, respectively.
Requisites for co-ownership under Article 147
For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3)
their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code relate only to voidable marriages and exceptionally to void
marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code.
Elna Mercado-Fehr vs. Bruno Fehr, G.R. No. 152716, October 23, 2003
When no legal impediment to marry exists between common-law spouses,

co-ownership applies.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,

suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any
"male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 of the Family Code.
Antonio A.S. Valdes vs. RTC, Branch 102, QC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each
other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from
the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law
governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a
marriage license." "Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal
co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household.'"
Diaz-Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016
The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed
co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary.
Uy v. Spouses Lacsamana, G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015
When a legal impediment to marry exists, only actual contributions shall be owned
in common.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or

when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions.
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally
married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such
relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the
effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
Banguis-Tambuyat v. Balcom-Tambuyat, G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015, citing
Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
Art. 147 or 148 govern property relations of parties in a void marriage.
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147
or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake
of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. . . . Under
this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through the couple's joint efforts and governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
Salas, Jr. v. Aguila, G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013
A constructive trust is deemed created when property is titled in the name of

common-law wife during subsistence of a pre-existing marriage.
Property acquired by a man while living with a common-law wife during the
subsistence of his marriage is conjugal property, even when the property was titled in
the name of the common-law wife. In such cases, a constructive trust is deemed to
have been created by operation of Article 1456 of the Civil Code over the property
which lawfully pertains to the conjugal partnership of the subsisting marriage. It was
at the time that the adjudication of ownership was made following the husband's
demise (not when he merely allowed the property to be titled in his paramour's name)
that a constructive trust was deemed to have been created.
Josephine B. Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89667, October 20, 1993
Paramour named in certificate of title is not deemed owner where lawful heirs
stand to be deprived.
The paramour cannot be deemed owner to half of the property just because its
title was registered in her name and that of the husband because the heirs of the lawful
pre-existing marriage stand to be deprived. A certificate of title under the Torrens
system is aimed to protect dominion, and should certainly not be turned into an
instrument for deprivation of ownership.
Even if it is only the man who works, the property acquired during the
man-and-wife relationship belongs to the two of them through a fifty-fifty sharing.
The formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife not
legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties acquired
through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized through
decisions of the Supreme Court. With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article
144 codified the law established through judicial precedents but with the modification
that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works, the
property acquired during the man-and-wife relationship belongs through a fifty-fifty
sharing to the two of them. This provision recognizes that it would be unjust and
abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except for the
requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and children, neglect her
traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business before
the rules on co-ownership would apply.
Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, May 11, 1984
Common-law wife must show that she really contributed to the acquisition of the
property during cohabitation.
The creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed

by conditions, the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided
thereunder may be deemed to accrue. One such condition is that there must be a clear
showing that the common-law wife had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the
acquisition of the property involved.
Teresita C. Yaptinchay vs. Hon. Guillermo E. Torres, G.R. No. L-26462, June 9, 1969
A woman’s “real contribution” refers to her contribution to the family’s material

and spiritual goods.
"Real contribution" to the acquisition of property must include not only the
earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also her
contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods through caring for the
children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her
husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a
housewife.
The woman traditionally holds the family purse even if she does not contribute to
filling that purse with funds.
The provisions of the Civil Code are premised on the traditional and existing,
the normal and customary gender roles of Filipino men and women. No matter how
large the income of a working wife compared to that of her husband, the major, if not
the full responsibility of running the household remains with the woman. She is the
administrator of the household. Even if the couple was not legally married, such fact
does not change the nature of their respective roles. It is the woman who traditionally
holds the family purse even if she does not contribute to filling that purse with funds.
There must be evidence that the woman actually contributed to the acquisition of
property.
Although in cases of common-law relations where an impediment to marry

exists, equity would dictate that property acquired by the man and woman through
their joint endeavor should be allocated to each of them in proportion to their
respective efforts, there must be evidence that the woman actually contributed to the
acquisition of the property in question.
Common-law couple with legal impediment to marry, own proportionately the

property acquired by them in common.
When a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only the

property acquired by them — through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry — shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions.
Wives in marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid marriage are not precluded

from proving that property acquired during their cohabitation with their Muslim
husband, is their exclusive property, respectively.
Co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man
and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Therefore, the
co-ownership contemplated in this provision cannot apply to Hadji Abdula's marriages
celebrated subsequent to a valid and legally existing marriage, since from the point of
view of the Civil Code Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to marry. However, the wives
in such marriages are not precluded from proving that property acquired during their
cohabitation with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property, respectively. Absent such
proof, however, the presumption is that property acquired during the subsistence of a
valid marriage — and in the Civil Code, there can only be one validly-existing
marriage at any given time — is conjugal property of such subsisting marriage.
Neng "Kagui Kadiguia" Malang vs. Corocoy Moson, G.R. No. 119064, August 22, 2000
Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void
marriages on the spouses' property relations.
The applicable law . . . in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liability is concerned, is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 147
of the Family Code.
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36
of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, as in this case.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore,
that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3)
their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. . . . The term
"capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance
of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.
The rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for
valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages.
Art. 148 - Cohabitation
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse.

Art. 148 applies to cohabitation amounting to adultery or concubinage.
Administration of property during cohabitation does not amount to contribution in its
acquisition.
Co-ownership exists even if the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
However, a foreigner cannot recover real properties purchased in the name of his Filipina
partner.
Wages and contributions in the form of care of the home and children are excluded in this
regime.
No co-ownership exists if actual contribution of a party is not proved.
Co-ownership is up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry.
Art. 148 governs even if cohabitation or acquisition of property occurred before effectivity
of Family Code.
Cohabitation, no matter how long, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Paramour is deemed to hold property in trust for the legal spouse and compulsory heirs.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse.
The term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not
only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse.
Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of
the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least,
cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation,
and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public
as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated,
do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this
jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship
the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of
illegitimate children.
Cirila Arcaba vs. Erlinda Tabancura vda. de Batocael, G.R. No. 146683, November 22,
2001
Art. 148 applies to cohabitation amounting to adultery or concubinage.
The Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by
expressly regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state
of adultery or concubinage.
Guillerma Tumlos vs. Mario Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000
Administration of property during cohabitation does not amount to contribution in

its acquisition.
Nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of
the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition.
Guillerma Tumlos vs. Mario Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000
Co-ownership exists even if the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were
not capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been
living together, they could not have owned properties in common. The Family Code,
in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides
that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them
through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership even though the couple
are not capacitated to marry each other.
Eustaquio Mallilin vs. Ma. Elvira Castillo, G.R. No. 136803, June 16, 2000
Article 148 of the Family Code refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons and to
multiple alliances of the same married man.
However, a foreigner cannot recover real properties purchased in the name of his
Filipina partner.
Even if it is assumed gratia arguendi that the respondent and the petitioner
were capacitated to marry, the petitioner, a German citizen, is still disqualified to own
the properties in tandem with the respondent. The sale of parcels of land in favor of a
foreigner is illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because they were
entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover
the properties or the money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be
subversive of public policy.
Alfred Fritz Frenzel vs. Ederlina P. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
Wages and contributions in the form of care of the home and children are excluded
in this regime.
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their
actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned
by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of
care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime. plpecdtai
No co-ownership exists if actual contribution of a party is not proved.
a) Actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147

which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not
proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda A. Agapay vs. Carlina V. Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997
b) A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of "actual
joint contribution" by both the live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned
by them in proportion to their contribution. The presumption of equality of
contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate contributions,
subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first. Simply put, proof
of actual contribution by both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal sharing.
Co-ownership is up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money,

property or industry.
a) The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of

parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation
in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof
of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed
to be equal.
Jacinto Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003
b) When a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only

the property acquired by them — through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry — shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions.
Art. 148 governs even if cohabitation or acquisition of property occurred before

effectivity of Family Code.
Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which

is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148
thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted,
there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of
adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
Jacinto Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003
Lupo Atienza vs. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006
Cohabitation, no matter how long, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage.
The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does
not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage; otherwise, the law would be giving
a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral.. Hence, all property
acquired from the date of the previous marriage, until the date of the other spouse’s
death, are still presumed conjugal.
Paramour is deemed to hold property in trust for the legal spouse and compulsory
heirs.
The registration of the property in paramour's name was clearly designed to

deprive the husband's legal spouse and compulsory heirs of ownership. By operation
of law, the paramour is deemed to hold the property in trust for them. Therefore, she
cannot rely on the registration in repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-known
exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a certificate of title.
Art. 151 - Suit between family members
When a stranger becomes a party to the suit, the law law no longer requires earnest efforts
towards a compromise.
Conditions precedent may be generally averred in the pleadings.
A barangay certification complies with the condition precedent established in Art. 151.
Trial court should order amendment of complaint if there is failure to comply with
condition precedent.
Barangay conciliation is not required where there is deprivation of liberty.
When a stranger becomes a party to the suit, the law law no longer requires
earnest efforts towards a compromise.
[O]nce a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family,
the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards
a compromise before the action can prosper.
Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Edmundo T. cuña, et al., G.R. No. 154132,
August 31, 2006
Conditions precedent may be generally averred in the pleadings.
The attempt to compromise as well as its failure or inability to succeed is a

condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family. Rule
8, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that conditions precedent
may be generally averred in the pleadings. While it is true that the lead sentence which
reads "Earnest efforts towards have been made but the same have failed" may be
incomplete or even grammatically incorrect as there might be a missing word or
phrase, a lacking word like "compromise" could be supplied by the rest of the
paragraph.
Sps. Manuel and Rosemarie Wee vs. Rosario D. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, August 11,
2004
A barangay certification complies with the condition precedent established in Art.

151.
Although the petition for habeas corpus failed to allege that compromise
proceedings were resorted to, the attachment of a Barangay Certification effectively
established that the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts.
Evidently, the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code has been
complied with. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is
a failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere
failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is not an
outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Edwin N. Tribiana vs. Lourdes M. Tribiana, G.R. No. 137359, September 13, 2004
Trial court should order amendment of complaint if there is failure to comply with
condition precedent.
Failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional

defect. Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the court’s power to
resolve. If a party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is
deemed waived. Such defect is curable by amendment as a matter of right without
leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive pleading. A motion to dismiss
is not a responsive pleading. More importantly, an amendment alleging compliance
with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it alter the cause
of action of a petition for habeas corpus. We have held that in cases where the defect
consists of the failure to state compliance with a condition precedent, the trial court
should order the amendment of the complaint. Courts should be liberal in allowing
amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and to present the real
controversies between the parties.
Barangay conciliation is not required where there is deprivation of liberty.
The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the Local Government

Code does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings where a person is "deprived of
personal liberty." In such a case, Section 412 expressly authorizes the parties "to go
directly to court" without need of any conciliation proceedings. There is deprivation
of personal liberty warranting a petition for habeas corpus where the "rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
[A] failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint

among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect
in the statement of a cause of action.
Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014
Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code, which
provision as then Article 222 of the New Civil Code was described as "having been
given more teeth" by Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rule of Court, it is safe to say that
the purpose of making sure that there is no longer any possibility of a compromise,
has been served. As cited in commentaries on Article 151 of the Family Code —
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sudden and

more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It
is necessary that every effort should be made towards a compromise before a
litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a
lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers.
Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014
Art. 152 - Family home
Reason for exemption from execution of the family home.

Provisions on "family home" remain effective regardless of couple's property regime.
There is no more need to constitute a family home judicially or extrajudicially.
However, Article 152 of the Family Code has no retroactive effect
When family home not exempt from execution of money judgment.
"Actual" occupancy by owner or beneficiaries excludes maids and overseer.
Reason for exemption from execution of the family home.
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the
Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the homestead — the dwelling
place. A houseless, homeless population is a burden upon the energy, industry, and
morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted with
crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been
gathered and sheltered. The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in
special cases. The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be
exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited
to the particular kind of property or the specific articles prescribed by the statute; the
exemption cannot exceed the statutory limit.
Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015
Provisions on "family home" remain effective regardless of couple's property

regime.
The provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions
found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless
of the property regime of the spouses.
Antonio A.S. Valdes vs. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
There is no more need to constitute a family home judicially or extrajudicially.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute
the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. In the present case,
the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted
as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not
August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987
(1988 being a leap year)
Jose Modequillo vs. Hon. Augusto V. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
Two sets of rules are applicable for family homes to be exempted from execution.
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to
what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or
extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil
Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition
before the courts and the registration of the court's order with the Registry of Deeds of
the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is
governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a
public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure
to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment
debtor from availing of the privilege.
For family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption
is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its
constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed
certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts
incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which
the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988.
And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is not
sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a
family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved.
Juanita Trinidad Ramos, et al. vs. Danilo Pangilinan, et al., G.R. No. 185920, July 20,
2010
The . . . rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from

execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or
extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be
exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as

a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter,
are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to
the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Sps. Ernesto and Araceli de Mesa vs. Sps. Claudio, Jr. and Ma. Rufina Acero, et al.,
G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012
However, Article 152 of the Family Code has no retroactive effect
A family residence cannot be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied in 1969. Article 162 of the Family Code does not mean that Articles 152 and
153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment
of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply
means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect
Florante F. Manacop vs. Court of Appeals and E & L Mercantile, Inc., G.R. No. 97898.
August 11, 1997
Pablito Taneo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals and Abdon Gilig, G.R. No. 108532, March 9,
1999
When family home not exempt from execution of money judgment.
A family home is not exempt from execution of money judgment where the
debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred, and the
money judgment arising therefrom, preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the Family Code.
Florante F. Manacop vs. Court of Appeals & F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., G.R. No. 104875,
November 13, 1992
"Actual" occupancy by owner or beneficiaries excludes maids and overseers.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the
owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is "actual" is
something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to
something which is presumptive or constructible. Actual occupancy, however, need
not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by
the beneficiaries" enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code. This enumeration
may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband
and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the
beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.
Florante F. Manacop vs. Court of Appeals and E & L Mercantile, Inc., G.R. No. 97898.
August 11, 1997
Perla G. Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III, et al., G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
Art. 153 - Advantages of family home
Claim for exemption from execution or forced sale must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before public auction sale.
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved
to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
Jose E. Honrado vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 166333, November 25, 2005
Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of
cherished memories that last during one's lifetime. It is likewise without dispute that
the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment. The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and
free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and
prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a
reasonable time thereafter.
G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved
to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
Sps. Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza vs. Sps. Raul and Rona Lapitan, G.R. No. 178288,
August 15, 2012 citing Honrado vs. Court of Appeals, 512 Phil. 657 (2005)
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of
the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it
must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the
property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be
set up and proved to the Sheriff. . .
G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012 citing Spouses Versola vs. Court of Appeals, 529
Phil. 377 (2006)
Art. 154 - Beneficiaries of family home
Three requisites must concur to be a beneficiary of the family home.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must
be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in
the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the
family.
Art. 155 - Liabilities of family home
Family home answers for debts incurred prior to its constitution.
Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred
prior to the constitution of the family home. In the case at bar, the house and lot of
was not constituted as a family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time
the debts were incurred. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as
such only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the debts
were incurred before the constitution of the family home.
Mary Josephine Gomez, et al. vs. Roel Sta. Ines, et al., G.R. No. 132537, October 14,
2005
Rules have been laid down relative to the levy on execution over the family home.
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. lays down the rules relative to the levy on
execution over the family home, viz.:
No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly
constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted
jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the
house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated.
The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's
consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of
the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of
P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family
residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as
such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover,
the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988),
the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or
extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
Juanita Trinidad Ramos, et al. vs. Danilo Pangilinan, et al., G.R. No. 185920, July 20,
2010, citing Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc., G.R. No. 172263, July 9, 2008
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.
However, Article 155 (3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a
family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution." . . . While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be
set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.
Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
Sps. Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza vs. Sps. Raul and Rona Lapitan, G.R. No. 178288,
August 15, 2012 citing Honrado vs. Court of Appeals, 512 Phil. 657 (2005)
Even though petitioner's property has been constituted as a family home, it is not
exempt from execution. Article 155 of the Family Code explicitly provides that debts
secured by mortgages are exempted from the rule against execution, forced sale, or
attachment of family home. . . Since petitioner's property was voluntarily used by him
as security for a loan he obtained from respondent, it may be subject to execution and
attachment.
Vitug v. Abuda, G.R. No. 201264, January 11, 2016
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or
attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless
those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts
do not match the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the
amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the
constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to
the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons

constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the
actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall
below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in
an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can
be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable
to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160. Certainly, the humane considerations
for which the law surrounds the family home with immunities from levy do not
include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the just claims of their creditors.
Art. 159 - Minor beneficiaries of family home
Three requisites must concur before a minor becomes beneficiary of family home.
Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits
of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they
live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of
the family.
Purpose of provision
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit
following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the
physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following
restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a
period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of
the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein;
and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been
alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the
partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of
the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate
partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the
family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been
willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an
ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights
of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights
granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.
Vilma G. Arriola, et al. vs. John Nabor C. Arriola, G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008
Art. 160 - Value of the family home
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or
attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless
those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts
do not match the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the
amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the
constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to
the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons

constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the
actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall
below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in
an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can
be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable
to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160. Certainly, the humane considerations
for which the law surrounds the family home with immunities from levy do not
include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the just claims of their creditors.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160,
petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value;
(2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by
the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3)
the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.
Art. 164 - Presumption of legitimacy of child
Presumption of legitimacy may be refuted only by evidence of physical

impossibility of access between husband and wife during conception.
The presumption that the child is the legitimate son of the couple becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access
between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the
child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by
only one evidence — the physical impossibility of access between husband and wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This
presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in
marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of the physical
impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the presumption.
Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals and Elizabeth Mejias, G.R. No. L-49542,
September 12, 1980
Children born in wedlock are presumed legitimate.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born
in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the
child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such way that
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the
periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code
(which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of the
child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
becomes fixed and unassailable.
Jinkie Christie A. De Jesus, et al. vs. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, G.R. No.
142877, October 2, 2001
A legitimate child implies a valid marriage.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child's status in relation to
his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya, (G.R. No. 153798, 2 September 2005) we
have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz.:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful
marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate
filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more
emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate".
Continental Steel Mfg. Corp. vs. Allan S. Montaño, et al., G.R. No. 182836, October 13,
2009
Art. 166 - Grounds for impugning legitimacy of child
Sexual intercourse is presumed where personal access is not disproved.

There must be physical impossibility of access by the husband to the wife to defeat the
presumption of legitimacy.
Impotency is not synonymous with sterility
Advanced tuberculosis does not prevent carnal intercourse.
Person who never became the husband of the child's mother never acquired any right to
impugn the child's legitimacy.
Presumption of legitimacy may be overthrown by proof that there was no access that could
have enabled the husband to father the child.
Presumption of legitimacy is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy.
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it

must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have
enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed
where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by
evidence to the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband
must be taken be the father of the child.
September 12, 1980
There must be physical impossibility of access by the husband to the wife to defeat
the presumption of legitimacy.
To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be physical

impossibility of access by the husband to the wife during the period of conception.
The law expressly refers to physical impossibility. Hence, a circumstance which
makes sexual relations improbable, cannot defeat the presumption of legitimacy; but it
may be proved as a circumstance to corroborate proof of physical impossibility of
access.
September 12, 1980
Impotency is not synonymous with sterility
Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The fact that
the deceased was able to produce a specimen of his semen by means of a rubber sac,
commonly called "condom" and a woman, shows conclusively that he was potent.
Impotency is not synonymous with sterility. Impotency is the physical inability to have
sexual intercourse; it is different from sterility. However, even considering the
evidence as to sterility, according to medical jurisprudence, a man may not have
spermatozoa at a certain time, but may have had it previously or may have it
subsequently to the examination.
Probate of the will of the late Faustino Neri San Jose, G.R. No. L-1967, May 28, 1951
Advanced tuberculosis does not prevent carnal intercourse.
Although the husband was already suffering from tuberculosis and his
condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his
feet were swollen and his voice hoarse, yet that is no evidence of impotency, nor does
it prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this
sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more
inclined to sexual intercourse. As an author has said, "the reputation of the
tuberculous towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon
confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease."
Mariano Andal vs. Eduvigis Macaraig, G.R. No. L-2474, May 30, 1951
Person who never became the husband of the child's mother never acquired any
right to impugn the child's legitimacy.
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never
acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
Gerardo B. Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
Presumption of legitimacy may be overthrown by proof that there was no access

that could have enabled the husband to father the child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,

particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the
basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child.
Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless
such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is
quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of
coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the separation
between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may
take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they
were never together during the period of conception. Or, the husband was in prison
during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through
the violation of prison regulations.
Gerardo B. Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
Presumption of legitimacy is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent

offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute
but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.
Camelo Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004
In Herrera v. Alba, (499 Phil. 185, 191 (2005)) we stressed that there are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face:
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child. We explained that a prima
facie case exists if a woman declares — supported by corroborative proof — that she
had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence
shifts to the putative father. We explained further that the two affirmative defenses
available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother
due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at the time of conception.
Charles Gotardo vs. Divina Buling, G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code . . . do not contemplate a situation . . .
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs)
denies as his own a child of his wife.
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015, citing Benitez-Badua v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
Art. 167 - Declaration of mother against child's legitimacy
Reasons for presumption of legitimacy of child despite mother's declaration against

legitimacy.
The law which provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress has been adopted for two solid reasons. First, in a fit of anger or to arouse
jealousy in the husband, the wife may have made this declaration. Second, the article
is established as a guaranty in favor of the children whose condition should not be
under the mercy of the passions of their parents. The husband whose honor if
offended, that is, being aware of his wife's adultery, may obtain from the guilty spouse
by means of coercion, a confession against the legitimacy of the child which may
really be only a confession of her guilt. Or the wife, out of vengeance and spite, may
declare the child as not her husband's although the statement be false. But there is
another reason which is more powerful, demanding the exclusion of proof of
confession or adultery, and it is, that at the moment of conception, it cannot be
determined when a woman cohabits during the same period with two men, by whom
the child was begotten, it being possible that it be the husband himself.
September 12, 1980
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is
the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the
law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child
cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Juan De Dios Carlos vs. Felicidad Sandoval, et al., G.R. No. 179922, December 16,
2008
Art. 170 - Period to impugn legitimacy of child
Article 263 [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] refers to an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife.
However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents
are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is
not a child of Jose at all.
Aguilar v. Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015, citing Labagala v. Santiago, 422
Phil. 699, 708 (2001)
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code . . . do not contemplate a situation . . .
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs)
denies as his own a child of his wife.
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015, citing Benitez-Badua v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
Art. 171 - Heirs of husband may impugn legitimacy of child
Art. 171 applies where a husband denies as his own, a child of his wife.
Art. 171 applies only when the child is the undisputed offspring of the mother.
Legitimacy of a child can be impugned only in a direct action.
There is no presumption of legitimacy in favor of children born out of husband's
cohabitation with another woman.
There must be physical impossibility of access by the husband to the wife to defeat the
presumption of legitimacy.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife
The heirs of the husband may also repudiate the filiation of a child.
The husband’s heirs are allowed to contest a child’s legitimacy only in exceptional cases.
Art. 171 applies where a husband denies as his own, a child of his wife.
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code govern a situation where a
husband (or his heirs) denies as his own, a child of his wife. It is inapplicable to a case
which is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action to claim
inheritance as legal heirs of private respondents’ childless deceased aunt.
Marissa Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
Art. 171 applies only when the child is the undisputed offspring of the mother.
Article 171 of the Family Code applies only to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. It, however, presupposes that the child was
the undisputed offspring of the mother.
Teofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
Legitimacy of a child can be impugned only in a direct action.
It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by
law.
William Liyao, Jr. vs. Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002
[P]roof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175,

should only be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of
a child. . . . . however, . . . this procedural rule is applicable only to actions where the
legitimacy — or illegitimacy — of a child is at issue.
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses .
. . jurisprudence shows that the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling on the
secondary evidence of respondent — even if such proof is similar to the evidence
admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not
being a direct action to prove one's filiation.
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
There is no presumption of legitimacy in favor of children born out of husband's

cohabitation with another woman.
Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it

has been legally ended is presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the husband with
another woman will not give rise to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the
children born of the second union, until and unless there be convincing proof that the
first marriage had been lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully entered into.
Voltaire Arbolario vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it

must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have
enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed
where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by
evidence to the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband
must be taken be the father of the child.
September 12, 1980
There must be physical impossibility of access by the husband to the wife to defeat
the presumption of legitimacy.
To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be physical

impossibility of access by the husband to the wife during the period of conception.
The law expressly refers to physical impossibility. Hence, a circumstance which
makes sexual relations improbable, cannot defeat the presumption of legitimacy; but it
may be proved as a circumstance to corroborate proof of physical impossibility of
access.
September 12, 1980
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is
the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his
wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in
view of the moral or economic interest involved.
September 12, 1980
The heirs of the husband may also repudiate the filiation of a child.
The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock

belongs only to the alleged father, who is the husband of the mother and can be
exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and in certain cases, and only
in a direct suit brought for the purpose.
September 12, 1980
The husband’s heirs are allowed to contest a child’s legitimacy only in exceptional
cases.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband,
or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and
he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view
of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his
heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his
heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate
as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon
the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate,
which is a public document.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie

evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the
truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties.
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015, citing Rivera v. Heirs of
Romualdo Villanueva, 528 Phil. 570, 578 (2006)
Art. 172 - Proof of filiation of legitimate children
Unmistakable acts of recognition tending to prove filiation.

Illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
Filiation may be proved by other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Requisites to establish “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child.”
An illegitimate child may establish filiation through act or declaration about pedigree.
Evidence of filiation is admissible only if presented during alleged father's lifetime.
Mere cohabitation of husband with another will not give rise to presumption of legitimacy
in favor of children born of the second union.
Courts should not hesitate to rule on admissibility of DNA evidence.
Proof of filiation to determine citizenship should be independent from proof for civil law
purposes.
Recognition of illegitimate children has been increasingly liberalized in favor of child's
greater interest and welfare.
Filiation must be settled in special proceedings, not in an action for recovery of property.
A child cannot choose his own filiation.
Legitimate filiation of a child cannot depend on the declaration of the attending physician,
midwife or mother.
Unmistakable acts of recognition tending to prove filiation.
During his lifetime, the father acted in such a manner as to evince his intent to
recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto as his flesh and blood, first, by allowing her from birth
to use his family name; second, by giving her and her mother sums of money by way
of support and lastly, by openly introducing her to members of his family, relatives
and friends as his daughter. Supplementing such unmistakable acts of recognition
were those of his kin and gangmates manifesting open acceptance of such
relationship. Taken altogether, the claimed filiation would be hard to disprove.
Ma. Theresa R. Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86639, June 2, 1994
Illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children.
Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were
repealed by the Family Code, which now allows the establishment of illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children (Art. 175).
Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article 283 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, that filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father."
Bienvenido Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85723, June 19, 1995
Filiation may be proved by other means allowed under the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it

is one of "the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws" to show
pedigree. An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by 'any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,' according to the Civil
Code, or 'by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,' according
to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Arturio Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118904, April 20, 1998
Requisites to establish “open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child.”
a) To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an

illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
"Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but
only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The possession
of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity
(since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention
of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care.
Casimiro Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals and Teopista Toring Tuñacao, G.R. No. 86302,
September 24, 1991
b) To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate

child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must
be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life,
not accidentally, but continuously. This standard of proof is founded on the principle
that an order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or
may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Francisco L. Jison vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998
An illegitimate child may establish filiation through act or declaration about

pedigree.
An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other

means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code,
or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the
Family Code. In light of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Rules of Court, the following
requisites have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree
may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is
in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.
September 24, 1991
Evidence of filiation is admissible only if presented during alleged father's lifetime.
Private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence

of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove
his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special
laws. The simple reason is that the alleged father is already dead and can no longer be
heard on the claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.
Dorotea Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989
Mere cohabitation of husband with another will not give rise to presumption of
legitimacy in favor of children born of the second union.
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially

established. It stands to reason that children born within wedlock are legitimate.
Failure to prove the fact or presumption of marriage between parents cannot give rise
to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children. Once a valid marriage is
established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it has been legally ended is
presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the husband with another woman will not
give rise to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children born of the second
union, until and unless there be convincing proof that the first marriage had been
lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully entered into.
Voltaire Arbolario vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003
Courts should not hesitate to rule on admissibility of DNA evidence.

a) Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility
and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test
as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing vs. Court of Appeals and Angelita Diamante, G.R. No.
125901, March 8, 2001
b) In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactory

establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long
dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity.
Proof of filiation to determine citizenship should be independent from proof for

civil law purposes.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining citizenship status

should be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed
for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation
or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to
personal and family relations.
Recognition of illegitimate children has been increasingly liberalized in favor of

child's greater interest and welfare.
The growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of

illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping
well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the
greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern
the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political
rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on
"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law.
Filiation must be settled in special proceedings, not in an action for recovery of

property.
The filiation of the paramour's children must be settled in a probate or special

proceeding instituted for the purpose, not in an action for recovery of property.
Matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper
probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. The status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir
to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in
this case, was for the recovery of property.
A child cannot choose his own filiation.
The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to
be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is
fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother's alleged paramour.
On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot
elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.
Legitimate filiation of a child cannot depend on the declaration of the attending

physician, midwife or mother.
The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself. It cannot be made
dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the
mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother, with or without the
participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her
offspring through the simple expedient of writing the putative father's name in the
appropriate space in the birth certificate.
Belen Sagad Angeles vs. Aleli "Corazon" Angeles Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798,
September 2, 2005
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child,
or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that
such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation
respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court."
Art. 174 - Surname of legitimate children
Children conceived before decree of annulment shall use surname of father.

To discard father's surname is to create the impression that the children are illegitimate.
Legitimate children may not adopt the surname of their mother's second husband.
Child born out of lawful wedlock cannot bear surname of mother's second husband.
The child should be the one to apply for a change of surname.
Change of surname discretionary on part of children when they reach adulthood.
Children conceived before decree of annulment shall use surname of father.
Our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person
who is not his father. Article 364 of the Civil Code specifically provides that
legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father, and Article 369 of
the same Code provides that in case of annulment of a voidable marriage the children
conceived before the annulment shall principally use the surname of the father, and
considering by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, it is correctly concluded that
the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as
carrying the surname of the real father.
Elaine A. Moore vs. Republic of the Phils., G.R. No. L-18407, June 26, 1963
To discard father's surname is to create the impression that the children are
illegitimate.
To allow minor children, who are presumably legitimate, at their mother's

behest, to bear only their mother's surname (which they are entitled to use together
with their father's surname) and to discard altogether their father's surname, thus
removing the prima facie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestry, is a
serious matter in which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be consulted.
To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors' parentage
and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry
the maternal surname only. That would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as
indicated in their birth records
In re: Dionesio Divinagracia, Jr. and Bombi Roberto Divinagracia, G.R. No. L-55538,
March 15, 1982
Legitimate children may not adopt the surname of their mother's second husband.
Our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person
who is not their father. To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother's
second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It
could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture
of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by her second husband, thus
bringing their legitimate status into discredit.
In re: Dolores Gemora Padilla vs. Republic of the Phils., G.R. No. L-28274, April 30,
1982
Child born out of lawful wedlock cannot bear surname of mother's second
husband.
If a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the
second husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree
of divorce, there may result a confusion as to his real paternity. In the long run the
change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community. While the purpose
which may have animated petitioner, the minor's mother, is plausible and may run
along the feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the
members of the family of her second husband, there is a legal barrier which cannot at
present be overlooked or brushed aside
Elaine A. Moore vs. Republic of the Phils., G.R. No. L-18407, June 26, 1963
The child should be the one to apply for a change of surname.
The child should, and in the course of time must, know of his parentage. If,
when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for
himself, he wants to use his mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's
surname, then he should be the one to apply for a change of surname
In re: Dionesio Divinagracia, Jr. and Bombi Roberto Divinagracia, G.R. No. L-55538,
March 15, 1982
Change of surname discretionary on part of children when they reach adulthood.
The petition for change of name filed by the mother in behalf of her minor
children is premature. Indeed, the matter of change of their surname should better be
left to the judgment and discretion of the children themselves when they reach the age
of maturity. If in their adulthood they want to change their surname, then they
themselves or any of them may take such appropriate action as the law may permit.
In re: Dolores Gemora Padilla vs. Republic of the Phils., G.R. No. L-28274, April 30,
1982
Art. 174 (1) - Wife's use of husband's surname
Use of former husband’s name by a widow or divorcee is not obligatory.

Use of former husband’s name by a divorcee is not a crime.
Use of husband's surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public, does not
constitute material representation warranting cancellation of certificate of candidacy.
Elements of usurpation of name under Art. 377 of Civil Code.
Woman cannot use the surname of a man to whom she has never been married.
Husband, not wife, should initiate change in spelling of his surname.
Wife shall continue using her husband's surname even after decree of legal separation.
Woman who used the name of the man she is living with to claim benefits for their son
cannot be criminally liable.
Wife cannot appropriate the initials or nickname of her husband.
Use of former husband’s name by a widow or divorcee is not obligatory.
When the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of
the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee
need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert
to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not
obligatory to her. Thus, a petition to resume the use of maiden name is a superfluity
and an unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former
husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from
her in accordance with Muslim laws.
Hatima C. Yasin vs. Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 94986, February 23, 1995
Use of former husband’s name by a divorcee is not a crime.
The use of a surname by a divorced wife for a purpose not criminal in nature is
certainly not a crime. The contention that every use of the husband’s surname
constitutes a new crime cannot be countenanced. The effect of divorce is more akin to
the death of the spouse where the deceased woman continues to be referred to as the
Mrs. of her husband even if the latter has remarried rather than to annulment since in
the latter case, it is as if there had been no marriage at all.
Constancia C. Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals and Consuelo David, G.R. No. L-41427,
June 10, 1988
Use of husband's surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public,
does not constitute material representation warranting cancellation of certificate of
candidacy.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Sec. 78

of the Omnibus Election Code must be made with an intention to deceive the
electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not
intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one’s identity is not within the scope of
the provision. The material misrepresentation contemplated by said provision refer to
qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the
consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation
in his certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could
not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and
substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous
mistake.
Victorino Salcedo II vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999
Elements of usurpation of name under Art. 377 of Civil Code.
The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code implies some
injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of
confusion of identity between the owner and the usurper, and exists when a person
designates himself by another name. The elements are as follows: (1) there is an actual
use of another’s name by the defendant; (2) the use is unauthorized; and (3) the use of
another’s name is to designate personality or identify a person.
Zenaida F. Dapar vs. Gloria Lozano Biascan, G.R. No. 141880, September 27, 2004
Constancia C. Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals and Consuelo David, G.R. No. L-41427,
June 10, 1988
Woman cannot use the surname of a man to whom she has never been married.
It is not proper for a woman to continue representing herself as the wife of a

man in view of the non-existence of the former’s marriage with him and the latter’s
actual marriage to another. Article 370 of the Civil Code of the Philippines authorizes
a married woman to use the surname of her husband; impliedly, it also excludes others
from doing likewise.
Elenita Ledesma Silva vs. Esther Peralta, G.R. No. L-13114, November 25, 1960
Husband, not wife, should initiate change in spelling of his surname.
A married woman may use her husband's surname under Art. 370 of the Civil
Code. It is axiomatic that if she desires judicial authorization to change the spelling of
his surname, her husband should initiate the proceeding.
In re: Milagros Llerena Telmo vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-28549,
September 23, 1976
Wife shall continue using her husband's surname even after decree of legal
separation.
The language of Article 372 of the New Civil Code is mandatory that the wife,
even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and
surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is
unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be
the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her
unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.
Elisea Laperal vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-18008, October 30, 1962
Woman who used the name of the man she is living with to claim benefits for their
son cannot be criminally liable .
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as

the wife and use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is
married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it
unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be identified who are living with men
prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself
out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not
her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No.
142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the
light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed.
Corazon Legamia y Rivera vs. IAC and People of the Phils., G.R. No. L-63817, August
28, 1984
Wife cannot appropriate the initials or nickname of her husband.
Bad faith or malice on the part of a candidate was evident when, in her
certificate of candidacy and campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or
nickname of her husband, the incumbent Representative of the district in question
whom she wanted to succeed in office. Article 370 of the Civil Code, which she
invokes, provides no relief. The article enumerates the names which a married woman
may use. One of them is "her husband's full name but prefixing a word indicating that
she is his wife, such as Mrs." If for expediency and convenience she would use the
initials of her husband, then her name, in initials would be "MRS. JTV."
Ma. Amelita C. Villarosa vs. HRET and Ricardo V. Quintos, G.R. No. 143351,
September 14, 2000
Art. 175 - Establishment of illegitimate filiation
Judicial pronouncement is unnecessary if illegitimate child is voluntarily recognized.

Change in entries in the record of birth is an audacious indirect attempt to establish
filiation.
Death of putative father bars illegitimate child from establishing filiation.
Lack or insufficiency of judicial approval is a defect available to the minor, not to the
recognizing parent.
Even if action for recognition/establishment of filiation is filed after death of putative
parent, status of illegitimate children may be confirmed.
Whether an action for establishment of illegitimate filiation is filed under the Civil Code
or the Family Code, the result will be the same.
Whether the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child or of the alleged parent
depends on the basis of the action.
Article 171 of Family Code presupposes that the child is the undisputed offspring of the
mother.
How “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child” is proved.
What constitutes “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child”.
“Authentic writing” for purposes of voluntary recognition, defined.
The acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is increasingly liberalized.
How filiation of illegitimate children is established.
When judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to
establish the child's acknowledgment.
Judicially approved compromise agreement by parents may constitute a statement by
which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged.
A judicial order to compel a person to submit to DNA paternity testing does not violate
his right against self-incrimination.
Judicial pronouncement is unnecessary if illegitimate child is voluntarily

recognized.
The illegitimate child having been voluntarily recognized by her father through
the record of birth, there was no need for any judicial pronouncement. There can be
no dispute then that the child enjoyed the open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child and that her action in defending her status is similar to an
"action to claim legitimacy" brought during her lifetime.
Juan Castro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-50974-75, May 31, 1989
Change in entries in the record of birth is an audacious indirect attempt to

establish filiation.
A change in the entry from "Domingo Patawaran" to "Dominador P. Dizon",

and the alteration of the word "Unknown" after the column "Name of Father" to
"Policarpio Dizon", do not only partake of the nature of a change of name, but also
principally involve the issue of paternity and filiation. Obviously, the purpose in this
proceeding for correction of entries filed after about 65 years is an audacious indirect
attempt to establish filiation with the late putative father through the simple expedient
of changing the entries in the record of birth in the civil registry and his right to
inherit.
Republic of the Phils. vs. Hon. Fernando Bartolome, G.R. No. L-38109, September 6,
1985
Death of putative father bars illegitimate child from establishing filiation.
Under the Family Code, the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish
his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. However, claimant can no longer be allowed at this time to
introduce evidence of open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child or prove filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or
special laws because the alleged father is already dead and can no longer be heard on
the claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.
Dorotea Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989
Lack or insufficiency of judicial approval is a defect available to the minor, not to

the recognizing parent.
The requirement of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 of the Civil Code
is clearly intended for the benefit of the minor. The lack of judicial approval cannot
impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment made. The judicial approval is for the
protection of the minor against any acknowledgment made to his prejudice. Therefore,
the lack or insufficiency of such approval is NOT a defect available to the recognizing
parent but one which the minor may raise or waive. If after reaching majority the
minor consents to the acknowledgment, the lack of judicial approval should make no
difference. Implied consent to the acknowledgment may be shown by such acts as
keeping, even after reaching the age of majority, the acknowledgment papers and the
use of the parent's surname.
Ligaya Gapusan-Chua vs. Court of Appeals and Prospero Parcon, G.R. No. 46746,
March 15, 1990
Even if action for recognition/establishment of filiation is filed after death of

putative parent, status of illegitimate children may be confirmed.
The action for recognition (or to establish filiation) is timely filed — having
been instituted after the demise of the putative parent and before the attainment of the
age of majority of the children concerned — and the ground invoked therefor having
been satisfactorily proven.
Jacoba T. Paterno vs. Beatriz Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990
Whether an action for establishment of illegitimate filiation is filed under the Civil
Code or the Family Code, the result will be the same.
Under Article 283 (2) of the Civil Code, a father is obliged to recognize the
child as his natural child "when the child is in continuous possession of the status of a
child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or that of his family." Under
Art. 175 in relation to Article 172 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation shall be
proved by "the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child."
Thus, whether the case is decided under the Civil Code or the Family Code, the result
will be the same.
Loth R. Ayco vs. Lourdes S. Fernandez, G.R. No. 84770, March 18, 1991
Whether the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child or of the alleged
parent depends on the basis of the action.
If the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an
admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private
handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of
the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by
the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Court of Appeals and Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan, G.R. No.
95229, June 9, 1992
Article 171 of Family Code presupposes that the child is the undisputed offspring
of the mother.
Article 171 of the Family Code applies only to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that
the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother.
Teofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
How “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child” is

proved.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,

there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must
be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life,
not accidentally, but continuously. By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and
consistent, but does not require any particular length of time. The foregoing standard
of proof required to establish one's filiation is founded on the principle that an order
for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an
irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Francisco L. Jison vs. Court of Appeals and Monina Jison, G.R. No. 124853. February
24, 1998
What constitutes “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate

child”.
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an

illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
"Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but
only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The possession
of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity
(since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention
of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care.
September 24, 1991
“Authentic writing” for purposes of voluntary recognition, defined.
"Authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary

recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term
would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or
other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is increasingly

liberalized.
The growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of

illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping
well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the
greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern
the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political
rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on
"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context or private relations, the domain of civil law
How filiation of illegitimate children is established.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by

(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall
be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus vs. The Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, G.R. No.
142877, October 2, 2001
The legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be

proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate

children.
Zoleta-San Agustin v. Sales, G.R. No. 189289, August 31, 2016
When judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in

order to establish the child's acknowledgment.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a

statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within
the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgment.
Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus vs. The Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, G.R. No.
142877, October 2, 2001
Judicially approved compromise agreement by parents may constitute a statement

by which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged.
A compromise agreement entered into by parents acknowledging their five (5)

natural children and providing for their support approved by the court, constitutes a
statement before a court of record by which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged.
Yao Kee vs. Aida Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. L-55960, November 24, 1988
A judicial order to compel a person to submit to DNA paternity testing does not
violate his right against self-incrimination.
The proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against
self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. PLPE05
Rosendo Herrera vs. Rosendo Alba, et al., G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005
Art. 176 - Surname of illegitimate children
Illegitimate children should bear the surname of their mother.

If alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, inscription of his name therein is
null and void.
Changing of surname to that of stepfather's will invite confusion as to child's paternity.
Illegitimate children should bear the surname of their mother.
Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of
their mother, Luzviminda Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the entries in
their birth certificates which deleted the entry in the date and place of marriage of
parents, the corresponding correction with respect to their surname should have also
been made and changed to Celestino, their mother's surname.
Republic of the Phils. vs. Gerson R. Abadilla, G.R. No. 133054, January 28, 1999
If alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, inscription of his name
therein is null and void.
It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative

father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local
Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child
upon the information of a third person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not
intervene in the birth certificate, e. g., supplying the information himself, the
inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere
certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary
acknowledgment on the latter's part.
Francisco L. Jison vs. Court of Appeals and Monina Jison, G.R. No. 124853, February
24, 1998
Changing of surname to that of stepfather's will invite confusion as to child's

paternity.
The reason alleged by Andrew Barretto (because it is the surname of his

step-father) is not compelling enough to warrant the change of name prayed for. The
surname "Barretto" is his mother's surname. He is the illegitimate child of Lucy
Barretto. But he is not a natural child of Magin V. Velez. The circumstances of his
illegitimate filiation are not known. Magin V. Velez had children of his own before he
married the applicant's mother. Magin V. Velez and Lucy Barretto also have their own
children. To warrant the change of name sought will necessary invite confusion as to
paternity, to the prejudice of Magin V. Velez, the applicant's mother, as well as their
common and separate offsprings.
Republic of the Phils. vs. Hon. Judge of Branch III of CFI-Cebu, G.R. No. L-35605,
October 11, 1984
This provision [Art. 176 of the Family Code] was later amended on March 19,
2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:
Art. 176. — Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when
an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made
by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
[T]he general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her
mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent's prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the
mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is
shown to be unfit.
Art. 177 - Legitimated children
Legitimation does not include children born of adulterous relations.

Legitimation is a privilege available only to natural children.
To effect legitimation, the parents should be married to each other.
Legitimated child enjoys all rights and privileges associated with legitimacy.
Legitimation does not include children born of adulterous relations.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of

adulterous relations.
Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla vs. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92-716, October
25, 1995
Legitimation is a privilege available only to natural children.
Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege,

available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although natural
children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural children, it is a
quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they likewise have the right
to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially, as in this case, when the
legally existing marriage between the children's father and his estranged first wife
effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between their parents.
Maria Rosario de Santos vs. Adoracion G. Angeles, G.R. No. 105619, December 12,
1995
To effect legitimation, the parents should be married to each other.
The parents should be married to each other in order to effect the legitimation
of their acknowledged natural children. And once legitimated, the child becomes
legitimate child. Since the parents marry each other, the acknowledgment of the
natural children need no judicial approval.
Alfonso Colorado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39948, February 28, 1985
The status of a marriage determines in large part the filiation of its resultant
issue. Thus, a child born within a valid marriage is legitimate, while one born outside
of wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the latter's parents were, at the time of the
child's conception, not legally barred from marrying each other and subsequently do
so, the child's filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the "legitimated" child
eventually enjoys all the privileges and rights associated with legitimacy.
Maria Rosario de Santos vs. Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles, G.R. No. 105619, December
12, 1995
Art. 179 - Rights of legitimated children
The status of a marriage determines in large part the filiation of its resultant
issue. Thus, a child born within a valid marriage is legitimate, while one born outside
of wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the latter's parents were, at the time of the
child's conception, not legally barred from marrying each other and subsequently do
so, the child's filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the "legitimated" child
eventually enjoys all the privileges and rights associated with legitimacy.
Maria Rosario de Santos vs. Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles, G.R. No. 105619, December
12, 1995
One who voluntarily but falsely acknowledges his spouse's child as his own is
bound by the effects of legitimation.
BBB is not CCC's biological father. Such being the case, it was improper to
have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA's marriage. Clearly then,
the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely
acknowledged CCC as his son. . . the principle of estoppel finds application and it
now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He
should not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own
misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the legitimation process. CCC
remains to be BBB's son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former
is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his
father's support.
BBB v. AAA, G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015
Art. 183 - Who may adopt
Adoption creates a status closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation.

The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an
adoption court must first confront.
Adopted child has sole right to sever legal ties created by adoption.
The interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration in
determining whether or not to set aside a decree of adoption.
Adoption laws should be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist.
Written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption.
However, written consent of natural parent can be dispensed with if said parent has
abandoned the child.
Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of an adoption decree.
Adoption creates a status closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation.
Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and

filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption,
such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of
surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional rights.
Republic of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. James Anthony and Lenita
Hughes, G.R. No. 100835, October 26, 1993
The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue

that an adoption court must first confront.
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the
written consent of the father, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since
abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under
which our statutes and jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written consent
to the adoption of their minor children. However, in cases where the father opposes
the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of
whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The
issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an
adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to
prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition
for adoption be considered on its merits.
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No.
105308, September 25, 1998
Adopted child has sole right to sever legal ties created by adoption.
R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) affirmed the legitimate status
of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The
new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to
the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child.
Isabelita S. Lahom vs. Jose Melvin Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003
The interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration
in determining whether or not to set aside a decree of adoption.
a) The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in proceedings

involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another, and the courts to
which the application for adoption is made is charged with the duty of protecting the
child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to
make rules to accomplish that end. Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the
sound discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance with
the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over the child
are not disregarded.
Rep. of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals and Zenaida C. Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326,
January 24, 1992
b) Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide
homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and
give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as
to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural
parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
In re: Frederick William Malkinson vs. Corazon Juliano Agrava, G.R. No. L-36309,
November 26, 1973
c) The philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the welfare of the

child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote that objective.
Paulina Santos vs. Gregoria Aranzanso, G.R. No. L-23828, February 28, 1966
Adoption laws should be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to
exist.
The rule of "dura lex sed lex" should be softened so as to apply the law with
less severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more for
the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock — than for
those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide
homes, love, and care and education for unfortunate children should be given the
widest latitude of sympathy, encouragement and assistance. The law is not, and should
not be made an instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy. As
often as is legally and lawfully possible, their texts and intendments should be
construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist.
Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen vs. CFI of Rizal, G.R. No.
L-30576, February 10, 1976
Slobodan Bobanovic and Dianne Elizabeth Cunningham Bobanovic vs. Hon. Sylvia P.
Montes, G.R. No. 71370, July 7, 1986
Written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree
of adoption.
Notwithstanding the amendments introduced by the Family Code to the Child

and Youth Welfare Code on adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
105308, September 25, 1998
However, written consent of natural parent can be dispensed with if said parent
has abandoned the child.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the

parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the
written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for
adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.
This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural
aspect of adoption.
105308, September 25, 1998
Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of an adoption decree.
Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption.

But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption when the findings of the trial court on
the issue of the husband's abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation
that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
105308, September 25, 1998
Art. 190 - Rules on legal or intestate succession to estate of the adopted
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority
is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological
parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, in some
instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the
Family Code. . .
Bartolome v. SSS, G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552
wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke
to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that someone
will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is
rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee is still in
his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the
adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other
than the adoptee's biological one.
Bartolome v. SSS, G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
[E]ven though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between
the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the
biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be
gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code. . .
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
Art. 194 - Support
Characteristics of legal support.

Mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of husband to support his wife.
An unborn child has a right to support from its progenitors.
Rationale for entitling illegitimate children to support and successional rights.
Right to support presupposes existence of a justifiable cause on the part of the claimant
spouse.
Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support
The wife is not entitled to support if she establishes her residence apart from the husband.
Husband's repeated illicit relations with women justify separate maintenance for the wife.
A claim for future support cannot be subject of a valid compromise.
Characteristics of legal support.
Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family
ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be
renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution;
(6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount.
Mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of husband to support his
wife.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied
terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the
law will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to
seek protection in the parental home.
Eloisa Goitia y de la Camara vs. Jose Campos Rueda, G.R. No. 11263, November 2,
1916
An unborn child has a right to support from its progenitors.
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional

personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. The unborn child, therefore, has
a right to support from its progenitors, even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa
mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
prescribed by law.
Carmen Quimiguing vs. Felix Icao, G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970
Rationale for entitling illegitimate children to support and successional rights.
Illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights because the
transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be visited
upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should help them to
surmount the disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents.
Artemio G. Ilano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994
Right to support presupposes existence of a justifiable cause on the part of the

claimant spouse.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal

partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse
claiming such right to live separately. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one
who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal
separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the
intendment of the law granting separate support.
Teodoro E. Lerma vs. Court of Appeals and Concepcion Diaz, G.R. No. L-33352,
December 20, 1974
Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support
Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support.
Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous
relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the husband; hence, would not
be entitled to support as such.
Feliciano Sanchez vs. Francisco Zulueta, G.R. No. 45616, May 16, 1939
Maria Quintana vs. Gelasio Lerma, G.R. No. 7426, February 5, 1913
The wife is not entitled to support if she establishes her residence apart from the
husband.
Although the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance and that the wife is entitled
to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her
husband where even without legal justification she establishes her residence apart
from that provided for by the former. In such event, there is no plausible reason why
she should be allowed any support from the husband.
Pilar Atilano vs. Chua Ching Beng, G.R. No. L-11086, March 29, 1958
Husband's repeated illicit relations with women justify separate maintenance for
the wife.
In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate

maintenance from her husband, it is not necessary that the husband should bring a
concubine into the marital domicile. Repeated illicit relations with women outside of
the marital establishment are enough. The law is not so unreasonable as to require a
wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose propensity towards other
women makes common habitation with him unbearable.
Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva vs. Rafael Villanueva, G.R. No. 29959, December 3,
1929
A claim for future support cannot be subject of a valid compromise.
No valid compromise is possible on the issue of future support. Hence, a

showing of previous efforts to compromise required under Art. 222 of the Civil Code
would be superfluous.
Cecilio Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals and Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza, G.R. No.
L-23102, April 24, 1967
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a

parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support
consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment
on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources
or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of
the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.
Art. 195 (3) - Who are obliged to support each other: Parents and their
legitimate children
[P]etitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the [Family] Code in demanding support
from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such
that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. . .
. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner's son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. . . . It is incumbent upon respondent
to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance
of a divorce decree) . . . . In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of
the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern.
Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved,
our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to
be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
Art. 195 (4) - Who are obliged to support each other
[Respondent]'s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to

petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195 (4). As such, her
entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her
filiation.
Ben-Hur Nepomuceno vs. Arhbencel Ann Lopez, G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010
Filiation must be duly proved before illegitimate children are entitled to support.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the
filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since petitioner's
demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is respondent's
illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged
him, until petitioner shall have proved his relation to him. The child's remedy is to file
through her mother a judicial action against respondent for compulsory recognition. If
filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation
must be duly proved.
Cherryl B. Dolina vs. Glenn D. Vallecera, G.R. No. 182367, December 15, 2010
Art. 199 - Order of support
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family
Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements
for the deceased.
From the aforecited provisions [Articles 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, Art. 199 of
the Family Code, Sec. 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code], it is undeniable that
the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the
members of the family to the exclusion of one's common law partner.
[I]t is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one's common law
partner.
[I]t is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was
living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no
controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced,
expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her
deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like
any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except
upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary
intent to that end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario
and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human
compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a
family member joins his Creator.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be
considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.
While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children
when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often
than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his
Creator.
Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will
not be considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a
legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband
should not be readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased
to that end. Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the
law favors the legitimate family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of
the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly
explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the
persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even if
Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among those on which
the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino),
an eminent authority on civil law, commented that it is generally recognized that
any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased should be established by some
form of testamentary disposition. As Article 307 itself provides, the wishes of the
deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly . . .
[T]he wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are not absolute. As Dr.
Tolentino further wrote:
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral,

must not be contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and
reglementary provisions concerning funerals and the disposition of the
remains, whether as regards the time and manner of disposition, or the place
of burial, or the ceremony to be observed.
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by
Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and
subject the same to those charged with the right and duty to make the proper
arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce

of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse
exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by
third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising
out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to
take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final
resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead
may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt
that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.
Art. 201 - Amount of support
The capacity or resources of both parents and the child's monthly expenses must be proved
to justify award of support.
The allowance for support is provisional.
Judgment for support is never final.
The capacity or resources of both parents and the child's monthly expenses must be
proved to justify award of support.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence
presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents
who are jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under Article 195 of
the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the child.
Jose Lam vs. Adriana Chua, G.R. No. 131286, March 18, 2004
The allowance for support is provisional.
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such
nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a
needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in
accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It
cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
Manuela Advincula vs. Manuel Advincula, G.R. No. L-19065, January 31, 1964
Judgment for support is never final.
Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his
illegitimate child. The amount is variable. There is no final judgment thereof as it
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or
increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family. Under the premises, the award of P5,000 monthly
support to Laurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant.
Dolores Montefalcon, et al. vs. Ronnie S. Vasquez, G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008
A judgment for support is never final in the sense that not only can its amount
be subject to increase or decrease but its demandability may also be suspended or
re-enforced when appropriate circumstances exist.
Bernarda S. Canonizado vs. Judge Regina G. Ordonez Benitez, G.R. Nos. L-49315 and
60966, February 20, 1984
Art. 203, par. 2 - Support pendente lite
Support pendente lite can be availed of in an action for legal separation.

Court order fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final.
Complaint may be filed in court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa where the issues
of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties are essentially involved.
Support pendente lite can be availed of in an action for legal separation.
Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal

separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If the amount of support
pendente lite ordered is found to be too onerous, a motion to modify or reduce the
same can always be filed.
1987
Court order fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final.
The order fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final in character in
the sense that it can be the subject of modification, depending on the changing
conditions affecting the ability of the obligor to pay the amount fixed for support.
Buenaventura San Juan vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-59906, October 23,
1982
Complaint may be filed in court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa where the
issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties are essentially
involved.
A complaint may be filed directly in a competent court without passing the

Lupon Tagapayapa in actions coupled with provisional remedies such as support
pendente lite. The issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties
belonging to the conjugal partnership, although not ‘coupled’ in the strict sense of the
word with the Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership, are essentially
involved in this petition because of the minority of the daughter, and because the
resolution or decision of this court on the pending petition would be incomplete
without a clear-cut disposition on the partition of the personal and real properties of
the conjugal partnership and consequent delivery thereof to the proper parties.
Mauro Blardony, Jr. vs. Hon. Jose L. Coscolluela, Jr., G.R. No. 70261, February 28,
1990
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the
action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final
judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary
measures availed of during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because
they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. The
subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main
action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Ma. Carminia C. Calderon vs. Jose Antonio F. Roxas, et al., G.R. No. 185595, January
9, 2013
Art. 207 - Parental support
A quasi-contract exists between the person obliged to give support and the third person
who furnished support.
[C]ontextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the [the person obliged
to give support] and [the third person who furnished support] is a quasi-contract, an
equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of
another.
Edward V. Lacson vs. Maowee Daban Lacson et al., G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006
Art. 209 - Parental authority
A mother bringing her children to mahjong sessions reveals her disregard for their moral
and mental development.
Definition of “parental authority”.
Joint parental authority is vested by law on the father and mother.
As far as joint parental authority is concerned, there is no more distinction between
legitimate or adopted children and acknowledged illegitimate children.
Inability to provide material comfort is not sufficient to deprive a personal of parental
authority.
A “bad” husband does not necessarily make a “bad” father.
Parental authority may not be transferred or renounced.
Parental authority may be waived or be subject to a compromise.
“Best interest” rule should not be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the
parents to exercise parental authority.
Definition of “parental authority”.
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution

whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated
children to the extent required by the latter's needs. It is a mass of rights and
obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical
preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, "there is no power,
but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust
for the welfare of the minor."
Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
Joint parental authority is vested by law on the father and mother.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons
of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent
present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death,
absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.
As far as joint parental authority is concerned, there is no more distinction between

legitimate or adopted children and acknowledged illegitimate children.
The new Family Code erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted
children on one hand and acknowledged illegitimate children on the other, insofar as
joint parental authority is concerned. Article 211 of the Family Code merely
formalizes into statute the practice on parental authority.
Christina Marie Dempsey vs. RTC Branch LXXV, Olongapo City and Joel Dempsey,
G.R. Nos. 77737-38, August 15, 1988
Inability to provide material comfort is not sufficient to deprive a personal of
parental authority.
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were
to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking
into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs
of the child. The conclusion that the husband abandoned his family needs more
evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that
his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so
emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and
counsel if they were given to adopting parents.
105308, September 25, 1998
A “bad” husband does not necessarily make a “bad” father.
The actuality that the father carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be
taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that he was necessarily an unfit father.
Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a "bad" husband
does not necessarily make a "bad" father. That a husband is not exactly an upright
man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his
inherent right to parental authority over the children.
105308, September 25, 1998
Parental authority may not be transferred or renounced.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in
cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend
or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it
does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation
is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Parental authority may be waived or be subject to a compromise.
The husband may not be deemed as having been completely deprived of

parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to his wife in the legal
separation case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis
of the agreement of the spouses. While parental authority may be waived, as in law it
may be subject to a compromise, there was no factual finding in the legal separation
case that the husband was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of
custody of his children or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive him
of parental authority.
105308, September 25, 1998
“Best interest” rule should not be implemented in derogation of the primary right
of the parents to exercise parental authority.
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the

domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations
should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in
derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority
over him. The rights of parents vis-a-vis that of their children are not antithetical to
each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent
possible.
105308, September 25, 1998
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor,
who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. . . .
There can be no other interpretation of this provision [Section 7 of the RH law] except
that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are
excluded from the decision-making process of the minor with regard to family
planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off
just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care,
advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother
and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their
consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the
family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family as an inviolable social institution.
Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, etc., April 8, 2014
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental
control over their minor child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters
which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of
conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to
his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of
maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords
couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the
foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents
in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution
of their parental authority.
A mother bringing her children to mahjong sessions reveals her disregard for their
moral and mental development
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions
did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency
to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the
culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and
serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own
personal and escapist desires. . . . The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for
her children's moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a
parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209
and Article 220 of the Family Code. . .
Art. 213 - Custody of children
Article 213 does not disallow a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years
of age.
The "tender-age presumption" may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the
mother's unfitness.
The sole and foremost consideration in controversies regarding custody of minors is the
physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child.
In custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the
child.
Right of parents to custody of minor children is a constitutional and natural right.
Right of parents to custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of
parental duties.
Even if estranged, mother and father may be granted joint custody of common children.
If child is under seven years of age, law presumes that the mother is the best custodian.
If child is over seven, his choice is paramount.
However, the court may find the chosen parent unfit.
The right of the child to choose the parent he wishes to live with may be invoked only if
the parents are married to each other but are separated.
Moral dereliction is not a ground to deprive mother of custody of child below 7 years old.
Lesbianism is not a ground to deprive mother of custody pendente lite of her child who is
less than 7 years old.
The mother has sole parental authority over an illegitimate child.
Recognition of an illegitimate child by the father is not a ground for awarding him custody
of said child.
Parental authority is inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced.
Custody of child may be awarded to the father to free her from her mother's immoral
influence.
A parent’s love outweighs that of the grandparents’.
Grounds for depriving a mother of custody and parental authority.
Adopting parents have the right to custody of the adopted child.
Decisions on the custody of minor children are always open to adjustment.
“Best interest” rule should not be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the
parents to exercise parental authority.
Family Code determines fitness of a mother, who is no longer a Muslim, to take custody
of her children.
Father’s use of trickery to take his son away from in-laws is not a ground to deprive him
of custody.
The welfare of the child, not the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent, is the
paramount consideration.
Contending parents stand on equal footing in custody cases of minor children.
Every child's rights should not be dependent solely on the whims and caprices of his
parents.
Article 213 does not disallow a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven
years of age.
Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and
serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. [The mother] can
raise it as a counter argument for [the father's] petition for custody. But it is not a
basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision
disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.
Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, et al. vs. Loran S.D. Abanilla, et al., G.R. No.
162734, August 29, 2006
The "tender-age presumption" may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the

mother's unfitness.
The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may
be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. The mother is
declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable
disease.
Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 174485, July 11, 2007
The sole and foremost consideration in controversies regarding custody of minors

is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child.
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the
latter's welfare is paramount. The foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as
well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from
this criterion.
In re: Angelie Anne C. Cervantes vs. Gina Carreon Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, Jan. 27,
1989
In custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest
of the child.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is
always the welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international
instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: "In all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."
Nerissa Z. Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996
In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled rule

is that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already over 7 years of
age, the child's choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall
be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit. Finally, in Perez v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996], We held that in custody cases, the
foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child, as reflected
in no less than the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child which provides that
"[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."
Geoffrey Beckett vs. Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, January 30,
2013
Right of parents to custody of minor children is a constitutional and natural right.
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural
rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The
right is an inherent one, which is not created by the estate of decisions of the courts,
but derives from the nature of the parent relationship.
Teresita Sagala-Eslao vs. CA and Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye, G.R. No. 116773, January
16, 1997
Right of parents to custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge
of parental duties.
While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child,
courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions of the care,
custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount",
and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated
from the mother. This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal
institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right
of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel
of his parents, into a radically different institution, due to the influence of Christian
faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig
Peña, now "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum
of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." As a result,
the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the
proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support,
education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development.
Zenaida Medina vs. Dra. Venancia L. Makabali, G.R. No. L-26953, March 28, 1969
Even if estranged, mother and father may be granted joint custody of common
children.
a) Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care
for their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare.
This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it
be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for
each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offspring invariably remain
unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of
course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
Carlitos E. Silva vs. CA and Suzanne T. Gonzales, G.R. No. 114742, July 17, 1997
b) The visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his children is sustained

in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over
their children. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other
is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither
the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent
threat to the well-being of the child.
If child is under seven years of age, law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian.
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated
by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under
seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The
presumption is strong but it is not conclusive: It can be overcome by "compelling
reasons".
Reynaldo Espiritu vs. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
[U]pon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the
child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the
law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or
divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for
commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how
best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother.
Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code
on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can
privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug
addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a
child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application
of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.
Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5,
2010
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that "No child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this provision's enforceability to
court-sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to
sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old of
separated parents. This effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple
expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting to the
separated mother sole custody of her children under seven years of age "to avoid a
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her." This ignores the
legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is
deprived of her child of tender age."
2010
It could very well be that Article 213's bias favoring one separated parent (mother)
over the other (father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint
parental custody, robs the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making
between the separated parents. However, these are objections which question the law's
wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these
grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rule's seeming harshness
or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish
to enter such as granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements
are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second
paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the mother final authority on the care
and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of disagreements.
2010
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is
limited in duration, lasting only until the child's seventh year. From the eighth year
until the child's emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to
the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt.
Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into
the Agreement for the joint custody of [the child], respondent repudiated the
Agreement by asserting sole custody over [her]. Respondent's act effectively brought
the parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of [the child].
2010
If child is over seven, his choice is paramount.
The mother and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that the
father promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that she is earning a
decent living and is able to support her children according to her means. Even now
that the child is over seven years of age the mother's custody over him will have to be
upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother.
Daisie T. David vs. CA and Ramon R. Villar, G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995
However, the court may find the chosen parent unfit.
If a child is over seven, the law allows him to make a choice. Once the choice
has been made, the burden lies on the court to investigate if the parent thus chosen is
unfit to assume parental authority and custodial responsibility. The child’s choice is
paramount but the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may
find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third
party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
The right of the child to choose the parent he wishes to live with may be invoked
only if the parents are married to each other but are separated.
Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which

the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are separated either by virtue of
a decree of legal separation or because they are living separately de facto.
Joey D. Briones vs. Maricel P. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
Moral dereliction is not a ground to deprive mother of custody of child below 7

years old.
The rationale for awarding the custody of children younger than seven years of
age to their mother was explained by the Code Commission: "The general rule is
recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of
her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for 'compelling
reasons' for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother's
heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient
punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the
baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation." PLPE05
Nerissa Z. Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996
Lesbianism is not a ground to deprive mother of custody pendente lite of her child
who is less than 7 years old.
It is not enough for the husband to show merely that the wife was a lesbian. He
must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of
the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the
child's proper moral development. PLPE05
Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto vs. Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V, G.R. No. 154994, June
28, 2005
The mother has sole parental authority over an illegitimate child.
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the
exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court
will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to
exercise such authority and care.
Recognition of an illegitimate child by the father is not a ground for awarding him
custody of said child.
Recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for

ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly
confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child. It is only if she
defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor.
Daisie T. David vs. CA and Ramon R. Villar, G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995
Parental authority is inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced.
a) Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be

transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to
parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a
friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody
and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
b) When the mother entrusted the custody of her minor child to the latter’s
paternal grandmother, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it
did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's
home or an orphan institution
16, 1997
Custody of child may be awarded to the father to free her from her mother's
immoral influence.
It is in the best interest of the child to be freed from the obviously

unwholesome, not to say immoral, influence that the situation in which the mother has
placed herself, might create in the moral and social outlook of her daughter who is
now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The fact that the
father might have been tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she
was still too young to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct
impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with
her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister's mother, is hardly of any consequence
now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life. In all controversies regarding the
custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education,
social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.
Miguel R. Unson III vs. Hon. Pedro C. Navarro and Edita N. Araneta, G.R. No. L-52242,
November 17, 1980
A parent’s love outweighs that of the grandparents’.
The law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the
grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable
may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority.
Grounds for depriving a mother of custody and parental authority.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to exercise
sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the
award of custody to someone else. In the past, the following grounds have been
considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority:
neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable
disease.
Dinah B. Tonog vs. CA and Edgar V. Daguimol, G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002
Adopting parents have the right to custody of the adopted child.
The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and
consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of
dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where
the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case,
parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The
adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
In re: Angelie Anne C. Cervantes vs. Gina Carreon Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, Jan. 27,
1989
Decisions on the custody of minor children are always open to adjustment.
Decisions even of the Supreme Court on the custody of minor children are
always open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand in
the light of the inflexible criterion
Miguel R. Unson III vs. Hon. Pedro C. Navarro and Edita N. Araneta, G.R. No. L-52242,
November 17, 1980
“Best interest” rule should not be implemented in derogation of the primary right
of the parents to exercise parental authority.
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the

domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations
should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in
derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority
over him. The rights of parents vis-a-vis that of their children are not antithetical to
each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent
possible.
Herbert Cang vs. CA and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308,
September 25, 1998
Family Code determines fitness of a mother, who is no longer a Muslim, to take

custody of her children.
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof is not restricted to

Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether
a non-Muslim woman is worthy to have custody of her children. What determines her
capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a
healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into
consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents.
Father’s use of trickery to take his son away from in-laws is not a ground to
deprive him of custody.
The father’s employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws,
though unjustifiable, is not a ground to wrest custody from him.
The welfare of the child, not the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either
parent, is the paramount consideration.
The law or jurisprudence does not intend to downplay a father's sense of loss
when he is separated from his child: While the bonds between a mother and her small
child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer
agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is
greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other
feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration.
Dinah B. Tonog vs. CA and Edgar V. Daguimol, G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002
Contending parents stand on equal footing in custody cases of minor children.
In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their minor children,
the contending parents stand on equal footing before the court who shall make the
selection according to the best interest of the child. The child if over seven years of
age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the court
is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and
foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the
child concerned, taking into account the respective resources as well as social and
moral situations of the opposing parents.
Reymond B. Laxamana vs. Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana, G.R. No. 144763, September 3,
2002
Every child's rights should not be dependent solely on the whims and caprices of
his parents.
Legal provisions grant to every child rights which are not and should not be
dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His
welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where
the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose
custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law.
Alfonso Lacson vs. Carmen San Jose-Lacson and CA, G.R. No. L-23482, August 30,
1968
Art. 220 - Rights and duties of persons exercising parental authority
Right of parents to the custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of
parental duties.
Adoption creates a status closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with
corresponding rights and duties.
Right of parents to custody of minor children is an inherent one.
Parents’ right to impose discipline on their children does not authorize them to invade the
latter's honor.
Right of parents to the custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper
discharge of parental duties.
In the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been
transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law,
under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parent, into a radically
different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The
obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pena, now "there is no
power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." As a result, the right of
parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper
discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support. education,
moral, intellectual and civic training and development
Zenaida Medina vs. Dra. Venancia L. Makabali, G.R. No. L-26953, March 28, 1969
Adoption creates a status closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation

with corresponding rights and duties.
Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and

filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption,
such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of
surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional rights.
Republic of the Phil. vs. CA and Sps. James Anthony and Lenita Hughes, G.R. No.
100835, October 26, 1993
Right of parents to custody of minor children is an inherent one.
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural
rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The
right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but
derives from the nature of the parental relationship.
16, 1997
Parents’ right to impose discipline on their children does not authorize them to
invade the latter's honor.
Although the Family Code recognizes the parents' rights and duties to "impose
discipline" on their unemancipated children; "supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others . . .; and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to
their . . . morals", it does not authorize them to force their offspring to copulate with
them under the mask of discipline, or invade their honor and violate their dignity nor
does it give them the license to ravish the product of their marital union.
People of the Phils. vs. David Silvano, G.R. No. 127356, June 29, 1999
Art. 229 (3) - Abandonment of child
Abandonment, defined.
Physical absence, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment.
Inability to provide material comfort is not sufficient to deprive a personal of parental
authority.
Abandonment, defined.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon" means to forsake entirely, to forsake
or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under
a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus
put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent
never to resume or claim one's rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a
child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
September 25, 1998
Physical absence, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to

abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not

tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, the father was physically absent as he
was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of
love, care and support for his children. His conduct did not manifest a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment.
September 25, 1998
Inability to provide material comfort is not sufficient to deprive a personal of

parental authority.
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were
to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking
into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs
of the child. The conclusion that the husband abandoned his family needs more
evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that
his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so
emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and
counsel if they were given to adopting parents.
September 25, 1998
Art. 247 - Judgment of the court
No right to appeal is granted to any party, including the State, in judgments

rendered in summary judicial proceedings.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by

express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As had been ruled, the
right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a
statutory privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all
judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately
final and executory", the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein.
The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision. PLPE05
Republic of the Phil. vs. Gloria Bermudez-Lorino, G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary

period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are
"immediately final and executory." It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC
to give due course to the Republic's appeal and order the transmittal of the entire
records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Gloria Bermudez-Lorino, G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005
Art. 256 - Retroactive effect
While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are
inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and,
therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it
is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and
automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal
partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial
agreements.
[T]he petitioner's claim of vested right [by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code
which prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a
person's vested right] is not one which is written on stone. A vested right is one whose
existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the
holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term "vested right"
expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural
justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny. To be vested, a right must have become a title — legal
or equitable — to the present or future enjoyment of property. The concept of "vested
right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of
a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing Go, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 172027, July 29, 2010
[W]hile one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the same if
there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. . . .
[T]he alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one founded, not only in
the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This
provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty
spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. . . . [T]he petitioner's claim of a
vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code,
his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in
a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance
to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside
under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing
ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. vs. The Hon. Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, October 18, 2005

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Family Code Case Doctrines

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Executive Order No.

209 - Family Code

a) It is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights,

b) Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is

There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation

b) Between employer and employee

Marriage demands respect and dignity.

We cannot overemphasize that having an extra-marital affair is an afront to the

A married person still enjoys the right to privacy of communication and

Persons living together as husband and wife are presumed to be married.

Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment.

Doubts in the validity of a marriage should be resolved in its favor

Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a

The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as

Art. 3 (2) - Marriage license

A marriage license is indispensable to the validity of marriage.

A marriage license is indispensable to the validity of marriage.

Requirement of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil

A marriage license wrongfully obtained does not invalidate marriage

Absence of marriage certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the

A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal

Marriages exceptional in character do not require a marriage license.

Rationale for not requiring a marriage license in marriages exceptional in

Exchange of vows is presumed to have been made based on testimonies that a

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge

Art. 6 - Form of solemnization of marriage

Good faith and Christian motives cannot be made as an excuse to solemnize

For solemnizing marriage without the required marriage license, respondent

Solemnizing marriage out of human compassion may not amount to gross

The judge’s act of solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage

A judge is not authorized to solemnize marriages outside of his jurisdiction.

Considering that respondent Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without

Art. 8 - Venue of marriage ceremony

1. at the point of death;

2. in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or

3. upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this

[A] divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption [Processual presumption

Art. 16 - Additional requirements where parental consent or parental advice

Certificate of legal capacity is prima facie evidence of alien's legal capacity to

Art. 22 - Marriage certificate/contract

The marriage certificate attesting that a marriage ceremony was performed by a

Marriage certificate is best evidence of marriage.

Certified copy of marriage contract is the best evidence of its contents.

The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in

While baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered documents, they

Marriage certificate constitutes prima facie proof of its contents.

Marriage certificate is not indispensable to establish the fact of marriage.

A marriage certificate is not indispensable to establish the fact of marriage in

Absence of marriage certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the

A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal

Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the

Failure of solemnizing officer to send copy of marriage certificate to municipal

Truth or falsehood of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage certificate is