Intervention,: (G.R. No. 230642. September 10, 2019.)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 230642. September 10, 2019.]
OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, VICTORIA B. LOANZON, ELGIN MICHAEL
C. PEREZ, ARNOLD E. CACHO, AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, ARIANNE C. ARTUGUE,
CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA, KRISTINE JANE R. LIU, ALYANNA MARI C. BUENVIAJE, IANA PATRICIA DULA T. NICOLAS, IRENE A.
TOLENTINO and AUREA I. GRUYAL, petitioners, vs. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, as represented by its Chairperson, HON. EMERSON B.
AQUENDE, and LEB Member HON. ZENAIDA N. ELEPAÑO, respondents,
ATTYS. ANTHONY D. BENGZON, FERDINAND M. NEGRE, MICHAEL Z. UNTALAN, JONATHAN Q. PEREZ, SAMANTHA WESLEY K.
ROSALES, ERIKA M. ALFONSO, KRYS VALEN O. MARTINEZ, RYAN CEAZAR P. ROMANO, and KENNETH C. VARONA , respondents-in-
intervention,
APRIL D. CABALLERO, JEREY C. CASTARDO, MC WELLROE P. BRINGAS, RHUFFY D. FEDERE, CONRAD THEODORE A. MATUTINO and
numerous others similarly situated, ST. THOMAS MORE SCHOOL OF LAW AND BUSINESS, INC., represented by its President RODOLFO C.
RAPISTA, for himself and as Founder, Dean and Professor, of the College of Law, JUDY MARIE RAPISTA-TAN, LYNNART WALFORD A. TAN,
IAN M. ENTERINA, NEIL JOHN VILLARICO as law professors and as concerned citizens, petitioners-intervenors.
[G.R. No. 242954. September 10, 2019.]
FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L. ABAYATA, GRETCHEN M. VASQUEZ, SHEENAH S. ILUSTRISMO, RALPH LOUIE SALAÑO, AIREEN MONICA B.
GUZMAN, DELFINO ODIAS, DARYL DELA CRUZ, CLAIRE SUICO, AIVIE S. PESCADERO, NIÑA CHRISTINE DELA PAZ, SHEMARK K.
QUENIAHAN, AL JAY T. MEJOS, ROCELLYN L. DAÑO, * MICHAEL ADOLFO, RONALD A. ATIG, LYNNETTE C. LUMAYAG, MARY CHRIS
LAGERA, TIMOTHY B. FRANCISCO, SHEILA MARIE C. DANDAN, MADELINE C. DELA PEÑA, DARLIN R. VILLAMOR, LORENZANA L.
LLORICO, and JAN IVAN M. SANTAMARIA, petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, Executive Secretary, and LEGAL EDUCATION
BOARD, herein represented by its Chairperson, EMERSON B. AQUENDE, respondents.
DECISION
J.C. REYES, JR., J p:
On the principal grounds of encroachment upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning the practice of law,
violation of institutional academic freedom and violation of a law school aspirant's right to education, these consolidated Petitions
for Prohibition (G.R. No. 230642) and Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 242954) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assail as
unconstitutional Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7662, 1 or the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993, which created the Legal Education
Board (LEB). On the same principal grounds, these petitions also particularly seek to declare as unconstitutional the LEB
issuances establishing and implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School Admission
Test or the PhiLSAT.
The Antecedents
Prompted by clamors for the improvement of the system of legal education on account of the poor performance of law
students and law schools in the bar examinations, 2 the Congress, on December 23, 1993, passed into law R.A. No. 7662 with the
following policy statement:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the standards
of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving, and decision-
making, to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and
dignity of the legal profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice
and to develop social competence.
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require
proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal apprenticeship and
continuing legal education.
R.A. No. 7662 identifies the general and specific objectives of legal education in this manner:
SEC. 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. —
(a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;
(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and
oppressed sectors of society;
(3) to train persons for leadership;
(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the improvement of its
administration, the legal system and legal institutions in the light of the historical and
contemporary development of law in the Philippines and in other countries.
(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:
(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various fields and of legal
institutions;
(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate and apply the law
effectively, as well as to allow them to have a holistic approach to legal problems and issues;
(3) to prepare law students for advocacy, [counseling], problem-solving and decision-making, and to
develop their ability to deal with recognized legal problems of the present and the future;
(4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful employment or sufficient as a
foundation for future training beyond the basic professional degree, and to develop in them the
desire and capacity for continuing study and self-improvement;
(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession; and
(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their profession and to fully adhere
to its ethical norms.
For these purposes, R.A. No. 7662 created the LEB, an executive agency which was made separate from the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), but attached thereto solely for budgetary purposes and administrative support. 3 The
Chairman and regular members of the LEB are to be appointed by the President for a term of five years, without reappointment,
from a list of at least three nominees prepared, with prior authorization from the Court, by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). 4
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7662 enumerates the powers and functions of the LEB as follows:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. — For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board
shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with the provisions
of this Act;
(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions as herein
enumerated;
(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of
enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities, without encroaching
upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;
(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation
to faculty members;
(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements for admission to
the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses of study as may be prescribed by the law
schools and colleges under the different levels of accreditation status;
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall
undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during
the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months.
For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications
of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar[;]
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem
necessary; and
(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary for the
attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.
On the matter of accreditation of law schools, R.A. No. 7662 further elaborates:
SEC. 8. Accreditation of Law Schools. — Educational institutions may not operate a law school unless
accredited by the Board. Accreditation of law schools may be granted only to educational institutions
recognized by the Government.
SEC. 9. Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. — The [LEB] may withdraw or downgrade the
accreditation status of a law school if it fails to maintain the standards set for its accreditation status.
SEC. 10. Effectivity of Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. — The withdrawal or
downgrading of accreditation status shall be effective after the lapse of the semester or trimester following the
receipt by the school of the notice of withdrawal or downgrading unless, in the meantime, the school meets
and/or upgrades the standards or corrects the deficiencies upon which the withdrawal or downgrading of the
accreditation status is based.
Bar Matter No. 979-B
Re: Legal Education
In July 2001, the Court's Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM), through its Chairperson, Justice
Jose C. Vitug, noted several objectionable provisions of R.A. No. 7662 which "go beyond the ambit of education of aspiring
lawyers and into the sphere of education of persons duly licensed to practice the law profession." 5
In particular, the CLEBM observed:
x x x [U]nder the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662], the State "shall x x x require
apprenticeship and continuing legal education." The concept of continuing legal education encompasses
education not only of law students but also of members of the legal profession. [This] implies that the [LEB]
shall have jurisdiction over the education of persons who have finished the law course and are already licensed
to practice law[, in violation of the Supreme Court's power over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines].
x x x Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing "awareness among
members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of the society." Such
objective should not find a place in the law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of law as they
perform the task of educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution also
provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules on "legal assistance to the
underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A. No. 7662] might give rise to infringement of a
constitutionally mandated power.
x x x [Section 7(e) giving the LEB the power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and
Section 7(h) giving the LEB the power to adopt a system of continuing legal education and for this purpose, the
LEB may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as
the LEB may deem necessary] encroach upon the Supreme Court's powers under Section 5, paragraph 5 of
Article VIII of the Constitution. Aside from its power over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Supreme
Court is constitutionally mandated to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law. 6
While the CLEBM saw the need for the LEB to oversee the system of legal education, it cautioned that the law's
objectionable provisions, for reasons above-cited, must be removed. 7
Relative to the foregoing observations, the CLEBM proposed the following amendments to R.A. No. 7662:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the standards
of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counseling, problem-solving, and decision-
making; to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to impress upon them the importance, nobility and
dignity of the legal profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of
justice; and, to develop socially-committed lawyers with integrity and competence.
proper selection of law students, provide for legal apprenticeship, and maintain quality among law schools.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education. — x x x
xxx xxx xxx
2.) to increase awareness among law students of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors
of society;
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 7. Power and functions. — x x x
(a) to regulate the legal education system in accordance with its powers and functions herein
enumerated;
(b) to establish standards of accreditation for law schools, consistent with academic freedom and
pursuant to the declaration of policy set forth in Section 2 hereof;
(c) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
(d) to prescribe minimum standards for admission to law schools including a system of law aptitude
examination;
(e) to provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law schools;
(f) to prescribe guidelines for law practice internship which the law schools may establish as part of the
curriculum; and
(g) to perform such other administrative functions as may be necessary for the attainment of the
policies and objectives of this Act." 8 (Underscoring supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In a Resolution 9 dated September 4, 2001, the Court approved the CLEBM's explanatory note and draft amendments to
R.A. No. 7662. The Senate and the House of Representatives were formally furnished with a copy of said Resolution. This,
notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7662 remained unaltered.
LEB Issuances
In 2003, the Court issued a resolution authorizing the JBC to commence the nomination process for the members of the
LEB. In 2009, the LEB was constituted with the appointment of Retired Court of Appeals Justice Hilarion L. Aquino as the first
Chairperson and followed by the appointment of LEB members, namely, Dean Eulogia M. Cueva, Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Dean
Venicio S. Flores and Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Director Felizardo Y. Francisco. Despite the passage of the
enabling law in 1993, the LEB became fully operational only in June 2010.
Acting pursuant to its authority to prescribe the minimum standards for law schools, the LEB issued Memorandum
Order No. 1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011) providing for the Policies and Standards of Legal Education and Manual of
Regulation for Law Schools.
Since then, the LEB had issued several orders, circulars, resolutions, and other issuances which are made available
through their website:
A. Orders
Number Title/Subject
LEBMO No. 2 Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law Program
LEBMO No. 3-2016 Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the Accreditation of Law Schools
to Offer and Operate Refresher Courses
LEBMO No. 4-2016 Supplemental to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016
LEBMO No. 5-2016 Guidelines for the [Prerequisite] Subjects in the Basic Law Courses
LEBMO No. 6-2016 Reportorial Requirements for Law Schools
LEBMO No. 7-2016 Policies and Regulations for the Administration of a Nationwide
Uniform Law School Admission Test for Applicants to the Basic Law
Courses in All Law Schools in the Country
LEBMO No. 8-2016 Policies, Guidelines and Procedures Governing Increases in Tuition and
Other School Fees, and Introduction of New Fees by Higher Education
Institutions for the Law Program
LEBMO No. 9-2017 Policies and Guidelines on the Conferment of Honorary Doctor of Laws
Degrees
LEBMO No. 10-2017 Guidelines on the Adoption of Academic/School Calendar

LEBMO No. 11-2017 Additional Transition Provisions to [LEBMO] No. 7, Series of 2016, on
PhiLSAT
LEBMO No. 12-2018 LEB Service/Transaction Fees
LEBMO No. 13-2018 Guidelines in the Conduct of Summer Classes
LEBMO No. 14-2018 Policy and Regulations in Offering Elective Subjects
LEBMO No. 15-2018 Validation of the Licenses of, and the Law Curriculum/Curricula for the
Basic Law Courses in use by Law Schools and Graduate Schools of Law
LEBMO No. 16-2018 Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the Academic Law Libraries of
Law Schools
LEBMO No. 17-2018 Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum Academic Requirement of

Master of Laws Degree for Deans and Law
Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law Schools
LEBMO No. 18-2018 Guidelines on Cancellation or Suspension of Classes in All Law Schools
LEBMO No. 19-2018 Migration of the Basic Law Course to Juris Doctor
LEBMO No. 20-2019 Discretionary Admission in the AY 2019-2020 of Examinees Who Rated
Below the Cut-off/Passing Score but Not Less than 45% in the
Philippine Law School Admission Test Administered on April 7, 2019

B. Memorandum Circulars
LEBMC No. 1 New Regulatory Issuances
LEBMC No. 2 Submission of Schedule of Tuition and Other School Fees
LEBMC No. 3 Submission of Law School Information Report
LEBMC No. 4 Reminder to Submit Duly Accomplished LSIR Form
LEBMC No. 5 Offering of the Refresher Course for AY 2017-2018
LEBMC No. 6 Applications for LEB Certification Numbers
LEBMC No. 7 Application of Transitory Provisions under [LEBMO] No. 7, Series of

2017 and [LEBMO] No. 11, Series of 2017 in the Admission of
Freshmen Law Students in Basic Law Courses in Academic Year 2017-
2018
LEBMC No. 8 Guidelines for Compliance with the Reportorial Requirements under
[LEBMO] No. 7, Series of 2016 for Purposes of the Academic Year
2017-2018
LEBMC No. 9 Observance of Law Day and Philippine National Law Week
LEBMC No. 10 September 21, 2017 Suspension of Classes

LEBMC No. 11 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the Academic
Year 2016-2017
Year 2017-2018
LEBMC No. 13 Legal Research Seminar of the Philippine Group of Law Librarians on
April 4-6, 2018
LEBMC No. 14 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. 2016
Year 2018-2019
LEBMC No. 16 Clarification to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016
LEBMC No. 17 Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course
in the Academic Year 2018-2019
LEBMC No. 18 PHILSAT Eligibility Requirement for Freshmen in the Academic Year
2018-2019
LEBMC No. 19 Guidelines for the Limited Conditional Admission/Enrollment in the 1st
Semester of the Academic Year 2018-2019 Allowed for Those Who
Have Not Taken the PhiLSAT
LEBMC No. 20 Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course
in the Academic Year 2018-2019
LEBMC No. 21 Adjustments/Corrections to the Requirements for Law Schools to be

Qualified to Conditionally Admit/Enroll Freshmen Law Students in AY
2018-2019
LEBMC No. 22 Advisory on who should take the September 23, 2018 PhiLSAT
LEBMC No. 23 Collection of the PhiLSAT Certificate of Eligibility/Exemption by Law

Schools from Applicants for Admission
LEBMC No. 24 Observance of the Philippine National Law Week
LEBMC No. 25 Competition Law
LEBMC No. 26 Scholarship Opportunity for Graduate Studies for Law Deans, Faculty
Members and Law Graduates with the 2020-2021 Philippine Fulbright
Graduate Student Program
LEBMC No. 27 Advisory on April 7, 2019 PhiLSAT and Conditional [Enrollment] for
Incoming Freshmen/1st Year Law Students
LEBMC No. 28 April 25-26, 2019 Competition Law Training Program
LEBMC No. 29 Detailed Guidelines for Conditional Enrollment Permit Application
LEBMC No. 30 Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in AY 2019-2020
LEBMC No. 31 Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in AY 2019-2020

LEBMC No. 40 Reminders concerning Conditionally Enrolled Freshmen Law Students
in AY 2019-2020

C. Resolutions and Other Issuances
Resolution No. 16 Reportorial Requirement for Law Schools with Small Students
Population
Resolution No. 7, Series of Declaring a 3-Year Moratorium in the Opening of New Law Schools
2010
Resolution No. 8, Series of Administrative Sanctions

2010
Resolution No. 2011-21 A Resolution Providing for Supplementary Rules to the Provisions of
LEBMO No. 1 in regard to Curriculum and Degrees Ad Eundem
Resolution No. 2012-02 A Resolution Eliminating the Requirement of Special Orders for
Graduates of the Basic Law Degrees and Graduate Law Degrees and
Replacing them with a Per Law School Certification Approved by the
Legal Education Board
Resolution No. 2013-01 Ethical Standards of Conduct for Law Professors
Resolution No. 2014-02 Prescribing Rules on the Ll.M. Staggered Compliance Schedule and the
Exemption from the Ll.M. Requirement
Resolution No. 2015-08 Prescribing the Policy and Rules in the Establishment of a Legal Aid
Clinic in Law Schools
Order Annual Law Publication Requirements
Chairman Memorandum Restorative Justice to be Added as Elective Subject

The PhiLSAT under LEBMO No.
7-2016, LEBMO No. 11-2017,
LEBMC No. 18-2018, and related
issuances
As above-enumerated, among the orders issued by the LEB was Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO
No. 7-2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the minimum standards for law admission" under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662.
The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve the quality of legal education by requiring all those
seeking admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test, known as the
PhiLSAT. 10
The PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications and language proficiency, critical
thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning. 11 It was designed to measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the
study of law. 12 Exempted from the PhiLSAT requirement were honor graduates who were granted professional civil service
eligibility and who are enrolling within two years from their college graduation. 13
Synthesizing, the key provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 are as follows:
(1) The policy and rationale of requiring PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. The
PhiLSAT shall be administered under the control and supervision of the LEB; 14
(2) The PhiLSAT is an aptitude test that measures the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the
study of law; 15
(3) A qualified examinee is either a graduate of a four-year bachelor's degree; expecting to graduate
with a four-year bachelor's degree at the end of the academic year when the PhiLSAT was administered; or a
graduate from foreign higher education institutions with a degree equivalent to a four-year bachelor's degree.
There is no limit as to the number of times a qualified examinee may take the PhiLSAT; 16
(4) The LEB may designate an independent third-party testing administrator; 17
(5) The PhiLSAT shall be administered at least once a year, on or before April 16, in testing
centers; 18
(6) The testing fee shall not exceed the amount of P1,500.00 per examination; 19
(7) The cut-off or passing score shall be 55% correct answers, or such percentile score as may be
prescribed by the LEB; 20
(8) Those who passed shall be issued a Certificate of Eligibility while those who failed shall be issued
a Certificate of Grade; 21
(9) Passing the PhiLSAT is required for admission to any law school. No applicant shall be admitted
for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law course leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or
Juris Doctor unless he has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of the study; 22
(10) Honor graduates granted professional civil service eligibility who are enrolling within two years
from college graduation are exempted from taking and passing the PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to the
basic law course; 23
(11) Law schools, in the exercise of academic freedom, can prescribe additional requirements for
admission; 24
(12) Law schools shall submit to LEB reports of first year students admitted and enrolled, and their
PhiLSAT scores, as well as the subjects enrolled and the final grades received by every first year student; 25
(13) Beginning academic year 2018-2019, the general average requirement (not less than 80% or 2.5)
for admission to basic law course under Section 23 of LEBMO No. 1-2011 is removed; 26
(14) In academic year 2017-2018, the PhiLSAT passing score shall not be enforced and the law
schools shall have the discretion to admit in the basic law course, applicants who scored less than 55% in the
PhiLSAT, provided that the law dean shall submit a justification for the admission and the required
report; 27 and
(15) Law schools, in violation of LEBMO No. 7-2016, shall be administratively sanctioned as
prescribed in Section 32 28 of LEBMO No. 2-2013 29 and/or fined up to P10,000.00. 30
Effective for the academic year 2017 to 2018, no applicant to law school was allowed admission without having taken
and passed the PhiLSAT. The first PhiLSAT examination was held on April 16, 2017 in seven pilot sites: Baguio City, Metro
Manila, Legazpi City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and Cagayan de Oro. A total of 6,575 out of 8,074 examinees passed
the first-ever PhiLSAT. For the first PhiLSAT, the passing grade was adjusted by the LEB from 55% to 45% by way of
consideration.
Since the PhiLSAT was implemented for the first time and considering further that there were applicants who failed to
take the PhiLSAT because of the inclement weather last April 16, 2017, the LEB issued Memorandum Order No. 11, Series of
2017 (LEBMO No. 11-2017).
Under LEBMO No. 11-2017, those who failed to take the first PhiLSAT were allowed to be admitted to law schools for
the first semester of academic year 2017 to 2018 for justifiable or meritorious reasons and conditioned under the following terms:
2. Conditions. — x x x
a. The student shall take the next scheduled PhiLSAT;
b. If the student fails to take the next scheduled PhiLSAT for any reason, his/her conditional admission
in the law school shall be automatically revoked and barred from enrolling in the following semester;
c. If the student takes the next scheduled PhiLSAT but scores below the passing or cut-off score,
his/her conditional admission shall also be revoked and barred from enrolling in the following semester, unless
the law school expressly admits him/her in the exercise of the discretion given under Section/Paragraph 14 of
LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, subject to the requirements of the same provision;
d. The student whose conditional admission and enrol[l]ment is subsequently revoked shall not be
entitled to the reversal of the school fees assessed and/or refund of the school fees paid; and
e. The student shall execute under oath, and file with his/her application for a Permit for Conditional
Admission/Enrol[l]ment, an UNDERTAKING expressly agreeing to the foregoing conditions. 31
The conditional admission and enrollment under LEBMO No. 11-2017 and the transitory provision provided in LEBMO
No. 7-2016 were subsequently clarified by the LEB through its Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 7-
2017).
On September 24, 2017 and April 8, 2018, the second and third PhiLSATs were respectively held.
On October 26, 2017, the LEB issued a Memorandum reminding law schools, law students, and other interested persons
that the passing of the PhiLSAT is required to be eligible for admission/enrollment in the basic law course for academic year 2017
to 2018. It was also therein clarified that the discretion given to law schools to admit those who failed the PhiLSAT during the
initial year of implementation is only up to the second semester of academic year 2017-2018.
Because of the confusion as to whether conditional admission for academic year 2018 to 2019 may still be allowed, the
LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 18, Series of 2018 (LEBMC No. 18-2018). Under LEBMC No. 18-2018, it was clarified
that the conditional admission was permitted only in academic year 2017 to 2018 as part of the transition adjustments in the initial
year of the PhiLSAT implementation. As such, by virtue of LEBMC No. 18-2018, the conditional admission of students
previously allowed under LEBMO No. 11-2017 was discontinued.
Nevertheless, on July 25, 2018, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 2018 (LEBMC No. 19-2018)
allowing limited conditional admission/enrollment in the first semester of academic year 2018 to 2019 for those applicants who
have never previously taken the PhiLSAT. Those who have taken the PhiLSAT and scored below the cut-off score were
disqualified. In addition, only those law schools with a passing rate of not less than 25%, are updated in the reportorial
requirement and signified its intention to conditionally admit applicants were allowed to do so. The limited enrollment was
subject to the condition that the admitted student shall take and pass the next PhiLSAT on September 23, 2018, otherwise the
conditional enrollment shall be nullified. Non-compliance with said circular was considered a violation of the minimum standards
for the law program for which law schools may be administratively penalized.
The fourth PhiLSAT then pushed through on September 23, 2018.
The Petitions
Days before the scheduled conduct of the first-ever PhiLSAT on April 16, 2017, petitioners Oscar B. Pimentel
(Pimentel), Errol B. Comafay (Comafay), Rene B. Gorospe (Gorospe), Edwin R. Sandoval (Sandoval), Victoria B. Loanzon
(Loanzon), Elgin Michael C. Perez (Perez), Arnold E. Cacho (Cacho), Al Conrad B. Espaldon (Espaldon) and Ed Vincent S.
Albano (Albano) [as citizens, lawyers, taxpayers and law professors], with their co-petitioners Leighton R. Siazon (Siazon),
Arianne C. Artugue (Artugue), Clarabel Anne R. Lacsina (Lacsina) and Kristine Jane R. Liu (Liu) [as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers], Alyanna Mari C. Buenviaje (Buenviaje) and lana Patricia Dula T. Nicolas (Nicolas) [as citizens intending to take up
law] and Irene A. Tolentino (Tolentino) and Aurea I. Gruyal (Gruyal) [as citizens and taxpayers] filed their Petition for
Prohibition, 32 docketed as G.R. No. 230642, principally seeking that R.A. No. 7662 be declared unconstitutional and that the
creation of the LEB be invalidated together with all its issuances, most especially the PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon the rule-
making power of the Court concerning admissions to the practice of law. 33 They prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) to prevent the LEB from conducting the PhiLSAT.
Respondents-in-intervention Attys. Anthony D. Bengzon (Bengzon), Ferdinand M. Negre (Negre), Michael Z. Untalan
(Untalan), Jonathan Q. Perez (Perez), Samantha Wesley K. Rosales (Rosales), Erika M. Alfonso (Alfonso), Krys Valen O.
Martinez (Martinez), Ryan Ceazar P. Romano (Romano), and Kenneth C. Varona (Varona) [as citizens and lawyers] moved to
intervene and prayed for the dismissal of the Petition for Prohibition. 34
On February 12, 2018, petitioners-in-intervention April D. Caballero (Caballero), Jerey C. Castardo (Castardo), MC
Wellroe P. Bringas (Bringas), Rhuffy D. Federe (Federe) and Conrad Theodore A. Matutino (Matutino) [as graduates of four-year
college course and applicants as first year law students], St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., [as an educational
stock corporation] and Rodolfo C. Rapista (Rapista), Judy Marie Rapista-Tan (Rapista-Tan), Lynnart Walford A. Tan (Tan), Ian
M. Enterina (Enterina) and Neil John Villarico (Villarico) [as citizens and law professors] intervened and joined the Petition for
Prohibition of Pimentel, et al., seeking to declare R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as unconstitutional. 35
Thereafter, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 242954, was filed by petitioners Francis Jose
Lean L. Abayata (Abayata), Gretchen M. Vasquez (Vasquez), Sheenah S. Ilustrismo (Ilustrismo), Ralph Louie Salaño (Salaño),
Aireen Monica B. Guzman (Guzman) and Delfino Odias (Odias) [as law students who failed to pass the PhiLSAT], Daryl Dela
Cruz (Dela Cruz), Claire Suico (Suico), Aivie S. Pescadero (Pescadero), Niña Christine Dela Paz (Dela Paz), Shemark K.
Queniahan (Queniahan), Al Jay T. Mejos (Mejos), Rocellyn L. Daño (Daño), Michael Adolfo (Adolfo), Ronald A. Atig (Atig),
Lynette C. Lumayag (Lumayag), Mary Chris Lagera (Lagera), Timothy B. Francisco (Francisco), Sheila Marie C. Dandan
(Dandan), Madeline C. Dela Peña (Dela Peña), Darlin R. Villamor (Villamor), Lorenzana Llorico (Llorico) and Jan Ivan M.
Santamaria (Santamaria) [as current law students who failed to take the PhiLSAT] seeking to invalidate R.A. No. 7662 or, in the
alternative, to declare as unconstitutional the PhiLSAT. They also sought the issuance of a TRO to defer the holding of the
aptitude test. 36
These Petitions were later on consolidated by the Court and oral arguments thereon were held on March 5, 2019.
Temporary Restraining Order
On March 12, 2019, the Court issued a TRO 37 enjoining the LEB from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 and, thus,
allowing those who have not taken the PhiLSAT prior to the academic year 2018 to 2019, or who have taken the PhiLSAT, but
did not pass, or who are honor graduates in college with no PhiLSAT Exemption Certificate, or honor graduates with expired
PhiLSAT Exemption Certificates to conditionally enroll as incoming freshmen law students for the academic year 2019 to 2020
under the same terms as LEBMO No. 11-2017.
Subsequently, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 2019 (LEBMC No. 27-2019) stating that the
PhiLSAT scheduled on April 7, 2019 will proceed and reiterated the requirements that must be complied with for the conditional
enrollment for the academic year 2019 to 2020.
The Parties' Arguments
In G.R. No. 230642
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive to the Court's power to regulate
and supervise the legal profession pursuant to Section 5 (5), Article VIII 38 of the Constitution and that the Congress cannot
create an administrative office that exercises the Court's power over the practice of law. They also argue that R.A. No. 7662 gives
the JBC additional functions to vet nominees for the LEB in violation of Section 8 (5), Article VIII 39 of the Constitution.
In their Memorandum, petitioners also question the constitutionality of the LEB's powers under Section 7 (c) 40 and 7
(e) 41 to prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members and Section 7 (h) 42 on the LEB's power to adopt a
system of continuing legal education as being repugnant to the Court's rule-making power concerning the practice of law. They
also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education.
Petitioners-in-intervention meanwhile contend that the PhiLSAT violates the right to liberty and pursuit of happiness of
the student-applicants. They posit that the PhiLSAT violates the equal protection clause as it is an arbitrary form of classification
not based on substantial distinctions. They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the right of all citizens to quality and accessible
education, violates academic freedom, and is an unfair academic requirement. It is also their position that the PhiLSAT violates
due process as it interferes with the right of every person to select a profession or course of study. They also argue that R.A. No.
7662 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers.
In G.R. No. 242954
Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 argue that certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies either under the expanded or
traditional jurisdiction of the Court. They also invoke the doctrine of transcendental importance.
Substantively, they contend that R.A. No. 7662, specifically Section 3 (a) (2) 43 on the objective of legal education to
increase awareness among members of the legal profession, Section 7 (e) on law admission, 7 (g) 44 on law practice internship,
and 7 (h) on adopting a system of continuing legal education, and the declaration of policy on continuing legal
education 45 infringe upon the power of the Court to regulate admission to the practice of law. They profess that they are not
against the conduct of law school admission test per se, only that the LEB cannot impose the PhiLSAT as the power to do so
allegedly belongs to the Court. 46
It is also their contention that the PhiLSAT violates academic freedom as it interferes with the law school's exercise of
freedom to choose who to admit. According to them, the LEB cannot issue penal regulations, and the consequent forfeiture of
school fees and the ban on enrollment for those who failed to pass the PhiLSAT violate due process.
The Comments
Procedurally, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the LEB, argues that certiorari and prohibition are
not proper to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7662 either under the traditional or expanded concept of judicial power. For
the OSG, R.A. No. 7662 was enacted pursuant to the State's power to regulate all educational institutions, and as such, there could
be no grave abuse of discretion. It also claims that the Congress is an indispensable party to the petitions.
Substantively, the OSG contends that the Court's power to regulate admission to the practice of law does not include
regulation of legal education. It also defends Section 7 (e) on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission
as referring to admission to law schools; Section 7 (g) on the LEB's power to establish a law practice internship as pertaining to
the law school curriculum which is within the power of the LEB to regulate; and 7 (h) on the LEB's power to adopt a system of
continuing legal education as being limited to the training of lawyer-professors. 47 Anent the argument that R.A. No. 7662 gives
the JBC additional functions not assigned to it by the Court, the OSG points out that the Court had actually authorized the JBC to
process the applications for membership to the LEB making this a non-issue.
In defending the validity of the PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the argument that the PhiLSAT is the minimum standard
for entrance to law schools prescribed by the LEB pursuant to the State's power to regulate education. The OSG urges that the
PhiLSAT is no different from the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which the Court already upheld as a valid exercise
of police power in the seminal case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez. 48
It is also the position of the OSG that neither the PhiLSAT nor the provisions of R.A. No. 7662 violate academic
freedom because the standards for entrance to law school, the standards for accreditation, the prescribed qualifications of faculty
members, and the prescribed basic curricula are fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
For their part, respondents-in-intervention contend that R.A. No. 7662 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and
that the study of law is different from the practice of law.
In its Comment to the Petition-in-Intervention, the OSG dismisses as speculative the argument that the PhiLSAT is anti-
poor, and adds that the Court has no competence to rule on whether the PhiLSAT is an unfair or unreasonable requirement, it
being a question of policy.
Respondents-in-intervention, for their part, argue that the right of the citizens to accessible education means that the
State shall make quality education accessible only to those qualified enough, as determined by fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements. They dispute the claimed intrusion on academic freedom as law schools are not prevented
from selecting who to admit among applicants who have passed the PhiLSAT. They stress that the right to education is not
absolute and may be regulated by the State, citing Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas. 49
By way of Reply, petitioners-in-intervention emphasize that the doctrine in Tablarin 50 is inapplicable as medical
schools are not the same as law schools. They further aver that the decline in enrollment as a result of the implementation of the
PhiLSAT is not speculative. 51
The Issues
After a careful consideration of the issues raised by the parties in their pleadings and refined during the oral arguments,
the issues for resolution are synthesized as follows:
I. Procedural Issues:
A. Remedies of certiorari and prohibition; and
B. Requisites of judicial review and the scope of the Court's review in the instant petitions.
II. Substantive Issues:
A. Jurisdiction over legal education;
B. Supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power;
1. Reasonable supervision and regulation
2. Institutional academic freedom
3. Right to education
C. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-à-vis the Court's jurisdiction over the practice of law; and
D. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-à-vis the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education.
The Rulings of the Court
I.
Procedural Issues
A.
Remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition
The propriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition is assailed on the ground that R.A. No. 7662 is a legislative
act and not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function. In any case, respondents argue that the issues herein presented
involve purely political questions beyond the ambit of judicial review.
The Court finds that petitioners availed of the proper remedies.
The 1935 52 and 1973 53 Constitutions mention, but did not define, "judicial power." In contrast, the 1987 Constitution
lettered what judicial power is and even "expanded" its scope.
As constitutionally defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, 54 judicial power is no longer limited
to the Court's duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, or the power of
adjudication, but also includes, the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. This innovation under the 1987
Constitution later on became known as the Court's traditional jurisdiction and expanded jurisdiction, respectively. 55
The expanded scope of judicial review mentions "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
to harbinger the exercise of judicial review; while petitions for certiorari 56 and prohibition 57 speak of "lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Petitions for certiorari and prohibition as it
is understood under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are traditionally regarded as supervisory writs used as a means by superior or
appellate courts, in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction, to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their
jurisdictions. As such, writs of certiorari and prohibition correct only errors of jurisdiction of judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies. 58
However, considering the commonality of the ground of "grave abuse of discretion," a Rule 65 petition, as a procedural
vehicle to invoke the Court's expanded jurisdiction, has been allowed. 59 After all, there is grave abuse of discretion when an act
is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of
malice, ill will, or personal bias. 60 In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 61 the Court emphasized that certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues.
That it is a legislative act which is being assailed is likewise not a ground to deny the present petitions.
For one, the 1987 Constitution enumerates under Section 5 (2) (a), Article VIII, 62 the Court's irreducible powers which
expressly include the power of judicial review, or the power to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation.
For another, the Court's expanded jurisdiction, when invoked, permits a review of acts not only by a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
"Any branch or instrumentality of the Government" necessarily includes the Legislative and the Executive, even if they are not
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. 63 As such, the Court may review and/or prohibit or nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, there being no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 64
The power of judicial review over congressional action, in particular, was affirmed in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives, 65 wherein the Court held:
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives . In Tañada v.
Angara, where petitioners sought to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
Constitution, it held that the petition raised a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative
branch is alleged to have seriously infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, [this Court] declared null and void a
resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of
the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
judicial review. In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is
vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it exercised its power of judicial
review to determine which between the Electoral Commission and the National Assembly had jurisdiction over
an electoral dispute concerning members of the latter. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
This was reiterated in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, 66 as follows:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader
in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials . (Internal
citation omitted; emphasis supplied)
Consistently, in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City, 67 the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition were regarded as proper vehicles to assail the constitutionality of curfew ordinances, and in Agcaoili v. Fariñas, 68 to
question the contempt powers of the Congress in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation.
The consistency in the Court's rulings as to the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to correct, undo, or restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
legislative and the executive, propels the Court to treat the instant petitions in the same manner.
B.
Requisites for Judicial Review
The power of judicial review is tritely defined as the power to review the constitutionality of the actions of the other
branches of the government. 69 For a proper exercise of its power of review in constitutional litigation, certain requisites must be
satisfied: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 70
These requisites are effective limitations on the Court's exercise of its power of review because judicial review in
constitutional cases is quintessentially deferential, owing to the great respect that each co-equal branch of the Government affords
to the other.
Of these four requisites, the first two, being the most essential, 71 deserve an extended discussion in the instant case.
1. Actual Case or Controversy
Fundamental in the exercise of judicial power, whether under the traditional or expanded setting, is the presence of an
actual case or controversy. 72 An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights and an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The case must not be moot or academic, or based on extra-legal or other
similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
To be justiciable, the controversy must be definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests. It must be shown from the pleadings that there is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand,
and a denial thereof on the other. There must be an actual and substantial controversy and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. Further, the actual and substantial controversy must admit specific relief through a conclusive decree and must not merely
generate an advisory opinion based on hypothetical or conjectural state of facts. 73
Closely associated with the requirement of an actual or justiciable case or controversy is the ripening seeds for
adjudication. Ripeness for adjudication has a two-fold aspect: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the
hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. The first aspect requires that the issue must be purely legal
and that the regulation subject of the case is a "final agency action." The second aspect requires that the effects of the regulation
must have been felt by the challenging parties in a concrete way. 74
To stress, a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the challenged governmental act has a direct and
existing adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 75 While a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to
a constitutional interest may provide basis for a constitutional challenge, it is nevertheless still required that there are sufficient
facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues. 76
In this regard, the Court's pronouncement in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) v. Secretary of
Education 77 deserves reiteration:
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider
petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, [e]specially where, as respondents assert,
petitioners suffered no wrong — nor allege any — from the enforcement of the criticized statute.
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is
one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of human judgment, will shrink from
exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official
oath decline the responsibility. x x x
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become
dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. x x x
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to
the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger
of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has
merely a general [interest] to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive
or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or [has an] interest common to all
members of the public. x x x
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. x x x
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests
of litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. x x x
Bona fide suit. — Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and
controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of
such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed
as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as
necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. x x
x Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however
intellectually solid the problem may be. This is [e]specially true where the issues "reach constitutional
dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional
issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." x x x (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
Ultimately, whether an actual case is present or not is determinative of whether the Court's hand should be stayed when
there is no adversarial setting and when the prerogatives of the co-equal branches of the Government should instead be respected.
As ruled in Republic v. Roque: 78
A perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to
demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern
Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions
which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain
untrammelled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents' fear of prosecution was solely based on
remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to
show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the
implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent
threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory
relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not
peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. (Internal
citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Concededly, the Court had exercised the power of judicial review by the mere enactment of a law or approval of a
challenged action when such is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre: 79
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred and the
challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative
order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate
adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function."
This is a rather novel theory — that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before
they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether
the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts
implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the
legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes
the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
Said the Court:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that
the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or
interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x, it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
xxx xxx xxx
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters
that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by
any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:
x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the
duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a
statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where
the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to
declare such act unconstitutional and void.
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the
dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, 80 the Court took cognizance of the petitions despite posing a facial challenge against the
entire law as the petitions seriously alleged that fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed legislation:
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is
ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that
the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty
of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
xxx xxx xxx
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending
that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also
all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of
the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of
the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free
speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason
for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above
have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a
reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment
of the Filipino people. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied) 81
Likewise in Belgica v. Ochoa, 82 the Court held that the requirement of an actual case or controversy is satisfied by the
antagonistic positions taken by the parties:
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the
parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are
ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization — such as the
2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund — are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
1 (a). Scope of Judicial Review
To determine whether petitioners presented an actual case or controversy, or have seriously alleged that R.A. No. 7662
suffers from constitutional infirmities to trigger the Court's power of judicial review, resort must necessarily be had to the
pleadings filed.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 allege that R.A. No. 7662 and the LEB issuances relative to the admission and practice of
law encroach upon the powers of the Court. 83 It is their position that the powers given to the LEB are directly related to the
Court's powers. 84 In particular, they argue that the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education under Section 7
(h) of R.A. No. 7662 falls within the authority of the Court. 85 In their Memorandum, they additionally argue that the LEB's
powers to prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members under Section 7 (c) and 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662,
Sections 50-51 of LEBMO No. 1, and Resolution No. 2014-02 intrude into the Court's rule-making power relative to the practice
of law. 86 They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education. 87 It is
their contention that the LEB is without power to impose sanctions. 88 They also question the authority of the LEB Chairperson
and Members to act in a hold-over capacity. 89
For their part, petitioners-in-intervention allege that the PhiLSAT requirement resulted to a reduced number of law
student enrollees for St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc. and constrained said law school to admit only students
who passed the PhiLSAT which is against their policy of admitting students based on values. 90 Their co-petitioners are students
who either applied for law school, failed to pass the PhiLSAT, or were conditionally enrolled. Thus, they argue that Section 7 (e)
of R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT violate the law school's academic freedom.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 allege that they are current law students who failed to pass and/or take the PhiLSAT, and
who are therefore threatened with the revocation of their conditional enrollment and stands to be barred from enrolling. Twelve of
the 23 petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 were not allowed to enroll for failure to pass and/or take the PhiLSAT.
It is their argument that the LEB's power under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission, Section 7 (g) to establish a law practice internship, Section 7 (h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education, and
Section 3 (a) (2) on the stated objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the
needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society usurp the Court's rule-making powers concerning admission to the
practice of law. 91 In addition, they argue that the PhiLSAT issuances violate academic freedom, and that the LEB is not
authorized to revoke conditional enrollment nor is it authorized to forfeit school fees and impose a ban enrollment which are
penal sanctions violative of the due process clause. They also argue that the classification of students to those who have passed or
failed the PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to law school is repugnant to the equal protection clause.
The petitions therefore raise an actual controversy insofar as they allege that R.A. No. 7662, specifically Section 2,
paragraph 2, Section 3 (a) (2), Section 7 (c), (e), (g), and (h) of R.A. No. 7662 infringe upon the Court's power to promulgate
rules concerning the practice of law and upon institutional academic freedom and the right to quality education. Necessarily, a
review of the LEB issuances when pertinent to these assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7662 shall also be undertaken.
2. Legal Standing
Inextricably linked with the actual case or controversy requirement is that the party presenting the justiciable issue must
have the standing to mount a challenge to the governmental act.
By jurisprudence, standing requires a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the petitioner has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the violation of its rights, 92 thus:
Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." To
possess legal standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have]
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." The
requirement of direct injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions." 93 (Emphasis supplied)
The rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the over breadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third-party standing and
the doctrine of transcendental importance. 94
Petitioners-in-intervention Caballero, Castardo, Bringas, Federe and Matutino, being graduates of a four-year college
course and applicants as first year law students, as well as petitioners Abayata, Vasquez, Ilustrismo, Salaño, Guzman and Odias,
as law students who failed to pass the PhiLSAT and were denied admission to law school for the academic year 2018 to 2019, and
petitioners Dela Cruz, Suico, Pescadero, Dela Paz, Queniahan, Mejos, Daño, Adolfo, Atig, Lumayag, Lagera, Francisco, Dandan,
Dela Peña, Villamor, Llorico and Santamaria, being law students who were conditionally enrolled, possess the requisite standing
to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 and the implementing LEB issuances, as they were, in fact,
required to take the PhiLSAT, or to comply with the terms of the conditional enrollment and failing which, were denied
admission as regular students to law school.
Petitioner-in-intervention St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., likewise sufficiently alleges injury that it
has sustained in the form of reduced number of enrollees due to the PhiLSAT requirement and the curtailment of its discretion on
who to admit in its law school. Under the specific and concrete facts available in this case, these petitioners have demonstrated
that they were, or tend to be directly and substantially, injured.
Meanwhile, petitioners Pimentel, Comafay, Gorospe, Sandoval, Loanzon, Perez, Cacho, Espaldon, Albano, Siazon,
Artugue, Lacsina, Liu, Buenviaje, Nicolas, Tolentino, and Gruyal; and petitioners-in intervention Rapista, Rapista-Tan, Tan,
Enterina and Villarico commonly anchor their standing to challenge R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as citizens.
Standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance or when paramount public interest is involved. 95
Legal standing may be extended to petitioners for having raised a "constitutional issue of critical
significance." 96 Without a doubt, the delineation of the Court's rule-making power vis-à-vis the supervision and regulation of
legal education and the determination of the reach of the State's supervisory and regulatory power in the context of the guarantees
of academic freedom and the right to education are novel issues with far-reaching implications that deserve the Court's immediate
attention. In taking cognizance of the instant petitions, the Court is merely exercising its power to promulgate rules towards the
end that constitutional rights are protected and enforced. 97
Now, to the core substantive issues.
II.
Substantive Issues
A.
Jurisdiction Over Legal Education
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law necessarily includes the power to do things related to the practice of law, including the power to prescribe the requirements
for admission to the study of law. In support, they point to Sections 6 98 and 16, 99 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. They contend
that the Congress cannot create an administrative body, like the LEB, that exercises this rule-making power of the Court. They
emphasize that the LEB belongs to the Executive department, and, as such, is not linked or accountable to the Court nor placed
under the Court's regulation and supervision.
For their part, petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 maintain that the Court exercises authority over the legal profession which
includes the admission to the practice of law, to the continuing requirements for and discipline of lawyers. 100 According to
them, the rule-making power of the Court is plenary in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
They argue that the Court's power to admit members to the practice of law extends to admission to legal education because the
latter is a preparatory process to the application for admission to the legal profession, which "residual power" of the Court can be
inferred from Sections 5 101 and 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. They also emphasize that under Sections 1 102 and 2 103 of
Rule 138-A, non-lawyers are allowed to have limited practice of law and are held to answer by the Court under the same rules on
privileged communication and standard of conduct pursuant to Sections 3 104 and 4 105 of Rule 138-A. 106
Contrary to petitioner's claims, the Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education. Neither the history
of the Philippine legal education nor the Rules of Court invoked by petitioners support their argument. The supervision and
regulation of legal education is an Executive function.
1. Regulation and supervision of
legal education had been
historically and consistently
exercised by the political
departments
Legal education in the Philippines was institutionalized in 1734, with the establishment of the Faculty of Civil Law in the
University of Santo Tomas with Spanish as the medium of instruction. Its curriculum was identical to that adopted during the time
in the universities in Europe 107 and included subjects on Civil Law, Canon Law, ecclesiastical discipline and elements of
Natural Law. 108
In 1901, Act No. 74 was passed centralizing the public school system and establishing the Department of Public
Instruction headed by the General Superintendent. 109 The archipelago was then divided into school divisions and districts for
effective management of the school system. It was through Act No. 74 that a Trade School 110 and a Normal School 111 in
Manila and a School of Agriculture in Negros were established. 112
In 1908, the legislature approved Act No. 1870 which created the University of the Philippines (UP). However, English
law courses were not offered until 1910 when the Educational Department Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association
(YMCA), through the efforts of Justice George Malcolm, offered law courses in the English language. In 1911, UP adopted these
classes by formally establishing its College of Law, 113 with its first graduates being students who studied at YMCA. 114 The
curriculum adopted by the UP College of Law became the model of the legal education curriculum of the other law schools in the
country. 115
Private schools were formally regulated in 1917 with the passage of Act No. 2706 116 which made obligatory the
recognition and inspection of private schools and colleges by the Secretary of Public Instruction, so as to maintain a standard of
efficiency in all private schools and colleges 117 in the country. As such, the Secretary of Public Instruction was authorized to
inspect schools and colleges to determine efficiency of instruction and to make necessary regulations. Likewise, under Act No.
2706, the Secretary of Public Instruction was specifically authorized to prepare and publish, from time to time, in pamphlet form,
the minimum standards required of law schools and other schools giving instruction of a technical or professional character. 118
In 1924, a survey of the Philippine education and of all educational institutions, facilities and agencies was conducted
through Act No. 3162, which created the Board of Educational Survey. Among the factual findings of the survey was that schools
at that time were allowed to operate with almost no supervision at all. This led to the conclusion that a great majority of schools
from primary grade to the university are money-making devices of persons who organize and administer them. Thus, it was
recommended that some board of control be organized under legislative control to supervise their administration. 119 It was
further recommended that legislation be enacted to prohibit the opening of any school without the permission of the Secretary of
Public Instruction. The grant of the permission was, in turn, predicated upon a showing that the school is compliant with the
proper standards as to the physical structure, library and laboratory facilities, ratio of student to teacher and the qualifications of
the teachers. 120
Consistent with these statutory precursors, the 1935 Constitution expressed in no uncertain terms that "[a]ll educational
institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State." 121
This was followed by several other statutes such as the Commonwealth Act No. 578 122 which vests upon teachers,
professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly-recognized private schools, colleges and universities the
status of "persons in authority" and Republic Act No. 139 123 which created the Board of Textbooks, mandating all public
schools to use only the books approved by the Board and allowing all private schools to use textbooks of their choice, provided it
is not against the law or public policy or offensive to dignity. 124
In 1947, the Department of Instruction was changed to the Department of Education. 125 During this period, the
regulation and supervision of public and private schools belonged to the Bureau of Public and Private Schools. The regulation of
law schools in particular was undertaken by the Bureau of Private Schools through a special consultant who acted as a supervisor
of the law schools and as a national coordinator of the law deans. 126
The Department of Education, through its Bureau of Private Schools, issued a Manual of Instructions for Private Schools
which contained the rules and regulations pertaining to the qualifications of the faculty and deans, faculty load and library
holdings of private learning institutions. 127 Meantime, a Board of National Education was created 128 with the task of
formulating, implementing and enforcing general educational policies and coordinating the offerings and functions of all
educational institutions. The Board of National Education was later renamed as the National Board of Education. 129 In 1972, the
Department of Education became the Department of Education and Culture, 130 and was later on renamed as the Ministry of
Education and Culture in 1978. 131
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution remained consistent in mandating that all educational institutions shall be under the
supervision of and subject to regulation by the State. 132
With the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang 232 133 (B.P. Blg. 232) or the Education Act of 1982, the regulatory rules
on both formal and non-formal systems in public and private schools in all levels of the entire educational system were codified.
The National Board of Education was abolished, and instead, a Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) was organized
to supervise and regulate educational institutions. Part and parcel of the MECS' authority to supervise and regulate educational
institutions is its authority to recognize or accredit educational institutions of all levels. 134
Accordingly, the MECS was given the authority over public and private institutions of higher education, as well as
degree-granting programs, in all post-secondary public and private educational institutions. 135 In particular, a Board of Higher
Education 136 was established as an advisory body to the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports with the functions of making
policy recommendations on the planning and management of the integrated system of higher education and recommending steps
to improve the governance of the higher education system. Apart from the Board of Higher Education, a Bureau of Higher
Education was also established to formulate and evaluate programs and educational standards for higher education 137 and to
assist the Board of Higher Education. Law schools were placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Higher Education. 138
The MECS later became the DECS in 1987 under Executive Order No. 117 139 (E.O. No. 117). Nevertheless, the power
of the MECS to supervise all educational institutions remained unchanged. 140
The Administrative Code 141 also states that it shall be the State that shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all; and that the DECS shall
be primarily responsible for the formulation, planning, implementation, and coordination of the policies, plans, programs and
projects in the areas of formal and non-formal education. The Administrative Code also empowered the Board of Higher
Education to create technical panels of experts in the various disciplines including law, to undertake curricula
development. 142 As will be discussed hereunder, the 1987 Constitution crystallized the power of the State to supervise and
regulate all educational institutions. 143
2. DECS Order No. 27-1989 was
the precursor of R.A. No. 7662
Pursuant to its mandate under B.P. Blg. 232, the DECS promulgated DECS Order No. 27, Series of 1989 (DECS Order
No. 27-1989), 144 in close coordination with the Philippine Association of Law Schools, the Philippine Association of Law
Professors and the Bureau of Higher Education. DECS Order No. 27-1989 specifically outlined the policies and standards for
legal education, and superseded all existing policies and standards related to legal education. These policies were made applicable
beginning school year 1989 to 1990.
"Legal education" was defined in DECS Order No. 27-1989 as an educational program including a clinical program
appropriate and essential in the understanding and application of law and the administration of justice. It is professional education
after completion of a required pre-legal education at the college level. For state colleges and universities, the operation of their
law schools was to depend on their respective charters, and for private colleges and universities, by the rules and regulations
issued by the DECS. Nevertheless, it was made clear under DECS Order No. 27-1989 that the administration of a law school shall
be governed primarily by the law school's own policies and the provisions thereof apply only suppletorily. 145
Likewise, in generally permissive terms, DECS Order No. 27-1989 prescribed the preferred qualifications and functions
of a law dean, as well as the preferred qualifications, conditions of employment and teaching load of law faculty members. It also
prescribed the general inclusions to the law curriculum, but gave the law schools the prerogative to design its own curriculum.
The DECS also drew a model law curriculum, thus, revising the 122-unit curriculum prescribed in 1946 by the Office of Private
Education, as well as the 134-unit curriculum prescribed in 1963. The law schools were also given the option to maintain a legal
aid clinic as part of its law curriculum. It also prescribed the need for law schools to have relevant library resources. Applicants
for a law course are required to comply with the specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the
Court.
Such was the state of the regulation of legal education until the enactment of R.A. No. 7662 in 1993. In 1994, R.A. No.
7722 146 was passed creating the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) tasked to supervise tertiary degree programs. Except
for the regulation and supervision of law schools which was to be undertaken by the LEB under R.A. No. 7662, the structure of
DECS as embodied in E.O. No. 117 remained practically unchanged.
Due to the fact that R.A. No. 7662 was yet to be implemented with the organization of the LEB, the CHED, meanwhile,
assumed the function of supervising and regulating law schools. For this purpose, the CHED constituted a Technical Panel for
Legal Education which came up with a Revised Policies and Standards for Legal Education, which, however, was unpublished.
3. Legal education is a mere
composite of the educational
system
As recounted, the historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the consistent exercise by the
political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels and areas of education, including legal education.
Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique because it is a
specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is not reason in itself to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the
regulatory and supervisory powers of the political branches.
Notwithstanding, petitioners maintain that legal education, owing to its specialized "legal" nature and being preparatory
to the practice of law, should fall within the regulation and supervision of the Court itself. Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 went as
far as professing that they are not against the creation of an administrative body that will supervise and regulate law schools, only
that such body should be placed under the Court's supervision and control.
Two principal reasons militate against such proposition:
First, it assumes that the Court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal education as a necessary
consequence of its power to regulate the admission to the practice of law. This assumption, apart from being manifestly contrary
to the above-recounted history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal anchorage.
Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon itself a power that is not
constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to void R.A. No. 7662
and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners
suggest, is to demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism.
4. Court's exclusive rule-making
power covers the practice of
law and not the study of law
The Constitution lays down the powers which the Court can exercise. Among these is the power to promulgate rules
concerning admission to the practice of law.
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court had been uniformly granted under the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987
Constitutions. The complexion of the rule-making power, however, changes with the promulgation of these organic laws.
Under the 1935 Constitution, existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure were repealed and were instead
converted as the Rules of Court which the Court can alter and modify. The Congress, on the other hand, was given the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules on pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law promulgated by
the Court. 147
This power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and admission to the practice of law is in
fact zealously guarded by the Court.
Thus, in Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, 148 the Court asserted its "exclusive" and constitutional power with
respect to the admission to the practice of law and when the act falls within the term "practice of law," the Rules of Court
govern. 149
In In Re: Petition of A.E. Garcia, 150 the Court withheld from the executive the power to modify the laws and
regulations governing admission to the practice of law as the prerogative to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law
belongs to the Court and the power to repeal, alter, or supplement such rules is reserved only to the Congress.
Even then, the character of the power of the Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law under the 1935 Constitution was held not to be absolute and that
any law passed by the Congress on the matter is merely permissive, being that the power concerning admission to the practice of
law is primarily a judicial function.
The 1973 Constitution is no less certain in reiterating the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts and the admission to the practice of law. As observed in Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 151 the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving it the additional power to
promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 152
The ultimate power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure, the admission to the practice of law, and
the integration of the Bar remains to be with the Court under the 1973 Constitution even when the power of the Batasang
Pambansa to pass laws of permissive and corrective character repealing, altering, or supplementing such rules was retained.
The 1987 Constitution departed from the 1935 and the 1973 organic laws in the sense that it took away from the
Congress the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to
the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar and therefore vests exclusively and beyond doubt, the power to promulgate such
rules to the Court, thereby supporting a "stronger and more independent judiciary." 153
While the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions "textualized a power-sharing scheme" between the legislature and the Court in
the enactment of judicial rules, 154 the 1987 Constitution "textually altered the power-sharing scheme" by deleting the Congress'
subsidiary and corrective power. 155
Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as vesting upon the Court the
authority to define the practice of law, 156 to determine who will be admitted to the practice of law, 157 to hold in contempt any
person found to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law, 158 and to exercise corollary disciplinary authority over members of
the Bar. 159
The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of law is a judicial function because it
requires "(1) previously established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles." 160
Petitioners readily acknowledge that legal education or the study of law is not the practice of law, the former being
merely preparatory to the latter. In fact, the practice of law has a settled jurisprudential meaning:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns
the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involved
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. 161 (Internal citations omitted)
The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study of law.
5. The Court exercises judicial
power only
Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions." The Court
exercises judicial power only and should not assume any duty alien to its judicial functions, the basic postulate being the
separation of powers. As early as Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., 162 the Court already stressed:
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as
the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should
not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. (Emphases supplied)
Neither may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as an exercise of the Court's "residual" power.
A power is residual if it does not belong to either of the two co-equal branches and which the remaining branch can, thus, exercise
consistent with its functions. Regulation and supervision of legal education is primarily exercised by the Legislative and
implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary.
It is with studied restraint that the Court abstains from exercising a power that is not strictly judicial, or that which is not
expressly granted to it by the Constitution. 163 This judicial abstention is neither avoidance nor dereliction — there is simply no
basis for the Court to supervise and regulate legal education.
Court supervision over legal education is nevertheless urged 164 to the same extent as the Court administers, supervises
and controls the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA). 165 The parallelism is mislaid because the PHILJA is intended for
judicial education. 166 It particularly serves as the "training school for justices, judges, court personnel, lawyers and aspirants to
judicial posts." 167 Court supervision over judicial education is but consistent with the Court's power of supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof. 168
Still, petitioners insist that the Court actually regulated legal education through Sections 5, 6, and 16 of Rule 138 and
Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Rule 138-A of the 1997 Rules of Court. On the contrary, the Rules of Court do not intend nor provide
for direct and actual Court regulation over legal education. At most, the Rules of Court are reflective of the inevitable relationship
between legal education and the admissions to the bar.
6. The Rules of Court do not
support the argument that the
Court directly and actually
regulates legal education
While the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law exists under the 1935
Constitution and reiterated under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the Court has not promulgated any rule that directly and
actually regulates legal education.
Instead, the 1964 Rules of Court concerned only the practice of law, admission to the bar, admission to the bar
examination, bar examinations, and the duties, rights and conduct of attorneys. The 1997 Rules of Court is no different as it
contained only the rules on attorneys and admission to the bar under Rule 138, the law student practice rule under Rule 138-A, the
integrated bar in Rule 139-A and disbarment and discipline of attorneys in Rule 139-B. 169
In the exercise of its power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Court has prescribed
the subjects covered by, as well as the qualifications of candidates to the bar examinations. Only those bar examination candidates
who are found to have obtained a passing grade are admitted to the bar and licensed to practice law. 170 The regulation of the
admission to the practice of law goes hand in hand with the commitment of the Court and the members of the Philippine Bar to
maintain a high standard for the legal profession. To ensure that the legal profession is maintained at a high standard, only those
who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set
by the Court by passing the bar examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner are admitted to the practice of
law. 171
Thus, under the 1997 Rules of Court, admission to the bar requires: (1) furnishing satisfactory proof of educational,
moral, and other qualifications; (2) passing the bar examinations; 172 and (3) taking the lawyer's oath, 173 signing the roll of
attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court a certificate of the license to practice. 174 An applicant for admission to the bar
must have these qualifications: (1) must be a citizen of the Philippines; (2) must at least be 21 years of age; (3) must be of good
moral character; (4) must be a resident of the Philippines; (5) must produce satisfactory evidence of good moral character; and (6)
no charges against the applicant, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 175 It
is beyond argument that these are the requisites and qualifications for admission to the practice of law and not for admission to
the study of law.
In turn, to be admitted to the bar examinations, an applicant must first meet the core academic qualifications prescribed
under the Rules of Court.
6 (a). Sections 5, 6, and 16, Rule 138
Section 5 provides that the applicant should have studied law for four years and have successfully completed all the
prescribed courses. This section was amended by Bar Matter No. 1153, 176 to require applicants to "successfully [complete] all
the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent, in a law school or university officially recognized by
the Philippine Government, or by the proper authority in foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted." Bar Matter No.
1153 further provides that a Filipino citizen who is a graduate of a foreign law school shall be allowed to take the bar
examinations only upon the submission to the Court of the required certifications.
In addition to the core courses of civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international
law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation, and legal ethics, Section 5 was further amended
by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC or the Revised Law Student Practice Rule dated June 25, 2019 to include Clinical Legal Education as a
core course that must be completed by an applicant to the bar examinations.
Notably, Section 5, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is not directed to law schools, but to those who would
like to take the bar examinations and enumerates the academic competencies required of them. The Court does not impose upon
law schools what courses to teach, or the degree to grant, but prescribes only the core academic courses which it finds essential
for an applicant to be admitted to the bar. Law schools enjoy the autonomy to teach or not to teach these courses. In fact, the
Court even extends recognition to a degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent obtained abroad or that granted by a foreign law
school for purposes of qualifying to take the Philippine Bar Examinations, subject only to the submission of the required
certifications. Section 5 could not therefore be interpreted as an exercise of the Court's regulatory or supervisory power over legal
education since, for obvious reasons, its reach could not have possibly be extended to legal education in foreign jurisdictions.
In similar fashion, Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an applicant to the bar examinations must have
completed a four-year high school course and a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. Again, this requirement is imposed upon the
applicant to the bar examinations and not to law schools. These requirements are merely consistent with the nature of a law
degree granted in the Philippines which is a professional, as well as a post-baccalaureate degree.
It is a reality that the Rules of Court, in prescribing the qualifications in order to take the bar examinations, had placed a
considerable constraint on the courses offered by law schools. Adjustments in the curriculum, for instance, is a compromise which
law schools apparently are willing to take in order to elevate its chances of graduating future bar examinees. It is in this regard
that the relationship between legal education and admissions to the bar becomes unmistakable. This, however, does not mean that
the Court has or exercises jurisdiction over legal education. Compliance by law schools with the prescribed core courses is but a
recognition of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction over admissions to the practice of law — that no person shall be allowed to take
the bar examinations and thereafter, be admitted to the Philippine Bar without having taken and completed the required core
courses.
Section 16, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that those who fail the bar examinations for three
or more times must take a refresher course. Similarly, this is a requirement imposed upon the applicant. The Court does not
impose that a law school should absolutely include in its curriculum a refresher course.
6 (b). Revised Law Student Practice Rule
Neither does Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC on law student practice manifest
the Court's exercise of supervision or regulation over legal education. The three-fold rationale of the law student practice rule is as
follows:
1. [T]o ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or inexperience of law
students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully equipped
to act [as] counsels on their own;
2. [T]o provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect itself from any
potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law students; and
3. [T]o ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular
profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law. 177
Consistently, the Revised Law Student Practice Rule is primordially intended to ensure access to justice of the
marginalized sectors and to regulate the law student practitioner's limited practice of law pursuant to the Court's power to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student practitioner, what the Court regulates and
supervises is not legal education, but the appearance and conduct of a law student before any trial court, tribunal, board, or
officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic — an activity rightfully falling under the definition of practice of law.
Inasmuch as the law student is permitted to act for the legal clinic and thereby to practice law, it is but proper that the Court
exercise regulation and supervision over the law student practitioner. Necessarily, the Court has the power to allow their
appearance and plead their case, and thereafter, to regulate their actions.
In all, the Rules of Court do not support petitioners' argument that the Court regulates and supervises legal education. To
reiterate, the Rules of Court are directed not towards legal education or law schools, but towards applicants for admission to the
bar and applicants for admission to the bar examinations — consistent with the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning
admission to the practice of law, the same being fundamentally a judicial function.
Having, thus, established that the regulation and supervision of legal education do not fall within the competence of the
Court and is, instead, a power exercised by the political departments, the Court now proceeds to determine the extent of such
police power in relation to legal education.
B.
Reasonable Supervision and Regulation of Legal
Education as an Exercise of Police Power
The term police power was first used 178 in jurisprudence in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden 179 where the U.S. Supreme
Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, held that the regulation of navigation by steamboat operators for purpose of interstate
commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress, thus, negating state laws interfering with the exercise of the
power. Likewise often cited is Commonwealth v. Alger 180 which defined police power as "the power vested in legislature by the
[C]onstitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the [C]onstitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth,
and of the subjects of the same."
Closer to home, early Philippine jurisprudence pertain to police power as the power to promote the general welfare and
public interest; 181 to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as may promote public health, public morals, public
safety and the general welfare of each inhabitant; 182 to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state and to
establish for the intercourse of [citizens] those rules of good manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of
rights. 183
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel [Operators] Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 184 the nature and scope of
police power was reaffirmed as embracing the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. It is negatively defined as the authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare 185 and the State's inherent power to prohibit all that is
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society, 186 and flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex. 187 It
is described as the most essential, insistent and illimitable 188 of the powers of the State. It is co-existent with the concept of the
State and is the very foundation and one of its cornerstones, 189 and therefore even precedes the written Constitution.
1. Enactment of education laws
is an exercise of police power
The State has a "high responsibility for [the] education of its citizens" 190 and has an interest in prescribing regulations
to promote the education, and consequently, the general welfare of the people. 191 The regulation or administration of
educational institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public interest. 192 Thus, the enactment of education
laws, implementing rules and regulations and issuances of government agencies is an exercise of the State's police power. 193
As a professional educational program, legal education properly falls within the supervisory and regulatory competency
of the State. The legislative history of the Philippine legal educational system earlier recounted evinces that the State, through
statutes enacted by the Congress and administrative regulations issued by the Executive, consistently exercises police power over
legal education.
The exercise of such police power, however, is not absolute.
2. Supervisory and regulatory
exercise, not control
The 1935 194 and 1973 195 Constitutions plainly provide that all educational institutions shall be under the supervision
of and subject to regulation by the State. These reflect in express terms the police power already inherently possessed by the State.
Making express an already inherent power is not a superfluous exercise, but is rather consequential in case of conflict between
express powers. As elucidated in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities: 196
In this connection we do not share the belief that [now Article XIV, Section 4(1)] has added new power to what
the State inherently possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power is necessarily more extensive
than a mere implied power. For instance, if there is conflict between an express individual right and the express
power to control private education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the former — conflict
of two express powers. But if the power to control education is merely implied from the police power, it is
feasible to uphold the express individual right[.] x x x
The 1987 Constitution under Section 4 (1), Article XIV, even when expressly recognizing the complementary roles
played by the public and private schools in education, reiterated that these educational institutions are subject to State supervision
and regulation, thus:
SEC. 4 (1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the
educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.
(Emphasis supplied)
As much as possible, the words of the Constitution are understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. 197
As worded, the Constitution recognizes that the role of public and private schools in education is complementary in
relation to each other, and primordial in relation to the State as the latter is only empowered to supervise and regulate. The
exercise of police power in relation to education must be compliant with the normative content of Section 4 (1), Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution. 198 The exercise of police power over education must merely be supervisory and regulatory.
The State's supervisory and regulatory power is an auxiliary power in relation to educational institutions, be it a basic,
secondary or higher education. This must necessarily be so since the right and duty to educate, being part and parcel of youth-
rearing, do not inure to the State at the first instance. Rather, it belongs essentially and naturally to the parents, 199 which right
and duty they surrender by delegation to the educational institutions. As held in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan
(SPARK) v. Quezon City, 200 the right and duty of parents to rear their children being a natural and primary right connotes the
parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children. The responsibility to educate lies with the parents and
guardians as an inherent right, 201 over which the State assumes a supportive role. 202 Withholding from the State the
unqualified power to control education also serves a practical purpose — it allows for a degree of flexibility and diversity
essential to the very reason of education to rear socially responsible and morally upright youth and to enable them, also, to come
in contact with challenging ideas.
In this sense, when the Constitution gives the State supervisory power, it is understood that what it enjoys is a supportive
power, that is, the power of oversight 203 over all educational institutions. It includes the authority to check, but not to interfere.
In addition to supervision, educational institutions are likewise made subject to State regulation. Dispensing a regulatory
function means imposing requirements, setting conditions, prescribing restrictions, and ensuring compliance. In this regard, the
political departments are vested with ample authority to set minimum standards to be met by all educational institutions. 204
Starkly withheld from the State is the power to control educational institutions. Consequently, in no way should
supervision and regulation be equated to State control. It is interesting to note that even when a suggestion had been made during
the drafting of the 1935 Constitution that educational institutions should be made "subject to the laws of the State," the proponent
of the amendment had no totalitarian intentions, 205 and the proposal was not meant to curtail the liberty of teaching, 206 thus:
I think it only insures the efficient functioning of educational work and does not limit liberty of
administrators of schools. The gentleman will notice that my amendment does not tend to curtail which he used
in asking the question [sic]. I want the power of the State to be supervisory as supervision in educational
parlance should be of the constructive type in the matter of help rather than obstruction. 207 (Emphasis
supplied)
3. Reasonable exercise
To be valid, the supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power must be reasonable and not
repugnant to the Constitution. 208
As held in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., 209 the exercise of police power, in order to be valid, must be compliant
with substantive due process:
[T]he State, x x x may be considered as having properly exercised [its] police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise[;] and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method. (Emphases supplied)
In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 210 the Court held that:
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its
awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it
defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. (Emphasis supplied)
Obviating any inference that the power to regulate means the power to control, the 1987 Constitution added the word
"reasonable" before the phrase supervision and regulation.
The import of the word "reasonable" was elaborated in Council of Teachers, 211 as follows:
x x x Section 4(1) was a provision added by the Framers to crystallize the State's recognition of the
importance of the role that the private sector plays in the quality of the Philippine education system. Despite this
recognition, the Framers added the second portion of Section 4[1] to emphasize that the State, in the exercise of
its police power, still possesses the power of supervision over private schools. The Framers were explicit,
however, that this supervision refers to external governance, as opposed to internal governance which was
reserved to the respective school boards, thus:
Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the addition of the
word "reasonable" before the phrase "supervision and regulation"; two, the addition of the
word "quality" before the word "education"; three, the change of the wordings in the 1973
Constitution referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be relevant to the goals
of national development, to the present expression of "relevant to the needs of the people and
society"; and four, the explanation of the meaning of the expression "integrated system of
education" by defining the same as the recognition and strengthening of the complementary
roles of public and private educational institutions as separate but integral parts of the total
Philippine educational system.
When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external
governance of educational institutions, particularly private educational institutions as
distinguished from the internal governance by their respective boards of directors or trustees
and their administrative officials. Even without a provision on external governance, the State
would still have the inherent right to regulate educational institutions through the exercise of
its police power. We have thought it advisable to restate the supervisory and regulatory
functions of the State provided in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with the addition of the
word "reasonable." We found it necessary to add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter
dictum of our Supreme Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of Colleges
and Universities vs. The Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that
case, the court said, and I quote:
It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the
Constitution provides for control of education by the State.
The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to
regulate means power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education was
intended by organic law.
The addition, therefore, of the word 'reasonable' is meant to underscore the
sense of the committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State supervision and
regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer only to the power of the State
to provide regulations and to see to it that these regulations are duly followed and
implemented. It does not include the right to manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit.
Therefore, it does not include the right to dominate. (Emphases in the original; underscoring
supplied)
The addition of the word "reasonable" did not change the texture of police power that the State exercises over education.
It merely emphasized that State supervision and regulation of legal education cannot amount to control.
4. Academic freedom
Fundamental in constitutional construction is that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, and that all provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the purposes of the
Constitution. 212
Accordingly, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is not a stand-alone provision, but must be read in
conjunction with the other Constitutional provisions relating to education which include, in particular, the clause on academic
freedom.
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar provision was found in the 1973 Constitution providing
that: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." 213 Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions provide for a
broader scope of academic freedom compared to the 1935 Constitution which limits the guarantee of academic freedom only to
universities of higher learning established by the State. 214
In fact, academic freedom is not a novel concept. This can be traced to the freedom of intellectual inquiry championed by
Socrates, lost and replaced by thought control during the time of Inquisition, until the movement back to intellectual liberty
beginning the 16th century, most particularly flourishing in German universities. 215
Academic freedom has traditionally been associated as a narrow aspect of the broader area of freedom of thought,
speech, expression and the press. It has been identified with the individual autonomy of educators to "investigate, pursue, [and]
discuss free from internal and external interference or pressure." 216 Thus, academic freedom of faculty members, professors,
researchers, or administrators is defended based on the freedom of speech and press. 217
Academic freedom is enjoyed not only by members of the faculty, but also by the students themselves, as affirmed
in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong: 218
x x x. After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none too different
from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states:
"Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to
whether and what aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna
explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom,
especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic
freedom."
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence
'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom
shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes x x x" Gascon
finished off the broken thought, — "the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."
Jurisprudence has so far understood academic freedom of the students as the latter's right to enjoy in school the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. For instance, in Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines 219 and in Non v. Dames
II, 220 it was held that academic standards cannot be used to discriminate against students who exercise their rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech, in Malabanan v. Ramento, 221 it was ruled that the punishment must be commensurate with the
offense, and in Guzman v. National University, 222 which affirmed the student's right to due process.
Apart from the academic freedom of teachers and students, the academic freedom of the institution itself is recognized
and constitutionally guaranteed.
The landmark case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology 223 elucidates how
academic freedom is enjoyed by institutions of higher learning:
[I]t is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It
would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly
extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner
or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former President Vicente G.
Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it
"definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from the
academic freedom of a university professor." He cited the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the
University of Dijon, France, President of the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of European
universities: "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of
the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the
freedom of the individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily
connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore, between the
autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university teacher." Also:
"To clarify further the distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he
says: "The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher — recognized and
effectively guaranteed by society — to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic
work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as
important, in considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and through
which they disseminate their learning. (Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Garcia also enumerated the internal conditions for institutional academic freedom, that is, the academic staff should
have de facto control over: (a) the admission and examination of students; (b) the curricula for courses of study; (c) the
appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (d) the allocation of income among the different categories of
expenditure. 224
Reference was also made to the influential language of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 225 describing it as the "business of the university" to provide a conducive atmosphere for speculation,
experimentation, and creation where the four essential freedoms of the university prevail: the right of the university to determine
for itself on academic grounds (a) who may teach; (b) what may be taught; (c) how it shall be taught; and (d) who may be
admitted to study.
4 (a). State's supervisory and
regulatory power over legal
education in relation to
academic freedom
The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught and who to admit, being part of their academic freedom. The State, in the exercise of its reasonable
supervision and regulation over education, can only impose minimum regulations.
At its most elementary, the power to supervise and regulate shall not be construed as stifling academic freedom in
institutions of higher learning. This must necessarily be so since institutions of higher learning are not mere walls within which to
teach; rather, it is a place where research, experiment, critical thinking, and exchanges are secured. Any form of State control,
even at its most benign and disguised as regulatory, cannot therefore derogate the academic freedom guaranteed to higher
educational institutions. In fact, this non-intrusive relation between the State and higher educational institutions is maintained
even when the Constitution itself prescribes certain educational "thrusts" or directions. 226
This attitude of non-interference is not lost in jurisprudence. To cite an example, due regard for institutional academic
freedom versus State interference was recognized in Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 227 the commendable purpose of the
Philippine Regulation Commission of ensuring the integrity of the examination notwithstanding:
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the
schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and
centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full-
[f]ledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be
inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from
helping out their students. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, 228 the Court upheld the university's academic
freedom to choose who should teach and held that the Civil Service Commission had no authority to dictate to the university the
outright dismissal of its personnel. Nothing short of marked arbitrariness, 229 or grave abuse of discretion 230 on the part of the
schools, or overriding public welfare 231 can therefore justify State interference with the academic judgment of higher
educational institutions. As held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, 232 "[a]s corporate entities, educational
institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure."
5. Right to education
Apart from the perspective of academic freedom, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is also to be viewed
together with the right to education. The 1987 Constitution speaks quite elaborately on the right to education. Section 1, Article
XIV provides:
SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels
and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
The normative elements of the general right to education under Section 1, Article XIV, are (1) to protect and promote
quality education; and (2) to take appropriate steps towards making such quality education accessible.
"Quality" education is statutorily defined as the appropriateness, relevance and excellence of the education given to meet
the needs and aspirations of the individual and society. 233
In order to protect and promote quality education, the political departments are vested with the ample authority to set
minimum standards to be met by all educational institutions. This authority should be exercised within the parameters of
reasonable supervision and regulation. As elucidated in Council of Teachers: 234
While the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality education, the determination of what
constitutes quality education is best left with the political departments who have the necessary
knowledge, expertise, and resources to determine the same. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission again are very instructive:
Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before "education"
to send appropriate signals to the government that, in the exercise of its supervisory and
regulatory powers, it should first set satisfactory minimum requirements in all areas:
curriculum, faculty, internal administration, library, laboratory class and other
facilities, et cetera, and it should see to it that satisfactory minimum requirements are
met by all educational institutions, both public and private.
When we speak of quality education we have in mind such matters, among
others, as curriculum development, development of learning resources and instructional
materials, upgrading of library and laboratory facilities, innovations in educational
technology and teaching methodologies, improvement of research quality, and others.
Here and in many other provisions on education, the principal focus of attention and concern
is the students. I would like to say that in my view there is a slogan when we speak of quality
of education that I feel we should be aware of, which is, "Better than ever is not enough." In
other words, even if the quality of education is good now, we should attempt to keep on
improving it. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, "accessible" education means equal opportunities to education regardless of social and economic
differences. The phrase "shall take appropriate steps" signifies that the State may adopt varied approaches in the delivery of
education that are relevant and responsive to the needs of the people and the society. This is why, towards this end, the State shall:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the
needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without
limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all
children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other
incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to
the underprivileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-learning, independent,
and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency,
and other skills. 235 (Emphases supplied)
The deliberations of the framers in this regard are instructive:
MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize is
that education should be equally accessible to all regardless of social and economic differences. So we go
into the issue of providing opportunities to such an education, recognizing that there are limitations imposed
on those who come from the poorer social classes because of their inability to continue education. 236 x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
And further, as follows:
This is why when we speak of education as a right, it means very clearly that education should be
accessible to all, regardless of social and economic differences, meaning, educational opportunities should
be provided through a system of free education, at least, up to the secondary level. And recognizing the
limits of our financial resources, tertiary education should still be afforded and provided availability to
those who are poor and deserving. That is why when we say that education is a right, it imposes a correlative
duty on the part of the State to provide it to the citizens. Making it a right shows that education is recognized as
an important function of the State. Education is not merely a social service to be provided by the State. The
proposed provision recognizes that a right to education is a right to acquire a decent standard of living, and that,
therefore, the State cannot deprive anyone of this right in the same manner that the right to life, the right to
liberty and property cannot be taken away without due process of law. 237 (Emphasis supplied)
The element of accessibility under the Constitution, thus, pertains to both the elimination of discrimination especially
against disadvantaged groups and to the financial duty of the State for, after all, the right to education is part and parcel of social
justice. The objective is to make quality education accessible by appropriate means.
Apart from the Constitution, the right to education is also recognized in international human rights law under various
instruments to which the Philippines is a state signatory and to which it is concomitantly bound.
For instance, Article 13 (2) 238 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
recognizes the right to receive an education with the following interrelated and essential features: (a) availability; (b) accessibility;
(c) acceptability; and (d) adaptability. 239
In particular, accessibility is understood as giving everyone, without discrimination, access to educational institutions
and programs. Accessibility has three overlapping dimensions:
(1) Non-discrimination — education must be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable groups, in law and
fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds x x x;
(2) Physical accessibility — education has to be within safe physical reach, either by attendance at some
reasonably convenient geographic location ([e.g.] a neighborhood school) or [via] modern technology
([e.g.] access to a "distance learning" programme); [and]
(3) Economic accessibility — education has to be affordable to all. This dimension of accessibility is subject to
the differential wording of [A]rticle 13(2) in relation to primary, secondary and higher education:
whereas primary education shall be available "free to all," States parties are required to progressively
introduce free secondary and higher education[.] 240
Pertinent to higher education, the elements of quality and accessibility should also be present as the Constitution
provides that these elements should be protected and promoted in all educational institutions.
Nevertheless, the right to receive higher education is not absolute.
5 (a). Right to education is subject to
fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic
requirements
Article 26 (1) 241 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[t]echnical and professional education
shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit[,]" while the
ICESCR provides that "[h]igher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate
means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education[.]" 242 Thus, higher education is not to be generally
available, but accessible only on the basis of capacity. 243 The capacity of individuals should be assessed by reference to all their
relevant expertise and experience. 244
The right to receive higher education must further be read in conjunction with the right of every citizen to select a
profession or course of study guaranteed under the Constitution. In this regard, the provisions of the 1987 Constitution under
Section 5 (3), Article XIV are more exacting:
SEC. 5. x x x. —
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements.
There is uniformity in jurisprudence holding that the authority to set the admission and academic requirements used to
assess the merit and capacity of the individual to be admitted and retained in higher educational institutions lie with the
institutions themselves in the exercise of their academic freedom.
In Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, 245 the Court ruled:
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition
that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a
privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students
have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission,
discipline and promotion of students. This right x x x extends as well to parents x x x as parents are under a
social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the
schools."
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful
management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step further, the
establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline,
may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as
collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their
own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have
a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. (Citation in the
original omitted; emphases supplied)
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, 246 the Court similarly held:
xxx xxx xxx
2. What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social, economic, and cultural
rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and high school grades but also on the college level.
The constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in
areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education" up to the high school
level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and universities. It is only at the most a
reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a duty to be obligatory in the case of students in the colleges
and universities. As far as the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right
because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
"Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental
stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."
3. It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social economic, and cultural
rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used
being "generally available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the
basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned
petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency.
4. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic
standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of
students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to
discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal
protection clause being disregarded. (Emphases supplied)
Likewise, in Calawag: 247
Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, we held that
the right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen
has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements." The thesis requirement and the compliance with the procedures leading to it, are
part of the reasonable academic requirements a person desiring to complete a course of study would have
to comply with. (Citation in the original omitted; emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the framers on the qualifications to the right to education are also illuminating:
MR. NOLLEDO:
Thank you, Madam President. Before I ask questions directed to the chairman and members of the
committee, I would like to warmly congratulate them for a job well-done. The committee report to my
mind, Madam President, is excellent and I hope it will not, in the course of amendments, suffer from
adulteration. With respect to page 1, lines 12-13: "Education is the right of every citizen of the
Philippines," I agree with this statement, but when we talk of the right, I understand from the chairman
that it is compellable and from Commissioner Guingona, that it is enforceable in court. Suppose a
student of a private school is not allowed to enroll by reason of misconduct or that his stay in the
school is considered by the administration of that school to be undesirable, does he have a right to
enforce his right to education under this situation?
MR. GUINGONA:
Madam President, the right to education, like any other right, is not absolute. As a matter of fact,
Article XXVI of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, when it acknowledges the right to
education, also qualifies it when at the end of the provision, it says "on the basis of merit." Therefore, the
student may be subject to certain reasonable requirements regarding admission and retention and
this is so provided in the draft Constitution. We admit even of discrimination. We have accepted this in
the Philippines, and I suppose in the United States there are schools that can refuse admission to boys
because they are supposed to be exclusively for girls. And there are schools that may refuse
admission to girls because they are exclusively for boys. There may even be discrimination to
accept a student who has a contagious disease on the ground that it would affect the welfare of the
other students. What I mean is that there could be reasonable qualifications, limitations or restrictions to
this right, Madam President.
MR. GASCON:
May I add, Madam President.
MR. NOLLEDO:
Yes, the Commissioner may.
MR. GASCON:
When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize is that education should be
equally accessible to all regardless of social and economic differences. So we go into the issue of
providing opportunities to such an education, recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who
come from the poorer social classes because of their inability to continue education.
However, in the same light, this right to education is subject to the right of educational institutions
to admit students upon certain conditions such as ability to pay the required entrance examination
fee and maintaining a respectable school record. When we speak of this right of schools as far as
maintaining a certain degree or quality of students, these conditions must be reasonable and
should not be used just to impose certain unfair situations on the students.
MR. GUINGONA:
Madam President, may I add.
There is already established jurisprudence about this. In the United States, in the case of [Lesser] v.
Board of Education of New York City, 239, NYS 2d 776, the court held that the refusal of a school to
admit a student who had an average of less than 85 percent which is the requirement for that school was
lawful.
In the Philippines, we have the case of Padriguilan [sic] v. Manila Central University where refusal to
retain the student was because of the alleged deficiency in a major subject and this was upheld by our
Supreme Court. There is also the case of Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, wherein Garcia, a woman,
tried to continue studying in this school of theology. 248 (Citation in the original omitted; emphases
supplied)
Extant from the foregoing is that while there is a right to quality higher education, such right is principally subject to the
broad academic freedom of higher educational institutions to impose fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. Plainly stated, the right to receive education is not and should not be taken to mean as a right to be admitted to
educational institutions.
With the basic postulates that jurisdiction over legal education belongs primarily and directly to the political
departments, and that the exercise of such police power must be in the context of reasonable supervision and regulation, and must
be consistent with academic freedom and the right to education, the Court now proceeds to address whether the assailed
provisions of R.A. No. 7662 and the corresponding LEB issuances fall within the constitutionally-permissible supervision and
regulation of legal education.
C.
LEB's Powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-à-vis the
Court's Jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section
5 (5) of the Constitution
1. Section 3 (a) (2) on increasing
awareness among members of
the legal profession
One of the general objectives of legal education under Section 3 (a) (2) of R.A. No. 7662 is to "increase awareness
among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.]" This objective is
reiterated by the LEB in LEBMO No. 1-2011, Section 7, Article II, as follows:
SEC. 7. (Section 3 of the law) General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education. —
a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived
and oppressed sectors of society[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The plain language of Section 3 (a) (2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7 (2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 are clear and need no
further interpretation. This provision goes beyond the scope of R.A. No. 7662, i.e., improvement of the quality of legal education,
and, instead delves into the training of those who are already members of the bar. Likewise, this objective is a direct
encroachment on the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and legal assistance to the
underprivileged and should, thus, be voided on this ground. As aptly observed by the CLEBM and which the Court had approved:
In the same vein Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing "awareness
among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of the society."
Such objective should not find a place in the law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of law
as they perform the task of educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution
also provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules on "legal assistance to the
underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A. No. 7662] might give rise to infringement of a
constitutionally mandated power. 249
2. Section 2, par. 2 and Section
7 (g) on legal apprenticeship
and law practice internship as
a requirement for taking the
bar
Towards the end of uplifting the standards of legal education, Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 mandates the State to
(1) undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system; (2) require proper selection of law students; (3) maintain quality
among law schools; and (4) require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
Pursuant to this policy, Section 7 (g) of R.A. No. 7662 grants LEB the power to establish a law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the bar examinations:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. — x x x
xxx xxx xxx
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar, which a law student
shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime
during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12)
months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.
This power is mirrored in Section 11 (g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011:
SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. — For the purpose of achieving the objectives
of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student
shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime
during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12)
months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar[.]
It is clear from the plain text of Section 7 (g) that another requirement, i.e., completion of a law internship program, is
imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to
promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto.
The jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the Court. In
fact, under the whereas clauses of the Revised Law Student Practice Rule, the Court now requires the completion of clinical legal
education courses, which may be undertaken either in a law clinic or through an externship, as a prerequisite to take the bar
examinations, thus:
Whereas, to produce practice-ready lawyers, the completion of clinical legal education courses must be
a prerequisite to take the bar examinations as provided in Section 5 of Rule 138.
Under Section 7 (g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal education, but now
dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar examinations, and consequently, admissions to the bar. This is a direct
encroachment upon the Court's exclusive authority to promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be
struck down as unconstitutional.
Further, and as will be discussed hereunder, the LEB exercised this power in a manner that forces upon law schools the
establishment of a legal apprenticeship program or a legal aid clinic, in violation of the schools' right to determine for themselves
their respective curricula.
7 (h) on continuing legal
education of practicing
lawyers
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the power given to the LEB to adopt a system of continuing legal education
implies that the LEB exercises jurisdiction not only over the legal education of those seeking to become lawyers, but also over
those who are already lawyers which is a function exclusively belonging to the Court. 250 Respondent, on the other hand,
maintains that the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education is different from the mandatory continuing legal
education required of all members of the bar. 251 Respondent explains that the continuing legal education under R.A. No. 7662 is
limited to the training of lawyer-professors and not to the practice of the legal profession. 252
The questioned power of the LEB to adopt a system of continuing legal education appears in Section 2, par. 2 and
Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. — x x x
xxx xxx xxx
proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal apprenticeship
and continuing legal education.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the [LEB] may provide for
the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the [LEB] may
deem necessary; x x x (Emphases supplied)
This power is likewise reflected in Section 11 (h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, as follows:
SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. — For the purpose of achieving the objectives
of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for
the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may
deem necessary[.] x x x (Emphasis supplied)
By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal education" under Section 2, par. 2, and Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662
unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the
LEB is authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB deems
necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the
education of "lawyer-professors" as teaching of law is practice of law. The mandatory continuing legal education of the members
of the bar is, in fact, covered by B.M. No. 850 or the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) dated August 22,
2000 which requires members of the bar, not otherwise exempt, from completing, every three years, at least 36 hours of
continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee directly supervised by the Court.
As noted by the CLEBM:
Thus, under the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662], the State "shall undertake
appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require the proper selection of law students, maintain quality
among law schools and require apprenticeship and continuing legal education["]. The concept of continuing
legal education encompasses education not only of law students but also of members of the legal profession. Its
inclusion in the declaration of policies implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the education of
persons who have finished the law course and are already licensed to practice law. Viewed in the light of
Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution that vests the Supreme Court with powers over the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, said portion of Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662] risks a declaration of
constitutional infirmity. 253 (Underscoring supplied)
4. Section 7 (e) on minimum
standards for law admission
and the PhiLSAT issuances
Of the several powers of the LEB under R.A. No. 7662, its power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission
under Section 7 (e) received the strongest objection from the petitioners. Section 7 (e), provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and
compensation of faculty members; (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners argue that the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission belongs to the Court pursuant to
its rule-making power concerning the admission to the practice of law. Thus, Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 which gives the LEB
the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission is allegedly unconstitutional as it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. Necessarily, according to the petitioners, the PhiLSAT which was imposed by the LEB pursuant to Section
7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 is likewise void.
The Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-making power and the power of the LEB to prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662. Consequently, the PhiLSAT, which intends to
regulate admission to law schools, cannot be voided on this ground.
4 (a). LEB's power to prescribe
minimum standards for "law
admission" pertain to
admission to legal education
and not to the practice of law
Much of the protestation against the LEB's exercise of the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission
stems from the interpretation extended to the phrase "law admission." For petitioners, "law admission" pertains to the practice of
law, the power over which belongs exclusively to the Court.
The statutory context and the intent of the legislators do not permit such interpretation.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
that is, every part must be read together with the other parts, to the end that the general intent of the law is given primacy. 254 As
such, a law's clauses and phrases cannot be interpreted as isolated expressions nor read in truncated parts, but must be considered
to form a harmonious whole. 255
Accordingly, the LEB's power under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission should be read with the State policy behind the enactment of R.A. No. 7662 which is fundamentally to uplift the
standards of legal education and the law's thrust to undertake reforms in the legal education system. Construing the LEB's power
to prescribe the standards for law admission together with the LEB's other powers to administer, supervise, and accredit law
schools, leads to the logical interpretation that the law circumscribes the LEB's power to prescribe admission requirements only to
those seeking enrollment to a school or college of law and not to the practice of law.
Reference may also be made to DECS Order No. 27-1989, as the immediate precursor of R.A. No. 7662, as to what is
sought to be regulated when the law speaks of "law admission" requirements.
Section 1, Article VIII of DECS Order No. 27-1989 is clear that the admission requirement pertains to enrollment in a
law course, or law school, or legal education, thus:
Article VIII
Admission, Residence and Other Requirements
SEC. 1. No applicant shall be enrolled in the law course unless he complies with specific
requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the Supreme Court of the
Philippines, for which purpose he must present to the registrar the necessary credentials before the end of the
enrollment period. (Emphases supplied)
This contemporary interpretation suffice in itself to hold that the phrase "law admission" pertains to admission to the
study of law or to legal education, and not to the practice of law. Further support is nevertheless offered by the exchanges during
the Senate interpellations, wherein it was assumed that the phrase "minimum standards for law admission" refers to the
requirements that the student must fulfill before being admitted to law school. This assumption was not corrected by the bill's
sponsor. 256
4 (b). Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 is
reasonable supervision and
regulation
Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662, insofar as it gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission is faithful to the reasonable supervision and regulation clause. It merely authorizes the LEB to prescribe minimum
requirements not amounting to control.
Emphatically, the law allows the LEB to prescribe only the minimum standards and it did not, in any way, impose that
the minimum standard for law admission should be by way of an exclusionary and qualifying exam nor did it prevent law schools
from imposing their respective admission requirements.
Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, the minimum standards for admission to law schools as implemented by the LEB are:
(1) completion of a four-year high school course; and (2) completion of a course for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences. 257 Again, these requirements are but consistent with the nature of the law course in the Philippines as being both a
professional and post-baccalaureate education.
As the facts disclose, however, the LEB later on introduced the PhiLSAT as an additional prerequisite for admission to
law school.
4 (c). Pursuant to Section 7 (e), LEB
is authorized to administer an
aptitude test as a minimum
standard for law admission
Evident from the Senate deliberations that, in prescribing the minimum standards for law admission, an aptitude test
may be administered by the LEB although such is not made mandatory under the law. Thus:
Senator Tolentino: x x x
xxx xxx xxx
I will proceed to another point, Mr. President. I have taught law for more than 25 years in private schools
and in the University of the Philippines as well. There is one thing I have noticed in all these years of
teaching and that is, many students in the law school are not prepared or apt by inclination or by ability to
become lawyers. I see that the objectives of the legal education that are provided for in this bill do not
provide for some mechanism of choosing people who should take up the law course.
As it is now, because of our democratic principles, anybody who wants to become a lawyer, who can
afford the tuition fee, or who has the required preparatory course, can be admitted into the law school.
And yet, while studying law, many of these students — I would say there are about 30 or 40 percent of
students in private schools — should not be taking up law but some other course because, simply, they
do not have the inclination, they do not have the aptitude or the ability to become lawyers.
Can that be provided for in this bill, Madam Sponsor? Would it contravene really our principles of
democracy where everybody should be free to take the course that he wants to take? Or should the State
be able to determine who should be able or who should be allowed to take a particular course, in this case
of law?
Senator Shahani:
Mr. President, there are those aptitude tests which are being taken when the student is in high
school to somehow guide the guidance councilors [sic] into the aptitude of the students. But the
talent or the penchant for the legal profession is not one of those subjects specifically measured. I
think what is measured really is who is, more or less, talented for an academic education as against
a vocational education. But maybe, a new test will have to be designed to really test the aptitude of
those who would like to enter the law school. x x x
Senator Tolentino: x x x
Many parents want to see their children become lawyers. But they do not consider the aptitude of these
children, and they waste money and time in making these children take up law when they really are not
suited to the law course. My real concern is whether by legislation, we can provide for selection of
those who should be allowed to take up law, and not everybody would be allowed to take up law . x
xx
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Shahani:
Mr. President, of course, the right to education is a constitutional right, and I think one cannot just
categorically deny a student — especially if he is bright — entrance to a law school. I think I would
stand by what I had previously said that an aptitude examination will have to be specially
designed. It is not in existence yet. x x x 258 (Emphases supplied)
This matter was amplified in second reading:
Senator Angara: x x x
Senator Tolentino asked why there is an omission on the requirements for admission to law school. I
think [Senator Shahani] has already answered that, that the [LEB] may prescribe an aptitude test for
that purpose. Just as in other jurisdictions, they prescribe a law admission test for prospective
students of law. I think the board may very well decide to prescribe such a test, although it is not
mandatory under this bill. 259 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The lawmakers, therefore, recognized and intended that the LEB be vested with authority to administer an aptitude test
as a minimum standard for law admission. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law
and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. 260 This presumption has
not been successfully challenged by petitioners.
It also bears to note that the introduction of a law aptitude examination was actually supported by the Court when it
approved the CLEBM's proposed amendment to Section 7 (e), as follows:
SEC. 6. Section 7 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 7. Power and Functions. — x x x
xxx xxx xxx
d). to prescribe minimum standards for ADMISSION TO LAW SCHOOLS INCLUDING A SYSTEM
OF LAW APTITUDE EXAMINATION x x x[.]" (Underscoring supplied)
And further in Bar Matter No. 1161 261 when the Court referred to the LEB the conduct of a proposed law entrance
examination.
4 (d). PhiLSAT, as an aptitude exam,
is reasonably related to the
improvement of legal
education
Having settled that the LEB has the power to administer an aptitude test, the next issue to be resolved is whether the
exercise of such power, through the PhiLSAT, was reasonable.
Indeed, an administrative regulation is susceptible to attack for unreasonableness. In Lupangco v. Court of
Appeals, 262 the Court held:
It is an [axiom] in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily
and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. (Emphasis
supplied)
To determine whether the PhiLSAT constitutes a valid exercise of police power, the same test of reasonableness, i.e., the
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful means, is employed. Petitioners argue that the PhiLSAT is unreasonable because: it is
not a conclusive proof of the student's aptitude; 263 it entails unreasonable examination and travel expenses and burdensome
documentary requirements; 264 applying for PhiLSAT exemption is inconvenient; 265 it is redundant to existing law school
entrance exams; 266 and it is not supported by scientific study. 267
Unfortunately, these grounds are not only conclusions of fact which beg the presentation of competent evidence, but also
necessarily go into the wisdom of the PhiLSAT which the Court cannot inquire into. The Court's pronouncement as to the
reasonableness of the PhiLSAT based on the grounds propounded by petitioners would be an excursion into the policy behind the
examinations — a function which is administrative rather than judicial.
Petitioners also argue that there is no reasonable relation between improving the quality of legal education and regulating
access thereto. The Court does not agree.
The subject of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. It is indubitable that the State has an interest in
prescribing regulations promoting education and thereby protecting the common good. Improvement of the quality of legal
education, thus, falls squarely within the scope of police power. The PhiLSAT, as an aptitude test, was the means to protect this
interest.
4 (e). Tablarin sustained the conduct
of an admission test as a
legitimate exercise of the
State's regulatory power
Moreover, by case law, the Court already upheld the validity of administering an aptitude test as a reasonable police
power measure in the context of admission standards into institutions of higher learning.
In Tablarin, the Court upheld not only the constitutionality of Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 2382, or the Medical Act of
1959, which gave the Board of Medical Education (BME) the power to prescribe requirements for admission to medical schools,
but also MECS Order No. 52, Series of 1985 (MECS Order No. 52-1985) issued by the BME which prescribed NMAT.
Using the rational basis test, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as follows:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one
hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand . This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all
its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission
to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the
establishment of minimum medical educational requirements — i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a
recognized medical school — for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related;
the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the
rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That
upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things,
of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in
our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and
economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical
schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use
today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical
College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational
resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to
prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of
the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. 268 (Emphases supplied)
The Court reached its conclusion that NMAT is a valid exercise of police power because the method employed, i.e.,
regulation of admissions to medical education is reasonably related to the subject, i.e., the protection of the public by ensuring
that only those qualified are eventually allowed to practice medicine.
The necessity of State intervention to ensure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by those unqualified to take
care of the life and health of patients was likewise the reason why the Court in Department of Education, Culture and Sports v.
San Diego 269 upheld the "three-flunk" rule in NMAT:
We see no reason why the rationale in the [Tablarin] case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue
raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the
admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any
less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is
validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and
a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the
right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor
is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. (Emphases
supplied)
Tablarin recognized that State intervention was necessary, and therefore was allowed, because of the need to meet the
goal of promoting public health and safety.
In similar vein, the avowed purpose of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education by evaluating and
screening applicants to law school. As elucidated, the State has an interest in improving the quality of legal education for the
protection of the community at-large, and requiring an entrance test is reasonably related to that interest. In other words, the State
has the power and the prerogative to impose a standardized test prior to entering law school, in the same manner and extent that
the State can do so in medical school when it prescribed the NMAT.
In all, the Court finds no constitutional conflict between the Court's rule-making power concerning admissions to the
practice of law and on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662.
Further, pursuant to its power under Section 7 (e), the Court affirms the LEB's authority to initiate and administer an
aptitude test, such as the PhiLSAT, as a minimum standard for law admission. Thus, the PhiLSAT, insofar as it functions as an
aptitude exam that measures the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law to the end that the quality of legal
education is improved is not per se unconstitutional.
However, there are certain provisions of the PhiLSAT that render its operation exclusionary, restrictive, and qualifying
which is contrary to its design as an aptitude exam meant to be used as a tool that should only help and guide law schools in
gauging the aptness of its applicants for the study of law. These provisions effectively and absolutely exclude applicants who
failed to pass the PhiLSAT from taking up a course in legal education, thereby restricting and qualifying admissions to law
schools. As will be demonstrated, these provisions of the PhiLSAT are unconstitutional for being manifestly violative of the law
schools' exercise of academic freedom, specifically the autonomy to determine for itself who it shall allow to be admitted to its
law program.
D.
LEB's Powers vis-à-vis Institutional Academic
Freedom and the Right to Education
1. PhiLSAT
Paragraphs 7, 9, 11, and 15 of LEBMO No. 7-2016, provide:
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7. Passing Score — The cut-off or passing score for the PhiLSAT shall be FIFTY-FIVE
PERCENT (55%) correct answers, or such percentile score as may be prescribed by the LEB.
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9. Admission Requirement — All college graduates or graduating students applying for admission
to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to any law
school in the Philippines. Upon the effectivity of this memorandum order, no applicant shall be admitted for
enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws
or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within 2 years before the start of studies for
the basic law course and presents a valid [Certificate of Eligibility] as proof thereof.
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11. Institutional Admission Requirements — The PhiLSAT shall be without prejudice to the right of
a law school in the exercise of its academic freedom to prescribe or impose additional requirements for
admission, such as but not limited to:
a. A score in the PhiLSAT higher than the cut-off or passing score set by the LEB;
b. Additional or supplemental admission tests to measure the competencies and/or personality of the
applicant; and
c. Personal interview of the applicant.
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15. Sanctions — Law schools violating this Memorandum Order shall [be] imposed
the administrative sanctions prescribed in Section 32 of LEBMO No. 2, Series of 2013 and/or fine of up to
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for each infraction. (Emphases supplied)
Without doubt, the above provisions exclude and disqualify those examinees who fail to reach the prescribed passing
score from being admitted to any law school in the Philippines. In mandating that only applicants who scored at least 55% correct
answers shall be admitted to any law school, the PhiLSAT actually usurps the right and duty of the law school to determine for
itself the criteria for the admission of students and thereafter, to apply such criteria on a case-by-case basis. It also mandates law
schools to absolutely reject applicants with a grade lower than the prescribed cut-off score and those with expired PhiLSAT
eligibility. The token regard for institutional academic freedom comes into play, if at all, only after the applicants had been "pre-
selected" without the school's participation. The right of the institutions then are constricted only in providing "additional"
admission requirements, admitting of the interpretation that the preference of the school itself is merely secondary or
supplemental to that of the State which is antithetical to the very principle of reasonable supervision and regulation.
The law schools are left with absolutely no discretion to choose its students at the first instance and in accordance with
its own policies, but are dictated to surrender such discretion in favor of a State-determined pool of applicants, under pain of
administrative sanctions and/or payment of fines. Mandating law schools to reject applicants who failed to reach the prescribed
PhiLSAT passing score or those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility transfers complete control over admission policies from the law
schools to the LEB. As Garcia tritely emphasized: "[c]olleges and universities should [not] be looked upon as public utilities
devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different, and
certainly higher category." 270
1 (a). Comparison of PhiLSAT with
NMAT and LSAT
Respondent urges the Court to treat the PhiLSAT in the same manner that the Court treated the NMAT in Tablarin.
Petitioners oppose on the ground that the PhiLSAT and the NMAT are different because there is a Constitutional body, i.e., the
Court, tasked to regulate the practice of law while there is none with respect to the practice of medicine.
The Court treats the PhiLSAT differently from the NMAT for the fundamental reason that these aptitude exams operate
differently.
For one, how these exams allow the schools to treat the scores therein obtained is different.
While both exams seem to prescribe a "cut-off" score, the NMAT score is evaluated by the medical schools in relation to
their own cut-off scores. Unlike the PhiLSAT score, the NMAT score is not the sole determining factor on whether or not an
examinee may be admitted to medical school. The NMAT score is only meant to be one of the bases for evaluating applicants for
admission to a college of medicine.
Medical schools further enjoy the discretion to determine how much weight should be assigned to an NMAT score
relative to the schools' own admissions policy. Different medical schools may therefore set varying acceptable NMAT scores.
Different medical schools may likewise assign different values to the NMAT score. This allows medical schools to consider the
NMAT score along with the other credentials of the applicant. The NMAT score does not constrain medical schools to accept pre-
selected applicants; it merely provides for a tool to evaluate all applicants.
Obtaining a low NMAT percentile score will not immediately and absolutely disqualify an applicant from being admitted
to medical school. Obtaining a high NMAT percentile score only increases an applicant's options for medical schools. Taking the
NMAT, thus, expands the applicant's options for medical schools; it does not limit them.
For another, medical schools are not subjected to sanctions in case they decide to admit an applicant pursuant to their
own admissions policy. In fact, at some point, 271 there was even no prescribed cut-off percentile score for the NMAT, and
instead it was stressed that a student may enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting the latter's specific requirements
and reasonable regulations. 272 Also, the issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission to a college of medicine had been
transferred to the medical schools, thus, rightfully giving the responsibility for and accountability of determining eligibility of
students for admission to the medical program to the schools concerned. 273
Similar to the NMAT, the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is only one of the several criteria for evaluation for law
school admission. It is just one of the methods that law schools may use to differentiate applicants for law school. The American
Bar Association actually allows a law school to use an admission test other than the LSAT and it does not dictate the particular
weight that a law school should give to the results of the LSAT in deciding whether to admit an applicant. 274
In contrast, the PhiLSAT score itself determines whether an applicant may be admitted to law school or not, the
PhiLSAT being strictly a pass or fail exam. It excludes those who failed to reach the prescribed cut-off score from being admitted
to any law school. It qualifies admission to law school not otherwise imposed by the schools themselves. The PhiLSAT, as
presently crafted, employs a totalitarian scheme in terms of student admissions. This leaves the consequent actions of the
applicant-student and the school solely dependent upon the results of the PhiLSAT.
1 (b). Balancing State interest with
institutional academic freedom
Thus far, it is settled that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, is reasonably related to the State's
unimpeachable interest in improving the quality of legal education. This aptitude test, however, should not be exclusionary,
restrictive, or qualifying as to encroach upon institutional academic freedom. Moreover, in the exercise of their academic freedom
to choose who to admit, the law schools should be left with the discretion to determine for themselves how much weight should
the results of the PhiLSAT carry in relation to their individual admission policies. At all times, it is understood that the school's
exercise of such academic discretion should not be gravely abused, arbitrary, whimsical, or discriminatory.
With the conclusion that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, passes the test of reasonableness, there is
no reason to strike down the PhiLSAT in its entirety. Instead, the Court takes a calibrated approach and partially nullifies
LEBMO No. 7-2016 insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT and the taking thereof within two years as a
prerequisite for admission to any law school which, on its face, run directly counter to institutional academic freedom. The rest of
LEBMO No. 7-2016, being free from any taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect, especially in view of the
separability clause 275 therein contained.
1 (c). PhiLSAT and the right to
education
Anent the argument that the PhiLSAT transgresses petitioners' right to education and their right to select a profession or
course of study, suffice to state that the PhiLSAT is a minimum admission standard that is rationally related to the interest of the
State to improve the quality of legal education and, accordingly, to protect the general community. The constitutionality of the
PhiLSAT, therefore, cannot be voided on the ground that it violates the right to education as stated under Section 1, Article XIV
of the Constitution. The Court's pronouncement in Tablarin 276 again resonates with significance:
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more, petitioners have
failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary,
we may note — x x x — that the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to
promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section
5(3) of Article XIV, as one must, one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with
absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education
"accessible to all" who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school, but rather
merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission
and academic requirements."
2. Other LEB issuances on law admission
Apart from the PhiLSAT, the LEB also imposed additional requirements for admission to law schools under LEBMO
No. 1-2011, specifically:
Article III
Prerequisites and Program Specification
SEC. 15. Prerequisites to admission to Law School. — x x x
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Where the applicant for admission into a law school is a graduate of a foreign institution or school
following a different course and progression of studies, the matter shall be referred to the Board that shall
determine the eligibility of the candidate for admission to law school.
SEC. 16. Board Prerequisites for Admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. Program. — The Board shall apply
Section 6 of Rule 138 in the following wise: An applicant for admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. program of studies
must be a graduate of a bachelor's degree and must have earned at least eighteen (18) units in English, six (6)
units in Mathematics, and eighteen (18) units of social science subjects.
SEC. 17. Board Prerequisites for Admission to Graduate Programs in Law. — Without prejudice to
other requirements that graduate schools may lay down, no applicant shall be admitted for the Master of
Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent master's degree in law or juridical science, without an Ll.B. or a J.D. degree.
Admission of non-Members of the Philippine Bar to the master's degree shall be a matter of academic freedom
vested in the graduate school of law. The candidate for the doctorate degree in juridical science, or doctorate in
civil law or equivalent doctorate degree must have completed a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent degree.
Graduate degree programs in law shall have no bearing on membership or non-membership in the
Philippine Bar. 277 (Emphases supplied)
Further, LEBMO No. 1-2011, Article V, provides:
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SEC. 23. No student who has obtained a general average below 2.5 or 80 in the college course required
for admission to legal studies may be admitted to law school. Exceptions may be made by the Dean in
exceptionally meritorious cases, after having informed the Board. 278
These provisions similarly encroach upon the law school's freedom to determine for itself its admission policies. With
regard to foreign students, a law school is completely bereft of the right to determine for itself whether to accept such foreign
student or not, as the determination thereof now belongs to the LEB.
Similarly, the requirement that an applicant obtain a specific number of units in English, Mathematics, and Social
Science subjects affects a law school's admission policies leaving the latter totally without discretion to admit applicants who are
deficient in these subjects or to allow such applicant to complete these requirements at a later time. This requirement also
effectively extends the jurisdiction of the LEB to the courses and units to be taken by the applicant in his or her pre-law course.
Moreover, such requirement is not to be found under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court as this section simply requires
only the following from an applicant to the bar exams:
SEC. 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he
had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for
admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for
a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of
concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.
Likewise, in imposing that only those with a basic degree in law may be admitted to graduate programs in law
encroaches upon the law school's right to determine who may be admitted. For instance, this requirement effectively nullifies the
option of admitting non-law graduates on the basis of relevant professional experience that a law school, pursuant to its own
admissions policy, may otherwise have considered.
The required general weighted average in the college course suffers the same infirmity and would have been struck down
had it not been expressly repealed by the LEB because of the PhiLSAT. 279
3. Section 7 (c) and 7 (e) on the
minimum qualifications of
faculty members
The LEB is also empowered under Section 7 (c) to set the standards of accreditation taking into account, among others,
the "qualifications of the members of the faculty" and under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe "minimum qualifications
and compensation of faculty members[.]"
Relative to the power to prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty members, LEB prescribes under LEBMO No.
1-2011 the following:
[PART I]
Article V
Instructional Standards
SEC. 20. The law school shall be headed by a properly qualified dean, maintain a corps of
professors drawn from the ranks of leading and acknowledged practitioners as well as academics and
legal scholars or experts in juridical science[.] x x x
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PART III
QUALIFICATIONS AND CURRICULUM
Article I
Faculty Qualifications
SEC. 50. The members of the faculty of a law school should, at the very least, possess a Ll.B. or a
J.D. degree and should be members of the Philippine Bar. In the exercise of academic freedom, the law
school may also ask specialists in various fields of law with other qualifications, provided that they possess
relevant doctoral degrees, to teach specific subjects.
Within a period of five (5) years of the promulgation of the present order, members of the faculty
of schools of law shall commence their studies in graduate schools of law.
Where a law school offers the J.D. curriculum, a qualified Ll.B. graduate who is a member of the
Philippine Bar may be admitted to teach in the J.D. course and may wish to consider the privilege granted under
Section 56 hereof.
SEC. 51. The dean should have, aside from complying with the requirements above, at least a
Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or a master's degree in a related field, and should have been a Member of
the Bar for at least 5 years prior to his appointment as dean.
SEC. 52. The dean of a graduate school of law should possess at least a doctorate degree in law
and should be an acknowledged authority in law, as evidenced by publications and membership in
learned societies and organizations; members of the faculty of a graduate school of law should possess at
least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or the relevant master's or doctor's degrees in related fields.
Aside from the foregoing, retired justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals may serve as deans of schools of law, provided that: they have
had teaching experience as professors of law and provided further that, with the approval of the Legal
Education Board, a graduate school of law may accredit their experience in the collegiate appellate courts and
the judgments they have penned towards the degree [ad eundem] of Master of Laws. 280 (Emphases supplied)
Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, a law faculty member must have an Ll.B or J.D. degree and must, within a period of
five years from the promulgation of LEBMO No. 1-2011, or from June 14, 2011 to June 14, 2016, commence studies in graduate
school of law.
The mandatory character of the requirement of a master's degree is underscored by the LEB in its Resolution No. 2014-
02, a "sequel rule" to Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1-2011, which provides that:
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1. Members of the law faculty are required to be holders of the degree of Master of Laws. It is the
responsibility of the law deans to observe and implement this rule.
2. The law faculty of all law schools shall have the following percentage of holders of the master of laws degree:
2.1. School Year — 2017-2018 — 20%
2.2. School Year — 2018-2019 — 40%
2.3. School Year — 2019-2020 — 60%
2.4. School Year — 2020-2021 — 80%
In computing the percentage, those who are exempted from the rule shall be included.
3. Exempted from this requirement of a master's degree in law are the following:
The Incumbent or Retired Members of the:
3.1. Supreme Court;
3.2. Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals;
3.3. Secretary of Justice and Under-Secretaries of Justice, Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsmen, Solicitor
General and Assistant Solicitors General;
3.4. Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission who teach Labor Laws;
3.5. Regional Trial Court Judges;
3.6. DOJ State and Regional State Prosecutors and Senior Ombudsman Prosecutors who teach Criminal
Law and/or Criminal Procedure;
3.7. Members of Congress who are lawyers who teach Political Law, Administrative Law, Election Law,
Law on Public Officers and other related subjects;
3.8. Members of Constitutional Commissions who are Lawyers;
3.9. Heads of bureaus who are lawyers who teach the law subjects which their respective bureaus are
implementing;
3.10. Ambassadors, Ministers and other [D]iplomatic Officers who are lawyers who teach International
Law or related subjects;
3.11. Those who have been teaching their subjects for 10 years or more upon recommendation of their
deans; and
3.12. Other lawyers who are considered by the Board to be experts in any field of law provided they
teach the subjects of their expertise.
4. The following are the sanctions for non-compliance with the foregoing rules:
4.1. If a law school is non-compliant with these rules for the first time beginning School Year 2017-2018,
the Board shall downgrade its Recognition status to Permit status;
4.2. If a law school under a Permit status should remain non-compliant with these rules in succeeding
school years, the Board shall downgrade the Permit status to Phase-Out status;
4.3. If a law school which is under Phase-Out status remains non-compliant with these rules in
succeeding school years, the Board shall order its closure to take effect at the end of the school
year.
5. If a law school under sanction shall become compliant, its Recognition status shall be restored. (Emphases
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
And under LEBMO No. 2:
SEC. 31. Unfitness to Continue Operating a Law Program. — A law school which is operated below
quality standards of a law school is unfit to continue operating a law program.
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2) A law school is substandard if the result of the inspection and evaluation of the law school and its
facilities by members of the Board or its staff shows that the law school has serious deficiencies including
a weak faculty as indicated, among others, by the fact that most of the members are neophytes in the
teaching of law[.] x x x
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SEC. 32. The imposable administrative sanctions are the following:
a) Termination of the law program (closing the law school);
b) Phase-out of the law program;
c) Provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and putting the law program of the
substandard law school under Permit Status.
This master of laws degree requirement is reiterated in LEBMO No. 17, Series of 2018 (Supplemental Regulations on the
Minimum Academic Requirement of Master of Laws Degree for Deans and Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law
Schools), as follows:
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B) For Members of the Law Faculty
SEC. 6. For purposes of determining compliance with the minimum academic requirement of a
Ll.M. degree for the members of the law faculty in law schools required under Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1,
Series of 2011 and Resolution No. 2014-02, the required percentage of holders of Ll.M. shall be computed
based on the aggregate units of all courses/subjects offered during the semester by the law school.
SEC. 7. Within thirty (30) days upon completion the effectivity this of this memorandum [sic], the
President of the HEI and the Dean of each law school shall jointly submit to the LEB separate certification of
the total teaching assignments/load for the 1st Semester and 2nd Semester of the Academic Year 2017-
2018 in the prescribed matrix form containing the names of every faculty member, his/her highest
academic law degree, qualification for exemption from the Ll.M. requirement, if applicable,
courses/subjects assigned to teach, and academic weight of each course/subject, and a disclosure whether
or not the law school is compliant with the prescribed percentage of Ll.M. holders for faculty members.
Thereafter, the same certification shall be submitted for every regular semester not later than 45 days from the
start of the semester.
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SEC. 12. Law schools failing to meet the prescribed percentage of its faculty members required
to have Ll.M. degrees shall be imposed the appropriate administrative sanction specified under
Resolution No. 2014-02. (Emphases supplied)
To be sure, under its supervisory and regulatory power, the LEB can prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty
members. This much was affirmed by the Court when it approved the CLEBM's proposal to revise the powers of LEB under R.A.
No. 7662, but nevertheless retaining the LEB's power to "provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law
schools." As worded, the assailed clauses of Section 7 (c) and 7 (e) insofar as they give LEB the power to prescribe the minimum
qualifications of faculty members are in tune with the reasonable supervision and regulation clause and do not infringe upon the
academic freedom of law schools.
Moreover, this minimum qualification can be a master of laws degree. In University of the East v. Pepanio, 281 the
Court held that the requirement of a masteral degree, albeit for tertiary education teachers, is not unreasonable. Thus:
The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The
operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure that
only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to
teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for
protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the
required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or to possess
postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment. (Emphasis supplied)
This was reiterated in Son v. University of Santo Tomas, 282 as follows:
As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate program professor's
field of instruction has been in place, through DECS Order 92 (series of 1992, August 10, 1992) or the Revised
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Article IX, Section 44, paragraph [1(a)] thereof provides that
college faculty members must have a master's degree in their field of instruction as a minimum qualification for
teaching in a private educational institution and acquiring regular status therein.
DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in the exercise of its [rule]-making
power as provided for under Section 70 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of
1982. As such, it has the force and effect of law. In University of the East v. Pepanio, the requirement of a
masteral degree for tertiary education teachers was held to be not unreasonable but rather in accord with the
public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents, for maintaining
professors without the mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to be employed despite
knowledge of their lack of the necessary qualifications. Petitioners cannot therefore insist to be employed by
UST since they still do not possess the required master's degrees; the fact that UST continues to hire and
maintain professors without the necessary master's degrees is not a ground for claiming illegal dismissal, or
even reinstatement. As far as the law is concerned, respondents are in violation of the CHED regulations for
continuing the practice of hiring unqualified teaching personnel; but the law cannot come to the aid of
petitioners on this sole ground. As between the parties herein, they are in pari delicto.
xxx xxx xxx
The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the undergraduate teacher's field of instruction has
been cemented in DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners and respondents have been violating it. The
fact that government has not cracked down on violators, or that it chose not to strictly implement the provision,
does not erase the violations committed by erring educational institutions, including the parties herein; it simply
means that government will not punish these violations for the meantime. The parties cannot escape its
concomitant effects, nonetheless. And if respondents knew the overwhelming importance of the said provision
and the public interest involved — as they now fiercely advocate to their favor — they should have complied
with the same as soon as it was promulgated.
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In addition, the Court already held in Herrera-Manaois v. St. Scholastica's College that —
Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual, Manaois still cannot
legally acquire a permanent status of employment. Private educational institutions must still
supplementarily refer to the prevailing standards, qualifications, and conditions set by the
appropriate government agencies (presently the Department of Education, the Commission on
Higher Education, and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority). This
limitation on the right of private schools, colleges, and universities to select and determine the
employment status of their academic personnel has been imposed by the state in view of the
public interest nature of educational institutions, so as to ensure the quality and competency of
our schools and educators. (Internal citations omitted)
Thus, the masteral degree required of law faculty members and dean, and the doctoral degree required of a dean of a
graduate school of law are, in fact, minimum reasonable requirements. However, it is the manner by which the LEB had exercised
this power through its various issuances that prove to be unreasonable.
On this point, the amicus curiae, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, while admitting that the masteral degree requirement is a
"laudable aim" of the LEB, nevertheless adds that the LEB-imposed period of compliance is unreasonable given the logistical and
financial obstacles:
The masteral degree requirement is a laudable aim of LEB, but the possibility of meeting the LEB
period of compliance is unreasonable and unrealistic in the light of logistical and financial considerations
confronting the deans and professors, including the few law schools offering graduate degrees in law.
To illustrate, to the best of my knowledge there are no more than six (6) graduate schools of law
around the country to service potential applicants. Those who have opted for graduate studies in law find it very
costly to fly to the venue. While one or two programs may have been delivered outside the provider's home
school venue to reach out to graduate students outside the urban centers, pedagogical standards are often
compromised in the conduct of the modules. This is even aggravated by the fact that very few applicants can
afford to go into full-time graduate studies considering that most deans and professors of law are in law
practice. Perhaps, LEB should work in consultation with PALS in designing a cost-effective but efficient
delivery system of any graduate program in law, [especially] for deans and law professors. 283
Further, the mandatory character of the master of laws degree requirement, under pain of downgrading, phase-out and
closure of the law school, is in sharp contrast with the previous requirement under DECS Order No. 27-1989 which
merely prefer faculty members who are holders of a graduate law degree, or its equivalent. The LEB's authority to review the
strength or weakness of the faculty on the basis of experience or length of time devoted to teaching violates an institution's right
to set its own faculty standards. The LEB also imposed strict reportorial requirements that infringe on the institution's right to
select its teachers which, for instance, may be based on expertise even with little teaching experience. Moreover, in case a faculty
member seeks to be exempted, he or she must prove to the LEB, and not to the concerned institution, that he or she is an expert in
the field, thus, usurping the freedom of the institution to evaluate the qualifications of its own teachers on an individual basis.
Also, while the LEB requires of faculty members and deans to obtain a master of laws degree before they are allowed to
teach and administer a law school, respectively, it is ironic that the LEB, under Resolution No. 2019-406, in fact considers the
basic law degrees of Ll.B. or J.D. as already equivalent to a doctorate degree in other non-law academic disciplines for purposes
of "appointment/promotion, ranking, and compensation."
In this connection, the LEB also prescribes who may or may not be considered as full-time faculty, the classification of
the members of their faculty, as well as the faculty load, including the regulation of work hours, all in violation of the academic
freedom of law schools. LEBMO No. 2 provides:
SEC. 33. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. — There are two general kinds of faculty members, the full-
time and part-time faculty members.
a) A full-time faculty member is one:
1) Who possesses the minimum qualification of a member of the faculty as prescribed in Sections 50
and 51 of LEBMO No. 1;
2) Who devotes not less than eight (8) hours of work for the law school;
3) Who has no other occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work, except when permitted by
the higher education institution of which the law school is a part; and
4) Who is not teaching full-time in any other higher education institution.
b) A part-time faculty member is one who does not meet the qualifications of a full-time professor as enumerated
in the preceding number.
SEC. 34. Faculty Classification and Ranking. — Members of the faculty may be classified, in the
discretion of the higher education institution of which the law school is a part, according to academic
proceeding, training and scholarship into Professor, Associate Professor, Assistant Professor, and Instructor.
Part-time members of the faculty may be classified as Lecturers, Assistant Professorial Lecturers,
Associate Professorial Lecturers and Professorial Lecturers. The law schools shall devise their scheme of
classification and promotion not inconsistent with these rules.
SEC. 35. Faculty Load. — Generally, no member of the faculty should teach more than 3
consecutive hours in any subject nor should he or she be loaded with subjects requiring more than three
preparations or three different subjects (no matter the number of units per subject) in a day.
However, under exceptionally meritorious circumstances, the law deans may allow members of the
faculty to teach 4 hours a day provided that there is a break of 30 minutes between the first 2 and the last 2
hours. (Emphases supplied)
The LEB is also allowed to revoke permits or recognitions given to law schools when the LEB deems that there is gross
incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or instructors under Section 41.2 (d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011,
thus:
SEC. 41.2. Permits or recognitions may be revoked, or recognitions reverted to permit status for just
causes including but not limited to:
a) fraud or deceit committed by the institution in connection with its application to the Board;
b) the unauthorized operation of a school of law or a branch or an extension of a law school;
c) mismanagement or gross inefficiency in the operation of a law school;
d) gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or instructors;
e) violation of approved standards governing institutional operations, announcements and advertisements;
f) transfer of the school of law to a site or location detrimental to the interests of the students and inimical to the
fruitful and promising study of law;
g) repeated failure of discipline on the part of the student body; and
h) other grounds for the closure of schools and academic institutions as provided for in the rules and regulations
of the Commission on Higher Education. 284 (Emphasis supplied)
In this regard, the LEB is actually assessing the teaching performance of faculty members and when such is determined
by the LEB as constituting gross incompetence, the LEB may mete out penalties, thus, usurping the law school's right to
determine for itself the competence of its faculty members.
7 (g) on legal apprenticeship
and legal internship
While the clause "legal apprenticeship" under Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7 (g) on legal internship, as plainly worded,
cannot immediately be interpreted as encroaching upon institutional academic freedom, the manner by which LEB exercised this
power through several of its issuances undoubtedly show that the LEB controls and dictates upon law schools how such
apprenticeship and internship programs should be undertaken.
Pursuant to its power under Section 7 (g), the LEB passed Resolution No. 2015-08 (Prescribing the Policy and Rules in
the Establishment of a Legal Aid Clinic in Law Schools) wherein it classified legal aid clinics into three types: (1) a legal aid
clinic which is an outreach project of a law school; (2) a legal aid clinic which entitles the participating student to curricular
credits; and (3) a legal aid clinic that entitles the participating student to avail of the privileges under Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court.
Pertinent to the third type, the LEB requires the law schools to comply with the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
b) Implementing Rules
(1) A LAC should be established by the law school.
(2) The law school should formulate its Clinical Legal Education Program and submit it to the
Legal Education board for its assessment and evaluation.
(3) If Legal Education Board finds the Clinical Legal Education Program to be proper and in
order it shall endorse it to the Supreme Court for its approval.
(4) Once approved by the Supreme Court, fourth (4th) year law students in that law school enrolled in it
shall be allowed to practice law on a limited manner pursuant to the provisions of Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied).
Further, Section 24 (c), Article IV of LEBMO No. 2 prescribes the activities that should be included in the law school's
apprenticeship program, as follows:
Article IV
Law School: Administrative Matters and Opening of Branches or
Extension Classes
SEC. 24. Administrative Matters. —
xxx xxx xxx
c) Apprenticeship Program. The apprenticeship program should be closely supervised by the Dean or a
member of the faculty assigned by the Dean to do the task. The apprenticeship program should at least
include any of the following activities:
1) Preparation of legal documents
2) Interviewing clients
3) Courtroom observation and participation
4) Observation and assistance in police investigations, inquests and preliminary investigations
5) Legal counseling
6) Legal assistance to detention prisoners
7) For working students, participation in the legal work of the legal section or office of the employer-
entity x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Relatedly, Section 59 (d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, provides:
Article IV
Grading System
SEC. 59. Grading System. — The law school, in the exercise of academic freedom, shall devise its
own grading system provided that on the first day of classes, the students are apprised of the grading system
and provided further that the following are observed:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) When apprenticeship is required and the student does not complete the mandated number of
apprenticeship hours, or the person supervising the apprenticeship program deems the performance of the
student unsatisfactory, the dean shall require of the student such number of hours more in apprenticeship as will
fulfill the purposes of the apprenticeship program. 285 (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions unduly interfere with the discretion of a law school regarding its curriculum, particularly its
apprenticeship program. Plainly, these issuances are beyond mere supervision and regulation.
III.
Conclusion
In general, R.A. No. 7662, as a law meant to uplift the quality of legal education, does not encroach upon the Court's
jurisdiction to promulgate rules under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the Constitution. It is well-within the jurisdiction of the State,
as an exercise of its inherent police power, to lay down laws relative to legal education, the same being imbued with public
interest.
While the Court is undoubtedly an interested stakeholder in legal education, it cannot assume jurisdiction where it has
none. Instead, in judicial humility, the Court affirms that the supervision and regulation of legal education. is a political exercise,
where judges are nevertheless still allowed to participate not as an independent branch of government, but as part of the sovereign
people.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged is settled as belonging exclusively to the Court, certain provisions and clauses of R.A. No. 7662 which, by
its plain language and meaning, go beyond legal education and intrude upon the Court's exclusive jurisdiction suffer from patent
unconstitutionality and should therefore be struck down.
Moreover, the exercise of the power to supervise and regulate legal education is circumscribed by the normative contents
of the Constitution itself, that is, it must be reasonably exercised. Reasonable exercise means that it should not amount to control
and that it respects the Constitutionally-guaranteed institutional academic freedom and the citizen's right to quality and accessible
education. Transgression of these limitations renders the power and the exercise thereof unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission. The PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in measuring the applicants' aptness for
legal education along with such other admissions policy that the law school may consider, is such minimum standard.
However, the PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant's aptitude for law school. The PhiLSAT,
as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the
PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT goes
beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and therefore,
unconstitutional. In striking down these objectionable clauses in the PhiLSAT, the State's inherent power to protect public interest
by improving legal education is neither emasculated nor compromised. Rather, the institutional academic freedom of law schools
to determine for itself who to admit pursuant to their respective admissions policies is merely protected. In turn, the recognition of
academic discretion comes with the inherent limitation that its exercise should not be whimsical, arbitrary, or gravely abused.
In similar vein, certain LEB issuances which exceed the powers granted under its charter should be nullified for
being ultra vires.
As in all levels and areas of education, the improvement of legal education indeed deserves serious attention. The parties
are at a consensus that legal education should be made relevant and progressive. Reforms for a more responsive legal education
are constantly introduced and are evolving. The PhiLSAT, for instance, is not a perfect initiative. Through time and a better
cooperation between the LEB and the law schools in the Philippines, a standardized and acceptable law admission examination
may be configured. The flaws which the Court assessed to be unconstitutional are meanwhile removed, thereby still allowing the
PhiLSAT to develop into maturity. It is, thus, strongly urged that recommendations on how to improve legal education, including
tools for screening entrants to law school, reached possibly through consultative summits, be taken in careful consideration in
further issuances or legislations.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.
The Court further declares:
As CONSTITUTIONAL:
1. Section 7 (c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to set the standards of
accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty
without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning; and
2. Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to prescribe the minimum
requirements for admission to legal education and minimum qualifications of faculty members without
encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:
1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing legal education" as an aspect of legal
education which is made subject to Executive supervision and control;
2. Section 3 (a) (2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7 (2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the objective of legal education to
increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed
sectors of society;
3. Section 7 (g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11 (g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education
Board the power to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar; and
4. Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11 (h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education
Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal education and to provide for the mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:
1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and qualifying admissions to law schools
in violation of the institutional academic freedom on who to admit, particularly:
a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college graduates or graduating students applying
for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for
admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as
a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris
Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of studies for the
basic law course;
b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission to law
schools;
Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on March 12, 2019 enjoining the Legal Education
Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is made PERMANENT. The regular admission of
students who were conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to the discretion of the law schools in the
exercise of their academic freedom; and
c. Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011.
2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications and classification of faculty
members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in violation of institutional academic freedom on who may
teach, particularly:
a. Sections 41.2 (d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;
b. Resolution No. 2014-02;
c. Sections 31 (2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;
d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and
3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the establishment of legal
apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of institutional academic freedom on what to teach,
particularly:
a. Resolution No. 2015-08;
b. Section 24 (c) of LEBMO No. 2; and
c. Section 59 (d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. Nos. 230642 & 242954, [September 10, 2019])
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]
RENATO L. CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision
in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
office. cdphil
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel
about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.).
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23,
193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as
to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law
or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys."
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,
144). (Emphasis ours).
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of
the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and
he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23).
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of
law." cdrep
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of
the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that 'They must be Members of the Philippine Bar' — I am quoting
from the provision — 'who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' "
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in
the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We
have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on
the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal
work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on
Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Thank you."
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although
many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups
of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be
organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologies, unhelpful defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v.
Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire
practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.). LibLex
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the
late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation
and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers
in specialized practice will usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty
such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is
that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the
lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable
to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature
and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly
"model-making" and contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of
the policy-making process, wherein a model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law,
the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research
has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar
types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute
attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is
the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business
and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate
lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type
of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law
firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His
areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the
Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law. LLjur
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding
how one's work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to
see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more
closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because
working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In
most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-
educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking
of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights
into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise
known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities
but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group
within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to identifiable factors in the group-context interaction
such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders,
promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of
team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics
principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In
the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. llcd
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to
which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice
and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy
work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last
decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key
aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships
with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not to understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very
least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p.
4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial
law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11,
1989, p. 4). LLpr
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a
letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June
18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He
has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa
Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as
chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of
the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-
Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the
party-list system for the House of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet
the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and
(5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing
the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States
Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan
World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973).
(Emphasis supplied).
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies, demand expertise
in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign
lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan
agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should
be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either
party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to
that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the
rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said: 'They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and
bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.' (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in
Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters,
1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and
taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences
as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: prcd
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide." (emphasis supplied).
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis supplied).
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without re
appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation
is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year
for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice
of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or
in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact
that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is different from
the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he
lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that
he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall
the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant
the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. llcd
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus
in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it
would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help
in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
"No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins."
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly
replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
||| (Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, [September 3, 1991], 278 PHIL 235-274)
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. March 8, 2011.]
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME
COURT"
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors 1 in response to
the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should
not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an administrative
matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting
opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of
indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting
opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds that with
the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was not a
member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to the issues at
hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the
attention of respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under
the Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic
republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows: EDSHcT
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 — A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority,
or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 — A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 — A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds, they must
ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and
abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a decision it has
rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such decision's reconsideration. The accusation of
plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to
deflect everyone's attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by respondents' explanations whether
or not respondent members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and
speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending
case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act
on their Statement, 2 which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the
Court's proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the
respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of
expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in
court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents' invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely
because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring
attorneys that respondents' own non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly
motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court. acHTIC
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents' actuations, it is apropos to revisit the factual
antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya,
et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel 3 for Vinuya, et
al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the following
grounds:
I. OUR OWN CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORIES REJECT THIS
HONORABLE COURTS' (SIC) ASSERTION THAT THE EXECUTIVE'S FOREIGN POLICY
PREROGATIVES ARE VIRTUALLY UNLIMITED; PRECISELY, UNDER THE RELEVANT
JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, SUCH PREROGATIVES ARE
PROSCRIBED BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN STANDARDS,
INCLUDING THOSE PROVIDED FOR IN THE RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
OF WHICH THE PHILIPPINES IS A PARTY. 4
II. THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS CONFUSED DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION WITH THE
BROADER, IF FUNDAMENTAL, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES TO PROTECT THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF ITS CITIZENS — ESPECIALLY WHERE THE RIGHTS ASSERTED ARE SUBJECT
OF ERGA OMNES OBLIGATIONS AND PERTAIN TO JUS COGENS NORMS. 5
On July 19, 2010, 6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel
Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they
posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.
Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT'S
JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES — AN
ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A
BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE
PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW — AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT'S
ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE
PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION'S CLAIMS. 7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but
of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the
assailed Judgment for denying the Petition." 8 HEDCAS
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were namely:
(1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent's article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;" 9 (2) Christian J. Tams'
book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law; 10 and (3) Mark Ellis' article "Breaking the
Silence: On Rape as an International Crime." 11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010, journalists
Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort
women," on the Newsbreak website. 12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19,
2010. 13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque's column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila Standard
Today. 14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not
properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent,
had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle's response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news
report 15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku's blog
entry in this wise:
The newspaper's 16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday with
the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court's decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that are
identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent).
Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners' [plagiarism] allegations until after the
motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court's jus cogens discussion is that it implies that
the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms.
Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court's decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm 17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of
plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis,
wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours: SEcTHA
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question of the
integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take
exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an international crime in
your esteemed Court's Judgment in the case of Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. (G.R. No.
162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine chapter
of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI), 19 an affiliate of the London-based
Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of
the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court may have
misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be
ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take
the time to carefully study the arguments I made in the article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis 20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.
In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo
to the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of
Justice Del Castillo. 21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty
of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak's website 22 and on Atty. Roque's blog. 23 A report
regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV 24 and the Sun
Star 25 sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of
Law's bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 2010 26 and at said college's website. 27 DHACES
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the Philippines
College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice
Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Chief Justice

Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight
(38) 28 members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be
considered by the Supreme Court en banc.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual signatures of the
alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each
name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse
and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their
own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of
judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they
only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by
the Highest Court of the land. TacESD
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views the
charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the
individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious
threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, 'plagiarism' is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another person's work as
one's own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of
someone else's ideas and expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into committing
such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions were
originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system that allows
plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of
the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest
means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente merely
copied select portions of other legal writers' works and interspersed them into the decision as if they
were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court's and no longer just the ponente's. Thus
the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original
writers' names and the publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the spokesman of the
Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a reference to
the 'primary' sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable, because the original
authors' writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are
precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together with portions of their
writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of
a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors' work of organizing and analyzing those
primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal and
scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more
demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of
diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan
Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that
the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have
attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its
aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the contrary
conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works without attribution
by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and
deceive. DHSEcI
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State liability and
responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured
parties' home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely
have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort
women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World War made it incumbent on the
Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the
Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners
seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and
plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme
Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive
Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false
sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of
decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine
legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot accept
excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench
and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic
society. Given the Court's recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the
charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only further erode
faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest
for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the
horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice
to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own
conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes
ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are
credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not casually
cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It
is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of professional care and
practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of administration
of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court
as the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely
above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional
ethics. aICHEc
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as
teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine
College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical
and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence
expected of the Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and
undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the
decision of cases and the establishment of legal precedents through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial
function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been
left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and
dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the
Court may consider appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it conducts research,
prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts,
and to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest
quality of legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Dean and Professor of Law
(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN
Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA (SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA
Dean (1995-1999) Dean (2005-2008)
and Professor of Law
REGULAR FACULTY
(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL
Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR (SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD
DAWAY Assistant Professor
Associate Dean and Associate Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA
Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA
Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS
Assistant Professor Assistant Professor
LECTURERS
(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA (SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA 29
(Underscoring supplied.)
Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his sentiments on the
alleged plagiarism issue to the Court. 30 We quote Prof. Tams' letter here: ACcISa
Glasgow, 18 August 2010
Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. (G.R. No. 162230)
Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice
Your Excellency,
My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of Glasgow. I
am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-mentioned judgment of
your Honourable Court.
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court's Judgment, in the section
addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant
sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that there is a
generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from
another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive passages reproduced in the
Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of referencing.
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgment's cautious
approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my book's central thesis
is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm
place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he present study
attempts to demystify aspects of the 'very mysterious' concept and thereby to facilitate its
implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding section notes that "the preceding chapters
show that the concept is now a part of the reality of international law, established in the jurisprudence
of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have been cited
to support — as it seemingly has — the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way
in which your Honourable Court's Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly
acknowledging it.
On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court. ICTacD
I remain
Sincerely yours
(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams 31
In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares' exhibits during the August 26, 2010
hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the
Restoring Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain faculty members with the
letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the
said Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing. 32
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law
Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty
members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members
appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include former
Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies of the
Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit)
signed the Statement although his name was not included among the signatories in the previous copies submitted to
the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having been
formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under consideration by the Court. 33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations regarding the UP
Law Faculty Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators' opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a
truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo's explanation on how he
cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the
authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court .
The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas
who had suffered abuse during a time of war. ISaCTE
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the
land. . . . .
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court's alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect . 34 . . . .
(Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types
of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The
court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty's less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court's
honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the
comfort women's claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and
invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to
their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as
attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. 35 . . . . (Citations omitted;
emphases and underscoring supplied.) ATSIED
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O.
Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J.
Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan
P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M.
La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos,
Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina
D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 37
Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10,
2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the
consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty
Statement. 38
In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by
Respondents in Response to the October
19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed the following
pleadings:
(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents, excluding Prof.
Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11
and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in
relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in relation to the same
charge in par. (1);
(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to the charge of
violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and HSTCcD
(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents
(Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof.
Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common compliance
which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common
Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in the discharge of the 'solemn
duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law,' and as members of the Bar to speak out on a
matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them." 39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with the
purest of intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was involved either as party or counsel" 40 in
the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause Resolution's findings and conclusions
were "a prejudgment — that respondents indeed are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors
and officers of the Court, and have violated 'Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility." 41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:
(a) Respondents' alleged noble intentions
In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes 42 and the courts 43 and of
tending to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the Court 44 in the issuance of their Statement,
respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and
to ensure continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly evidenced by the portion of
their Statement "focusing on constructive action." 45 Respondents' call in the Statement for the Court "to provide
clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in
adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to 'participate in the development of the
legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice'"
(under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal processes"
(under Canon 1, id.). 46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to vigilantly
guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the
academe, especially in our law schools." 47 acHCSD
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity Statement as an
'institutional attack' . . . on the basis of its first and ninth paragraphs." 48 They further clarified that at the time the
Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any action on
the grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation." 49 According to respondents, the bases for
their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court
Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry
into the matter; 50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to
downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation charges." 51 Respondents claimed that it was their
perception of the Court's indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo
that impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents' position that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism and should be
held accountable in accordance with the standards of academic writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits of respondents'
charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court
of Appeals 52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue that their position regarding the
plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they are therefore justified in issuing
their Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance included, among others: (i) the letter
dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D., 53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno,
alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted without proper attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana
Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and from an International Court
of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity
and International Human Rights Law" by Michael O'Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of their charge that Justice
Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections. 54
(c) Respondents' belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have likewise spoken on
the "plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and misrepresentation
allegations are legitimate public issues." 55 They identified various published reports and opinions, in agreement with
and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on the issue of plagiarism, specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero; 56
(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010; 57
(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010; 58
(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine Star on July 30,
2010; 59
(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in
the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010; 60 SIDEaA
(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
August 8, 2010; 61
(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan's call for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo
published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July 31, 2010; 62
(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law on the calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in
The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on August 11, 2010; 63
(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former dean of the
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional Association, the Judges
Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines — Bulacan Chapter published
in the Philippine Star on August 16, 2010; 64 and
(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law published in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010. 65
In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for sanctions and the charge
in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they may have violated specific canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is unfair and without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their position that in
issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be performing their duties as members of the Bar, officers
of the court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise
of free speech." 66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v. Bustos, 67 In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880,
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections. 69 CSAaDE
(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement was also issued
in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of
the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he national university has the right and
responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee,
Loyola School of Theology 70 which they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage
a free and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty member's field of study without fear of reprisal. It is
respondents' view that had they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have
"compromised [their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and generation
of students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and pleading; or,
worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are
inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to one's conduct." 71
In closing, respondents' Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following portion of the
dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez, 72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the bench
than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or
injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and
courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and
the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by
the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case. 73
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common Compliance stated,
thus:
WHEREFORE:
A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and officers of
the Court, respectfully pray that:
1. the foregoing be noted; and
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause Resolution,
including its conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, . . . and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b]
committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility." CcaASE
B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents
respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that before final
judgment be rendered:
1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the findings and
conclusions of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including especially the finding and
conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that connection, that appropriate
procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted and defined that will allow them the
full and fair opportunity to require the production of and to present testimonial,
documentary, and object evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation
issues in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the
Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC); and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts, reports and
submissions in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses who were or could have been called in In the Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC). 74
Compliance and Reservation of Prof.
Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-
Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations
in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.
Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the findings and
conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be
considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after
charge and hearing." 75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the best intentions
to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to resign." 76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her
deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the
Statement. SEACTH
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence 77 which in her view highlighted
that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such that schools have the
freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may
be admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere in the schools' exercise of discretion in these
matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of
the University of the Philippines and other universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents' constitutional right to
freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to public safety, public
morale, public health or other legitimate public interest. 78
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by registered
mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his
signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of conversation among the UP Law faculty
early in the first semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly contained citations not properly attributed
to the sources; that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class;
and that, agreeing in principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good
faith. 79
In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens
in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the attention of the Court to the following
authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto; 80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen; 81 and (c) a discussion appearing in
American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d. 82 He claims that he "never had any intention to unduly influence, nor
entertained any illusion that he could or should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case" 83 and
that "attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing on respondent's mind when he signed the
Statement." 84 Unlike his colleagues, who wish to impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views
on what constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused
the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element of the
same. Others, like respondent, were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the
intent of the perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty made
the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable Court has ruled
that plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another's work and to pass it off as one's
own. 85 (Emphases supplied.) HCaDIS
Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have been remiss in
correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and could have been more careful." 86 He ends his
discussion with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully complied with the Show Cause
Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the
Court.
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen
regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10 in relation to his submission of
a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty
Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty
Statement, which he described as follows:
• "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College of Law in its
signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the
Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan on
31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
• "Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature, but which reflects as
signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A
copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in the UP College of Law
on 10 August 2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was also officially received by the
Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three
weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.
• "Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and which presently serves
as the official file copy of the Dean's Office in the UP College of Law that may be signed by
other faculty members who still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty-seven
original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their printed names and the notation
"(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight (8) other members of the faculty above
their handwritten or typewritten names. 87
For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant since what
Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these two
documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court. IAETDc
On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean Leonen
alleged, thus:
2.2. On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the faculty on a
draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it among the faculty
members so that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty
roster to serve as the printed draft's signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the Restoring
Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was
unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Court's Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the Honorable Court was in
the process of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonen's staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the
faculty. Some faculty members visited the Dean's Office to sign the document or had it brought to their
classrooms in the College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still other faculty members who, for
one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time, nevertheless conveyed to
Dean Leonen their assurances that they would sign as soon as they could manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been
circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a style and
manner appropriate for posting in the College of Law. Following his own established practice in
relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to reformat the signing pages so that only the
names of those who signed the first printed draft would appear, together with the corresponding
"(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring Integrity II thus came into being. 88
According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of non-signatories in the
final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the integrity
of such documents." 89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting statements with blanks would be an open invitation to
vandals and pranksters." 90
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza's name as among the signatories in Restoring Integrity
II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a miscommunication
involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that: CHTcSE
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted signing
pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)"
signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed Restoring Integrity
I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his staff to the inclusion of the
Justice's name among the "(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice Mendoza
over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean
to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally with its contents. Also
according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement
himself as he was leaving for the United States the following week. It would later turn out that this
account was not entirely accurate. 91 (Underscoring and italics supplied.)
Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and so placed full
reliance on her account" 92 as "[t]here were indeed other faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to
indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time unable to affix their signatures physically to the
document." 93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the circumstances
surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza's signature. It would turn out that this was what actually transpired:
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean's staff talked to Justice Mendoza on the
phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement as he
fundamentally agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say that he
authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could authorize
the dean to sign it for him as he was about to leave for the United States. The dean's staff informed him
that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the Restoring Integrity Statement to him.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the
Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.
2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he went to
the College to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice
Mendoza declined to sign. 94 SaICcT
According to the Dean:
2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received
from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time the
hard copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the
U.S., he declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time, he predicted
that the Court would take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and under those
circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a former Associate
Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the Statement. 95 (Emphases
supplied.)
With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit's name in the signature page of Restoring Integrity II when he
was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen's August 10, 2010
letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it
was explained in the Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was
circulated to him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonen's staff in the
reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still
included in the reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona
that 38 members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.) 96
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the Statement that was not a
true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the main body of the Statement was unchanged in all
its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This purportedly is merely "reflective of [the
Statement's] essential nature as a 'live' public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to its message, its
signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic . . . many other printings of [the Statement] may be made in the
future, each one reflecting the same text but with more and more signatories." 97 Adverting to criminal law by
analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance where it has been made to appear in a document that a
person has participated in an act when the latter did not in fact so participate" 98 for he "did not misrepresent which
members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or
had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto." 99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01
and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of the UP
Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts
that he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement] through the appropriate channels by
transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latter's information and proper disposition with the
hope that its points would be duly considered by the Honorable Court en banc." 100 Citing Rudecon Management
Corporation v. Camacho, 101 Dean Leonen posits that the required quantum of proof has not been met in this case
and that no dubious character or motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative sanction for
violation of the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility. 102 cCSHET
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the Common
Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records, evidence and witnesses allegedly
relevant not only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving Justice Del Castillo.
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch
(Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of the Philippine
bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at
the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e
subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, that '. . .[d]ebate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 103 In signing the Statement, he believes
that "the right to speak means the right to speak effectively." 104 Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila Public
School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr., 105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be
forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen" 106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an
atmosphere of repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-
assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers." 107 Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 108 Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive
evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on
free speech). 109 He also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause
Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did." 110
ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the material issues to
be resolved in this case are as follows:
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents' academic freedom as law professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be disciplined as Members
of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as a
Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such
hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence presented, or
could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)? HCSAIa
DISCUSSION
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny
respondents their freedom of expression.
It is respondents' collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has
interfered with respondents' constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears that the
underlying assumption behind respondents' assertion is the misconception that this Court is denying them the right to
criticize the Court's decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors' dissenting
view on what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the
fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism
that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by which
respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said
Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive
and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of
the UP Law faculty's Restoring Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo was
guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth" 111 when
it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such
allegations." 112 It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. 113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the
Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to explain
those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive,
to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court .
The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas
who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the
land. . . . .
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court's alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect . 114 . . . .
(Underscoring ours.) SHaIDE
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents' freedom of expression when it stated
that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types
of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The
court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty's less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court's
honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the
comfort women's claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and
invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to
their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as
attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. 115 . . . . (Citations omitted;
emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents' submissions, this Court has held that the
right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only
citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded
the limits of fair comment and common decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez, 116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco both guilty
of contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court,
denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the
rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in
the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that
this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want
that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the
press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein
petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this
honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same
time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and
his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and
make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. 117 (Emphases supplied.) SaHIEA
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and further held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his
argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient
and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly
improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has
done, because both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction them by reason of
their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment,
particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a
more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course
which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the
press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has
been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing
the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in
order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion
promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement
with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred
in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the
court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to
intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with
good reasons, that it has acted erroneously. 118 (Emphases supplied.)
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from the minority view of
Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the
respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing at
all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents' theory, Salcedo is authority for the following
principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only
because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and
160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also
because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and
prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source
of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to
which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief. 119 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his pleading, by
accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents' Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to
the Court. cASIED
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen, 120 cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the
Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great injustice to his client committed by the
Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to
our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his
client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by
this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never
be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that:
". . . a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in
the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of
the noblest profession." 121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer,
just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers, including judicial
authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside
of it, must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive discussion of
the legal authorities sustaining this view. To quote from that decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action. HcDSaT
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not
mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden
more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He
vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts;" and the Rules of
Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
". . . the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be
obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules
of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all
insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts."
(Bradley v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those
gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as
incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of
justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the
foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
xxx xxx xxx

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting
language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to
disciplinary action. 122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.) CacTSI
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto, 123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,
respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the
administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a
constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal,
uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal
interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts,
under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. . . . .
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the
decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it
may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well
taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its
decision. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of
one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members
of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino
people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members
of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take
the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member
of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he
has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to
the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on
a very shaky foundation. 124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned even from
more recent jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson, 125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of a fine,
for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative complaint and held,
thus: cCSTHA
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering
justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the
courts and to show respect to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a
judge. As we stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot
criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail
of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right.
Nor is he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which
would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657,
665).
xxx xxx xxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on
the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
xxx xxx xxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right
carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but
freedom with responsibility. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high
esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends
necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to
degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive
and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive
language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly
baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs.
Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools
Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295
[1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]). IcEACH
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly
unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under his
duty of fidelity to his client. . . . . 126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In Saberon v. Larong, 127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for using
intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use
strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings must be dignified. 128
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair
comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 129 relied upon by respondents in the
Common Compliance, held that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press.
The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that
press for recognition. . . . . 130 (Emphasis supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial independence
and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and
institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and Gonzales, 131 where we indefinitely
suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the
Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to
deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between
free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. . . . . 132 (Emphases supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents 133 that the Statement presents no
grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest. ETIcHa
The Show Cause Resolution does not
interfere with respondents' academic
freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and
undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must point
out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can
teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for
this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled
with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure , even if
purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any previous case before
this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense
in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the
outcome of a case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Court's past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline cases,
academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence
discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed
by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the public's faith in the legal
profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case
of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v.
Monsod, 134 lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other
disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical
standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons of
professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is
inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents' proposition in the Common Compliance that their
issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal system by
initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice" under
Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping
with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct
that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given
particular situations. With more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to
provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred
portions thereof.
The Court's rulings on the submissions
regarding the charge of violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents' main arguments of freedom of expression and academic freedom, the Court
considers here the other averments in their submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents' allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their position
regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the
correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents' staunch belief that Justice Del
Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause
Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer's conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for
denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into
disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong,
should be applied in this case with more reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the
Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a public statement using contumacious language, which with
temerity they subsequently submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."
That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was one of
the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but
of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in
times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of
pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the
primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have
been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein. 135 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.) HcTEaA
Whether or not respondents' views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was
wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to be
properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to
dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the
Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as to attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism
charges against Justice Del Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo ( A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC), with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the filing of respondents'
submissions in this administrative case. As respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not
proper procedure for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no bearing on
their own administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for effective
speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen." 136 One wonders what sort of
effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in concern
for the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow
respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to
their point of view is to be offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in full in the
narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters and the
antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who would expectedly be
affected by any perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of
this Court, they still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a deferential and scholarly manner. It is
unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not do the same. These foreign authors' letters underscore the
universality of the tenet that legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due respect. The mark of
the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric
and unproductive recriminations.
As for the claim that the respondents' noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive action" on the
plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for this
Court's consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first before it was submitted to this
Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to
capture media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents' colleague on the UP Law
faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the
Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the
merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement's issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final
disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time
the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and
they had issued the Statement under the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge against
Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July
27, 2010 and its publication and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had already
been convened. If it is true that the respondents' outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of
the Court then, when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent
respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into account in the interest of fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents' reliance on
various news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof that they are being unfairly
"singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance show that it is not enough for one to
criticize the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary 137 or contempt 138 action. This Court takes into account
the nature of the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism
comes from persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose
personal or other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them.
However, when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and
worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would
have a grave implication on legal education in our country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this appears to
be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to
give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement.
However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and
undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo: HcDSaT
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the
court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need
no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions and
practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J.,
45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was
justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should
always be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or
want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this case, taking into
consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he
prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order
to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following the bad example, from
taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney
with the justice it deserves. 139 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of good
faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain
from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts
and the administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance compared to his
colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who showed true candor and sincere deference to
the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to sign the Statement. He was candid
enough to state that his agreement to the Statement was in principle and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of
discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC was the uncertainty brought about by a division of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate intent was an
element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the
effect of the language of the Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having to retract his
position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without
baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this Court expected from
respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that they recognize that they themselves may have
committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the
respondents can grasp the true import of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court
finds Prof. Vasquez's Compliance satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota
and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused from these proceedings.
However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to
be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
For even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar, civility
and respect among legal professionals of any nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of decency
and fairness.
The Court's ruling on Dean Leonen's
Compliance regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he should not be disciplinary
dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that was not a true
and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a true and faithful
reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body, there were no
differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of
the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live"
public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He
likewise stresses that he is not administratively liable because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law
faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to
be signatories thereto." 140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen's implied view that the signatures in the Statement
are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally submitted to this Court
at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that point. The value of the Statement as a
UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the Statement's
persuasive authority mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed,
it is apparent from respondents' explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of their positions as UP law
professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case. IEcaHS
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen's predicament is the fact that he did not from the
beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead,
submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out, according to
Dean Leonen's account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed
staff. First, an unnamed administrative officer in the dean's office gave the dean inaccurate information that led him to
allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff
also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in
fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a signed document
may have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are
willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate blanks is necessitated by
vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a signed document for the
Court's consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is the original signed
document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of the actual signed document. Dean Leonen
has not offered any explanation why he deviated from this practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring
Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this
Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court
submissions for court employees are accountable for the care of documents and records that may come into their
custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not contain the actual
signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen's explanations yield the answer. In the course of his explanation of his
willingness to accept his administrative officer's claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a signatory,
Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only authorized him to indicate them as
signatories and had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed,
posted and submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary
to Dean Leonen's proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person or persons
participated in an act when such person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent standards of
intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least one
person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all he had was a verbal communication of
an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that the former intended
to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the
Court, we see no reason why he could not have waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the
Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly
impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen
should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual signatures before
submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to nor counsels in
the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement was neither a pleading with a deadline
nor a required submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen's Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court is willing to
ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due
consideration of Dean Leonen's professed good intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for
failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10.
Respondents' requests for a hearing, for
production/presentation of evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in G.R. No.
162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for
access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC are unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the Court find
their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they
be allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence that were presented or may be presented in
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen's separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista's Compliance, she
similarly expressed the sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt,
under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing." 141 It is this
group of respondents' premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due process. EATCcI
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs largely from its
characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majority's purported failure to follow the
procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.
However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71
(which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this
case was docketed as an administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators. — In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the
Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme
Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme
Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner
provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be
conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to the specified
officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an
investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type hearing. We
have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of
the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been
afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in
all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. 142 (Emphases
supplied.)
In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio 143 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may
be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor. 144 (Emphases supplied.)
In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court — Br. 81, Romblon — On the Prohibition
from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law, 145 we further observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any
formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of
their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further
investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the
misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to
public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the
errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the
proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those
cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability,
without need for further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur. HADTEC
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is
required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already
established by the facts on record.
xxx xxx xxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal
investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its
disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be
heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present
matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court. 146 (Emphases supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their reservation of a
right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings any justification
for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically stated what relevant evidence,
documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the plagiarism
and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the findings of
this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to
the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for their request for access to the
records and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement
(or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from that fact, it bears repeating that
the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent
matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the respondents issued a
Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics
case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than the four corners of the Statement itself, its
various versions, news reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their
Common Compliance) and internet sources that are already of public knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the Statement and the
circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does
not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo could possibly shed light on these facts.
To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents and if there is any evidence on these matters the same
would be in their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonen's Compliance he narrated how as early as September 2010, i.e.,
before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October
19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the
Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the Statement. By
simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the
Statement's principles, could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit recognition that the
Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should simply let pass. This belies respondents' claim that it is
necessary for them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases for the
Show Cause Resolution.
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective compliances or chosen
not to make a full defense at this time, because they were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents'
own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines
regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk they have
taken.
Thus, respondents' requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence presented in, A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any
subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of
view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it
should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to
another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or
private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for
admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this
sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they
belong. aSATHE
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his Compliance to
be SATISFACTORY.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P.
Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D.
Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R.
Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig,
Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C.
Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas
Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY.
These 35 respondent law professors are REMINDED of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language
tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and
warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a
member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his
dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is EXCUSED from these proceedings. However,
he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of
responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents' requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty on Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No.
10-10-4-SC, [March 8, 2011], 660 PHIL 1-130)
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001.]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch
133, Makati City, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent is an RTC Branch Clerk of Court who appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin in a criminal case without prior permission from the Court. Hence, he was charged
under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession.
Sec. 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court also prohibits certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. However, it should be clarified that the
"private practice" of the law profession that is prohibited does not pertain to an isolated court appearance. It contemplates succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one's self to the public as a lawyer. Here, the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin does not constitute the "private practice" of the law
profession contemplated by law. Nonetheless, respondent failed to obtain a written permission therefore from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, and not the Presiding Judge of the court to which respondent is assigned, as the Judge is not the head of the department contemplated by law. And
despite the fact that respondent filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. Respondent was reprimanded with stern warning that any repetition of the act would be
dealt with more severely.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES; PROHIBITED PRIVATE PRACTICE
OF LAW PROFESSION; ELUCIDATED. — Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil
servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from
engaging in the private practice of their profession. . . . However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited,
does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer . . . . [T]he
isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.
2. ID., REVISED CIVIL SERVICE RULES; WRITTEN PERMISSION TO PRACTICE PROFESSION FROM HEAD OF DEPARTMENT, REQUIRED. — [W]hile
respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court as
required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules. . . . Wherefore,. . . . respondent is. . . . REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be
dealt with more severely.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J p:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of
his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled "People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for Falsification of
Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. 1 While respondent's letter-request was
pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator,
dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondent's authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the
said criminal case. 2 On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment. 3
In his Comment, 4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without
prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense
of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private
complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his
appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his
position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave applications approved by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying respondent's request for authorization to appear as counsel and
directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court without the required
authorization from the Court. 5 On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against
respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees," which provides:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. — Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood cousins" who belong to a "powerless family"
from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always
supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga
sought respondent's help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant,
Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to "seek vengeance" on her cousin. He explained that his
cousin's discord with Ms. Andres started when the latter's husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms.
Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their
eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their
family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga's plea to be her counsel since she did not have enough funds to pay for the
services of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the
Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only
in this particular case that he had been administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal
assistance for "humanitarian purpose." He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned
appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that
during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his
comment. cTIESa
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent's comment and referred the administrative matter to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin,
Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for "Falsification of Public Documents" before
the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the
previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as such
counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge,
Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the
respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in
the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of
his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably.
Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all
the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without
first securing permission from the Court, and considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact
that said appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt
with more severely. 6
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found
under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. The said section reads:
SECTION 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession in this case, which is
prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva, 7 we explained the meaning of the term "private practice" prohibited by the said section,
to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel
on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following
observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available
to the public for a compensation, as a source of his — livelihood or in consideration of his said services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. 8
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin
in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a
written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules, thus:
SECTION 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case
of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of
the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time
so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in
the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. 9
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18,
1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications corresponding to
the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge
of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern
warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Office of the Court Administrator v. Ladaga, A.M. No. P-99-1287 (Resolution), [January 26, 2001], 403 PHIL 228-235)
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC. December 7, 2010.]
JOVITO S. OLAZO, complainant, vs. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (respondent) filed by
Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02, 1 Rule 6.03 2 and Rule 1.01 3 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.
Factual Background
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan
in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and
declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, 4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No.
172, 5 issued on October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to purchase
the lands declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was
one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the
respondent's district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
In the complaint, 6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a member of
the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant's sales application because of his personal interest
over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainant's
father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant's sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The
complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment
of the latter's alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of
rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent's deceased
wife. IcHSCT
As a result of the respondent's abuse of his official functions, the complainant's sales application was denied. The
conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given due course by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the
complainant's brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights
over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent's promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the
conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights
over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard
executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application
by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7 (b) (2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year
prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
In his Comment, 7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against
him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was nominated as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for
alleged violation of Section 3 (e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent events.
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed these rights to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo's rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land (between Miguel
Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR
found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over the subject land was given due course. The
respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by the
Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court. aAcDSC
The respondent also advanced the following defenses:
(1) He denied the complainant's allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the respondent had been
orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this allegation was without
corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the
complainant's sister.
(2) He denied the complainant's allegation that he offered the complainant P50,000.00 for the subject land and that
he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over
the subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the subject land.
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo's affidavit where the latter
asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth.
(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over the subject
land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The
respondent insisted that the money he extended to them was a form of loan.
(5) The respondent's participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez involved
the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.
(6) Manuel's belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, regarding
what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo,
dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his father
Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to
the transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez,
and the withdrawal of his father's application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez's application.
(7) The complainant's allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the subject
land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision was clear
that the complainant had no rights over the subject land. TSacAE
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He alleged that
during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting
claims and their respective supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office
ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the
DENR.
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since the
provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in private law practice and to those
who, though prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active
practice of law. 8 In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee
on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a member.
The Court's Ruling
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. 9 He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his
misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. 10
The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent's actions constitute a breach of the standard
ethical conduct — first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and
second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously
connected with.
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to
dismiss the administrative complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed
by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No.
6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code
of Professional Responsibility. HTDCAS
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more
exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny
under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the
interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions. 11
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the following
restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2)
advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We previously held that the
restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private interests. 12
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez, 13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali
v. Bubong, 14 we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives.
We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of the
intricacies of the law to benefit relatives. 15
In Vitriolo v. Dasig, 16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education) of
extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 17 We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an
employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based
on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the complainant who had a pending application for visas before his
office. 18
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano 19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded and received money from
the complainant who had a pending case before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the respondent
abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant's sales application was ever brought before the Committee on
Awards. By the complaint's own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before the Land Management
Bureau. By 1996, the complainant's sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR
due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only
on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the
respondent's elective public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private interests in the
discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when the
respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note
in this regard that the denial of the complainant's sales application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the
Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainant's allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject land does not specify
how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel
Olazo, dated May 25, 2003, 20 categorically stating that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a
contracting party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo's disclaimer is the
nearest relevant statement on the respondent's alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondent's favor.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his claim that the
respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional
Director-NCR; 21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996; 22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996 23 ), do
not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely
showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also
showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are
neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the
decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainant's sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to the
Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states
on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly
exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo. aTIEcA
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation — backed by corroborating evidence — of the
nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In
her affidavits dated May 25, 2003 24 and July 21, 2010, 25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondent's claim that the sums of
money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment
and hospitalization expenses.
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent's claim that the latter's involvement was
limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and
Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the
amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land. 26
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when the sums of
money were extended by the respondent — on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when
the Deed of Conveyance 27 over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were
extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondent's
allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and,
also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from the government
service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled
"Assurance" where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing
pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod, 28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law
is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private practice after their
separation from the service.
Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: aDHCAE
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. — Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; . . .
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned
cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case
the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency. 29 By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following
conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with his or her official functions. 30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In
case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No.
6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the
government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the
said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously
interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings. 31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the
ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in
a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales application
covering Manuel's land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to
sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the
respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., 32 we specifically described
private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's
self to the public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondent's act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of
evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance
was intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in
this regard against the respondent's favor. TcCEDS
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion, we
already struck down the complainant's allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as
a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant's claim that the respondent violated paragraph 4
(1) 33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that
his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez's qualifications to apply for a sales application
over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated
April 3, 2004, 34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by
this finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court of
Appeals 35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we
dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was
committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision. 36
All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the
burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary
powers. 37 The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense, 38 until the burden shifts to him/her because
of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense. 39
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the complainant's failure to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the Court's
disciplinary power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Olazo v. Tinga, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, [December 7, 2010], 651 PHIL 290-308)
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997.]
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC SERVICE (R.A. 6713); ENUNCIATES THE CONDUCT REQUIRED OF A
PUBLIC SERVANT. — The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713)inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics
and utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . . refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of
every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary.
2. ID.; ATTORNEY; WHEN USE OF SUCH TITLE CAN BE CONSIDERED PROPER. — As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion
to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter
is an attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully take the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; COURT PERSONNEL; A JUDICIAL EMPLOYEE IS EXPECTED TO ACCORD RESPECT TO A PERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
AT ALL TIMES. — Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed
— however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith." Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot
justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for
most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected
that he accord respect for the person and the right of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation
from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
DECISION
NARVASA, C .J p:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a
District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan
was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
". . . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent
was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales
agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and
unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the
bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with
the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record
that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract
against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The
envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage — PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection
Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable
from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
" . . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the
'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its
sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract
itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds
between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia
Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in
all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions
from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management
& Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming
sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's
UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage, and . . .
the refund of . . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified
complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage — PD 26." 1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly
use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence
to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and
coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that notices of
resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty.
Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk
of Court," but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was
the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis;
Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar,"
but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ." 4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones, 5 Alauya requested
the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. 6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were
done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his
signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered
"undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a
total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with
Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he
gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: " Free
Postage — PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as he
knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed
with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a
title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken
for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not
consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank
contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him;
despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject of his supposed agreement with
Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she
promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with
Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out,
receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with
unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and
April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya"
— in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA." cda
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi)
with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor
and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . . (his) rights and
interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured
and pursued the housing loan without . . . (his) authority and against . . . (his) will," and "concealed the
real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only
what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings
and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713)inter alia enunciates the State
policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that
"(p)ublic officials and employees . . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than once has this Court emphasized
that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the
presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all
times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary." 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of
others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law
requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent
with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of
conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person
and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity.
His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction
that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the
Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who
has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in
the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved
to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized
to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment.
His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately
establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar
or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, [February 24, 1997], 335 PHIL 1096-1106)
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 3360. January 30, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW; CASE AT BAR. — The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law
imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she
had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: "Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." "Sec. 28. Suspension of Attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court
of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE, VALID GROUND THEREFOR; RATIONALE. — The crimes of which respondent was convicted also
import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the
good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, this Court stressed that: "the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law."
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM p:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar,
asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated
value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales
proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984,
respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued
three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also
for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for
payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders
Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no
arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her
obligations to Ms. Marquez. LLpr
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for
estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as
Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated
25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced
respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 85-38359;.
(c) to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
(d) to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and
to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in
addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision reads as follows:
"For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense for
(sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the
practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in
accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be
forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED." 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a
Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to
the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of
Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared
that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for
filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had
lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
"that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a painful penalty aggravating the
lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the
trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she
is innocent of the offenses charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-
appellee."
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to
complainant Ms. Marquez. llcd
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add
that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order.
In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
"xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. xxx The thrust
of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense
against public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the
public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest." 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
"Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." (Emphasis supplied)

"Sec. 28. Suspension of Attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes
named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises." (Emphasis supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not)
relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
"the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law." 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to
the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent. prLL
||| (People v. Tuanda, A.C. No. 3360 (Resolution), [January 30, 1990])
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 533. June 17, 1993.]
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW, MEANING AND EXTENT OF. — Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. In the practice of
his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which
possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. When a person
participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an
attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with
respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
2. ID.; ID.; LEGAL SUPPORT SERVICES IN CASE AT BAR CONSTITUTE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in
and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law." The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit: . . . While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoptation, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were
merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of
action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely
within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. The aforesaid
conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales: . . .
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARALEGAL OR LEGAL ASSISTANT; CONCEPT IN THE UNITED STATES. — Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted
by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. As the concept of the "paralegal" or
"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There
are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT IN THE PHILIPPINES. — In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. (Illustrations: . . .)
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL POLICY ON PARALEGAL. — We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should
first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. . . . Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted
intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies
to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW IN CASE AT BAR CANNOT BE PERFORMED BY PARALEGALS; REASON. — It should be noted that in our
jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. . . .
7. ID.; ADVERTISEMENT BY LAWYER; RULE. — Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of
value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of
the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHARACTER AND CONDUCT AS BEST ADVERTISEMENT. — We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as
well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome
result of propaganda.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISEMENT OF TALENT OR SKILL. — The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. . . .
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed
by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented." . . . The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law
firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in
the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory
but not under a designation of special branch of law.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR LAW LIST. — The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management
or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task,
which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall
under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION IN BATES, ET AL. vs. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA (433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691) AS TO PUBLICATION
OF LEGAL FEES, NOT APPLICABLE; REASONS. — The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification
relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to
the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present
Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state." This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and
when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar. It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly with
respect to these characteristics of lawyers: . . . Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of
the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately
by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J p:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of Annexes À' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law." cdrep
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the
law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
herein before quoted. cdphil
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van
O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Women
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federation International de
Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar
associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with
appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of. cdphil
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda
submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal
support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to
layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitute
practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations.
Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed 4 .
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used
by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More
importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears with
(the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the
bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a
person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as
to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary
to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being
offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize a Guam divorce, and
any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce, is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos
can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam
for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the
very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice. LibLex
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license. LLpr
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions
one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example
alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or
committed (a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services
as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is
that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements
in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited
from further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering
such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and
retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit
such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields,
such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal
profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer
using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any
form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring
prevention of, illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members
of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts
which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void
under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding
such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable
of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take,
and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a
clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services. cdrep
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself
as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate
and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Articles of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to
lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines"
(pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public
under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within
the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to
say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial
advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Perkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense.
From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its
reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but
includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal rights and then
take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court (See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1948 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded
by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is
an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice
against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted
as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of
the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are
subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the
persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are, to wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support
services" to lawyers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s)
of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside the court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly
regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investment Law of the Philippines and such
other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid laws, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advises based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge
and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely
and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection of
the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in
the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified
to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions as an aid to the administration of justice, there are
in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the
general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable
Court may decide to take measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be
dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by
advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by
lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public
from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services." 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters, will be given to them
if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent
is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved
in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as
provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of
lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in
bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage
which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of
contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to
advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of this petition, for one
(cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so
that such as act could become justifiable. LLphil
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in
this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here,
when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful
because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our
Code of Morals should not be done. LLjur
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the
Bar. 10
6. Federacion International de Abogadas:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the
business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge
of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
". . . Of necessity, no one . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is
familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which
the law forbids. It seems . . . clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice
of law . . .. It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with the broad features of the law . . .. Our knowledge of the law — accurate
or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving
others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar
with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws
plans and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
"But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by
the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
"It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
"If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise
him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer
always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of
industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate
special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge
and skill in such matters, and without regard to legal training or lack of it. More recently, consultants like
the defendant have tendered to the smaller employers the same service that the larger employers get from
their own specialized staff.

"The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about
declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the
technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
"In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular
client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This,
of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's
primary efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within
which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a
welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
"Another branch of defendant's work is the representation of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of
law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it.
But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs. cdphil
"Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The
rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear ìn person, or by counsel,
or by other representative.' Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. `Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and òther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal."
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-
156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of
the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar;
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succinctly
states the rule of conduct:
"Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with
the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity."
1.10. In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A", Petition). Services
on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or
a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in Rx for
Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services, then it is engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas
(See Annexes "A" and "B", Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute practice of law.
The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines by
himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals
may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
"It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amounts to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted
by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . Apparently it is urged that the
conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled
out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted
texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status
of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport `to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in the publication
and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitute the unlawful practice of law . . .. There
being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial
law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an
interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal
contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the
charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation
of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of
law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation
agreement sought and should be affirmed." (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky,
supra at p. 101.)
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory." It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute
practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary
for the judicious disposition of this case.
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion)
that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles
2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily
related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services" or "legal support services",
and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for a proper determination of the
issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial
construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of
the term, some of which we now take into account. LLjur
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending
in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, inorder to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers
with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the later to look after the case
in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct
with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)."
This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177), stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management
of, such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect
of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing
In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144)."
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria
to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
"Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers,
which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-
government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records
or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they
can avail of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation
of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management
of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts, and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services." 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how,
such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention
that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will
simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her
on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for
which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court
since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research,
giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of
the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure,
main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the
Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors, are "specialists" in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery
of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it
caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "When they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's
what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms, and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been
categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists."
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken
care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital, the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a
while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa ospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a
common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which require more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich realtive who
died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your
relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with that problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relative's will, then
you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence
to support the case." 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is
engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. prcd
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the
main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of
law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction where from respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis.
The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted
to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are
allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by
the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights,
claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable
persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an
occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be
aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities
there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the
"paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public.
One of the major standards, or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the
Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are
also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of
Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered, as paralegal
service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation
in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a
person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered
by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to
be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of
their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. 37 The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate
that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Estanislao R. Bavot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-
changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions
to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two
broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and
other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact
of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of
a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may
a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the
name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication
of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory
but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to
task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so
hold that the time definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule
involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar. LLpr
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude
of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with
respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services
except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine
Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding
will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic,
Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect
since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is,
of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present
state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services. llcd
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General
who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred
to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and
purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance
herewith.
||| (Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553 (Resolution), [June 17, 1993], 295 PHIL 295-492)
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ. June 20, 2012.]
JUVY P. CIOCON-REER, ANGELINA P. CIOCON, MARIVIT P. CIOCON-HERNANDEZ, and REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR., complainants, vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO C. LUBAO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, General Santos City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, Angelina P. Ciocon, Marivit P. Ciocon-Hernandez, and Remberto C. Karaan, Sr.
(complainants) filed an administrative complaint against Judge Antonio C. Lubao (Judge Lubao) of the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City, Branch 22, for gross ignorance of the law, rules or procedures; gross incompetence and
inefficiency; violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019; violations of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Code; violations of pertinent provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, The New Code of Judicial Conduct per A.M.
No. 03-05-01-SC, and Canons of Judicial Ethics; and dishonesty and grave misconduct.
The Antecedent Facts
Complainants are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7819 (Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al. v. Gaspar Mayo, et al.) for
Unlawful Detainer, Damages, Injunction, etc., an appealed case from the Municipal Trial Court of General Santos City,
Branch 3. Complainants alleged that on 12 September 2008, Judge Lubao issued an Order directing the parties to submit
their respective memoranda within 30 days from receipt of the order. Complainants further alleged that on 30 September
2008, a copy of the order was sent by registered mail to the defendants, which they should have received within one week
or on 7 October 2008. Complainants alleged that the 30-day period within which to submit memoranda expired on 6
November 2008. Since the defendants failed to submit their memorandum on 6 November 2008, complainants alleged
that they should be deemed to have waived their right to adduce evidence and Judge Lubao should have decided the case.
Yet, four months passed from 6 November 2008 and Judge Lubao still failed to make his decision. DaScHC
In his Comment, Judge Lubao explained that the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda on
12 September 2008. The Order was sent to the parties through registered mail on 30 September 2008. Judge Lubao
alleged that the plaintiffs submitted their memorandum on 10 November 2008 but the court did not receive the registry
return card on the notice to the defendants. On 10 December 2008, the branch clerk of court sent a letter-request to the
Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order of 12 September 2008, sent under
Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the defendants. However, the court did not receive any reply from the Post
Office.
Judge Lubao further explained that on 20 May 2009, for the greater interest of substantial justice, the defendants
were given their last chance to submit their memorandum within 30 days from receipt of the order. In the same order, he
directed the plaintiffs to coordinate with the branch sheriff for personal delivery of the order to the defendants. However,
the plaintiffs failed to coordinate with the branch sheriff and the order was sent to the defendants, again by registered
mail, only on 17 June 2009.
Judge Lubao informed the Court that complainant Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (Karaan) is engaging in the practice of
law even though he is not a lawyer. Judge Lubao asked this Court to require Karaan to show cause why he should not be
cited in contempt for unauthorized practice of law.
Karaan filed a supplemental complaint alleging that Judge Lubao's failure to submit his comment on time to
complainants' administrative complaint is a violation of the existing rules and procedure and amounts to gross ignorance
of the law. As regards his alleged unauthorized practice of law, Karaan alleged that Judge Lubao was merely trying to
evade the issues at hand.
The Findings of the OCA
In its Memorandum dated 13 April 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reported that a verification
from the Docket and Clearance Division of its Office revealed that Karaan also filed numerous administrative
complaints 1 against judges from different courts, all of which were dismissed by this Court.
In its evaluation of the case, the OCA found that there was no evidence to show that the orders issued by Judge
Lubao were tainted with fraud, dishonesty or bad faith. The OCA stated that the matters raised by complainants could
only be questioned through judicial remedies under the Rules of Court and not by way of an administrative complaint.
The OCA stated that Karaan could not simply assume that the order of 12 September 2008 had been received by the
defendants without the registry return card which was not returned to the trial court. DTcACa
The OCA found that based on the pleadings attached to the records, it would appear that Karaan was engaged in
the practice of law. The OCA also noted the numerous frivolous and administrative complaints filed by Karaan against
several judges which tend to mock the judicial system.
The OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Lubao for lack of merit. The OCA further
recommended that Karaan be required to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for violation of
Section 3 (e), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In its Resolution dated 24 November 2010, this Court dismissed the complaint against Judge Lubao for being
judicial in nature and for lack of merit. This Court likewise directed Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt for violating Section 3 (e), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Karaan filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Lubao. Karaan denied
that he had been assuming to be an attorney or an officer of the court and acting as such without authority. He alleged that
he did not indicate any PTR, Attorney's Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number in his documents. He further stated that
A.M. No. 07-1674 filed against Judge Lindo was not actually dismissed as reported by the OCA.
Karaan thereafter filed Supplemental Arguments to the motion for reconsideration and compliance to the show
cause order. Karaan reiterated that he never represented himself to anyone as a lawyer or officer of the court and that his
paralegal services, rendered free of charge, were all for the public good. He stated that he assists organizations which
represent the interests of senior citizens, the indigents, and members of the community with limited means. HAEDIS
In a Memorandum dated 8 November 2011, the OCA found no merit in the motion for reconsideration. The OCA
noted Judge Lubao's explanation that the case was summarily dismissed by the municipal trial court without service of
summons on the defendants. Thus, Judge Lubao deemed it proper to issue the order requiring all parties to submit their
memorandum to give all concerned the opportunity to be heard. The OCA stated that the remedy against Judge Lubao's
action was judicial in nature. The OCA found that the claim of Karaan that he could prove the receipt of the order by one
Mr. Mayo is immaterial because it was not in the records of the case where Judge Karaan based his order.
The OCA noted that Karaan, through the use of intemperate and slanderous language, continually attributed all
sorts of malicious motives and nefarious schemes to Judge Lubao regarding the conduct of his official function but failed
to substantiate his allegations. The OCA further noted that this case is just one of the many cases Karaan filed against
various judges in other courts where the same pattern of accusations could be observed.
The OCA found Karaan's explanation on the show cause order unsatisfactory. The OCA noted Karaan's modus
operandi of offering free paralegal advice and then making the parties execute a special power of attorney that would
make him an agent of the litigants and would allow him to file suits, pleadings and motions with himself as one of the
plaintiffs acting on behalf of his "clients." The OCA noted that Karaan's services, on behalf of the underprivileged he
claimed to be helping, fall within the practice of law. The OCA recommended that Karaan be declared liable for indirect
contempt and be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment for 10 days at the Manila City Jail and to pay a fine of P1,000
with a warning that a repetition of any of the offenses, or any similar or other offense, against the courts, judges or court
employees will merit more serious sanctions.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the OCA's recommendation that the motion for reconsideration of the Court's 24 November 2010
Resolution dismissing the complaint against Judge Lubao has no merit. acCDSH
Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a corresponding penalty. In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. 2 We agree with
the OCA that the remedy of the complainants in this case is judicial in nature. Hence, the denial of their motion for
reconsideration of this Court's 24 November 2010 Resolution dismissing the administrative case against Judge Lubao is in
order. As the OCA stated, Karaan could not make assumptions as to when the defendants received the copy of Judge
Lubao's order without the registry return receipt. While Karaan claimed that he knew when one of the parties received a
copy of the order, this claim was unsupported by evidence and was not in the records of the case when Judge Lubao
issued his 20 May 2009 Order giving the defendants their last chance to submit their memorandum. The records would
also show that Judge Lubao had been very careful in his actions on the case, as his branch clerk of court even wrote the
Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order of 12 September 2008, sent under
Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the defendants. There was no evidence that Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily or in
bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao could not be faulted for trying to give all the parties an opportunity to be heard
considering that the records of the case would show that the court a quo summarily dismissed the case without issuing
summons to the defendants.
We likewise agree with the OCA that Karaan was engaged in unauthorized practice of law.
In Cayetano v. Monsod, 3 the Court ruled that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. 4 Generally, to practice law is to render
any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. 5 Here, the OCA was able to establish the pattern
in Karaan's unauthorized practice of law. He would require the parties to execute a special power of attorney in his favor
to allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as their attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint and
other pleadings "acting for and in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact, agent or representative" of the parties. The fact
that Karaan did not indicate in the pleadings that he was a member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorney's Roll, or MCLE
Compliance Number does not detract from the fact that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in the practice of law.
Under Section 3 (e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person "[a]ssuming to be an attorney or an
officer of a court, and acting as such without authority," is liable for indirect contempt of court. Under Section 7 of the
same rules, a respondent adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank "may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) months, or both." If a respondent is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he "may be
punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both." aTEADI
Following the ruling of this Court in In re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 6 the OCA recommended that Karaan be cited
for indirect contempt and be sentenced to serve an imprisonment of ten days at the Manila City Jail, and to pay a fine of
P1,000 with a warning that a repetition of any of the offenses, or any similar or other offense against the courts, judges or
court employees will merit further and more serious sanctions. The OCA further recommended that a memorandum be
issued to all courts of the land to notify the judges and court employees of Karaan's unauthorized practice of law and to
report to the OCA any further appearance to be made by Karaan. However, the records would show that Karaan is already
71 years old. In consideration of his old age and his state of health, we deem it proper to remove the penalty of
imprisonment as recommended by the OCA and instead increase the recommended fine to P10,000.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for reconsideration of the Court's Resolution dated 24 November 2010
dismissing the complaint against Judge Antonio C. Lubao for being judicial in nature. We find REMBERTO C.
KARAAN, SR. GUILTY of indirect contempt under Section 3 (e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
impose on him a Fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land for their guidance and information. The courts and
court employees are further directed to report to the Office of the Court Administrator any further appearance by
Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. before their sala.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ciocon-Reer v. Lubao, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ (Resolution), [June 20, 2012], 688 PHIL 339-347)
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 11754. October 3, 2017.]
JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS, respondents.
DECISION
TIJAM, J p:
This administrative case arose from a verified Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) by complainant Joaquin G. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) against respondents Atty. Edgardo O. Era (Atty. Era) and Atty. Diane
Karen B. Bragas (Atty. Bragas) for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders
Corporation entitled Gil Abucejo, Edgar Besmano, Efren Sager, Darlito Sosa, Gerardo G. Talosa, and Salvador Villanueva v.
Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation and/or Joaquin G. Bonifacio, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-05953-03.
Complainants therein (Abucejo Group) were represented by Era and Associates Law Office through Atty. Era. 2
On June 15, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal dismissal and, consequently,
ordered them to pay Abucejo Group their separation pay, full backwages and pro-rated 13th month pay. More specifically,
Bonifacio and his corporation were ordered to pay a partially computed amount of P674,128 for the separation pay and full
backwages, and P16,050.65 for the 13th month pay. 3 Bonifacio and the corporation brought their case up to the Supreme Court
but they suffered the same fate as their appeals and motions were decided against them. 4
Thus, on January 26, 2006, a Writ of Execution 5 was issued to implement the June 15, 2004 Decision. A Notice of
Garnishment dated February 6, 2006 was likewise issued. 6 Two alias writs dated May 8, 2008 7 and April 16, 2013 8 were later
on issued, directing the sheriff to collect the sum of P4,012,166.43, representing the judgment award plus interest and attorney's
fees.
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests
entitled Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo O. Era, docketed as A.C. No. 6664. 9 In a July 16, 2013 Decision, this Court
found Atty. Era guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating
Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from
the practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his commission
of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA and entered
m [sic] his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator,
as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED. 10
On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties in the business
establishment was conducted to implement the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. He attended the public auction
and tendered a bid for his clients who were declared the highest bidders. On the same day, a certificate of sale was issued, which
Atty. Era presented to the corporation's officers and employees who were there at that time. Armed with such documents, Atty.
Era led the pulling out of the subject properties but eventually stopped to negotiate with Bonifacio's children for the payment of
the judgment award instead of pulling out the auctioned properties. Atty. Era summoned Bonifacio's children to continue with the
negotiation in his law office. On behalf of his clients, their counter-offer for the satisfaction of the judgment award went from P6
Million to P9 Million. 11
As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's business
establishment together with their clients and several men, and forced open the establishment to pull out the auctioned properties.
This was evidenced by the videos presented by Bonifacio in the instant administrative complaint. 12
This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and trespassing with the Office of
the City Prosecutor, Pasay City. In its Resolution 13 dated March 31, 2014, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable
cause to indict Attys. Era and Bragas for grave coercion. 14
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and this Court sometime in February
and April, 2014 with regard to the subject labor case. 15
On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint. 16
In their Answer, 17 Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that Bonifacio has no personal knowledge as to what transpired on
November 28, 2013 and December 3, 2013 as the latter was not present therein at that time. 18 Hence, his allegations of force,
threat, and intimidation in the execution of the judgment is without basis. 19 In his defense, Atty. Era further argued that he did
not violate the Court's order of suspension from the practice of law as he merely acted as his clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a
Special Power of Attorney 20 (SPA) dated May 3, 2006. It is Atty. Era's theory that with such SPA, he was not engaged in the
practice of law in representing his clients in the implementation of the alias writ. He added that he never signed any document or
pleading on behalf of his clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being an associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she
was merely representing the Abucejo Group as said law firm's clients. Anent the Php6 Million to 9 Million counter-offer that they
made, Attys. Era and Bragas explained that the parties were still on negotiation, hence, both parties are free to have their own
computations, which they could respectively accept or otherwise. 21
In his Report and Recommendation 22 dated March 17, 2015, Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera
recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The Investigating Commissioner found nothing wrong with the indication of a suspended lawyer's name in a pleading
considering that the same was not signed by the latter. There was also no proof that a pleading was prepared by Atty. Era. On the
other hand, there was no impediment against Atty. Bragas to sign the pleadings. There was also no proof that in doing so, Atty.
Bragas was assisting suspended Atty. Era in filing a pleading. Neither the presence of Atty. Era during the public auction and the
negotiations was an implication or proof that Atty. Era was engaging in the practice of law during his suspension. According to
the Investigating Commissioner, anybody, not exclusively lawyers, can be present at an auction sale or negotiation.
As to whether Attys. Era and Bragas violated any rules/laws in the implementation of the judgment by using force,
threat, and intimidation, the Investigating Commissioner noted that complainant contradicted such imputations by filing the
following pleadings, to wit: (1) a Motion to Close and Terminate Case 23 dated December 18, 2013, acknowledging the full
satisfaction of the judgment award and even prayed for Attys. Era and Bragas' clients to take possession of the remaining
machines in his business establishment; (2) a Manifestation 24 dated March 12, 2014, wherein complainant stated that he has
surrendered the vehicles listed in the certificate of sale; (3) an Omnibus Motion with Entry of Appearance Motion to Withdraw
and Motion to Reiterate Motion to Close and Terminate Case and release of TRO Bond 25 dated February 4, 2014; (4) A Motion
for Consignation with Motion to Lift Levy 26 dated October 29, 2014; and (5) a Motion to Withdraw Complaint 27 dated
December 10, 2013 on the criminal case for Malicious Mischief, Robbery, and Trespassing against Attys. Era and Bragas. In fine,
the Investigating Commissioner ratiocinated that in acknowledging the satisfaction of the judgment in the labor case and
withdrawing the criminal case that he filed against Attys. Era and Bragas with regard to the implementation of the said judgment,
complainant contradicted and demolished his own allegation that the satisfaction of the judgment was improperly and unlawfully
implemented. 28
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the administrative charges against Attys. Era and Bragas be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 29
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), in its Resolution No. XXI-2015-270 30 dated April 18, 2015 reversed and set
aside the Investigating Commissioner's findings and conclusions:
RESOLUTION No. XXI-2015-270
CBD Case No. 14-4300
Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs.
Atty. Edgardo O. Era and
Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and considering Atty. Era's continued engagement in the practice of law during the
period of his suspension by admittedly participating in the negotiation for the payment of money judgment
including pegging of interest he acted as his clients advocate instead as an agent in view of the presence also of
his client in the negotiation, for holding office and admittedly summoned the complainant's children to
determine the money judgment. Hence, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) years.
RESOLVED FURTHER, for her assistance in the unauthorized practice of law of Atty. Edgardo O.
Era, Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month.
In its Extended Resolution 31 dated October 17, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Era's argument that he
merely acted pursuant to an SPA given to him untenable. The Board explained that the invoked SPA gave Atty. Era the authority
to appear and represent the Abucejo Group only on the May 4, 2006 auction and did not include the November 28, 2013 auction.
Also, while he was authorized to receive payment on behalf of his clients, the SPA specifically stated that said payments should
be made in the form of checks and not machinery or property. Thus, Atty. Era had no authority under the SPA to represent his
clients during the November 28, 2013 auction and to pull out and receive the corporation's machines as payment of the judgment
award. At any rate, according to the Board, Atty. Era's clients relied on his legal knowledge in having the judgment award
satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era violated Section 28, 32 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 33
Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for allowing and assisting Atty. Era to engage in an
unauthorized practice of law. The Board concluded that Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts during the satisfaction of
the alias writ could be performed only by a member of the bar in good standing. 34
Pursuant to Section 12 (b), 35 Rule 139-B of the Rules, the records of the instant case were transmitted to this Court.
No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of June 29, 2017.
Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final action on the instant administrative case, the issues being: (1)
Did Atty. Era engage in the practice of law during his suspension therefrom that would warrant another disciplinary action against
him?; and (2) In the affirmative, is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Atty. Era in his illegal practice of law that
would likewise warrant this Court's exercise of its disciplining authority against her?
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.
Atty. Era's acts constituted
"practice of law."
On this matter, Our pronouncement in the landmark case of Renato L. Cayetano v. Christian Monsod, et al. 36 is on
point. Thus, We quote herein the relevant portions of the said Decision, viz.:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited
to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office
where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act
or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of
a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. pp. 262, 263).
xxx xxx xxx
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute." (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
23) 37 (Emphasis supplied)
In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamante, 38 We succinctly ruled that the term practice of law
implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying
oneself as an attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the
general practice of law. 39
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning clients in
the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured the certificate of sale
and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and employees present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that
his clients are now the new owners of the subject properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull
out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his law office as regards the payment of the judgment award
with interest instead of pulling out the properties. 40
It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the same may not be exclusively for
lawyers, as opined by the Investigating Commissioner. However, in this case, as aptly put by the Board in its Resolution, Atty.
Era's acts clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal effects and consequences of each course of action
in the satisfaction of the judgment award. 41 Precisely, this is why his clients chose Atty. Era to represent them in the public
auction and in any negotiation/settlement with the corporation arising from the labor case as stated in the SPA being invoked by
Atty. Era. 42 Such trained legal mind is what his clients were relying upon in seeking redress for their claims. This is evident
from the fact that they agreed not to enter into any amicable settlement without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the latter
being their lawyer. 43 It could readily be seen that the said SPA was executed by reason of Atty. Era being their legal counsel.
Thus, We are one with the Board's submission that the said SPA cannot be invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he was not
engaged in the practice of law in performing the acts above-cited as such SPA cunningly undermines the suspension ordered by
this Court against Atty. Era, which We cannot countenance.
Atty. Era was engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law during
his suspension
As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years in this Court's Decision dated
July 16, 2013. He performed the above-cited acts on the same year, specifically November to December 2013. Indubitably, Atty.
Era was engaged in an unauthorized law practice.
Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27, 44 Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional maneuver to circumvent the
suspension order not only reflects his insubordination to authority but also his disrespect to this Court's lawful order which
warrants reproach. Members of the bar, above anyone else, are called upon to obey court orders and processes. 45 Graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their
processes. 46
This case is not novel. We had previously disciplined erring lawyers who continue in their practice despite being
suspended by the Court. In Rodrigo A. Molina v. Atty. Ceferino R. Magat, 47 this Court suspended Atty. Magat from the practice
of law for practicing his profession despite this Court's previous order of suspension. Likewise in another case, We suspended a
lawyer for continuing in her practice despite the clear language of this Court's suspension order. 48
In view of the foregoing, We agree with the Board of Governors' Resolution, finding Atty. Era guilty of willfully
disobeying the lawful order of this Court warranting the exercise of Our disciplining authority. We also adopt the Board's
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed upon Atty. Era, i.e., three years suspension from the practice of law, taking into
account that this is his second infraction.
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty.
Era in his unauthorized practice of
law and, thus, must likewise be
reproved.
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet, she
allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR, specifically:
CANON 9 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is founded
upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice be limited only to individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. 49
As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law practice could be
performed only by a member of the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence, she should have not
participated to such transgression.
Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to circumvent the suspension order. The factual circumstances
of the case clearly shows that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm's clients during
the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who admittedly was the one actively performing all acts pertaining
to the labor case he was handling.
Considering the foregoing, We also adopt the Board's recommendation as regards Atty. Bragas' guilt in the violation of
the CPR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's
lawful order and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Diane Karen B.
Bragas is likewise found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, effective immediately from receipt of this Decision. Also, both
Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense, or a commission of another offense will
warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondents as members of the Bar, and copies
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Bonifacio v. Era, A.C. No. 11754, [October 3, 2017], 819 PHIL 170-185)

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 230642. September 10, 2019.]

[G.R. No. 242954. September 10, 2019.]

J.C. REYES, JR., J p:

LEBMO No. 2 Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law Program

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LEBMC No. 10 September 21, 2017 Suspension of Classes

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LEBMC No. 16 Clarification to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016

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Order Annual Law Publication Requirements

Chairman Memorandum Restorative Justice to be Added as Elective Subject

[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

[A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. March 8, 2011.]

[A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001.]

[A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC. December 7, 2010.]

JOVITO S. OLAZO, complainant, vs. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), respondent.

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997.]

[A.C. No. 3360. January 30, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

[B.M. No. 533. June 17, 1993.]

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

[A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ. June 20, 2012.]

[A.C. No. 11754. October 3, 2017.]

JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS, respondents.

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