Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803)  Jefferson was sworn into office on 4 March
Facts
 This decision arose out of the intense rivalry
between Presidents John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.
 Prior to Jefferson’s inauguration,
Adams nominated approximately 60 Federalist
supporters to circuit judge and justice of the peace
positions which the Federalist-controlled Congress had
created under the Judiciary Act 1801.  Most of the
judges were appointed, but some had not had their
appointments delivered by the time of Jefferson’s
inauguration.
 Jefferson was sworn into office on 4 March
1801. Jefferson instructed his Secretary of State, James
Madison, to withhold undelivered appointments.
 Jefferson maintained that the appointments void
due to not being delivered in time. William Marbury was
one of the prospective judges who had not had their
appointment delivered on time. Madison refused to hand
it to Marbury.
Issues
 Did Marbury have a right to his appointment?
 If so, did Marbury have a legal remedy or relief
for him to reclaim it?
 If so, could the US Supreme Court legally issue
that remedy to Marbury?
 KB Home
 Constitutional Law
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803)
Facts
 This decision arose out of the intense rivalry
between Presidents John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.
 Prior to Jefferson’s inauguration,
Adams nominated approximately 60 Federalist
supporters to circuit judge and justice of the peace
positions which the Federalist-controlled Congress had
created under the Judiciary Act 1801.  Most of the
judges were appointed, but some had not had their
appointments delivered by the time of Jefferson’s
inauguration.
1801. Jefferson instructed his Secretary of State, James
Madison, to withhold undelivered appointments.
 Jefferson maintained that the appointments void
due to not being delivered in time. William Marbury was
one of the prospective judges who had not had their
appointment delivered on time. Madison refused to hand
it to Marbury.
Issues
 Did Marbury have a right to his appointment?
 If so, did Marbury have a legal remedy or relief
for him to reclaim it?
 If so, could the US Supreme Court legally issue
that remedy to Marbury?
Held
 The US Supreme Court (led by Chief Justice
John Marshall) held that Marbury did have a right to his
appointment as it had been signed and sealed.  The
delivery of the appointments were a formality and
custom, rather than part of the legal process.
 As a result, Marbury clearly had a legal right to
relief – the Court held that a writ of mandamus was the
appropriate remedy.
 Marshall  went on to declare that the Court had
no power to issue a writ of mandamus to Marbury
because the relevant provision of the Judiciary Act 1801
was unconstitutional.
 Section 13 of the Act was inconsistent with
Article III, Section 2 of the US Constitution, which stated
(in part) that “the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction” in “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party,” and that “in all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction.”
 In doing so, Marshall had read into the law the
Court’s power of “judicial review”.
 KB Home
 Constitutional Law
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803)
Facts
 This decision arose out of the intense rivalry
between Presidents John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.
 Prior to Jefferson’s inauguration,
Adams nominated approximately 60 Federalist
supporters to circuit judge and justice of the peace
positions which the Federalist-controlled Congress had
created under the Judiciary Act 1801.  Most of the
judges were appointed, but some had not had their
appointments delivered by the time of Jefferson’s
inauguration.
 Jefferson was sworn into office on 4 March
1801. Jefferson instructed his Secretary of State, James
Madison, to withhold undelivered appointments.
 Jefferson maintained that the appointments void
due to not being delivered in time. William Marbury was
one of the prospective judges who had not had their
appointment delivered on time. Madison refused to hand
it to Marbury.
Issues
 Did Marbury have a right to his appointment?
 If so, did Marbury have a legal remedy or relief
for him to reclaim it?
 If so, could the US Supreme Court legally issue
that remedy to Marbury?
Held
 The US Supreme Court (led by Chief Justice
John Marshall) held that Marbury did have a right to his
appointment as it had been signed and sealed.  The
delivery of the appointments were a formality and
custom, rather than part of the legal process.
 As a result, Marbury clearly had a legal right to
relief – the Court held that a writ of mandamus was the
appropriate remedy.
 Marshall  went on to declare that the Court had
no power to issue a writ of mandamus to Marbury
because the relevant provision of the Judiciary Act 1801
was unconstitutional.
 Section 13 of the Act was inconsistent with
Article III, Section 2 of the US Constitution, which stated
(in part) that “the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction” in “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party,” and that “in all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction.”
 In doing so, Marshall had read into the law the
Court’s power of “judicial review”.
Significance
 Marbury v. Madison was the first decision where
the US Supreme Court struck down legislation as
unconstitutional.
 Marshall’s judgment had granted the Supreme
Court the power of judicial review.
 It is arguably the most important decision in
respect of American constitutional law, and is an
interesting comparative decision with Australian
constitutional case law.
 The right of judicial review has gone on to be
accepted by the American people as part of the role of
the Court – to enforce the constitutionality of laws made
by Congress.
 Even though Marbury v. Madison established
the right to strike down unconstitutional laws, this right
has only been rarely utilised. Another famous example of
a legislative strike out was the decision of Dredd Scott v.
Sandford.
Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an
end-of-term appointee of President John Adams
(President Adams) to a justice of the peace position in
the District of Columbia, brought suit against President
Thomas Jefferson’s (President Jefferson) Secretary of
State, James Madison, seeking delivery of his
commission.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the
United States (Supreme Court) has constitutional
authority to review executive actions and legislative acts.
The Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction, the bounds
of which are set by the United States Constitution
(Constitution), which may not be enlarged by the
Congress.
acts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson,
outgoing President Adams attempted to secure
Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new
judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees.
Included in these efforts was the nomination by
President Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of
Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace
for the District, which were confirmed by the Senate the
day before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of
the commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered
when President Jefferson took office. The new president
instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold
delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus
in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to
deliver his commission.
Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the
Supreme Court?
Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.  As
the President signed Marbury’s commission after his
confirmation, the appointment has been made, and II. THE ISSUE
Marbury has a right to the commission.  Given that the
law imposed a duty on the office of the president to
deliver Marbury’s commission, that the Supreme Court Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of
has the power to review executive actions when the its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed
executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of
government “to do a particular thing therein specified,” the National Assembly?
mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to the
Supreme Court.  To issue mandamus to the Secretary of
State really is to sustain an original action, which is (in
III. THE RULING
this case) outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction
imposed on the Supreme Court.

Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is [The Court DENIED the petition.]

both political and legal. Although the case establishes
the traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution
on which the remainder of constitutional law rests, it also NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in
transformed the Supreme Court from an incongruous excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
institution to an equipotent head of a branch of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner
federal government. notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly.
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081,
July 15, 1936
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate
I. THE FACTS exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to
take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and
that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took
cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election
his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of
protests against members of the National Assembly, nor
the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935,
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the
the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming
rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said
resolution.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the
remained originally in the legislature. The express
petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
National Assembly. The following day, December 9,
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own
National Assembly. xxx.
resolution providing that it will not consider any election
protest that was not submitted on or before December 9,
1935.
[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it
ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to
limit the time with which protests intrusted to its
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National
cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is
Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance
however denied his motion.
of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure
to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise
of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
Garcia vs. Board of Investments, 191 SCRA 288
CASE ANALYSIS
Case Summary and Outcome
The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that a
foreign investment group’s applications to build a
petrochemical plant had to be disclosed, but any trade
secrets and other confidential information could be
redacted. The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC)
applied to invest into Bataan State, but later amended its
application to invest in a different region of Batangas.
This angered a Bataan congressman who requested a
copy of BPC’s original and amended application
documents, which was denied, leading to a lawsuit. The
Court reasoned that the inhabitants of Bataan had an
interest in the establishment of a petrochemical plant
because it would affect their economic life and health,
and that BPC’s amended application required a new
public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be held.
Facts
The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a
Taiwanese private corporation, applied for registration
with the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as
a new domestic producer of petrochemicals in the
Philippines. It originally specified the province of Bataan
as the site for the proposed investment but later
submitted an amended application to change the site to
Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the site,
Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of
Bataan requested a copy of BPC’s original and amended
application documents.
The BOI denied the request on the basis that the
investors in BPC had declined to give their consent to
the release of the documents requested, and that Article
81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protected the
confidentiality of those documents absent consent to
disclose.
The BOI subsequently approved the amended
application without holding a second hearing or
publishing notice of the amended application. Garcia
filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
Decision Overview
The Court ruled that the BOI violated Garcia’s
Constitutional right to have access to information on
matters of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of
the Constitution. The Court found that the inhabitants of
Bataan had an “interest in the establishment of the
petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real,
and vital because it will affect not only their economic
life, but even the air they breathe”. [p. 4] The Court also
ruled that BPC’s amended application was in fact a
second application that required a new public notice to
be filed and a new hearing to be held.
Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code
provides that “all applications and their supporting
documents filed under this code shall be confidential and
shall not be disclosed to any person, except with the
consent of the applicant,” the Court emphasized that
Article 81 provides for disclosure “on the orders of a
court of competent jurisdiction”. [p. 4] The Court ruled
that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure of the
application, amended application, and supporting
documents filed with the BOI under Article 81, with
certain exceptions.
The Court went on to note that despite the right to
access information, “the Constitution does not open
every door to any and all information” because “the law
may exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny”. [p. 4] Thus it excluded “the trade secrets and
confidential, commercial, and financial information of the
applicant BPC, and matters affecting national security”
from its order. [p. 4] The Court did not provide a test for
what information is excluded from the Constitutional
privilege to access public information, nor did it specify
the kinds of information that BPC could withhold under
its ruling.
Oposa vs Factoran
Legal Standing: Common and General Interest
 
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR
G.R. NO. 101083.     224 SCRA 792     July 30, 1993
OPOSA et al, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.,
respondents.
Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network,
Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of
our environment and natural resources. The petitioners
alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued
approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to
numerous commercial logging companies to cut and
deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners
request the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:
 Cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country;
 Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same
may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act
of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant,
however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to
the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.
 
Issues:
 Whether or not the petitioners have the right to
bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
 Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in
their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided
by law.
 Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have
all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing violates the requirements of due
process.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
 The petitioners have the right to bring action to
the judicial power of the Court.
1. The case at bar is subject to judicial
review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr.
precisely identified in his opinion the requisites
for a case to be subjected for the judicial review
by the Court. According to him, the subject
matter of the complaint is of common interest,
making this civil case a class suit and proving
the existence of an actual controversy. He
strengthens this conclusion by citing in the
decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
2. The petitioners can file a class suit
because they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn. Their personality to
sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony
of nature.” Nature means the created world in its
entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-
shore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present
as well as future generations.
3. Every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors’ assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to
come.
 The Court does not agree with the trial court’s
conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved
or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
 complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data.
1. The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
1. This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
1. While the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill
of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated
in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing
less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation —
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate
all governments and constitutions. As a matter of
fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind.
 The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s
pronouncement.
1. The respondent Secretary did not
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, Justice
Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity
to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect
the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and
the demands of public interest and welfare. He
was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code
(P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the
national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form
of privilege granted herein .
2. All licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested
by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The
petitioners amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS G.R. NO. 122156.
February 3,
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila
Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management
expertise or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two
(2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s
check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of
the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court
Issues:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the
national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is
premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid
of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount
and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract. A provision which lays down
a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature
and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it
is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an
action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but also
to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences
and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has
become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel
when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it
has since then become the venue of various significant
events which have shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of
the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from
the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the
highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to
be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to
give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision
of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules,
the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this
policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood
to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given
factors which investors must consider when venturing
into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or
with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed
to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution
and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when
there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the
foreign group is to insist that government be treated as
any other ordinary market player, and bound by its
mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable.
Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion
while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the
Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to
award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in
the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of
the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per
share and thereafter to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue
the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
Kilosbayan v. Guingona
Facts:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and
restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease
executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation in connection with the on-line
lottery system, also know as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line
lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical
considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease
violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B.
P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the
contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of
1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety
of acts of the executive department are beyond the
ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners have no
standing to maintain the instant suit
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to
file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.
RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved
to set aside the procedural technicality in view of the
importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the
liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary
taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association
of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate
and prosecute actions to question the validity or
constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of
various government agencies or instrumentalities.
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the
petitioners whether the contract in question is one of
lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent
contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title
or designation of the contract but by the intent of the
parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of
the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The
intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
Therefore the instant petition is granted and the
challenged Contract of Lease is hereby declared
contrary to law and invalid.
KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO
G.R. NO. 118910. July 30, 1993
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R.
SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO
C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM
TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE,
CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V.
VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S.
DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO
TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the
PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts:
GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of
the contract between Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) for the
operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The
contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter
which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries through a collaboration, association, or joint
venture.
Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and
accessories on January 25, 1995. The agreement are as
follow:
Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO
at which in no case be less than an annual rental
computed at P35,000 per terminal in commercial
operation.
Rent is computed bi-weekly.
Term is 8 years.
PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible
for the facilities.
Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the
equipment at P25M.
Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended
ELA invalid because:
It is the same as the old contract of lease.
It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.
It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has
not been approved by the President and it is not most
advantageous to the government.
PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
ELA is a different lease contract with none of the
vestiges in the prior contract.
ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the
exception provided in EO No. 301.
Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the
Board of Directors of PCSO.
Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online
lottery equipment.
Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they
were not parties to the contract.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a
legal standing to sue.
Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in
operating an online lottery is valid.
Rulings
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.
STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling
sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure
from the settled rulings on real parties in interest
because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former
appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present case is not
the same one litigated by the parties before in
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any
sense be regarded as “the law of this case”. The parties
are the same but the cases are not.
RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT”
cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed
upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be
drawn in question in any future action between the same
parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule
does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the
second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction
identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt
with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the
second proceeding to make an independent examination
of the legal matters at issue.
Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision
does not preclude determination of the petitioner’s
standing.
Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no
constitutional question is actually involved. The more
appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are ‘real
parties of interest’.
Question of contract of law: The real parties are those
who are parties to the agreement or are bound either
principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to
one of the contracting parties and can show the
detriment which would positively result to them from the
contract.
Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest.
Questions to the nature or validity of public contracts
maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO now
bears all losses because the operation of the system is
completely in its hands.
Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of
business judgment and the Court is not inclined to
review.
Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as
a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt is discussed in the
dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.)
In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their
agreement. Petitioners state that this would allow PGMC
to control and operate the on-line lottery system. The
Court held that the claim is speculative. In any case, in
the construction of statutes, the resumption is that in
making contracts, the government has acted in good
faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a
reason for denying power.
It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO does
not have the power to enter into any contract which
would involve it in any form of “collaboration,
association, or joint venture” for the holding of
sweepstakes activities. This only mentions that PCSO is
prohibited from investing in any activities that would
compete in their own activities.
It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which
does not compete with their own activities. The Court
held that is also based on speculation. Evidence is
needed to show that the transfer of technology would
involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited
association with the PGMC.
O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to
contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment and not on the contracts of lease. Public
bidding for leases are only for privately-owned buildings
or spaces for government use or of government owned
buildings or spaces for private use.
Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease
contract. The motion for reconsideration of petitioners is
DENIED with finality.
Tanada vs Angara
Justiciable Question; Theory of Auto-Limitation;
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
TANADA VS ANGARA G.R. No. 118295 May
2, 1997
Wigberto E. Tanada et al, in representation of various
taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations,
petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.
Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada,
together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various
NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the
growth of our National Economy and against to the
“Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign
markets, especially its major trading partners, through
the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty
associated with exporting and more investment in the
country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in
the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators,
a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the
provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement
is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines
because it meant that Congress could not pass
legislation that would be good for national interest and
general welfare if such legislation would not conform to
the WTO Agreement.
Issues:
Whether or not the petition present a justiciable
controversy.
Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included
in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or
undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative
power by Congress.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable
Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’
implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
Discussions:
1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy controlled by
Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of
foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the
international community.” The WTO itself has some built-
in advantages to protect weak and developing
economies, which comprise the vast majority of its
members. Unlike in the UN where major states have
permanent seats and veto powers in the Security
Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of
sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal in
weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can
protect their common interests more effectively through
the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with
developed countries. Within the WTO, developing
countries can form powerful blocs to push their
economic agenda more decisively than outside the
Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical
alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus,
the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like the
Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.”
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the
doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.
A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1,
Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With
regard to Infringement of a design patent, WTO
members shall be free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within
their own internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of
legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly
gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making
it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of
its sovereign duty and power.
Rulings:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on
the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or
any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.”
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor
of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the
country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows
an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power
in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived
from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly
agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute
rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines
has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived
without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale
that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity
with all nations.”
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not
contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with
due process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from
its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the
WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware
of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter
of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators
of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was
concurring in.
SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA
judicial power and judicial function
Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem.
School. He was adjudged 3rd Honors (3rd placer). 3
days before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought
the invalidation of the ranking of honor students. They
filed a CERTIORARI case against the principal and
teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.
They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse
of official discretion because they claim that
o the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival
of Santiago before, except in Grade 5 only.
o That Santiago was a consistent honor student from
Grade 1 to 5
o that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by
grade 6 teachers during the summer (gaining unfair
advantage)
o The committee was composed only of Grade 6
teachers.
o That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an
intention to pull him to a much lower rank
o That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word
“first place” was erased and replaced with “second
place”
o That the Principal and district supervisors merely
passed the buck to each other to delay his grievances.
The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action
was improper, and that even assuming it was proper, the
question has become academic (because the graduation
already proceeded).
Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ
on the part of the teachers since the Committee on
Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial
functions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against
judicial functions)
ISSUE: may judicial function be exercised in this case?
What is judicial power?
SC:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial
powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of
something in the nature of the action of the court. In
order for an action for certiorari to exist, (TEST TO
DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD
EXERCISES JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS)
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of
persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and
determination. , and
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to
pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the
sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the
not the legislative nor the executive)
It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.
The phrase judicial power is defined:
as authority to determine the rights of persons or
property.
authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear
and determine when the rights of persons or property or
the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of
adjudication.
The power exercised by courts in hearing and
determining cases before them.
The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal
rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are
neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the
performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that
there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such
rights are made, and the controversy ensuring therefrom
is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with
power and authority to determine what that law is and
thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of contending
parties.
There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for
when teachers sit down to assess individual merits of
their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors.
Worse still, the petitioners have not presented the
pertinent provisions of the Service Manual for Teachers
which was allegedly violated by the Committee.
The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the
board of judges.
And for that matter, it would not interfere in literary
contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions.
PACU VS. SEC OF EDUCATION Digested
PACU VS. SEC OF EDUCATION / (G.R. No. L-5279
October 31, 1955)
ACTUL CASE / CONTROVERSY
Facts:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
made a petition that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as
the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of
private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary
of Public Instruction” and was amended by Act No. 3075
and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives
the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers
and parents of liberty and property without due process
of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural
Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency
and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of
Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe
rules and standards constitute towards unlawful
delegation of Legislative powers.
Section 1 of Act No. 2706
“It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction
to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private
schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same
shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in
accordance with the class and grade of instruction given
in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly
authorized representative shall have authority to advise,
inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order
to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the
same,”
The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the
Secretary of Education before opening a school is not
originally included in the original Act 2706. And in
support to the first proposition of the petitioners they
contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a
citizen to own and operate a school and any law
requiring previous governmental approval or permit
before such person could exercise the said right On the
other hand, the defendant Legal Representative
submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters
presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting
unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional
question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the
validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally
valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by
the court.
Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no.
3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180 is void and
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law
and needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain.
Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented
before the court. It is an established principle that to
entitle a private individual immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he
has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the
validity of executive and legislative action he must show
that he has sustained common interest to all members of
the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to
declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the
interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for
their protection against actual interference. As such,
Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases
and controversies and the authority to pass on the
validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such
cases where conflicting claims under the constitution
and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the
constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and
it must be necessary to determined a real and vital
controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this are
brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive
relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere
academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein.
The court however, finds the defendant position to be
sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner
remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate
the law because it needs no argument to show that
abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the
statute does not per se demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the
litigation the court conclude that there has been no
undue delegation of legislative power even if the
petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda
issued by the Department of Education they fail to
indicate which of such official documents was
constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain
nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for
prohibition.
Gonzales vs Hechanova
conflict with the fundamental law; separation of
power
GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
G.R. No. L-21897 9 SCRA 230 October 22, 1963
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary,
MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense,
PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO
BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry,
and SALVADOR MARINO, Secretary of Justice,
respondents.
Facts:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation
of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources.
Ramon Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said
implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly
repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207, prohibits the
importation of rice and corn “by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency.”
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in
Republic Act 2207 is to be authorized by the President of
the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government
of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice
and Corn administration and any other government
agency from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of
Republic Act 3542 indicates that only private parties may
import rice under its provisions. They contended that the
government has already constitute valid executive
agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of
conflict between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3542, the
latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under
the American jurisprudence.
Issue/s:
Whether or not an international agreement may be
invalidated by our courts.
Discussions:
From a constitutional viewpoint, the said international
agreement being inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the
President may, under the American constitutional
system enter into executive agreements without previous
legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited
by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. He
may not interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto
power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that
have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing
the same through an executive agreement providing for
the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
Ruling/s
Yes. The Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
Section 2 Article 8 states that judicial review is vested
with the Supreme Court. The alleged consummation of
the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma
does not render this case academic. Republic Act No.
2207 enjoins our government not from entering into
contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice,
except under the conditions prescribed in said Act.
A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed
importation would not compel our Government to default
in the performance of such obligations as it may have
contracted with the sellers of rice in question because
aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied
without importing the said commodity into the
Philippines, the proposed importation may still be
legalized by complying with the provisions of the
aforementioned laws.
G.R. No. L-31685 July 31, 1975
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
IMELDA R. MARCOS, as Chairman of the Cultural
Center of the Philippines, Father HORACIO DE LA
COSTA, I. P. SOLIONGCO, ERNESTO RUFINO,
ANTONIO MADRIGAL, and ANDRES SORIANO, as
Members thereof, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez; Jr. and
Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for
respondent Imelda R. Marcos.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo, Beto and Ongsiako for
respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
It was the novelty of the constitutional question raised,
there being an imputation by petitioner Ramon A.
Gonzales of an impermissible encroachment by the
President of the Philippines on the legislative
prerogative, that led this Tribunal to give due course to
an appeal by certiorari from an order of dismissal by the
Court of First Instance of Manila.1 More specifically, the
issue centered on the validity of the creation in Executive
Order No. 30 of a trust for the benefit of the Filipino
people under the name and style of the Cultural Center
of the Philippines entrusted with the task to construct a
national theatre, a national music hall, an arts building
and facilities, to awaken our people's consciousness in
the nation's cultural heritage and to encourage its
assistance in the preservation, promotion, enhancement
and development thereof, with the Board of Trustees to
be appointed by the President, the Center having as its
estate the real and personal property vested in it as well
as donations received, financial commitments that could
thereafter be collected, and gifts that may be
forthcoming in the future. 2 It was likewise alleged that
the Board of Trustees did accept donations from the
private sector and did secure from the Chemical Bank of
New York a loan of $5 million guaranteed by the
National Investment & Development Corporation as well
as $3.5 million received from President Johnson of the
United States in the concept of war damage funds, all
intended for the construction of the Cultural Center
building estimated to cost P48 million. The Board of
Trustees has as its Chairman the First Lady, Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, who is named as the principal
respondent.3 In an order of dismissal by the then Judge,
now Justice of the Court of Appeals, Jose G. Bautista of
a suit for prohibition filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, stress was laid on the funds administered by the
Center as coming from donations and contributions, with
not a single centavo raised by taxation, and the absence
of any pecuniary or monetary interest of petitioner that
could in any wise be prejudiced distinct from those of the
general public. Moreover, reference was made to the
admission by petitioner of the desirability of the objective
of Executive Order No. 30, his objection arising from the
alleged illegality of its issuance.4
There was a motion of respondents to file a motion to
dismiss this appeal by certiorari, and it was granted in a
resolution of March 5, 1970. Such a pleading was
submitted to this Court twelve days later, where it was
contended that Executive Order No. 30 represented the
legitimate exercise of executive power, there being no
invasion of the legislative domain and that it was
supplementary to rather than a disregard of Republic Act
No. 4165 creating the National Commission on Culture.
In this exhaustive motion to dismiss, the point was
likewise raised that petitioner did not have the requisite
personality to contest as a taxpayer the validity of the
executive order in question, as the funds held by the
Cultural Center came from donations and contributions,
not one centavo being raised by taxation.5 Thereafter, a
manifestation was filed by the then Solicitor General,
now Associate Justice, Felix Q. Antonio, adopting "the
Motion to Dismiss the Petition dated February 25, 1970,
filed by respondents with this Honorable Court."6 There
was an opposition to such motion to dismiss on the part
of petitioner.7 That was the status of the case, there
being no further pleadings filed except two motions for
extension of time to file answer submitted by the Solicitor
General and granted by this Court, when on July 22,
1975, there was a second motion to dismiss on the part
of respondents through the Acting Solicitor General
Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr. and Assistant Solicitor General
Reynato S. Puno. It is therein set forth: "(1) As stated in
the petition itself its undeniable quintessence is [the
allegation of] "an executive usurpation of legislative
powers, hence, respondents in enforcing the same, are
acting without jurisdiction, hence, are restrainable by
prohibition." ... (2) On October 5, 1972, Presidential
Decree No. 15 ... was promulgated creating the Cultural
Center of the Philippines, defining its objectives, powers
and functions and other purposes. Section 4, thereof
was amended by Presidential Decree No. 179 ...
enacted on April 26, 1973. It is submitted that it is now
moot and academic to discuss the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 30 considering the promulgation of
PD Nos. 15 and 179, done by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers under martial law.
Executive Order No. 30 has ceased to exist while PD
Nos. 15 and 179 meet all the constitutional arguments
raised in the petition at bar."8
It would thus appear that the petition cannot succeed.
There is no justification for setting aside the order of
dismissal. Notwithstanding the exhaustive and scholarly
pleadings submitted by petitioner on his own behalf, the
burden of persuasion to warrant a reversal of the action
of the lower court was not met. Both on procedural and
substantive grounds, a case for prohibition was not
made out, notwithstanding the valiant efforts of
petitioner. With this latest manifestation, that Executive
Order No. 30 had been superseded by Presidential
Decree Nos. 15 and 179, the moot and academic
character of this appeal by certiorari became rather
obvious. To repeat, the petition must fail.
1. It may not be amiss though to consider briefly both the
procedural and substantive grounds that led to the lower
court's order of dismissal. It was therein pointed out as
"one more valid reason" why such an outcome was
unavoidable that "the funds administered by the
President of the Philippines came from donations [and]
contributions [not] by taxation." Accordingly, there was
that absence of the "requisite pecuniary or monetary
interest." 9 The stand of the lower court finds support in
judicial precedents. 10 This is not to retreat from the
liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works, 11 foreshadowed by People v. Vera, 12
where the doctrine of standing was first fully discussed.
It is only to make clear that petitioner, judged by
orthodox legal learning, has not satisfied the elemental
requisite for a taxpayer's suit. Moreover, even on the
assumption that public funds raised by taxation were
involved, it does not necessarily follow that such kind of
an action to assail the validity of a legislative or
executive act has to be passed upon. This Court, as held
in the recent case of Tan v. Macapagal, 13 "is not devoid
of discretion as to whether or not it should be
entertained." 14 The lower court thus did not err in so
viewing the situation.
2. Nor was the lower court any more impressed by the
contention that there was an encroachment on the
legislative prerogative discernible in the issuance of
Executive Order No. 30. It first took note of the exchange
of diplomatic notes between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States as to the use of a
special fund coming from the latter for a Philippine
cultural development project. Then, as set forth in the
order of dismissal, it explained why no constitutional
objection could be validly interposed. Thus: "When the
President, therefore, acted by disposing of a matter of
general concern (Section 63, Rev. Adm. Code) in accord
with the constitutional injunction to promote arts and
letters (Section 4, Article XIV, Constitution of the
Philippines) and issued Executive Order No. 30, he
simply carried out the purpose of the trust in establishing
the Cultural Center of the Philippines as the
instrumentality through which this agreement between
the two governments would be realized. Needless to
state, the President alone cannot and need not
personally handle the duties of a trustee for and in behalf
of the Filipino people in relation with this trust. He can do
this by means of an executive order by creating as he
did, a group of persons, who would receive and
administer the trust estate, responsible to the President.
As head of the State, as chief executive, as spokesman
in domestic and foreign affairs, in behalf of the estate as
parens patriae, it cannot be successfully questioned that
the President has authority to implement for the benefit
of the Filipino people by creating the Cultural Center
consisting of private citizens to administer the private
contributions and donations given not only by the United
States government but also by private persons." 15
There is impressive juridical support for the stand taken
by the lower court. Justice Malcolm in Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Springer 16 took pains to
emphasize: "Just as surely as the duty of caring for
governmental property is neither judicial nor legislative in
character is it as surely executive." 17 It Would be an
unduly narrow or restrictive view of such a principle if the
public funds that accrued by way of donation from the
United States and financial contributions for the Cultural
Center project could not be legally considered as
"governmental property." They may be acquired under
the concept of dominium, the state as a persona in law
not being deprived of such an attribute, thereafter to be
administered by virtue of its prerogative of imperium. 18
What is a more appropriate agency for assuring that they
be not wasted or frittered away than the Executive, the
department precisely entrusted with management
functions? It would thus appear that for the President to
refrain from taking positive steps and await the action of
the then Congress could be tantamount to dereliction of
duty. He had to act; time was of the essence. Delay was
far from conducive to public interest. It was as simple as
that. Certainly then, it could be only under the most
strained construction of executive power to conclude that
in taking the step he took, he transgressed on terrain
constitutionally reserved for Congress.
This is not to preclude legislative action in the premises.
While to the Presidency under the 1935 Constitution was
entrusted the responsibility for administering public
property, the then Congress could provide guidelines for
such a task. Relevant in this connection is the excerpt
from an opinion of Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer: 19 "When the President acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any
actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperative
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than
on abstract theories of law." 20 To vary the phraseology,
to recall Thomas Reed Powell, if Congress would
continue to keep its peace notwithstanding the action
taken by the executive department, it may be considered
as silently vocal. In plainer language, it could be an
instance of silence meaning consent. The Executive
Order assailed was issued on June 25, 1966. Congress
until the time of the filing of the petition on August 26,
1969 remained quiescent. Parenthetically, it may be
observed that petitioner waited until almost the day of
inaugurating the Cultural Center on September 11, 1969
before filing his petition in the lower court. However
worthy of commendation was his resolute determination
to keep the Presidency within the bounds of its
competence, it cannot be denied that the remedy, if any,
could be supplied by Congress asserting itself in the
premises. Instead, there was apparent conformity on its
part to the way the President saw fit to administer such
governmental property.
3. The futility of this appeal by certiorari becomes even
more apparent with the issuance of Presidential Decree
No. 15 on October 5, 1972. As contended by the
Solicitor General, the matter, as of that date, became
moot and academic. Executive Order No. 30 was thus
superseded. The institution known as the Cultural Center
is other than that assailed in this suit. In that sense a
coup de grace was administered to this proceeding. The
labored attempt of petitioner could thus be set at rest.
This particular litigation is at an end. There is, too,
relevance in the observation that the aforesaid decree is
part of the law of the land. So the Constitution provides.
21
4. It only remains to be added that respondents as
trustees lived up fully to the weighty responsibility
entrusted to them. The task imposed on them was
performed with competence, fidelity, and dedication.
That was to be expected. From the inception of the
Marcos Administration, the First Lady has given
unsparingly of herself in the encouragement and support
of literary, musical, and artistic endeavors and in the
appreciation of our rich and diverse cultural heritage.
The rest of the then Board of Trustees, named as the
other respondents, were equally deserving of their being
chosen for this worthy project. One of them, the late I.P
Soliongco, was in his lifetime one of the most gifted men
of letters. Father Horacio de la Costa is a historian and
scholar of international repute. Respondents Ernesto
Rufino, Antonio Madrigal and Andres Soriano, all men of
substance, have contributed in time and money to civic
efforts. It is not surprising then that the Cultural Center
became a reality, the massive and imposing structure
constructed at a shorter period and at a lower cost than
at first thought possible. What is of even greater
significance, with a portion thereof being accessible at
modest admission prices, musical and artistic
performances of all kinds are within reach of the lower-
income groups. Only thus may meaning be imparted to
the Constitutional provision that arts and letters shall be
under State patronage. 22 For equally important as the
encouragement and support for talented Filipinos with a
creative spark is the diffusion of the opportunity for the
rest of their countrymen to savour the finer things in life.
Who knows, if state efforts along these lines are
diligently pursued, that what was said by Justice Holmes
about France could apply to the Philippines. Thus: "We
have not that respect for art that is one of the glories of
France." 23 In justice to petitioner Gonzales, it may be
noted that he did not question the wisdom or soundness
of the goal of having a Cultural Center or the
disbursement of the funds by respondents. It is the
absence of statutory authority that bothered him. The
lower court did not see things in the same light. It is
easily understandable why, as the preceding discussion
has made clear, it cannot be said that such a conclusion
suffered from legal infirmity. What is more, with the
issuance of Presidential Decree No. 15, the suit, to
repeat, has assumed a moot and academic character.
WHEREFORE, this appeal by certiorari to review the
lower court's order of dismissal dated December 4, 1969
is dismissed.
PEOPLE VS VERA G.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56
November 16, 1937
undue delagation of power; equal protection of the
law
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and
HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,
petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
Facts:Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial
court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four
motions for new trial but all were denied. He then
elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial.
While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation
alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was
convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the
appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied
the application. However, Judge Vera upon another
request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for
hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that
Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation
because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which
provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial
boards the power to provide a system of probation to
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the
law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only
indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And
even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional
because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal
protection of laws. The said law provides absolute
discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes
undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation
law may be an encroachment of the power of the
executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon
Issues:
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue
delegation of legislative power
Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection
of the laws
Discussions:
An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid
if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by
which the administrative officer or board may be guided
in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to
it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards
any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by
Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is
a “roving commission” which enables the provincial
boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if
the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the
provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the
various provincial boards to determine. The equal
protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws. The classification of equal protection, to be
reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class.
Rulings:
The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set
standard provided by Congress on how provincial
boards must act in carrying out a system of probation.
The provincial boards are given absolute discretion
which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of
the non delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of
equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged
section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards have provided for
the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation
officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and
shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law
shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The that all Appellants were taxpayers.
applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If Issue. Have the Appellants established standing to bring
suit in an Article III court?
the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
Held. Yes. Reversed and remanded.
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
probation officer. Court) states that standing refers to the plaintiff(s) having
It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the a “personal stake in the outcome” of the case. In the
taxpayer context, the Supreme Court outlines two
provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial requirements to show this personal stake.
to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The The first requirement is that the taxpayer must challenge
resultant inequality may be said to flow from the the constitutionality only of exercises under the taxing
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although and spending clause of the Constitution. Expenditures
perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. which are incidental to a regulatory statute or other
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for incidental expenditures do not give rise to taxpayer
standing.
the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one
The second requirement is that the moving party must
province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray allege that Congress acted beyond the scope of a
the salary of a probation officer, while another province particular constitutional provision. It is insufficient to
may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation allege spending beyond the powers delegated under Art.
Act would be in operation in the former province but not I, Section: 8 of the Constitution.
in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming
within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the Dissent. Justice John Marshall Harlan (J. Harlan)
argues that the two requirements outlined by the majority
benefits of probation in one province while another
do not establish that P has a personal stake in the
person similarly situated in another province would be outcome.
denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the Discussion. The Supreme Court establishes a two-
provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for prong test that allows taxpayer standing without opening
the salaries of the probation officers in their respective the federal courts to generalized grievances.
provinces, in which case no inequality would result for
the obvious reason that probation would be in operation
in each and every province by the affirmative action of
appropriation by all the provincial boards.

Flast v. Cohen

Brief Fact Summary. The Appellant, including Flast

(Appellants), brought suit, claiming standing solely as
taxpayers, seeking to enjoin expenditure of federal funds
on religious schools. Appellants claimed such
expenditures violated the Establishment and Free
Exercise clauses of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution (Constitution).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Taxpayer standing is

appropriate when the plaintiff challenges an enactment
under the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution
and the enactment exceeds specific constitutional
limitations on taxing and spending.

Facts. Congress had funded, under Titles I and II of the

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (the
Act), writing, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious
schools. Appellants brought suit, claiming that these
expenditures violated the Establishment and Free
Exercise clauses of the First Amendment of the
Constitution. The only claim to standing provided was