CIVIL LAW

CASE #1:

G.R. No. L-4440             August 29, 1952

BUNGE CORPORATION and UNIVERSAL COMMERCIAL AGENCIES, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
ELENA CAMENFORTE and COMPANY, doing business or trading under the name and style of Visayan Products
Company, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Juan E. Yap and J.P. Garcia for appellants.

Vicente L. Faelnar for appellees.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiffs brought action against the defendants to recover certain damages they have allegedly sustained in view of
the failure of the latter to deliver to the former the amount of Philippine copra which they had agreed to deliver
within the time and under the conditions specified in the contract celebrated between them on October 22, 1947.

Plaintiffs claim that on October 22, 1947, in the City of Cebu a contract was entered into between the Visayan
Products Company and Bunge Corporation (represented by the Universal Commercial Agencies) whereby the former
sold to the latter 500 long tons of merchantable Philippine copra in bulk at the prices of $188.80, U.S. currency, per
ton, less 1 per cent brokerage per short ton of 2,000 pounds, C & F Pacific Coast, U.S.A.; that, according to the terms
and conditions of the contract, the vendor should ship the stipulated copra during the month of November or
December 1947, to San Francisco, California, U.S.A. for delivery to the vendee; that, notwithstanding repeated
demands made by the vendee, the vendor failed to ship and deliver the copra during the period agreed upon; that
believing in good faith that the vendor would ship and deliver the copra on time, the vendee sold to El Dorado Oil
Works the quantity of copra it had purchased at the same price agreed upon; and that because of the failure of the
vendor to fulfill its contract to ship and deliver the quantity of copra agreed upon within the period stipulated, the
vendee has suffered damages in the amount of P180,00.

Defendants answered separately the allegations set forth in the complaint and, with the exception of Vicente Kho,
denied that the Visayan Products Company has ever entered into a contract of sale of copra with the plaintiffs, as
mentioned in the complaint. They aver that if a contract of that tenor has ever been entered into between said
company and the plaintiffs, the truth is that Vicente Kho who signed for and in behalf of the company never had any
authority to act for that company either expressly or impliedly, inasmuch as the only ones who had the authority to
do so are Elena Camenforte, the general manager, Tan Se Chong, the manager, and Tiu Kee, the assistant manager.

Vicente Kho, on his part, after admitting that the commercial transaction mentioned in the complaint had actually
taken place, avers that the contract was concluded with the Visayan Products Company which had its office in
Tacloban, Leyte, and not with the Visayan Products Company established in Cebu, which is not a party to the
transaction; that the Visayan Products Company organized in organized in Tacloban is the one that was presented by
him in the transaction, of which he is the manager and controlling stockholder, which fact was clearly known to the
plaintiffs when the contract was entered into believing that the company he was representing was the one recently
organized in Cebu; that he, Vicente Kho, did his best to comply with the contract, but he failed because of  force
majeure as follows: he informed the plaintiffs sometime in December, 1947, that he would have all the copra
covered by the contract ready for shipment somewhere in the port of San Ramon, Samar, in order that they may
make an arrangement for the booking of a ship, but before the arrival of the ship, a strong storm visited the place
causing the bodega where the copra was stored to be destroyed and the copra washed away into the sea; and that,
because of this  force majeure, he cannot now be held liable for damages.

After trial, art which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision ordering
defendant Elena Camenforte & Company to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P79,744, with legal interest thereon from
the filing of the complaint, and the costs of action. The court ordered that, in case said company be unable to pay
the judgment because of total or partial insolvency, the same be paid by its co-defendants, jointly and severally,
either in full or such part thereof as may be left unpaid. Defendants interposed the present appeal.

At the outset, it should be stated that while in the lower court there was a dispute between plaintiffs and defendants
as regards the real contract that was entered into between the parties and which he was given rise to this litigation,
that defense apparently has been abandoned in this appeal, for the only issue now raised by appellants is one of law.
Thus, appellants now admit, contrary to their stand in the lower court, that a contract of purchase and sale of copra
was in effect entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendants under the terms and conditions embodied in
the contract quoted in the complaint, and the only defense on which they now rely is that the copra they had
gathered and stored for delivery to the appellees in Samar was destroyed by  force majeure which under the law has
the effect of exempting them from liability for damages. Consequently, appellants now contend that the lower court
erred in condemning them for damages despite the fact that their failure to fulfill the contract is due to  force
majeure.

A perusal of the contract is necessary to see the feasibility of this contention. The contract is embodied in Exhibit C.
A perusal of this contract shows that the subject matter is Philippine copra. The sale is to be made by weight, — 500
long tons. It does not refer to any particular or specific lot of copra, nor does it mention the place where the copra is
to be acquired. No portion of the copra has been earmarked or segregated. The vendor was at liberty to acquire the
copra from any part of the Philippines. The sale simply refers to 500 long tons of the Philippine copra. The subject-
matter is, therefore, generic, not specific.

Having this view in mind, it is apparent that the copra which appellants claim to have gathered and stored in
a bodega  at San Ramon, Samar, sometime in December, 1947, in fulfillment of their contract, and which they claim
was later destroyed by storm, in the supposition that the claim is true, cannot be deemed to be the one
contemplated in the contract. It may be the one chosen by appellants in the exercise of the discretion given to them
under the contract, which they could exercise in a manner suitable to their interest and convenience, but it cannot
certainly be considered as the copra contemplated by the parties in the contract. And this must be so because the
copra contemplated in the contract is generic and not specific.

It appearing that the obligation of appellant is to deliver copra in a generic sense, the obligation cannot be deemed
extinguised by the destruction or disappearance of the copra stored in San Ramon, Samar. Their obligation subsists
as long as that commodity is available. A generic obligation is not extinguished by the loss of a thing belonging to a
particular genus. Genus nunquan perit.

Manresa explains the distinction between determinate and generic thing in his comment on article 1096 of
the Civil Code of Spain, saying that the first is a concrete, particularized object, indicated by its own
individuality, while a generic thing is one whose determination is confined to that of its nature, to the genus
(genero) to which it pertains, such as a horse, a chair. These definition are in accord with the popular
meaning of the terms defined.

Except as to qualify and quantity, the first of which is itself generic, the contract sets no bounds or limits to
the palay to be paid, nor was there even any stipulation that the cereal was to be the produce of any
particular land. Any palay of the quality stipulated regardless of origin or however acquired (lawfully) would
be obligatory on the part of the obligee to receive and would discharged the obligation. It seems therefore
plain that the alleged failure of crops through alleged fortuitos cause did not excuse performance." (De Leon
vs. Soriano, 87 Phil., 193; 47 Off Gaz., Supplement No. 12, pp. 377, 379-380.)

In binding himself to deliver centrifugal sugar, the defendant promised a generic thing. It could be any
centrifugal sugar without regard to origin or how he secured it. Hence, his inability to produce sugar,
irrespective of the cause, did not relieve him from his commitment. War, like floods and other catastrophies,
was a contingency, a collateral incident, which he could have provided for by proper stipulation. (Reyes vs.
Caltex, 84 Phil., 654; 47 Off, Gaz., 1193; Vda.-Lacson vs. Diaz, 87 Phil., 150; 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. to No. 12, p.
337.)

If appellants are not relieved of civil liability under the contract, what are then the damages for which they stand
liable to the appellees? Appellees claim that, immediately after they had concluded their agreement to buy copra
with the appellants, they agreed to sell to El Dorado Oil Works the 500 long tons of copra subject matter of the
agreement, together with another lot of 500 tons, confident in their belief that the Visayan Products Company would
comply with its agreement. The copra was to delivered by Bunge Corporation to El Dorado Oil Works not later than
December 31, 1947. Because of the failure of the appellants to fulfill their aforementioned agreement, appellees
failed to deliver the copra it sold with the result that they had to pay damages in the sum of $84,630.86 (or
P169,461.72).

The lower court, however, did not sustain this claim in view of the discrepancy of one day it note in the dates of
execution of the contracts of sale of the copra in question. The court found that the contract signed by El Dorado Oil
Works is dated October 21, 1947, (Exhibit O), whereas the contract signed by the Visayan Products Company is dated
contract had been executed one day latter than the former, which gives rise to the belief that the copra that was
sold to the El Dorado Oil Works could not have been the one purchased from the appellants. Nevertheless, the court
awarded damages to the appellees taking into account the highest price of copra in the market during the month of
December, 1947, as per statement Exhibit P, even though the appellees had made no allegation in their complaint of
any offer or transaction they might have had with other copra dealers during the period contemplated in the
contract in question.

We are of the opinion that the lower court erred in disregarding the transaction with the El Dorado Oil Works simply
because it found an apparent discrepancy in the dates appearing in the contracts Exhibits O and C. Exhibit C appears
dated on October 22, 1947, and was executed in Cebu, Philippines, whereas Exhibit O appears dated on October 21,
1947, and was executed in New York City. the difference of one day in the execution of these documents is merely
nominal because New York time is several hours behind Cebu time. In fact both transactions have been practically
executed on the same day. Even supposing that the contract with the El Dorado Oil Works calls for future and not
present deliveries. There is nothing improbable for the appellees to sell copra which they expect to acquire
sometime in the future for purposes of speculation. But this error cannot now materially change the result of this
case considering that plaintiffs-appellees did not appeal from the decision. "It has been held that appellee, who is
not appellant, may also assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds,
but he may not do so if his purpose is to have the judgment modified or reversed, for, in such case, he must appeal."
(Saenz vs. Mitchell, 60 Phil., 69, 80; see Mendoza vs. Mendiola, 53 Phil., 267; Villavert vs. Lim, 62 Phil., 178; Bajaladia
vs. Eusala, G. R. No. 42579). Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Labrador, JJ., concur.

CASE #2:

G.R. No. L-44349 October 29, 1976

JESUS V. OCCENA and EFIGENIA C. OCCENA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. RAMON V. JABSON, Presiding Judge of the Court Of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVI; COURT OF APPEALS
and TROPICAL HOMES, INC., respondents.

Occena Law Office for petitioners.

Serrano, Diokno & Serrano for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court reverses the Court of Appeals appealed resolution. The Civil Code authorizes the release of an obligor
when the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties but does not
authorize the courts to modify or revise the subdivision contract between the parties or fix a different sharing ratio
from that contractually stipulated with the force of law between the parties. Private respondent's complaint for
modification of the contract manifestly has no basis in law and must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action. On February 25, 1975 private respondent Tropical Homes, Inc. filed a complaint for modification of
the terms and conditions of its subdivision contract with petitioners (landowners of a 55,330 square meter parcel of
land in Davao City), making the following allegations:

"That due to the increase in price of oil and its derivatives and the concomitant worldwide spiralling of prices, which
are not within the control of plaintiff, of all commodities including basis raw materials required for such
development work, the cost of development has risen to levels which are unanticipated, unimagined and not within
the remotest contemplation of the parties at the time said agreement was entered into and to such a degree that
the conditions and factors which formed the original basis of said contract, Annex 'A', have been totally changed;
'That further performance by the plaintiff under the contract.

That further performance by the plaintiff under the contract,Annex 'S', will result in situation where
defendants would be unustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff; will cause an inequitous
distribution of proceeds from the sales of subdivided lots in manifest actually result in the unjust and
intolerable exposure of plaintiff to implacable losses, all such situations resulting in an
unconscionable, unjust and immoral situation contrary to and in violation of the primordial concepts
of good faith, fairness and equity which should pervade all human relations.

Under the subdivision contract, respondent "guaranteed (petitioners as landowners) as the latter's fixed and sole
share and participation an amount equivalent to forty (40%) percent of all cash receifpts fromthe sale of the
subdivision lots"

Respondent pray of the Rizal court of first instance that "after due trial, this Honorable Court render judgment
modifying the terms and conditions of the contract ... by fixing the proer shares that shouls pertain to the herein
parties out of the gross proceeds from the sales of subdivided lots of subjects subdivision".

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint principally for lack of cause of action, and upon denial thereof and of
reconsideration by the lower court elevated the matter on certiorari to respondent Court of Appeals.

Respondent court in its questioned resolution of June 28, 1976 set aside the preliminary injunction previously issued
by it and dimissed petition on the ground that under Article 1267 of the Civil Code which provides that

ART. 1267. When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation
of the parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part. 1

... a positive right is created in favor of the obligor to be released from the performance of an
obligation in full or in part when its performance 'has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond
the contemplation of the parties.

Hence, the petition at abar wherein petitioners insist that the worldwide increase inprices cited by respondent does
not constitute a sufficient casue of action for modification of the subdivision contrct. After receipt of respondent's
comment, the Court in its Resolution of September 13, 1976 resolved to treat the petition as special civil actionand
declared the case submitted for decision.

The petition must be granted.

While respondent court correctly cited in its decision the Code Commission's report giving the rationale for Article
1267 of the Civil Code, to wit;

The general rule is that impossibility of performance releases the obligor. However, it is submitted
that when the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the
parties, the court should be authorized to release the obligor in whole or in part. The intention of
the parties should govern and if it appears that the service turns out to be so difficult as have been
beyond their contemplation, it would be doing violence to that intention to hold the obligor still
responsible. ... 2

It misapplied the same to respondent's complaint.

If respondent's complaint were to be released from having to comply with the subdivision contract, assuming it
could show at the trial that the service undertaken contractually by it had "become so difficult as to be manifestly
beyond the contemplation of the parties", then respondent court's upholding of respondet's complaint and dismissal
of the petition would be justifiable under the cited codal article. Without said article, respondent would remain
bound by its contract under the theretofore prevailing doctrine that performance therewith is ot excused "by the
fact that the contract turns out to be hard and improvident, unprofitable, or unespectedly burdensome", 3 since in
case a party desires to be excuse from performance in the event of such contingencies arising, it is his duty to
provide threfor in the contract.

But respondent's complaint seeks not release from the subdivision contract but that the court "render judgment I
modifying the terms and Conditions of the Contract by fixing the proper shares that should pertain to the herein
parties out of the gross proceed., from the sales of subdivided lots of subject subdivision". The cited article does not
grant the courts this authority to remake, modify or revise the contract or to fix the division of shares between the
parties as contractually stipulated with the force of law between the parties, so as to substitute its own terms for
those covenanted by the partiesthemselves. Respondent's complaint for modification of contract manifestly has no
basis in law and therefore states no cause of action. Under the particular allegations of respondent's complaint and
the circumstances therein averred, the courts cannot even in equity grant the relief sought.

A final procedural note. Respondent cites the general rule that an erroneous order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and should not be corrected by certiorari but by appeal in due course. This case however manifestly
falls within the recognized exception that certiorari will lie when appeal would not prove to be a speedy and
adequate remedy.' Where the remedy of appeal would not, as in this case, promptly relieve petitioners from the
injurious effects of the patently erroneous order maintaining respondent's baseless action and compelling
petitioners needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by one more futile case,
certiorari will issue as the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of an aggrieved party.

ACCORDINGLY, the resolution of respondent appellate court is reversed and the petition for certiorari is granted and
private respondent's complaint in the lower court is ordered dismissed for failure to state a sufficient cause of
action. With costs in all instances against private respondent.

Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin JJ., concur.

CASE #3:

G.R. No. L-55372 May 31, 1989

LETTY HAHN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSIE M. SANTOS and FRANCISCO SANTOS, respondents.

Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.

Mary Concepcion Bautista for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

It is said that diamonds are a girl's best friend, but private respondent Josie M. Santos may have her doubts about
this. The fact is that they have caused her not a little difficulty, and her troubles are not yet over. This case was
decided against her by the trial court and later by the respondent court which, however, mitigated the judgment of
the former. The petitioner does not like this and wants the earlier decision reinstated. That is why she is now before
this Court.

The basic facts as determined by the trial court 1 and affirmed by the respondent court 2 are no longer in issue. It has
been established that Santos received two diamond rings with a total value of P47,000.00 in 1966 from the
petitioner. She issued separate receipts therefor in which she acknowledged that they had been delivered by Letty
Hahn to her for sale on commission and that they would be returned upon demand if unsold. 3 The rings were not
sold nor were they returned when demanded by Hahn.

Hahn sued for recovery of the rings or their value. While the civil case was pending, she also filed a criminal action
for estafa against Santos. Santos was acquitted on reasonable doubt. 4 In the civil action, however, where she also
pleaded that the contracts between her and Hahn were not of agency but of sale, Santos did not fare as well.

The trial court ordered her to return the two rings or pay the plaintiff their value, which was increased to
P65,000.00, with legal interest, plus P10,000 moral damages, P5,000 exemplary damages, and P6,000.00 attorney's
fees. 5 The increase on the original value of the rings was based on Article 1250 of the Civil Code calling for an
adjustment of the payment due in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation. The moral and exemplary damages
were imposed because of the defendant's "seeming lack of scruples and conscientiousness."

On appeal, this decision was modified. The Court of Appeals found that Article 1250 was not applicable and that the
appellant had not acted in bad faith or with malice. Accordingly, it rendered judgment:

A. Ordering the defendants to return to the plaintiff the two rings in question; to pay
plaintiff legal interest on the value of the ring, P47,000.00, from the time of the filing
of the complaint until restitution in made; and attorney's fees in the amount of
P6,000.00.

B. Sentencing the defendants, in case return of the rings is no longer feasible, to pay
to the plaintiff the value thereof, which is P47,000.00, with interest at the legal rate
from the time of the filing of the complaint until full payment and P6,000.00
attorney's fees. 6

In challenging this decision, the petitioner contends that the respondent erred in not allowing an upward adjustment
of the original price of the two rings and in disallowing the moral and exemplary damages granted by the trial court.
These are the issues in this petition.

On the first question, the petitioner cites Central Bank figures to show that the amount of P47,000.00 in 1966, when
the obligation to return it or the rings fell due, was equivalent to about P235,000.00 in 1980 (and necessarily to an
even higher amount now in view of the continued reduction in the purchasing power of the peso). As the increase
ordered by the trial court (to P65,000.00 on August 7, 1971) was a finding of fact based on official figures, the Court
of Appeals was not justified in reversing the same.

The petitioner also argues that the award of moral and exemplary damages by the trial court was entirely justified
and should not have been disallowed by the respondent court. The reason is that there was sufficient showing that
the private respondent had acted with malice and in bad faith toward the petitioner who had trusted her.

Thus, Santos misrepresented her agreements with the petitioner as contracts of sale when the very language of the
receipts she herself had written and signed clearly shows that she was receiving the rings in trust from the
petitioner, as later found in both the criminal and civil cases. 7 Second, she claimed she had made installment
payments directly and personally to the petitioner during the period from August 14 to November 20, 1966, and
when this lie was exposed with evidence that the petitioner was abroad during that period, changed her testimony
to make it appear that the alleged payments had been made when Hahn was in the country. 8 In fact, the finding of
the trial court as sustained by the respondent court was that she had made no payment at all at any time. 9 Third,
when Santos offered to return the solitaire ring to the petitioner, the latter readily saw that it was not the same ring
she had entrusted to the private respondent, who evidently wanted to foist another deception upon her. 10

For her part, the private respondent dismisses the claim for upward adjustment of the amount due and says Article
1250 of the Civil Code is not applicable, there being no inflation or deflation. The Central Bank statistics Hahn invokes
are hearsay and immaterial. Not in point either is the case of Zulueta v. Pan-American World Airways," 11 as cited by
the petitioner, where the issue of inflation was not even raised. Moreover, the delay in the payment of the amount
due was imputable not to her but to the petitioner, who had unreasonably prevented her from discharging her
obligation.

As early as December of 1966, she says she had offered to return the marquisette ring to the petitioner but the
petitioner's lawyer, acting on her instructions, refused to accept it and demanded the return also of the P35,000.00
solitaire ring. 12 She offered to pay for this other ring on installment but this offer was also rejected. 13 At the trial of
the criminal case against her, she brought the solitaire ring to prove that she had not disposed of it, but the
petitioner denied it was the ring she had delivered to the accused.14 Still later, she offered to pay for both rings on
installment, but the offer was also rejected without reason by the petitioner. 15 In sum, it is the petitioner who has
delayed payment of the amount due and not the private respondent, who was ready to settle her obligation.

The trial court cited no legal basis for the upward adjustment of the original amount due although the reason was
presumably Article 1250 of the Civil Code. We agree with the respondent court that such adjustment was erroneous
for, as explained by Justice Serafin M. Cuevas (later a member of this Court):

We, however, find the contention of appellant under her fifth assignment of error — that the lower
court erred in applying the floating rate to the purely peso transaction — to be meritorious.

In this regard, Article 1250 of the Civil Code provides —

In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should

supervene, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the
obligation should be the basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to the
contrary.

By extraordinary inflation or deflation of currency is understood to be any uncommon decrease or

increase in the purchasing power of currency which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen
and which has been due to war and the effects thereof, or any unusual force majeure or fortuitous
event. (Civil Code of the Philippines, Dean Capistrano, Vol. III, p. 186.)

Under the circumstances, we do not find any legal justification in applying the so-called 'floating
rate," since there has been no 'extraordinary inflation" of currency within the meaning of the
aforequoted Art. 1250 of the Civil Code. 16

The Court holds that, in determining the accountability of the private respondent, the trial judge should have applied
the following provisions of the Civil Code, as the respondent court apparently did:

Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in
delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of
the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent
per annum.

Art. 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach
of contract.

Art. 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the
obligation may be silent upon this point.

The Court notes, however, that the respondent court should also have imposed interest on the interest due on the
principal amount of P47,000.00, conformably to Article 2212. The interest due started to earn interest from the date
it was judicially demanded with the filing of the complaint on January 6,1967.

As to the delay in the performance of the private respondent's obligation, our ruling is that it was caused by the
private respondent herself and not the petitioner who had the right to demand performance in full of the former's
obligation she had assumed under their written agreement.
The receipts composed and signed by Santos, which were offered as Exhibits A and B, read as follows:

June 2, 1966

Received from Mrs. Letty Hahn 1 ring solo diamond worth P12,000 to be sold on commission or to
be return upon demand7-87

June 7,1966

Received from Mrs. Letty Hahn 1 ring solo diamond worth P35,000 to be sold on commission basis or
to be return upon demand.

From the moment demand was made upon Santos and she did not or could not comply, she has
already incurred in delay. The meaning of the receipts is unmistakable. Her contention that it was
the private respondent who had prevented her from fulfilling her obligation is simply untenable and
unacceptable.

There is no doubt that the petitioner could validly reject the private respondent's offer to pay for the rings on
installment because Hahn was entitled to payment in full. If such payment could not be made, Santos was obligated
to return both of the rings — and not one or the other only at her option — "upon demand," under the separate
receipts she had signed. According to Article 1233 of the Civil Code, "a debt shall not be understood to have been
paid unless the thing or service in which the obligation consists has been completely delivered or rendered as the
case may be."

As for the private respondent's offer to return the solitaire ring, which was also refused, the pertinent rule is Article
1244, providing that "the debtor of a thing cannot compel the creditor to receive a different one, although the latter
may be of the same value as, or more valuable than that which is due." More so then in the case at bar if, as averred
by the petitioner, the ring offered was less valuable than the one that was due . 17

We cannot sustain the respondent court, however, on the moral and exemplary damages which it disallowed on the
ground that "there was no clear showing of malice and bad faith on the part of the defendant." The Court thinks
otherwise. We hold that the moral and exemplary damages should be restored in light of her dubious conduct as
recounted in the petitioner's brief and the following findings of the trial court which we have no reason to disturb:

The Court cannot but take note of the relative ease with which i Josie M. Santos says one thing at
one given time and another altogether i n subsequently afterwards, even if the statements different
version are both under the sanction of an oath. This seeming lack of scruples and conscientiousness
on her part do not place her in a favorable light under the painstaking scrutiny of the Court. There is
so much deviousness and complexity in her testimony that does not invite the confidence of the
Court. 18

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated August 29, 1980, is
MODIFIED as follows: a) the award of moral damages in the sum of I P10,000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum
of P5,000.00 is i added to the other amounts to be paid by the private respondent to the petitioner in accordance
with the said decision; and b) I interest on the principal amount of P47,00.00 shall earn interest also at the legal rate,
from January 6, 1967, and until full payment is made. Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

CASE #4:

[G.R. No. L-27454. April 30, 1970.]

ROSENDO O. CHAVES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRUCTUOSO GONZALES, Defendant-Appellee.

 Chaves, Elio, Chaves & Associates, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Sulpicio E. Platon, for Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR NON-PERFORMANCE; FIXING OF PERIOD BEFORE FILING OF
COMPLAINT FOR NON-PERFORMANCE, ACADEMIC.— Where the time for compliance had expired and there was
breach of contract by non-performance, it was academic for the plaintiff to have first petitioned the court to fix a
period for the performance of the contract before filing his complaint.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENDANT CANNOT INVOKE ARTICLE 1197 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.— Where the
defendant virtually admitted non-performance of the contract by returning the typewriter that he was obliged to
repair in a non-working condition, with essential parts missing, Article 1197 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
cannot be invoked. The fixing of a period would thus be a mere formality and would serve no purpose than to delay.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DAMAGES RECOVERABLE; CASE AT BAR.— Where the defendant-appellee contravened the tenor of
his obligation because he not only did not repair the typewriter but returned it "in shambles,’’ he is liable for the cost
of the labor or service expended in the repair of the typewriter, which is in the amount of P58.75, because the
obligation or contract was to repair it. In addition, he is likewise liable under Art. 1170 of the Code, for the cost of
the missing parts, in the amount of P31.10, for in his obligation to repair the typewriter he was bound, but failed or
neglected, to return it in the same condition it was when he received it.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES OR ATTORNEY’S FEES NOT RECOVERABLE; NOT ALLEGED OR PROVED IN
INSTANT CASE.— Claims for damages and attorney’s fees must be pleaded, and the existence of the actual basis
thereof must be proved. As no findings of fact were made on the claims for damages and attorney’s fees, there is no
factual basis upon which to make an award therefor.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; APPEAL FROM COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE TO SUPREME COURT; ONLY QUESTIONS OF
LAW REVIEWABLE.— Where the appellant directly appeals from the decision of the trial court to the Supreme Court
on questions of law, he is bound by the judgment of the court a quo on its findings of fact.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is a direct appeal by the party who prevailed in a suit for breach of oral contract and recovery of damages but
was unsatisfied with the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 65138,
because it awarded him only P31.10 out of his total claim of P690 00 for actual, temperate and moral damages and
attorney’s fees.

The appealed judgment, which is brief, is hereunder quoted in full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the early part of July, 1963, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant, who is a typewriter repairer, a portable
typewriter for routine cleaning and servicing. The defendant was not able to finish the job after some time despite
repeated reminders made by the plaintiff. The defendant merely gave assurances, but failed to comply with the
same. In October, 1963, the defendant asked from the plaintiff the sum of P6.00 for the purchase of spare parts,
which amount the plaintiff gave to the defendant. On October 26, 1963, after getting exasperated with the delay of
the repair of the typewriter, the plaintiff went to the house of the defendant and asked for the return of the
typewriter. The defendant delivered the typewriter in a wrapped package. On reaching home, the plaintiff examined
the typewriter returned to him by the defendant and found out that the same was in shambles, with the interior
cover and some parts and screws missing. On October 29, 1963. the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant formally
demanding the return of the missing parts, the interior cover and the sum of P6.00 (Exhibit D). The following day, the
defendant returned to the plaintiff some of the missing parts, the interior cover and the P6.00.

"On August 29, 1964, the plaintiff had his typewriter repaired by Freixas Business Machines, and the repair job cost
him a total of P89.85, including labor and materials (Exhibit C).

"On August 23, 1965, the plaintiff commenced this action before the City Court of Manila, demanding from the
defendant the payment of P90.00 as actual and compensatory damages, P100.00 for temperate damages, P500.00
for moral damages, and P500.00 as attorney’s fees.

"In his answer as well as in his testimony given before this court, the defendant made no denials of the facts
narrated above, except the claim of the plaintiff that the typewriter was delivered to the defendant through a
certain Julio Bocalin, which the defendant denied allegedly because the typewriter was delivered to him personally
by the plaintiff.

"The repair done on the typewriter by Freixas Business Machines with the total cost of P89.85 should not, however,
be fully chargeable against the defendant. The repair invoice, Exhibit C, shows that the missing parts had a total
value of only P31.10.

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P31.10, and the
costs of suit.

"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

The error of the court a quo, according to the plaintiff-appellant, Rosendo O. Chaves, is that it awarded only the
value of the missing parts of the typewriter, instead of the whole cost of labor and materials that went into the
repair of the machine, as provided for in Article 1167 of the Civil Code, reading as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at his cost.

This same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of the obligation. Furthermore it may be
decreed that what has been poorly done he undone."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the other hand, the position of the defendant-appellee, Fructuoso Gonzales, is that he is not liable at all, not even
for the sum of P31.10, because his contract with plaintiff-appellant did not contain a period, so that plaintiff-
appellant should have first filed a petition for the court to fix the period, under Article 1197 of the Civil Code, within
which the defendant appellee was to comply with the contract before said defendant-appellee could be held liable
for breach of contract.

Because the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court and the appellee did not interpose any appeal, the
facts, as found by the trial court, are now conclusive and non-reviewable. 1

The appealed judgment states that the "plaintiff delivered to the defendant . . . a portable typewriter for routine
cleaning and servicing" ; that the defendant was not able to finish the job after some time despite repeated
reminders made by the plaintiff" ; that the "defendant merely gave assurances, but failed to comply with the same" ;
and that "after getting exasperated with the delay of the repair of the typewriter", the plaintiff went to the house of
the defendant and asked for its return, which was done. The inferences derivable from these findings of fact are that
the appellant and the appellee had a perfected contract for cleaning and servicing a typewriter; that they intended
that the defendant was to finish it at some future time although such time was not specified; and that such time had
passed without the work having been accomplished, far the defendant returned the typewriter cannibalized and
unrepaired, which in itself is a breach of his obligation, without demanding that he should be given more time to
finish the job, or compensation for the work he had already done. The time for compliance having evidently expired,
and there being a breach of contract by non-performance, it was academic for the plaintiff to have first petitioned
the court to fix a period for the performance of the contract before filing his complaint in this case. Defendant
cannot invoke Article 1197 of the Civil Code for he virtually admitted non-performance by returning the typewriter
that he was obliged to repair in a non-working condition, with essential parts missing. The fixing of a period would
thus be a mere formality and would serve no purpose than to delay (cf. Tiglao. Et. Al. V. Manila Railroad Co. 98 Phil.
18l).

It is clear that the defendant-appellee contravened the tenor of his obligation because he not only did not repair the
typewriter but returned it "in shambles", according to the appealed decision. For such contravention, as appellant
contends, he is liable under Article 1167 of the Civil Code. jam quot, for the cost of executing the obligation in a
proper manner. The cost of the execution of the obligation in this case should be the cost of the labor or service
expended in the repair of the typewriter, which is in the amount of P58.75. because the obligation or contract was to
repair it.

In addition, the defendant-appellee is likewise liable, under Article 1170 of the Code, for the cost of the missing
parts, in the amount of P31.10, for in his obligation to repair the typewriter he was bound, but failed or neglected, to
return it in the same condition it was when he received it.

Appellant’s claims for moral and temperate damages and attorney’s fees were, however, correctly rejected by the
trial court, for these were not alleged in his complaint (Record on Appeal, pages 1-5). Claims for damages and
attorney’s fees must be pleaded, and the existence of the actual basis thereof must be proved. 2 The appealed
judgment thus made no findings on these claims, nor on the fraud or malice charged to the appellee. As no findings
of fact were made on the claims for damages and attorney’s fees, there is no factual basis upon which to make an
award therefor. Appellant is bound by such judgment of the court, a quo, by reason of his having resorted directly to
the Supreme Court on questions of law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed judgment is hereby modified, by ordering the defendant-
appellee to pay, as he is hereby ordered to pay, the plaintiff-appellant the sum of P89.85, with interest at the legal
rate from the filing of the complaint. Costs in all instances against appellee Fructuoso Gonzales.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.

CRIMINAL LAW

CASE #1:

G.R. No. L-11260             April 29, 1959

In Re: Petition for the issuance of owner's duplicate of transfer certificate of title No. 28709, to cancel
encumbrances and to issue new title to heirs. CONCEPCION OCAMPO VDA. DE SANTIAGO, JESUS OCAMPO, PEDRO
J. OCAMPO, ROSARIO OCAMPO, PAZ OCAMPO VDA. DE CAMPOS, JOSE N. OCAMPO, ANGELA OCAMPO-TINOPO,
JOSEFA RIVERA and JUAN RIVERA, represented by TERESA DEL ROSARIO-FRANCISCO, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MARIA A. GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

Jesus Ocampo and Gonzalo D. David for appellees.

Rosendo J. Tansinsin for appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

On 21 March 1956 the petitioners filed a petition in G.L.R.O. Cad. Rec. No. 159 alleging and claiming that they are the
heirs of the late Manuel Rivera who died intestate leaving a parcel of land situated on Evangelista street Santa Cruz,
Manila, containing an area of 47.10 sq. m. more or less, described in transfer certificate of title No. 28709 (Sp. Proc.
No. 29718, Court of First Instance of Manila); that the owner's duplicate certificate of title to the parcel of land in the
possession of one of the heirs was lost or destroyed during the battle for liberation of Manila in February 1945; that
on the back of the transfer certificate of title, a certified copy of which is attached to the petition (Annex A), two
encumbrances are recorded, to wit: (1) the appointment on 19 June 1926 of Mariano Ocampo y Zamora as
administrator of the estate of the late Manuel Rivera y Angeles in Sp. Proc. No. 29718 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, entered at 10:52 o'clock a.m. on 20 June 1927; and (2) a notice of the levy upon execution dated 12 July
1932 to satisfy a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Case No. 36466 in favor of Maria A.
Garcia, plaintiff, against Jacinta Rivera, defendant, for the sum of P1,630.80 with interest thereon from 22 April 1931
until paid and P50.24 for costs of the suit and expenses incurred in the execution of the judgment, entered at 11:12
o'clock a.m. on 13 July 1932; that the two encumbrances have no more reason to continue recorded on the transfer
certificate of title, because the administrator Mariano Ocampo y Zamora died in 1938 and the record of special
proceedings No. 29718 was destroyed or burned during the war; because the sum due the judgment creditor Maria
A. Garcia, which was for P1,630.80 only together with interest thereon from 22 April 1931 until paid, and P50.24 for
costs and expenses incurred in the execution of the judgment, had already been satisfied in the form of rentals
received by the judgment creditor from Irineo A. Cristobal, the petitioners' lessee, amounting to P5,200 which is very
much in excess of the amount due her, and for that reason she should turn over the excess to the petitioners under
the principle of solutio indebiti; and lastly because the entry of the encumbrance having been made on 13 July 1932,
or more than ten years from the date of entry, whatever right the judgment creditor might still have thereunder is
already barred by statute; and that the petitioners as heirs of the late Manuel Rivera y Angeles, already had
executed a deed of partition of the parcel of land attached to the petition (Annex B). They prayed that the Register of
Deeds in and for the City of Manila be directed to issue another owner's duplicate of certificate of title No. 28709; to
cancel the two encumbrances appearing on the back thereof; and to issue a new title in the name of the petitioners
in the proportion stated in their petition.

Maria A. Garcia filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that on 20 March 1956 she brought an action
against the petitioners in the same Court raising the question of ownership and title to the parcel of land (civil No.
29242, p. 71, Rec. on App.); and that for that reason the land registration court had no jurisdiction to grant what the
petitioners pray in their petition. The petitioners filed a reply to the opposition; the oppositor, a rejoinder to the
petitioners' reply; the petitioners, a sur-reply; the oppositor, an answer to the sur-reply; and the petitioners, a
closing remarks.

After hearing, on 26 April 1956 the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Branch, acting as land registration court,
entered an order directing the Registrar of Deeds in and for the City of Manila, upon payment of his lawful fees, to
issue another owner's duplicate of transfer certificate of title No. 28709, in lieu of the lost one, and to cancel the two
encumbrances appearing on the back thereof, but denying the petitioners' prayer for a new transfer certificate of
title to be issued in their names, without prejudice to their right to file for registration the deed of partition executed
by them with the Office of the Registrar of Deeds in accord with law and the Rules of Court.

The oppositor has appealed to this Court on the ground that the order is contrary to law. In her brief she assigns an
error of law only..

Section 109 and 112 of Act No. 496 provide:

If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a grantee, heir, devisee, assignee, or
other person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument a
suggestion of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in
interest and registered. The Court may thereupon, upon the petition of the registered owner or other person
in interest, after notice and hearing direct the issue of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a
memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be
entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as the original
duplicate for all the purpose of this Act. (109)

. . . Any registered owner or other person in interest may at any time apply by petition to the court, upon the
ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have
terminated and ceased; . . . and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition after
notice to all parties in interest and may order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a
memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security
if necessary, as it may deem proper: . . . (112)

There is no question that under the foregoing quoted provisions of Act No. 496, the court of first instance, acting as
land registration court, may, upon petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, after notice and
hearing, and upon satisfactory proof, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate of title in lieu of a lost or
destroyed one, and the cancellation of encumbrances on a certificate of title which have terminated or ceased.
Having shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the owner's duplicate of transfer certificate of title No. 28709 had
been lost or destroyed during the battle for liberation of Manila, the appellees are entitled to the issuance of
another owner's duplicate of transfer certificate of title No. 28709. Having also shown to the Court's satisfaction that
Mariano Ocampo y Zamora, who had been appointed by the probate court in Sp. Proc. No. 29718 to administer the
estate of the late Manuel Rivera y Angeles, died in 1938, and the record of that fact on the back of the certificate of
title would serve no useful purpose, the appellees may ask for the cancellation thereof and the Court commits no
error in directing the cancellation of the annotation on the certificate of title of the administrator's appointment by
the probate court. As regards the second encumbrance recorded at the appellant's instance, from 13 July 1932, the
date of the filing of the instant petition, and 20 March 1956, of the appellant's complaint in civil case No. 29242 (p.
71, Rec. on App.), almost 24 years had already elapsed without the appellant having taken any step to make effective
her right thereunder and for that reason whatever right she might have under it is already barred by the statute of
limitations. Such being the case the said encumbrance may also be ordered cancelled.

Jurisdiction being conferred by law, the filing of a suit by the appellant against the appellees in the Court of First
Instance to secure a declaration that she is the owner of and entitled to one-half of the parcel of land, cannot divest
the land registration court of its jurisdiction to hear and determine the appellees petition for an order directing the
Register of Deeds in and for the City of Manila to issue another duplicate for the owner of transfer certificate of title
No. 28709 in lieu of the one lost and to cancel the encumbrances mentioned above, pursuant to the provisions of
sections 109 and 112 of the Land Registration Act hereinbefore quoted.

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

CASE #2:

G.R. No. 8722           September 10, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BUENAVENTURA BALCORTA, Defendant-Appellant.

Herrero, Gabaldon and Masigan, by Basilio Aromin for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, sentencing the defendant,
Buenaventura Balcorta, to three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and a fine of
625 pesetas, together with the accessory penalties provided by law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

It is alleged that the court does not sustain the guilt of the appellant. The record, however, clearly shows that the
accused entered a private house, uninvited, where services of the Methodist Episcopal Church were being
conducted by between ten and twenty persons, and threatened the assemblage with a club, thereby interrupting of
disturbing the divine service. The punishment meted out to the defendant by the lower court is that provided for in
article 223 of the Penal Code which reads as follows:

The penalty of prision correccional  in its medium and maximum degrees and a fine of not less than 625 and not more
than 6,250 pesetas  shall be imposed upon any person who, by means of threats violence, or other equivalent
compulsion, shall force some other person to perform an act of worship or prevent him from performing such act.

This conclusion of law is assigned as error, it being insisted that the offense falls under paragraph 1 of article 571,
which reads:chanrobles virtual law library

The penalties of arresto  from one to ten days and a fine of from fifteen to one hundred and twenty-five pesetas  shall
be imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall disturb or interrupt any ceremony of a religious character in any manner not failing within
the provisions of section 3, chapter 2, title 2 of book 2 of this code.

The twenty-first article of the Spanish constitution of 1869 provided for a state religion, but also guaranteed the
privilege of freely practicing, both in public and private, the forms and ceremonies of other sects, subject only to the
restrictions imposed by general law and morality. Under this constitution of Penal Code of Spain, now in effect, was
promulgated in 1870. As a consequence of the removal of all restrictions upon the exercise of religious beliefs, the
Penal Code of Spain, enacted in 1870, in its chapter on crimes against religion, is wholly impersonal. In none of its
articles (Nos. 236 to 241) is any particular religion mentioned, but offense against religion, as such, are defined and
penalized. The heading of the chapter is "Crimes relative to the free exercise of religion ( los cultos)."chanrobles
virtual law library

The constitution of 1876, in Spain, which is still in force, after providing for a state religion, guaranteed that no one in
Spanish territory would be molested for his religious opinions, nor for observing the forms of his faith, provided due
respect were shown for Christian morals. By this same article, however, only the followers of the state religion could
engage in public ceremonies or other manifestations. It will be noted that this article materially modified article 21 of
the former constitution. While everyone could still worship God in his own manner, it was no longer permissible for
cults other than the state religion to demonstrate their religious beliefs in
public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It was under this constitution that the Penal Code for the Philippine Islands was promulgated in 1884. As a
consequence its provisions are considerably different from those of the Spanish Penal Code. Of the eight articles
defining and penalizing "Crimes against religion and worship" (which is the title of the chapter), six refer specially
and solely to crimes against the state religion. The only crime specifically defined against religious other than that of
the state is for disturbing, by means of violence, threats, etc., their ceremonies when conducted in cemeteries or
other places were such ceremonies may be lawfully authorized. (Art. 225.)chanrobles virtual law library

The change of sovereignty and the enactment of the fourteenth paragraph of section 5 of the Philippine Bill caused
the complete separation of church and state, and the abolition of all special privileges and all restrictions theretofore
conferred or imposed upon any particular religious sect. All became equal in the eyes of the law, and those articles
of the Penal Code defining special crimes against that denomination which, under the former sovereign, was the
state religion, as well as article 225, defining a crime against all others than that religion, necessarily became
inoperative. Only those articles of the Penal Code which refer to all religious equally and without distinction can now
be considered as in effect. They appear to be two in number, viz, article 223 and
571.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Let us first examine article 223, from which, neither by the specific language used nor by implication, can it be
inferred that nay particular religious doctrine was in the minds of the code makers. What was the object and
purpose of this section? It will be remembered that at the time this article became law, all faiths not opposed to
Christian morals were, under the constitution of Spain, tolerated. According to the terms of the constitution,
everyone had the right to worship his Maker in his own manner; and as a corollary no one could be compelled to
indorse a particular creed. Were it lawful to prevent the one or exact the other, the terms of the constitution would
have become a dead letter. As is usual with constitutions, no penalty was attached to this article. It remained for the
legislature in the course of its ordinary legislation to provide for its enforcement. In order to instil respect for this
constitutional provision, it was necessary to provide a punishment for anyone who sought to interfere with the
religious beliefs of his fellow citizens. A glance at the other articles of the Penal Code in the chapter we are discussing
shows that none of the crimes defined and punished therein would respond to a state of facts where both the will
and conscience of a human being were being tampered with upon the subject of religion. The provisions of article
223 were relied upon to prevent such practices. The article says that "the penalty . . . shall be imposed upon any
person who . . . shall force some other person to perform an act of worship . . ." In other words, any attempt, by
coercive methods, to induce a person to worship God in a manner different from or to an extent greater than that
person desired, constituted an abridgment of his constitutional right to believe or disbelieve, to regard or disregard
the outer forms of a sect, even though he were a member of that sect. Whatever may have been the inducement for
the passage of this article of the code, certainly it is in the closest harmony with the principles of government of the
present sovereign, one of which is the greatest freedom of thought and speech consistent with public order upon
religious matters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The concluding portion of the article is, "or prevent him from performing such act." History has perhaps
demonstrated that it is a more common form of interference with freedom of religious thought to prevent a person
from worshiping the Supreme Being according to the dictates of his own conscience than it is to force him to go
through the forms of a religious ceremony in which he does not believe; but whether the one method or the other is
adopted, it remains interference with religious freedom, which is incompatible with tolerance of all creeds as
provided for in the Spanish constitution. To prevent a person from performing acts of devotion which he desires to
perform for the sole reason that this creed does not meet with the approval of him who prevents them is as much as
blow aimed at that constitutional right to religious as is the first method of requiring a person to perform acts of
devotion against his will or conscience. Thus far the clause extends. But does it also extend to acts which, while
preventing a person from performing an act of devotion, are not prompted by religious intolerance but from some
other motive? It must be remembered that the great underlying purpose of this article is to prevent and punish
religious intolerance. There is no reason for presuming that the code makers had in view mere disturbances of
religious worship, since these offenses are provided for in other articles of the same chapter. Even less is it to be
presumed that they had in mind offenses which, while perhaps seriously disturbing or preventing (for the time)
religious services, were committed with some other object in view. We are of the opinion that an essential element
of the crime defined and penalized under this article is the intent of the guilty person to coercively the religious
beliefs of another person.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The offense defined and punished by article 571, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code falls under the classification of
"Misdemeanors against the public order." Due to the fact that all the articles in section 3, chapter 2, of book 2 of the
code, with the exception of article 223 have become inoperative, all offenses against religious cults which do not
amount to an attempt to control the conscience of persons must now fall within the provisions of this article. While
the punishment therein provided may be, in some instances, not sufficient, we are of the opinion that, it together
with those provided for "Threats and coercion," will serve as a sufficient deterrent, and instil a wholesome respect
for the decorum and dignity of an assemblage gathered for religious devotion. We find it much easier to arrive at this
conclusion after comparing this penalty with those provided in the jurisdiction of that country from whence came
the clause of the Philippine Bill which insures to all religious orders in this country equal protection. Mere
disturbances of religious worship in the United States are generally classified as misdemeanors only. The increased
severity of the punishments affixed to such penalties under the Penal Code is doubtless due to the long religious
training of the nation which enacted the law and its recognition of a particular faith as a state
religion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, the offense of the defendant falls within the provisions of article 223 or of article 571. The record fails to
disclose the purpose of the defendant in committing the acts complained of. It is true that it is shown that the
defendant was of the Aglipayan faith, while the members of the congregation were of a different sect, but none of
the witnesses for the prosecution state that the defendant made any comment whatever upon religion. He simply
treatened to assault them with a sick he was carrying if they did not stop the services. Under the circumstances, and
considering that it is not proven that religious hatred prompted the defendant to act as he did, his offense appears
to be simply that of disturbing or interrupting the religious services. An essential element of the crime provided for
in article 223 was not proved and the court erred in finding him guilty of the crime therein
defined.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is further alleged that the people thus dispersed by the defendant were not holding religious services, as they were
simply reading some verses out of the Bible. We have been unable to find any provision of law which requires
religious services to be conducted in approved orthodox style in order to merit its protection against interference
and disturbances. As stated in Hull vs. State (120 Ind., 153):

It makes no difference that the method of worship of those assembled was singular or uncommon. The protection of
the statute is extended to all, irrespective of creed, opinion, or mode of
worship.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Persons who meet for the purpose of religious worship, by any method which is not indecent and unlawful, have a
right to do so without being molested or disturbed.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant is sentenced to ten days
imprisonment [ arresto menor], and a fine of P20, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed
one-third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs of the cause. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano,  C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson,  JJ.,  concur.

Moreland, J.,  concurs in the result.

CASE #3:

G.R. No. L-12644      December 22, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEON MORALES, ET AL., defendants. PEDRO RIGOR, MARIANO GORUSPE, and CIPRIANO DE LOS REYES, appellants.

Claudio Gabriel for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

This cause was instituted by a complaint filed by the provincial fiscal, on December 7, 1915, charging the above-
mentioned fourteen defendants with the crime defined and punished by article 223 of the Penal Code, and, on
August 25, 1916, judgment was rendered therein whereby Pedro Rigor, Cipriano de los Reyes, and Mariano Goruspe
were each sentenced to the penalty of ten days' arresto in the municipal jail of Tarlac and to pay a fine of 125
pesetas, together with one-fourteenth of the costs, or, in case of insolvency in respect to the fine, to subsidiary
imprisonment, not to exceed three days, at the rate of one day for each P2.50 they should fail to pay. With respect
to Raymundo Capiral, Dalmacio Capiral, and Hermenegildo Tejada, the case was dismissed; and Leon Morales, Pedro
Gallardo, Pedro Mendoza, Pedro Muega, Aniceto Gonzalez, Juan Vasquez, Geronimo Gusto, and Guillermo Damian
were absolved from the complaint, with the remainder of the costs de officio. From this judgment the defendants
Rigor Goruspe and Reyes appealed.

Upon a careful examination of the record of the proceedings in the present cause, the following facts are found to
have been proven: That shortly after 8 o'clock of the evening of July 15, 1915, about thirty residents of the barrio of
Moriones, of the municipality of Tarlac, accompanied by a number of women and children, all of whom belonged to
the Catholic creed started out in a procession from the Catholic church of said municipality intending to pass through
some of the streets of the town, as they had already done on previous evenings. As they went along in the
procession they said prayers and carried the image of the Virgin of the Immaculate Conception; but on arriving in
front of the Aglipayan church on Calle San Agustin, several men, among whom were Pedro Rigor, who is an
Aglipayan priest, and the residents Mariano Goruspe and Cipriano de los Reyes, there posted with others and
provided with clubs and sticks, prevented the Catholic procession from proceeding further and compelled its
members to take another route, which was not a street and was dirty and the priest, Rigor, said to them that he had
previously warned them not to say prayers during the novenary; thereupon Maximo Cayetano, a resident who on
that occasion was conducting the procession and leading those in it who were saying prayers in novena, replied to
the priest, Rigor, that the latter ought not to prohibit them from doing a good deed, and after this reply, gave the
order for the procession to continue its march; but at this moment Rigor, Goruspe, Reyes, and others of their
companions attacked said Maximo Cayetano, some of them with sticks and clubs while a majority of the others
engaged in pushing back the people in the procession, as a result of which aggression they started to run, the image
of the Virgin fell to the ground and was abandoned, and the procession was disbanded. During the disturbance the
crown of the image disappeared and one of its hands was broken. The foregoing facts were brought out by the
testimony of the said Cayetano and the eyewitnesses Hilario de los Santos, Roman Yamson, and Bartolome Licu, who
testified that the defendants Reyes, Rigor and Goruspe, with others, met the members of the procession, prevented
them from proceeding and passing in front of the Aglipayan church, and maltreated Maximo Cayetano and others in
the procession, and that the priest Rigor also said to them that he had previously warned them that they should not
in the future perform the novena by a procession through the streets.
According to the medical certificate, Exhibit A, issued by Dr. Juan Nepomuceno, who examined Maximo Cayetano's
body, the latter bore slight wounds as a result of the maltreatment he had received.

The defendants, Pedro Rigor, Mariano Goruspe, and Cipriano de los Reyes, pleaded not guilty and denied the charge
filed against them. Pedro Rigor stated that at the time of the occurrence he was praying in the Aglipayan church, and
that, on noticing the commotion and hearing the shouts in the adjacent street, he ordered a mandatory of his to
make an investigation and inform him what was going on, whereby he learned that Mariano Goruspe and Maximo
Cayetano had raised a disturbance. This exculpatory statement appears to have been refuted by the witnesses for
the prosecution, and specially by the very witness for the defense, Teodoro Lacsamana, a policeman, who, on
hearing the tumult, went to the place of the occurrence. His testimony corroborated that given by the
aforementioned witnesses for the prosecution. He also testified that he found the priest, Pedro Rigor, Cipriano de los
Reyes, Maximo Cayetano, and several others in the place of the disturbance.

The other defendant, Goruspe, likewise denied the acts charged against him, and in exculpation testified that on
arrival of the procession of the Roman Catholics in front of the Aglipayan church, he warned Maximo Cayetano not
to halt in the street the procession he was conducting, so that the Aglipayans might have room and a passage way,
and that, if they should halt there in the afternoon of the following day, perhaps something might happen; but that
Cayetano, without replying, went forward with the procession until the latter, still in formation, entered the Catholic
church; that afterwards Cayetano returned to the place where witness was, to ascertain what the latter had said,
and forthwith assaulted witness, with the aid of the witnesses Santos, Yamson, and Licu, who accompanied
Cayetano; and that, in response to witness' cries for help, Clemente Basilio, Valeriano Sembrano, and others came to
the scene.

Article 223 of the Penal Code provides: lawphi1.net

ART. 223. The penalty of  prision correccional in its medium and maximum degrees and a fine of not less than
six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas shall be imposed
upon any person who, by means of threats, violence, or other equivalent compulsion, shall force some other
person to perform an act of worship or prevent him from performing such act.

This article, among the several others contained in section 3, chapter 2, title 2, book 2, of said code, is the only one
now applicable to crimes in the matter of religion and worship which may be committed in this country, and provides
punishment for the delinquent who shall prevent some other person from performing any act of worship.

The facts were fully proven that, on one of the occasions when the procession passed through Calle San Agustin,
where the Aglipayan church is situated, after the priest, Pedro Rigor, had given Maximo Cayetano an unequivocal
warning that the procession should not go out to pray in novena through the streets, nor pass in front of said
Aglipayan church, on its doing so in the evening of July 15, the said priest Rigor, and the other defendants Goruspe
and Reyes, who, with others were awaiting it there, went to meet those who formed said religious procession, and
while some maltreated Maximo Cayetano, who was conducting it, others engaged in pushing back its members and
preventing their going forward, by which procedure they succeeded in disbanding it and dispersing its members in
such wise that, through fright, they abandoned the image of the Virgin in the street. These facts appear to be
corroborated by Maximo Cayetano and the three aforementioned witnesses for the prosecution, and also by the
witness for the defense. Clemente Basilio, who positively stated that the cause of the disbandment of the procession
was the fear that predominated in the minds of those who composed it, as a result of the assault and the tumult
raised by the defendants, preventing the residents who attended the procession and said prayers of the Catholic
ritual, from going forward and continuing the pious exercise which they had a right to perform, for they were
proceeding religiously and orderly through Calle San Agustin, giving no cause for any disturbance whatever, and on
arriving in front of the Aglipayan church were compelled to suspend the religious acts they were performing. There is
no evidence of record that the local authority had forbidden the passage of the procession through the streets of the
town nor that said religious acts were contrary to law, morals, or public order.

The defendants themselves were not authorized to hinder the passage of a Catholic procession through the street in
front of the Aglipayan church, to which they belong, and by performing reprehensible acts of maltreatment and
violence against the persons of the parties attending the procession, they produced as a result and by force the
dissolution of said religious procession and prevented those attending it from performing the religious acts in which
they were engaged. The defendants have therefore incurred the penalty prescribed in said article, and, as the
commission of the crime was unaccompanied by any extenuating or aggravating circumstances, they should be
punished with the double penalty provided by law, in the medium period of the medium and maximum degrees of
the penalty of prision correccional, and each of them by a fine of 1,000 pesetas.

In the judgment appealed from, the crime charged is classified as a mere misdemeanor for the disturbance of a
religious procession which a number of Catholics were holding through the streets of the town of Tarlac, and, on this
ground, the trial court held that said crime was not comprised by the aforementioned section 3 of chapter 2, title 2,
book 2, of the Penal Code, but by article 571 of the same Code.

The evidence adduced at the trial proves that the defendants, by means of force and violence, succeeded in realizing
their decided purpose of preventing at any risk a religious procession of the Catholic Church of Tarlac from
continuing of its way through Calle San Agustin, where the Aglipayan church is situated; that they opposed the
exercise of the pious acts which, on the evening of the occurrence in question, the Catholics were performing as they
were entitled to do so; and that the defendants, impelled by the passion of intolerance, perhaps in the belief that
the Aglipayan religious faith to which they belonged was the only one ought to predominate in that town, devoted
themselves to preventing absolutely the performance of the religious rites which were then being performed by the
persons attending said procession, and with this purpose in view, having provided themselves with sticks and clubs,
they stationed themselves near the church to which they belonged and, on the arrival there of the Catholic
procession, not merely disturbed it, but by means of violent and aggressive acts, dissolved it and dispersed the
members thereof, who fled in freight and abandoned the image of the Virgin which they were carrying.

It is seen that the defendants, by dissolving the procession and by main force dispersing its members, proposed not
only to interrupt and disturb a religious procession, but also absolutely to prevent the person taking part therein
from being able to address their prayers to God in the manner established by the Catholic church, to the community
and confession of which they belonged. this procedure was entirely unlawful and the acts committed by them are
punishable under the aforecited article of the Penal Code. In the present case, the crime prosecuted is totally
different from that concerned in the case of the United States vs. Balcorta (25 Phil. Rep., 273), for the reason that
the herein defendants, in dissolving the procession and putting its members to flight by means of violence exercised
upon their persons, prevented them from being able to perform technically religious acts which they were entitled
freely to perform and under the protection of the authorities.

The facts involved in the case of the United States vs. Balcorta are related in the following paragraph transcribed
from the judgment rendered therein:

It is alleged that the record does not sustain the guilt of the appellant. The record, however, clearly shows
that the accused entered a private house, uninvited, where services of the Methodist Episcopal church were
being conducted by between ten and twenty persons, and threatened the assemblage with a club, thereby
interrupting or disturbing the divine service.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The record fails to disclose the purpose of the defendant in committing the acts complained of. It is true that
it is shown that the defendant was of the Aglipayan faith, while the members of the congregation were of a
different sect, but none of the witnesses for the prosecution state that the defendant made any comment
whatever upon religion. He simply threatened to assault them with a stick he was carrying if they did not
stop the services. Under the circumstances, and considering that it was not proven that religious hatred
prompted the defendant to act as he did, his offense appears to be simply that of disturbing or interrupting
the religious services. An essential element of the crime provided for in article 223 was not proven and the
court erred in finding him guilty of the crime therein defined.

It is further alleged that the people thus dispersed by the defendant were not holding religious services, as
they were simply reading some verses out of the Bible. We have been unable to find any provision of law
which requires religious services to be conducted in approved orthodox style in order to merit its protection
against interference or disturbance.
A mere perusal of the three preceding paragraphs shows that the facts therein related are very different from those
concerned in the present decision.

For the foregoing reasons it is proper that, reversing the judgment appealed from in the part thereafter relative to
said three defendants and appellants, Pedro Rigor, Mariano Goruspe, and Cipriano de los Reyes, they be, as they are
hereby sentenced each to the penalty of three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to the
accessory penalties of article 61, to the payment by each of them of a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and in case of
insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed one-third of the time of the principal
penalty, to pay each of them one-fourteenth of the costs of first instance and one third of the costs of this second
instance. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J.,  concurring:

I concur in the opinion and judgment as handed down by Justice Torres. Reference is made to the case of the United
States vs. Balcorta. ([1913], 25 Phil., 273). This case held those articles of the Penal Code defining special crimes
against the State religion as well as article 225, defining a crime against all others than that religion as no longer
operative. The same decision found article 223 of the Penal Code designed to punished acts of interference with the
freedom of will and conscience in religious matters, and so, in effect. Applying these principles, it was found that the
acts of disturbance or interruption of religious service were not prompted by the motives provided for in article 223.
The facts in the present case disclose unequivocally that the accused were endeavoring through violence to prevent
persons from performing an act of worship by taking part in a religious procession. It is accordingly our duty to give
force to the great constitutional principles enunciated in the Treaty of Paris and in the Philippine Bill of Rights
protecting the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, the violation of which is punished by
the Penal Code. Even though the penalty meted out by the accused is severe, it is not too severe, if religious liberty is
to be respected.

CARSON, J.,  dissenting:

I dissent.

I think the offense committed was a misdemeanor as found by the trial judge, and that the judgment entered in the
court below should be affirmed.

The facts in this case are substantially identical with those in the case of the United States vs. Balcorta (25 Phil. Rep.,
273), wherein we held that the interruption and forcible dispersal of a bible class was a misdemeanor as defined and
penalized in article 571 of the Penal Code, and not a violation of article 223 of that code.

STREET, J.,  dissenting:

I dissent.