DELOS SANTOS V.

JARRA
G.R. No. L-4150 February 10, 1910 Facts: The Plaintiff Felix delos Santos filed this suit against
Agustina Jarra. Jarra was the administratix of the estate of Jimenea. Plaintiff alleged that he
owned 10 1st class carabaos which he lent to his father-in-law Jimenea to be used in the
animal-power mill without compensation. This was done on the condition of their return after the
work at the latter’s mill is terminated. When delos Santos demanded the return of the animals
Jimenea refused, hence this suit.

Issue: W/N the contracts is one of a commodatum

Ruling: YES. The carabaos were given on commodatum as these were delivered to be used by
defendant. Upon failure of defendant to return the cattle upon demand, he is under the
obligation to indemnify the plaintiff by paying him their value. Since the 6 carabaos were not the
property of the deceased or of any of his descendants, it is the duty of the administratrix of the
estate to either return them or indemnify the owner thereof of their value.

REPUBLIC V. BAGTAS
May 8, 1948: Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau
of Animal Industry three bulls: a Red Sindhi with a book value of P1,176.46, a Bhagnari, of
P1,320.56 and a Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for a period of 1 year for breeding purposes subject to a
breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bullsMay 7, 1949: Jose requested for a renewal for
another year for the three bulls but only one bull was approved while the others are to be
returnedMarch 25, 1950: He wrote to the Director of Animal Industry that he would pay the value
of the 3 bullsOctober 17, 1950: he reiterated his desire to buy them at a value with a deduction
of yearly depreciation to be approved by the Auditor General.October 19, 1950: Director of
Animal Industry advised him that either the 3 bulls are to be returned or their book value without
deductions should be paid not later than October 31, 1950 which he was not able to
doDecember 20, 1950: An action at the CFI was commenced against Jose praying that he be
ordered to return the 3 bulls or to pay their book value of P3,241.45 and the unpaid breeding fee
of P199.62, both with interests, and costsJuly 5, 1951: Jose V. Bagtas, through counsel
Navarro, Rosete and Manalo, answered that because of the bad peace and order situation in
Cagayan Valley, particularly in the barrio of Baggao, and of the pending appeal he had taken to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the President of the Philippines, he
could not return the animals nor pay their value and prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint.RTC: granted the actionDecember 1958: granted an ex-parte motion for the
appointment of a special sheriff to serve the writ outside ManilaDecember 6, 1958: Felicidad M.
Bagtas, the surviving spouse of Jose who died on October 23, 1951 and administratrix of his
estate, was notifiedJanuary 7, 1959: she file a motion that the 2 bulls where returned by his son
on June 26, 1952 evidenced by recipt and the 3rd bull died from gunshot wound inflicted during
a Huk raid and prayed that the writ of execution be quashed and that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued.

ISSUE: W/N the contract is commodatum and NOT a lease and the estate should be liable for
the loss due to force majeure due to delay.

HELD: YES. writ of execution appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costsIf
contract was commodatum then Bureau of Animal Industry retained ownership or title to the bull
it should suffer its loss due to force majeure. A contract of commodatum is essentially
gratuitous. If the breeding fee be considered a compensation, then the contract would be a
lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the
responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith, because she had continued possession of the bull
after the expiry of the contract. And even if the contract be commodatum, still the appellant is
liable if he keeps it longer than the period stipulatedthe estate of the late defendant is only liable
for the sum of P859.63, the value of the bull which has not been returned because it was killed
while in the custody of the administratrix of his estateSpecial proceedings for the administration
and settlement of the estate of the deceased Jose V. Bagtas having been instituted in the CFI,
the money judgment rendered in favor of the appellee cannot be enforced by means of a writ of
execution but must be presented to the probate court for payment by the appellant, the
administratrix appointed by the court.

PAJUYO V. CA
In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo (Pajuyo) paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the
rights over a 250- square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a
house made of light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the house from 1979 to 7
December 1985.On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra
(Guevarra) executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed
Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and
orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises on
Pajuyos demand.In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and
demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra refused.Pajuyo filed an ejectment case
against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31 (MTC).In his
Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of possession over the lot
where the house stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation
No. 137 for socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to September
1994, Pajuyo did not show up or communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor
Pajuyo has valid title to the lot.MTC: The MTC ruled that the subject of the agreement between
Pajuyo and Guevarra is the house and not the lot. Pajuyo is the owner of the house, and he
allowed Guevarra to use the house only by tolerance. Thus, Guevarras refusal to vacate the
house on Pajuyos demand made Guevarras continued possession of the house illegal.RTC:
The RTC upheld the Kasunduan, which established the landlord and tenant relationship
between Pajuyo and Guevarra. The terms of the Kasunduan bound Guevarra to return
possession of the house on demand.The RTC rejected Guevarras claim of a better right under
Proclamation No. 137, the Revised National Government Center Housing Project Code of
Policies and other pertinent laws. In an ejectment suit, the RTC has no power to decide
Guevarras rights under these laws. The RTC declared that in an ejectment case, the only issue
for resolution is material or physical possession, not ownership.CA: Pajuyo and Guevarra are
squatters. Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the contested lot which the government
owned.Perez, the person from whom Pajuyo acquired his rights, was also a squatter. Perez had
no right or title over the lot because it is public land. Pajuyo and Guevarra are in pari delicto or
in equal fault. The court will leave them where they are.Kasunduan is not a lease contract but a
commodatum because the agreement is not for a price certain.Since Pajuyo admitted that he
resurfaced only in 1994 to claim the property, the appellate court held that Guevarra has a
better right over the property under Proclamation No. 137. President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 137 on 7 September 1987. At that time, Guevarra was in physical possession
of the property. Under Article VI of the Code of Policies Beneficiary Selection and Disposition of
Homelots and Structures in the National Housing Project (the Code), the actual occupant or
caretaker of the lot shall have first priority as beneficiary of the project. The Court of Appeals
concluded that Guevarra is first in the hierarchy of priority.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred or abused its authority and discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction in ruling that the Kasunduan voluntarily entered into by the parties was in fact a
commodatum, instead of a Contract of Lease as found by the Metropolitan Trial Court and in
holding that the ejectment case filed against defendant-appellant is without legal and factual
basis

Ruling:
The Court do not subscribe to the CA’s theory that the Kasunduan is one of commodatum.In a
contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another something not consumable so
that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it. An essential feature of
commodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing
belonging to another is for a certain period. Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the
thing loaned until after expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for
which the commodatum is constituted. If the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may
demand its return for temporary use. If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he
can demand the return of the thing at will, in which case the contractual relation is called a
precarium. Under the Civil Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum.The Kasunduan reveals
that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While
the Kasunduan did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in
good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract different from
a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from that of a commodatum.
Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a
landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in the termination
of the lease. The tenants withholding of the property would then be unlawful. This is settled
jurisprudence.Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one of
commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over possession of the
property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or to return the thing received attaches to
contracts for safekeeping, or contracts of commission, administration and commodatum. These
contracts certainly involve the obligation to deliver or return the thing received.Guevarra turned
his back on the Kasunduan on the sole ground that like him, Pajuyo is also a squatter.
Squatters, Guevarra pointed out, cannot enter into a contract involving the land they illegally
occupy. Guevarra insists that the contract is void.Guevarra should know that there must be
honor even between squatters. Guevarra freely entered into the Kasunduan. Guevarra cannot
now impugn the Kasunduan after he had benefited from it. The Kasunduan binds Guevarra.The
Kasunduan is not void for purposes of determining who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has a
right to physical possession of the contested property. The Kasunduan is the undeniable
evidence of Guevarras recognition of Pajuyos better right of physical possession. Guevarra is
clearly a possessor in bad faith. The absence of a contract would not yield a different result, as
there would still be an implied promise to vacate.

PRODUCERS BANK V. CA
Facts:
Sanchez asked his friend Mr. Vives to help her another friend Doronilla. Mr. Vives agreed and
deposited Php 200,000 to a Producer’s Bank savings account named under Sterella (business
owned by Doronilla).Such deposit will be used as a show money for Sterella’s incorporation.
The authorized signatories of the account were Mrs. Vives and Sanchez. The passboook was
held by Mrs. Vives. Despite this, Doronilla was able to transfer Php 110,000 to his own
account.Doronilla issued checks as payments to Vives, however, they were all dishonored upon
presentment. Hence, Vives filed a case against Doronilla, Sanchez and Producer’s Bank for the
recovery of his money.
RTC – ruled in favor of Vives. The contract between Vives and Doronilla is commodatum. Also,
the bank is liable as the employer of its branch manager which is found to be in collusion with
Doronilla.

CA – Affirmed

Issue:
(1) WON the contract between Vives and Doronilla is a mutuum and not a commodatum. (NO,
its a commodatum)

(2) WON Producer’s Bank is liable to Vives. (Yes)

Ruling:
(1)Petitioner bank contends that the transaction between Vives and Doronilla is a simple loan
(mutuum) since all the elements of a mutuum are present: (1) What was delivered by Vives to
Doronilla was money, a consumable thing; and (2) the transaction was onerous as Doronilla
was obliged to pay interest. Since the contract is a loan, the bank is not liable as it was not a
party thereto.The SC held otherwise. Art. 1933 provides that if the subject of the contract is a
consumable thing, such as money, the contract would be a mutuum. However, there are some
instances where a commodatum may have for its object a consumable thing.Art. 1936 provides
that consumable goods may be the subject of commodatum if the purpose of the contract is not
the consumption of the object, as when it is merely for exhibition. Thus, if consumable goods
are loaned only for purposes of exhibition, or when the intention of the parties is to lend
consumable goods and to have the very same goods returned at the end of the period agreed
upon, the loan is a commodatum and not a mutuum.As correctly pointed out by both the Court
of Appeals and the trial court, the evidence shows that private respondent agreed to deposit his
money in the savings account of Sterela specifically for the purpose of making it appear “that
said firm had sufficient capitalization for incorporation, with the promise that the amount shall be
returned within thirty (30) days.”Vives merely “accommodated” Doronilla by lending his money
without consideration, as a favor to his good friend Sanchez. It was however clear to the parties
to the transaction that the money would not be removed from Sterela’s savings account and
would be returned to private respondent after thirty (30) days.Doronilla’s attempts to return to
Vives the amount of P200,000.00 which the latter deposited in Sterela’s account together with
an additional P12,000.00, allegedly representing interest on the mutuum, did not convert the
transaction from a commodatum into a mutuum because such was not the intent of the parties
and because the additional P12,000.00 corresponds to the fruits of the lending of the
P200,000.00.Article 1935 of the Civil Code expressly states that the bailee in commodatum
acquires the use of the thing loaned but not its fruits. Hence, it was only proper for Doronilla to
remit to private respondent the interest accruing to the latter’s money deposited with petitioner.

(2)Neither does the Court agree with petitioner’s contention that it is not solidarily liable for the
return of private respondent’s money because it was not privy to the transaction between
Doronilla and Vives.The nature of said transaction, that is, whether it is a mutuum or a
commodatum, has no bearing on the question of petitioner’s liability for the return of private
respondent’s money because the factual circumstances of the case clearly show that petitioner,
through its employee Mr. Atienza, was partly responsible for the loss of private respondent’s
money and is liable for its restitution.Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers shall be
held primarily and solidarily liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks.
CATHOLIC VICAR V. CA
Facts:- 1962: Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (Vicar), petitioner, filed with the
court an application for the registration of title over lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 situated in Poblacion
Central, Benguet, said lots being used as sites of the Catholic Church, building, convents, high
school building, school gymnasium, dormitories, social hall and stonewalls.- 1963: Heirs of Juan
Valdez and Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano claimed that they have ownership over lots 1, 2 and 3.
(2 separate civil cases)- 1965: The land registration court confirmed the registrable title of Vicar
to lots 1 , 2, 3 and 4. Upon appeal by the private respondents (heirs), the decision of the lower
court was reversed. Title for lots 2 and 3 were cancelled.- VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his application
for registration of Lots 2 and 3.- During trial, the Heirs of Octaviano presented one (1) witness,
who testified on the alleged ownership of the land in question (Lot 3) by their predecessor-in-
interest, Egmidio Octaviano; his written demand to Vicar for the return of the land to them; and
the reasonable rentals for the use of the land at P10,000 per month. On the other hand, Vicar
presented the Register of Deeds for the Province of Benguet, Atty. Sison, who testified that the
land in question is not covered by any title in the name of Egmidio Octaviano or any of the heirs.
Vicar dispensed with the testimony of Mons. Brasseur when the heirs admitted that the witness
if called to the witness stand, would testify that Vicar has been in possession of Lot 3, for 75
years continuously and peacefully and has constructed permanent structures thereon.

Issue:
1. WON Vicar had been in possession of lots 2 and 3 merely as bailee borrower in
commodatum, a gratuitous loan for use.
2. Whether or not the failure to return the subject matter of commodatum constitutes an adverse
possession on the part of the owner

Held:
1. YES. Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed
by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed. They never asked for the
return of the house, but when they allowed its free use, they became bailors in commodatum
and the petitioner the bailee.

2. No. The bailees’ failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not
mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property
subject matter of commodatum.Petitioner repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its
name for taxation purposes.Ratio: The Court of Appeals found that petitioner Vicar did not meet
the requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither
did it satisfy the requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription
because of the absence of just title. The appellate court did not believe the findings of the trial
court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by purchase and Lot 3 was acquired also by
purchase from Egmidio Octaviano by petitioner Vicar because there was absolutely no
documentary evidence to support the same and the alleged purchases were never mentioned in
the application for registration.

Ruling: WHEREFORE AND BY REASON OF THE FOREGOING, this petition is DENIED for
lack of merit, the Decision dated Aug. 31, 1987 in CA-G.R. Nos. 05148 and 05149, by
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner
QUINTOS AND ANSALDO V. BECK

FACTS: The defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff. The latter gratuitously granted to the former
the use of the furniture subject to the condition that the defendant would return them to the
plaintiff upon the latter's demand. The plaintiff sold the property. There after the plaintiff required
the defendant to return all the furniture transferred to him for the new owners in the house
where they were found.On November 5, 1936, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff reiterating that
she may call for the furniture in the ground floor of the house. On the 7th of the same month, the
defendant wrote another letter to the plaintiff informing her that he could not give up the three
gas heaters and the four electric lamps because he would use them until the 15th of the same
month when the lease in due to expire. The plaintiff refused to get the furniture in view of the
fact that the defendant had declined to make delivery of all of them. On November 15th, before
vacating the house, the defendant deposited with the Sheriff all the furniture belonging to the
plaintiff and they are now on deposit in the custody of the sheriff.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant complied with his obligation to return the furniture upon the
plaintiff’s demand.

HELD: NO. The contract entered into between the parties is one of commadatum, because
under it the plaintiff gratuitously granted the use of the furniture to the defendant, reserving for
herself the ownership thereof; by this contract the defendant bound himself to return the
furniture to the plaintiff, upon the latters demand (clause 7 of the contract, Exhibit A; articles
1740, paragraph 1, and 1741 of the Civil Code).The obligation voluntarily assumed by the
defendant to return the furniture upon the plaintiff's demand, means that he should return all of
them to the plaintiff at the latter's residence or house. The defendant did not comply with this
obligation when he merely placed them at the disposal of the plaintiff, retaining for his benefit
the three gas heaters and the four eletric lamps. As the defendant had voluntarily undertaken to
return all the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the latter's demand, the Court could not legally
compel her to bear the expenses occasioned by the deposit of the furniture at the defendant's
behest. The latter, as bailee, was not entitled to place the furniture on deposit; nor was the
plaintiff under a duty to accept the offer to return the furniture, because the defendant wanted to
retain the three gas heaters and the four electric lamps.