46.

FLUEMER VS HIX

FACTS: An application for probate of the will of Edward Randolph Hix was filed on February 20, 1929.
Petitioner who is the special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph alleged that the will was
executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who resided therein. Petitioner submitted a
copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2,
1914, p1690 and as certified to by the Director of the National Library.

Trial Court’s decision: denied the probate of the document alleged to be the last will and testament of the
deceased.

Petitioner filed an appeal from the judgment of the probate court before the Supreme Court. Pending appeal,
petitioner presented an unverified petition for the Court to accept as part of the evidence documents, one of
which was a paper purporting to be the last will and testament of the testator which was presented for
probate on June 8, 1929 to the clerk of Randolph County, State of West Virginia.

ISSUES: Whether or not the pertinent law of West Virginia was duly proven?

RULLING: No. The law was not proved as fact. The requirements in proving the foreign law were not met.
Findings of the court are as follows:

a. It did not show that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority
of the State of West Virginia.

b. The extract from the law was not attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original,
under the seal of the State of West Virginia.

c. It did not show that the extract of the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was
executed.

47. In re: Ruperta Palaganas

FACTS:   
Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died
single and childless.  In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother,
Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the
U.S.   

Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another  brother of Ruperta, filed with the a petition for
the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.  However,
petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of
Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but
in the U.S. where she executed it
        The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as
special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing
the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not
been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed. 

HELD:

Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of
a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of
such estate.  Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the
will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition
the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is
lost or destroyed.   

          Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the
petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of
the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e)  if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of
the person having custody of it.  Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at
the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the estate he left in such province.  The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already
been allowed and probated in the country of its execution. 

48. ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner, vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.

Facts:

1. Spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey were American citizens who resided in the Philippines for
30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill. Audrey died testate, bequeathing her entire
estate to Richard. The court named petitioner as ancilliary administrator. Her will was also admitted to
probate by the CFI of Rizal. Petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1)
Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate in Makati, (2) a bank account in Audrey’s name; and (3) shares of
stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
2. Richard then married respondent with whom he had two children. Richard died testate bequeathing his
entire estate to respondent, save for the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. His will was
submitted for probate before the Makati RTC.
3. Petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. Petitioner also filed on a project of
partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati
property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank account; and Kyle, the ¼
undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.
These were granted and approved by the trial court.
4. Petitioner then filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati
property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children.
Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy ." The trial court ruled in
favor of respondent.
5. Respondent filed with the CA an amended complaint for the annulment of the trial court’s previous orders.
Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws
of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s. The CA annulled the trial court’s orders.

ISSUES: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in not holding that the ancillary administrator having acted in
good faith, did not commit fraud, either extrinsic or intrinsic, in the performance of his duties as ancillary
administrator

RULINGS:

The CA is correct.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will is governed by her national law as provided in
Article 16 of the Civil Code. Notice should be also be given to Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on
Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate. Petitioner was duty-bound
to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland. The CA aptly noted that petitioner was
remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by
petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the
Makati property. Well-intentioned though it may be, petitioner’s action appears to have breached his duties
and responsibilities. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under
ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant
frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic
fraud. It does not rest upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the
circumstances. Respondent was excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or
negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control.

49. EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY

FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse,
Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and
Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. After Cristina’s death,
respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over Cristina’s estate.

Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in
the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-
Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead,
Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent,
Cristina. Federico died. Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision
appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. On appeal by certiorari, the
Supreme Court in an earlier case reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. The Court decided to
include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico’s estate.

ISSUE: Who between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s
estate.

HELD: Isabel. The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down
in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court,
or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.

50. Ventura vs Ventura

Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio Ventura. appellees
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate children with his former wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. On December 14, 1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did
not include the appellees. In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was
named and appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate. Said
will was admitted to probate on January 14,195. Gregorio Ventura died on September 26, 1955.

On October 10, 1955, the appellant Maria Ventura filed a motion for her appointment as executrix and for
the issuance of letters testamentary in her favour.

On October 17, 1955, Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters testamentary was
issued in her favour.

On or about July 26, 1956, Maria Ventura submitted an inventory of the estate of Gregorio Ventura. On June
17, 1960, she filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive.

Oppositions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to remove as executrix and administrator
Maria Ventura on the grounds that (1) that she is grossly incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously and
purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate
daughter who can have no harmonious relations with the appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to
render her accounts and failed to comply with the Order of the Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix and
administratrix.

Ruling: Yes. This would now necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the following
provision: Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing
to serve;" xxx

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of
kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as
those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property. It is generally
said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of
administrator. 'Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

51. Villamor vs. Court of Appeals 162 SCRA 574 (1988)

Facts: Two special proceedings cases were filed by heirs of Rufino and Barbara. Both of them were children of
spouses Victor Cortes and Maria Castaneda. For heirs of Rufino, it is the estate of Rufino Cortes while for the
heirs of Barbara, it is the estate of Bartolome,Eustaquio and his children.
Since both involves the same properties, the two heirs agreed to settle and adjudicate themselves the
properties. After six months of negotiation, or on December 7, 1946, a Project of Partition was executed by
Sixta Ceniza (daughter in law of Barbara and husband of Eustaquio) and Father Camomot, in his capacity as
administrator of the Estate of Bartolome Cortes (son of Barbara), assisted by their counsels and Ireneo and
Paula Cortes Villamor (children of Rufino), assisted by Atty. Gaudencio Juezan, on the other.
On April 14, 1948, Judge S. C. Moscoso approved the project of partition, and on September 30, 1948,
the administrators delivered the seven parcels of land to Ireneo and Paula Villamor. Special Proceedings Nos.
262 and 343 were ordered closed and terminated by Judge Florentino Saguin on November 25, 1953. Entry of
judgment was made on March 18, 1954. (PARTITION APPROVED). Nicanor, son of Eustaquio and Sixta, was not
given any property in the partition. It was revealed in letters he had written that he might renounced his
inheritance since he being a priest, he took a vow of poverty.

Meanwhile, upon the death of Sixta Ceniza on July 28, 1948, one Cristina Ceniza, sister of respondent
Daniela Ceniza Urot instituted Special Proceedings No. 364-R for the administration of the estate of Sixta
Ceniza. One Escolastico Ceniza, brother of respondent, was appointed special administrator. The latter's
appointment, however, was revoked on February 20, 1954 upon petition of Fr. Nicanor Cortes through his
counsel, Atty. Fermin Yap on January 14, 1954, and in his stead, Victorio Perez was appointed the special
administrator. In this proceedings, the nephews and nieces of Sixta Ceniza, including herein respondent,
prayed that they be declared the sole and only forced heirs of Sixta Ceniza, although at the time, Fr. Nicanor
Cortes, the only surviving child of Sixta Ceniza, was still alive.

ISSUE: Could strangers to decedents be appointed as administrators of their estate?

Held: Yes . We do not consider as "intriguing" the observation of the lower court and concurred in by the Court
of Appeals that in both Special Proceedings in question, the administrators appointed were complete strangers
to the decedents. There is nothing repulsive in this nor is this an indicium of fraud and collusion as found by
the courts. Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the persons who can act as executors and
administrators. It provides that in case the persons who have the preferential right to be appointed are not
competent or are unwilling to serve, administration may be granted to such other person as the court may
appoint.

52. Leon vs Manulife

Facts: Butler, a former resident of the Philippines, died in New York. His will was probated in New York. In his
will, he left his remaining estate to Mercedes Leon (a Filipina). Butler specified that since Mercedes is not of
sound judgement, his New York executors are allowed to invest the money in annuity, thus, one of his New
York executors, James Madison Ross purchased an annuity from Manulife (Canada Head Office). The contract
stipulates for a monthly payment of $57.60 to Mercedes during her lifetime, with the proviso that in the
event of her death, the residue, if any, of the capital sum shall be paid in one lump sum to James Madison
Ross. Manulife (Canada HO) has been religiously paying this monthly annuity thru Manulife (Manila
Branch). Mercedes now wants to get this one lump sum payment. She presented Butler’s will for probate
before the CFI-Manila with Ghezzi as the administratrix.

Issue: WON Ghezzi, the Philippine administratrix, has the power to administer properties outside the
Philippines?

Ruling: No. The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the assets of a
decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that an administrator appointed in one
state or country has no power over property in another state or country.

This principle is specifically embodied in Section h of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

Estate, how administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters
of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to
all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to
persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.

Whether considered as a trust or as simple consideration for the company’s assumed obligation, which it has
been religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to the annuitant, the proceeds of the sale cannot
be withdrawn without the consent of the company, except, upon the death of the annuitant, the residuary
legatee may claim the remainder, if there be any.

53. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs FERDINAND R. MARCOS II and

IMELDA R. MARCOS G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855

Facts: The RTC of Pasig issued an order granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R.
Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby authorized to continue her functions as Special Administrator of
the Estate of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos. Later on, the Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration to the Order granting letters testamentary to respondents. On the other hand, Imelda
Marcos filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not
proven its existence and validity. Subsequently, Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he
already filed a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as directed by the RTC and filed a Motion to Revoke the
Letters of Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato. The Motion for
reconsideration of Republic and Imelda was both denied.

Petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the R ules of Court,
questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents. The Court issued a
Resolution referring the petition to the CA which was denied later on. Hence, a motion for reconsideration
was filed to SC.

Issue: WON petition for certiorari was proper.

Held: No. Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, which was then in effect provides that, except in criminal cases
where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may
be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Supreme Court shall further have
exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorarias the law or rules of court
may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as provided in the pertinent portions of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of
granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a
direct appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring that the "issues raised by petitioner do not
fall within the purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court should take
cognizance of the instant case."
54. Heirs of Austino Mesina and Genoveva Mesina v. Heirs of Domingo Fian, et al., GR No. 201816, Apr 8,
2013
Facts: The late spouses Mesina, during their lifetime, bought from the spouses Fian two parcels of land on
installment: Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs, claiming ownership of the parcels of land and
taking possession of them refused to acknowledge the payments for the lots and denied that their late parents
sold the property to the spouses Mesina. Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian refused to
vacate the lots and to turn possession over to the heirs of the spouses Mesina.

Norman, as attorney-in-fact of his siblings, filed an action for quieting of title and damages before the RTC
against the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian Yray (Theresa) as the representative. Respondent Theresa
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint, arguing that the complaint states no cause of action.
She added that since the names of all the heirs of the late spouses Mesina and spouses Fian were not
individually named, the complaint is infirmed, warranting its dismissal. On November 24, 2005, petitioners
filed their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. RTC dismissed the case because it has no cause of action. The
CA ruled that all the heirs of the spouses Fian are indispensable parties.
Issue: W/N all heirs of spouses Fian should be impleaded in the complaint.

Ruling: Yes. The complaint states no cause of action because all the heirs of the spouses Fian are indispensable
parties; hence, they should have been impleaded in the complaint. Failure to state a cause of action refers to
the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three
essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) The legal right of the plaintiff; (b) The correlative obligation
of the defendant; and (c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right.
The inclusion of Theresa’s co -heirs does not fall under any of the above elements. The infirmity is not a failure
to state a cause of action but a non-joinder of an indispensable party. As such, this is properly a non-joinder of
indispensable party, the indispensable parties who were not included in the complaint being the other heirs of
Fian, and not a failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to
state a cause of action is improper. Trial court should direct petitioner Norman to implead all the heirs of Fian
as defendants within a reasonable time from notice with a warning that his failure to do so shall mean
dismissal.
Additional Notes:
Non-joinder - failure to bring a person who is a necessary party or in this case an indispensable party into a
lawsuit.
Indispensable party - is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of the action, and
who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant.
Parties in interest.  – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

55. Quiazon v. Belen, supra

FACTS: The case started as a petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon filed by
respondents, who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. Petitioner Amelia, the wife of Eliseo, opposed
the petition. Eliseo died intestate on Dec. 12, 1992. Elise, represented by her mother, filed the petition for
Letters of Administration with RTC Las Piñas. Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.  Insisting on the
legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo's marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter's marriage with
one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).  To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father.
RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond.

ISSUE: WON Elise is deemed an interested party.

HELD: Yes. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled
to the issuance of letters of administration. An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.  Also, in
estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that
they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo's estate,
is deemed to be an interested party.  With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove
her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's
estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the CA.  Certainly, the right of
Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds.  It is founded on her right as a
compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are
satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural children, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
56. Hilado v. Court of Appeals, supra
Facts: The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate and survived by his wife, private
respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-
Paulino. There were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. Julita filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor. The petition acknowledged
the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, "net of liabilities."
RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband
and issuing letters of administration in her favor. In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private
respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated
before the Bacolod City courts
RTC issued an order denying the motion on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the
contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
CA dismissed the petition and declared that RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners can intervene in the intestate proceedings of Benedicto?

Ruling: No. Sec. 1, Rule 19 requires that an intervenor “has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court.” Case law has consistently held that
the legal interest required of an intervenor “must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent or expectant.” The claims of petitioners against the decedent are contingent or expectant,
as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts. Hence petitioners cannot
intervene in the intestate proceedings.

57. Maloles II v. Philips, G.R. No. 129505, January 31, 2000

Facts: Dr. Santos filed a petition for probate of his will declaring that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is
naming Arturo de Santos Foundation (ASF) as sole devisee and legatee. The executrix is Pacita Phillips. RTC
Makati Judge Gorospe determined that Arturo is of sound mind and was not acting in duress when he signed
the last will and testament.
Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Pacita filed a motion for the issuance of testamentary. Maloles II
filed a motion for intervention claiming as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator’s sister) and Octavio L.
Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that
he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will
and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.’
Private respondent Pacita filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary and it was issued on her
favor. Petitioner sought to intervene and set aside the appointment of respondent as special administrator.
Issue: WN petitioner has the right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary.
Ruling: No. The opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the will. Rule 79, 1
provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. - Any person
interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons
named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the
sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will
annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is
material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.

Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testators
will. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect
the desires of the testator. Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give
bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in
this case.

58. Ocampo v. Ocampo, et al., G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010

Facts: Petitioners Dalisay, et al. are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo, together with his siblings
Renato and Erlinda (respondent), jointly administered the estate of their parents, Sps Ocampo. Leonardo had
been receiving his 1/3 share in the total income from the properties. Subsequently, Leonardo died and was
survived by his wife and children (petitioners Dalisay). Respondent took possession of the properties to the
exclusion of petitioners. Petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings and respondent filed a
counter-petition praying that they be appointed a specials joint administrators.
RTC granted the respondents’ counter petition. It appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators
of the estate. However, RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay and substituted her with Erlinda. Petitioners
filed a Motion to Revoke the Special Administration. RTC granted this and revoked and terminated the
appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint specials administrators and appointed Melinda as regular
administratix.

Issue: WN the revocation of respondent’s appointment as joint special administrators was proper.

Ruling: Yes. The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than
those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion.  As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse,
and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted.

RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise to appoint joint special administrators pending the
determination of the person or persons to whom letters of administration may be issued, pursuant to Section
1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
Even if special administrators had already been appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees no
longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect
thereto.
Melinda’s appointment is supposed to be revoked. However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the
settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and posting of bond by Melinda, with a view to putting an end
to the squabbles of the heirs, Melinda’s appointment should be converted into one of special administration.

Additional Note: A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control,
expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and
speedy settlement.  The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the
estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors
and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
59. Pijuan v. De Gurrea, 124 Phil. 1527
Facts: Manuela Ruiz (Mrs. Gurrea) and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain and live together untul 1945.
Carlos and his son Teodoro abandoned Ruiz and came to Philippines where he lived with Rizalina Perez by
whom he had two children. Mrs. Gurrea came to Philippines but Carlos refused to admit her to his residence.
Hence, she stayed with their son, Teodoro. Mrs. Gurrea instituted a civil case for support and annulment of
some alleged donations of conjugal property. Carlos died leaving a last will and testament in which he named
Marcelo Pijuan as executor and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and Teodoro.
Pijuan was appointed as special administrator, without bond. Mrs. Gurrea, Teodoro and Pilar (illegitimate
daughter of deceased) filed oppositions to the probate of the will.

Issue: WN Mrs. Gurrea (widow) has a right of preference over the administration of the estate.

Ruling: No. The preference, accorded by Section 5, Rule 78 of the Revised ROC to the surviving spouse, for
appointment as administrator or administratix of the estate of the deceased, exists “if no executor is named in
the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate.” None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The deceased has left a document
purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said that he has died intestate.
Said document named Pijuan as executor and it is not claimed that he is incompetent . This right of preference
refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, not to that of a special administrator. The order
appointing a special administrator lies within the discretion of the probate court and is not appealable.

60. Co v. Rosario, G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008

Facts: RTC Makati appointed petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special administrators of the estate of the
petitioner's father, Co Bun Chun. However, on motion of the other heirs, the trial court set aside petitioner's
appointment as special co-administrator. Petitioner consequently, nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co for
appointment as co-administrator of the estate. RTC appointed Alvin as special co-administrator.

Almost 4 years thereafter, the RTC revoked the appointment of Alvin. The trial court reasoned that Alvin had
become unsuitable to discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator because his capacity , ability
or competence to perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the filing of several
criminal cases against him, which, even if there was no conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample reason to
doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and confidence.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but this was denied. Subsequently,
petitioner brought the matter to the CA on petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The appellate court affirmed
the revocation of the appointment and dismissed the petition. Thus, the instant petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

Issue: WN Alvin’s appointment as special co-administrator is valid.

Ruling: Yes. The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion.

As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. The
exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles. Thus, even if a special
administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its
confidence, it is justified to withdraw the appointment.

The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is
expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration
and earliest settlement. In this case, Alvin's removal as special co-administrator is grounded on reason, equity,
justice and legal principle. It is not characterized by patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim and abuse,
arbitrariness or despotism, as to be correctible by the writ of certiorari.

The court took into consideration the fiduciary nature of the office of a special administrator which demands a
high degree of trust and confidence in the person to be appointed. The court observed that, burdened with
the criminal charges of falsification of commercial documents leveled against him (sic), and the corresponding
profound duty to defend himself in these proceedings, Co's ability and qualification to act as special co-
administrator of the estate of the decedent are beclouded, and the recall of his appointment is proper.

61. Manungas v. Loreto, G.R. No. 193161, August 22, 2011

Facts: Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They have no children on their own. They
adopted Samuel Avila. Florentino died intestate while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother. Avila was
survived by his wife Sarah Manungas.
Engracia (administratix) filed a Motion for Partition of estate in the intestate estate proceedings . Avila’s widow
executed a Waiver of Rights. Decree of Final Distribution was issued distributing the properties to Engracia and
Ramon (natural son of Florentino). RTC appointed Parreño (niece of Engracia) as the judicial guardian of
properties of her incompetent aunt. Engracia, through Parreño, instituted a civil case against the spouses
Diosdado Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages in occupying the property because
they said that Diosdado is an illegitimate son of Florentino.

Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Engracia but was
opposed by Loreto and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was not a Manungas, not an heir or creditor of Engracia
but was in fact a debtor of the estate. RTC appointed Parreño again as administrator. Diosdado filed an MR.

Issue: WN Disodado should be an administrator of Manungas estate as illegitimate child of Florentino.

Ruling: No. While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate,
such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It
may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until
a regular administrator is appointed.

As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:

Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. -- Such special administrator shall take possession and
charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the
executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as
administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold.

A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.
The subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia. The estate of Florentino was already the
subject of intestate proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs
with the issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution. With the termination of the intestate estate proceedings of
Florentino, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino, is still not an heir of Engracia and is not entitled to
receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no
interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator.   TC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Rule 80: Special Administrator

62. In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay, Emilio A.M. Suntay III v. Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay [G.R. 183053, Oct. 10, 2012]

FACTS: Cristina died intestate on June 4, 1990. The decedent was survived by her spouse Federico, her 3
legitimate grandchildren (including respondent) and 2 illegitimate grandchildren (including petitioner Emilio),
all of which were the children of her son Emilio I, who predeceased his parents. On Oct. 26, 1995, respondent
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate.

Federico opposed this on the ground that as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed
administrator of the estate. He later nominated petitioner to administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in
the event that the letters of administration be issued to Federico. Federico died in 2000. Almost a year later,
petitioner was appointed administrator by the RTC. CA reversed and appointed respondent as administratrix.
Petitioner was appointed as respondent’s co-administrator based on his interests on the estate. Respondent
alleged that petitioner is unfit to be an administrator as he demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to
the estate.

ISSUE: WON the probate court has the authority to appoint two or more special co-administrators. WON
petitioner is suitable to be appointed as co-administrator.

HELD: Yes. The selection of a special co-administrator is not an absolute right, however, the probate court
has the authority to appoint such co-administrator based upon the independent proprietary interests and
moral circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily related to the demand for representation
being repeatedly urged by respondents.

No. Petitioner failed to make and return a true and complete inventory, which became proven fact when he
actually filed partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of Federico’s
exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs. As
administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to faithfully discharge the
duties of settling the decedent’s estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to
do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and inaction become even more significant and
speak volume of his unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those
immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina. [Respondent is now the sole administrator.]
63. Vilma C. Tan, et al., v. Hon. Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr., Rogelio Lim Suga and Helen Tan Racoma[ PRs],
represented by Romualdo Lim [GR. 166520, Mar. 14, 2008]

FACTS: Gerardo Tan died intestate. PRs, claiming to be the children of the decedent, filed with the RTC for the
issuance of letters of administration. Petitioners opposed, claiming to be the legitimate heirs of the decedent.
PR then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator
to take possession and charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can be resolved by the RTC or until the
appointment of a regular administrator.

They prayed that Romualdo be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners opposed, stating that
Romualdo does not have the competence as that of Vilma, who was already acting as the estate’s de facto
administratrix. Atty. Nuevo as court-appointed commissioner issued directives [submission of financial report]
to Vilma in her capacity as de facto administratrix.

After more than a year of non-compliance, Vilma was given another 10 days to comply. Still no compliance.
Romualdo was then appointed as special administrator. Petitioners filed MR, claiming that Vilma should be
appointed as the special administratrix as she was the next of kin of the deceased in accordance with the
order of preference when appointing an administrator. RTC denied the MR. CA affirmed the denial. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE: WON Vilma should be appointed as special administratrix based on the order of preference.

HELD: No. The SC has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. The appointment of the special
administrator lies entirely in the discretion of the court and is not appealable. The appointment of a special
administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent
leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will) occasioned by
any cause. [Sec. 1, Rule 80] The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to
preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs. In the case at bar, PRs were constrained to move for the appointment of a
special administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the
directives of the court-appointed commissioner . It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still
appointed special administratrix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her
defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials.
Rule 81: Bonds of Executors and Administrators

64. Dalisay E. Ocampo, et al. v. Renato M. Ocampo and Erlinda M. Ocampo [GR. 187879, July 5, 2010]

FACTS: Petitioners are the wife and children of the deceased Leonardo Ocampo. Leonardo and his siblings
(respondents) are the legitimate children and only heirs of Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate.

Five months after Leonardo’s death, petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings, praying for the
settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo.

It prayed for the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the
lawful heirs of the decedents. Respondents opposed the petition, praying that they be appointed as special
administrators of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, and to serve as such without posting a bond.

Petitioners argued that they had been deprived of their fair share of the income of the estate, and that the
appointment of respondents as special joint administrators would further cause injustice to them. Thus, they
prayed that, letters of administration to serve as joint administrators of the subject estate be issued to
respondents and Dalisay. RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators and required them
to post a bond of P200k each.

Dalisay was substituted by Erlinda, court recognized that respondents were the nearest of kin of the deceased
spouses. Respondents filed a motion for exemption from filing Administrators’ bond, stating that it would be
in the best interest of the heirs that the estate be spared from incurring unnecessary expenses. RTC revoked
the appointments of respondents for their failure to post the required bond. CA held that the “bond is a
prerequisite before respondents could enter their duties and responsibilities as joint special administrators.”

ISSUE: WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it revoked the appointments of respondents
on the ground of their failure to post the bond.

HELD: No. Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of
an administrator. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the
administration of the decedent’s estate requiring the special administrator.

The administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator,
whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon,
him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond should
not be considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among
the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the
bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of administration.

Rule 82: Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation and Removal of Executors and Administrators

A. Discovery of Will During Intestate Proceeding

65. Vicente Uriarte v. CFI Negros Occidental [33 SCRA 252, May. 29, 1970]

FACTS: Juan Uriarte died in Spain and left properties in PH. Vicente claims to be his son and sole heir. Vicente
filed a petition for the intestate settlement of the decedent’s estate in CFI Negros.

The nephews of Juan opposed the petition, alleging that there was a valid will found in Spain, a copy of which
is being requested. Later, the nephews filed a settlement of the estate of the deceased in CFI Manila on the
basis of the alleged will of the deceased.

Petitioner opposed the settlement in CFI Manila on the ground that there was a pending intestate proceeding
in CFI Negros. Petitioner’s opposition was dismissed together with the intestate settlement in CFI Negros.
Petitioner now questions the dismissal of the intestate settlement in CFI Negros.

ISSUE: WON the intestate settlement in CFI Negros should be dismissed.

HELD: Yes. The SC held that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is proper. Under the Rules on the
settlement of estate of the deceased person, testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Sec. 1, Rule 82 provides that if after letters of administration have been granted on the estate of a decedent
as if he had died intestate, his will is proved and allowed by the court, the letters of administration shall be
revoked and all powers thereunder cease, and the administrator shall surrender the letters to the court, and
render his account.

66. Victorio Reynoso, et al. v. Vicente Santiago [85 Phil. 268, Dec. 29, 1949]

FACTS: The heirs of Salvadora Obispo filed a petition for the administration of the property of the deceased in
a special intestate proceeding no. 2914.

Petitioners are the surviving spouse and the eldest son of the deceased; they opposed the petition and filed a
document purported to be Salvadora’s last will.
CFI rejected the document as a forgery, CA reverse, finding the will to be authentic. Petitioners then filed 2
petitions, one in special proceeding no. 2914, and another in SP no. 3107, praying that the special
administrator, Meliton Palabrica, who had been appointed in SP no. 2914, be ordered to turn over the
properties of the deceased and the proceeds of coprax, nuts and other agricultural products to Victorio, and to
render an accounting within a reasonable time, it also asked for the closing of the intestate proceeding.

The other petition prayed that the estate should be settled in SP no. 3107, and that Victorio be appointed
executor of Salvadora's will.

ISSUE: WON Victorio’s petition for the appointment of a regular executor/administrator should be granted.

HELD: Yes. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will or
some other cause. In this case, the CA decreed the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor,
thus, there is no valid reason for the further retention of a special administrator.

The appointment of a regular administrator is necessary for the prompt settlement and distribution of the
estate. There are important duties devolving on a regular administrator which a special administrator cannot
perform, and there are many actions to be taken by the court which could not be accomplished before a
regular administrator is appointed.

(Whether dapat ma-appoint si Victorio could not be decided on yet due to a pending case between Palabrica
and Victorio. But ang point is that IF na appoint si Victorio, there’s no need to retain the special administrator.)

67. Emilio Advincula v. Hon. Judge Jose Teodoro, Sr. and Enrique A. Lacson [99 Phil. 413, May 31, 1956]

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as the special administrator, and later a regular administrator, of his
deceased wife’s estate. After he qualified as administrator, his brothers-in-law submitted a document
purporting to be the deceased wills.

Petitioner opposed the probate of the will, stating that the signature was not his wife’s, and if it were hers, the
same was procured through fraud.

Respondent Enrique prayed that he be appointed as the administrator, alleging that petitioner was
incompetent and thus unsuitable to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate. The court ruled in favor of
Enrique’s motion. Emilio filed an MR but was denied. Petitioner was ordered to render his final account
covering the entire period of his administration.

ISSUE: WON the discovery of a will, after the appointment of petitioner as administrator, ipso facto nullify the
letters of administration issued in his favor.

HELD: No. The discovery of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of a deceased, after the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of the latter, upon the assumption that he or she had died
intestate, does not ipso facto nullify the letters of administration already issued or even authorize the
revocation thereof, until the alleged will has been “proved and allowed by the court.”

If after letters of administration have been granted on the estate of a decedent as if he had died intestate, his
will is proved and allowed by the court, the letters of administration shall be revoked and all powers
thereunder cease, and the administrator shall forthwith surrender the letters to the court, end render his
account within such time as the court directs. Proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of
administration under the will shall be as hereinbefore provided. [Rule 82, Sec. 1] (No basis to conclude that
petitioner was incompetent was provided by respondent.)

B. Purpose of Administration

68. Luzon Surety Company, Inc. (LSC) v. Pastor T. Quebrar and Francisco Kilayko [127 SCRA 295, Jan. 31,
1984]

FACTS: On Aug. 9, 1954, LSC issued two administrator’s bonds on behalf of Quebrar as administrator in special
proceedings no. 3075 (testate estate of A. B. Chinsuy) and 3076 (testate estate of Cresenciana Lipa).
Respondents executed 2 indemnity agreements where they agreed to pay LSC P300 in advance as premium
thereof for every 12 months or fraction thereof. For the first year (1954-1955), respondents paid the
premiums.

On June 6, 1957, CFI Negros Occidental approved the amended Project of Partition and Accounts of
respondents. On May 1962, LSC demanded the payment of the premiums and documentary stamps from Aug.
9, 1955. Respondents ordered a motion for cancellation and/or reduction of executor's bonds on the ground
that "the heirs of these testate estates have already received their respective shares". CFI Negros Occidental
cancelled the bonds. LSC demanded the payment of P4,872 for the period of Aug. 9, 1955 to Oct. 20, 1962. CFI
Manila allowed LSC to recover the amount from respondents. CA certified the case to SC, finding that it
involves only errors/questions of law.

ISSUE: WON the administrator’s bonds and indemnity agreement ceased to have force and effect after the
approval of the amended project of partition and accounts on June 6, 1957.

HELD: No. Quebrar did not cease as administrator after June 6, 1957, for administration is for the purpose of
liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. And liquidation
means the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. It
appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957. The approval of the project of
partition did not necessarily terminate the administration proceedings. For as long as Quebrar was
administrator of the estates, the bond was held liable and inevitably, the LSC’s liability subsists since the
liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator.

C. Removal of Administrator

69. Intestate Estate of the deceased Mariano Cotia. Elena Cotia, et al. v. Maria Jimenez , et al., [GR. L-12132,
Dec. 22, 1958]

FACTS: Elena Cotia was appointed administratrix of the estate of the deceased Mariano Cotia on June 13,
1950. Failing to submit an account of her administration up to June 18, 1955, she was ordered by the lower
court, on motion of the oppositors-appellees to submit said accounting.

During the hearing of the statement of accounts subsequently presented by Elena Cotia, it was established
that she spent for family expenses and attorney's fees the total sum of P64,650 without prior judicial
authority. The oppositors-appellees therefore filed a motion for her removal as administratrix not only
because she neglected to submit the accounting required by the Rules and to settle the estate, but because
she had made unauthorized disbursements.

ISSUE: WON the lower court abused its discretion in removing Elena as administratrix.

HELD: No. Sec. 2, Rule 82 of the ROC provides that the court may remove an administrator who neglects to
render his account and settle the estate according to law or to perform an order or judgment of the court,
or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust.
70. Cobarubbias v Dizon

Facts:

The petitioner Magdalena Cobarrubias filed an urgent motion, alleging that the funeral Pilar Leyba had
deposited sys alhajas Are worth P4,500 in security section of the Bank of the Philippine Islands; 

That said bank notified all interested parties that they withdraw the contents of their section within the
shortest possible time, so she asked to be appointed special administrator and that she was authorized to
withdraw said jewelry from the bank.

 In her application Magdalena Cobarrubias stated that she was the only forced heiress of the late Pilar
Leyba. Accepting as good these allegations, the Honorable Judge Dizon on the same date, July 5, 1945,
appointed Magdalena Cobarrubias special administrator on bail of P200.

On July 19, the petitioner filed a brief alleging that since the Court "has rescinded its order dated 5 of said
month and year," requested that the Court order the cancellation of the bond of P200 and its return to the
lawyer of The applicant

Issue: Whether or not appointed special administrator can be revoked?

Ruling: Yes.

Revoking the appointment of the appellant as special administrator and revoking the order authorizing her to
withdraw the deposited jewels, the Court does not abuse its discretion, nor work outside its jurisdiction.  The
power of the Court of First Instance to render ineffective the appointment of an administrator, when the
appointment has been obtained through false or incorrect representations, is indisputable. 

When the Court appointed the appellant special administrator with authorization to withdraw from the bank
jewels valued at P4,500 under a P200 bond, it took into account its essential claim that "it was the sole forced
heiress of the deceased." There was no danger of possible embezzlement; They could even name it without
bail. But upon receiving a report that this allegation was inaccurate.

 Which was confirmed by the motion of the same petitioner who requested the "suspension of publication and
postponement of the hearing" because he wished to "have time to arrange an extrajudicial partition with his
co-heirs," the court had ample grounds to revoke those orders even Without notification to the administrator:
the intestate is not initiated for the benefit of the administrators but of the heirs.  The court should act
immediately and not put in danger. With his indifference, the jewels.

 If he allowed a few hours to pass, without taking drastic action, the jewels valued at P4,500 could be
withdrawn by the special administrator who was only secured in P200 to the detriment of the interests of the
minors. The zeal shown by the court was well founded. The position of special administrator is one of
trust. As soon as it lost its confidence in the integrity of the applicant, the Court was fully justified in
revoking its appointment as special administrator and withdrawing its authorization to remove the jewels
from the bank.
71. Garcia v Vasquez

Facts: Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried, leaving no descendants, ascendants, brother or sister. At
the time of her death, her estate consists mostly of real properties. Gliceria, during her lifetime, executed two
wills: one in 1956 and another dated in 1960.

Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, a niece of the deceased, petitioned for probate of the alleged last will,
and for her appointment as special administratrix. The petition was opposed separately by several groups of
alleged heirs, one of which was pet. Rev. Fr. Lucio V. Garcia, a legatee named in the 1956 will. The oppositions
invariably charged that the instrument executed in 1960 was not intended by the deceased to be her true will
Consuelo’s petition was granted. Oppositors petitioned the court for the immediate removal of the special
administratrix claiming that Consuelo and her husband, had caused Gliceria to execute a fraudulent deed of
absolute sale conveying to them 3 parcels of land and the improvements.

Issue: W/N Consuelo should be remove as special administrator

Ruling: Yes. Considering that the alleged deed of sale was executed when Gliceria del Rosario was already
practically blind and that the consideration given seems unconscionably small for the properties, there was
likelihood that a case for annulment might be filed against the estate or heirs of Alfonso Precilla. And the
administratrix being the widow and heir of the alleged transferee, cannot be expected to sue herself in an
action to recover property that may turn out to belong to the estate. This, plus her conduct in securing new
copies of the owner’s duplicate of titles without the court’s knowledge and authority and having the contract
bind the land through issuance of new titles in her husband’s name, cannot but expose her to the charge of
unfitness or unsuitability to discharge the trust, justifying her removal from the administration of the estate.

ACQUISITION OF INTEREST ADVERSE TO THAT OF THE ESTATE MAKES THE ADMINISTRATOR

UNSUITABLE TO DISCHARGE THE TRUST.

72. De Borja v Tan *3 de Borja yung petitioners (Francisco, Crisanto and Matilde)*

Facts:

Francisco, duly appointed executor of the will of his deceased spouse. Letters testamentary were
issued to him. Matilde wrote a letter addressed to the Court, informing the court that her father is physically
unfit evidenced by the a medical certificate to the effect that Francisco is practically bed-ridden and unable to
be up and about and appointed Crisanto (son) as co-administrator.  All the children and heirs of the deceased,
including Crisanto himself, filed a petition ex parte praying that the appointment of Crisanto de Borja as co-
administrator be set aside, on the ground that the appointment was not to the executor's liking, and that any
way said Crisanto is helping him in the administration. No action from the court , instead appointed Jose P. de
Borja co-administrator.

Upon being informed about Jose’s appointment, he filed (through counsel) a MFR alleging that the
appointment disregard the provisions of the will (na dapat si Crisanto ang co-admin) and that the appointment
was issued without previous notice, and that the appointee holds an interest adverse to that of the estate
under administration. Thereupon Francisco filed another motion praying the court to prohibit Jose de Borja to
act as co-administrator until the appeal against his appointment had been decided, but again the court denied
this motion.

Issue: 1. W/N the court abused its powers when they appointed Jose as co-admin

2. W/n the cancellation of Crisanto’s appointment was without jurisdiction

Ruling:

1. No. It can be seen from the record that the haste of the judge in making the appointment of Josde
Borja without previous notice or hearing was due to his apparent desire to have the amended account
promptly acted upon by the court, with a view to terminating the administration as soon as possible. It is true
that there was no previous notice of the court's intention to appoint him and thus give the other interested
parties opportunity to express their objection thereto. But this procedural defect was cured when the said
interested parties presented their motions to reconsider the appointment. What the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. There was
an opportunity given in this case when the petitioners presented their motions for reconsiderations.

The administration of one of the estate under administration was entrusted to an encargado, over whom the
court had no direct power or authority. The administrator, because of his old age and physical inability, had
to perform his duties through others over whom the court had no power or control. These circumstances
must have impelled the court in allowing Jose de Borja to assume his position immediately, without waiting for
the perfection of the appeal. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in appointing a co-
administrator under these circumstances.

2. No. It is also contended that the revocation of Crisanto de Borja's previous appointment as co-administrator
was with- out jurisdiction, because the motion of the heirs for the cancellation of his appointment had been
abandoned. It must be stated that there is sufficient cause of his removal even without the request for the
cancellation of his appointment. It is his failure to produce the vouchers, receipts, and papers supporting the
expenses, and the unsatisfactory excuse later given by him of said failure, i. e., that said vouchers and receipts
were lost.

73. Borromeo v Borromeo

Facts: Maximo Borromeo died leaving his widow Johanna Hofer Borromeo, and a will wherein he designated
the Borromeo Bros. Estate Inc. as his sole heir and naming his brother Canuto as executor. Proceedings having
been instituted, the CFI probated the will and granted letters testamentary to Canuto. Thereafter, the
attorneys for the widow submitted an "Urgent Motion" whereby they prayed for the removal of Canuto on the
grounds of negligence in the performance of his duties and unfitness to continue discharging the powers of
the office.

Canuto withdrew, without authority from the court, from a joint current account of Canuto and Maximo in
BPI. The court, for several reasons, one of them the unauthorize withdrawal of funds, decreed the removal of
Canuto. On motion for reconsideration, Canuto's attorney prayed that the order be revoked or that at least,
Canuto be permitted to resign.
Issue: W/N Canuto should be remove

Ruling: Yes. There were sufficient grounds therefor. One of which was the unauthorized withdrawal.
Attempting to justify his attitude, he claims, in effect, that the money deposited was his at the time he
withdrew it. However, the bank only allowed him because he was the executor. Thus, he should have kept it
in his account as executor.

Second reason. Canuto omitted to include in his report, as income of the estate, the sum which he, had
received from Hacienda Plaridel. Further, he received other sums as proceeds from the farm of the deceased,
but instead of depositing them in his name as executor, placed them in his joint account with his brother
Exequiel.

Third reason. Canuto claimed as his own certain shares of the Interisland Gas Service in the name of Maximo,
asserting that Maximo was merely his "dummy".

Conflict between the interest of the executor and the interest of the deceased is ground for removal or
resignation of the former, who was thereby become unsuitable to discharge the trust. (Section 2, Rule 83.)

"Reasons for rule.--'An executor is a quasi trustee, who should be indifferent between the estate and
claimants of the property, except to preserve it for due administration, and when his interest conflicts with
such right and duty the county court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may remove him.'

Rule 83
74. Sebial v Sebial

Facts:  Gelacio Sebial died in 1943, he had 3 children with this 1st wife Reoncia (Roberta's mother) and 6 other
children with his 2nd wife Dolores, (Benjamina's mother). In 1960, Bejamina filed for the settlement of her
father's estate and her appointment as administrator. This petition was opposed by Roberta on the ground
that said estate had already been apportioned and that she should be the one appointed as administrator and
not Benjamina.

The Court appointed Benjamina and found that alleged partition was invalid and ineffective. So the
letters of administration were issued and a notice to the creditors was issue don the same date. The
oppositors motion for reconsideration was denied. For the possibility of an amicable settlement, the court
ordered both sides to give a complete list of the properties of the decedent with segregation for each
marriage.

On Nov. 1961, the lower court approved the administrator's inventory (second one) or six months from the
appointment. Roberta them moved for the motion reconsideration alleging as ground that the court has no
jurisdiction to approve the inventory as it was files beyond the 3-month period. The Court of Appeals certified
the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Did the court lose jurisdiction to approve the inventory which was made 6 months after the
appointment?

Ruling. NO. Under section 1 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, the prescribed three-month period is not
mandatory. Once a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is filed with the proper court and the
publication of the notice of hearing is complied with, said court acquires jurisdiction over the estate and
retains such until the probate proceedings is closed. Hence, even if the inventory was filed only after the
three-month period, this delay will not deprive the probate court of its jurisdiction to approve it. However,
under section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, such unexplained delay can be a ground for an administrator's
removal.

*Case 75 omitted*

76. and 80. Estate of Hilario Ruiz vs CA

FACTS:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, Montes and his three granddaughters (private respondents) with Edmond as the executor. Four
years after the testator’s death, private respondent Montes filed a petition for the probate and approval of
Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. During the pendency of the
probate proceedings, the court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk the rental deposit and
payments representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, Edmond turned over
the amount net of expenses for repair and maintenance on the estate.
Subsequently, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed a motion
praying for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk. Respondent Montes opposed
the motion and concurrently filed a Motion and prayed for the release of the said rent payments to the
testator’s grandchildren and for the distribution of the testator’s properties, specifically the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will. The
probate court denied Edmond’s motion but granted respondent Montes’ motion. The probate court, ordered
the release of the funds to Edmond but only “such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for support” of the testator’s three granddaughters subject to collation and
deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles
to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors.
Hence, Edmond filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC and argued that affirming the
Probate Court’s order would have the following effect: (1) disallow the executor/administrator of the estate of
the late Hilario M. Ruiz to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate; (2) grant
support, during the pendency of the settlement of an estate, to certain persons not entitled thereto; and (3)
prematurely partition and distribute the estate pursuant to the provisions of the holographic will even before
its intrinsic validity has been determined, and despite the existence of unpaid debts and obligations of the
estate.
Issues:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate’s debts
and obligations, has the authority:

(1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s grandchildren; (Rule 84
Sec. 3)

(2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and

(3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will. (Rule 84)
Held:

(1) NO (RULE 83). Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent’s
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend it to the
deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate court’s order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the
testator pending settlement of his estate.

(2) NO. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1)
after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a
sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs,
or when provision is made to meet those obligations. In the case at bar, Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts
when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is
one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires
that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to
their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the
estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.

(3) NO(RULE 84). The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so long as it is necessary for
the payment of the debts and expenses of administration.” An heir’s right of ownership over the properties of
the decedent is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor,
he is a mere trustee of his father’s estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to
the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and
possess all his parents’ properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of
all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses
of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by
the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.

77. Aranas vs Mercado

Facts:

Emigdio S. Mercado owned shares in Mervir Realty Corp. and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corp. He assigned
his real properties in exchange for stocks in Mervir Realty and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir
Realty. Emigdio died intestate, survived by his second wife, Teresita and their five children, and his children
from his first wife, Thelma Aranas. Teresita was appointed as administrator. Teresita indicated in her inventory
that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but only personal properties.” Thelma
claimed that Emigdio owned properties that were not included in the inventory. The parties agreed to submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded
from the inventory. Thereafter, the RTC ruled that Teresita should have included in the Badian Property in the
inventory.
Issue:

Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion of the properties in the estate
of decedent?

Held:

No. The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of
estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to
include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to
Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. The
usage of the word “all” in Section 1, Rule 83, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of
the decedent in the inventory. However, the word “all” is qualified by the phrase which has come into his
possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to
the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true
inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory,
regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.

78 and 79. Heirs of Sy Bang vs Sy et. al

Facts:

Deceased Sy Bang died intestate leaving behind real and personal properties including several
businesses.

Respondents Rolandoy, Rosalino, Lucio, Enrique, Rosauro, Bartolome, Julieta, Lourdes, and Florecita all
surnamed Sy are children of Sy Bang in his second marriage to Rosita Sy while petitioners Jose Sy Bang, Julian
Sy and Oscar Sy are children of Sy Bang to Ba Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the
children of petitioner Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan.

Respondents filed a Complaint for Partition against Petitioners. During an out of court conference
between petitioner and respondents, it was agreed that the management, supervision or administration of the
common properties and the entire estate of the deceased Sy Bang shall be placed temporarily in the hands of
Jose Sy Bang. Also as agreed upon that the income from the three cinemas shall be given to the respondents
for their support and sustenance, pending the termination of Civil case for Judicial Partition while the income
from the vast part of the entire estate will be given to the petitioners.

While the case was still pending Rosita Sy filed a motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance and the
court granted the motion and ordred the petitioners to pay Rosita the amount of P25,000.00 as monthly
widows allowance until the estate was finally settled or until the court order. Respondent filed a Joint Petition
for the Guardianship of the Incompetent Rosita Sy before RTC Branch 58, Lucena City. Rosauro Sy file a motion
to be named as Guardian. The Guardianship court issued an order directing to deposit before such court an
amount representing the widow’s allowance of the incompetent Rosita Sy. Petitioners questioned the order.
Issue:  Whether or not the trial court, acting the Guardianship court had the authority to enforce payment of
widow’ allowance

Held: No. As stated in Rule 83, Section 3 of the Rules of Court: “the widow and minor and incapacitated
children of the deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law”

In relation to that provision was Article 188 of the Civil Code states that: “ from the common mass of
property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the
inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount
received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.”

The court referred in Section 3 of Rule 83 is the court hearing the settlement of the estate. The said
court shall effect the payment of allowance considering that the estate are within its jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other courts. The guardianship court having a limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the
delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed.
81. Mananquil vs Villegas

Facts: A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Villegas for grave misconduct or malpractice committed while
acting as counsel of record of one Felix Leong in the latter's capacity as administrator of the Testate Estate of
the late Felomina Zerna in Special Proceedings No. 460 before then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental.

Felix Leong as administrator of Zerna’s estate entered into a lease contract with iniquitous terms and
condition with the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLAGES over several lots included in Zerna’s estate to wit Villegas
was a member of such partnership and appointed as managing partner. The said lease contract was renewed
several times henceforth.

When Leon died, this disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed administrator for LEONG’s
estate. He alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous terms and conditions and lastly,
alleged that Atty. Villegas should have first notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zerna’s
estate before the contracts were renewed in violation of Article 1646 and 1491 of the New Civil Code.

Issue: Whether VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate court’s approval regarding the lease.

Held: NO. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator
has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He
may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having
jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to
enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and
approval.

Thus, considering that administrator Felix Leong was not required under the law and prevailing
jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the
estate, Villegas, as counsel of Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of the
various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.

In this case Atty. Villegas was not disbarred but was suspended for 3 months.

82. San Diego vs Nombre

Facts: While being the judicial administrator of the intestate estate subject of Special Proceeding 7279, Adelo
Nombre leased one of the properties (fishpond) of the said estate to Pedro Escanlar for 3 years for P3000
annually without approval of the court. When Nombre was removed as judicial administrator, he was
substituted by Sofronio Campillanos.

Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a lease contract of the same fishpond in
favour of Moises San Diego. This motion was granted on the ground that the contract of lease entered into
between Nombre and Escanlar was void for want of judicial authority. Nombre and Escanlar appealed this
order to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the same order for the reason that a contract or lease for more
than 6 years I not entirely invalid; It is invalid only in so far as it exceeds the 6-year limit.

Petitioner contends, that No. 8, Art. 1878 (Special powers of attorneys are necessary: To lease any
real property to another person for more than one year. (Art. 1878) is the limitation to the right of a judicial
administrator to lease real property without prior court authority and approval, if it exceeds one year. The
lease contract in favor of Escanlar being for 3 years and without such court approval and authority is,
therefore, null and void. Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that there is no limitation of such right;
and that Article 1878 does not apply in the instant case

Issue: Whether or not provisions on agency should apply?

Held: No. Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the validity of the contract of lease in favor of Escanlar,
notwithstanding the lack of prior authority and approval.

While it... may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that
both act in representative capacity), are in some respects, identical, the provisions on agency (Art. 1878, C.C.),
should not apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial... administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only
the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate (Chua Tan vs. del Rosario, 57
Phil., 411). A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is required to file a bond.

These circumstances are not true in case of agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The
protection which the law gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from the fact
that control by the principal can only be thru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator are
subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing court.
83. Caro vs CA
Facts: Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of two parcels of land.
Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father, Saturnino
Benito, were appointed as joint administrators of Mario's estate.
Benjamin Benito, one of the co-owners, sold his one-third undivided portion over said parcels of land in
favor of herein petitioner, Luz Caro. This was registered on September 29, 1959. Caro received Transfer of
Certificate of title upon consent by Saturnino and Alfredo Benito.
Luz Caro made an allegation in a pleading presented that she acquired by purchase from Benjamin
Benito the aforesaid one-third undivided share in each of the two parcels of land.
Basilia Lahorra Vda. De Benito a written offer to redeem to redeem the said one-third undivided share.
Caro ignored the offer, thus Basilia sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 2105 entitled "Rosa Amador
Vda. de Benito vs. Luz Caro" for annulment of sale and mortgage and cancellation of the annotation of the sale
and mortgage involving the same parcels of land. The main case was dismissed. Basilia then filed the present
case as an independent one and in the trial sought to prove that as a joint administrator of the estate of Mario
Benito, she had not been notified of the sale as required by Article 1620 in connection with Article 1623 of the
New Civil Code.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that: (a) private respondent, as administratrix
of the intestate estate of Mario Benito, does not have the power to exercise the right of legal redemption, and
(b) Benjamin Benito substantially complied with his obligation of furnishing written notice of the sale of his
one-third undivided portion to possible redemptioners.
Issue:
Whether Basilia, as administrator of Mario’s estate, could exercise the right of redemption.
Held:
NO.
Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the right to the possession of the real and
personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the expenses of administration, and the
administrator may bring and defend action for the recovery or protection of the property or right of the
deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession and administration do not include the right of legal
redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners after the death of another,
because in such case, the right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to the stranger was
perfected and formed no part of the estate of the deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted
to the heir of the deceased co-owner. (Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526).
Even assuming that redemption exists, private respondent as administratrix, has no personality to
exercise said right for and in behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as co-
administrator Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's consent to the sale of the one-third portion to petitioner
cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the ground that the right of redemption was not within
the powers of administration, in the same manner, private respondent as co-administrator has no power
exercise the right of redemption — the very power which the Court of Appeals ruled to be not within the
powers of administration. Basilia cannot be considered to have brought this action in her behalf and in behalf
of the heirs of Mario Benito because the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint specifically stated that she
brought the action in her capacity as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito.