G.R. No.

78214 Case Digest

G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988
Yolanda Caballes
vs Dept. Agrarian Reform, Hon. Heherson Alvarez and Bienvenido
Abajon
Ponente: Sarmiento

Facts:
The landholding subject of the controversy is consists of 60 sqm
was acquired by spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virute of
a Deed of Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes, this land is
situated in Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. Before the sale of the property
to Caballes, Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a protion
of the land, paying monthly rental to Andrea Millenes. Abjon was
likewise allowed to plant thereon, and they have agreed that the
produce thereon would be shred by them 50-50.

When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will
put up a poultry on the land and they intended to build it close
to Abajon's house and they pursuaded Abajon to transfer his
dwelling to the opposite portion of the land. Abajon offered to
pay renta; to the new owners, but they refuse and later demanded
for Abajon to vacate. Abajon refused to leave.

DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner,

Andrea.

Issue: Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.

Ruling:
Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion
of the land which cannot be interpreted as economic-family size
farm under the definition of RA 3844.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1.            The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2.            The subject is agricultural land;
3.            There is consent;
4.            The purpose is agricultural production;
5.            There is personal cultivation; and
6.            There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy

relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not
make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or
a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not
entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to

establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual
for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from
someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and
laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of
expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not
automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof especially
when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and
located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or
commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an
occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for
the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances
of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is
more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of
benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a
garden of some sort at its south western side rather than a
tenant of the said portion.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that

since Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the criminal case
for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as
proper for trial so that proceedings in the lower court can
resume.

http://jeanneguian.blogspot.com/2016/11/gr-no-78214-case-digest.html
Ros vs. DAR, GR 132477, Aug. 31, 2005 468 SCRA 471

Fact:

Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili,

Balamban, Cebu. By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municipal
Council, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands. On 03 April 1995, the
Provincial Board of Cebu approved Balamban’s land use plan and adopted en toto
Balamban’s Municipal Ordinance No. 101 with the passage of Resolution No. 836-95
and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8, respectively. As part of their preparation for the
development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured all the
necessary permits and appropriate government certifications. Despite these permits and
certifications, petitioner received a letter from Director of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Regional Office for Region 7, informing him that the DAR was
disallowing the conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed him to
cease and desist from further developments on the land to avoid the incurrence of civil
and criminal liabilities. Petitioners were thus constrained to file with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Toledo City  for Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction the RTC, ruling that it is the DAR which has
jurisdiction, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. At the Court of Appeals,
the public respondents were ordered to file their Comments on the petition. Two sets of
comments from the public respondents, one from the Department of Agrarian Reform
Provincial Office and another from the Office of the Solicitor General, were submitted,
to which petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply. the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision  affirming the Order of Dismissal issued by the RTC. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied in a resolution dated 30 January
1998. Adrian Avilado Antazo

Issue:
 Whether the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by LGU
pursuant to its authority has the effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of the
CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR?Adrian Avilado Antazo

Held:

No, after the passages of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP), agricultural lands,
though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion. jurisdiction over
which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already reclassified before the
effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 are exempted from conversion. The agricultural lands
must go through the required process of conversion despite of having undergone
reclassification. In the current case, there is no final order of conversion. The subject
landholding was merely reclassified. Conversion is different from reclassification.
Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into
some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on
the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the
land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion.
Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a
landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He has to
undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for
other purposes. Adrian A

https://adrianantazo.wordpress.com/2018/02/23/ros-vs-dar-gr-132477-aug-31-2005-468-
scra-471/

CASE DIGEST: CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS

ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) v. THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM

FACTS: Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and
Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural
Uses. The said AO embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced and all untitled agricultural lands and
agricultural lands reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses after 15 June
1988. March 1999, Sec DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion
of Agricultural Lands to Non AgriculturalUses, it covers the following: (1) those to
be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-
agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural
activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt
the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage;
(3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously
authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or
other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on
15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other
pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such uses. The 2 earlier
AOs was further amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002 Comprehensive
Rules on Land Use Conversion; covers all applications for conversion from
agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.

The AO was amended again in 2007 to include provisions particularly addressing

land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. To address the conversion
to lands to non agricultural, Sec of DAR suspended processing and approval of
land conversion through DAR Memo 88. CREBA claims that there is a slowdown
of housing projects because of such stoppage

ISSUES: Is DAR's AO unconstitutional?

HELD: RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as lands devoted to or

suitable for the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,
raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm
products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by a person whether natural or
juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial
or industrial land. However, he issued an AO included in this definition - lands
not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural
uses before 15 June 1988. In effect, lands reclassified from agricultural to
residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses after 15 June
1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for purposes of conversion,
redistribution, or otherwise. This is violation of RA 6657 because there is nothing
in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that
confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded
lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority. Also, it
violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was not provided therein
that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or
requirements, or that the DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect
reclassification. The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also
contravenes the constitutional mandate on local autonomy under Section 25,
Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. There is
deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law because under
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DARs jurisdiction are
unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use
on pain of administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination
and violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the
aforesaid administrative order is patently biased in favor of the peasantry at the
expense of all other sectors of society. DISMISSED.

https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2017/05/creba-v-agrarian-reform-secretary-gr-no-
183409.html

FORTICH vs. CORONA G.R. No. 131457, April

24, 1998
Facts:  This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao,
Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development
Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-
classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural
to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors
who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its
people. Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on
November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve
conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the
instant application for the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-
industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and
directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries. After a careful evaluation
of the petition vis-a-vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof by Secretary Garilao
was based, we find that the instant application for conversion by the Municipality of
Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question
from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and
bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the
municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who
are not even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits. In pursuance
of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in view of the favorable
recommendations of the various government agencies, the subject Order of Department
of Agrarian Reform, was SET ASIDE, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP
decision which having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days.
The DAR filed a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the
President.

Some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR
Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10,
1997, some persons claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed
a motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-
C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144-hectare
property be set aside.  President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers
and promised to resolve their grievance within the framework of the law. He created an
eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary
Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend possible solutions to the
problem. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers’ protest
by issuing the so-called “Win/Win” Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona. A copy of the “Win-Win” Resolution was received by
Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and
NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997 28 and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present
petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and
injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence this case.

Issue: Whether the Office of the president still have Jurisdiction when it entertained
the Second Motion for Reconsideration and became the basis of the Win-Win
Resolution?

Held: No, When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997
declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably
filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-
open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the
President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed
by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed
“Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43
of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is
allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion
for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as
provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not
have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not
seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality.
Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially
modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory,
was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.

https://adrianantazo.wordpress.com/2018/09/08/fortich-vs-corona-g-r-no-131457-april-
24-1998/
 Gelos vs. Court of Appeals 
208 SCRA 608 (1992)
Facts:
Rafael Gelos was employed by Ernesto Alzona and his
parents as their laborer on a 25,000-sq. m farmland. They
executed a written contract which stipulated that as hired
laborer Gelos would receive a daily wage of P5.00. Three
(3) years later, Gelos was informed of the termination of his
services and was asked to vacate the property. Gelos
refused and continued working on the land. Alzona filed a
complaint for illegal detainer. The lower court found Gelos
as tenant of the property and entitled to remain thereon as
such. The decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals.   DHACES
Issue:
What is the nature of the contract between Gelos and
Alzona?
Held:
The parties entered into a contract of employment, not a
tenancy agreement. The agreement is a lease of services,
not of the land in dispute. . . . The petitioner would disavow
the agreement, but his protestations are less than
convincing. His wife's testimony that he is illiterate is
belied by his own testimony to the contrary in another
proceeding. Her claim that they were tricked into signing
the agreement does not stand up against the testimony of
Atty. Santos Pampolina, who declared under his oath as a
witness (and as an attorney and officer of the court) that he
explained the meaning of the document to Gelos, who even
read it himself before signing it. . . . Gelos points to the
specific tasks mentioned in the agreement and suggests
that they are the work of a tenant and not of a mere hired
laborer. Not so. The work specified is not peculiar to
tenancy. What a tenant may do may also be done by a hired
laborer working under the direction of the landowner, as in
the case at bar. It is not the nature of the work involved but
the intention of the parties that determines the relationship
between them. As this Court has stressed in a number of
cases, "tenancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land.
It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this
case, their written agreements, provided these are
complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more
important."
     Classes of agricultural tenancy
     Agricultural tenancy is classified into share tenancy and
leasehold tenancy (M. A. GERMAN, SHARE AND
LEASEHOLD TENANCY, 13 [1995]).
     Share tenancy means "the relationship which exists
whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for
agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the
land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production,
the tenant cultivating the land personally with aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household,
and the produce thereof to be divided between the
landholder and the tenant." (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963]. Sec.
166 [25]).
     With the passage of RA 3844, share tenancy has been
declared to be contrary to public policy and abolished
(Rep. Act No. 3844[1963], sec. 4) except in the case of
fishponds, saltbeds, and lands principally planted to citrus,
coconuts, cacao, coffee, durian and other similar
permanent trees at the time of the approval of said Act
(Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 35). When RA 6389 (1971)
was enacted, agricultural share tenancy has been
automatically converted to leasehold but the exemptions
remained. It was only under RA 6657 when the exemptions
were expressly repealed.
     Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either
personally or with the aid of labor available from members
of his immediate farm household undertakes to cultivate a
piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a
single person together with members of his immediate
farm household, belonging to or legally possessed by,
another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both (Rep. Act No. 1199 [1954], sec. 4).
     Under RA 6657, the only agricultural tenancy relation
that is recognized is leasehold tenancy. Said law expressly
repealed Sec. 35 of RA 3844, making all tenanted
agricultural lands throughout the country subject to
leasehold.
     Leasehold tenancy may be established by operation of
law, that is, through the abolition of share tenancy under
Sec. 4 of RA 3844; through the exercise by the tenant of his
right to elect leasehold; or by agreement of the parties
either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly, which was
the condition before 1972 (M.A. German,supra, at 27).
     Leasehold relation is instituted in retained areas with
tenant(s) under RA 6657 or PD 27 who opts to choose to
remain therein instead of becoming a beneficiary in the
same or another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features. The tenant must exercise his option
within one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests
his choice of the area for retention (Rep. Act No.
6657[1988], sec. 6). Leasehold relation also exists in all
tenanted agricultural lands that are not yet covered under
CARP (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).
     The institution of leasehold in these areas ensure the
protection and improvement of the tenurial and economic
status of tenant-tillers therein. (Rep. Act No. 6657 [1988],
sec. 6).
     Leasehold tenancy distinguished from civil law lease
     In Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974), the
Supreme Court distinguished leasehold tenancy from civil
law lease.
There are important differences between a leasehold
tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject matter of
leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of
civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to
attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold
tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural
land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally
cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the
landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture,
whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any
other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil
law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold
tenancy is governed by special laws (at 596).
Elements of Agricultural Tenancy
     The following are the essential requisites for the
existence of a tenancy relation:
a)         The parties are the landholder and the tenant;
b)         The subject is agricultural land;
c)         There is consent by the landholder for the tenant to
work on the land, given either orally or in writing, expressly
or impliedly;
d)         The purpose is agricultural production;
e)         There is personal cultivation or with the help of the
immediate farm household; and
f)         There is compensation in terms of payment of a
fixed amount in money and/or produce. (Carag vs. CA, 151
SCRA 44 [1987]; Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590
[1974]; Oarde vs. CA, 280 SCRA 235 [1997]; Qua vs. CA,
198 SCRA 236 [1991])
     The Supreme Court emphasized in numerous cases that
"(a)ll these requisites must concur in order to create a
tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of
one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a
cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant.
This is so because unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws." (Caballes v.
DAR, 168 SCRA 254 [1988])
In the case of Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969), the
Court found all the elements of an agricultural leasehold
relation contained in the contract of lease executed by the
parties.
http://tomorrowslegalcounsels.blogspot.com/2014/09/agricultural-leasehold.html