I.

Writ of Habeas Corpus

In the Matter of the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of the person of Army Major Aquino

GR no. 174994 August 31, 2007

FACTS: Major Aquino was ordered arrested and confined at the Intelligence Servie Group of the
Philippine Army in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig. A panel of investigators was assigned to investigate Major
Aquino, the former finding that some military personnel found troop movements that was illegal,
implicating Major Aquino. He was charged with violations of certain Articles of War. On July 12,
2006, Lt. Gen. Esperon issued an Order to exercise custodial responsibility over Major Aquino and
to place them in confinement in the Philippine Army Detention Center.
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On July 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Court of Appeals for the
production of Major Aquino. The CA denied the petition, holding that the remedy of the writ of
habeas corpus is futile because charges had already been preferred.  

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Habeas Corpus.

HELD: No, the CA did not err in denying the petition.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person

is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled to it. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which
has jurisdiction to do so. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. 

In the case at bar, Major Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for alleged
violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War. The legality of Major Aquino's restraint having
been settled, the privilege of the writ is unavailing.
So v. Tacla Jr.
GR. 190108 October 19, 2010

FACTS: Guisande was accused of qualified theft. Judge Tacla issued a warrant of arrest, but it was
found that Guisande was under life-threatening situation while confined at a government hospital
due to bipolar mood disorder. Tacla then ordered Guisande’s referral to NCMH for assessment if
Guisande can undergo trial for arraignment, with NCMH having custody of Guisande, and Tacla
ordered for confinement in jail, if she becomes ready. So filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Amparo on behalf of his daughter. However, NCMH found that Guisande was fit for trial and
since offense is non-bailable, she should remain in confinement in jail. The prosecutor dropped the
case, stating that the habeas corpus and writ of amparo pending should also be dismissed having
rendered moot and academic

ISSUE: Whether or not petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for being moot and academic

HELD: The petition should be dismissed.

There was no affirmation of the petitioner’s claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the
NCMH was illegal, neither were the respective acts performed by Judge Tacla and the Doctor in
ascertaining the fitness of Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful.

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such
relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If
an individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must
be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. 
In re: Salibo v. Warden
GR No. 197597 April 08, 2015

FACTS:
In 2010, Salibo learned that police officers in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang,
one of the accused in the Maguindanao Massacre who had a pending warrant of arrest issued by
the trial court. Salibo went to the police to clear his name, explaining that he was in Saudi Arabia at
that time, presenting pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other documents to
prove so. However, they tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure and detained
him for three days. He was eventually transferred to the Quezon City Jail.

Salibo filed before the Court of appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus questioning the
legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. He maintained that he was not the accused
Batukan S. Malang. The Writ was granted and issued on September 21, 2010 and the CA ordered
the Warden to file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the
person of Salibo at the hearing set on September 27, 2010. It was only on September 28, 2010 that
the Warden filed the Return of the Writ, and was heard on October 1, 2010.

On trial, the assistant Solicitors claim that since Salibo was charged under a valid Information and
Warrant of Arrest, a petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. The trial court ruled in favor of
Salibo, but the Court of Appeals reversed it, claiming that the motion to quash information should
have been the remedy and not writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not petition of writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

HELD: Yes, the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense, neither was he
restrained under a lawful process or order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty and
therefore, correctly availed of a Petition for Habeas Corpus. The fact that the police officers had no
probable cause to arrest Salibo deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for
which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued. Even if filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he
alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from
"Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in
this case.

Thus, since Salibo was illegally deprived of his liberty, his Petition for Habeas Corpus must be
granted.
 II. Writ of Amparo

Santiago v. Tulfo
G.R. No. 205039 October 21, 2015

FACTS: Spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin (Raymart) and Claudine Margaret Santiago were in the
airport waiting for the arrival of their baggage but were informed that it was offloaded and transferred
to a different flight. While they were lodging a complaint before the complaint desk, Raymart saw a
man taking photos of his wife. He then approached him and found out that it was Ramon “Mon”
Tulfo. The confrontation escalated to a brawl, which came to a stop because of the interference of
the airport security personnel. Days after the incident, the brother of Mon Tulfo aired on their TV
program comments and expletives together with a threat that they will retaliate against the
Santiagos. Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of amparo against respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for the issuance of a writ of amparo should be granted.

HELD: No.

The Amparo Rule has limited the remedy as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof. "Extrajudicial killings," according to case law, are generally
characterized as "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings," while "enforced disappearances," according to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act
No. 9851, otherwise known as the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian
Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity," "means the arrest, detention, or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time."

The Court held that it must be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance
was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any
case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses
above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents' purported
violation of their right to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of
direct or indirect government participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside
the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail. Hence, the RTC, through Judge Singh,
properly exercised its discretion to motu proprio dismiss the same under this principal determination,
regardless of the filing of the May 23, 2012 Motion.
Namba v. Bueno
G.R. No. 191416, February 7, 2017

FACTS: The canteen owned by Emelita Mamba was robbed. Emelita is the mother of Mayor
Mamba, then mayor of the Municipality of Tuao, Cagayan, and Atty. Mamba, then a Malacanang
official. The Task Force Lingkod Bayan (Task Force), an agency created by the Sangguniang Bayan
of Tuao to help the local police with the peace and order of the municipality, undertook an
investigation on the robbery. Several members of the Task Force, together with Barangay Officials
went to the house of the respondent, then still a minor, to invite him for questioning on his supposed
involvement in the robbery. The respondent and his mother, Maritess Bueno, acceded to the
invitation. Thereupon, the respondent was brought to the Tuao police station.

The parties gave different accounts of what happened after the respondent was brought to the police
station. Respondents claim that Maritess went to the police station to look for her son; she was told
that the respondent was brought to Mayor Mamba’s house. Maritess was not permitted to see her
son and she was able to talk to Mayor Mamba. Maritess then sought the assistance of P/Supt
Buenaobra regarding the respondent’s disappearance. The PNP Cagayan regional Office was then
preparing a case for Habeas Corpus when the respondent was released on June 18, 2009 to the
local SWD office.

Maritess filed a Petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with the CA. The CA opined that the
respondent’s rights to liberty and security were undeniably undermined when he was invited by the
members of the Task force for investigation and was brought to Mayor Mamba’s house. The CA
further claimed that the invitation extended to the respondent by the Task Force members was in the
nature of an arrest. The same amounted to an invalid warrantless arrest since the circumstances of
the case do not fall within the purview of Section 2 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

The CA ruled that, the refusal of the members of the Task Force and especially Mayor Mamba, to
admit and address the irregularities committed by its members is tantamount to continuing violation
of the respondent’s right to security. The petitioners sought for reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in granting the petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo.

HELD: No.

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address
specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. Section 1
of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC specifically delimits the coverage of the writ of amparo to extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. In an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective
claims by substantial evidence.

Respondent was able to prove by substantial evidence that he was apprehended by the members of
the Task Force, illegally detained, and tortured. It was further established that Maritess would not
have seen his son if not for the timely intercession of P/Supt. Buenaobra of the PNP Cagayan
Regional Office. The members of the Task Force apprehended and detained the respondent to
make him admit to his complicity in the heist the night before sans the benefit of legal and judicial
processes.

The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in
the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action.

Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's favor notwithstanding that he has
already been released from detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate the
punishment of those behind the illegal detention through subsequent investigation and action.

More importantly, the writ of amparo likewise covers violations of the right to security. At the core of
the guarantee of the right to security, as embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, is the
immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person, i.e., houses, papers and
effects, against unwarranted government intrusion. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution not only
limits the State's power over a person's home and possession, but more importantly, protects the
privacy and sanctity of the person himself.
Callo v. Commissioner Morente
G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017

FACTS: Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) was charged for deportation for being an undesirable,
undocumented, and overstaying alien. It was alleged that Danielle Nopuente, also known as
Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker, was a fugitive from justice in the United States of
America with an outstanding arrest warrant issued against her. A Summary Deportation Order
(SDO) was issued against her. Subsequently, Parker was arrested in Tagaytay City on the premise
that Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker are one and the same person. She was then taken
to the Immigration Detention Facility where she continues to be detained, as the deportation was not
carried out due to the fact that Parker is charged with falsification and use of falsified documents
before Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City.

Parker, as petitioner, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before RTC of Pasig City. The Bureau of
Immigration was able to produce the body of Parker before the RTC. The Bureau of Immigration
then alleged that as the SDO had become final and executory, which served as the legal authority to
detain Parker. The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that the detention of Parker was legal. Parker
appealed the case to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC and found that Parker failed to prove that
she was a Filipino citizen to warrant judicial intervention through habeas corpus.

A year later, Callo filed this petition for a writ of amparo with prayer to issue Interim Reliefs of
Immediate Release of Danielle Tan Parker from Detention. Callo argues that Parker is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and thus, there is no reason for her to be detained by the Bureau of Immigration.
Moreover, Callo alleges that the life of Parker is endangered in the detention center; and thus a writ
of amparo with the interim reliefs prayed for should be issued by this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of amparo should be issued.

HELD: No. The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to
violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to
address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

For the issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It is even not
sufficient to allege and prove that a person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the required
quantum of proof that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to
acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing persons. In
this case, Parker has not disappeared. Her detention has been sufficiently justified by the Bureau of
Immigration, given that there is an SDO and a pending criminal case against her.
 III. Writ of Habeas Data

Manila Electric Company v. Lim

G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010

FACTS: A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in Bulacan denouncing Lim, an
administrative clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety.
She complained under the premise that the transfer was a denial of her due process, writing a letter
stating that: “It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly
suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” She added, “instead of the
management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action
would be a punitive one.” She asked for deferment thereafter. Since the company didn’t respond,
she filed for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to Meralco’s omission of providing her
with details about the report of the letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and
security. She asked for disclosure of the data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the
data.

Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasn’t in
order. Trial court ruled in her favor. In the Supreme Court, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data
applies to entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an
aggrieved party’s person, family or home.

Issue: Whether or not Habeas Data is the proper remedy for Lim.

Held: No. Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum
directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data
allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of
information technology.
Rodriguez v. Arroyo
GR no. 191805 November 15, 2011

FACTS: Noriel is a member of Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, he was tagged as an enemy of the
state. He was then harassed by four men who took him where he was forced to confess to be a
member of NPA where he remained silent until they reached a military camp. Having been beaten
and tortured by the Philippine Army he was coerced to sign several documents of his surrender.
Months later, military went inside their house and took pictures. Despite efforts of Rodriguez they
didn’t stop. Since then they noticed several suspicious looking men following them and they felt
unsecured, thus Rodriguez filed a petition for writ of habeas data and amparo for protection order,
inspection of place and production of documents and personal properties against President Arroyo
and other police members.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Rodriguez, and found the police members liable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writ of amparo and
habeas data cases.

HELD: Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents
are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the
courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.

Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative
liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. “In the
context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by
action or omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to
respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.”

“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and
allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data
proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo
was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise
failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj.
Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.”
Gamboa v. Chan
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012

FACTS: Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, classifying her as someone
who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–
Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby
causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that
her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the
PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD: No. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s
right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized
that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained
that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
[T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of
Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.