G.R. No.

133495 September 3, 1998

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.
 
MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials, with the exception
of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms. In particular, the question is whether a vice-mayor who
succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in
that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he
ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for
another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. 1
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on the theory
that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be
ineligible to serve for another term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private
respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. 2 However, on motion of private respondent the
COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections.
3
The majority stated in its decision:
In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office
for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not
elected. In the case before the Commission, respondent Capco was not elected to the position of Mayor in the
January 18, 1988 local elections. He succeeded to such office by operation of law and served for the unexpired
term of his predecessor. Consequently, such succession into office is not counted as one (1) term for purposes of
the computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioner's 7,773 votes and
was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated My 7, 1998, of the COMELEC and to seek a declaration
that private respondent is disqualified to serve another term as mayor of Pateros, Metro Manila.
Petitioner contends that private respondent Capco's service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992 should be
considered as service for one full term, and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should
be considered to have served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution and §43(b) of
the Local Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989,
private respondent became the mayor and thereafter served the remainder of the term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant
that private respondent became mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the number
of terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power.
This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, §8 of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
This provision is restated in §43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):
Sec. 43. Term of Office. — . . .
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. . . .
First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in
question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office
regardless of how the official concerned came to that office — whether by election or by succession by operation of law —
would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Article X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with
preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F.
Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative
officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred
from running for the same position in the of the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. 4
Monsod warned against "prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose" as a result of the proposed absolute
disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained provisions "recognizing people's power." 5
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said:
The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary or a perpetual disqualification
on those who have served their terms in accordance with the limits on consecutive service as decided by the
Constitutional Commission. I would be very wary about this Commission exercising a sort of omnipotent power
in order to disqualify those who will already have served their terms from perpetuating themselves in office. I
 think the Commission achieves its purpose in establishing safeguards against the excessive accumulation of
power as a result of consecutive terms. We do put a cap on consecutive service — in the case of the President,
six years, in the case of the Vice-President, unlimited; and in the case of the Senators, one reelection. In the case
of the Members of Congress, both from the legislative districts and from the party list and sectoral
representation, this is now under discussion and later on the policy concerning local officials will be taken up by
the Committee on Local Governments. The principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent future
situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President down to
the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers
and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families
in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or the unbroken
service of all of these officials. But where we now decide to put these prospective servants of the people or
politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual disqualification, I have a feeling that we are
taking away too much from the people, whereas we should be giving as much to the people as we can in terms
of their own freedom of choice. . . . 6
Other commissioners went on record against "perpetually disqualifying" elective officials who have served a certain number of
terms as this would deny the right of the people to choose. As Commissioner Yusup R. Abubakar asked, "why should we arrogate
unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want?" 7
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when she called on her colleagues to "allow the people to exercise their
own sense of proportion and [rely] on their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself." 8
Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: "Why should we not leave [perpetual disqualification after serving a number of
terms] to the premise accepted by practically everybody here that our people are politically mature? Should we use this
assumption only when it is convenient for us, and not when it may also lead to a freedom of choice for the people and for
politicians who may aspire to serve them longer?" 9
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of
service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second
is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be
preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the
officials concerned were serving by reason of election. This is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional
Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI, §§4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow the
Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before — if the Gentlemen will remember — was: How long
will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the
election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third year or on the
sixth year thereafter, this particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation for
six years. That was the Committee's stand. 10
Indeed a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose those whom they
please to govern them. 11 To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a
result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, §8
contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of "the term
of office of elective local officials" and bars "such official[s]" from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second
sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected." The term served must therefore be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected." The
purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective local official may
serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official
he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of
office prior to its expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas' comment on Art. VI, §7, which similarly bars members of the House of
Representatives from serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that "if one is elected Representative to
serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of
computing the number of successive terms allowed." 12
This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in answer to a query of Commissioner Suarez: "For
example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of
the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term,
which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the
meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?" Commissioner Davide said: "Yes, because we speak of "term,"
and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the
Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House." 13
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who
succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the
mayorship by operation of law. 14 On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. 15 In a real sense,
therefore, such Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit
the right to be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than
refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, §8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who
succeeds another confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, §4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case
of vacancy in that office. After stating that "The President shall not be eligible for any reelection," this provision says that "No
person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the
same office at any time." Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a
full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latter's office and serves for the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-President, who simply steps into the
Presidency by succession, would be qualified to run President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The
absence of a similar provision in Art. X, §8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It
underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purposes of the
three-term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more than four
years is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the
latter's death, permanent disability, removal, or resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming, so is
entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the
Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in
the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the Presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a
full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the Local Government Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and
he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in
the event of vacancy therein being only one of
them. 16 It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that, in running
for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance
than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following cases or situations:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months
before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next
election?
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office
before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the
term limit. Under Art. X, §8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one "for which he was elected." Since A is only
completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be considered to
have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a
total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he
has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms
notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In
the second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two
conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, §8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he
qualified to run again in the next election?
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by
operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the
death, of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection
would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them.
If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another
term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it
is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the
term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while
the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that
their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999
ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and EUFEMIO MULI, respondents.
 
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the resolutions issued by the COMELEC First
Division dated May 21, 1998 and by the COMELEC En Banc dated August 11, 1998 in SPA 98-190 entitled, In the matter of the
Petition to Disqualify Mayoralty Candidate Romeo Lonzanida of San Antonio, Zambales, Eufemio Muli, petitioner, vs. Romeo
Lonzanida, respondent. The assailed resolutions declared herein petitioner Romeo Lonzanida disqualified to run for Mayor in the
municipality of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 1998 elections and that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted and if he
has been proclaimed winner the said proclamation is declared null and void.1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again
proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by
his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision
dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections. The court ruled:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court hereby renders judgment declaring the results of the election for the office of
the mayor in San Antonio, Zambales last May 8, 1995 as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of
election.
Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby declared vacant.
Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC resolved the election protest filed by Alvez and
after a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales by
plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling P1,720 votes as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the COMELEC
issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which he obeyed, and Alvez assumed office for the remainder
of the term.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his
opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998
elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida
was proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution granting the
petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time. The COMELEC found that Lonzanida's
assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the
term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code. The finding of the COMELEC First Division was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August
11, 1998.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions finding him disqualified to run for mayor of San Antonio
Zambales in the 1998 elections. He maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his
assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections as evidenced by the
COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 in EAC No. 6-97 entitled Juan Alvez, Protestant-Appellee vs. Romeo Lonzanida,
Protestee-Appellant; wherein the COMELEC declared Juan Alvez as the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner
also argues that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in
the 1998 mayoral elections; as the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under
Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Private respondent Eufemio Muli filed comment to the petition asking this court to sustain the questioned resolutions of the
COMELEC and to uphold its jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification. The private respondent states that the petition for
disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 mayoral elections. Under section 6, RA 6646 and Rule 25 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure petitions for disqualification filed with the COMELEC before the elections and/or proclamation
of the party sought to be disqualified may still be heard and decided by the COMELEC after the election and proclamation of the
said party without distinction as to the alleged ground for disqualification, whether for acts constituting an election offense or
for ineligibility. Accordingly, it is argued that the resolutions of the COMELEC on the merits of the petition for disqualification
were issued within the commission's jurisdiction. As regards the merits of the case, the private respondent maintains that the
petitioner's assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of
mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.
The Solicitor-General filed comment to the petition for the respondent COMELEC praying for the dismissal of the petition. The
Solicitor-General stressed that section 8, Art. X of the Constitution and section 43 (b), Chapter 1 of the Local Government Code
which bar a local government official from serving more than three consecutive terms in the same position speaks of "service of
a term" and so the rule should be examined in this light. The public respondent contends that petitioner Lonzanida discharged
the rights and duties of mayor from 1995 to 1998 which should be counted as service of one full term, albeit he was later
unseated, because he served as mayor for the greater part of the term. The issue of whether or not Lonzanida served as a de
jure or de facto mayor for the 1995-1998 term is inconsequential in the application of the three term limit because the
prohibition speaks or "service of a term" which was intended by the framers of the Constitution to foil any attempt to
monopolize political power. It is likewise argued by the respondent that a petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court
is proper when the petition for disqualification is filed after the elections and so the instant petition for disqualification which
was filed before the elections may be resolved by the COMELEC thereafter regardless of the imputed basis of disqualification.
The petitioner filed Reply to the comment. It is maintained that the petitioner could not have served a valid term from 1995 to
1998 although he assumed office as mayor for that period because he was not lawfully elected to the said office. Moreover, the
petitioner was unseated before the expiration of the term and so his service for the period cannot be considered as one full
term. As regards the issue of jurisdiction, the petitioner reiterated in his Reply that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction to
hear the election protest after the petitioner's proclamation.
The petition has merit.
Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law
shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
The issue before us is whether petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to
March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local
government officials.
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of
the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from running for the same
position after serving three consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of
massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The
delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to
infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. The
mayor was compared by some delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief executive of his political
territory and is most likely to form a political dynasty. 1 The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some
local government officials run for office before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the
same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from. As finally voted
upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from running for the same post after three
consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office. 2
The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials with the exception of barangay officials from serving
more than three consecutive terms was discussed at length in the case of Benjamin Borja, Jr.; vs. COMELEC and Jose Capco, Jr. 3
where the issue raised was whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of law upon the death of
the incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term should be considered to have served a term in that office for the
purpose of computing the three term limit. This court pointed out that from the discussions of the Constitutional Convention it is
evident that the delegates proceeded from the premise that the official's assumption of office is by reason of election. This Court
stated: 4
Two ideas emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the
notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged
stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose
those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption
that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. This is clear from the following exchange in the
Constitutional Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI sections 4 and 7 of the Constitution,
for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We
will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before — if the Gentlemen will remember-
was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one
term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that
during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be
on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular member of the Senate can run.
So it is not really a period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committees' stand.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art
X, section 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first
sentence speaks of "the-term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such officials" from serving for more
than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective official may be deemed to
have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
The term served must therefore be one "for which the official concerned was elected." The purpose of the
provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve."
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio
Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was
ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the
petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of
the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having
been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the
COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous
proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason
of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all 5 and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of
the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of
the election protest. 6 Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March
1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was
later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post
before the expiration of the term. The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full
term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the
second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second
sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. "The clear intent of the
framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of
office from 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of
the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took
roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected.
We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to
any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to
move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for
the execution of the regional trial court's decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume
office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to have intentionally sought by the
petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local
government post in the succeeding mayoral election.
The petitioner's contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was
proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998
elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioner's proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC
and Trinidad 7 that the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is
pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the
merits.
Sec. 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:
Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case. — any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification
case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the
election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the
said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has
been proclaimed.
The court stated:
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification
case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word "shall" signified that this requirement of
the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. The implication is that the
COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in
providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election,
Silvestre vs. Duavit in effect disallows what R.A. No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial
legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the
scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in
perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect.
By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed,
a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in
case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of election
offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case
against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine
before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that
the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the
commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more
fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divest the
COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case. In
Aguam v. COMELEC this Court held —
Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power.
It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private
respondent's petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass
and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the
Constitution and law to COMELEC . . . Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded
from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office
thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from
running or, if elected. From serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact
that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and
may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation .
Accordingly, the petition is granted. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC declaring petitioner Lonzanida disqualified to run
for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are hereby set aside.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115962           February 15, 2000

DOMINADOR REGALADO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeal affirming the ruling of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, Negros Oriental, which found petitioner Dominador Regalado, Jr. guilty of violating §261(h) of the Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), as amended. 2
The Information against petitioner alleged:
That on or about January 25, 1988, at Tanjay, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, said accused DOMINADOR S. REGALADO, JR., [as] OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Tanjay, Negros Oriental, did
then and there unlawfully, feloniously and illegally TRANSFER one MRS. EDITHA P. BARBA, a permanent Nursing
Attendant, Grade I, in the Office of the [M]ayor of Tanjay, from her permanent assignment to a very remote Barangay of
Sto. Niño during the election period and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from the Commission on
Elections, Manila.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on January 15, 1987, complainant Editha Barba was appointed nursing attendant in
the Rural Health Office of Tanjay, Negros Oriental by then Officer-In-Charge Mayor Rodolfo Navarro. 3 Although she was detailed
at, and received her salary from, the Office of the Mayor, she reported for work at the Puriculture Center, Poblacion, Tanjay. As
Navarro decided to run for mayor of Tanjay in the January 18, 1988 elections, petitioner Dominador Regalado, Jr. was appointed
substitute OIC-Mayor. His brother, Arturo S. Regalado, was also a mayoralty candidate.
Petitioner's brother won in the elections. Four days later, on January 22, 1988, petitioner, still sitting as OIC-Mayor, issued a
memorandum to Barba informing her that effective January 25, 1988, she would be reassigned from Poblacion, Tanjay to
Barangay Sto. Niño,4 about 25 kilometers from Poblacion. 5 The transfer was made without the prior approval of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC). Barba continued to report at the Puriculture Center, Poblacion, Tanjay, however. Hence, on February
18, 1988, petitioner issued another memorandum to Barba directing her to explain, within 72 hours, why she refuses to comply
with the memorandum of January 22, 1988. 6
In response, Barba, on February 21, 1988, sent a letter to petitioner protesting her transfer which she contended was illegal. 7
She then filed, on February 16, 1988, a complaint 8 against petitioner for violation of §261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as
amended, and after preliminary investigation, the Provincial Election Officer of Negros Oriental, Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, charged
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Negros Oriental.1âwphi1.nêt
On September 27, 1991, the lower court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states: 9
Finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 261, paragraph (h), of the Omnibus Election
Code, the accused Dominador S. Regalado, Jr., is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for an indeterminate period
ranging from one (1) year minimum to three (3) years maximum without the benefit of probation and to suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. He is further sentenced to indemnify the
offended party, Editha P. Barba, as civil liability arising from the offense charged[,] in the sum of Five Hundred (P500.00)
Pesos . . . . for moral damages.
As petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied,10 he elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which, on February 3,
1994, affirmed the lower court's decision. He moved for a reconsideration, but his motion was likewise denied, hence this
appeal.
Petitioner alleges that —
I.THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE RURAL HEALTH UNIT OF
THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANJAY, NEGROS ORIENTAL, VIZ-A-VIZ, THE LETTERS OF APPOINTMENT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
II.THE MEMORANDUM DID NOT EFFECT A TRANSFER, BUT MERELY A "RE-ASSIGNMENT" OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
III.EXIGENCIES OF SERVICE WERE NOT ACCOUNTED FOR. 11
Petitioner's contentions have no merit.
First. The two elements of the offense prescribed under §261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, are: (1) a public
officer or employee is transferred or detailed within the election period as fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail
was effected without prior approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules and regulations. 12
The implementing rule involved is COMELEC Resolution No. 1937, 13 which pertinently provides:
Sec. 1.Prohibited Acts.
Effective November 19, 1987 up to February 17, 1988, no public official shall make or cause any transfer or detail
whatsoever of any officer or employee in the Civil Service, including public school teachers, except upon prior approval
of the Commission.
Sec. 2. Request for authority of the Commission. — Any request for . . . . approval to make or cause any transfer or detail
must be submitted in writing to the Commission stating all the necessary data and reason for the same which must
satisfy the Commission that the position is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and
that the . . . . filling thereof shall not in any manner influence the election.
Petitioner admits that he issued the January 22, 1988 memorandum within the election period set in Resolution No. 1937
without the prior approval of the COMELEC. He contends, however, that he did not violate §261(h) because he merely effected a
"re-assignment" and not a "transfer" of personnel by moving Barba from one unit or place of designation (Poblacion, Tanjay) to
another (Sto. Niño, Tanjay) of the same office, namely, the Rural Health Office of Tanjay, Negros Oriental. 14 In support of his
contention, he relies upon the following portions of §24 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law): 15
(c) Transfer — a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level, or salary without break of
service involving the issuance of an appointment.
(g) Reassignment — an employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency.
Provided, that such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary.
Petitioner, however, ignores the rest of §24(c) which provides that:
[A transfer] shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of the public service, in which case, the
employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no justification for
the transfer, he may appeal his case to the Commission.
The transfer may be from one department or agency to another or from one organizational unit to another in the same
department or agency: Provided, however, That any movement from the non-career service to the career service shall
not be considered a transfer. (Emphasis added).
Thus, contrary to petitioner's claim, a transfer under §24(c) of P.D. No. 807 in fact includes personnel movement from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency.
Moreover, §261(h) of B.P. No. 881, as amended, provides that it is an election offense for —
Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service
including public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission. (Emphasis
added).
As the Solicitor General notes, "the word transfer or detail, as used [above], is modified by the word whatever. This indicates
that any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency, during the election is
covered by the prohibition."16
Finally, the memorandum itself issued by petitioner to Barba on January 22, 1988 stated that the latter was being "transferred,"
thus:17
 Effective Monday, January 25, 1988, your assignment as Nursing Attendant will be transferred from RHU I Tanjay
Poblacion to Barangay Sto. Niño, this Municipality.
You are hereby directed to perform the duties and functions as such immediately in that area.
For strict compliance.(Emphasis added)
Second. Petitioner next contends that his order to transfer Barba to Barangay Sto. Niño was prompted by the lack of health
service personnel therein and that this, in effect, constitutes sufficient justification for his non-compliance with §261(h). 18
The contention has no merit.
It may well be that Barangay Sto. Niño in January 1988 was in need of health service personnel. Nonetheless, this fact will not
excuse the failure of petitioner to obtain prior approval from the COMELEC for the movement of personnel in his office.
Indeed, appointing authorities can transfer or detail personnel as the exigencies of public service require. 19 However, during
election period, as such personnel movement could be used for electioneering or even to harass subordinates who are of
different political persuasion, §261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, prohibits the same unless approved by the
COMELEC.
Third. The award of P500,000.00 as moral damages to Barba must be deleted. Under §264, par. 1 of the Omnibus Election Code,
as amended, the only imposable penalties for the commission of any of the election offenses thereunder by an individual are —
imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years [which] shall not be subject to probation. In
addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
deleted. SO ORDERED.

P.E.T. Case No. 001             February 13, 1996

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, protestant,
vs.
FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS, protestee.
RESOLUTION
In her motion of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant Miriam Defensor-Santiago prayed
that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot
areas be deemed completed.
We deferred action on that motion and required the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective memoranda on the
issue of whether this case had been rendered moot by the election of the Protestant as a Senator in the May 1995 election and
her assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995.
The Protestant answers this issue in the negative. Relying on Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,1 Lomugdang vs. Javier,2 and De
Castro vs. Ginete,3 she asserts that an election contest involves not only an adjudication and settlement of the private interests
of the rival candidates, but more importantly, the paramount need to dispel, once and for all, the uncertainty that beclouds the
true choice of the electorate. Hence, it is imbued with public interest and should be pursued to its final conclusion to determine
the bona fide winner. She further asserts that an election case may be rendered moot only if the term of the contested office
has expired,4 thus her election as Senator and assumption of office as such cannot, under the rule laid down in Moraleja vs.
Relova,5 be construed as an abandonment of the instant protest. Finally, she alleges that this Court has departed from the
orthodox view that a case should be dismissed if it has been mooted. 6
For his part, the Protestee submits that there is strong legal basis for this Tribunal to rule that the Protestant is deemed to have
abandoned the instant protest, in light of the ruling in Dimaporo vs. Mitra7 which construed Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
(Omnibus Election Code).8 He submits, however, that public interest requires that this protest be resolved on the merits
considering that: (a) it involves a matter of paramount and grave public interest; and (b) it was filed merely to keep Protestant
Santiago in the limelight in preparation for her Senatorial campaign. He likewise claims that a resolution on the merits would
confirm his victory in the 11 May 1992 presidential election and prove that the instant protest is unfounded. Further more, it
would establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines with respect to presidential election protest cases, thereby
educating the bench and the bar and preventing the indiscriminate filing of baseless protest cases.
We cannot subscribe to the view of the Protestee that by filing her certificate of candidacy for Senator Protestant Santiago ipso
facto forfeited her claim to the office of President pursuant to Section 67 of B.P. Blg. 881. Plainly, the said section applies
exclusively to an incumbent elective official who files a certificate of candidacy for any office "other than the one he is holding in
a permanent capacity." Even more plain is that the Protestant was not the incumbent President at the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy for Senator nor at any time before that. Thus, the holding in Dimaporo does not apply to the Protestant.
Neither do we find any convincing logic to the Protestee's proposition that this case should nevertheless be resolved on the
merits because its filing was done in bad faith, i.e., merely to keep the Protestant in the limelight in preparation for her
Senatorial campaign. If that were so, then public interest would be served if this case were put to an abrupt end after the
Protestant won a seat in the Senate. Finally, neither do we find any cogent nor compelling reason to proceed with this case, in
the event that we find it to be moot, simply to establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines with respect to election
protests involving the office of the President or the Vice-President.
I.
The key then to the resolution of the aforestated issue is the consideration of public interest and public policy and their
encompassing effects on election cases which have been unequivocally expressed in the cases cited by the Protestant.
In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,9 this Court stated:
It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and settlement of the private
interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds
the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift, is a
 proceeding imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over and above ordinary civil actions. For this
reason, broad perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within
their command who is the real candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered by
technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be frustrated (Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al.,
G.R. L-17512, December 29, 1960; Reforma vs. De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958). So inextricably intertwined are the
interests of the contestants and those of the public that there can be no gainsaying the logic of the proposition that
even the voluntary cessation in office of the protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him or the character of an
adversary in the contest inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep his political opponent out of the office and
maintain therein his successor, but also does not in any manner impair or detract from the jurisdiction of the court to
pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion (De Los Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595, 597; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62
Phil. 584, 587; Galves vs. Maramba, G.R. L-13206).
Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed
against him, and it may be stated as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment
despite the death of the protestee. (In Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 520 [1967], where the trial court proceeded with the
trial of an election protest and decided it even if the protestee had already died and his Vice-Mayor had assumed office
by succession, this Court, instead of dismissing the appeal brought on behalf of the deceased protestee, required the
Vice-Mayor to intervene on the side of the appellant)
In Lomugdang vs. Javier,10 this Court declared:
Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter clothed with public interest, wherefore, public
policy demands that an election contest, duly commenced, be not abated by the death of the contestant. We have
squarely so ruled in Sibulo vda. de Mesa vs. Judge Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, October 26, 1966, in the same spirit that
led this Court to hold that the ineligibility of the protestant is not a defense (Caesar vs. Garrido, 53 Phil. 57), and that the
protestee's cessation in office is not a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor detract the Court's jurisdiction to
decide the case (Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584).
In the same Sibulo case, already cited, this Court likewise ruled that by virtue of Section 7, Republic Act 2264, the vice-
mayor elect has the status of a real party in interest in the continuation of the proceedings and is entitled to intervene
therein. For if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice mayor succeeds to the office of mayor that
becomes vacant if the duly elected cannot assume the post.
In Moraleja vs. Relova,11 this Court ruled:
As to the contention that by accepting such appointment as Technical Assistant, protestant has abandoned his protest,
all that need be said is that once the court has acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved
demands that the true winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties, so much so that there can
be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of cases. (Francisco, How To Try Election Cases, p. 163,
citing Civilio v. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689). In the same manner that the acceptance by the protestee of an appointment to
another position is not a ground for dismissal of the protest (Philippine Law on Elections by Martin, 1970 ed., pp. 258-
259, citing Calvo v. Maramba, G.R. No. L-13206, January 7, 1918) like the resignation of the protestee from the
contested office (Angeles v. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595), simply because it is of public interest that the real winner be
known, neither can the acceptance of a more or less temporary employment, such as that of a technical assistant of the
Vice-Governor, which is a primarily confidential position, be considered as inconsistent with protestant's determination
to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. In such
instances, the plight of protestant may be viewed in the same light as that of an employee who has been illegally
dismissed and who, to find means to support himself and family while he prosecutes his case for reinstatement, accepts
a temporary employment elsewhere. Such employee is not deemed to have abandoned the position he seeks to
recover. (Tan v. Gimenez, et al. G.R. No. L-12525, February 19, 1960, 107 Phil. 17; Potot v. Bagano, G.R. No. L-2456,
January 25, 1949, 82 Phil. 679). Of course, the case of protestant who accepts a permanent appointment to a regular
office could be different, but We are not ruling on it here.
In De Castro vs. Ginete,12 this Court stated:
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers
is really the lawful choice of the electorate. What is sought in an election protest is the correction of the canvass of the
votes, which is the basis of the proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest involves a public office in
which the public has an interest. Certainly, the act of a losing candidate of recognizing the one who is proclaimed the
winner should not bar the losing candidate from questioning the validity of the election of the winner in the manner
provided by law.
The factual milieu in these cases is not on all fours with the instant protest.
In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, as in the later case of Silverio vs. Castro,13 the protestee had been proclaimed the winning mayoralty
candidate and had assumed office, and then died during the pendency of the election protest. While in Lomugdang, it was the
protestant who died during the pendency of the protest.
In Moraleja, the election protest survived the protestant's acceptance of temporary employment during the pendency of his
election protest. Likewise, in De los Angeles vs. Rodriguez,14 cited in Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, an election protest was continued
despite the resignation from office of the protestee.
Finally, in De Castro, the only issue presented was whether the protest should be dismissed on the ground of estoppel. In this
proceeding, the protestant congratulated the protestee after the latter was proclaimed the winner by the board of canvassers
and even exhorted those present during the inauguration and installation into office of the protestee to support the latter's
administration.
May the above dicta apply to the case of Protestant Santiago who assumed the office of Senator after her election as such in the
8 May 1995 election? This question was impliedly raised but not resolved in Moraleja. For after holding that the acceptance by
the protestant therein of a temporary appointment during the pendency of his protest did not amount to an abandonment
thereof, nor could it be considered inconsistent with his determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the
election protest, this Court noted: "Of course, the case of a protestant who accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office
could be different, but We are not ruling on it here."15
Indeed, it would be entirely different where the protestant pursued the new position through a popular election, as in the case
of Protestant Santiago who filed a certificate of candidacy for Senator in the 8 May 1995 election, campaigned for such office,
and submitted herself to be voted upon. She knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be
six years, to commence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election 16 and to end at noon of 30 June 2001.
Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that during her campaign, she promised to serve the
electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate
without any qualification, condition, or reservation.
In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate that if elected, she would assume the office of Senator,
discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such for the term for which she was elected. These are givens which are in
full accord with the principle enshrined in the Constitution that, public office is a public trust, and public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. 17
Indeed, it has been aptly said:
It is impossible that government shall be carried on, and the functions of civil society exercised, without the aid and
intervention of public servants or officers, and every person, therefore, who enters into civil society and avails himself of
the benefits and protection of the government, must owe to this society, or, in other words, to the public, at least a
social duty to bear his share of the public burdens, by accepting and performing, under reasonable circumstances, the
duties of those public offices to which he may be lawfully chosen. 18
In this jurisdiction, an elected public official may even be held criminally liable should he refuse to discharge an elective office. 19
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the last
three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant
Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest. that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In
assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in
the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of
who is the real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results
of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of
national recovery.
It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily
dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds:
(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;
(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof;
(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules;
(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and
(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible. 20
Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, 21 may
likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary
hearing on such grounds.22 In sum, if an election protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly
stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.
II.
There is yet another reason why this case should now be dismissed.
This Tribunal cannot close its eyes to the fact that the Protestant has decided to waive the revision of the remaining unrevised
ballots from 4,017 precincts out of the 17,527 precincts of the designated three pilot areas. This is an unabashed reversal from
her original stand in her Motion and Manifestation dated 18 October 1993. Taking this into account, this Tribunal declared in its
resolution of 21 October 1993:
After deliberating on the foregoing pleadings and the arguments of the parties, the Tribunal rules for the Protestant
insofar as the revision of the remaining ballot boxes from her pilot areas are concerned, and against the immediate
application of Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal to the Protestee in respect of the Counter-Protest.
At this stage of the proceedings in this case it cannot be reasonably determined whether the revised ballots are
"considerable" enough to establish a trend either in favor of or against the Protestant as would justify an appropriate
action contemplated in Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal, or whether the unrevised ballots from said areas would not,
in the language of the Protestant, "materially affect the result of the representative sample of the ballot boxes so far
revised." As to the 1,300 ballot boxes from Makati, the proper time to raise the objections to the ballot boxes and its
contents would be during the revision stage.
Consequently, we resolved therein to:
A. ORDER the revision of the remaining unrevised ballot boxes enumerated in the aforequoted paragraph A of the 5
October 1993 Resolution and for that purpose to DIRECT the Acting Clerk of Court of the Tribunal to collect said ballot
boxes and other election documents and paraphernalia from their respective custodians in the event that their revisions
in connection with other election protests in which they are involved have been terminated, and if such revisions are not
yet completed, to coordinate with the appropriate tribunal or court in which such other election protests are pending
and which have already obtained custody of the ballot boxes and started revision with the end in view of either seeking
expeditious revisions in such other election protests or obtaining the custody of the ballot boxes and related election
documents and paraphernalia for their immediate delivery to the Tribunal; and
 B. REQUIRE the Protestant to inform the Tribunal, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, if after the completion of the
revision of the ballots from her pilot areas she would present evidence in connection therewith.
Until the present, however, the Protestant has not informed the Tribunal whether after the completion of the revision of the
ballots from her pilot areas, she still intends to present evidence in connection therewith. This failure then, is nothing short of a
manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.
It is entirely irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings that the Protestant's revisors discovered in the course of the revisions
alleged irregularities in 13,510 out of the 17,525 contested precincts in the pilot areas and have objected to thousands of ballots
cast in favor of the Protestee. Revision is merely the first stage, and not the alpha and omega, of an election contest. In no
uncertain terms then, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of 18 March 1993 that:
Protestant knows only too well, being a lawyer and a former judge herself, that the revision phase of her protest is but
the first stage in the resolution of her electoral protest and that the function of the revisors is very limited. In her 12
February 1993 Comment on Protestee's 5 February 1993 Urgent Motion for the issuance of a resolution which, inter alia,
would clarify that revisors may observe the objections and/or claims made by the revisors of the other party as well as
the ballots subject thereof, and record such observations in a form to be provided for that purpose, Protestant
unequivocally stated:
8. Further, the principle and plan of the RPET [Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal] is to subdivide the
entire election contest into various stages. Thus, the first stage is the Revision Proper. Second is the technical
examination if so desired by either party. Third is the reception of evidence. And Fourth, is the filing of parties'
memoranda.
and described the function of the revisors as "solely to examine and segregate the ballots according to which ballots
they would like to contest or object (contested ballots) and those which they admit or have no objections (uncontested
ballots)." Indeed, revisors do not have any judicial discretion; their duties are merely clerical in nature (Hontiveros vs.
Altavas, 24 Phil. 632 [1913]). In fact, their opinion or decision on the more crucial or critical matter of what ballots are to
be contested or not does not even bind the Tribunal (Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil. 781 [1929]; Olano vs. Tibayan, 53 Phil.
168 [1929]). Thus, no undue importance may be given to the revision phase of an election contest. It can never serve as
a logical or an acceptable basis for the conclusion that massive fraud or irregularities were committed during an election
or that a Protestant had won in said election. If that were so, a Protestant may contest all ballot boxes and, in the course
of the revision thereof, object for any imagined ground whatsoever, even if the same be totally unfounded and
ridiculous to all ballots credited to the Protestee; and then, at the end of the day, said Protestant may even announce to
the whole world that contrary to what is reflected in the election returns, Protestee had actually lost the elections.
All told, a dismissal of this election protest is inevitable.
III.
However, three Members of the Tribunal outrightly disagree with the foregoing disquisitions. Hence, a reply to the important
points they raise is in order.
Mr. Justice Puno's perception that the majority would dismiss this "election protest as moot and academic on two (2) grounds:
first, that the findings of irregularities made by the revisors of the protestant in the course of the revision of ballots in 13,510
contested precincts are entirely irrelevant; and second, she abandoned her protest when she filed her certificate of candidacy in
the 8 May 1995 senatorial elections," is inaccurate. The dispositive portion of this resolution leaves no room for any doubt or
miscomprehension that the dismissal is based on the ground that the protest "has been rendered moot and academic by its
abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her
discharge of the duties and functions thereof." There is, therefore, ONLY ONE reason or ground why the protest has been
rendered moot and academic, i.e., it has been abandoned or withdrawn. This was the very issue upon which the parties were
required, in the resolution of 26 September 1995, to submit their respective memoranda.
The majority neither conveyed, asserted nor even suggested, as Mr. Justice Puno has apparently understood, that this protest
has become moot and academic because the finding of irregularities by the Protestant's revisors in the course of the revision of
the ballots in 13,510 contested precincts in the pilot areas are "entirely irrelevant," and that the Protestant has abandoned this
protest by filing a certificate of candidacy for the office of Senator in the 8 May 1995 elections. The majority's views on
"irrelevancy" and "on the filing of the certificate of candidacy" are not the grounds themselves, but parts only of the arguments
to strengthen the conclusion reached, i.e., abandonment. Otherwise stated, in order to make the point crystal clear, the majority
never held that the irrelevancy of the finding of irregularities is a ground why this protest has become moot and academic. It
only declared that the Protestant's: (a) waiver of revision of the unrevised ballots from the remaining 4,017 contested precincts
in the pilot areas; and (b) failure to comply with the resolution of 21 October 1995 requiring her to inform the Tribunal within
ten days from notice if she would still present evidence after completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas
rendered such "findings" of irregularities entirely irrelevant considering the Tribunal's disquisitions on what revision is in its 18
March 1993 resolution.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Puno lifted the words "entirely irrelevant"; from the fourth paragraph under the heading "II" of this
Resolution. It must, however, be stressed that the said paragraph is inexorably linked to the preceding two paragraphs relating
to the above-mentioned waiver and non-compliance, which provide the major premises for the fourth paragraph; more
concretely, the latter is nothing more than the logical conclusion which the major premises support.
The reasons adduced by Mr. Justice Puno for the Protestant's turn-around are mere speculations. In any event, the protestant's
possible "belief . . . that the contested ballots in 13,500 precincts when properly appreciated will sufficiently establish her
electoral victory," cannot stand against her previous insistence to proceed with the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots
and the aforementioned finding of the Tribunal in its resolution of 21 October 1993. The Tribunal is not to blame for "the slow
pace of the protest," if at all she so believes in such a state of things. Neither can the thought of cutting costs be a valid reason.
The Protestant knew from the outset that the revision of the ballots in the pilot areas was a crucial phase of this protest
because, under Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal, the protest could forthwith be dismissed if the Tribunal were convinced that
she would probably fail to make out a case but only after examination of the ballots from the pilot areas and the evaluation of
the evidence offered in connection therewith. It goes without saying that every ballot then in the pilot areas counts.
Then too, it was never the view of the majority that the Protestant's filing of the certificate of candidacy for a seat in the Senate
in the 8 May 1995 election was the sole and exclusive operative act for what Mr. Justice Puno perceives to be the majority's
second ground why this protest has become moot and academic. To the majority, such filing was only the initial step in a series
of acts performed by the Protestant to convincingly evince her abandonment of this protest, viz., campaigning for the office of
Senator, assumption of such office after her election and her discharge of the duties and functions of the said office. Precisely, in
the resolution of 26 September 1995, this Court directed the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective
memoranda on the issue
[o]f whether or not the protest has not been rendered moot and academic by the election of the Protestant as Senator
and her subsequent assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995. (emphasis supplied)
As to the concept of abandonment, Mr. Justice Puno and Mr. Justice Kapunan cite Black's Law Dictionary and the cases of
Roebuck vs. Mecosta Country Road Commission, 23 Dober vs. Ukase Inv. Co., 24 and McCall vs. Cull,25 cited therein. We have
turned to the primary sources of these cases, meticulously perused them, and found none materially significant to this protest.
The first two cases above refer to abandonment of property. Roebuck involved the issue of whether a roadway had been
abandoned by the Mecosta Road Commission. The Court therein held that in order for there to be an abandonment of land
dedicated to public use, two elements must concur, viz., (a) intention to relinquish the right or property, but without intending
to transfer title to any particular person; and (b) the external act which such intention is carried into effect. While Dober, on the
issue of whether the plaintiff therein abandoned a certain property, quoted Corpus Juris that the intention to abandon must be
determined from the facts and circumstances of the case. There must be a clear, unequivocal and decisive act of the party to
constitute abandonment in respect of a right secured an act done which shows a determination in the individual not to have a
benefit which is designed for him.
It is, of course, settled that a public office is not deemed property. 26
Only McCall involved the issue of abandonment of office. It is stated therein as follows:
Abandonment is a matter of intention and, when thought of in connection with an office, implies that the occupant has
quit the office and ceased to perform its duties. As long as he continues to discharge the duties of the office, even
though his source of title is two appointments, one valid and the other invalid, it cannot be said he has abandoned it. It
was said in Steingruber v. City of San Antonio, Tex. Com. App., 220 S.W. 77, 78: "A public office may be abandoned.
Abandonment is a species of resignation. Resignation and abandonment are voluntary acts. The former is a formal
relinquishment; the latter a relinquishment through non-user. Abandonment implies non-user, but non-user does not, of
itself, constitute abandonment. The failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with actual or imputed
intention on the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office. The intention may be inferred from the acts and
conduct of the party, and is a question of fact. Abandonment may result from an acquiescence by the officer in his
wrongful removal or discharge, but, as in other cases of abandonment, the question of intention is involved.
Strictly speaking, McCall is inapplicable to this protest for, as correctly stated in the dissent of Mr. Justice Kapunan, the
Protestant could not abandon the office of President which she was not holding at the time she filed the certificate of candidacy
for Senator. But the majority of the Tribunal never declared, nor even implied, that she abandoned the office of President
because it knew that she had yet nothing to abandon. Precisely, she filed this protest to be declared the winner for that office, to
thereafter assume and perform the duties thereof, and exercise the powers appertaining thereto. What the Tribunal explicitly
states is that the Protestant abandoned this Protest, thereby rendering this protest moot.
Mr. Justice Puno also insists that abandonment raises a question of fact and that the Tribunal cannot resolve it "for lack of
competent evidence"; moreover, he notes that the Protestee "has not adduced evidence which can be the basis for a finding
that she intentionally abandoned her protest; on the contrary, the Protestee does not want the protest to be dismissed on a
technicality but prays that it be decided on the merits." Suffice it to say that the Protestant herself has not denied nor
questioned the following facts, which by themselves, constitute overwhelming proof of the intention to abandon the protest:
(a) Filing of a certificate of candidacy for Senator for the 8 May 1995 elections;
(b) Campaigning for the office of Senator in such election;
(c) Taking her oath of office as Senator upon the commencement of the term therefor;
(d) Assumption of office as Senator; and
(e) Discharge and performance of the duties appertaining to the office of Senator.
These acts speak for themselves res ipsa loquitur to negate any proposition that the Protestant has not abandoned this protest.
Thus, what initially appears to be the correct view in the dissent is, in the final analysis, misplaced. This must also be the verdict
upon the following pronouncements of Mr. Justice Puno:
A more fundamental reason prevents me from joining the majority. With due respect, I submit that the majority ruling
on abandonment is inconsistent with the doctrine that an election contest is concerned less with the private interest of
the candidates but more with public interest. Under a republican regime of government, the overarching object of an
election contest is to seek and enforce the judgment of the people on who should govern them. It is not a happenstance
that the first declaration of policy of our Constitution underlines in bright that "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The first duty of a citizen as a particle of sovereignty in a democracy is to
exercise his sovereignty just as the first duty of any reigning government is to uphold the sovereignty of the people at all
cost. Thus, in Moraleja vs. Relova, we emphatically held that ". . . once the court has acquired jurisdiction over an
election contest, the public interest involved demands that the true winner be known without regard to the wishes or
acts of the parties so much so that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of cases."
Wisely, this Tribunal has consistently demurred from dismissing election contests even on the ground of death of the
protestee or the protestant.
 The majority appears to stray away from this lodestar of our Constitution. It will dismiss the case at bar even while the
protestee and the protestant are yet alive, even while the term of the 1992 president-elect has yet to expire, and even
while the protestee and the protestant together plead, that the Tribunal should determine the true will of the people by
deciding their dispute on the merit[s] and not on technicalities that trifle with the truth. I submit that it is the better
stance for the Tribunal to decide this election contest on the merit[s] and vindicate the political judgment of the people
which far surpasses in significance all other considerations. Our duty to tell the people who have the right to govern
them cannot depend on the uncertain oscillations of politics of the litigants as often times they are directed by the wind
of convenience, and not by the weal of the public.
For one, the majority has, in no uncertain terms, demonstrated the dissimilarities in the factual settings of the instant protest
vis-a-vis the earlier cases that enunciated the doctrine relied on by Mr. Justice Puno. Then, too, it must be reiterated, to avoid
further miscomprehension, that the Moraleja ruling even conceded that the matter of abandonment "could be different" if the
petitioner therein had accepted "a permanent appointment to a regular office" during the pendency of his protest. In short,
Moraleja in fact intimates abandonment of an election protest if, in the meantime, the Protestant accepts a permanent
appointment to a regular office. If that be so, then would it be, and for weightier reasons, against a protestant who voluntarily
sought election to an office whose term would extend beyond the expiry date of the term of the contested office, and after
winning the said election, took her oath and assumed office and thereafter continuously serves it.
In Moraleja, the Supreme Court was meticulous in excluding abandonment from the enumeration of specific "acts or wishes" of
the parties which must be disregarded because of the public interest component of an election protest. As reflected in the
above quotation from Mr. Justice Puno's dissent, only default, compromise, or stipulation of facts are included.
Finally, with all due respect, the above pronouncement of Mr. Justice Puno forgets that, as distinctly pointed out in the early
part of this Resolution, the Rules of the Tribunal allow summary dismissal of election protests even for less important grounds,
to repeat, such as the petition filed with the Tribunal or the annexes attached thereto are not clearly legible, or the filing fees
and cash deposits were not filed within the periods fixed in the Rules, 27 and the additional provision for dismissal under Rule 61.
All these provisions of the Rules would then be put to naught or, at the very least, modified or amended in a way not authorized
by the Rules, if the theory of Mr. Justice Puno be accepted. Such theory would unreasonably bind the Tribunal to the technical
minutiae of trial on the merits to bring to their ultimate end all protests or contests filed before it including those filed by
candidates who even forgot to vote for themselves and obtained no votes in the final count, but, unable to accept defeat, filed a
protest claiming massive fraud and irregularities, vote-buying, and terrorism. Consequently, all the time and energy of the
Justices of the Supreme Court would be spent appreciating millions of revised ballots to the prejudice of their regular judicial
functions in the Court, as the electoral protest of every Juan, Pedro, and Jose who lost in the presidential elections would have
to be heard on the merits. Public policy abhors such a scenario and no public good stands to be thereby served.
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal hereby resolved to
(1) GRANT the Protestant's Motion of 16 August 1995 to dispense with the revision of ballots and other election
documents in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas;
(2) DISMISS the instant election protest, since it has been rendered moot and academic by its abandonment or
withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of
the duties and functions thereof; and
(3) DISMISS, as a consequence, the Protestee's Counter-Protest.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125629 March 25, 1998

MANUEL C. SUNGA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND B. TRINIDAD, respondents.
 
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to annul and set aside, for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC
2nd Division in Sunga v. Trinidad, SPA No. 95-213 1 dismissing the petition for disqualification against private respondent
Ferdinand B. Trinidad pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 promulgated 3 November 1988, as amended by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2050-A promulgated 8 August 1990, and 30 July 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 17 May
1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division.
Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of
Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-
election in the same municipality.
On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint 2 for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of using
three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election
Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another letter-complaint 3 with the COMELEC charging Trinidad this time with
violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election
Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an Amended Petition 4
for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and providing more specific
details of the violations committed by Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.
In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, 5 the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the complaint to its Law Department for
investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted
not to submit any evidence at all.
Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while Sunga trailed second.
On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However, notwithstanding the motion,
Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation.
Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.
On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report 6 to the COMELEC En Banc recommending that Trinidad be
charged in court for violation of the following penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote
buying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of
any equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political subdivisions. The Law Department likewise
recommended to recall and revoke the proclamation of Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan;
proclaim Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected Mayor; and, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume the duties and functions of
the office.
The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing of the corresponding informations in
the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4) informations 7 for various elections offenses were filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the COMELEC 2nd
Division for hearing.
On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the Proclamation with Urgent Motion for
Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996 Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for
disqualification, holding in its Resolution No. 2050 that —
1. Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically
enumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission before an election in which
respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts
complained of have in fact been committed . . . .
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu propio, or on motion of any of
the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise
of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election
laws . . . .
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Sec. 6 of Republic Act
No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as a winner shall be dismissed as
a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of
this Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint
shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary
investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt
and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition
for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and said
court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
As interpreted in the case of Silvestre v. Duavit, SPA 94-003, Resolution No. 2050 provides for the outright dismissal of
the disqualification case in three cases: (1) The disqualification case was filed before the election but remains unresolved
until after the election; (2) The disqualification case was filed after the election and before the proclamation of winners;
and (3) The disqualification case was filed after election and after proclamation.
If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt by the COMELEC of the letter-complaint on April 26 1995, it
nevertheless remained pending until after the election. If it is deemed to have been filed upon filing of the amended
petition on 11 May 1995, it was clearly filed after the election. In either case, Resolution No. 2050 mandates the
dismissal of the disqualification case.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed the instant petition contending that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 of RA No.
6646 requires the COMELEC to resolve the disqualification case even after the election and proclamation, and the proclamation
and assumption of office by Trinidad did not deprive the COMELEC of its jurisdiction; second COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is
null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646; third, the fact that COMELEC authorized the filing of four (4) informations
against private respondent for violation of the penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code shows more than sufficient and
substantial evidence to disqualify Trinidad, and he should have been so disqualified; and fourth, since Trinidad was a disqualified
candidate, it is as if petitioner was the only candidate entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
In his 17-page Comment and Manifestation dated 3 December 1996, the Solicitor General concurred with petitioner's
arguments.
Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia that Sunga's letters-complaint of 22 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 were
not petitions for disqualification because no filing fee was paid by Sunga; the letters-complaint were never docketed by the
COMELEC; and, no summons was ever issued by the COMELEC and private respondent was not required to answer the letters-
complaint. It was only on 13 May 1995 when petitioner filed the so-called Amended Petition, docketed for the first time as SPA
No. 95-213. Thus, the COMELEC correctly dismissed the disqualification case for having been filed only after the 8 May 1995
elections and the proclamation of private respondent on 10 May 1995, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.
COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily on Resolution No. 2050 and the Silvestre v. Duavit 8 ruling in support
of the dismissal of the disqualification case. The COMELEC insisted that the outright dismissal of a disqualification case was
warranted under any of the following circumstances: (a) the disqualification case was filed before the election but was still
pending (unresolved) after the election; (b) the disqualification case was filed after the election but before the proclamation of
the winner; and, (c) the disqualification case was filed after the election and after the proclamation of the winner.
The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the disqualification case
against private respondent Trinidad.
The petition is partly meritorious.
We find private respondent's arguments on the propriety of the letters-complaint puerile. COMELEC itself impliedly recognized
in its Resolution that the petition was filed before the 8 May 1995 election in the form of letters-complaint, thus —
This case originally came to the attention of this Commission on 26 April 1995 in a form of letter from petitioner accusing
respondent of utilizing government properties in his campaign and praying for the latter's immediate disqualification.
Another letter dated 7 May 1995 and addressed to the COMELEC Regional Director of Region II reiterated petitioner's
prayer while alleging that respondent and his men committed acts of terrorism and violated the gun ban. Finally, on 11
May 1995, an Amended Petition was filed with the Clerk of Court of the Commission containing substantially the same
allegations as the previous letters but supported by affidavits and other documentary evidence.
That the Amended Petition was filed only on 11 May 1995, or after the elections, is of no consequence. It was merely a
reiteration of the charges filed by petitioner against private respondent on 26 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 or before the
elections. Consequently, the Amended Petition retroacted to such earlier dates. An amendment which merely supplements and
amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred
by the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint. 9
The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fatal procedural lapse on the part of petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42, of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides, "If the fees above described are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action
thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or proceeding." The use of the word "may" indicates that it is permissive
only and operates to confer a discretion on the COMELEC whether to entertain the petition or not in case of non-payment of
legal fees. That the COMELEC acted on and did not dismiss the petition outright shows that the non-payment of fees was not
considered by it as a legal obstacle to entertaining the same. Be that as it may, the procedural defects have been cured by the
subsequent payment of docket fees, and private respondent was served with summons, albeit belatedly, and he submitted his
answer to the complaint. Hence, private respondent has no cause to complain that no docket fee was paid, no summons served
upon him, or that he was not required to answer.
Neither do we agree with the conclusions of the COMELEC. We discern nothing in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaring,
ordering or directing the dismissal of a disqualification case filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the
election. What the Resolution mandates in such a case is for the Commission to refer the complaint to its Law Department for
investigation to determine whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed by the candidate sought to be
disqualified. The findings of the Law Department then become the basis for disqualifying the erring candidate. This is totally
different from the other two situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after the election
but before the proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and the proclamation of winners, wherein it was
specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as a disqualification case.
Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit infringes on Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, 10 which provides:
Sec. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong (emphasis supplied).
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its
conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word "shall" signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory,
operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. 11 The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but
to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the
disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646
imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid
for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative
agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions
into effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a
quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy
between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of election offenses would be
undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the
investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed
committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics
so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election. This
scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority
and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC 12 this Court held
—
Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass
and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no
bar to the exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since
private respondent's petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and
 proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to
COMELEC . . . Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that
proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected,
from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed
elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate
investigation.
It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect involves the
ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate. Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown
hearing and the quantum of proof required to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other
hand, is a determination of whether the offender should be disqualified from office. This is done through an administrative
proceeding which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect
that we are more concerned with, under which an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction. 13
It is quite puzzling that the COMELEC never acted on Sunga's motion to suspend the proclamation of Trinidad. The last sentence
of Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 categorically declares that the Commission may order the suspension of the proclamation of a
candidate sought to be disqualified whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. And there is not a scintilla of doubt that the
evidence of Trinidad's guilt was strong as shown in the Report and Recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department —
Parenthetically, there is merit to petitioner's petition against the respondent for disqualification for the alleged
commission of election offenses under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, such as use of armed men and act of
terrorism, intimidation and coercion of voters, massive vote-buying and others, duly supported by affidavits of witnesses
and other documents. Consequently, the petitioner's evidence supporting the disqualification of respondent remain
unrebutted simply because respondent has expressly waived his right to present evidence in SPA No. 95-213 in his
Manifestation and objection to the presentation of evidence in SPA No. 95-213 dated 16 June 1995, thus the waiver is
the intentional relinquishing of a known right of respondent TRINIDAD.
In fact, on the basis of this Report and Recommendation the COMELEC directed the filing of four (4) criminal informations against
Trinidad before the Regional Trial Court, an indication that there was indeed prima facie evidence of violation of election laws.
However, Sunga's contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Iguig, Province
of Cagayan, in the event that Trinidad is disqualified finds no support in law and jurisprudence. The fact that the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes is later disqualified for the office to which he was elected does not entitle the candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a
disqualified person may not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him there. But in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. 14
Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic electoral process as well as the sociological and psychological elements
behind voters' preferences. Election is the process of complete ascertainment of the expression of the popular will. Its ultimate
purpose is to give effect to the will of the electorate by giving them direct participation in choosing the men and women who will
run their government. Thus, it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of whom have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him. 15
While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of votes, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the people
of Iguig, Cagayan. "The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the
law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does
not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected." 16 In Aquino v. COMELEC, 17 this Court
made the following pronouncement:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our
judgment for the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the election. He was repudiated by either
a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which
excludes the disqualified candidate; the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard the express mandate of Sec. 44, RA No. 7160, 18 which provides in part —
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the Governor or Mayor, the Vice-Governor or Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the
Governor or Mayor . . .
For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office . . . .
This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room for interpretation but merely application. This is
the basic legal precept. Accordingly, in the event that Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy will be
created for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall
succeed as provided by law. 19
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17 May 1996 and 30 July 1996 Resolutions of the COMELEC are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC is ordered to REINSTATE SPA No. 95-213, "Manuel C. Sunga v. Ferdinand B. Trinidad," for
disqualification, and ACT on the case taking its bearings from the opinion herein expressed. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135691 September 27, 1999
EMMANUEL SINACA, petitioner,
vs.
MIGUEL MULA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
 
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order assailing the Resolution of 6 October 1998, of respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter
COMELEC) in SPA No. 98-292, declaring as invalid the substitution of mayoralty candidate Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. by herein
petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca. 1
The records disclose that in the 11 May 1998 elections, the two opposing factions of the ruling party LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD
(hereafter LAKAS) filled in separate candidates for the position of mayor of the Municipality of Malimano, Surigao del Norte. One
faction headed by Robert Z. Barbers (hereafter "BARBERS Wing") nominated Grachil G. Canoy (hereafter CANOY), while the
other group lead by Francisco T. MATUGAS (hereafter "MATUGAS Wing") endorsed the candidacy of Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr.
(hereafter TEODORO).
Miguel H. Mula (hereafter MULA), a candidate for vice-mayor and belonging to the "BARBERS Wing," filed before the COMELEC a
petition for disqualification against TEODORO which was docketed as SPA 98-021. On 8 May 1998, the Second Division of the
COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying TEODORO as candidate for mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte
and ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy because of prior conviction of bigamy, a crime involving moral
turpitude. 2
On 10 May 1998, TEODORO filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. On even date, herein petitioner
Emmanuel D. Sinaca, (hereafter EMMANUEL), an independent candidate, withdrew his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang
Bayan Member, joined and became a member of the LAKAS party and was nominated by the LAKAS "MATUGAS Wing" as the
substitute mayoralty candidate for the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte. On the basis of said nomination,
EMMANUEL filed his certificate of candidacy 3 attached thereto is his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate
signed by Governor Francisco T. MATUGAS (hereafter MATUGAS), as party provincial chairman together with EMMANUEL's
written acceptance of the party's nomination. 4
On 11 May 1998, MULA filed through mail another petition for disqualification, this time against EMMANUEL, which was
received by the COMELEC on 14 May 1998 and was docketed as SPA No. 98-292. In his petition MULA contended that
the nomination of EMMANUEL as substitute candidate is illegal on the following grounds:
a) The substitute, before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy as LAKAS
candidate, was an independent candidate. Being so, he cannot rightfully
substitute the disqualified one;
b) The nomination of respondent substitute bears only the approval of
Provincial Chairman Matugas and without consultation and consent of the
higher political hierarchy especially Mr. Robert Ace Barbers who has also a say
on nomination of candidates within his jurisdiction, as evidenced by an
authority hereto attached as Annex "E";
c) Substitution generally takes place when by reason of a candidate's
disqualification the party to which he belongs loses such representation. In the
instant case, the disqualification did not at all prejudice LAKAS NUCD-UMDP
because Mr. Garchil G. Canoy is still there representing the party after the
disqualification. The substitution is a redundancy and not necessary under the
circumstances, more so that it was done with malice and without the required
consensus of the political hierarchy. 5
In his answer, EMMANUEL moved for the dismissal of the petition for the following reasons:
a) The petition does not state a cause of action as it is not based on any of the
grounds for disqualification as provided under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Sec. 40(A) of the Local Government Code of 1991;
b) The issue of who in LAKAS has the authority to nominate candidates for local
officials, is an intra-party matter hence beyond the jurisdiction of the Comelec;
c) Gov. Matugas was duly authorized by LAKAS as its Provincial Chairman and
official candidate for Provincial Governor to nominate the party's local
candidates; and
d) The petition is already moot and academic because of the proclamation of
EMMANUEL as mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte. 6
On 28 May 1998, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for disqualification and upheld the candidacy for mayor of
EMMANUEL. 7 The pertinent part of the resolution reads:
It is therefore clear, that candidate for governor Matugas was clothed with the authority to nominate the
respondent as substitute candidate for the position of mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, vice the
disqualified candidate, Apropos thereto, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code states:
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that on May 10, 1998 the proper nomination was issued by the official of the party authorized
therefor, it stands to reason that the substitution was valid, respondent having accepted the nomination and his
certificate of candidacy dated May 10, 1998, correspondingly filed.
 Respondent is correct in stating that the question of nomination is a party concern which is beyond the ambit of
the Commission. What matters is, the candidate has been certified as a party member and the nomination duly
issued in his favor.1âwphi1.nêt
Be that as it may, the petition is rendered moot and academic by the proclamation of respondent on May 12,
1998, as evidenced by the certificate of canvass and proclamation of winning candidates for municipal offices
with SN 16671298 and his oath of office dated May 13, 1998, which forms part of the record of this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant petition
for lack of merit.
MULA filed a motion for reconsideration raising in the main that the signature alone of MATUGAS in the nomination was not
sufficient because the party's authority to nominate was given to both MATUGAS and Senator Robert S. Barbers (hereafter
BARBERS), in their joint capacity, and that the nomination of EMMANUEL is void since he was an independent candidate prior to
his nomination. 8
On 6 October 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution 9 which set aside the resolution dated 28 May 1998 of the Second
Division and disqualified EMMANUEL, for the following reasons:
In the motion for reconsideration, petitioner argues that the signature only of Governor Matugas in the
nomination was not sufficient because the party's authority to nominate was given to both Governor Matugas
and Senator Robert Barbers, in their joint capacity.
We do not have to resolve this issue because the more important issue is whether respondent is disqualified as
a substitute candidate. He was an independent candidate for councilor at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor as a substitute of a disqualified candidate. Thus, he did not belong to the same political
party as the substituted candidate.
We sustain petitioner's position. We declare that the substitution of disqualified mayoralty candidate Teodoro F.
Sinaca, Jr. by respondent Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because the latter was an independent candidate
for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a
Lakas party member.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Commission en banc hereby resolves to SET ASIDE the Commission (Second Division)'s
resolution dated May 28, 1998. We declare Emmanuel D. Sinaca DISQUALIFIED to be a substitute candidate for
mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, and ANNUL his proclamation as such being void ab initio. Upon finality of
this resolution, he is ordered to vacate the position of mayor of the municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte,
to which the vice-mayor elected in the May 11, 1998 elections shall succeed by operation of law.
Not satisfied therewith, EMMANUEL is now before us alleging that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed Resolution. EMMANUEL principally contends that his nomination as a substitute candidate was regular and valid
hence, his proclamation as mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte must be upheld.
In the assailed resolution, the COMELEC disqualified EMMANUEL solely on the basis that he was an independent candidate prior
to his nomination as a substitute candidate.
The rule on substitution of an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party who dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy is governed by Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
which provides:
If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of
the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and
mid-day of election day, said certificate maybe filed with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the
country, with the Commission.
Thus, under the said provision it is necessary, among others, that the substitute candidate must be of the same political party as
the original candidate and must be duly nominated as such by the political party.
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the above said requirements. EMMANUEL was properly nominated as
substitute candidate by the LAKAS party "MATUGAS wing" to which TEODORO, the disqualified candidate, belongs, as evidenced
by the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance signed by MATUGAS, the Party's provincial chairman. 10 That EMMANUEL is a
bona fide member of the LAKAS party is shown not only by the certificate of membership, 11 which is being controverted for
having been presented as new evidence for the first time before this court, but more importantly by his certificate of candidacy
filed before the COMELEC stating therein that he belongs to the LAKAS party. 12
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate's political creed or lack
of political creed. 13 It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for
the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to
any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated. 14
The certificate of candidacy of EMMANUEL permitted the placing of his name before the electorate. It constituted an authorized
badge, which the voter could scrutinize before casting his ballot. Thus, with the declaration of EMMANUEL in his certificate of
candidacy that he is affiliated with the LAKAS party, he was effectively voted by the electorate not as an independent candidate,
but as a member of the LAKAS party. His allegation in the certificate of candidacy as to political party to which he belongs is
sufficient to make the electorate conscious of the platform of the said political party. 15
The fact that EMMANUEL was an independent candidate prior to his nomination is immaterial. What is more significant is that
he had previously withdrawn his certificate of candidacy as independent candidate for Sangguniang member before he filed his
certificate of candidacy as a substitute for TEODORO at which time he was, for all intents and purposes, already deemed a
member of the LAKAS party "MATUGAS wing." As such, EMMANUEL is obliged to pursue and carry out the party's ideology,
political ideas and platforms of government. As the official candidate of an organized political party, he is bound by the party's
rule. He owes loyalty to the party, its tenet and its policies, its platforms and programs of government. To the electorate he
represents the party, its principles, ideals and objectives. 16
Even the fact that EMMANUEL only became a member of the LAKAS party after the disqualification of TEODORO, will not affect
the validity of the substitution. There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a
substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated
as such. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person belonging to
and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced. We cannot provide for an additional requirement or
condition not provided under the said provision without encroaching into the domain of the legislative department.
As aptly observed by Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores in her dissenting opinion, to wit:
. . . . With due respect to the majority opinion, I find that at the time the substitute candidate filed his certificate
of candidacy for mayor and at the time of his election as such, he was an independent candidate no more. He
was, at that time, a nominee of the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP Political Party. This fact is evidenced by the Certificate
of Nomination and Acceptance dated 10 May 1998 executed by the Provincial Chairman of the said party of
Surigao del Norte and by herein respondent. This certificate bonafide member of the said party. To rule that
respondent was still an independent candidate and not a member of the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP political party at
the time of filing his certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate for mayor is to arrogate upon this
Commission what would have been the sole and exclusive prerogative of any political organization — to
determine party membership and its nominees to elective positions. It is an accepted fact that, in this country,
politicians switch party affiliations more frequently than the ebb and flow of the tides. 17
The argument advanced by private respondent MULA that MATUGAS has no authority to nominate a candidate without the
concurrence of BARBERS is devoid or merit.
Firstly, MATUGAS, was designated by the LAKAS National Headquarters through its Deputy Secretary General and National
Secretariat Executive Director Reynaldo L. Maclang, as the party officer authorized to nominate, sign, attest under oath, and
issue Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance for the Party's official candidates for the positions of Board Members, City
Councilors, Municipal Mayors, Vice-mayors and councilors for the Province of Surigao del Norte. 18
This authorization which was dated March 26, 1998 replaced and/or modified the former authorization given by the party of
both BARBERS and MATUGAS. 19 Both BARBERS and MATUGAS were given separate and distinct authorizations when the mother
of BARBERS ran for governor against MATUGAS.
Secondly, there are only two official candidates for mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, namely TEODORO and CANOY, 20 both
of whom are members of the LAKAS party but from different factions. TEODORO was indorsed by the "MATUGAS wing" and
CANOY by the "BARBERS Wing." The certificates of candidacy of these candidates were never questioned despite the fact that
they belong to the same political party and were separately and independently endorsed by either BARBERS or MATUGAS.
Therefore, if the absence of a joint nomination is to be considered fatal to the validity of the certificate of candidacy of
TEODORO or CANOY, then there would in effect no candidates running for mayor in the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del
Norte.
Verily, it stands to reason that with the disqualification of TEODORO, who is a member of the LAKAS "MATUGAS wing," the
substitute must come from the same faction as the candidate to be substituted and since it was MATUGAS who indorsed the
nomination of TEODORO, then MATUGAS' nomination of EMMANUEL in substitution of TEODORO is sufficient and in order.
There is also no irregularity in the act of EMMANUEL in joining a political party. The right of individuals to form an association as
guaranteed by the fundamental law includes the freedom to associate or refrain from association. 21 No man is compelled by law
to become a member of a political party; or after having become such, to remain a member. He may join such a party for
whatever reason reasons seems good to him, and may quit the party for any cause, good, bad, or indifferent, or without cause. 22
The decision of a candidate on whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is
left entirely to his discretion. 23
We also agree with the contention of EMMANUEL that the decision as to which member a party shall nominate as its candidate
is a party concern which is not cognizable by the courts.
A political party has the right to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard bearer who best
represents the party's ideologies and preference. 24 Political parties are generally free to conduct their internal affairs free from
judicial supervision; this common-law principle of judicial restraint, rooted in the constitutionally protected right of free
association, serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. 25 Thus, the rule
is that the determination of disputes as to party nominations rests with the party, in the absence of statutes giving the court's
jurisdiction. 26
Quintessentially, where there is no controlling statute or clear legal right involved, the court will not assume jurisdiction to
determine factional controversies within a political party, but will leave the matter for determination by the proper tribunals of
the party itself or by the electors at the polls. 27 Similarly, in the absence of specific constitutional or legislative regulations
defining how nominations are to be made, or prohibiting nominations from being made in certain ways, political parties may
handle party affairs, including nominations, in such manner as party rules may establish. 28
An election in which the voters have fully, fairly, and honestly expressed their will is not invalid even though an improper
method is followed in the nomination of candidates. 29 This is because in determining the effect of a particular irregularity in a
party nomination for office on the result of the general election, the pivotal issue is whether the irregularity complained of has
prevented a full, fair, and free expression of the public will. Thus, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, an
election may not even be invalidated by the fact that the nomination of the successful candidate was brought about by fraud,
and not in the manner prescribed by the statute, provided it appears that noncompliance with the law did not prevent a fair and
free vote. 30
None of the situations adverted to above are obtaining in the case at bar as to warrant this Court's intervention in ascertaining
the propriety of EMMANUEL's nomination as a substitute candidate by the LAKAS "MATUGAS wing."
Finally, the issue as to the validity of EMMANUEL's nomination as substitute candidate has been rendered moot and academic
by his proclamation on May 12, 1998, by the Board of Canvassers of Malimono as the duly elected municipal mayor and after he
has assumed into office. The fact that the nomination of a substitute lacks the signature of one of the authorized signatory is but
a technicality which cannot be used to frustrate the will of the electorate.
It has been held that the provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the
same, as well as the information required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they
are regarded as merely directory. With respect to election laws, it is an established rule of interpretation that mandatory
provisions requiring certain steps before election will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of
the electorate. Thus, even if the certificate of candidacy was not duly signed or if it does not contain the required data, the
proclamation of the candidate as winner may not be nullified on such ground. The defects in the certificate should have been
questioned before the election; they may not be questioned after the election without invalidating the will of the electorate,
which should not be done. 30 In Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, 32 the Court held that the "will of the people cannot be
frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory
and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after
the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn
to his certificate of candidacy."
Thus, were a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all possible doubts should be
resolved in favor of the candidate's eligibility for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people. 33 Above and beyond all,
the determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must
prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred. 34
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of 6 October 1998 of the COMELEC en banc is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and another one rendered declaring EMMANUEL SINACA as having been duly elected mayor of the Municipality
of Malimono, Surigao del Norte. SO ORDERED.

EUGENIO "JING-JING" FAELNAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. RAMON CODILLA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 19, Cebu City, and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order, dated July 29, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cebu City,
denying petitioner’s motion to quash in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941 and 49942 and the order, dated October 4, 1999,
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows: Nexold
On April 8, 1997, petitioner Eugenio Faelnar filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Guadalupe, Cebu City in the May 12, 1997 barangay elections. The following day, on April 9, 1997, a basketball tournament,
dubbed the "2nd JING-JING FAELNAR’S CUP," opened at the Guadalupe Sports Complex and lasted up to April 30, 1997. This
gave rise to a complaint for electioneering filed against petitioner and Cecilio Gillamac by Antonio Luy. The complaint alleged
that the basketball tournament was actually a campaign gimmick staged outside the campaign period which officially started on
May 1, 1997, in violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Luy alleged that: (1) during the tournament, a streamer bearing
petitioner’s name was placed on the facade of the Guadalupe Sports Complex; (2) petitioner’s name was repeatedly mentioned
over the microphone during the games; (3) the tournament was widely published in the local newspaper; and (4) a raffle
sponsored by Cecilio Gillamac was held with home appliances given away as prizes.
Petitioner denied participation in the tournament and claimed that its major sponsor was Gillamac Marketing, Inc. He contended
that the same was purely a sporting event for the benefit of the youth. Manikx
The complaint was investigated by Atty. Edwin Cadungog, election officer of Cebu City, who later recommended the dismissal of
the charges against petitioner and Gillamac. On the other hand, the Law Department of the COMELEC recommended the filing of
a case against petitioner and Gillamac for violation of §80, 1 in relation to §262, of the Omnibus Election Code, and §50 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2888, in relation to §12 of Republic Act No. 6679.
In its Resolution No. 97-3040, dated September 16, 1997, the COMELEC en banc resolved to dismiss the case. However, on
motion of Antonio Luy, the COMELEC reconsidered its action and ordered the filing of the necessary Informations against
petitioner and Gillamac.
Accordingly, petitioner and Gillamac were formally charged in the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City under two Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941 and CBU-49942.
Petitioner moved to quash the information or, in the alternative, for reinvestigation of the case, contending that Resolution No.
97-3040, which dismissed the complaint against him, was immediately executory and could no longer be reconsidered. Misox
Petitioner’s motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated July 29, 1999. He moved for reconsideration, but his motion
was likewise denied by the court in its order, dated October 4, 1999. Hence this petition.
Petitioner reiterates his argument in the trial court that COMELEC Resolution No. 97-3040, which dismissed the complaint
against him, can no longer be reconsidered by the COMELEC. He contends that under the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC,
the dismissal of the complaint was immediately final and executory. Additionally, he avers that Antonio Luy’s Motion for
Reconsideration of Resolution No. 97-3040 is a prohibited pleading under the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. He avers that
since the resolution in question was immediately final and executory, it was no longer within the power of the COMELEC to

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reconsider. Consequently, Resolution No. 98-2914, in directing the filing of charges in court, was "ultra-vires," and the
Informations filed against him should have been quashed.
The petition is without merit.
First. While the instant petition challenges the trial court’s orders denying petitioner’s motion to quash the complaints in
Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941 and 49942, the grounds relied upon by petitioner are directed at the validity of Resolution No.
98-2914 of the COMELEC. Thus, petitioner prays that said resolution be declared null and void.
This petition is nothing but an attempt to circumvent a final resolution of the COMELEC.
Resolution No. 98-2914 was promulgated by the COMELEC en banc on October 29, 1998. Petitioner’s remedy was to seek its
annulment by way of a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Rule 64, §2 provides:
SEC. 2. Mode of Review. ¾ A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65,
except as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 3 of said Rule provides that such petition shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the resolution sought to be reviewed.
No such petition was ever filed. The present petition to set aside the orders of the trial court denying its motion to quash and
motion for reconsideration was filed only on November 12, 1999, more than a year after Resolution No. 98-2194 was
promulgated on October 29, 1998. Consequently, the resolution is now final and binding upon the parties. Maniks
Even if said resolution is erroneous for being contrary to the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, the same is
not void. Since it has become final and executory, it is already binding and effective.
Second. The above discussion should be enough to dispose of this petition. However, we think there is an important question of
law that must not be left undecided, i.e., is the resolution of the COMELEC dismissing the criminal complaint for violation of the
election laws immediately final and executory, as petitioner contends?
The contention is untenable. In support of his claims, petitioner cites Rule 13, §1(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC
which provides:
SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. - The following pleadings are not allowed:
....
(d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision; . . . .
The above quoted provision, however, is taken from the 1988 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which has already been amended.
The 1993 Rules of Procedure, now provides:
Rule 13. - Prohibited Pleadings.
SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. ¾ The following pleadings are not allowed:
....
(d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense
cases; . . . (Emphasis added).
Under the present rule, therefore, a motion for reconsideration of a ruling, resolution or decision of the COMELEC en banc is
allowed in cases involving election offenses.
Here, there is no question that what is involved is a resolution of the COMELEC en banc in an election offense. Hence, a motion
for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC.
Petitioner likewise invokes Rule 34, §10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that ¾ Manikanx
SEC. 10. Appeals from the Action of the State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal. ¾ Appeals from the resolution
of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers
may be made only to the Commission within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution of said officials,
provided, however that this shall not divest the Commission of its power to motu proprio review, revise, modify
or reverse the resolution of the chief state prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors. The decision of the
Commission on said appeals shall be immediately executory and final. (Emphasis added)
Even a cursory reading of the above rule, however, will show that it governs appeals from the action of the State Prosecutor or
Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers. The present case does not involve such an
appeal but a resolution of the COMELEC itself in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of
election offense cases. Such distinction can be easily explained.
In cases where the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal exercises the delegated power to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offense cases, after the investigating officer submits his recommendation, said officers already resolve
the issue of probable cause. From such resolution, appeal to the COMELEC lies. As the exercise by the Commission of its review
powers would, at this point, already constitute a second look on the issue of probable cause, the COMELEC’s ruling on the
appeal would be immediately final and executory. Oldmisox
On the other hand, if the preliminary investigation of a complaint for election offense is conducted by the COMELEC itself, its
investigating officer prepares a report upon which the Commission’s Law Department makes its recommendation to the
COMELEC en banc on whether there is probable cause to prosecute. It is thus the COMELEC en banc which determines the
existence of probable cause. Consequently, an appeal to the Commission is unavailing. Under the present Rules of Procedure of
the COMELEC, however, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed. This effectively allows for a review of the
original resolution, in the same manner that the COMELEC, on appeal or motu proprio, may review the resolution of the State
Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal.
Reliance by petitioner upon Rule 34, §10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is thus without any basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.