Balacuit v CFI G.R. No.

L-38429 June 30, 1988

J. Gancayo

Facts:
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the
Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½ of the
ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6
month imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from
being enforced.  The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is
ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is
not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of
Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for
theaters and not admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general
welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.

Issue:
Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission
to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under
the general welfare clause as invoked by the City?

Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio:
1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to
control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of
exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police
regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised.
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other
places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of
delegated police power by the local government.
People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs from
selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid
exercise of police power.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in
question under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as
delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public
generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere
with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.
In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution
for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of
the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a
contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.
Homeowners Association- the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification,
limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the
prescriptions of the fundamental law
The court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the
public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who
have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would
for themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the
parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The
ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes
them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty
in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the
ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to
avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this
undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth
certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however,
not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly
oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between
the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by
movie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price of
admission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults.
Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be
discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's
pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves.
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the
proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable
consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the
performance on condition that he behaves properly.  Such ticket, therefore, represents a right,
Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale.
This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily,
a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary
in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom
he pleases and at such price as he can obtain.
In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as
a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not
mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain
degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the
communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions
by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural
traits are considerable.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be
within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its
provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or
calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation,
be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.
A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should
not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34
The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent
attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause.
Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance,
such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears
on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BATASANG PAMBANSA; MAY PRESCRIBE CRIMINAL

PUNISHMENT FOR ACTS INIMICAL TO PUBLIC WELFARE; MALUM PROHIBITUM.
— It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-
payment of a debt excontractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body
to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are
not the only facts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as
inherently wrong, hence not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the
community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do
this in the exercise of its police power.

The question now arises: Is BP 22 a valid law?

Previous efforts to deal with the problem of bouncing checks within the ambit of the law on
estafa did not evoke any constitutional challenge. In contrast, BP 22 was challenged promptly.

Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional
provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes
the equal protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and (5) its
enactment is flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional
provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading.

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment
of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor
to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment
of a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to
proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not
the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently
wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can
be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise
of its police power.

The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable
of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. 24 It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the
state, plenary, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in
organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good
order and welfare."25cralaw:red

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the
making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions.

DEL ROSARIO VS BENGZON

Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two newspapers
of general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days after its
publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order 62
was amended by Administrative Order 76 dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January
1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections
6 and 12 of the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the
Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines,
on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit
requesting the Court to declare some provisions (specifically penal) of the Generics Act of 1988
and the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant thereto as unconstitutional,
hence, null and void. The petition was captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over which
the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, the
Court decided to treat it as a petition for prohibition instead.
Issue: Whether the prohibition against the use by doctors of “no substitution” and/or words of
similar import in their prescription in the Generics Act is a lawful regulation.
Held: Yes. There is no constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act; rather, it implements the
constitutional mandate for the State “to protect and promote the right to health of the people” and
“to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable
cost” (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The prohibition against
the use by doctors of “no substitution” and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is a
valid regulation to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to
choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write
both the generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a
brand-name drug with “no substitution,” the patient’s option to buy a lower-priced, but equally
effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the
impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still developing country like ours,
not the affluent and generally healthy minority
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
J. Fernando

Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar
Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the
city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due
to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of
the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of
due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class
motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;  there was also the requirement that the guests
would fill up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of
due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and
laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that
violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Held: No. Judgment reversed.

Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character,
the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case,
the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption
of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be
unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
 Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry
into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet
the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and
the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing
amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this
class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount,"
here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police
power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It
was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole
case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected
with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting,
but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments,
and the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the generalities about not supplying
criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."

Homeowners’ Association of the Phils., Inc. vs. The Municipal Board of Manila, et al. and Villegas
By: John Willie Alferos
G.R. No. L-23979          
August 30, 1968
FACTS
The Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Municipal Ordinance No.
4841 on December 31, 1963, to take effect on January 1, 1964, declaring a state of
emergency in view of the prevailing scarcity of lands and buildings for residential purposes
in the City of Manila which shall provide housing accommodations especially for the poor
at reasonable rates. An action was brought by the Homeowners’ Association of the
Philippines, Inc. and its President, Vicente A. Rufino against the Mayor and the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila to nullify the aforementioned Municipal Ordinance.
ISSUE
Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 is constitutional?
HELD
The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring said ordinance “ultra
vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio upon the ground that the power to “declare
a state of emergency … exclusively pertains to Congress”; that “there is no longer any state
of emergency” which may justify the regulation of house rentals; that said ordinance
disconstitutes an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of private properties and
arbitrarily encroaches on the constitutional rights of property owners”; that the power of the
City of Manila to “regulate the business of … letting or subletting of lands and buildings”
does not include the authority to prohibit what is forbidden in said ordinance; and that the
same cannot be deemed sanctioned by the general welfare clause in the City Charter.

G.R. No. L-42571-72 – 123 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title
– Police Power Not Validly Exercise

Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord.
No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz
averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said
ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy
and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier
issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant
to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND
COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of
police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were
deprived of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a
lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs
employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as
well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping
exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The
objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure
that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue
should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

Velasco vs villegas
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief
challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the
contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their
means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall
be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging
customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or
rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the
barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person."[1] As noted in the
appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this
ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition
for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case
involving such issue having been filed.[2]
Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in
the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its
enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business
of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely
different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to
forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for
massage of customers."[3] This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the
general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria,[4] a 1918 decision, this Court through
Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which "delegates in
statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given
wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of
the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to recall, is the progressive view
of Philippine jurisprudence."[5] As it was then, so it has continued to be.[6] There is no showing,
therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance.
Magtajas vs Pryce

FACTS:

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games
of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a
building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and
prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.

Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City of
Cagayan de Oro denounced such project.

In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two (2)
ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing business permit
to establishment for the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an ordinance
prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation. (ORDINANCE NO.
3375-93).

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner.

Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal
governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only
delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers
higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot be
amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.
As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the morality
of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It
is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the
legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit
some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus,
it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting, and horse-racing. In
making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority
to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the
judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these
branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will
ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

Tano vs Socrates
FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1,
1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government
of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling,
and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in
and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare
the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances
deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII
of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal
fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to
subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine
wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of
marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to
the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development
and utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery
laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the
enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.
In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers
granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity
of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

CITY OF MANILA V Judge Laguio

Facts: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It
built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly
accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as
tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the
establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day
clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given
three months to wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or
convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided
that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar
as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power
and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

Ratio: SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of
police power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights,
but (2)the means employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community. The closing down and transfer of
businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable
relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will
not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself
eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in
Manila.
Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable
and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its
property. The ordinance forbids running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate
area and instructs owners/operators to wind up their business operations or to transfer
outside the area or convert said business into allowed business. An ordinance which
permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are
two types of taking: A “possessory” taking and a “regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this
case.

Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as
to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation
provided the classification is reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to
all members of the class. In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinction between motels,
inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the
public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting
the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in
contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it
likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the
residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments.

Ruling: Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.

Mirasol v DPWH
FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the court a petition for declaratory judgment with application for
temporary restraining order and injunction. It seeks the declaration of nullification of
administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000
(Limited Access Highway Act) which was enacted in 1957.
Previously, pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Dept. Order
no. 215 declaring the Manila Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities.

Petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances.

The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent the
enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along NLEX, SLEX, Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road)
toll Expressway under DO 215.

RTC, after due hearing, granted the petitioner’s application for preliminary injunction
conditioned upon petitioner’s filing of cash bond in the amount of P100, 000 which petitioners
complied.

DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic
centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).  

Upon assumption of Hon. Presiding Judge Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were
required to file their Memoranda.

The court issued an order dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

RTC ruled that DO 74 is valid but DO 123 is invalid being violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution

ISSUE:

Whether RTC’s decision is barred by res judicata?

Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulation contravene RA 2000.
Whether AO 1 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

1. NO. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the RTC’s Order granting their prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. Since petitioners did not appeal from that order, the
petitioners presumed that the order became a final judgment on the issues.

The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication on the merits of the case that would trigger
res judicata.

A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of the issues, it being a
provisional remedy.
2. YES. The petitioners claimed that DO 74, DO 215 and TRB’s rules and regulation issued
under them unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in sec. 4 of RA 2000 to regulate toll ways.
They contend that DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like redesigning curbings or
central dividing sections.  

They claim that DPWH is only allowed to redesign the physical structure of toll ways and not to
determine “who or what can be qualifies as toll ways user”.

The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare
certain expressways as limited access facilities.

Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities.

Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the  Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB) cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing
limited access facilities.

The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place.
3. NO. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then Department of Public Works and
Communications had issued AO 1 in February 1968, as authorized under Section 3 of Republic
Act 2000, prior to the splitting of the department and the eventual devolution of its powers to the
DOTC.

Because administrative issuances had the force and effect of law, AO 1 enjoyed the presumption
of validity and constitutionality. The burden to prove its unconstitutionality rested on the party
assailing it, more so when police power was at issue and passed the test of reasonableness. The
Administrative Order was not oppressive, as it did not impose unreasonable restrictions or
deprive petitioners of their right to use the facilities. It merely set rules to ensure public safety
and the uninhibited flow of traffic within those limited-access facilities.

The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a tollway.
Petitioners were free to access the tollway as much as the rest of the public. However, the mode
in which they wished to travel, pertaining to their manner of using the tollway, was a subject that
could validly be limited by regulation. There was no absolute right to drive; on the contrary, this
privilege was heavily regulated.

ANGLO-FIL TRADING CORPORATION VS. LAZARO, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011
GR # L-54958 September 2, 1983 (Constitutional Law – Police Power, Stevedoring)
FACTS: Respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) implemented a policy of integrating
contractors engaged in stevedoring services and have only one stevedoring contractor to engage
in cargo-handling services in Manila South Harbor to insure efficiency and economy in cargo-
handling operation and provide better service to port users and to amply protect the interest of
labor and the government as well. The evaluation of performance of existing contractors made
by a special committee created by PPA resulted to an award in favor of Ocean Terminal
Services, Inc. (OTSI).

Petitioners with hold-over permits, contends that the award is invalid because contracts entered
into with local and foreign clients or customers would be impaired.

ISSUE: Whether or not PPA have the power and authority to award an exclusive stevedoring
contract in favor of respondent OTSI.

HELD: Yes. Manila South Harbor is a public property owned by the State, wherein operations of
the port including stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public good
and interest of the general welfare. In addition, the contract clause cannot override the police
power enacting public regulations intended for the general welfare.

Petition Denied.

PPA vs Cipres Stevedoring

Facts: Cargo handling operations in Dumaguete City were granted to respondent Cipres
Stevedoring since 1976. On 1990, petitioner Philippine Ports Authority issued Administrative
Order 03-90 outlining the guidelines and procedures in the selection and award of cargo handling
contracts in all government ports as well as cargo handling services. Respondent was able to
continue with its business by virtue of hold-over permit granted by PPA. While the second hold-
over permit was in effect, PPA issued AO 03-2000 expressly provides that all contract for cargo
handling services of more than three years shall be awarded through public bidding. Cipres filed
for TRO contending that substantial number of workers in the port of Dumaguete City faced the
risk of displacement. Moreover, the possibility existed that the contract for cargo handling in
Dumaguete City would be awarded to an incompetent and inexperienced participant in the
bidding process unlike respondent which had already invested substantial capital in its operations
in the port of said city. RTC decided in favour of Cipres. PPA filed petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not AO 03-2000 is constitutional?
Decision: Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside. Stevedoring services are imbued
with public interest and subject to the state’s police power. The Manila South Harbor is public
property owned by the State. The operations of this premiere port of the country, including
stevedoring work, are affected with public interest. Stevedoring services are subject to regulation
and control for the public good and in the interest of general welfare.
PPA is empowered, after consultation with relevant government agencies, to make port
regulations particularly to make rules or regulation for the planning, development, construction,
maintenance, control, supervision and management of any port or port district in the country.51
With this mandate, the decision to bid out the cargo holding services in the ports around the
country is properly within the province and discretion of petitioner which we cannot simply set
aside absent grave abuse of discretion on its part.

Chavez v Romulo
Facts: GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the
issuance pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines
banning carrying firearms outside of residence. Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to
reconsider the implementation. The request was denied. Hence the petition for prohibition and
injunction against Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.
Issue: Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or not
the banning of carrying firearms outside the residence is a valid exercise of police power?
Decision: Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may
be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be
exercised under existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as
the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it
might be revoked. Revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or
privilege.
The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed Guidelines
do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of
firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their
residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of
firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.

Agustin v Edu
FACTS:
Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an
early warning device to be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the
constitutional guarantee of due process and transgresses the fundamental principle of non-
delegation of legislative power.
Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the
implementing rules and regulations of the said instruction.
Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already
properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft,
which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in
Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"
Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral
because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P
56.00 to P72.00 per set." are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists
who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to
the specified set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."
This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and highways,
including expressways or limited access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or
parked motor vehicles without appropriate early warning devices. The hazards posed by these
disabled vehicles are recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety. The
Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
United Nations Organizations and the said Vienna Convention was ratified by the Philippine
Government under PD 207.
ISSUE:
WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due process.
HELD:
NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no
unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police
power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was
clearly intended to promote public safety.
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: “The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the nation.” 
Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a
commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act
of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 .
The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreoever, at
war with the principle of international morality.
Petition dismissed.