G.R. No.

131501             July 14, 2004

FRANCISCO ZARATE, petitioner,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PRECIOSA T. DAVILA, REGALADO TORIAGA, PATRIA TORIAGA, RENATO
TORIAGA, ROSALINDA TORIAGA, RYL TORIAGA, PROBO TORIAGA, JOSE CORPUS, MARCELINITO HONORIO,
JOSE MELO, LOLITO TALAGA, FELIPE VILLANUEVA, DOMINADOR TAGBALAY, MAXIMO VILLANUEVA, and
the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 28241 affirming the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 3, in Land Registration Case No. 273.

The Antecedents

As gleaned from the decision of the Court of Appeals, the factual backdrop and antecedental proceedings are as follows:

This is an application for registration of title filed by appellant Francisco Zarate on 27 December 1976 to have his three
parcels of land brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act. The subject parcels of land contain a land area of
68.2787 hectares and 10.5135 hectares, located at Dumatiad, Tangalan, Aklan, and of 3.8500 hectares, located at Afga,
Tangalan, Aklan. The said parcels have been subdivided into six (6) lots.

Appellant claims that the first two parcels of land which formed only one parcel of land consisting of about 78.7922 hectares
originally belonged to the spouses Solomon Tirol and Venancia Hontiveros. When they died in 1905 and 1913, respectively,
the said parcels of land were inherited by their children Gregorio, Ignacio, Lamberto, Eleanor and Carmen, all surnamed
Tirol.

On 26 May 1923, they donated said parcel to Josefino Tirol, son of Gregorio, and Angeles Arcenas in consideration of their
marriage (Exhs. (sic) "Z"). Said land was later subdivided into two, one with an area of 68.2787 hectares and the other
10.5135 hectares which was later sold to herein appellant on 7 January 1976 (Exh. "HH"). The third parcel (with an area of
3.8500 hectares) was inherited by Gregorio Tirol, father of Josefino, from his ancestors. When Gregorio died, Josefino
inherited the same. He later sold the said land to herein appellant on 11 March 1976.

Applicant claims that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in peaceful possession and usufruct of the property for
over eighty (80) years, religiously paying the taxes thereon. Nobody disturbed their possession and usufruct for more than
fifty (50) years, until oppositors Maximo Villanueva, Jose Corpuz, Dominador Tagbalay, Marcelinito Honorio, Lolito Talaga,
Felipe Villanueva and Jose Molo, entered and occupied portions of the land sometime in 1970.

Oppositors Preciosa Tirol Davila, on the other hand, contends that Lot 1, Plan Psu-06-000253 with an area of 530,310 sq.
meters situated in Tangalan, Aklan, owned by her, was previously the property of Ignacio Tirol, her father. When Ignacio
died, the said lot was entrusted to Josefino Tirol, who was his lawyer and first cousin. She did not have any tax declarations
because Josefino assured her that he would be responsible for them. Preciosa denied that the said property was donated by his
father to Josefino and that the signature appearing on the deed of donation was forged.

Oppositor Development Bank of the Philippines gave another version. It claims that the questioned lots are owned by spouses
Valeriano Molo and Lutgarda Molo. The said parcel which consists of about 190,922 square meters located at Afga,
Tangalan, Aklan, was mortgaged to the bank. When the couple failed to pay their indebtedness, the mortgage was foreclosed
and the land became the property of the bank in whose name the land is now declared for taxation purposes.

Oppositors Regalado, Patria, Renato, Rosalinda, Ryl and Probo, all surnamed Toriaga, likewise, contend that the land
claimed by them which is about 4 hectares in area and situated in Afga, Tangalan, Aklan, originally belonged to Eulalio
Tanasa, who possessed it before 1949. When he died, the land was inherited by his daughter Prima who was married to
Probio (sic) Toriaga. Prima continuously resided on the land until her death in 1977. The land passed to her son, Regalado
Toriaga, Sr., husband of oppositor Patria and father of the other oppositors. The said land is declared in the name of the
Toriagas.
 All the oppositors claim that the land applied for by appellant was unoccupied and covered with wild trees and cogon. They
cleared the land, built their houses and planted mangoes, casoy, jackfruit, bananas, camote, and cassava. Neither Josefino
Tirol nor Francisco Zarate possessed the land nor enjoyed the products thereof.

Oppositor Republic of the Philippines, for its part, claims that the subject land was timberland or unclassified forest. In 1970,
at the time of oppositors’ occupation, the lands were covered with wild trees and thickets and was (sic) released as alienable
and disposable under Land Classification Map No. 2779, Project 10-A only on 16 April 1973.

Since there were many claimants, the trial court commissioned a geodetic engineer to determine the different portions
claimed by the applicant and the oppositors. The commissioner’s report shows the following claims:

Regalado Toriaga, et al. - 4.1444 hec.

Maximo Villanueva - 4.3572 "

Jose Molo - 3.7575"

Jose Corpuz - 6.3555"

Marcelino (sic) Honorio - 7.5123"

Dominador Tagbalay - 2.6496"

(pp. 1,310-1,313, Vol. IV, Record)

Oppositor DBP also claimed an area of 19.092 hectares while Preciosa Davila is also claiming an area of 53.0310 hectares of Lot 1.

After the contending parties presented their evidence, the trial court on 26 April 1990 rendered judgment dismissing the application of
title filed by applicant Francisco Zarate, and the claims of private oppositors.

Not satisfied with the aforesaid decision, applicant filed this appeal assigning the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ADVERSE CLAIMS OF OWNERSHIP OF THE LANDS
IN QUESTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALL THE OTHER OPPOSITORS ARE
FALSE AND FRAUDULENT WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT AND LAW.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE APPLICANT-APPELLANT, INCLUDING THE
POSSESSIONS AND USUFRUCTS OF HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST, HAS BEEN IN POSSESSION AND
USUFRUCT OF THE LANDS SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS PROCEEDING FOR OVER 80 YEARS AND FROM TIME
IMMEMORIAL AND HE, THEREFORE, ACQUIRED VESTED RIGHTS THEREON.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPROVING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE TO LAND
WHICH THE APPLICANT BROUGHT (sic) TO HAVE HIS THREE PARCELS OF LAND BROUGHT UNDER THE
OPERATION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION ACT AND TO HAVE THE TITLES THERETO IN THE EXCLUSIVE
NAME OF THE APPLICANT REGISTERED AND CONFIRMED.3

On February 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court.

The applicant-appellant, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review contending that:

I
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF GEODETIC
ENGINEER RONDARIO AND RESPONDENT (OPPOSITOR) MAXIMO VILLANUEVA AND NOT TO THAT OF THE
PETITIONER (APPLICANT) AND HIS WITNESSES, RELATIVE TO THE TRUE CLASSIFICATION OF THE
SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND.

II

THE CLAIMS OF THE RESPONDENTS (OPPOSITORS) ARE RIDDLED WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND
IMPROBABILITIES, WHICH INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES ONLY STRENGTHEN PETITIONER’S
(APPLICANT’S) CLAIMS.

III

A STRICT APPLICATION OF THE RULE REGARDING THE RELEASE OF PUBLIC LANDS AS EMBODIED IN THE
CASE OF VALLARTA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 151 SCRA 679 (1987), WOULD WORK SERIOUS
AND IRREPARABLE INJUSTICE TO THE PETITIONER APPLICANT).4

The petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence and probative weight to the testimony of Geodetic Engineer
Jose Rondario and his Certification that the subject property was within the alienable and disposable area of Tangalan, Aklan, certified
and released as such under Land Classification Map No. 2779, Project 10-A on April 16, 1973. He asserts that the appellate court
should have considered his testimonial and documentary evidence, that the property subject of his application hardly comes close to
being a forest or timberland, and that there were hardly any big trees on the property. The petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest
even planted bananas, cassava, coconut trees, and camotes on the property.

The petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,5 should not be applied so as to
prejudice his vested rights over the subject property. The petitioner asserts that for a period of eighty years before 1973, he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in public, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession of the property. He cites the ruling of this
Court in Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands to fortify his plea.6

On the other hand, the trial court declared that:

To find out the real nature of the lands, the Court examined the testimony of the witnesses –

Witness Jose Rondario, for the oppositor Development Bank of the Philippines, and surveyor of the lands of the applicant,
testified as follows:

ATTY. TEJADA:

Q You stated that you have gone over the property that you have surveyed for Valeriano Molo, can you tell the court what
[were the] improvements, if there are (sic) any, during the survey in 1974?

A When I execute[d] my survey, I found out that there is no(t) any (sic) plant only kaingin.

xxx

Q When you conducted the survey for Valeriano Molo in 1974, were you approached by any person?

A There is (sic) nobody questioning me during my survey because actually there was a (were) people making kaingin there –
I think that (sic) was the tenant of Valeriano Molo." (Tsn, Melgar, November 5, 1987, pp. 7 and 13).

Witness Maximo Villanueva (one of the oppositors) declared:

ATTY. TAPLAC:

Q When you first occupied this land in question, what was the condition of the land?

A Filled with thickets and second group forest.

 Q How big are (sic) the trees found when you first occupied this land?

A Some were big trees because we used to get (sic) our materials in building our house.

Q Were there signs of occupation when you first entered the land?

A There was no sign that there was a previous occupation (sic)."

xxx

COURT:

Q What kind of trees were existing on the land when you occupied it?

A Wild trees not planted by people.

Q There were no coconut trees existing at the time you occupied the land?

A No, Your Honor." (TSN, Peniano, January 31, 1990, pp. 9-10 and 17).

Witness Agustin Bautista, an employee of the Forest Management Sector of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office, Kalibo, Aklan, testifying for the oppositor Director of Lands, averred:

ATTY. TORRE:

Q In this land classification map 10-A, which is described as alienable and disposable, would you mind informing this Court
as to what is the status of this Project No. 10-A previously classified as alienable and disposable?

A That is timberland. Previously, it is not being classified alienable and disposable.

xxx

Q But previous to April 16, 1973, what is (sic) the status of the land then?

A It is (sic) timberland. It is (sic) not classified as alienable and disposable." (Tsn, Gonzales, February 1, 1990, pp. 3 and 5).

Evidently, the three parcels of land in question were forest lands. The applicant’s predecessor-in-interest, Josefino Tirol, and the
private oppositors, who claimed possession over the area did not and could not have acquired ownership over the said lands
considering that the area was then inalienable and non-disposable.

In the present case, the lands applied for title were released as alienable and disposable only on April 16, 1973 (Exhs. "5-RP" and "6-
RP") as per Project No. 10-A, Land Classification Map No. 2779. The application for registration was filed on December 27, 1976.
Since the applicant, and likewise, the private oppositors, possessed the land from the time of release on April 16, 1973, for only three
(3) years and eight (8) months prior to the filing of the application, the thirty (30) year possession required by law was not complied
with.7

Moreover, to warrant registration, proof of possession must be "conclusive" (Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120
SCRA 734), or "well-nigh incontrovertible" (Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146). The applicant was not able to prove such
possession. The bulk of the evidence submitted revealed numerous occupants on the lands. The survey plan submitted by Reynaldo
Lopez, a geodetic engineer commissioned by the Court to determine the different portions claimed by the applicant and the oppositors
(Records, p. 1,314), showed that of the three parcels of land with a total area of eighty one (81) hectares, the private oppositors claim
the following:
 Regalado Toriaga, et al. - 4.1554 hectares
(Lot A);

Maximo Villanueva - 4.3572 hectares

(Lot B);

Jose Molo - 3.7575 hectares

(Lot C);

Jose Corpus - 6.3556 hectares

(Lot D);

Marcelinito Honorio - 7.5123 hectares

(Lot E); and

Dominador Tagbalay - 2.6496 hectares

(Lot F).

The evidence likewise showed that Valeriano Molo, now substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines, claims 19.092
hectares, and oppositor Preciosa Tirol Davila, 53.0310 hectares. The aforementioned oppositors claim that they are in actual, physical
possession of their respective portions. It is admitted by the applicant in his amended application and in his evidence presented during
the trial that oppositors Maximo Villanueva, Jose Corpus, Marcelinito Honorio, Joselito Honorio, Dominador Tagbalay, Jose Molo,
Valeriano Molo (now substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines), and the heirs of Regalado Toriaga, Sr., occupy
portions of the land through "illegal entry, unauthorized squatting or usurpation." More than one-half (1/2) of the total area applied for
registration not being in the possession of the applicant, he cannot, thus, claim exclusive and notorious possession under claim of
ownership, nor can he support his claim of title through acquisitive prescription.

The Court, therefore, holds that the applicant, as well as the private oppositors, failed to prove by sufficient evidence that they have
complied with the requisites provided by law to warrant registration of title to the three (3) parcels of land.8

The Court of Appeals concurred in toto with the findings of the trial court and cited the ruling of this Court in Vallarta vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court9 in ruling against the appellants.

We find the petition to be barren of merit.

The decisive issue for resolution is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the appealed decision dismissing the
petitioner’s application, on the ground that he failed to prove ownership of the three parcels of land subject of his application under
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.

The question raised by the petitioner, whether the parcels of land subject of his application are forest lands, and whether the petitioner,
by himself, and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding his application in 1976, are questions of fact which the trial court and
the Court of Appeals resolved in the negative. Such factual findings are generally conclusive in this Court and will not be reviewed on
appeal.10 This Court is not a trier of facts in a case appealed to it under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended. There are, to be
sure, exceptions to this rule. However, we have carefully reviewed the records and find no justification to deviate from the findings of
the trial and appellate courts that the subject property was, before April 16, 1973, forest land, and that the petitioner failed to prove his
claim of title over the parcels of land subject of his application under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and
the legal conclusions based on their findings.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.11 Consequently, the burden of proof to overcome
the presumption of ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. 12 Unless public land is shown to
have been reclassified and alienated by the State to a private person, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.13

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
 the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

The petitioner was burdened to prove, by positive and incontrovertible evidence, two legal requirements: (1) the land applied for was
alienable and disposable; and, (2) the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely for thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of his application on December 26,
1976. One claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with the legal requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, which prescribes the substantive as well as procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands.14 When the conditions
set forth by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of the law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.15

Under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, the classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department.16 In Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held that
the rule on the confirmation of imperfect title does not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The applicant must
secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for by the applicants are alienable and disposable.18

The petitioner failed to discharge his burden.

First. The petitioner failed to adduce in evidence any certification from the Bureau of Lands or the Bureau of Forestry to the effect that
the property is alienable or disposable. On the other hand, the respondents adduced evidence that the property applied for by the
petitioner was classified by the Director of Forestry as disposable and alienable only under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1295
issued on April 16, 1973, and Land Classification No. 2779 and Project No. 10-A. This is gleaned from the Certification of the
Director of Forestry, viz:

I hereby certify that this is the correct map of the areas demarcated as timberlands pursuant to Section 1816 of the Revised
Administrative Code and those set aside as Alienable or Disposable under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1295 dated
April 16, 1973. These areas were surveyed and the field notes plotted in accordance with the standard procedure and mapping
instruction of the Bureau of Forestry. Therefore, this map is hereby approved. The original reports, field notes and
computations in connection herewith are on file in this Office.

Manila, Philippines. April 16, 1973.

NOTE:

FAO No. 4-1295

Approved on (Sgd.) JOSE VIADO

June 19, 1973. Actg. Director of Forestry19

Geodetic Engr. Jose R. Rondario, who was commissioned by the petitioner to prepare the survey plan for the subject parcels of land
certified, thus:

I hereby certify that this area surveyed is within the alienable and disposable area of Tangalan, Aklan, certified and released
as such on April 16, 1973 per L.C. No. 2779 and Project No. 10-A.

I further certify that this Lot surveyed is outside civil and military reservation.

(Sgd.) JOSE R. RONDARIO

 Geodetic Engineer20

The petitioner cannot denigrate the verisimilitude of the contents of the Certification of Engr. Rondario because the same was offered
as his evidence and is based on the records of the Bureau of Forestry.

Since the property was reclassified as alienable and disposable only on April 16, 1973 and the petitioner filed his application only on
December 27, 1976, or only less than four years after the said reclassification. He irrefragably failed to prove his possession of the
property for the requisite thirty (30)-year period. The possession of the land by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, even
assuming that his predecessors had been in possession of the property prior to the reclassification thereof as alienable or disposable,
cannot be credited as part of the thirty (30)-year period required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended.21 Indeed, in Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals,22 we held that:

Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this score, we
agree with the respondents that the petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or
disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable or
disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that [the] petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the
same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet
alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of
title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain…

Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same
could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet
classified as disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until
released therefrom and open to disposition. Indeed, it has been held that the rules on [the] confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.23

The ruling of the Court in Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Island 24 has no application in this case because in that case, the
Court ruled that the property was "indisputably" agricultural land. The petitioner’s bare claims, even if true, that no big trees could be
found in the property and that he and his predecessors planted bananas, camotes and other fruit trees on portions of the property, do
not divest the property of its classification as forest land. A similar issue was raised in Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of
Forestry,25 where we held that:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.

This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184 [sic]) that possession of forest lands,
no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition
on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone
and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.

The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant petition.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not
divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. …26

We reject the claim of the petitioner that he had acquired vested rights over the property, on his assertion that he and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the property for decades before he filed his application in the trial court. It is a rule of law that
possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 27 Such lands are not capable of private appropriation,
and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership.28
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 28241 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring and Dissenting)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur with the draft ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in its well-crafted handling of the procedural or preliminary
issues. In particular, I agree that petitioners have shown an actual case or controversy involving at least two constitutional questions of
transcendental importance,1 which deserve judicious disposition on the merits directly by the highest court of the land.2 Further, I am
satisfied that the various aspects of this controversy have been fully presented and impressively argued by the parties. Moreover,
prohibition and mandamus are proper legal remedies 3 to address the problems raised by petitioners. In any event, this Court has given
due course to the Petition, heard oral arguments and required the submission of memoranda. Indeed, it would then be a galling copout
for us to dismiss it on mere technical or procedural grounds.

Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Must Be Within the Constitutional Framework

With due respect, however, I dissent from the ponencia’s resolution of the two main substantive issues, which constitute the core of
this case. Specifically, I submit that Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) of
1997, violates and contravenes the Constitution of the Philippines insofar as -

1. It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain, waters, x x x and other natural
resources" which, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, "are owned by the State" and "shall not be alienated." I
respectfully reject the contention that "ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not public lands and have never been owned
by the State." Such sweeping statement places substantial portions of Philippine territory outside the scope of the Philippine
Constitution and beyond the collective reach of the Filipino people. As will be discussed later, these real properties
constitute a third of the entire Philippine territory; and the resources, 80 percent of the nation's natural wealth.

2. It defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources," which the Constitution expressly requires to "be under the full control and supervision of the State."

True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural communities’ right to their ancestral lands, but such
mandate is "subject to the provisions of this Constitution."4 I concede that indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights to the beneficial use of public domains, as well as priority in the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law.

Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less in life, Congress in its wisdom may grant
preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the Constitution must be
respected. I personally believe in according every benefit to the poor, the oppressed and the disadvantaged, in order to empower them
to equally enjoy the blessings of nationhood. I cannot, however, agree to legitimize perpetual inequality of access to the nation's
wealth or to stamp the Court's imprimatur on a law that offends and degrades the repository of the very authority of this Court - the
Constitution of the Philippines.

The Constitution Is a Compact

My basic premise is that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all other laws must conform. 5 It is the people's
quintessential act of sovereignty, embodying the principles upon which the State and the government are founded. 6 Having the status
of a supreme and all-encompassing law, it speaks for all the people all the time, not just for the majority or for the minority at
intermittent times. Every constitution is a compact made by and among the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain
manner.7 Truly, the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all the Filipinos to govern themselves. No group, however
blessed, and no sector, however distressed, is exempt from its compass.

RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples, admittedly professes a laudable intent.
It was primarily enacted pursuant to the state policy enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development."8 Though laudable and well-meaning, this statute,
however, has provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin and authority. More specifically,
Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related provisions contravene the Regalian Doctrine - the basic foundation of the
State's property regime.

Public Domains and Natural Resources Are Owned by the State and Cannot Be Alienated or Ceded

Jura regalia was introduced into our political system upon the "discovery" and the "conquest" of our country in the sixteenth century.
Under this concept, the entire earthly territory known as the Philippine Islands was acquired and held by the Crown of Spain. The
King, as then head of State, had the supreme power or exclusive dominion over all our lands, waters, minerals and other natural
resources. By royal decrees, though, private ownership of real property was recognized upon the showing of (1) a title deed; or (2)
ancient possession in the concept of owner, according to which a title could be obtained by prescription. 9 Refusal to abide by the
system and its implementing laws meant the abandonment or waiver of ownership claims.

By virtue of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Philippine archipelago was ceded to the United States. The latter assumed administration of
the Philippines and succeeded to the property rights of the Spanish Crown. But under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the US Government
allowed and granted patents to Filipino and US citizens for the "free and open x x x exploration, occupation and purchase [of mines]
and the land in which they are found."10 To a certain extent, private individuals were entitled to own, exploit and dispose of mineral
resources and other rights arising from mining patents.

This US policy was, however, rejected by the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 when it crafted and ratified our first Constitution.
Instead, the said Constitution embodied the Regalian Doctrine, which more definitively declared as belonging to the State all lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals and other natural resources.11 Although respecting mining patentees under the Philippine Bill of
1902, it restricted the further exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, both as to who might be entitled to
undertake such activities and for how long. The pertinent provision reads:

"SECTION 1 [Art. XIII]. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be alienated, and license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be
the measure and the limit of the grant."

The concept was carried over in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Hence, Sections 8 and 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution,
state:

"SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and
the limit of the grant.

SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the Philippines shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens. The National Assembly, in the national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or associations to enter into
service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for
financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such."

Similarly, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

"SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizen, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.

"The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve
its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

"The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming,
with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.

"The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

"The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution."

The adoption of the Regalian Doctrine by the Philippine Commonwealth was initially impelled by the desire to preserve the nation's
wealth in the hands of the Filipinos themselves. Nationalism was fervent at the time, and our constitutional framers decided to embody
the doctrine in our fundamental law. Charging the State with the conservation of the national patrimony was deemed necessary for
Filipino posterity. The arguments in support of the provision are encapsulated by Aruego as follows: "[T]he natural resources,
particularly the mineral resources which constituted a great source of wealth, belonged not only to the generation then but also to the
succeeding generation and consequently should be conserved for them."12

Thus, after expressly declaring that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, all forces of energy and other natural resources
belonged to the Philippine State, the Commonwealth absolutely prohibited the alienation of these natural resources. Their disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization were further restricted only to Filipino citizens and entities that were 60 percent Filipino-
owned. The present Constitution even goes further by declaring that such activities "shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State." Additionally, it enumerates land classifications and expressly states that only agricultural lands of the public domain shall
be alienable. We quote below the relevant provision:13

"SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural
lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area. x x x."

Mr. Justice Kapunan upholds private respondents and intervenors in their claim that all ancestral domains and lands are outside the
coverage of public domain; and that these properties - including forests, bodies of water, minerals and parks found therein - are private
and have never been part of the public domain, because they have belonged to the indigenous people’s ancestors since time
immemorial.

I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Indeed, no one is exempt from its all-
encompassing provisions. Unlike the 1935 Charter, which was subject to "any existing right, grant, lease or concession," the 1973 and
the 1987 Constitutions spoke in absolute terms. Because of the State’s implementation of policies considered to be for the common
good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court said that once minerals are found even in private land, the State may intervene to enable
it to extract the minerals in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is converted into mineral land and may not be used by
any private person, including the registered owner, for any other purpose that would impede the mining operations. Such owner would
be entitled to just compensation for the loss sustained.

In Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. IAC, 15 the Court clarified that while mining claim holders and patentees have the exclusive
right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim, their rights are not absolute or strictly one of ownership. Thus, failure to
comply with the requirements of pertinent mining laws was deemed an abandonment or a waiver of the claim.

Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine political history cannot be set aside or ignored by IPRA,
however well-intentioned it may be. The perceived lack of understanding of the cultural minorities cannot be remedied by conceding
the nation’s resources to their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more privileged simply because they have chosen to ignore state
laws. For having chosen not to be enfolded by statutes on perfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot now maintain their ownership of
lands and domains by insisting on their concept of "native title" thereto. It would be plain injustice to the majority of Filipinos who
have abided by the law and, consequently, deserve equal opportunity to enjoy the country’s resources.

Respondent NCIP claims that IPRA does not violate the Constitution, because it does not grant ownership of public domains and
natural resources to ICCs/IPs. "Rather, it recognizes and mandates respect for the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral
lands and domains that had never been lands of the public domain."16 I say, however, that such claim finds no legal support. Nowhere
in the Constitution is there a provision that exempts such lands and domains from its coverage. Quite the contrary, it declares
that all lands of the public domain and natural resources "are owned by the State"; and "with the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated."

As early as Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 17 the Court declared as belonging to the public domain all lands not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant under laws, orders or decrees promulgated by the Spanish government; or by possessory
information under Act 496 (Mortgage Law).

On the other hand, Intervenors Flavier et al.18 differentiate the concept of ownership of ICCs/IPs from that which is defined in Articles
427 and 428 of the Civil Code. They maintain that "[t]here are variations among ethnolinguistic groups in the Cordillera, but a fair
synthesis of these refers to ‘x x x the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control x x x, a collective right to freely use the
particular territory x x x [in] the concept of trusteeship.'"

In other words, the "owner" is not an individual. Rather, it is a tribal community that preserves the property for the common but
nonetheless exclusive and perpetual benefit of its members, without the attributes of alienation or disposition. This concept, however,
still perpetually withdraws such property from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. The
perpetual and exclusive character of private respondents’ claims simply makes them repugnant to basic fairness and equality.

Private respondents and intervenors trace their "ownership" of ancestral domains and lands to the pre-Spanish conquest. I should say
that, at the time, their claims to such lands and domains was limited to the surfaces thereof since their ancestors were agriculture-
based. This must be the continuing scope of the indigenous groups’ ownership claims: limited to land, excluding the natural resources
found within.

In any event, if all that the ICCs/IPs demand is preferential use - not ownership - of ancestral domains, then I have no disagreement.
Indeed, consistent with the Constitution is IPRA’s Section 5719- without the too-broad definitions under Section 3 (a) and (b) - insofar
as it grants them priority rights in harvesting, extracting, developing or exploiting natural resources within ancestral domains.

The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must fail. Our Constitution vests the ownership
of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the Filipino people. As the protector of the Constitution, this Court has the
sworn duty to uphold the tenets of that Constitution - not to dilute, circumvent or create exceptions to them.

Cariño v. Insular Government Was Modified by the Constitution

In this connection, I submit that Cariño v. Insular Government 20 has been modified or superseded by our 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Its ratio should be understood as referring only to a means by which public agricultural land may be acquired by
citizens. I must also stress that the claim of Petitioner Cariño refers to land ownership only, not to the natural resources underneath or
to the aerial and cosmic space above.

Significantly, in Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals, 21 a Decision handed down after our three Constitutions had taken
effect, the Court rejected a cultural minority member's registration of land under CA 141, Section 48 (c). 22 The reason was that the
property fell within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. This Court quoted with favor the solicitor general’s following statements:

"3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of law involved, as to include even forest
reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is to unconstitutionally apply such provision. For, both the 1973 and present
Constitutions do not include timber or forest lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution states that ‘with the
exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not
be alienated.’ The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly states that ‘with the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated’."

Just recently, in Gordula v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court also stated that "forest land is incapable of registration, and its inclusion in a
title nullifies that title. To be sure, the defense of indefeasiblity of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie
against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest
reservation, the patent covering forest land being void ab initio."

RA 8371 Violates the Inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains

The ponencia theorizes that RA 8371 does not grant to ICCs/IPs ownership of the natural resources found within ancestral domains.
However, a simple reading of the very wordings of the law belies this statement.

Section 3 (a)24 defines and delineates ancestral domains as "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters,
coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or
through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement x x x. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds x x x bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources x x x." (Emphasis ours.)

Clearly, under the above-quoted provision of IPRA, ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs encompass the natural resources found therein.
And Section 7 guarantees recognition and protection of their rights of ownership and possession over such domains.

The indigenous concept of ownership, as defined under Section 5 of the law, "holds that ancestral domains are the ICC’s/IP’s private
but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed." Simply put, the law
declares that ancestral domains, including the natural resources found therein, are owned by ICCs/IPs and cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed. Not only does it vest ownership, as understood under the Civil Code; it adds perpetual exclusivity. This means that while
ICCs/IPs could own vast ancestral domains, the majority of Filipinos who are not indigenous can never own any part thereof.

On the other hand, Section 3 (b)25 of IPRA defines ancestral lands as referring to "lands occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial x x x, under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership, x x x including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
Section 8 recognizes and protects "the right of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands." Such ownership need
not be by virtue of a certificate of title, but simply by possession since time immemorial.

I believe these statutory provisions directly contravene Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, more specifically the declaration that
the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals and natural resources – none of which, except agricultural lands, can be
alienated. In several cases, this Court has consistently held that non-agricultural land must first be reclassified and converted into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes by a positive act of the government. 26 Mere possession or utilization thereof,
however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties.27 The presumption is that "all lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, x x x all applicants in land registration proceedings have
the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless the
applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either
by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of
public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to
substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and
title."28

Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sections 3 are merely definitions and should not be
construed independently of the other provisions of the law. But, precisely, a definition is "a statement of the meaning of a word or
word group."29 It determines or settles the nature of the thing or person defined. 30 Thus, after defining a term as encompassing several
items, one cannot thereafter say that the same term should be interpreted as excluding one or more of the enumerated items in its
definition. For that would be misleading the people who would be bound by the law. In other words, since RA 8371 defines ancestral
domains as including the natural resources found therein and further states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it means
that ICCs/IPs can own natural resources.

In fact, Intervenors Flavier et al. submit that everything above and below these ancestral domains, with no specific limits, likewise
belongs to ICCs/IPs. I say that this theory directly contravenes the Constitution. Such outlandish contention further disregards
international law which, by constitutional fiat, has been adopted as part of the law of the land.31

No Land Area Limits Are Specified by RA 8371

Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of alienable public land,
whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More than that, but not exceeding 500 hectares, they may hold by lease only.
RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by their mere definitions, they could
cover vast tracts of the nation's territory. The properties under the assailed law cover everything held, occupied or possessed "by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial." It also includes all "lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by [them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators."

Nomadic groups have no fixed area within which they hunt or forage for food. As soon as they have used up the resources of a certain
area, they move to another place or go back to one they used to occupy. From year to year, a growing tribe could occupy and use
enormous areas, to which they could claim to have had "traditional access." If nomadic ICCs/IPs succeed in acquiring title to their
enlarging ancestral domain or land, several thousands of hectares of land may yet be additionally delineated as their private property.

Similarly, the Bangsa Moro people's claim to their ancestral land is not based on compounded or consolidated title, but "on a
collective stake to the right to claim what their forefathers secured for them when they first set foot on our country." 32 They trace their
right to occupy what they deem to be their ancestral land way back to their ancient sultans and datus, who had settled in many islands
that have become part of Mindanao. This long history of occupation is the basis of their claim to their ancestral lands.33

Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various ICCs/IPs as ancestral domains; and over 10
thousand hectares, as ancestral lands.34 Based on ethnographic surveys, the solicitor general estimates that ancestral domains cover 80
percent of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 million hectares of land in the country. 35 This means that four
fifths of its natural resources and one third of the country's land will be concentrated among 12 million Filipinos constituting 110
ICCs,36 while over 60 million other Filipinos constituting the overwhelming majority will have to share the remaining. These figures
indicate a violation of the constitutional principle of a "more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth" among
Filipinos.

RA 8371 Abdicates the State Duty to Take Full Control and Supervision of Natural Resources

Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that "[t]he exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." The State may (1) directly undertake such activities; or (2) enter into co-
production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by
Filipinos.37 Such agreements, however, shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period and under terms and conditions as
may be provided by law.

But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar as natural resources found
within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and possession, they may develop and manage the natural
resources, benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and the utilization thereof. 38 And they may exercise such right
without any time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like
period.39 Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize natural resources must also be limited
to such period.

In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources, 40 a right
vested by the Constitution only in the State. Congress, through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of a minority group the State's
power of ownership and full control over a substantial part of the national patrimony, in contravention of our most fundamental law.

I make clear, however, that to the extent that ICCs/IPs may undertake small-scale utilization of natural resources and cooperative fish
farming, I absolutely have no objection. These undertakings are certainly allowed under the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.

Having already disposed of the two major constitutional dilemmas wrought by RA 8371 – (1) ownership of ancestral lands and
domains and the natural resources therein; and (2) the ICCs/IPs' control of the exploration, development and utilization of such
resources – I believe I should no longer tackle the following collateral issues petitioners have brought up:

1. Whether the inclusion of private lands within the coverage of ancestral domains amounts to undue deprivation of private
property

2. Whether ICCs/IPs may regulate the entry/exit of migrants

3. Whether ancestral domains are exempt from real property taxes, special levies and other forms of exaction
 4. Whether customary laws and traditions of ICCs/IPs should first be applied in the settlements of disputes over their rights
and claims

5. Whether the composition and the jurisdiction of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) violate the due
process and equal protection clauses

6. Whether members of the ICCs/IPs may be recruited into the armed forces against their will

I believe that the first three of the above collateral issues have been rendered academic or, at least, no longer of "transcendental
importance," in view of my contention that the two major IPRA propositions are based on unconstitutional premises. On the other
hand, I think that in the case of the last three, it is best to await specific cases filed by those whose rights may have been injured by
specific provisions of RA 8371.

Epilogue

Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, provides:

"SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well being.

"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain."

Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the rights of ICCs/IPs: (1) the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and (2) national development policies and programs.

Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society. This does not, however, give Congress any
license to accord them rights that the Constitution withholds from the rest of the Filipino people. I would concede giving
them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the preservation of their ancestral lands and domains. 41 But to grant perpetual ownership
and control of the nation's substantial wealth to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have chosen to live and abide by
our previous and present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but also subversive of the rule of law.

In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively mandating "reverse discrimination." In seeking
to improve their lot, it would be doing so at the expense of the majority of the Filipino people. Such short-sighted and misplaced
generosity will spread the roots of discontent and, in the long term, fan the fires of turmoil to a conflagration of national proportions.

Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to coddle the few, however disadvantaged they
may have been. Neither can a just society be approximated by maiming the healthy to place them at par with the injured. Nor can the
nation survive by enclaving its wealth for the exclusive benefit of favored minorities.

Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of opportunities and privileges that are open to all and by
preventing the powerful from exploiting and oppressing them. This is the essence of social justice – empowering and enabling the
poor to be able to compete with the rich and, thus, equally enjoy the blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity.

WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and to DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a)
and (b), 8 and related provisions of RA 8371.

[G.R. No. 103727. December 18, 1996.]

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division),
AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C DELA CRUZ, Respondents-Appellees.

[G.R. No. 106496. December 18, 1996.]

ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO
PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and
LEONA SAN PEDRO, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs
of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the
Government itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares or "214,047 quinones," 1 on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled
"Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay
City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon
City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south. 2

Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land swindles and rackets proliferated resulting in
tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the appellate court and in the Supreme Court, 3 in connection therewith.

We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, Et. Al. v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Antonio, Et. Al. V.
Barroga, Et Al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et al v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Et Al., 186 SC RA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 212
SCRA 360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 144 SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 135 SCRA
156 [1985]; and Director of Lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 [1994] 4 terminated the controversy as to ownership of lands covered
by Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest Tribunal of the land, has spoken, there the matter must
rest:

"It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the procedures and processes
for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of
the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the
verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court’s,
which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court’s
dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality."

It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render judgment herein writing finis to these
controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of the basis of the estate’s claim of ownership over this vast expense of real
property.

The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases

G. R NO. 103727

G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint 6 for recovery of possession and/or damages with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon
City in its decision 7 dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portion 8 of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain
and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of the herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5.000.00)
as and for attorney’s fees, and to pay the costs of suit."cralaw virtua1aw library

The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with damages and with a prayer for preliminary
injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the "Intestate Estate of Don Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban" against Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz,
Gaudencio R Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S.
Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty
Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.

In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the aforenamed defendants were able to
secure from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from Original
Certificate of Title No. 614 9 and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of
Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain portions of the
subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and
333 had been cancelled by and through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation to letter recommendations by
the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central Bank
Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity
and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate had been resolved in favor of the
petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to
a case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B. 10

Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela
Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 11

On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco, Inc. for improper service of summons
and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of action considering that the registered owner of the parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 12

Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.

On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on the following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain
and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the parcels of land covered by Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the
alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" specifically stated in its
dispositive portion that all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System by private persons shall
be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. 13

The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied, 14 and so, the petitioner estate interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On
January 20, 1992, the appeal was dismissed 15 for being unmeritorious and the lower court’s decision was affirmed with costs against
the petitioner estate. The appellate court ratiocinated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof was presented in the proceeding below;

(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered under the Torrens system hence, it cannot be used as evidence
of land ownership;

(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly excluded from the Titulo titled lands of private
individuals:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz as correctly ruled by the lower court;

(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of Ocampo Buhain and Dela Cruz originated was already
cancelled, hence the lower court did not err in not declaring the same as null and void. 16

Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March 16, 1992, filed the present petition 17 docketed as
G.R No. 103727.

G. R NO. 106496

G.R No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a petition 18 for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the
late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban which eventually resulted to an Order 19 dated November 17, 1978 declaring inter alia, Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect.

The dispositive portion 20 of the said Order reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.

2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal force and effect and that therefore no rights could be
derived therefrom.

3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other transactions involving the lands covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 are declared invalidated, void and of no force and effect.

4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban

5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from
representing or exercising any acts of possession or ownership or from disposing in any manner portions of all the lands covered by
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately vacate the same.

6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in Court within twenty days their final accounting and
inventory of all real and personal properties of the estate which had come into their possession or knowledge under oath.

7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to continue with the presentation of their evidence in order to rest their
case.

The consideration and approval of the administrator’s final accounting and inventory of the presentation of movants-intervenors’
evidence as well as the consideration of all other incident are hereby set on December 22, 1978 at 8:30 a m."cralaw virtua1aw library

The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban was filed on
December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The
petition docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought to be appointed as
administrator and co-administrator, respectively.

On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for the petitioners was received by the lower court
without any opposition. 21

On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing Engracio San Pedro as Administrator of the
subject estate. 22

On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San Pedro upon posting of a bond in the sum of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). 23

On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish copies of the letters of administration and other
pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the properties of the estate to the following entities:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) The Commanding General

Philippine Constabulary

Camp Crame, Quezon City

(b) The Solicitor General

Manila

(c) The Government Corporate Counsel

A. Mabini St., Manila

(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan

(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan

(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and

Caloocan

(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan

and Rizal

(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City

(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City

(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various municipalities in

which properties of the estate are located; and

(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon City and

Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. 24

The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion brought about by various persons who had been
misrepresenting themselves as having been legally authorized to act for the subject estate and to sell its properties by virtue thereof.

On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was filed by the Republic of the Philippines alleging,
inter alia:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976, Spanish titles like the TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and
ineffective as proof of ownership in court proceedings, except where the holder thereof applies for land registration under Act 496,
which is not true in the proceedings at bar;

5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as invalid;

6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or his supposed heirs have lost whatever rights of ownership they
might have bad to the so called Estate on the ground of inaction, laches and/or prescription;

7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered for purposes of inventory, settlement or distribution in
accordance with law, and all the inventories so far submitted, insofar as they embraced lands within the TITULO, are deemed
ineffective and cannot be legally considered; and

8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land subject matter of the petition considering that, except such
portions thereof had been (sic) already the subject of valid adjudication or disposition in accordance with law, the same belong in State
ownership."25cralaw:red

On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings. 26

On February 16, 1977, the Republic’s Opposition to the Petition for Letters of Administration was dismissed by means of the
following Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues raised, the Court hereby DISMISSES the ‘Opposition’ dated
August 30, 1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General; likewise, for lack of merit, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated
February 15, 1977, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.

The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the Co-administrator Justino Z. Benito are ordered to furnish the office of the Solicitor
General all copies of inventories already filed in Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof." 27

On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Republic. 28

On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, rendered a 52-page decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan,
issued on April 29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, covering a total area of approximately
214,047 quiniones or 173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City and Caloocan City;

(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa Pantaleon, Vicente Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad
San Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and Teresa Nicolas, as the true and lawful heirs of the deceased Don Mariano Sao
Pedro y Esteban and entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the said deceased, consisting of the above-mentioned tract of private
land covered and described by said above-mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, excluding
therefrom: (a) all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private persons, or the
Republic of the Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all lands declared by the government as reservations for
public use and purposes; (c) all lands belonging to the public domain; and, (d) all portions thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed
and/or previously excluded by the Administrator and duly approved by a final order of the Court, except those which may hereafter be
set aside, after due consideration on a case to case basis, of various motions to set aside the said Court order which approved the said
sales, quit-claims, and/or exclusions;

(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co-administrator, is hereby revoked to take effect immediately, to obviate any
confusion in the administration of the Estate, and to fix the responsibilities of administration to the co-heir Administrator, Engracio
San Pedro, whose appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said co-administrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby ordered to render
his final accounting of his co-administration of the Estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of copy hereof;

(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to amass, collate, consolidate and take possession of all the net
estate of the deceased Don Marino San Pedro y Esteban, as well as all other sets and credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to
take appropriate legal action to recover the same in the proper Courts of Justice, government offices or any appropriate forum; and to
pay all taxes or charges due from the estate to the Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and thereafter, to submit a project of
partition of the estate among the lawful heirs as herein recognized and declared.

It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos that, to avoid the concentration of too much
land to a few persons and in line with the projected urban land reform program of the government, corollary to the agricultural land
reform program of the New Society, the above intestate estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban should be expropriated or
purchased by negotiated sale by the government to be used in its human settlements and low cost housing projects.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED." 29

On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision. 30

On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition for the Inhibition of the then newly appointed
Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12, 1978, after the Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez
denied the said petition. 31

After hearings were conducted on the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Fernandez issued the aforestated Order 32 dated
November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set aside Judge Bagasao’s decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect, thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 from the
inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.

The petitioners heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court of Appeals and alleged that the lower court did not
act with impartiality when it granted the Republic’s motion for reconsideration which was merely pro forma, thereby overturning a
prior declaration by the same court of the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the
deceased Mariano San Pedro. 33

On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners-heirs. 34 In affirming the assailed Order dated
November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its discussion solely on the issue of whether or not the lower court erred in declaring
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 null and void. The appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed to controvert the Republic’s
claim that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is invalid on the following bases; (a) non-production of the original of the subject title; (b)
inadmissibility of the photostat copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish title under Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892 (Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of
the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings).

The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision by invoking certain cases wherein the validity of
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been allegedly recognized. The Court of Appeals refused to be swayed and denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. 35

Hence, the herein petition, 36 docketed as G R No. 106496, was filed on September 18, 1992.

After the parties filed their respective pleadings in GR NOS. 103727 and 106496, this Court resolved to consolidate both cases on
September 15, 1994. 37

While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions for intervention which we denied on different
occasions for lack of merit.

In G.R NO. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case NO. Q-88-447, RTC, Branch 104 was denied due process of law due to gross
negligence of lawyer, which respondent court grossly failed to take cognizance of.

II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial
and in affirming the lower court’s null and void judgment." 38

In G.R No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of errors, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which resolved a question of title or ownership over which the lower
court as an intestate court has no jurisdiction and over the vigorous and repeated objections of the petitioners. 39

Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of Judge Fernandez setting aside the order and decision of Judge
Puno and Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby acted as an appellate court reviewing, revising, amending or setting aside the order and
decision of Judges of equal rank. 40

Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the order of Judge Fernandez who without jurisdiction, set aside the
order of Judge Puno and the decision of Judge Bagasao, both of which were already final. 41

Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that Judge Fernandez was appointed by President Marcos to reverse
Judge Bagasao, regardless of the evidence, thereby unmindful that petitioners were denied the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal.
42

Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence presented before Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and
merely adopted the order of Judge Fernandez who never received a single piece of evidence, notwithstanding the 1906 Guido title
over Hacienda Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated therein being Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, and the
November 1991 en banc decision of the Supreme Court upholding the Guido title" 43

Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of the petitioners’ Spanish title in these cases is the
propriety of the lower court’s resolution of the question of ownership of the subject San Pedro estate in the special proceedings case.
Thus, before we address ourselves to the issue of whether or not petitioners’ Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no
legal force and effect, it is best that we first determine whether or not the lower court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for
letters of administration, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of the
San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.

Petitioners-heirs, in G.R No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no jurisdiction
as an "intestate court", 44 to resolve the question of title or ownership raised by the public respondent Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. 45

The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae, argues that petitioners’ contention is
misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned the existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court
became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly covers the said estate,
otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings would be mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the
State’s patrimony or improperly included as belonging to the estate of the deceased. 46

A probate court’s jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the
estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the issue of the validity of wills. We held in the case of Maningat v. Castillo, 47
that "the main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the
process of administration." Thus, its function necessarily includes the examination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased
so as to rule on whether or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for Purposes of distribution of the net assets of the
estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs.

In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 48 we stated, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased maybe passed upon in the Probate Court,
with the consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether certain properties ought to be included or
excluded from the inventory and accounting of the estate subject of a petition for letters of administration, as in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In this light, we echo our
pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia 49 that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding
proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the
inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the
administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty, the court has also inherent power to determine what properties,
rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased person duly call the court’s attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in
the inventory, it is likewise the court’s duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended
to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in
nature as to the ownership of the said properties." 50 [Emphasis Supplied]

In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any reversible error when it issued the Order
dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge Bagasao’s decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban.

A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the assailed Order of November 17, 1978 is the
impropriety of Judge Fernandez’ act of granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the public respondent Republic since, Judge
Fernandez did not personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a "reviewing judge." By setting aside the Decision
dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C.
Bagasao, respectively, Judge Fernandez, acting as a "reviewing judge," proceeded without authority and/or jurisdiction. 51

There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision arrived at is fair and just, a newly appointed judge who
did not try the case can decide the same as long as the record and the evidence are all available to him and that the same were taken
into consideration and thoroughly studied. The "reviewing judge" argument of the petitioners-heirs has no leg to stand on considering
that "the fact that the judge who penned the decision did not hear a certain case in its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his
findings and conclusion inasmuch as the full record was available to him for his perusal." 52 In the case at bar, it is evident that the
41-page Order dated November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the rationale
for reconsidering and setting aside Judge Bagasao’s Decision dated April 25, 1978.

Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge Fernandez’ disposition of the case, ie., the issuance
by the lower court of the assailed Order of November 17, 1978, we now focus on the core issue of whether or not the lower court in
GR No. 106496 committed reversible error in excluding from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the ground that the said title is null and void and of no legal force and
effect. Juxtaposed with this is the issue of whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, GR Nos. 103727 and 106496, erred in not
recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership by the late Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered
thereby.

It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976, the system of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be
registered under the Land Registration Act 53 within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16,
1976. 54 Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their lands. 55 Spanish titles can no longer be
countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. 56

"Section 1 of the said Decree provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system
which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.

All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system.

Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its passage, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of large tracts of public and private lands to unsuspecting
and unwary buyers appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming ownership under Spanish titles or grants of
dubious origin;

WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting claims and litigations between legitimate title holders,
bona fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one hand, and the holders of, or person claiming rights under the said Spanish
titles or grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and instability in property ownership and threatening the peace and order
conditions in the areas affected;

WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that recording in the system of registration under the Spanish
Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this system has become obsolete;

WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to
prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual possession;

WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in registration proceedings under the Torrens system;"

In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, Et Al., 57 we took cognizance of this Decree and thus held that caution
and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that have
been discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent to World War II.

In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of
P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. 58 Time and again we have had that a mere allegation is not
evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. 59 Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate
of Title covering the land registered.

In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge Bagasao who rendered the reconsidered Decision
dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the
deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in setting aside Judge Bagasao’s
decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under P.D. 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private
ownership in the special proceedings case. He made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of recognizing the nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership
underscored the fact that during the pendency of this case, smart speculators and wise alecks had inveigled innocent parties into
buying portions of the so called estate with considerations running into millions of pesos.

Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to charitable and religious organizations, including veterans’
organizations as smoke screen to the gargantuan fraud they have committed and to hood wink further other gullible and unsuspecting
victims." 60

In the same light, it does not escape this Court’s onomatopoeic observation that the then heir-judicial administrator Engracio San
Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages in GR No. 103727 on August 15, 1988
invoked Judge Bagasao’s Decision of April 25, 1978 in support of the Titulo’s validity notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the said
Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez’ Order of November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts’
holding in G.R No. 103727 insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.

This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the Torrens system is the lack of the necessary
documents to be presented in order to comply with the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount the possibility that the Spanish title
in question is not genuine, especially since its genuineness and due execution have not been proven. In both cases, the petitioners heirs
were not able to present the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the
petitioners-heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. "Q-RP") to produce it as requested by the Republic
from the then administrators of the subject intestate estate, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As
an alternative to prove their claim of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a document known as "hypoteca" (the
Spanish term is ‘hipoteca’) allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented
as evidence. Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the petitioners-heirs did not submit
the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was presented. (Exhs. "C-9" to "C-19").

The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is stated in unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a)
and (b) of the said Rule read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 2. — Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the
subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;"

x       x       x

Sections 3 and 4 of the same Rule further read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the adverse party."cralaw virtua1aw library

SEC. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse party’s custody. — If the writing be in the custody of the adverse party, he
must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the
writing, the contents thereof may be proved as in the case of its loss. But the notice to produce it is not necessary where the writing is
itself a notice, or where it has been wrongfully obtained or withheld by the adverse party."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original
evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible
piece of evidence. 61

Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the existence and due execution of the Titulo. Their
explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo could not be produced was not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which
should have resolved the issue as to the exact extent of the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro were not distinctly
proved. In the case of Ong Hing Po v. Court of Appeals, 62 we pointed out that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. 63

In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, Judge Bagasao, in his decision, relied on: (1) the
testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated January 28, 1963 denominated as "Questioned
Documents Report No. 230-163" ; (2) a photostat copy of the original of the Titulo duly certified by the then Clerk of Court of the
defunct Court of First Instance of Manila; and (3) the hipoteca registered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on December 4, 1894.

Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasao’s April 1978 decision correctly clarified that the NBI
report aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of the two signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado
appearing on the last page of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked by the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to admit the existence
and due execution of the Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x

ATTY. BRINGAS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the distinguished counsel for the government whether he admits that there is
actually a titulo propiedad 4136.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?

ATTY. AGCAOILI:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We are precisely impugning the titulo and I think the question of counsel is already answered by witness. The parties have not yet
established the due existence of the titulo.

ATTY. BRINGAS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the question. The witness is a witness for the government, so with the
testimony of this witness for the government to the effect that there is actually in existence titulo propiedad 4136; we are asking the
question candidly to the government counsel whether he is prepared to state that there is really in existence such titulo propiedad 4136.

ATTY. AGCAOILI:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We are now stating before this court that there was such a document examined by the NBI insofar as the signatures of Alejandro
Garcia and Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned and they are found to be authentic." 64

The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to our pronouncement that the Titulo is of dubious
validity:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated September 2, 1977 (Exhibit ‘O-RP’) concluded that the document
contained material alterations as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) On line 15 of ‘p. 1, Title’ and on line 5 of ‘p. 2, Title,’ the word ‘Pinagcamaligan’ was written after ‘Pulo;’

b) On line IC, ‘p. 1, Title,’ ‘un’ was converted to ‘mil;’

c) On Line 18, ‘p. 1, Title,’ ‘mil’ was written at the end of ‘tres’ in ‘tres mil;’

d) On line 19 of ‘p. 1, Title,’ a semblance of ‘mil’ was written after ‘setentay tres;’

e) On line 6, ‘p. 2, Title,’ ‘un’ was formed to a semblance of ‘uni;’ and

f) On line 8, ‘p. 2, Title,’ ‘un’ was formed to ‘mil.’

The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the titulo. According to Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still
"pieces of black ashes around the rings of the portions which are indications of burnings. The burnings were made on the very portions
where there were previous erasures, alterations and intercalations. Understandably, the burnings were done to erase traces of the
criminal act." 65

In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. 66 Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating the trial
court’s judgment therein, sustained the finding that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title in the name of Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations
and intercalations in an attempt to vastly increase the area and change the location of the land described in the original title . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain the lower court’s analysis, as affirmed by the
appellate court, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never presented in Court. Upon request of the Government, a
subpoena duces tecum (Exhibit "Q-RP’") was issued to the two administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to
other interested parties to produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. But no one produced the titulo. What the parties did
was to pass the buck to one another.

Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could not be produced, the Court cannot take cognizance of any
secondary evidence.

It was explained that the titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the hands of a certain Moon Park of Korea but who later
disappeared and that his present whereabouts could not be known.

Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts on the part of the claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve
this document of vital importance despite the Court order to produce it in order to determine its authenticity.

It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Park’s whereabouts are unknown or that there are not enough funds to locate him.
The only logical conclusion would be that the original would be adverse if produced." 67

As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners-heirs have not
established the conditions required by law for their admissibility as secondary evidence to prove that there exists a document
designated as Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same acquires no probative value. 68

At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, Et. Al. v. Ho L Emmanuel M. Muñoz, as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, Et. Al. 69 is enlightening. In said case, private respondent, Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro
Development Corporation, Inc. (PIADECO), claimed to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in the municipalities of
Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal To prove its
ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining that the Titulo is of doubtful
validity, 70 Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court, stated that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed facts. First. The Title embraces land ‘located in
the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon City.’ Second. The title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan,
and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.

To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of land must be proved not only through the
genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20
Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil 51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director,
65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured
per hectare or per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the Royal Decree of
August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly suggests that the land applied for must be measured per
hectare.

Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadeco’s ‘Rejoinder to Opposition’ dated April 28, 1964 filed in
Civil Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its
‘Opposition’ of May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is which? This
but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadeco’s land. Piadeco’s ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least
in these proceedings.

Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the property
by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p. 184) the basic decree that
authorized adjustment of lands, By this decree, applications for adjustment - showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied
for - were to be filed with the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, which then ordered the classification and survey of the land
with the assistance of the interested party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).

The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment at one year from the date of publication
of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If
Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have, then, seriously to be considered here are the Royal
Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land
with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98 Phil. 935,
941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500 hectares, with
allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op. cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that Piadeco’s Titulo is held out
to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.

But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta de Manila on April
17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26; Ventura, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a second petition for adjustment within six months from
publication, for those who had not yet secured-their titles at the time of the publication of the law (Ibid). Said law also abolished the
provincial boards for the adjustment of lands established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of
August 31, 1888, which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established by Decree on Municipal
Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which they may hold in their possession (Ramirez v. Director of
Land, supra, at p. 124).

Doubt on Piadeco’s title here supervenes when we come to consider that title was either dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or
eight days after the publication of the Maura Law.

Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its rights under the Titulo. The original owner
appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. From Piadeco’s explanation - not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-
188) we cull the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years,
for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don
Mariano Ignacio died, his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the land to herself. At about the same time,
Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 27, 1932. Later,
Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land to Piadeco’s treasurer and an
incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the
land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the
land. Castillo also executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold the same to Piadeco.
Consideration therefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian Castillo made to depend on the registration of
the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein
pointed out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadeco’s title."cralaw virtua1aw library

Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 71 we categorically enunciated that the alleged
Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any probative value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of
P.D. 892 as contained in our Resolution dated February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito and WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as
G.R No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final judgment was made respecting G.R No. 69343.

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court relating to the issue of the validity of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating otherwise. In the Muñoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulo’s validity. In the
WIDORA case, the Titulo’s nullification was definitive. In both cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
were on opposite ends before this bench. In the case en banc of Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 72 the Court explained
the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed
upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that
action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their
privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular
point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action
is not required by merely identity of issues."cralaw virtua1aw library

The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied upon by the
petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of ownership. In the petition for letters of administration the inventory submitted before
the probate court consisted solely of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no "net estate" to speak of after the Titulo’s
exclusion from the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.

In GR No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely
TCT No. 372592 (Exh. "2", Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh. "2" — De Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. "2" — Dela Cruz). 73
Under the Torrens system of registration, the titles of private respondents became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its
final decree. 74 More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoy the
conclusive presumption of validity. 75 As a last hurrah to champion their claim to the vast estate covered by the subject Spanish title,
the petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to prove on the part of the private respondents as regards their
Torrens titles and accused their own counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the proper witnesses from the Bureau of
Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs’ claim that OCT No. 614 from which private respondents were derived is null and void. It
is an elementary legal principle that the negligence of counsel binds the client. 76 The records show that the petitioners-heirs were not
at all prejudiced by the non-presentation of evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering that their ownership itself of
the lands being claimed was not duly proved. In the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v Dela Cruz, Et Al., 77 we held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client. This negligence ultimately resulted in a
judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is
bound by the mistakes of his counsel (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980] Only when the application of the general rule
would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue
prejudice against the petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim that the petitioner
had been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitioners-heirs were denied due process on account of the
negligence of their counsel, the writ of certiorari is unavailing.

It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are not without recourse. Presidential Decree
No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of Spanish Titles the right to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Decree. Thereafter, however, any
Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be used as evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings
under the Torrens system.

All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.
In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be more vigilant in handling land registration cases and
intestate proceedings involving portions of the subject estate. It is not too late in the day for the Office of the Solicitor General to
contest the Torrens titles of those who have acquired ownership of such portions of land that rightfully belong to the State.

In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban on August 13, 1968
sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and owner of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for
adjudication in these cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a party in any of the two cases before us for review, hence, this Court in
a Resolution dated May 10, 1993, 78 denied Catalino’s motion for leave to reopen and/or new trial. And, secondly, the
aforementioned bonds were not included in the inventory of the subject estate submitted by then administrators, Engracio San Pedro
and Justino Benito before the probate court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R Nos. 103727 and 106496 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Consequently, in G.R No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.

In GR No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows;

(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore, no rights could be derived therefrom;

(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban;

(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed and
terminated.

(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby
disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any portion of the
estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of them
are in possession thereof.

This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.