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The Sarcastic Implicatures of An Ambivalent Villain: Dahl's Willy Wonka
The Sarcastic Implicatures of An Ambivalent Villain: Dahl's Willy Wonka
research-article2018
LAL0010.1177/0963947018766453Language and LiteratureLoveday
Article
Abstract
This study investigates the impoliteness of Willy Wonka, a leading character in the children’s
fantasy novella Charlie and the Chocolate Factory, and probes into the workings of his sadistic
innuendo. While the menacing undertones of Wonka’s verbal aggression simultaneously thrill and
horrify, they also deserve an explanation that goes beyond their trite dismissal as the embodiment
of schoolboy humour. This research applies a Gricean framework to Wonka’s sarcastic discourse
to reveal his grotesque violation of the social conventions of conversation. It scrutinises his
covert verbal abuse with the aim of demonstrating how pragmatic resources help to serve
literary characterisation. The analysis demonstrates how Dahl meticulously exploits the tool of
conversational implicatures in order to position Wonka as an ambivalent villain.
Keywords
Impoliteness, conversational implicatures, Gricean maxims, sarcasm, characterisation of a villain,
children’s fantasy literature
1 Introduction
When the BFG, also known as the Big, Friendly Giant in Roald Dahl’s children’s story
of the same name, declares with dialectal charm that ‘What I mean and what I say is two
different things’ (1982a: 41), his assertion significantly echoes the defiant statement that
Humpty Dumpty made a century earlier in Through the Looking Glass: ‘“When I use a
word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to
mean – neither more nor less”’ (1871: 114).
While Humpty Dumpty brags about his dictatorship over the sense of words, Dahl’s
giant boasts about his dexterity at pragmatic manipulation. Carrol and Dahl share many
Corresponding author:
Leo John Loveday, Doshisha University, Karasuma-Imadegawa, Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto, Kyoto-fu 602-8580, Japan.
Email: lloveday@mail.doshisha.ac.jp
Loveday 87
affinities, but above all they are remembered for their gift for depicting surreal spaces
where malice and nonsense reign supreme. This study centres particularly on how such
qualities are represented in the unique discourse of Willy Wonka, the eccentric and sin-
ister confectioner who appears in Charlie and the Chocolate Factory, a phantasmagori-
cal novella¹ created by Roald Dahl (1916–1990) in 1964, the title of which will be simply
abbreviated to Charlie for the sake of convenience here. Moreover, this article is
restricted to Chapter 17 partly due to space limitations and also because it showcases
Wonka’s surreptitious sarcasm for the first time. It depicts the initial elimination of a
child candidate, greedy Augustus, who is sucked up a pipe after falling into a chocolate
river upon which he had been disobediently gorging himself.
This research represents a continuation of my pragmatic focus on the characterisation
of villainy in British children’s fantasy literature (see Loveday 2016, where I examine
the sarcastic utterances of Captain Hook in Peter Pan in relation to Searle’s speech act
theory). However, in this study I apply a Gricean approach based on the Cooperative
Principle to shed light on the effect of impolite sarcasm on the attribution of villainy in
fiction. In fact, the theoretical notions of the Oxford philosopher of language, Paul Grice,
helped lay the disciplinary foundations of pragmatics with his ground-breaking work in
1975. It postulated conventions of cooperation which govern conversation and to which
speakers orientate themselves by either obeying or ignoring them. I suggest that when an
author describes the impoliteness of a character as an attributive indicator of potential
villainy, it actually provides an indirect validation of the Gricean model (1975) because
impoliteness, and its sub-category sarcasm, are inextricably linked to the infraction of
the irenic ideals which regulate interpersonal communication. By critically contrasting
the uncooperative impoliteness of a bad guy with a hero’s irenic speech-style, children’s
stories subliminally inculcate and uphold Grice’s maxims of quantity, quality, relation
and manner.
Sarcasm seriously interferes with and violates all normal interpretation of language as
a formal system. It subverts the consistency, completeness and deductive-based reliabil-
ity of what is communicated, all of which are the essential parameters which guarantee
the sense which we make to each other. Sarcasm ruptures Grice’s Cooperative Principle,
on which conversation is built, by imposing idiosyncratic changes on the value of lin-
guistic symbols. In a covertly perverse manner, sarcasm contravenes the conventions
which underpin the truthfulness and trust built into how we are supposed to mutually
transmit and understand what is said. The interpersonal destructiveness evoked by sar-
casm is directly reflected in its ancient Greek etymology since it derives from the verb
sarkazein, meaning ‘to tear the flesh off a carcass like a dog’.
Today, there exist a plethora of theoretical labels and approaches in relation to sar-
casm, which is the lay metalinguistic name for the phenomenon. Haiman (1998) simply
adheres to this everyday term in his book on the subject, while a decade earlier Leech
(1983) came up with the technical term ‘mock politeness’ to describe it. More recently,
Bousfield (2008) labelled it an ‘off-record strategy of impoliteness’, while Culpeper
(2011: 165) prefers to call it ‘convention-driven implicational impoliteness’. Furthermore,
the seminal work of both these last two researchers, Bousfield and Culpeper, has played
a significant role in the establishment of the burgeoning field of (im)politeness studies in
its own right (see Culpeper et al., 2017a).
88 Language and Literature 27(2)
Several paradigms concerning the workings of impoliteness have been advanced over
the last two decades, among which the most theoretically significant are those posited by
Locher and Watts (2005), Bousfield (2008), Leech (2014) and Haugh (2015). However,
the most widely adopted current framework is that of Culpeper (1996, 2005, 2011, 2016),
who inverted the classic ‘superstrategies’ of politeness postulated by Brown and Levinson
(1987) to create his ‘impoliteness superstrategies’. Unfortunately, space limitations do
not allow for an extensive treatment of these developments here, but, in this regard,
Dynel (2013, 2015) and Haugh (2015) provide authoritative surveys.
One tenet that is agreed upon across the board is that sarcasm is communicated via an
inferable proposition which is not stated directly. This has been called a ‘conversational
implicature’ by Grice (1975), and exactly how and why such constructs are delivered by
Wonka constitutes the main focus here. In fact, sarcastic ‘implicatures’ are achieved
through ‘exaggeration, metaphor … (and) prosodic variation (which intimate) that the
provocation is not to be taken at face value’ (Culpeper, 2011: 166). Implicatures are not
solely restricted to the verbal channel but can be expressed by other means (cf. Loveday
and Kitamura (2016) for how the Japanese employ silent pauses to give indirect hints to
addressees to make sense of a speaker’s intended meaning). Simply put, for sarcasm to
be constructed and construed, it must incorporate implicit suggestions which reverse the
premises contained in an utterance. Such manipulation transgresses the Gricean maxim
of quality, which requires that speakers do not say things which they believe are false and
which Grice posited as a basic condition for conversation to work effectively. It should
be noted that a single utterance can simultaneously violate different maxims, so that in
the analysis which follows the same component of Wonka’s discourse will be shown to
involve more than one maxim infraction.
The distinction between the terms irony and sarcasm is still a matter of considerable
academic contention. Although both terms are usually taken as conveying a meaning that
contradicts the literal one expressed on the surface, sarcasm is increasingly viewed as a
sub-type of irony. This is because (a) sarcasm always implies a speaker’s awareness of
the falsehood of the proposition embodied in the utterance and (b) sarcasm suggests a
speaker’s contempt, which can trigger social conflict.
Current research argues against the popular denunciation of sarcasm as ‘the lowest
form of wit’ and instead stresses the complexity of its cognitive processing (Huang
et al., 2015). This fact is indirectly reflected in the Hollywood preference for British
actors to perform the role of a sarcastic villain due to a presumed association of intel-
lectual sophistication with the English upper-class accent. Equally significant are the
neurobiological findings of Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2005), who demonstrate that the
ability to interpret social cues and the acquisition of a ‘theory of mind’ are fundamen-
tal requirements for the successful decoding of sarcasm. Consequently, small children
experience difficulty in grasping that sarcasm is not a lie because of ‘their difficulties
in inferring the speaker’s belief and intentions’ (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005: 288),
and seem to need emphatic cues such as a special tone of voice or rolling eyes in order
to recognise it. Recent research further suggests that it is only from adolescence
onwards that sarcasm starts to be successfully perceived (Brant, 2012). It is signifi-
cant that autistic children have trouble in identifying irony due to their inability to
attribute mental states to others.
Loveday 89
A related strand of (im)politeness studies has been on banter, termed mock impolite-
ness by Leech (2014), which refers to the jocular use of offensive language.² While Haugh
and Bousfield (2012) view jocular mockery as forming a continuum between solidarity
and aggression, going from face-enhancing to face-destroying, I find it inappropriate to
label Wonka’s verbal output as banter. However, banter, according to its everyday meta-
linguistic sense, involves insult-laden talk intended as a form of affectionate teasing and
normally employed as a strategy of ‘mock impoliteness for social harmony’ (Culpeper,
1996: 357). It is typically brutal in its direct offensiveness and draws on vulgar and often
obscene language to deliver its punches. Consequently, it is a completely different ball-
game from Wonka’s highly polished register, emphatic lack of affinity with his guests and
his rigid maintenance of clinical formality in the face of agonising crises. As demonstrated
below, Wonka skates on thin ice between inferable aggression and indifferent matter-of-
factness, albeit of an outrageously amoral kind. It is precisely the inability to pragmati-
cally pin down the level of intentionality between Wonka’s menacing implicatures that
gives them their bite and shock appeal. After due consideration, I have come to the con-
clusion that Wonka engages in sarcasm proper and that it occurs when the characters to
whom it is directed, together with the reader, realise that overt dissonance exists between
the literal meaning of an utterance and the deducible implicatures it generates.
It is surprising to note that the copious amount of malevolent impoliteness occurring
in English children’s fiction has hardly received any academic attention. Only a handful
of researchers have probed into this unexpected narratological construct, such as the
examination by Salsa (1994) into the cheekiness of Carroll’s Alice in a time when chil-
dren were to be seen and rarely heard, together with the study by Schneebeli (2013) into
the abnormal degree of rudeness displayed by the fantasy creatures appearing in the same
work, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.
This paper investigates the horrific innuendo expressed by the major character of
Wonka, through the lens of impolite implicatures, with the aim of demonstrating how prag-
matic resources serve literary characterisation (see Bousfield, 2008; Culpeper, 2001).
While Haugh (2015) has devoted an entire volume to Im/polite Implicatures, he does not
deal with the literary context. Recently, however, McIntyre and Bousfield (2017) have
extensively surveyed the analytical value of impoliteness, stressing that the violation of
interactional norms by characters may contribute to ‘conflict, dramatic tension, plot devel-
opment (and) humour’ (759). Additionally, Kizelbach (2017) provides a review of the
application of im/politeness in the domain of Shakespearean studies and 18th century lit-
erature. In this connection it is worth considering that while Dahl composed Wonka’s
offensive speech-style most likely to serve as entertaining schoolboy jocularity, mature
readers tend to find its degree of sadistic sarcasm too bone-chilling to accept simply as a bit
of fun and games. Indeed, Roald Dahl once justified his controversial narratives of aggres-
sion by maintaining that children had a coarser sense of humour and were ‘basically more
cruel’ than adults (West, 1988: 75) to vindicate his passion for depicting brutality.
the hands of both teachers and fellow pupils at boarding school. Without doubt, there lies
a connection between the callousness displayed by Willy Wonka towards his guests and
the barbaric attitude of those in authority who occupied the educational institutions Dahl
attended.
There was a succession of deeply disturbing experiences which brought Dahl to the
point where he became fixated on the morbid and macabre. When he was three, Dahl’s
father died of pneumonia and then at nine he was separated from his family to be packed
off to boarding school. It is worth noting that the father of Charlie, the hero, makes all
but the briefest of appearances in the tale, his role supplanted by a grandfather who
accompanies him on the factory tour. On top of a troubled childhood at school, Dahl had
to confront many other forms of physical distress, such as his nose being almost wholly
severed from his face in a car accident when he was 10. Later, when working as a fighter
pilot for the Royal Airforce, he was forced to crash-land his plane in the Libyan Desert,
which involved not only his nose being damaged once more but also the fracturing of
his skull, severe facial burns and nearly crippling spinal injuries. Above all, the plane
crash exercised a negative effect on Dahl’s mind: ‘Nowadays doctors might well have
diagnosed Dahl as suffering from what is called “post-concussive syndrome” … His
sense of embarrassment – already minimal – was further diminished, his sense of fan-
tasy heightened, while his desire to shock became even more pronounced’ (Sturrock,
2010: 135–136).
In addition, Dahl was dealt more than his fair share of misfortune during his adult
family life. As a father, he lost his first daughter at the age of seven to measles; his
baby son suffered severe brain damage after a car accident and his first wife was struck
down by a paralysing intracranial aneurysm that left her unable to walk, properly talk
or even see.
One of his fondest childhood memories involved playing a naughty prank with a dead
rat on a tuck shop owner. This resulted in severe corporal punishment and being singled
out for his defiant attitude as ‘the cheekiest of the bloomin’ lot’ (Dahl, 1982b: 49).
Probably the most salient biographical element which features in Charlie is the fact that,
while at school, Dahl was given the regular task of critically tasting new products that
were being developed for the Cadbury company. Moreover, in Dahl’s autobiography he
confesses that, since his earliest days, ‘sweets were [his] life blood’ (Dahl, 1964: 34) and
that, as a teenager, he often daydreamed about concocting new candy flavours
I have no doubt at all that, thirty-five years later, when I was looking for a plot for my second
book for children, I remembered those little cardboard boxes and the newly-invented chocolates
inside them, and I began to write a book called Charlie and the Chocolate Factory (Dahl,
1982b: 149).
The name Willy Wonka also originated in his childhood and derived from a boomerang
an older brother had crafted for him and which he christened ‘Skilly Wonka’. Much later,
Dahl declared that by ‘changing two letters only I arrived at Willy Wonka’ (Dahl, 2011).
The usual pattern is for a person’s name to be applied to an object in order to humanise it,
but the opposite onomastic direction from object to human is rare indeed. Just as a boo-
merang knocks out prey while leaving its thrower unharmed, harrowing ‘accidents’
Loveday 91
successively take out the flawed children but leave Wonka and his production intact. The
alliterative patterning of the name provides genuine comic appeal, but it also evokes an
association with the colloquial adjective ‘wonky’, denoting something ‘uneven’ and
‘imbalanced’; was this a private allusion to a warped and twisted personality?
Certain critics, such as Chalou (2007) and Rasmussen (2005), claim that Dahl’s grue-
some vision in Charlie is the execution of divine punishment for such deadly sins as
gluttony, sloth, pride, anger and envy, which are embodied individually or combined in
the figures of the children who are eliminated. However, Dahl emphatically defined him-
self as an atheist due to the catalogue of agonies he had to endure during his life and
adamantly denied any suggestions that he had attempted to craft a morality play with
Christian allegoricism.
Dahl at the selection of the goofy US performer, Gene Wilder, for the role of Wonka in
the 1971 film adaptation because the latter did not correspond to his vision of the quin-
tessential Englishman who possessed a specific sardonic enunciation.
When cast for the role of Wonka, the fastidious actor Gene Wilder accepted it on the
condition that he make his first entrance with baffling panache:
When I make my first entrance, I’d like to come out of the door carrying a cane and then walk
toward the crowd with a limp. After the crowd sees Willy Wonka is a cripple, they all whisper
to themselves and then become deathly quiet. As I walk toward them, my cane sinks into one
of the cobblestones I’m walking on and stands straight up, by itself; but I keep on walking, until
I realize that I no longer have my cane. I start to fall forward, and just before I hit the ground, I
do a beautiful forward somersault and bounce back up, to great applause (Perkins, 2012).
Most telling of all is Wilder’s further clarification that this opening act would demon-
strate to the audience that ‘from that time on, no one will know if I’m lying or telling the
truth’ (Perkins, 2012). The disturbing ambivalence of this opening performance encapsu-
lates the enigma running throughout the narrative: to what extent Wonka is guilty of
deception.
Additionally, it is interesting to observe how verbal aggression as a mode of contem-
porary entertainment has transformed television celebrities such as quiz and talent show
hosts into popular ‘villains’ of mass culture whom viewers love to hate. While provoking
humorous reactions, the application of sarcasm can significantly boost the authority of a
speaker (Culpeper, 2005). Among its infamous practitioners are the likes of Anne
Robinson, who hosted The Weakest Link, and Simon Cowell, the caustic judge on
American Idol and The X Factor, both of whom have gained notoriety for their abrasive
treatment of contestants. It is interesting to compare these real-life intimidating inquisi-
tors with Willy Wonka’s sarcastic treatment of the ticket-winners and how it bolsters his
superior position. Throughout Charlie, power asymmetry conspires with sarcasm in
order to inflate the degree of psychological pain inflicted by Wonka.
3. RELATION: be relevant.
4. MANNER: avoid ambiguity.
Since its original publication, Grice’s account has been expanded and supplemented
by various theorists.³ Leech (1983), for instance, came up with his own six maxims of
politeness, each of which are discernibly violated by Wonka. For example:
Culpeper and Terkourafi (2017: 27) have recently called Grice’s formulations ‘lousy’
because meaning is ‘co-constructed’, ‘not a stable private act’ and ‘social implications
are conveyed in addition to implicatures’. In his defence, it needs to be recalled that
Grice originally intended his formulations only as a tentative and exploratory explana-
tion of conversational exchanges on a philosophical level and never claimed that it
accounted for all verbal behaviour. This study aims to demonstrate how the Gricean
model still has a lot going for it when it comes to the practical analysis of a text within
the domain of literary stylistics. For me, Grice’s classic stipulation concerning conversa-
tional implicatures offers the most insightful and illuminating tool for unravelling the
pragmatic dynamics behind Wonka’s literary characterisation. Significantly, corrobora-
tion for the psychological validity of Gricean maxims has come from research by Eskritt
et al. (2008), who discovered that even preschoolers as young as three possess an aware-
ness of the Cooperative Principle and show sensitivity to its violation.
5 Madness or malice?
The exasperating challenge for those taking part in the tour is their inability to gain a
sufficient confirmation as to whether Wonka is deliberately violating the Cooperative
Principle as a covert abuser or whether he is incapable of observing it due to some men-
tal disorder. Thus, if Wonka were conclusively out of his mind, he could then not be held
responsible for his sadistic innuendo and thereby escape the charge of villainy. While
young children sometimes produce offensive comments due to their inexperience and
ignorance of pragmatic implications, they are usually excused for their conversational
gaucheness and impolite outspokenness because of their lack of experience. Furthermore,
in real life such pragmatic exoneration is also extended to the mentally handicapped, the
elderly suffering from dementia and even the inebriated. Above all, the most perturbing
aspect of Wonka’s discourse is his emphatic indifference to the urgency of the situation
and his refusal to take any responsibility and express any sympathy, in addition to a
94 Language and Literature 27(2)
barely disguised delight in the suffering of his guests. The conclusion made by the visi-
tors very early on is that Wonka must be suffering from insanity:
‘He’s gone off his rocker!’ shouted one of the fathers, aghast, and the other parents joined in the
chorus of frightened shouting.
‘He’s balmy!’
‘He’s nutty!’
Paradoxically, by reporting the parents’ diagnosis in such a way, Dahl encourages the
reader to suspend judgement and absolve Wonka’s violation of conversational norms.
The reader is subliminally persuaded not to take the visitors’ diagnosis as accurate but to
give Wonka the benefit of the doubt regarding the intentions behind his interactional
style. In fact, throughout the novella Dahl never offers any clarification of whether
Wonka is consciously violating Gricean maxims or not.
little journey’ is much more than a superficial rendering of the British stiff upper lip. His
utterance aggravates the suffering of the Gloops instead of reducing it. Moreover, the
semantic mitigation expressed in ‘a little journey’ inversely functions on the illocutionary
level as an ominous forewarning, suggestive of a fatal outcome. More unsympathetic
downgrading is added by the dismissive understatement ‘that’s all’ to refer to the mortal
danger in which Augustus is placed. The ‘just’ in the assurance that ‘he’ll come out of it
just fine’ equivocally implies either that he will emerge unharmed or that, similar to the
completion of a recipe, he will be perfectly reconstituted as factory confectionery, an
intolerable prospect for any parent. Throughout this episode Dahl invites us to relish Mrs
Gloop’s reactions of snapping, shrieking, screaming and crying out in response to Wonka’s
total defiance of the Gricean Cooperation principle.4
Above all, Wonka’s glacial callousness reaches its heights with his off-hand farewell
to Mr and Mrs Gloop: ‘I’ll see you later’, which ends their interaction in Chapter 17. This
curt sendoff omits any expression of commiseration about what has happened to their
son and constitutes a hurtful violation of the quantity maxim; it eerily echoes the imperi-
ous voice of a teacher simply dismissing students at the end of class.
‘And I do promise you, madam, that your darling boy is perfectly safe’ (italics mine) (82).
The employment of the italicised term of endearment in this pledge implies that
Augustus is really a pest. Even though a written text cannot provide access to intonation,
which constitutes one of the primary cues for detecting sarcasm in speech, readers with
a feeling for British English patterns of tone, pitch and melody can almost hear Wonka’s
contemptuous suppression of the fundamental frequency in the stressed syllable of
ˈdarling. In addition to the sarcastic effect of the prolongation of the first accented syl-
lable of this word, it is highly likely that many readers would internally ‘hear’ a certain
degree of nasalisation together with extra slow delivery when they imagine Wonka artic-
ulating darling. The subvocal application of such prosodic features contributes to the
inversion of the semantic value of positive words and thereby flouts the quality maxim.
In a similar vein of sarcasm, the appearance of the hyperbole perfectly in the above
utterance flagrantly compromises the truth. After his half-hearted attempt to reassure
Mrs Gloop, Wonka immediately summons his workers to hurry and extricate Augustus
from the boiler. If Augustus was so perfectly unharmed, why would Wonka immediately
command the Oompa-Loompas to rush to his rescue? All too soon, the penny drops: it is
to protect Wonka fudge from being ruined. Wonka’s panic, expressed in exclamation
96 Language and Literature 27(2)
marks by Dahl, cancels out the potential truth value of his earlier commissive speech act
that Augustus is safe:
‘Go straight to the Fudge Room … and when you get there, take a long stick and start poking
around inside the big chocolate-mixing barrel. I’m almost certain you’ll find him in there. But
you’d better look sharp! You’ll have to hurry! If you leave him in the chocolate-mixing barrel
too long, he’s liable to get poured out into the fudge boiler, and that really would be a disaster,
wouldn’t it? My fudge would become quite uneatable!’ (italics mine) (Dahl, 1964: 83).
‘I’m joking,’ said Mr Wonka, giggling madly behind his beard. ‘I didn’t mean it. Forgive me. I’m
so sorry. Good-bye, Mrs Gloop! And Mr Gloop! Good-bye! I’ll see you later…’ (Dahl, 1964: 83).
On top of this, Wonka’s cavalier recitation of the mitigating formula ‘I’m so sorry’
smacks of semantic inversion. It implicitly signals indifference to the boy’s disappearance.
Wonka’s apparent placatoriness would be appropriate if addressed to someone who had
failed their driving test rather than having lost a son but, on the contrary, this hollow-sound-
ing apology throws up the question of whether Wonka is capable of any empathy at all.
When Dahl describes Wonka as ‘giggling madly behind his beard’ during his farewell
to the Gloops, readers are presented with a non-verbal indication of Wonka’s warped
attitude which seriously contests the truthfulness of his repeated apologies. Most of all,
the incongruity of giggling while expressing remorse undermines sincerity and implies
irresponsibility. Not only does it highlight a distressing contradiction between Wonka’s
words and thinking, it also throws a spotlight onto the existence of sarcasm, which young
children lacking in metalinguistic awareness find so difficult to register.
‘Because the taste would be terrible,’ said Mr Wonka. ‘Just imagine it! Augustus-flavoured
chocolate-coated Gloop! No one would buy it.’ (Dahl, 1964: 82).
Wonka flouts the maxim of relation with his response that ‘the taste would be terri-
ble’. For one moment before this riposte it almost looked as if the chocolatier was capa-
ble of some empathy and willing to save Augustus from being turned into fudge. Instead,
Wonka’s response concerning how terrible Augustus would taste contains a diabolical
implicature involving the commodification of human life. By blatantly responding with-
out regard for Mrs Gloop’s feelings, Wonka displays a shocking lack of both conscience
and compassion. He sets up numerous amoral implicatures, for example that the taste of
his fudge takes precedence over human life, the tragedy of Augustus’ death is inconse-
quential and, most heinous of all, cannibalism is acceptable. Furthermore, his response
incorporates a pragmatic twist that turns sarcasm on its head. Instead of drawing upon
the metaphorical distaste for a person, as sarcasm typically does, Wonka declares that
Augustus literally tastes awful. Then he goes even further by equating him with a faulty
ingredient that would damage the company’s product quality and dehumanises him with
the third person singular: ‘No one would buy it’ (italics mine).
clarity from the highest authority over the factory operation process. Moreover, Wonka’s
employment of the positive adjective ‘interesting’ in this context implies an abnormally
detached way of viewing the matter.
Grice included the value of conciseness in this maxim, but Wonka consistently disre-
gards it. To everyone’s distress, he revels in linguistic repetition at the most disturbing
moments. For instance, the reiteration of the minimising metaphor of ‘a little journey’
insidiously rubs more salt in Mrs Gloop’s wound. Over and over again Wonka exploits
this manner of aggravating his interlocutors’ pain as, for example, when he declares:
‘There is no danger! No danger whatsoever!’ The more Wonka repeats himself, the less
truthful his solace sounds. The utterance ‘I didn’t mean it. Forgive me. I’m so sorry’
(Dahl, 1964: 83) seems to cruelly imply the opposite. Wonka’s reiterations and grating
vagueness create the impression of an unruffled manner of business-as-usual approach in
the face of the gravest of circumstances.
7 Conclusion
This research has focussed on how, during the first tragi-comic calamity to occur in
Charlie and the Chocolate Factory, Wonka breaks every rule in Grice’s book. It provides
an illustration of how Gricean maxims actually underpin literary characterisation, espe-
cially when it comes to the depiction of an ambivalent villain and his torrent of veiled
torment. Wonka’s discourse is composed of a deliciously mystifying equivocality that
defies his absolutely conclusive identification as a villain. This study has identified how
Wonka inhumanely fails to comply with the Cooperative Principle in the following ways:
away with surrealistic murder. Wonka’s covert verbal abuse is allowed to triumph over
children’s naughtiness as his shrouded predatory nature is given the benefit of the doubt.
Ultimately, the reader learns that villainous attributes deriving from sarcastic implica-
tures can be exonerated when deeply flawed children need to be straightened out, fantas-
tic technology screws up and goodness prevails. The extraordinary genius of Dahl is that
an ambivalently malevolent character who profoundly lacks empathy made Charlie and
the Chocolate Factory his most popular work and elevated it to the stature of an all-time
classic of English children’s literature.5
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.
Notes
1. Dahl’s novella offers intriguing correspondences with another children’s classic,
Struwwelpeter, which was written in German by the psychiatrist Heinrich Hoffman (1845).
This overtly didactic book of limerick-style verse sets out the tragi-comic fates of 10 naughty
children with a horrific dose of Schadenfreude. Many similarities exist between the two
works, such as the fact that Dahl’s early draft of Charlie lined up a group of 10 children, the
same as the number in Hoffman’s set, although Dahl eventually reduced this number to five.
Hoffman’s work also featured a fat boy named Augustus, who dies from refusing to eat up
his soup, unlike the Augustus in Charlie whose misdemeanour is to disobediently overin-
dulge himself in liquid chocolate. An English translation appeared as early as 1848 and went
through numerous editions, while a Norwegian translation came out in 1921, both of which
Dahl could have had access to.
2. Culpeper et al. (2017b: 324) provide a comprehensive survey of research into banter, for
which a multiplicity of labels have been proposed, including ‘jocular abuse’, ‘under polite-
ness’ and ‘over politeness’ and even ‘mock politeness’.
3. Unfortunately, due to space limitations, I can only briefly mention here important revisions
to Grice’s model of everyday conversation based on the principle of mutual cooperation. In
fact, I totally agree with Pinker’s (2007) observation that pure cooperation is an unrealistic
idealisation or naive assumption, but it nevertheless forms the underlying principle according
to which conversation is tacitly constructed. This principle has been, of course, violated and
exploited for all kinds of purposes since the dawn of human history. Its validity is evident
in the fact that verbal aggression can only work because it is recognised and interpreted as
a denial of the implementation of the Cooperative Principle (CP). One of the first revisions
to Grice’s model began with Horn’s (1984) argument that all Gricean maxims (except that
of quality) should be collapsed into the Q(uantity) principle and the R(elation) principle.
Another revision was offered in the Relevance Theory postulated by Sperber and Wilson
(1995), where hints purposefully dropped by a speaker bear on the interpretation of utter-
ances, which takes into account the interactants’ cognitive and contextual factors. Levinson
(2000) argues for a highly logical distinction between the minimisation of content and the
100 Language and Literature 27(2)
minimisation of form by postulating the Q-principle as ‘Do not provide a statement that is
informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows, unless providing a stronger
statement would contravene the I-principle’ (76) and the I-principle as ‘Say as little as neces-
sary, that is produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve your communi-
cational ends (bearing the Q-principle in mind)’ (114). Currently, second and third wave (im)
politeness models have distanced themselves from Gricean formulations to concentrate on
the processes of the interpretation of the hearer and the co-construction of meaning. Recently,
Terkourafi (2015) has introduced the notion of conventionalisation as a three-way relation-
ship between expressions, context and speaker.
4. I thank one of my reviewer’s for pointing out that Wonka is also engaged here in the violation
of Leech’s (1983) tact maxim, which requires speakers to minimise the expression of beliefs
which imply cost to another.
5. According to the findings of a 2012 survey conducted by the University of Worcester, Charlie
and the Chocolate Factory ranked as the fourth most popular book for British adults to
have read as children, after Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, The Lion, the Witch and the
Wardrobe and The Wind in The Willows (The Telegraph, 2012).
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102 Language and Literature 27(2)
Author biography
Leo Loveday has been Graduate School Professor of English Linguistics at the Faculty of Letters
of Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan, since 1991. He obtained his PhD in Sociolinguistics from
Essex University in 1990 and holds a Master of Philosophy in Linguistics from Cambridge
University (1979) and B.A. in Modern Languages from Bradford University (1977). He is the
author of three books: The Sociolinguistics of Learning and Using a Non-Native Language,
Oxford: Pergamon (1982); Explorations in Japanese Sociolinguistics, Amsterdam: John Benjamins
(1986) and Language Contact in Japan, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1996). He has published
extensively in international journals and books specialising in semiotics, applied and anthropologi-
cal linguistics, pragmatics, mass media and multilingualism. His first study of the literary con-
struction of a sarcastic villain, Captain Hook in Peter Pan, appeared in Ways of Being in Literary
and Cultural Spaces in 2016 published by Cambridge Scholars Press, for which he was also the
co-editor.