TOGUAY, Paul Jeffrey U.

2019-80129
Block 4

Due to the above considerations, and not finding any error in the appealed judgment, we confirm it in
all its parts with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.

Citation G.R. No. L-46896

Date January 15, 1940

Petitioner EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS

Respondent PABLO SAN JUAN y MONTEROSA

PRINCIPLES/ 1. The jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila, in cases of theft, is

DOCTRINES determined, not by the penalty, but by the amount of the stolen and, when
it does not exceed P200, said Court has jurisdiction whatever the penalty
for the crime.

2. Conviction cannot, with the conviction in the present case, integrate the
concept of habitual crime. In the cause of the People of the Islands
Philippines v. Manuel Abuyen and Elais (52 Jur. Fil., 749), this Court I
declare that "... the provisions of Law No. 3397 on habitual delinquency are
applicable to the offenses listed therein, provided for and punished by the
Penal Code not only in degree of consummated but also frustrated and
attempted.”

VILLA-REAL, J.:

FACTS:
Pablo San Juan was convicted of theft of 5 bags of rice valued at Php 32.00 by the Municipal
Court of Manila, sentencing Pablo of imprisonment of six (6) months arresto mayor in its maximum
period and ordering him to pay Php 32.00. Also Pablo was sentenced to an additional penalty of seven
(7) years, four(4) months and one(1) day of prision mayor for habitual delinquency

He elevated the case to the Court of First Instance which, in turn, decided to sentence him for
the same penalty.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the accused-appellant for the crime of theft alleged in the
information should have been at most, arresto mayor in its medium degree that is from two (2)
months and one (1) day to four months.

2. Whether or not the Municipal Court of Manila loses jurisdiction as it imposes an additional penalty
of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one(1) day of prision mayor for habitual delinquency.

RULING:

1. NO. The penalty imposed upon Pablo for the crime of theft alleged in the information should not
have been at most, arresto mayor in its medium degree that is from two (2) months and one (1) day to
four months because Pablo’s habitual delinqucy must be appreciated which presupposes recidivism
which is a serious circumstance modifying criminal responsibility, the concurrence of said
circumstance must be appreciated, therefore the repeated penalty provided by law must be imposed to
its maximum degree. Not having attended any mitigating circumstance that compensates it, the main
penalty imposed by the sentencing Court, which is the object of this appeal, is adjusted to the law.

2. No. The Municipal Court of Manila does not lose jurisdiction as in the information is clear as to the
amount Pablo stole was PhP 32.00, which did not exceed Php 200.00.

The jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila, in cases of

theft, is determined, not by the penalty, but by the amount of
the stolen and, when it does not exceed P200, said Court has
jurisdiction whatever the penalty for the crime.

In the case at bar, the Municipal Court of Manila does not lose jurisdiction over the case due to
the additional penalty it imposed on Pablo for being habitual delinquent as what determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the amount stolen which does not exceeds Php 200.00. Here, Pablo’s fine
liability is only limited to Php 32.00 which is the amount he stole. Thus, Municipal Trial Court has
Jurisdiction over the case.
TRANSLATION:
It is intended by the appellant that, not having proven that any mitigating circumstance or
article 39, case 5, of the Revised Penal Code, has occurred in the commission of the crime, that is, one
month and one day to six months of arresto mayor, must be imposed on your degree half that is, two
months and one day to four months of arrest mayor, instead of the maximum degree of the
aforementioned penalty, which the Lower court.

As the defendant and appellant is the offender habitual, which presupposes recidivism which is
a serious circumstance modifying criminal responsibility, the concurrence of said circumstance must
be appreciated, therefore the repeated penalty provided by law must be imposed to its maximum
degree. Not having attended any mitigating circumstance that compensates it, the main penalty
imposed by the sentencing Court, which is the object of this appeal, is adjusted to the law.

It is also sustained by the appellant in his second submission of alleged error that the additional
penalty of seven years, four months and a day of major prison, imposed by the Municipal Court of
Manila by to be called the accused and appellant a habitual delinquent, is against the law, since said
Municipal Court of Manila did not have jurisdiction to impose said additional penalty. In the cause of
the People of Philippines v. Liberato del Mundo, R. G. No. 46531, this Court in Judgment issued on
October 18, 1939, said the following:

We have declared in the case of "The People of Philippines v. Jesus Acha y Rivera "(R. G. No.
46714) that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila, in cases of theft, is determined, not by
the penalty, but by the amount of the stolen and, when it does not exceed P200, said Court has
jurisdiction whatever the penalty for the crime.

According to this last sentence, the fact that the accused and appellant is a habitual delinquent,
a condition that makes him a liable to additional penalty, does not disqualify the Municipal Court of
Manila for know of a cause in which such a condition is alleged, as long as the crime of which he is
accused is theft and the value of the stolen thing does not exceeds P200.

Conviction cannot, with the conviction in the present case, integrate the concept of habitual
crime. In the cause of the People of the Islands Philippines v. Manuel Abuyen and Elais (52 Jur. Fil.,
749), this Court I declare that "... the provisions of Law No. 3397 on habitual delinquency are
applicable to the offenses listed therein, provided for and punished by the Penal Code not only in
degree of consummated but also frustrated and attempted. "
 Due to the above considerations, and not finding any error in the appealed judgment, we
confirm it in all its parts with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.