Malabang Case

Petitioners – mayor ng malabang, respondents – mayor ng balabagan

Formerly, balabagan was part of the municipality of malabang. However, by virtue of e.o. 386, it was created separately
from the municipality of malabang

The petitioners brought this action to nullify said e.o and to enjoin the resp from performing their respective duties and
functions. The petitoners were relying on the palaez doctrine:
that section 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it gives the President the power to create municipalities, is
unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (b) because it offends against
section 10 (1) of article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President's power over local governments to mere
supervision

respondents contended that palaez doctrine can have no application bec the municipalities involved are different here in
this case such that balabagan is a de facto corp. having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared
unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its
corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action.

Hence, given na de facto, its existence cant be directly or collateraly attacked by private persons, only in a few cases.
Only by the state.

Issue: WON balabagan is a de facto corp

Held: No

Ratio: a de facto  corporation cannot exist where the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional because there can be
no de facto corporation where there can be no de jure one. while others hold otherwise on the theory that a statute is
binding until it is condemned as unconstitutional. 

However, in an article in Yale, an analysis was made to reconcile the conflicting views. The pertinent portion of the
analysis relevant to the case is that An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a time
by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void;  provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other valid
law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or constitution of the state.

  In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it
was later invalidated, there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization.

mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it
a de facto corporation, because there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.

"An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it
is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Hence e. 386 created no office.

no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would have the
effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality
Padilla v Comelec

WON the plebiscite was validly conducted and WON kasama ung mga nakatira sa parent municipality of labo, CN

YES

It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it
means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof
have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the
plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. 10 Logically, those to be included in such political areas
are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312.

Grino v Comelec

WON makakaboto sila

YES

The Commission was under mistaken presumption that under Section 462 of the 1991 Local Government Code,
whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in a plebiscite, the
President will fill up the positions of provincial officials through appointment until their successors shall have
been elected and qualified. The law however is clear that in case of a negative vote, the elected officials of the
sub-province only shall be appointed by the President. The law did not provide that the President shall also
appoint provincial officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the people of the sub-province of
Guimaras shall continue to be represented by the provincial officials of the province of Iloilo elected at large by
registered voters of Iloilo province including the sub-province of Guimaras

Alvarez v Guingona

Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual
income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city, - YES

The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The
IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local
government unit.11 They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much
needed funds.

League of Cities v COMELEC

. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; - YES

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. 18 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same
uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code

Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To
be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.

Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The
exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision
contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not
exempted.

League of Cities vs COMELEC 2011

WON city hood laws clearly violate?

(ditto tiningnan na nila mismo kung fair ba and just ung 100 million na rqmt)

My respectful suggestion is for the Senate to request the House to do what they want to do regarding the applications of
certain municipalities to become cities pursuant to the requirements of the Local Government Code. Only after the House
shall have completed what they are expected to do under the law would it be proper for the Senate to act on specific bills
creating cities.

In other words, the House should be requested to finish everything that needs to be done in the matter of converting
municipalities into cities and not do it piecemeal as they are now trying to do under the joint resolution.

The petitioners further contend that the new income requirement of ₱100 million from locally generated sources
is not arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with; - WRONG SABI NI COURT

As indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59) existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an average
annual income of ₱100 million based on the figures contained in the certification dated December 5, 2008 by the Bureau
of Local Government. The large number of existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply with the ₱100
million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and probably unwarranted for the
petitioners to claim that the ₱100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply with.

municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated the threshold income of ₱100 million from local sources,
including those already converted into cities, are either in Metro Manila or in provinces close to Metro Manila.

municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different provinces of the Philippines,

reality underscores the danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent, i.e., that "the metropolis-located local
governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city
compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever

Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of ₱100 million from local sources under R.A. No. 9009
was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of ₱100 million, no research or empirical
data buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were
likely to arise.

Navarro v Ermita (2011) liberal construction

Issue: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that
the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the
exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and

It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic
viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the
LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its
collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them
should enjoy preferential consideration. ECONOMIC VIABILITY

It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not
a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces,
the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are
provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is
exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly
stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity
and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to
achieve the desired results

These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain decentralization and
countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new
law, now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic
country. This accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of local government units composed of one or
more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities
and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing
detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.

Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity
and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to
achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be
counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of
several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and
municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and
442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000
square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive
preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands — and negate the greater
imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the
constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of
a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land
mass.

Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the
purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should
be read together with territorial contiguity.

What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in
showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of ₱82,696,433.23 at the
time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of ₱20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province

City of Pasig v COMELEC

So dineclare ni pasig as separate na barangay si karangalan tsaka si napico. Nagissue ng ordinance si pasig regarding
ditto.

Nalaman ni Cainta and it moved to suspend yung plebiscite on the ground that the proposed barangays involve areas
included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case

The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico
should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local governments.

whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the
City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite
for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds

. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.

Kananga v Madrona
In their respective Memoranda, both parties raise the lone issue of whether respondent court may exercise original
jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.

YES

Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power and the authority to hear and determine a cause. the established rule
is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court."

Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the Complaint is Section 118 of the 1991 Local
Government Code (LGC),

Sec 118 applies when a boundary dispute arises between a component city or municipality and a highly
urbanized city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure
referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.

Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of boundary
disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, respondent court committed
no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all
controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers.21 They have the power not only to take judicial
cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at
that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.

Calanza v Paper Industries

This is not a case where the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur jointly rendered a
decision. the RTC cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case since there was no petition that was filed and
decided by the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Neither can the RTC assume original
jurisdiction since LGC allocates such power to the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur

Moreover, petitioners’ small-scale mining permits are legally questionable. In the case under consideration, petitioners
filed their small-scale mining permits on 23 August 1991, making them bound by the procedures provided for under the
applicable and prevailing statute, Republic Act No. 7076. Instead of processing and obtaining their permits from the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, petitioners were able to get the same from the governor of Davao del Norte.
Considering that the governor is without legal authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits are null and void.