Persons- Arts.

68 Cases

Lacson vs San-Jose Lacson

Petitioner: Alfonso Lacson
Respondent: Carmen San Jose-Lacson and the Court of Appeals
Nos. L-23482 (Aug. 30, 1968); L-23767 (Aug. 30, 1968) ; L-24259 (Aug. 30, 1968)
Ponente: Justice Castro (Note that this case is a consolidation of three cases)
FACTS:
Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson were married in 1953 in Bacolod. They had four
children: Enrique, Maria Teresa, Gerrard, and Ramon (herein listed in birth order). In 1963, Carmen left
Bacolod and resided in Manila. In March 1963, she filed a complaint to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court (JDRC) of Manila, claiming custody of all her children as well as support for him and for
herself.
In April 1963 (while the complaint in the JRDC was pending), the spouses managed to reach an
amicable settlement respecting custody, support, and separation for property. They then filed a joint
petition to the CFI of Negros Occidental. The said settlement provides that: (a) the spouses have mutually
agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership, (b) there will be separation of property, such that each
spouse shall own, dispose of, and enjoy such separate estate as they may acquire without the consent of
the other, (c) the custody of the two elder children, Enrique and Maria Teresa, shall be given to Alfonso
while the younger children, Gerrard and Ramon, to Carmen (d) that Alfonso shall pay Carmen a monthly
allowance of P200 for the support of the children in her custody, and (e) that each spouse shall have
reciprocal visitation rights, and that during this year’s summer months, all four children shall be in the
custody of Carmen, provided that she turns over Enrique and Maria Teresa to Alfonso on or before June
15, 1963, and (f) that they have no creditors.
The CFI rendered judgment approving the agreement. In compliance, Alfonso turned over the
four children to Carmen, and remitted money for their support. Thereafter, in June 1963, Carmen filed a
motion to the JRDC wherein she alleged that she entered into the agreement solely to get immediate
custody of her children, who at that time were all below seven. Alfonso opposed the motion, and the
JRDC dismissed Carmen’s case, citing bar by prior judgment. Carmen then went to the CA to appeal,
wherein she again alleged that the only reason why she entered into the agreement was to gain immediate
custody of her children (1st Case)
She also filed a motion to the CFI, praying that the CFI reconsider its decision on the agreement
and that she be relieved of her part in the agreement. In response, Alfonso filed a petition to the CFI,
contesting Carmen’s petition and praying for the execution of the CFI’s judgment approving the petition.
Alfonso also charged Carmen for contempt. The CFI rendered a decision, granting Alfonso’s motion for
execution and holding that if Carmen fails to turn over Enrique and Maria Teresa to Alfonso by June 29,
1963, she may be charged for contempt. Carmen also appealed this judgment to the CA (2nd Case)
Finally, Carmen also filed a petition for certiorari to the CA, claiming that the CFI gravely abused
its discretion in issuing the immediate execution of the compromise agreement. She thus sought for a writ
of preliminary injunction, and also prayed that she be given custody of Enrique and Maria Teresa. The
CA thus issued a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the CFI from executing the compromise
agreement. Despite opposition from Alfonso, the CA granted Carmen’s petition and nullified (a) the
compromise agreement between the spouses, and (b) the CFI’s orders for execution. Hence, Alfonso filed
the present appeal to the SC (3rd case; main case discussed by the SC)
ISSUES:
-W/N the compromise agreement entered by the spouses in April 1963 were conformable to law in terms
of:
O Separation of property (YES)
O Custody of Children (NO)

RULING (Note: The law in force at this time is the CIVIL CODE)
- On Separation of Property: The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership provided that judicial sanction is secured beforehand (Art. 190 of Civil Code:
“The husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval”). In the case at bar, the spouses have obtained the judicial sanction, mainly
because the CFI approved their compromise agreement.
O Likewise, the couple has been separated for more than five years, and as such a separation of
their financial and proprietary interests are manifest. However, it must be emphasized at this point that by
approving the regime of separation of property and the dissolution of their conjugal property, the Court
does not accord recognition nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouses. In this jurisdiction, the
husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support (Art. 109 Civil Code, and now Art.68 Family Code). There is therefore virtue in making it as
difficult couple for spouses to abandon each other, especially if the abandonment is due to “whims and
caprices”.
-On Custody of Children: The CFI erred in depriving the mother, Carmen, of the custody of the two older
children. At the date of the CFI order, Enrique was only 6 and Maria Teresa was only 5. The awarding of
the custody of these two children to Alfonso runs contrary to law, which mandates that “no mother shall
be separated from her child under seven years of age unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure” (Art. 363 Civil Code). In this case, there is no compelling reason why Carmen should be
deprived of her right to custody over Enrique and Maria Teresa.
O Even if at the time the case reached the SC, Enrique is 11 and Maria Teresa is 10 (thus
rendering Carmen’s petition moot and academic), the Court must, in accordance to Art. 365 of the Civil
Code, determine the custody of the child as best suited for their welfare. Besides, Enrique should be given
the choice of who to live with, given that he is more than 10 years of age (Cf. Sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court). Given this, the trial is in order to determine which spouse is best suited for custody.
-CA decision and resolution is AFFIRMED, JRDC orders are AFFIRMED, and the case is remanded to
the CFI of Negros Occidental for hearing on custody.

Arroyo v. Arroyo
Arroyo v Vazquez de Arroyo No.17014
Petitioner: Mariano Arroyo
Respondent: Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo
Ponente: Street J.

Facts: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo married in 1910. In 1920, the wife went away
from their common home and intended to love separate from her husband
The husband brought to the court an action to compel the wife to return to their matrimonial home and
live with him as a dutiful wife.

The wife cross-complained by saying she left because of her husband’s cruel treatment. She prayed to the
court for the decree of separation, liquidation of conjugal partnership and an allowance for coulee fees
and maintenance. Lower court ruled in favor of her, granting her P400 monthly alimony.

The trial court reached the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his
continued ill-treatment of her gave sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and
the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.

Issue:
1. Can the wife seek for mandatory maintenance? NO
2. Can the court compel the wife to cohabit with the husband again? NO

Held:
1. It has been determined that where the wife is forced to live apart from her husband, she can
compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance, provided that the continued
cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the
husband.
2. The court cannot compel one spouse to cohabit with the other. Although if property rights of a
spouse are invaded, an action to regain such rights can be maintained. But the court is unwilling
to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to
compel the restoration of personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for
no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof. The case gives
examples of how states have been reluctant to force spouses to live with each other. “…and the
experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation
of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable.”

Decision: The court is unable to hold that Mariano Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and
absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile

Lilius v. Manila Railroad

Aleko Lilius v. Manila Railroad Company
59 Phil 758 - 24 March 1934
Ponente: Villa-Real, J.

Facts:
May 10, 1931 - Aleko Lilius, his wife, Sonja Maria Lilius, and their daughter Brita Marianne, were on
their way to Pagsanjan, Laguna. Upon crossing the railroad tracks, Aleko slowed down and honked his
horn to warn anyone near the area that they were about to cross. Locomotive No. 713 owned by the
respondent suddenly hit the Lilius family car and severely injured Aleko's wife and daughter.
Due to the negligence of the company in its inability to post a flagman and a switchman, the failure of the
engineers to prevent such accident, they were ordered to pay the petitioner damages broken down to the
following:

P5,000 for the economic setback that Aleko has faced (as a writer and journalist) due to the accident.

P10,000 for Sonja's lacerations to the face and leg fractures causing a permanent deformity and paralysis.

P5000 for Brita's lacerations to the face and leg fractures.

P250 to the doctor who attended to the family & hospital expenses.

Respondent appealed due to the excessive fines while petitioner appealed due to have the damages
increased to P50,000 with interest because of his deprivation of his wife's assistance.

Issue:
W/N the petitioner is entitled to additional damages due to the absence of his wife's assistance resulting
from the accident? NOT NECESSARILY.

Held:
Aleko seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of the Anglo-Saxon common law 'consortium' of
his wife (her services, society and conjugal companionship) due to her physical disabilities. The
assistance that the wife shall provide through her management of the household including the care and
education of their child is stopped due to her injuries. However, in an age wherein women have become
more independent and participative in the industrial, professional, and political arenas, there is a need to
prove that the wife has been unable to accomplish her household duties and obligations. In this case,
Aleko was unable to show that prior to the accident, Sonja had some sort of domestic service to her
family (not counting her secretary and translator duties to Aleko's journalistic works). Again, Aleko
failed to show that Sonja's services had been present in the past and would have continued had there been
no accident.

Ruling:
Finding no error in judgment, the lower court's decision is AFFIRMED with the addition of the 6% per
annum interest.