PERSONS SEPT 6 2017

ARTICLE 35
Merlinda Montanez v Lourdes Cipriano GRNo. 181089 (RICKI)
Petitioner: Merlinda Cipriano Montanez
Respondent: Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano
Ponente: Peralta, J.

FACTS
1. Respondent Lourdes married Socrates Flores in Lezo, Aklan. During said marriage, she married
Silverio V. Cipriano in San Pedro, Laguna. Lourdes filed in the RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for
Annulment with her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity.
2. The RTC of Muntinlupa declared that the marriage of Lourdes with Socrates null and void.
3. Petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez (daughter of SILVERIO in his first marriage. Meaning
Lourdes and Silverio both had first marriages) filed a complaint of Bigamy against Lourdes in
Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna.
4. She provided an affidavit, which was signed and thumb printed by Silverio, stating that Lourdes
failed to reveal her previous marriage with Socrates.
5. An Information of Bigamy was also filed against Lourdes in RTC San Pedro, Laguna.
6. Lourdes filed a Motion to Quash Information alleging her marriage with Socrates has been
declared void ab initio on grounds of the latter's psycho incapacity.
7. RTC denies motion to Quash since elements of bigamy were satisfied since before the marriage
with Socrates was declared void, she deliberately contracted a second valid marriage with him
anyway.
8. Lourdes filed an MR claiming that Article 40 (requiring judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of marriages) of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to her two marriages that
were contracted before the Family Code.
9. RTC finally rules in favor of petitioner since existing marriage law (judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage not required) of Lourdes when she got married is more favorable to
the accused.
10. Petitioner Montanez files an MR, this was denied by the RTC. Montanez raises to SC via review
of certiorari.

ISSUES
1. W/N the annulment of Lourdes' first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity frees
her from liability to bigamy in her second marriage? NO.
2. W/N Article 40 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect? YES.

HELD
1. At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as
it had not been legally dissolved. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage with Socrates WOULD NOT change the fact that she contracted the second marriage
during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, Lourdes was properly charged with Bigamy
since the essential elements of the crime charged were sufficiently alleged. What makes a person
 criminally liable for Bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.
2. On retroactivity of Art 40, the 2 marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. Art 40 is a PROCEDURAL RULE on Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
Retroactive application of procedural laws is NOT VIOLATIVE of any right of a person. As a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. Therefore Art 40 may
be given retroactive effect since it does not violate the rights of Lourdes.

DECISION
Petition GRANTED. Case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

Minoru Fujiki v Maria Paz Galela Marinay et al. GRNo. 196049 (TRISHA)
G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013
Petitioner: Minoru Fujiki
Respondent: Maria Paz Galela Marinay
Ponente: Carpio, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they
were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void
ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). The RTC immediately
issued an Order dismissing the petition. The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC). Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. The petitioner contended that the Japanese
judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.

Issues:
Whether or not the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable?
Ruling:
Civil Law
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity
of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as
a fact according to... the rules of evidence.

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity
of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as
a fact according to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully... consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.

James Walter Capili v People GRNo. 189805 (GABBI)
G.R. No. 183805
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Facts
1. This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA ruling
2. Petitioner, James Capili, was accused for the crime of bigamy, wherein the information alleged
that the petitioner married private respondent, Shirley Tismo without having his previous marriage legally
dissolved. He then filed Motion to Suspend Proceedings (MSP) alleging that there was a pending civil
case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with his first wife, Karla, and if the marriage were to be
declared void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy, which he then contends that the civil
case serves as a prejudicial question for the criminal case
3. The RTC-Pasig rescheduled the arraignment and pre-trial of the petitioner in response to the
MSP. The RTC also rendered a decision declaring petitioner’s 2 nd marriage void on the ground that a
second marriage contracted during the lifetime of the legal wife is void ab nitio. Subsequently, the
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the criminal case on the ground that his 2 nd marriage was declared
void by the RTC, which the latter granted.
4. The respondent filed an appeal to the CA which reversed and set aside the decision of the CA.
Petitioner filed an MR, which was also denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
Issues
1. W/N the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy?
Disposition
WHEREFORE, Petition DENIED.
Rationale
1. NO. Under art 349 of the RPC, Bigamy is a crime for “any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage is legally dissolved…” The elements of bigamy are: (1)
offender is legally married, (2) the existing marriage has not been legally dissolved or the absent spouse is
not presumed dead, (3) a second marriage is contracted, (4) second marriage has all essential requisites
for validity. All of the elements of bigamy were present at the time he contracted his 2 nd marriage with
Shirley (3 months after his first marriage with Karla).
In Jarillo v. People, the court ruled that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the
subsequent marriage without the first marriage being judicially declared null and void. A subsequent
nullity of the first marriage is immaterial to the charge of bigamy since the crime was already
consummated. All that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage was contracted. It is a settled rule that criminal culpability
attaches to the offender upon the commission of the crime. Thus, the judicial declaration of nullity for the
2nd marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.

People v Edgardo Odtuhan GRNo. 191566 (DOBIE)

People v. Edgardo Odtuhan
GR No. 191566 - 17 July 2013
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Facts:
July 2, 1980 - Respondent marries Jasmin Modina.

Oct. 28, 1993 - Respondent marries Eleanor Alagon.

Aug. 1994 - Respondent files for petition for annulment with Modina. This petition was granted on Feb.
23, 1999 for the lack of a marriage license.

Nov. 10, 2003 - Eleanor Alagon dies.

June 2003 - Evelyn Alagon learns about respondent's previous marriage with Modina. She files a
complaint-affidavit charging respondent with bigamy.

Apr. 15, 2005 - Respondent indicted with an Information for BIgamy.

Feb. 5, 2008 - Respondent files a motion to quash the information because: a.) the facts do not charge him
of bigamy, and b.) criminal liability is extinguished from the nullification of his previous marriage.

RTC - Denies motion to quash on the grounds that the the absence of the dissolution of the marriage with
Modina prior to the marriage with Alagon constitutes bigamy.
CA - First marriage is void ab initio which makes the second marriage valid and not bigamous. RTC
decision reversed.

Issues:
W/N the nullity of the first marriage makes the second marriage valid? NO.

Held:
Bigamy is constituted when: a.) the offender has been legally marriage, b.) the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved, c.) a second marriage is contracted, and d.) the second marriage has all the essential
requisites of validity. Respondent's contention that the second element was not present (since the first
marriage was declared void) is incorrect. When he contracted the marriage with Alagon, his marriage
with Modina was not yet declared void. He contracted a marriage while already being in a valid
marriage. The parties may not assume or decide the nullity of marriage. This duty rests within the
competent courts.

Ruling:
Petition for Certiorari GRANTED. Criminal case REMANDED to the RTC.

Amelia Garcia-Quiazon et al. v Belen GRNo. 189121 (JAKE)

Petitioner: AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON
Respondent: MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON
Ponente: Perez J.
Facts: Case is a review on certiorari filed by petitioners to reverse the decision of CA to grant Elise
Quiazon administration over the estates of her deceased father.

Eliseo Quezon died December 1992. Lourdes Belen and Elise Quiazon filed Letter for Administration
before the RTC of Las Pinas for the estates Eliseo left. This was opposed by Amelia, to whom Eliseo was
married, and their children.

Elise, on her letter, stated that she was a natural child of the deceased as she was conceived when both her
parents were capacitated to marry each other. Elise stated that the marriage between petitioner and her
father was bigamous (therefore void ab initio) because Amelia was previously married to a Filipito
Sandico. In her letter she attached her certificate of live birth stating Eliseo was her father and that Eliseo
left real properties worth 2.04M and personal properties worth 2.1M. Elise sought appointment as the
administrator of her father’s estate

In Amelia’s opposition, she pointed out that 1. The venue of the issuance of the letter of administration
was supposed to be submitted at Capas, Tarlar not in Las Pinas. And 2.she claimed that Elise did not have
factual or legal basis to be granted the estates of Eliseo.

RTC ruled in favor of Elise saying the venue of issuance was actually correct. CA affirmed this.
Petitioners then brought the case to the SC.

Issues:
1. Was the venue where Elise filed the Letter for Administration wrong? NO
2. Was Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo void ab initio? YES
3. Does Elise show any interest in the Petition for Letter of Administration? YES

Held:
1. Under sec. 1 Rule 73 of the ROC, letters for administration should be filed at the RTC which has
jurisdiction over the residence of the person at the time of his death. Residence is defined as
nothing more than the person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he lives there
continuously. There are records showing that Eliseo lived in Pilar Village, Las Pinas City from
1972 to 1992. In addition, in1 985, Eliseo filed a judicial partition of property against Amelia
because their marriage was bigamous, therefore void.
2. First of all, a void (ab initially) marriage can be questioned by any interested party beyond the
lifetime of the parties; as provided in Nina v Bayadog. (Civil law was in effect, not Family code)
This provided, Elise can question the marriage of his father and Amelia since she her
successional rights may be prejudiced. Therefore, the fact that the marriage of Amelia and Eliseo
was void ab initial was proven. Records from the diocese of Tarlac provided a marriage
certificate between Amelia and Filipito. Thus without proof that this marriage was dissolved, it is
concluded that her subsequent marriage with Eliseo was bigamous.
3. [Court established that Letters of Administration may be granted to 1. Alive husband or wife or
next to kin 2. In absence of 1, may be given to principal creditors if they are competent; and 3. If
no creditor, court may select another person.] Under sec. 2 Rule 79 Letters of administration may
be filed by an “interested party.” (an heir or creditor) This includes “next to kin” or those whose
 relationship with deceased is such that they are entitled to share estates. Elise, a compulsary heir,
is an interested party. Elise’s appointment as administrator of the Estates left by his father is on
good grounds.

Decision: Petition is DENIED. CA decision is AFFIRMED.

Castillo v Castillo GRNo. 189607 (ANTON)

Petitioner: Renato A. Castillo
Respondent: Lea P. De Leon-Castillo
GR 189607 April 18, 2016 Chief Justice Sereno
FACTS:
Lea De Leon married Benjamin Bautista in 1972. In 1979, Lea married Renato Castillo. Renato
filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in 2001, arguing that his marriage to Lea should be
declared void because (1) Lea has a subsisting marriage with Bautista, and (2) Lea suffers from
psychological incapacity, which is a ground to nullify a marriage pursuant to Art. 26. Lea, on the other
hand, contested that her marriage to Benjamin was void because (1) they had no marriage license and (2)
neither of them belonged to the religious denomination wherein they were married. In 2002, Lea filed a
motion to declare her first marriage to Bautista void, which was granted by the RTC of Paranaque in
2003. Lea subsequently filed a demurrer to evidence in 2004, claiming that the evidence presented by
Renato is insufficient to nullify their marriage. The RTC denied this demurrer, and ruled in 2007 that the
marriage between Lea and Renato is null and void ab initio for being bigamous. This was because Lea’s
marriage to Benjamin was still subsisting when she married Renato, especially since Lea did not procure
a judicial declaration of nullity prior to marrying Benjamin. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC
decision and held that the marriage between Renato and Lea was valid. This is because according to the
Civil Code (which is the law in force at the time of the marriage), no judicial decree is needed to establish
the nullity of a marriage especially if the marriage is void ad initio, as is the case of Lea and Benjamin
wherein there was no marriage license. Benjamin thus filed the present petition to the SC.
ISSUE:
- W/N Lea’s marriage to Benjamin still subsisted when she married Renato, thus making her
marriage to Renato bigamous (NO)
RULING:
- The Civil Code is indeed the law in force at the time of the marriage between Lea and
Benjamin. It held that “in a void marriage, no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary”.
It is only in a voidable marriage that a judicial decree is necessary. While the Family Code does
require a judicial decree to establish the invalidity of both void and voidable marriages, the Civil
Code does not. Given that the Civil Code is the law in force at the time the marriage was solemnized,
then it should be followed.
- The absence of a marriage license makes Lea’s marriage to Benjamin void ab initio. This
means that no judicial declaration of invalidity is married. Hence, there was no subsisting marriage
between Lea and Benjamin when Lea married Renato. The marriage is thus not bigamous.
- Petition is DENIED, decision of the CA AFFIRMED.

ARTICLE 36
Santos v CA and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos GRNo. 112019 (RICKI)
Petitioners: Leouel Santos
Respondents: CA
Ponente: Vitug, J.

FACTS
1. Leouel Santos and Julia Bedia-Santos were married in 1986. Their marriage life was troubled by
the fact that Julia’s parents kept interfering with their married life. This led to quarrels between
husband and wife. In 1988, Julia left for the United States to work as a nurse, despite Leouel
dissuading her.
2. After a while, Julia called Leouel, saying that she will return home upon the expiration of her
contract the following year, but when the time came she failed to deliver. During a stint in the US
for a training program in 1990, Leouel tried to contact Julia, but he never did.
3. Leouel then filed a complaint for Voiding of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
claiming that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least communicate with him, for
the more than five years show that she was psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
life.
4. Despite Julia filing a manifestation that she would neither appear nor submit evidence, the RTC
dismissed Leouel’s complaint for lack of merit.
5. The CA also denied his appeal. Hence, he filed the present petition for review on certiorari to the
SC.

ISSUES
1. W/N the marriage was void due to the allegation of Julia's psychological incapacity. NO.

HELD
1. It should be first noted that the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity. During
deliberations by the Family Code Revision Committee, various members of the said Committee
formulated their own attempts to describe what would constitute psychological incapacity, like
“lacking in the exercise of judgment, insanity to a lesser degree, defects in consent, etc.” Thus, it
could be concluded that the Committee, in deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity,
designed the law so as to allow some resiliency in its application. After all, giving specific
examples of incapacity would limit the applicability of the provision
2. Various disciplines and sources could become persuasive in interpreting psychological
incapacity, like Canon Law and psychological research. The book “Canons and Commentaries on
Marriage” define psychological incapacity as “a real inability to render what is due by the
[marriage] contract”. Judge Dy favors the opinion of Dr. Veloso, a former judge of the RCAM
Marriage Tribunal. Veloso opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
3. Despite the wide scope of the term, it must noted that the use of the phrase “psychological
incapacity” does not comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. Article 36 must be taken in
conjunction with existing precepts of our law on marriage. As such, it should refer to no less than
a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital commitments
under Article 68, such as living together, observing love, respect, and fidelity.
 4. Until further statutory parameters are set, every circumstance that has some bearing on incapacity
must be very carefully examined and evaluated. Thus, the expert opinion of psychiatrists and
psychologists might be desirable. And given the lack of convincing evidence he shown, Leouel
failed to prove that Julia was psychologically incapacitated.

DECISION
Petition DENIED.

Republic v CA and Roridel Molina GRNo. 108763 (TRISHA)

G.R. No. 108763
February 13, 1997
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: COA & Roridel Olaviano Molina
Panganiban, J.

Facts:
Respondent Roridel Molina married Reynaldo Molina on April 14, 1985. After a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a husband and a father exhibited by his
preference to spend time with friends, squandering money, dependence on his parents and dishonesty
involving finances. Inevitably, this resulted in quarrels and by March 1987, Roridel quit her job and
moved in with her parents in Baguio. Reynaldo left her and their child a few weeks thereafter. On Aug.
16, 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of
psychological incapacity of the husband. The trial court declared the marriage void, which the CA
affirmed in toto; hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not there is psychological incapacity?

Held:
No. The case of Roridel and Reynaldo merely constituted incompatibility among the estranged spouses.
The law intended to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders that must have existed at the time marriage is celebrated. Irreconcilable differences
or conflicting personalities are not incapacities that would hinder the fulfillment of the essential marital
obligations of the parties. The characteristics of gravity, judicial antecedence and incurability are not
present in the case. Due to the improper interpretations and applications arrived at by the lower courts on
this particular issue, the SC found it wise to construe the law and lay down guidelines in interpretation
and application of Art. 36. Here, the SC sought the help of two amici curiae – considered an external aid
in statutory construction. The guidelines set forth are thus: (1) the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough to disable fulfillment of essential
marital obligations; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents
and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church are to be given great weight; and (8) the fiscal and the Solicitor-General must appear as counsel
for the State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. Assailed decision is reversed and set aside. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te GRNo. 161793 (GABBI)
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
G.R. No. 161793
Ponente: Nachura, J.
Facts
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner comes from a wealthy family. Respondent comes from a fine family. Petitioner, Edward Ngo
Te, met respondent, Rowena Yu-Te, in college. Edward was interested in Rowena’s friend at first, but
since the Rowena’s friend already had a boyfriend, Edward decided to court Rowena. After a month of
dating, Edward confided to Rowena about some problems he was having with his family. Rowena then
suggested eloping. Edward declined since they were still young and didn’t have jobs. 2 months late, after
respondent constantly suggesting they elope, petitioner reluctantly agreed since the respondent already
bought the boat tickets. They sailed to Cebu where they were supposed to stay with a friend, however,
being unable to locate, the couple resorted to renting an apartment. The P80,000 which petitioner brought
soon ran out, and petitioner was unable to find work. Their only option was to return to manila and seek
help from petitioner’s parents. When they returned, Respondent stayed with her uncle, while petitioner
went home, only to find out that his entire family left the country for a while. The petitioner decided to
stay behind, until the respondent kept telephoning him to stay with her in her uncle’s home, and if the
petitioner were to refuse, she would threaten to commit suicide. The petitioner then decided to stay with
Respondent and her uncle until his parents returned; however, even with the return of his parents, the
petitioner was not allowed to leave, so far as to being threatened by Respondent’s uncle by showing him
the former’s gun collection. The Uncle brought the couple to get married, where the petitioner signed a
marriage contract. However, he never applied for a marriage license. Petitioner wanted to go home, but
Respondent threatened the petitioner that if he insisted on going home they would commission their
military friends to harm his family.
At one point he was finally manage to escape and return to his parents asking for help. He hadn’t told
them about the marriage contract, but when they found out, he was referred to marriage counselling. After
counselling, he then contacted petitioner suggesting that they live with his parents. The respondent would
only agree to living with the petitioner if they had a separate house away from his parents. Respondent
also kept badgering the petitioner to claim his inheritance from his parents so that they may live on their
own. Upon the petitioner telling the respondent that he was disinherited, the respondent suggested that
they should part ways.
The TC declared the marriage null and void. The OSG filed an appeal to the CA who then reversed the
decision stating that the petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, and that the
evidence fell short of the requirements stated in Molina needed to for the nullity of the marriage under Art
36 of the FC. The MoR was also denied, hence the present petition.
Issues
1. W/N based in Art 36, the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent null and void? (#4 ratio)
Disposition
WHEREFORE Petitioner GRANTED
Rationale (similar to Kalaw v Fernandez)
1. The Petitioner contended that the CA erred in substituting the TC’s decision with its own. For the
petitioner, the TC declared the marriage null and void on the grounds that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated. The OSG contended that the petition for annulment contained no mention
of lacking essential requirements, the root cause of the PI was not mentioned, nor was it
medically/clinically identified and that a clinical psychologist did not examine the respondent personally.
2. The requirements for psychological incapacity is stated in Molina pursuant to the standard of Art 36
of the FC (see notes of Kalaw for the requirements). However, the Court began by taking a look at the
origin of the provision by looking at the deliberations of the framers of the Art 36. The Committee
purposely did not give any examples of psychological incapacity so that the courts could interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis. The law was designed as to allow some resiliency in its application.
Psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all cases of Psychoses. It should refer to the mental
capacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive to basic marital covenants expressed in Art 68 of the
FC: their mutual obligation to live together, observe love, respect, and fidelity; and render help and
support. The intention of the law to confine the declaration of nullity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders shows insensitivity and inability to give meaning and significance to marriage. The
intention of the Committee of the FC was rendered useless when in Molina a strict application of Art 36
was applied. In hindsight, it was inappropriate for the court to do so.
3. The Court need not worry about the abuse of the remedy by Art 36 as there are ample safeguards like
the intervention of the State. In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s PI, the court is not
demolishing the foundation of family, but rather protecting it because it refuses to allow a person afflicted
with a psychological disorder from remaining in the marital bond. However, the Court is not abandoning
Molina, it is simply a following of the principle that each case (of PI) must be judged with its own facts,
not with an a priori assumption.
4. YES. In the instant case, the psychologist who provided expert testimony declared that the petitioner
(dependent personality disorder) and respondent (Narcissistic and Antisocial personality disorder) were
psychologically incapacitated. The nature of Art 36 is that courts, must not discount, but instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on psychological and mental temperaments of
parties. Hernandez v CA reiterates the importance of presenting expert testimonies to establish the cause
of a party’s PI. Marcos v Marcos asserts that there is no need for a person to be personally examined by a
physician to be declared PI if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain such finding. The
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of parties. The
Psychological assessment, in the case at bar, is adequate to find that both parties are afflicted with
personality disorders.

Ma. Socorro Camacho-Reyes v Ramon Reyes GRNo. 185286 (DOBIE)

Ma. Socorro Camacho-Reyes v. Ramon Reyes
GR No. 185286 - 18 August 2010
Ponente: Nachura, J.
Facts:
Petitioner and Respondent met during their college days in UP. Petitioner knew respondent's tendency to
cut class and marijuana-use. Respondent dropped out in his junior year in 1974 to work in Aristocrat
restaurant.

Dec. 5, 1976 - A year after graduating, petitioner married respondent. She was already 5 months pregnant
at the time. The couple lived with the respondent's family in Mandaluyong. The couple's living expenses
were covered by the respondent's family, leaving their salaries for their personal expenses. Respondent
alotted P1500 for petitioner's monthly allowance.

Mar. 22, 1977 - Petitioner gave birth to the couple's first child. Since their child's arrival, their finances
became more constrained as respondent halted the monthly allowance. It so happens that the respondent
had quit his job to venture into his own seafood trading business in the province. This caused the
respondent to be constantly out of town.

Petitioner suggested to live independently from her in-laws which caused more financial difficulties for
the couple and their child. Respondent had contracted another business after the failure of the former but
was still unable to provide for the family. His attitude was noted to be indifferent and unbothered despite
their difficulties. After 2 years, the family transferred to the petitioner's mother.

1985 - Petitioner gave birth to her third son. Respondent didn't seem to care about the hospital bills or the
baby's health.

1989 - Respondent's fishpond business went bankrupt again which forced him to find another business
venture (which did not prosper).

1996 - Petitioner discovers/confirms her husband's affairs with his former secretary.

The last straw was when petitioner had a cyst-removal operation. Respondent again seemed to be
unconcerned and unattentive. Petitioner, with the aid of respondent's siblings, tried to encourage the
respondent to save the marriage. They attended counseling sessions but failed to fix or maintain their
relationship.

1997 - Respondent was brought to Dr. Dayan for a psychological assessment. Respondent resisted.
Respondent was then asked to move out of the house to give space to his spouse and children.

2001 - Petitioner filed to the RTC to nullify the marriage due to psychological incapacity. Testimonies of
Dr. Dayan, Dr. Magno, and Dr. Villegas were presented. The court ruled to declare the marriage null and
void.

CA however, reversed the ruling and declared the marriage still valid.

Issue:
W/N there is psychological incapacity with one or either party to constitute a nullity in their marriage?
YES.

Held:
The three doctors' testimonies show that the respondent has a personality disorder that is causing his
psychological incapacity to uphold his obligations as a spouse and a father. Even the petitioner's trauma
(psychosocial stressors-pervasive family discord) from her husband's (lack of) concern for her family has
manifested in her own OCD with Self-Defeating features.

The CA's contention that the doctors' analyses of respondent solely based on petitioner's stories are
insufficient. The SC counters by saying that in a marriage, the most evident and logical perspective to
understand a person's behavior is that of his spouse's. Respondent may not know that he has a disorder
which is why he contends that there is no psychological incapacity on his part. This now leads the
doctors to examine the respondent's behavior through the spouse's point of view. 'The totality of the
behavior of one spouse during the cohabitaiton and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly
by the other.'

CA's argument that respondent's psychological incapacity is not incurable (because of Dr. Dayan's
recommendation of therapy) is incorrect. Although a doctor's testimony or diagnosis cannot
automatically brand a person to be psychologically incapacitated, the factual antecedents and testimonies
of other people (respondent's siblings, son, in-laws) back up such claim. The sporadic financial support,
extra-marital affairs, substance abuse, failed business attempts, unpaid money obligations, inability to
keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses, and criminal charges of estafa show how/why
the respondent is incapable of upholding his obligations to his wife/sons.

Ruling:
Petition GRANTED. CA ruling REVERSED. RTC ruling that the marriage is NULL and VOID,
REINSTATED.

Danilo Aurelio v Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio GRNo. 175367 (JAKE)

Petitioner: Danilo Aurelio
Respondent: Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio
Ponente: Peralta J.

Facts: Danilo and Vida were married March 23, 1988. They had 2 sons; Danilo Miguel and Danilo
Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed a petition for nullity of marriage on grounds that both her and his
husband are psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with essential marital obligations.
Article 36 provides “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
CA summarized the allegations and found that both husband and wife are phsycologically incapacitated…
marital obligations. A psychologist found that the husband suffered from passive-aggressive personality
disorder. He exhibited arrogance, extreme jealousy, was not capable of providing financial support and he
liked to humiliate his wife in front of their kids.

On the other hand, the petitioner suffered from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissism. She was
emotionally immature, had low tolerance for boredom, cannot stand frustration or disappointment and
cannot delay to gratify her needs.

On Nov. 8, 2002, petitoner filed a motion to dismiss arguing that his wife’s petition failed to state a cause
of action and that it failed to meet standards for the application of ART36 of the Family Code. RTC
denied this and his MR stating that the petition complied with guidelines provided in the MOLINA
DOCTRINE. Case was appealed to the CA but denied. Hence this petition.

Issues:
1. Was the petition filed by Vida sufficient to declare marriage null? YES
2. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it denied petitioner’s action for
certiorari? NO

Held: BAE - court points out that if respondent filed case after March 15, 2003 the case would have been
automatically dropped because court prohibits filing motions to dismiss annulment of marriages.

1. In Rep.vCA, the Molina Doctrine was created to aid court in deciding cases involving psychological
incapacity:
● Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
● The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically identified (b) alleged in the
complaint (c) sufficiently proven by experts (d) clearly explained in decision
● Incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
● Incapacity must also be shown to be medically incurable.
● Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
● The essential marital obligations must under Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 regarding parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligations must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
● Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church,
while not controlling, should be given respect by the courts.
● The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. (To avoid delay)
Danilo said that his Wife’s petition lacked 3 of the Molina doctrines requisites, namely: root cause of
psychological incapacity is alleged in complaint; illness is grave enough that party is disabled to perform
marital duties; and non-complied marital obligations must estates in petition.

First, Court finds that root cause was stated and alleged in the complaint as discussed in their
backgrounds provided by the CA. Also, an expert psychologist clinically identified the same. Second, The
petition alleged that the illness of both spouses disabled them from performing marital obligations; such
illnesses were also deemed permanent and incurable. Lastly, respondents allegations fall under ART68 of
the Family Code stating “that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.”

(To add: findings of the RTC is the basis of the SC, it would be burdensome for the SC to resolve these
cases at first instance)

1. Court ruled that RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. Even if the court erred in saying that Vida’s petition was sufficient, this would only
constitute an error of judgment correctible by appeal, not an abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari. Hence CA’s dismissal of petitioner’s petition is not reviewable by certiorari.

Decision: Petition is DENIED. RTC and CA decisions are AFFIRMED.

Republic v Nestor Galang GRNo. 168335 (ANTON)

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Nestor Galang
GR 168335 June 6, 2011 Justice Brion
FACTS:
In 1994, Nestor Galang and Juvy Salazar were married in Pampanga. They had one child,
Christopher. Nestor worked as an artist, while Juvy stayed at home. In 1999, Galang filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage to Juvy according to Art. 36 of the Family Code. Galang alleged that
Juvy was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents’ money (which Juvy
claimed was for Galang’s hospitalization). Juvy also did not cook breakfast because she did not want to
wake up early; she often left Christopher to the care of the neighbors; and that she frequently engaged in
gambling. To support his claim, Galang presented Anna Guiang, a psychologist. Guiang testified that she
wrote Juvy a letter for interview, but Juvy did not reply. So, Guiang based her findings of Juvy on
Nestor’s stories and testimonies. From these, Guiang concluded that Juvy suffered from personality and
behavioral disorders, which were manifested in her grave dependency on gambling and stealing money.
As such, Guiang held that Juvy is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife
and mother. The RTC nullified the marriage between Galang and Juvy in 2001, giving credence to the
testimonies of Galang and Guiang. The Republic appealed to the CA, which upheld the decision of the
RTC. Hence, the Republic brought this petition to the SC.
ISSUES:
- W/N the marriage between Nestor Galang and Juvy Salazar could be nullified according to
Art. 36 (NO)
RULING:
 - In Santos vs CA, the SC held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Furthermore, this incapacity must be a
disability, and not a mere refusal or hesitance to perform the marital duties.
- Galang presented three main bases to argue for Juvy’s alleged psychological incapacity: (1)his
own testimony, and the (2) report and (3) testimony of Guiang.
- On Galang’s Testimony: The testimony fails to show that Juvy was suffering from some
debilitating or incapacitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to discharge her
marital functions. Juvy’s acts does not show any psychological incapacity, but merely immaturity and
a lack of sense of responsibility. This is nothing more than refusal and neglect, not psychological
incapacity. Furthermore, Art. 36 holds that the psychological incapacity must be present at the time
the marriage was solemnized. In the present case, Juvy’s actions happened only 2 years after the
marriage.
- On Guiang’s Report: Guiang did not personally examine Juvy. Instead, she relied on Nestor’s
stories, which is a considerably one-sided approach. The psychological report simply stressed Juvy’s
negative traits which she considers manifestations of Juvy’s psychological incapacity. She also failed
to identify what tests she used, failed to prove that Juvy’s condition is grave enough, and failed to
establish the incurability of such a condition. Given all of these, Guiang’s report is merely an opinion.
- On Guiang’s Testimony: She failed to establish gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. For one, her testimony seemed to stress that Juvy was hesitant to change, and so
appeared to be incurable. Hesitance to change and incurability are two distinct things, and
psychological incapacity must be characterized by the latter, not the former.
- In sum, the evidences Nestor Galang presented failed to establish the psychological incapacity
of Juvy Galang. Thus, there is no basis to nullify their marriage according to Art. 36. Petition is
GRANTED, decision of the CA is SET ASIDE.

Republic v Cesar Encelan GR No. 170022 (ANTON)

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Cesar Encelan
GR 170022 January 9, 2013 Justice Brion
FACTS:
In 1979, Cesar Encelan married Lolita Encelan. The marriage bore two children, Maricar and
Manny. In 1984, Cesar went to Saudi Arabia to work as an OFW. While still in Saudi Arabia, Cesar
learned that Lolita was having an affair with another man, Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, Lolita left her
and Cesar’s conjugal home and lived with Alvin. In 1995, Cesar filed a petition for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage, based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity (Art. 36). Cesar presented the
psychological report by Dr. Flores on Lolita, which states that “Lolita was not suffering from any form of
major psychiatric illness but had been unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and
lasting marital relationship”. In her defense, Lolita said that Alvin was just an associate in her promotions
business. Furthermore, she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother in law.
The RTC ruled in favor of Cesar and declared his marriage to Lolita void. Upon appeal, the CA originally
reversed the RTC’s verdict, but soon affirmed the RTC’s decision. The Republic, through the OSG, thus
filed the present petition to the SC.
ISSUE:
 - W/N Cesar and Lolita’s marriage may be nullified on the basis of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 (NO)
RULING:
- Psychological incapacity means “downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume the basic marital obligations”. This does not include refusal, neglect, or ill will. Given this,
Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s incapacity.
- In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. Rather, these are simply grounds for legal separation.
In the present case, Cesar failed to show that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations
of any psychological disorder.
o Cesar’s reliance on Dr. Flores’ report is misplaced, especially since the report itself
concluded that Lolita was not suffering from any serious mental illness. Furthermore,
Dr. Flores’ observations on Lolita’s interpersonal problems does not suffice as a
consideration that she was psychologically incapacitated at the time of her marriage
to Cesar.
- Petition is GRANTED, decision of the CA is set aside, petition for nullity is DISMISSED.

Valerio E. Kalaw v Ma. Elena Fernandez GRNo. 166357 (GABBI)

Kalaw vs. Fernandez
G.R. No. 166357
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Facts
1. This is a MoR for the Courts decision of dismissing the complaint for declaration of nullity for the
marriage of Kalaw that affirmed the decision of the CA to reverse the decision of the RTC. (RTC-
Granted, CA-Reversed, SC-Affirmed CA, thus MoR now)
2. Valerio Kalaw seeked the nullity of his marriage between Fernandez on the grounds of
Psychological Incapacity (PI). The petitioner presented two expert witnesses concluding the PI of
Fernandez. The conclusions heavily relied on the petitioner’s testimonies that the respondent has frequent
mahjong sessions, goes to the beauty parlor frequently, going out with friends, adultery, and neglecting
their children. The amount of time she spent playing mahjong and neglecting their children allegedly
constituted PI in the form of Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD). Petitioner did not present any proof
other than his testimony.
3. The respondent was able to refute the allegations. Respondent admittedly frequently played
mahjong, but not so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother (husband says 4-5 times a week,
wife says only 2-3 w/ permission). The children corroborated this by saying that they are with their
mother when she plays mahjong in a relative’s home. Petitioner said that his two sons repeated 2 nd grade
attributing it to the alleged neglect of respondent, but he was not able to link the allegation to
respondent’s mahjong-playing.
4. The Court dismissed the case since the allegations were not actually proven. Hence, this MR.
Issues
1. W/N respondent is psychologically incapacitated? - YES`
a. What constitutes PI?
b. Should the experts’ opinion be given credence?
c. Should the frequency of her mahjong playing be a determinant for her alleged PI?
Disposition
WHEREFORE, MoR GRANTED, Marriage declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
Rationale
1. YES. Respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
a. Pyshcological Incapacity is grounds for nullity of marriage under Art 36 of the Family code refers to
a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is
permanent. PI isn’t meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer to the mental
capacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive to basic marital covenants. The psychological
condition must exist during the time of the marriage. The guidelines set in Republic v CA (see notes)
made the process rigid and strict such that it would surely condemn any application for the declaration of
nullity. However, as intended by the FC committee (see notes), the framers intended Art 36 to not be
taken so literally. Instead, Courts should approach issues of nullity “not with a priori assumptions,
but according to the facts.” In the task of ascertaining the presence of PI, the courts must rely on
the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and, thus, make a more
intelligent judgement.
b. The findings of the RTC on the existence/non-existence of PI should be final and binding, as long as
the evaluation was not erroneous. Yet, the Court brushed the opinions of Dr. Gates, a psychologist, and
Fr. Gerard Healy, a canon law expert, in the September 19, 2011 decision of the Court, where the Court
now finds improper and unwarranted. The experts sufficiently and competently described the PI of the
respondent within the standard of Art 36. It is settled that courts must accord weight to the expert
testimony. By the very nature of Art 36, the courts, “despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making… must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on Psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.”
c. The frequency of respondents mahjong-playing should not delimit the determination of the
presence/absence of PI. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the
duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. The respondent’s rebuttal
to the allegation of neglecting her children by taking them with her to where she plays mahjong only
shows that she disregard for her children’s morals and mental development by exposing them to a culture
of gambling. It’s been more than 20 years since the parties split, and without a doubt the marriage is
beyond repair with both parties inflicting damage not only to themselves but also their children. It would
be a great injustice if the Court were to continue to recognize their void marriage, and force the parties
and their children to endure more damage.
Notes
- In Republic v CA and Molina the court set guidelines in interpreting Art 36:
a. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff
b. The root cause of the PI is medically identified
c. The incapacity must be proven to exist at the time of the celebration
d. The incapacity must be shown to be INCURABLE
e. The illness must be grave enough to prevent the party from performing marital obligations
f. The obligations must be those found in Art 68-71 of the FC.
g. Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, while not
controlling/decisive, should be given great respect by the courts
h. The TC must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the SolGen to appear as counsel for the
state.
- The Family Code Committee could not unanimously define “PI” so they decided to leave it with less
specificity that expected to allow some resilience in its application.

Republic v Reghis Romero and Olivia Lagman Romero GRNo. 209180 (DOBIE)
Republic v. Romero II
GR Nos. 209180 & 209253 - 24 February 2016
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Facts:
Reghis and Olivia met in Baguio in 1971 when the former helped the latter as she was stranded along
Kennon road. Reghis became close to Olivia's parents and was eventually persuaded to court her.
Because of his desire to finish hus studies and provide for his siblings, Reghis decided to end the
relationship with Olivia. Olivia refused and plotted to spend the night with him in his dorm (which did
not push through). When Reghis brought her home, Olivia's parents thought that the two had eloped and
planned their marriage. Because Reghis had owed Olivia's parents so much for their kindness, he
eventually agreed to marry her.

The two were married on May 11, 1972 and soon after had a child. However, the couple wasn't smooth
sailing as violent fights and jealousy issues were rampant. Reghis had secured a job as a medrep and
became very focused on it to the point that he spent little time with his family which Olivia resented.
They parted ways in 1986.

June 16, 1998 - Reghis filed a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to his
psychological incapacity to the QC RTC. He claimed that he married Olivia not because of love but
because he wanted to please her parents. He also claimed that he was not ready to enter into a marriage at
the time because of his educational and financial priority for his siblings. He also added that Olivia was
in a relationship with another man (Garcia). Reghis presented Dr. Basilio who submitted a Psychological
Evaluation Report and testified that Reghis had OCPD. His obsession for his work made him incapable
of performing the responisbilities and duties of a father and husband. She also stated that this is incurable
and that Reghis was an unwilling groom. Olivia on the other hand claimed that they were both
capacitated to fulfill their obligations as spouses but was unable to present evidence to prove this.

Nov. 5, 2008 - RTC ruled that the marriage was void ab initio because of the psychological incapacity
caused by Reghis' OCPD to his work and siblings. This disorder has prevented him from fully loving his
spouse.

March 21, 2013 - CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Nov. 19, 2013 - SolGen filed GR No. 209180 claiming that Reghis has not established that the psych
incapacity is grave, has juridical antecedence, and is incurable. Dr. Basilio's report had not factual basis
and that Reghis was able to fulfill his paternal/marital duties in the years that he lived with Olivia.

Nov. 13, 2013 - Olivia filed GR No. 209253 claiming that if Reghis was indeed forced into the marriage,
he could've abandoned her or refused to take his vows during the wedding.
Feb. 17, 2014 - The SC consolidated both cases.

Issue:
W/N there is psychological incapacity on Reghis' part that will constitute the nullity of his marriage with
Olivia? NO.

Held:
The Constitution's policy is to protect the family as a social institution and that marriage is the foundation
of the family (hence its inviolability). Psychological Incapacity should refer to the most serious cases of
personality disorders which makes the spouse highly incapable or insensitive to attend to the needs of the
family. Although it may be granted that everyone has their own quirks and abnormalities, psychological
incapacity must be grave and serious, must be rooted in the history of the party even before the marriage
(although it emerges after the marriage), and incurable (or beyond the means of the party to cure). Dr.
Basilio's testimony/report failed to prove that the OCPD complies with any of the mentioned elements.
No specifics were given to illustrate or establish that Reghis' incapacity existed before the marriage. Dr.
Basilio was unable to explain how the OCPD was incurable.

When it comes to Reghis' intent/motive to marry Olivia, it does not matter how or why a person may
contract marriage as long as the essential and formal requisites are present. Furthermore, it was shown
that in the 14 years that the couple lived together, Reghis was able to uphold his responsibilities as a
father and a spouse.

The courts should be more strict and diligent in deciding such cases with different quantums of evidence.
The state aims to always protect the marriage and the family. The judiciary's inability to strictly interpret
the state's policy will encourage couples to use Art. 36 as a quick way to end their marriages.

Ruling:
Petition GRANTED. CA ruling REVERSED. Petition to declare the nullity of the marriage
DISMISSED.