H. Multiple offenses/crimes
Dissents that the penalty for
1. Recidivism (Article 14(9), 29, RPC)
2. Reiteracion (Article 14(10), RPC
3. Quasi-Recidivism (Article 160, RPC)
4. Habitual Delinquency (Article 22, 62, 160 RPC)
Cases:
(Yao)People vs. Bernal, GR No. 44988, 31 October 1936
Appellee: People of the Philippines
Appellant: Canuto Bernal
FACTS
1. Accused Canuto Bernal took without consent three game-cocks belonging
to Elias Piamonte. It was established that the accused had been thrice convicted
of the crime of theft before the commission of the present crime.
2. The trial court found accused guilty as charged and sentenced to 4 months
and 1 day of arresto mayor, with an additional penalty of 7 years for being a
habitual delinquent.
ISSUES
1. W/N Should the aggravating circumstance of recidivism be taken into
account in fixing the penalty independently from the penalty provided for
being a habitual delinquent? (YES. Recidivism taken into account
independently with HD.)
HELD
1. Recidivism is committed by a person who, at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgement of another
crime embraced in the same title of the code.
2. The SC holds that it is wrong to assume that recidivism is twice taken into
account when the accused is declared a habitual delinquent.
3. Recidivism as an aggravating circumstance modifying the criminal
liability is not an inherent or integral element of habitual delinquency, which
the RPC considers as extraordinary and special aggravating circumstance.
4. Recidivism as viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is not a factor or
element which is necessarily forms an integral part of habitual delinquency.
Therefore, recidivism may exist independently from habitual delinquency in
case a person is a habitual delinquent. In the case at bar, the penalty of
recidivism should also be taken into account independently from the fact that
the accused is also penalized for being a habitual delinquent.
DECISION
Judgement is modified. Guilty of Theft and sentenced to 6 months and
1 day of prision correcional, and to an additional penalty of 3 years.
CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION
Abad Santos, J.
Concurs that the accused is guilty of theft.
recidivism should be considered independently from the penalty of habitual
delinquency. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism should not be taken
into consideration in the imposition of penalty prescribed by law for the crime
of which the appellant has been found guilty.
(Sungcad)People vs. Masonson, 63 Phil. 92 (1936)
People vs. Masonson
G.R. No. 44527
March 31, 1936
Ponente: Avaceña, C.J.
Facts
1. Respondent stole from Fausto Veloso, a leather wallet containing
money worth P117.
2. The information charged him with the crime of theft. The information
also alleged respondent to be a habitual delinquent since it was his fourth
conviction of a crime similar to theft. He pleaded guilty in the arraignment.
3. The previous court sentenced respondent to 6 months and 1 day of
prision correccional, and to indemnify the offended part in the sum of P120
with an additional penalty of 6 years.
Issues
1. W/N respondent is a habitual delinquent?
Disposition
Wherefore, modifying the appealed judgement, sentenced to 2 months and 1
day arresto mayor, eliminating additional penalty, affirming in all other
respects.
Rationale
1. NO. The information alleges that it was respondent’s fourth conviction
by final judgement of a crime SIMILAR to theft. The word similar has no legal
definition in the Penal Code and it is too abstract in its general acceptation.
There may be crimes similar in some sense, but were not ones enumerated in
law (Robbery, Theft, Estafa, Falsification, less/more serious Physical injuries).
Alleging in the information that he was already convicted four times of similar
crimes is not sufficient to show that the said crimes were precisely those
enumerated by law.
2. Furthermore, the information alleges that his last conviction was on
Sept. 9, 1935. The current crime being charged was committed on Aug 6, 1935,
which was prior to the last conviction. In order that former convictions may
constitute an element of habitual delinquency, they must precede the
commission of the crime charged.
3. The SolGen contends that if the allegations in the information relative
to the former conviction were insufficient to warrant the declaration of
respondent as a habitual delinquent, they are at least sufficient to constitute the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism of reiteracion. The Court disagrees. In
order that former convictions constitute the circumstance of recidivism, they
must arise from crimes prior to the current one charged now, and there is no
such allegation in the information.
4. The Appellants plea of guilty should be consider as a mitigating
circumstance, and since there is no aggravating circumstance present, penalty
prescribed by law should be imposed in its minimum period.
(Dy)People vs. Flores, 63 Phil. 443 (1936)
People v Flores 63 Phil 443
Petitioner: People of the PH
Respondent: Dominador Flores
Ponente: Villa-Real J.
(yo di na siya divided into facts etc kasi its literally 1 page long)
Case was an appeal of the judgment of CFI of Manila finding respondent guilty
of frustrated theft and sentencing him to 11 days of arresto menor + 2 years 4
mo. 1 day of prison correctional for being a habitual delinquent.
He appealed that the court erred in sentencing him of principal penalty of 11
days for arresto menor. But court found that in fact, consummated theft
warranted arresto mayor, so since he was guilty of frustrated theft, his penalty
will be a degree lower: arresto menor. He had aggravating circumstance of
being a recidivist but was mitigated by circumstance of plea of guilt.
However, facts alleged were not enough to prove existence of habitual
delinquency because neither dates of former convictions nor commission of
crimes of which he was convicted of were specified. Additional penalty for HD
cannot be imposed.
Judgment modified, penalty is reduced.
(Domingo)People vs. De Jesus, 63 Phil. 760 (1936)
No. 45198 October 31, 1936
FACTS:
Basilio De Jesus was convicted of theft by the CFI, having stolen an
umbrella and a buri hat amounting to P2.65. He was sentenced to one month
and one day of arresto mayor, as well as the additional penalty of 2 years, four
months, and one day for being a habitual delinquent. The records show that in
January 1933, he was convicted of theft and in November 1935, he was
convicted of qualified theft, his date of release being January 10, 1936. The
present crime, theft, is committed in the same year.
De Jesus admitted his guilt, and as such he also admitted him being a
habitual delinquent. The SolGen, however, argued that recidivism should also
be considered, notwithstanding the fact that De Jesus is a habitual delinquent.
He argues that “recidivism can be and must be taken twice into consideration
against the appellant”.
ISSUES:
- W/N recidivism could be appreciated, notwithstanding the fact that De
Jesus is a habitual delinquent
RULING
- In habitual delinquency, recidivism is implied, because recidivism is
one of those that constitute habitual delinquency and give it existence, the other
one being former conviction. Therefore, inasmuch as recidivism is a qualifying
or inherent circumstance in habitual delinquency, it cannot be considered an
aggravating circumstance at the same time.
(Domingo)People vs. Moran, GR No. 17905, 27 January 1923
No. 17905 January 27,1923
FACTS:
Juan Moran, Fructuoso Casino, and Hilario Oda were convicted of a
violation of the Election Law (defined and punished in Sec.2639 of the
Administrative Code) on March 31, 1922, in a decision by the Supreme Court.
However, on March 9, 1922, Act No. 3030 was passed, Sec.71 of which
provides that “offenses resulting from the violations of this Act shall prescribe
one year after their commission”.
On May 2, 1922, petitioners filed the present petition before the SC,
saying that under the new law, the crime has prescribed. This is because the
crime was committed more than one year before Act No. 3030 was passed.
ISSUES:
W/N the offenses referred to in Sec. 71 of Act No. 3030 refers only to that Act
(NO)
W/N Art. 22 of the RPC (retroactivity of penal laws) can be applied to Act No.
3030 as a special law (YES)
W/N the crime has prescribed (YES)
RULING:
1st issue: Act No. 3030 is amendatory to several sections and parts thereof of
the Election Law as defined in the Administrative Code. As such, when Act
No. 3030 refers to “This Act”, it necessarily refers to the Election Law as
found in the Administrative Code. The legislative intent also points out that Act
No. 3030, rather than being an integral part of the former election law, is in
conjunction with the latter the only election law in force.
2nd issue: This question is settled in US v. Parrone, where Art. 22 was applied.
In that case, since Act No. 2126 (a later law) provides for a more favorable
penalty than Act 1189, the punishment the court applied was that under Act No.
2126. The Court ruled that Art. 22, necessarily, cannot be applied to the RPC.
Hence, it can only be applied to subsequent laws insofar as the laws were
favorable to the accused. Neither can it be maintained that Art. 22 applies only
to penalties and not to procedure (like prescription), because the procedure is
linked to the penalty. Furthermore, Sec. 71 of Act 3030 is both a substantive
law insofar as it gives the person a right not to be prosecuted after one year has
passed, and a procedural law, insofar as it sets the time for prescription.
3rd issue: The crime was committed on December 20, 1920. The new law was
passed on March 9, 1922. Clearly, more than one year has passed. As such,
under Sec. 71 of Act 3030, the crime has now prescribed. The accused must be
RELEASED.