Small Wars & Insurgencies

ISSN: 0959-2318 (Print) 1743-9558 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fswi20

‘Savage warfare’: C.E. Callwell, the roots of

counter-insurgency, and the nineteenth century
context

Daniel Whittingham

To cite this article: Daniel Whittingham (2012) ‘Savage warfare’: C.E. Callwell, the roots of
counter-insurgency, and the nineteenth century context, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23:4-5,
591-607, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2012.709769

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.709769

Published online: 28 Sep 2012.

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 Small Wars & Insurgencies
Vol. 23, Nos. 4– 5, October – December 2012, 591–607

‘Savage warfare’: C.E. Callwell, the roots of counter-

insurgency, and the nineteenth century context
Daniel Whittingham*

Department of War Studies, King’s College, London, UK

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In his classic book Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (1896), the
military theorist Charles E. Callwell divided small wars into three broad
classes: wars of conquest were fought to expand empires; pacification
campaigns were internal, and often followed campaigns of conquest;
campaigns to wipe out an insult, avenge a wrong, or overthrow a dangerous
enemy, often developed into wars of conquest. While all three categories
involved major political considerations, Callwell’s text is often criticised for
its lack of discussion of politics. However, Callwell recognised that, if the
ultimate objective of a campaign was successfully to assimilate a people into
the British Empire, then ‘military intimidation’ was ill adapted to that end.
This article will argue that a strategy of ‘butcher and bolt’ was indeed
considered by many commentators, including Callwell, to be the best way to
win ‘hearts and minds’. This stemmed from a belief in the all-importance of
‘moral effect’, a recurring theme in small wars literature. However, to view
the British approach to colonial small wars as pure and simple brutality, in a
‘dark age’ before a more enlightened period of ‘minimum force’, is an
oversimplification.
Keywords: British imperialism; Callwell; counter-insurgency; small wars;
military theory; Victorian army

Introduction
The British Army, in the nineteenth century as in the twentieth, was a small wars
army. As Byron Farwell has written, ‘there was not a single year in Queen
Victoria’s long reign in which somewhere in the world her soldiers were not
fighting for her and for her empire’.1 All of these conflicts, with the exception of
the Crimean War against Russia (1853/4 – 1856), were small wars. The most
important British theorist from this period was an artillery officer who would
eventually reach the rank of major-general, Charles E. Callwell (1859 –1928),
and who in 1896 published the first edition of his magnum opus on the subject,
Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.2
In Callwell’s time, small wars were generally imperial wars, referred to
in typically Victorian language as ‘uncivilised’ or ‘savage’ warfare. Indeed, the
term ‘small war’ is itself suggestive of a war of lesser importance, a conflict on

*Email: daniel.whittingham@kcl.ac.uk

ISSN 0959-2318 print/ISSN 1743-9558 online

q 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.709769
http://www.tandfonline.com
 592 D. Whittingham
the periphery. However, Callwell himself recognised the difficulty of definition,
accepting that the expression was used ‘in default of a better’. The term, he
argued, included ‘all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides
consist of regular troops’. They did not necessarily have to be small in scale. That
this definition included a broad range of conflicts was therefore made clear from
the very start; there could be no prescriptive approach to the subject. However,
the common factor was that conditions somehow varied from the norms of
regular warfare. Thus the desultory operations in the British pacification of Upper
Burma after 1885 could be included alongside the Egyptian campaign of 1882,
when British forces fought against an opponent modelled on a regular force.
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A point often missed is that Small Wars is not simply a book about warfare
against ‘savages’. Partisan warfare in ‘civilised’ countries is also included.3
Callwell’s work is seen by many historians as the starting point of the history
of the British approach to counter-insurgency. Callwell frequently appears as the
first in a line of succession of theorist-practitioners, including Charles Gwynn,
Robert Thompson, and Frank Kitson.4 Indeed, he is the first author to be
discussed in Brigadier Gavin Bulloch’s historical survey in Countering
Insurgency (2009).5 However, it is important to note that Callwell was by no
means the first writer to consider the subject of small wars. As Simon Anglim has
written, Callwell ‘reflected prevailing opinion as much as influenced it’.6 The
principles discussed in Small Wars were illustrated using a wide array of
examples drawn from a century of British experience of countering colonial
revolt. The late nineteenth century saw the emergence of what could be described
as a ‘school’ of small wars theorist-practitioners. Callwell made use of much of
the existing literature on Britain’s small wars and referred to many texts directly.
Many of the principles he discussed were already well established by the end of
the nineteenth century and appeared in the first official army doctrine, the Field
Service Regulations (FSR) of 1909.7 However, Small Wars represents the most
complete codification of these principles. Callwell also drew on the experiences
of other powers, including France, Russia, and the United States.
Although Callwell is recognised as a major figure in the history of the study of
irregular warfare, his descriptions of ‘uncivilised’ or ‘savage’ warfare reveal that
he was very much a product of his time. While he appreciated that victory in
small wars was by no means a given, his was an era when regular troops were
usually successful. The idea that non-European opponents were ‘inferior’ – or at
best ‘semi-civilised’ – was a widely held one. Callwell believed that the ‘moral
force of civilisation’ was the vital factor that would ensure success.8 Indeed, the
term ‘butcher and bolt’ was coined to describe the punitive raids in which regular
forces would burn villages and remove crops and cattle. Such methods as these
were not permissible against ‘civilised’ opponents; in savage warfare the rules
were quite different. A strategy of ‘butcher and bolt’ was considered by many
commentators, including Callwell, to be the best way to win ‘hearts and minds’,
through the generation of moral effect. As such, the British approach in this
period can be viewed as one of exemplary force, even brutality, in a ‘dark age’
 Small Wars & Insurgencies 593
before a more enlightened period of ‘minimum force’. However, this is an
oversimplification, on two levels. Firstly, the extent to which the theory and
practice of ‘minimum force’ formed the basis of British counter-insurgency in
the twentieth century has been questioned.9 Secondly, nineteenth century
commentators such as Callwell recognised that, if the ultimate objective of a
campaign was successfully to assimilate a people into the British Empire, then
excessive use of force (or ‘military intimidation’, as it was described by H.L.
Wesseling) was ill adapted to that end.10
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Callwell’s Small Wars

The first edition of Small Wars appeared in 1896, with revised and expanded
second and third editions following in 1899 and 1906. All three editions were
published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, as semi-official manuals. The
preface to the third edition was by the then Chief of the General Staff, Sir Neville
Lyttelton. He wrote that Small Wars was highly recommended ‘as a valuable
contribution on the subject of the conduct of small wars’, although it was ‘not to
be regarded as laying down inflexible rules for guidance’, nor was it ‘an
expression of official opinion’.11
Important changes were made as Small Wars was updated. The 1899 edition
included lessons drawn from the French advance to Antananarivo and their later
operations in Madagascar, the guerrilla war in Cuba before the American
intervention there, the suppression of rebellions in Rhodesia, operations beyond
the Punjab frontier in 1897 –1898, the re-conquest of the Sudan, the US operations
in the Philippines and other more minor campaigns. Some chapters were
rearranged and in part rewritten. New chapters were added on hill and bush warfare
(the former particularly topical in light of events on the North-West Frontier).12
These campaigns further demonstrated the great diversity of small wars.
The third edition included lessons drawn from the South African War (1899 –
1902) against the Boers. In particular, Callwell added material to his chapter on
guerrilla warfare. Following their initial setbacks in battles such as at Colenso (15
December 1899), the British had gained the upper hand in conventional
operations. The Boers adopted guerrilla tactics and a further two years of fighting
were required. The British constructed an elaborate system of blockhouses to
control the countryside, against which the Boer kommandos were to be pinned by
a series of mobile drives. An increasingly indiscriminate scorched-earth policy
uprooted Boer women and children, who were then removed to concentration
camps, thus separating the guerrillas from the population. These measures slowly
turned the screw on the Boer bittereinders, leading to peace in May 1902.13 The
South African War was the largest of Britain’s small wars. As we have seen, it is
clear that Callwell knew that victory for the regulars was not a given. This had
become even clearer by the time of the 1906 edition: his conclusion that ‘small
wars of the future may involve very difficult operations’ does not appear in the
first two editions.14
 594 D. Whittingham
Small Wars is Callwell’s most famous work; but it was by no means his only
contribution to the subject. He made his first forays into writing with two essays
for the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institute: ‘Notes on the Tactics of our
Small Wars’ was published in 1884, followed by ‘Notes on the Strategy of our
Small Wars’ in 1885.15 Most notably, he won the Gold Medal of the Royal United
Service Institution in 1887 for his answer on the ‘Lessons to be Learnt from the
Campaigns in which British Forces have been Employed since the Year 1865’.16
He found the lessons of the Tirah campaign in India particularly instructive,
revisiting the war in 1911 for his Campaigns and Their Lessons series. Tirah was
part of the wider rising on the North-West Frontier in 1897 – 1898, which saw
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several expeditions sent out across the region. This was ‘butcher and bolt’ on a
large scale. The Tirah Field Force, commanded by General Sir William Lockhart,
was the largest of the expeditions; its operations proved by far the most difficult.
Lockhart’s aim was to announce the government’s terms to the jirgahs from
Tirah itself, which had never previously been entered by a British force. The
campaign demonstrated the difficulties of facing a well-armed guerrilla
opponent, who ‘fights when he chooses and runs away when he chooses without
being the worse for doing so’.17 Lockhart announced his terms but the subsequent
evacuation proved difficult.18

Callwell on moral effect

The idea that creating a sufficient ‘moral effect’ was the most important
consideration for regular armies in small wars was a recurring theme in the
literature. Indeed, following Callwell’s semi-official recommendations, the
principle received official endorsement with the publication of the 1909 Field
Service Regulations. In chapter X, ‘Warfare against an Uncivilized Enemy’,
soldiers were told that the ‘susceptibility of this class of enemy to moral influences
is a most important factor in the campaign.’19 Most of Callwell’s ideas – and the
case studies he used to illustrate them – in some way reflect the importance he
attached to moral factors.
Callwell recognised that the conduct of small wars would require regular
forces to employ irregular methods. ‘We must adapt our principles to the nature of
the enemy’, he told his audience in a lecture at the Aldershot Military Society in
1895.20 However, this logic of reciprocity, allied to a belief in the ‘impressionable’
nature of ‘inferior’ races, justified a degree of violence that would not have been
permissible in regular warfare. If the enemy adopted a raiding strategy, then the
regulars would be forced to do so in return. Callwell considered France’s Marshal
Thomas-Robert Bugeaud a prime exponent of the art. His razzias (raids) brought
the war to the Algerian population.21 Callwell emphasised the need to teach
‘savage’ tribes ‘a lesson which they will not forget’.22 Harsh measures were
justified because ‘uncivilized races attribute leniency to timidity . . . [They] must
be thoroughly brought to book and cowed or they will rise again’.23 Such opinions
are ever-present in Callwell’s work. His attitude towards ‘savage’ races is perhaps
 Small Wars & Insurgencies 595
typified by his comment that ‘most savages . . . can see far better in the dark than
Europeans can’.24
Callwell’s racial stereotyping often led him to underestimate the capacity of
irregular opponents to think strategically. His knowledge of historical examples
was broad; but he often drew mistaken conclusions, based on an exaggerated
notion of the power of ‘moral effect’. For example, in the Tirah campaign, the
British fought twice at Dargai, on 18 and 20 October 1897. Callwell attributed
the decision of the enemy to adopt guerrilla tactics to the British success in the
second of these engagements, which seemed ‘to have enormously impressed the
tribesmen’, rather than to any rational decision on their part.25 On the other hand,
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he also realised that in small wars the regulars were the amateurs. Their irregular
opponents were the professionals, imbued with ‘native cunning’ (in other words
supreme skill, expressed in typical Victorian language). This, Callwell argued,
‘no amount of training will instil into the soldier recruited in a civilised
country’.26 A strong irregular adversary was worthy of respect, especially if
under the command of a gifted leader like Abd al-Qadir, Bugeaud’s opponent in
Algeria, or the famous Boer, Christiaan de Wet.
Callwell believed that irregular warfare should be kept as ‘regular’ as possible:
‘The whole spirit of the art of conducting small wars’, he wrote, ‘is to strive for the
attainment of decisive methods’, which meant victory on the battlefield.27
However, he recognised that this was not always possible. He could describe it as
‘most fortunate’ when a formidable hostile army attacked, or occupied a defensible
position, because this presented the opportunity for a quick victory that was
missing in protracted pacification operations. In the Indian Mutiny (1857 –1859),
the rebels were willing to oblige; had they not been so, Callwell recognised, their
defeat would have been far harder to accomplish. Battle was the object; once the
enemy force had been found and fixed, the regulars should look to deliver a
crushing blow.28 However, the enemy often failed to offer himself up for
destruction. Small wars regularly involved long, drawn out, desultory operations
without necessarily coming to a satisfactory conclusion. As we have seen, Callwell
reserved high praise for Marshal Bugeaud; but it took him six years to pacify
Algeria.
Callwell’s concern to avoid desultory operations led him to stress the
importance of maintaining a clear objective. He linked the causes of small wars
with their conduct. ‘Military operations are always undertaken with some end in
view’, he wrote, ‘and are shaped for its achievement’.29 Such arguments were
the basis for Douglas Porch’s view that Callwell could be described as ‘the
Clausewitz of colonial warfare’.30 Indeed, it is clear that Callwell was familiar
with Clausewitz’s work.31 He divided small wars into three broad classes: wars of
conquest were fought to expand empires; pacification campaigns were internal,
and often followed campaigns of conquest; and campaigns to wipe out an insult,
avenge a wrong, or overthrow a dangerous enemy, were Victorian ‘wars of
expediency’ which often developed into wars of conquest.32 The first and final
categories were the ‘classic’ Victorian small wars. However, Callwell noted that
 596 D. Whittingham
the era of conquest was more or less at an end. Imperial warfare was the
inevitable result of imperial expansion; but by the time of the third edition of
Small Wars, territory had been carved up by the great powers and absorbed into
their empires. Insurrection and guerrilla warfare would become more common.33
Recognition of the need to understand the enemy in order to overcome him
led Callwell to divide opponents into seven rough categories. Irregular forces
could not be expected to conform to the accepted practices of European warfare,
but some did possess modern armament and a form of regular organisation,
although the extent to which this was the case varied considerably. Arabi’s
Egyptian army in 1882 was the most obvious example of this kind of opponent.
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Some irregular armies were disciplined but badly armed, the Zulus being the
classic example. The third category consisted of ‘fanatics’ who lacked discipline
and employed shock tactics on the battlefield, such as the Sudanese. Guerrillas,
both ‘civilised and savage’, formed another category. ‘Armies of savages in the
bush’, which often accepted battle when the opportunity presented itself, were
classed separately. Next were opponents who fought mounted, such as in Algeria
and Morocco. Finally, there were the Boers, whom Callwell placed in a category
of their own. The Boers were not disciplined, but they were well armed, and
provided the great tests of 1880 – 1881 and 1899 –1902.34
The army’s objectives therefore depended on the cause of hostilities,
knowledge of the enemy, and of the theatre of war. Often the objectives included
the enemy’s capital, his army, or both of these; but frequently there was no obvious
centre of gravity to aim at, especially when fighting guerrillas. In this respect the
Tirah campaign was exceptional. Lockhart announced the government’s terms at
the heart of Tirah itself, which had never previously been visited by a European
force. However, the presence of such a target did not preclude the employment of
severe measures. ‘The army performed its task of penetrating into Tirah’, Callwell
wrote in Small Wars, ‘and of leaving its mark in the usual manner by the
demolition of buildings and destruction of crops.’35
Callwell noted that the suppression of insurrection and pacification of
territory usually involved no such obvious objectives:
The regular army has to cope not with determinate but with indeterminate forces.
The crushing of a populace in arms and the stamping out of widespread disaffection
by military methods, is a harassing form of warfare even in a civilised country with
a settled social system; in remote regions peopled by half-civilised races or wholly
savage tribes, such campaigns are most difficult to bring to a satisfactory
conclusion, and are always most trying to the troops.
‘As a general rule’, he added, ‘the quelling of rebellion in distant colonies means
protracted, thankless, invertebrate war’.36 Such work called for tough measures.
This view is set out early in Small Wars:
The main points of difference between small wars and regular campaigns in this
respect are that, in the former, the beating of the hostile armies is not necessarily the
main object even if such armies exist, that moral effect is often far more important
 Small Wars & Insurgencies 597
than material success, and that the operations are sometimes limited to committing
havoc which the laws of regular warfare do not sanction.
It was then, Callwell argued, that ‘the regular troops are forced to resort to cattle
lifting and village burning and that the war assumes an aspect which may shock
the humanitarian’.37
Such ‘havoc’ involved the destruction of the enemy’s economic base. ‘If the
enemy cannot be touched in his patriotism or his honour’, Callwell wrote, ‘he can
be touched through his pocket.’ He quoted from the famous Soldier’s Pocket
Book by the Victorian hero, General (later Field-Marshal) Garnet Wolseley.
‘In planning a war against an uncivilised nation who have perhaps no capital’,
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Wolseley wrote, ‘your first object should be the capture of whatever they prize
most, and the destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war
most rapidly to a conclusion’.38 Such work had to be carried out deliberately, and
it was crucial to allow sufficient time.39
However, there was more than mere economic logic to this. ‘Butcher and bolt’
methods were considered by commentators such as Wolseley and Callwell to be
the best way to win ‘hearts and minds’, through the generation of moral effect.
Callwell quoted approvingly the Russian general, Mikhail Skobelev: ‘he is the
master who seizes the people pitilessly by the throat and imposes upon their
imagination’.40 Even when the enemy possessed a capital or an army, it was often
still necessary to employ such measures. Callwell’s recognition that small wars
were anything but easy was nowhere better demonstrated: the defeat of the enemy
forces, such as they were, may be accomplished quickly, and the capital occupied;
but the pacification of the country could take years.41 Callwell opined in his 1885
essay that the capture of Pretoria might not have brought the Transvaal War to a
conclusion.42 This certainly proved to be the case in the later South African War.
Once the objective had been decided upon, the next question concerned the line,
or lines, of advance. Separation of force was often unavoidable, and frequently
desirable. It relaxed the strain on supply lines and transport, thereby increasing
mobility. It also allowed the troops to cover a wider area, ensuring that sufficient
‘moral effect’ would be generated as more of the population would feel the
presence of the regular troops.43
The ‘havoc’ that Callwell described was certainly committed by French
troops under Bugeaud in the pacification of Algeria in the 1840s. Bugeaud was, and
remains, a controversial figure. His system of razzias turned the methods of the
Algerian leader Abd al-Qadir against the Algerians themselves. The purpose of
these raids was ‘not merely to disperse the gatherings of the enemy, but also to
chastise the rebels in their homes’. Callwell gives credit to Bugeaud for turning the
situation in Algeria around; but he must have been aware that, when pushed to its
extremes, the razzia strategy involved excessive brutality. Incidents such as that at
the Dahra cave in 1845, when a fire set by French troops engulfed members of the
Oulad Riah tribe who were sheltering inside, caused considerable controversy in
metropolitan France.44
 598 D. Whittingham
Callwell argued that, unlike European warfare, there was no question of
seizing the initiative, which generally passed to the regulars anyway. This
principle held for all three classes of small war: even in the suppression of
insurrection, where rebels made the first move. This was so because rebels ‘rarely
open proceedings by an effective operation of war’. Here Callwell, although he
noted the fact that this depended on the degree of rebel organisation and
leadership, perhaps underestimated the extent to which rebellious forces could
seize the initiative at the start of a campaign. He referred to the Indian Mutiny,
but did not remark on the extent to which it had threatened British control of
India.45
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For Callwell, the more important point was that once operations had begun,
there could be no let-up. Wolseley’s notes for distribution to each regiment
before the advance on the Ashanti capital, Kumasi, were reproduced in Henry
Brackenbury’s The Ashanti War (1874) , a work cited by Callwell. They make
clear the moral strength of the advancing British:
It must never be forgotten by our soldiers that Providence has implanted in the heart
of every native of Africa a superstitious awe and dread of the white man that
prevents the negro from daring to meet us face to face in combat. A steady advance
or a charge, no matter how partial, if made with determination, always means the
retreat of the enemy . . . [T]hey will not stand against the advance of the white
man.46
In seeking out a battle, when fighting guerrillas, when engaged in punitive
operations, it was vital that the regulars act boldly and resolutely. The only
possible strategy in small wars was an offensive one, based on the need to
generate moral effect as much as on the particular ends the regulars were seeking
to accomplish in each of the three classes of war. To avoid desultory warfare,
every single operation needed a ‘definite and distinct purpose’. Again, there were
no definite rules: battle was generally the object to be sought, but it might well be
avoided if by doing so the regular force achieved some other purpose, or did not
take unnecessary risks. As in regular warfare, maintaining the offensive was not
incompatible with standing on the defensive on the battlefield. However, in small
wars this posture was often enforced by specific circumstances. The regulars
were often massively outnumbered. Callwell again demonstrated his awareness
that small wars were not a matter of pure calculation in his reference to the fact
that, unlike in European warfare, defeat often meant total destruction. Ultimately,
the instinct of a commander would be crucial. ‘It is in cases such as this’, wrote
Callwell in Clausewitzian terms, ‘that genius triumphs over theory’.47 Generals
could harness the spirit of Robert Clive’s famous victory at Plassey (1757) or
Bugeaud’s at Isly (1844).
Callwell argued that once the offensive was underway, delay was to be
avoided at all costs. He maintained that any sign of hesitation would simply
encourage the enemy, although this argument was based less on purely military
reasons than on racial stereotyping. However, he did recognise that avoiding delay
was easier said than done, given the many problems the regulars faced – such as
 Small Wars & Insurgencies 599
those of intelligence and supply – which tended to prolong rather than shorten
operations.48 His final message in Small Wars stressed this theme:
The fundamental principle of carrying out operations against antagonists of this
class is to assume the initiative whenever it is possible to do so, and to maintain it as
long as it is practicable to maintain it . . . The commander who takes the field against
guerillas [sic, passim ], or savages, or hill-men must make up his mind to strike hard,
to move rapidly in spite of the impedimenta which encumber him, to pursue
relentlessly after a victory has been won and to seize the first possible moment for a
counter-stroke should he meet with reverse.49
However, in spite of the drive for decisiveness, guerrilla warfare was often
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the unavoidable sequel to the defeat of the irregular armies in the field. Callwell
therefore saw it as a subject worthy of special attention. He described it as the
form of warfare that ‘the regular armies always have most to dread’, in which the
regulars were at their worst and the irregulars at their best. This was especially so
when the enemy was commanded by a leader of genius. Callwell praised men
such as Abd al-Qadir for being great exponents of the art of war. In guerrilla
warfare, the regulars did not face a hostile army but a hostile population.50 ‘The
guerilla mode of war’, he wrote, ‘must in fact be met by an abnormal system of
strategy and tactics. The great principle which forms the basis of the art of war
remains – the combination of initiative with energy. But this is applied in a
special form’.51 The bold and vigorous movements he called for elsewhere were
not always enough: it was necessary to give some definite shape to operations.
Callwell discussed the development of doctrine in detail and recommended
elaborate preparation of the theatre. It should be subdivided into sections and
covered with fortified defensive posts, between which mobile flying columns
would launch offensives to pin down the guerrillas. The troops needed to
make their presence felt everywhere, systematically clearing the countryside of
any supplies or shelter that might aid the enemy. Here factors such as good
intelligence and self-reliance assumed particular importance. The principles
involved here were hardly new: it was ‘the system of Bugeaud and of Hoche’, the
latter a reference to the French general who pacified the Vendée and Brittany
regions in 1794 –1796. This strategy was not put into place by the Spanish in
Cuba, with disastrous results; but was successfully employed on a massive scale
in the South African War. The lessons were thus incorporated into the third
edition of Small Wars. The exact details of the composition of mobile forces
and subdivision of the theatre depended on circumstances; but Callwell was
sufficiently impressed by the British performance in South Africa to suggest
that the system of ‘drives’ represented ‘the last word in strategy directed against
guerilla antagonists’.52

British brutality?
Commentators do not fail to address Callwell’s advocacy of severe measures
when discussing his work. As stated above, H.L. Wesseling described the British
 600 D. Whittingham
approach as ‘military intimidation’. ‘For Callwell there was only one solution’, he
wrote, ‘an assault on the population itself. They must be intimidated. This entailed
the raiding of cattle and the burning of villages, even if this shocked the delicate
minded. For Callwell, this was the only way to deal with coloured peoples: “to go
for them and to cow them by sheer force of will”.’53 British methods in this period
have also been contrasted with the twentieth-century approach based, it has been
argued, on the principle of ‘minimum force’.54 Certainly, the suppression of the
two mid-century rebellions that were to cast a long shadow subsequently – the
Indian Mutiny (1857 – 1859) and the Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica (1865) –
could hardly be characterised as anything other than brutal.
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Commentators have drawn attention to Callwell’s assumptions of European

moral superiority. ‘Indigenous societies’, wrote Douglas Porch, ‘were viewed
by Callwell not as complex organizations, but as “inferior races” destined to be
smashed into submission. Callwell should – indeed, he must – have known
better, both from scholarship and practical experience’.55 In advocating what
seems to twenty-first century eyes to be a particularly ‘dirty’ form of warfare, it is
suggested that he ignored the political aspect of small wars, now seen as the most
important part of counter-insurgency. Commentators have noted his failure to
address issues such as domestic political constraints and the use of native troops.
Finally, new theories and conditions emerged in the decades after the First World
War that appeared to consign his work firmly to the past.56
It is easy to be distracted by Callwell’s descriptions of ‘savage’ warfare. ‘The
angry hordes that have dogged the columns as they toil painfully through theatres
of war bristling with obstacles to the march’, he wrote in his 1887 Gold Medal
winning essay for the Royal United Service Institution, ‘go down as wheat before
the sickle when modern weapons of precision are brought into play’.57 This, one
of many similar passages, conjures up the stereotypical image of Europeans
armed with the latest weapons mowing down charging masses of brave warriors
armed only with spears, and does little to commend Callwell to a modern-day
audience. However, he did know better than to suggest that ‘inferior races’
offered themselves up for destruction. Victory, as we have seen, was not a given.
Furthermore, pure and simple brutality was not the answer. Although
imperial rule ultimately rested on force, there had to be some ‘carrot’ to go with
the ‘stick’. All three classes of small war described by Callwell involved major
political considerations. His discussion of the objective reveals his understanding
of the close link between military operations and political goals. The infliction of
punishment was a necessary part of the suppression of rebellion. ‘The adoption of
guerilla methods by the enemy’, Callwell wrote, ‘almost necessarily forces the
regular troops to resort to punitive measures directed against the possessions of
their antagonists.’58 He quoted Sir George Cathcart, Governor of the Cape
Colony from 1852 to 1853, for support: ‘A war may be terminated by the
surrender or capitulation of the hostile sovereign or chief, who answers for his
people; but in the suppression of rebellion the refractory subjects of the ruling
power must be chastised and subdued.’59 ‘Still’, Callwell added, ‘there is a limit
 Small Wars & Insurgencies 601
to the amount of licence in destruction which is expedient.’ Indeed, it could be
counter-productive: ‘Wholesale destruction of the property of the enemy may
sometimes do more harm than good’, he wrote. The destruction of precious food
supplies was ‘more exasperating to the adversary’ than other measures, because
‘wanton damage tends to embitter their feeling of enmity.’ He appreciated that
something more than a raiding strategy would be required in order to achieve any
kind of victory. If the ultimate objective of a campaign was successfully to
assimilate a people into the empire, then steps had to be taken accordingly:
It is so often the case that the power which undertakes a small war desires to acquire
the friendship of the people which its armies are chastising, that the system of what
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is called ‘military execution’ is ill adapted to the end in view.

Callwell cited Hoche’s pacification of La Vendée in France in 1794 – 1795 as
an example of a successful counter-insurgency campaign, a ‘happy combination
of clemency with firmness’. Hoche, the first of the line of the French soldier-
administrators that included Bugeaud, Joseph-Simon Galliéni, and Hubert
Lyautey, substituted his more effective system for the policy of devastation
employed by his predecessors. Callwell argued that the lessons were not always
applicable: it was ‘out of place among fanatics and savages, who must be
thoroughly brought to book and cowed or they will rise again’. Here we are clearly
some way from the principle of ‘minimum force’, both in theory and in practice.
However, he still made clear the need for restraint. ‘The enemy must be chastised
up to a certain point’, he wrote, ‘but should not be driven to desperation’, as this
would merely increase their resistance. Care had to be taken not to exasperate the
people. It was vital to distinguish between those who were friendly and those who
were not: in Burma, the objective was ‘to punish only the dacoits and marauders’
who opposed British rule, and ‘great care had to be exercised not to punish villages
who were merely victims of dacoity.’ Callwell’s conclusion was in keeping with
his views as to the importance of the political ends in small wars:
Expeditions to put down revolt are not put in motion merely to bring about a
temporary cessation of hostility. Their purpose is to ensure a lasting peace.
Therefore, in choosing the objective, the overawing and not the exasperation of the
enemy is the end to keep in view.60
The idea of creating ‘moral effect’ thus extended beyond the need to
accomplish the total defeat of the irregular forces in the field; a more measured
approach towards the population would convince them of the benevolence and
benefits of British rule. Thus, Callwell’s use of Burma as a case study reflected the
emphasis of the instructions issued in November 1886 to commanders of columns
engaged in the pacification operations there. Rebels were to be dealt the heaviest
blow possible; but the columns were also to win the support of the people:
It must be remembered that the chief object of traversing the country with columns
is to cultivate friendly relations with the inhabitants, and at the same time to put
before them evidences of our power, thus gaining their good-will and their
confidence. It is therefore the bounden duty of commanding officers to ascertain that
 602 D. Whittingham
the troops under their command are not permitted to injure the property of the
people or to wound their susceptibilities . . . The most injurious accounts of our
intentions have been circulated amongst, and believed by, the people, and too much
pains cannot be taken to eradicate this impression, and to assure the people both by
act and word of our good-will towards the law-abiding. Chief men of districts
should be treated with consideration and distinction. The success of the present
operations will much depend on the tact with which the inhabitants are treated.61
Beyond his discussion of the different characteristics of his categories of
irregular opponents, Callwell does not explain why some offered greater
resistance to the imperial powers than others. Some political structures were more
capable of standing up to the onslaught of regular armies pursuing total victory,
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although the powers proved remarkably adept at exploiting the divisions that
existed to ensure high levels of collaboration in their imperial projects. This
method of ‘divide and rule’ at the political level is largely absent from Callwell’s
work; but he did recognise the role of moral effect in keeping ‘waverers’ who
hesitated to join either side from joining the enemy ranks.62 There is little
reference to the native troops employed in large numbers by European powers to
do much of the fighting. However, he discussed in some detail the importance of
native scouts, in intelligence gathering and combat roles. Scouts were invaluable
in guerrilla warfare.63
The question of how the British approach measured up in comparison with
the methods employed by other European countries must also be considered.
Callwell’s contemporaries, Galliéni and Lyautey, are celebrated for their
enlightened approach to pacification, the so-called tache d’huile (oil slick)
method. However, Douglas Porch has described ‘hearts and minds’ as ‘more a
public-relations exercise with the French people than a workable military
formula’ during Lyautey’s administration in Morocco in the first quarter of the
twentieth century.64 The Germans were also capable of extreme brutality in their
colonial campaigns. The war in South-West Africa against the local Herero
people (1904 – 1907) is often cited as an example of this, especially General von
Trotha’s infamous ‘extermination order’ of the Herero. Kenneth Mackenzie has
demonstrated that there was significant opposition in Britain to what was seen as
‘Prussian cruelty’ in colonial affairs, long before such ideas became widespread
as a result of the First World War and the resulting propaganda.65
Indeed, the court of public opinion was becoming increasingly important
during Callwell’s era. It is therefore perhaps surprising that he had little to say on
domestic constraints on the conduct of small wars. For example, he does not
mention the growing role of the media. This might have something to do with his
contempt for the press, which is clear in some of his other work.66 However, he did
refer to the ‘humanitarian’ who might be shocked by the conduct of an irregular
campaign.67 A considerable amount of freedom of action could be exercised on the
periphery. There were limits to the level of control possible from the metropole;
nevertheless, some degree of intervention or interference was common. Such
constraints on small wars were much less of an issue in Callwell’s day than they
 Small Wars & Insurgencies 603
have become subsequently; but it is worth noting that the suppression of the
Morant Bay Rebellion, the ‘butcher and bolt’ campaigns on the North-West
Frontier, and the conduct of the South African War all provoked controversy in
metropolitan Britain.68 ‘Butcher and bolt’ methods, in particular, were seen by
many as a short-term fix rather than a long-term solution. Commentators argued
that they were unnecessarily destructive and created bitterness and resentment.
They were also wasteful in money and lives. Authorities such as Lord Roberts
stressed the importance of friendly relations with frontier tribes in case of war
with Russia.69 Callwell himself felt that the Tirah campaign, although it had left
smoking ruins behind it, had been far from a complete success. The area, he
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argued, needed to be dominated for a long period.70

The South African War also provoked controversy. Measures such as the
scorched-earth policy and concentration camps were famously denounced in the
House of Commons by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as ‘methods of
barbarism’, although ultimately they proved successful militarily.71 Although
Callwell added the lessons of the South African War to his chapter on guerrilla
warfare in the 1906 edition of Small Wars, he chose to avoid any serious
discussion of the concentration camp policy. He limited himself to a brief and
curious reference in Small Wars, in a small section discussing the difficulties faced
by the regular force as regards the care of the wounded. He noted that, ‘even at a
time when the British troops were sweeping the whole country bare and were
burning farms and collecting the Boer women and children into concentration
camps’, the Boers nonetheless ‘almost invariably treated British wounded who
fell into their hands with the utmost consideration.’72 In 1923 he provided further
comment in the second volume of his memoir, Stray Recollections, when
reflecting on his own experience of service in the South African War. He criticised
the ‘pro-Boer’ point of view and justified the existence of the camps on the
grounds that the women and children could not be left to live on the veldt:
Politicians of the baser sort, in opposition at home, criticised the policy of herding
Boer women and children in concentration camps severely. I never visited one of
these institutions and know nothing about them; but they must have been badly
managed indeed, situated as they were on railways, if their occupants were not
incomparably better off thus accommodated than they would have been, wandering
about on the veldt, with little or nothing to eat, and with only broken-down wagons
drawn by worn-out oxen to live in.73
The South African War in many ways offered a vision of the future of small
wars. Although Callwell noted the closing technological gap, a development
which he did not and perhaps could not foresee was the emergence in the
twentieth century of independence movements inspired by ideologies such as
communism. At the same time the West, owing to an increasing aversion to
empire, was poorly placed to respond. Thus, the balance swung in favour of the
irregulars. The next generation of small wars theorists – T.E. Lawrence and
Mao Zedong on the insurgency side, Robert Thompson and David Galula on the
 604 D. Whittingham
other – produced their works in this very different context. Nonetheless, much of
this theory was based on the foundations laid previously by Callwell and others.74

Conclusion
In sum, Callwell argued that the ‘hearts and minds of the people’ were to be won
by ‘butcher and bolt’ style methods. Such ideas were based on the perceived
importance of ‘moral factors’ and the need to deal the rebels a heavy blow.
However, the controversies caused by this approach and awareness of the need to
win over but not exasperate the people suggest that the idea of British brutality
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can be exaggerated. Unfortunately, Callwell did not update Small Wars after
1906. Indeed, he did not revisit the subject of small wars at all after Tirah. He
lived until 1928; but, engaged in various other writing projects, he declined to
revise his work to take into account new ideological factors, the lessons of
counter-insurgency in Ireland (1919 –1921) and the Amritsar massacre (1919), or
technological developments such as air power. One wonders how he might have
modified his text in these altered circumstances.
In his report to his superiors dated 25 August 1919, the then Brigadier-
General Reginald Dyer, who commanded the troops at Amritsar, wrote:
I fired and continued to fire till the crowd dispersed, and I considered that this is the
least amount of firing which would produce the necessary moral and widespread
effect it was my duty to produce if I was to justify my action. If more troops had
been at hand the casualties would have been greater in proportion. It was no longer a
question of merely dispersing the crowd, but one of producing a sufficient moral
effect, from a military point of view, not only on those who were present, but more
specially throughout the Punjab. There could be no question of undue severity.75
Nick Lloyd’s recent work has questioned many of the widely held assumptions
about the Amritsar massacre. According to Lloyd, Dyer had no definite plan and
reacted to the threat posed by a large and hostile crowd. However, he was unable
to admit afterwards that he had panicked and, faced with the backlash, convinced
himself that he had saved India from a repeat of the Mutiny.76 Nonetheless,
Dyer’s use of the language of ‘moral effect’ is interesting: after all, he was a
contemporary of Callwell and had served in Burma and on the North-West
Frontier. Perhaps, in Dyer’s subsequent justification of his actions at Amritsar,
the Victorian idea of ‘moral effect’ had reached its logical, extreme conclusion.

Notes
1. Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars, 1.
2. Callwell, Small Wars, 23. All references will be to the 1996 reprint of the third
edition, originally published in London by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO)
in 1906, unless otherwise stated.
3. Ibid., 21 – 2.
4. Beckett, ‘Another British Way in Warfare’, 89, 101; Alderson, ‘Britain’, 32.
5. Bulloch, ‘The Development of Doctrine for Countering Insurgency’, CS 1 – 1.
6. Anglim, ‘Callwell versus Graziani’, 592.
 Small Wars & Insurgencies 605
7. Field Service Regulations, 191– 212.
8. Callwell, Small Wars, 90.
9. See for example Bennett, ‘Minimum Force in British Counterinsurgency’.
10. See Wesseling, ‘Colonial Wars’, 4 – 5.
11. N.G. Lyttelton, ‘Preface to the Third Edition, 1906’, in Callwell, Small Wars, 2.
12. Callwell, Small Wars, 1.
13. Ibid., 125– 49. The best book on the war is still Pakenham, The Boer War.
14. Callwell, Small Wars, 24.
15. Callwell, ‘Notes on the Tactics of our Small Wars’, 531– 52; Ibid., ‘Notes on the
Strategy of our Small Wars’, 403– 20.
16. Ibid., ‘Military Prize Essay’, 357– 412.
17. Ibid., Tirah, vi.
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18. On Tirah, see Johnson, The Afghan Way of War, 149– 73.
19. Field Service Regulations, 192.
20. Callwell, ‘Lessons to be Learnt from Small Wars since 1870’, 8.
21. Callwell, Small Wars, 128– 9. On Bugeaud, see Sullivan, Bugeaud.
22. Callwell, Small Wars, 395.
23. Ibid., 148.
24. Callwell, Tirah, 34.
25. Callwell, Small Wars, 104. For the Pashtun perspective, see Johnson, The Afghan
Way of War, 149– 73. An important study of the distorting effect that Victorian racial
attitudes could have on the study of small wars is Belich, The New Zealand Wars.
26. Callwell, Small Wars, 2nd ed., 125; Callwell, Tirah, 35 – 6.
27. Callwell, Small Wars, 125.
28. Ibid., 37 – 8, 90 – 3, 104.
29. Ibid., 34.
30. Porch, ‘Introduction’, xii.
31. His only reference to Clausewitz in Small Wars relates to Clausewitz’s views on
night attacks: Callwell, Small Wars, 485.
32. Ibid., 25 – 8.
33. Callwell, Tirah, v, 141.
34. Callwell, Small Wars, 29 – 32.
35. Ibid., 38 – 9.
36. Ibid., 26 – 7.
37. Ibid., 40 – 2.
38. Ibid., 40; Wolseley, The Soldier’s Pocket Book, 398.
39. Callwell, Small Wars, 308– 9.
40. Ibid., 72.
41. Ibid., 26 – 7, 36 – 7.
42. Callwell, ‘Notes on the Strategy of our Small Wars’, 415.
43. Callwell, Small Wars, 108– 14.
44. Ibid., 128– 9; Sullivan, Bugeaud, 122– 33.
45. Callwell, Small Wars, 71.
46. Brackenbury, The Ashanti War, I, 366– 7.
47. Callwell, Small Wars, 75 – 7, 84, 100, 107, 195– 6.
48. Ibid., 43 – 70.
49. Ibid., 498.
50. Ibid., 125– 9.
51. Callwell, Small Wars, 1st ed., 111.
52. Ibid., Small Wars, 125– 49.
53. Wesseling, ‘Colonial Wars’, 4 – 5.
54. See, for example, Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 17 – 18.
 606 D. Whittingham
55. Porch, ‘Introduction’, xv.
56. Beckett, ‘Another British Way in Warfare’ and Porch, ‘Introduction’, address some
of these issues.
57. Callwell, ‘Military Prize Essay’, 370.
58. Callwell, Small Wars, 145.
59. Ibid., 41. See also Correspondence of Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir George
Cathcart for Cathcart’s views on pacification, especially his report, 7 – 32.
60. Callwell, Small Wars, 40 – 2, 146–9. On minimum force, see Mockaitis, British
Counterinsurgency, 17 – 25.
61. Roberts, Forty-One Years in India, 573.
62. Callwell, Small Wars, 76 – 7.
63. Ibid., 144.
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64. Porch, ‘Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey’, 394.

65. Mackenzie, ‘Some British Reactions to German Colonial Methods’, 166.
66. See, for example, Callwell, Experiences of a Dug-Out 1914– 1918, 310–27.
67. Callwell, Small Wars, 40.
68. On the Morant Bay Rebellion and its aftermath, see Heuman, The Killing Time.
69. ‘Little Wars on the Indian Frontier’, 935– 6.
70. Callwell, Tirah, 139– 41.
71. See Spies, Methods. Wessels, ‘Boer Guerrilla and British Counter-Guerrilla
Operations’ provides a good summary of the British measures.
72. Callwell, Small Wars, 95 – 6.
73. Callwell, Stray Recollections, II, 149– 50.
74. Porch, ‘Introduction’, xvi– xviii.
75. Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate the
Disturbances in the Punjab, 112.
76. Lloyd, Amritsar, 156– 60, 182– 3.

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