Manika, Kanika-Petitioner

THE 2ND LEGAL INSIDER, MEMORIAL WRITING COMPETITION, 2020
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
SLP NO. ………… OF 2016

IN THE MATTER OF:
RANSOM AND ORS. PETITIONER
V.
UNION OF INDIANA .. RESPONDENT
CLUBBED WITH
WP(C) NO. ………… OF 2016
ZIO FOUNDATION .. PETITIONER
V.
UNION OF INDIANA .. RESPONDENT
ON SUBMISSION TO THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT

OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
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MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................... 2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................... 3
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION............................................................................................... 9
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................... 10
ISSUES RAISED .......................................................................................................................... 11
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .................................................................................................. 12
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ......................................................................................................... i
I. THAT THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT,

2014 IS NOT CONSTITUTIONAL ............................................................................................ i
II. THAT THE HIGH COURT AND SESSION’S COURT WERE NOT JUSTIFIED IN
REJECTING THE TEST FOR DETERMINATION OF RANSOM’S AGE .......................... vii
III. THAT PETER SHOULD BE ACQUIITED OF ALL THE CHARGES LEVIED

AGAINST HIM........................................................................................................................... x
PRAYER .................................................................................................................................... xviii
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
¶ Paragraph
§ Section
AIR All India Reporter
Art. Article
Cri Criminal
GOI Government Of Indiana
Hon’ble Honourable
IEA Indian Evidence Act
i.e That is
IPC Indian Penal Code
J. Justice
JJ. Juvenile Justice
NCRB National Crime Research Bureau
Ors. Others
POCSO Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
r/w Read with
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
v. Versus
Yrs. Years
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
S.NO. CASE LAWS CITATION PAGE

NUMBER
1. Abdul Sayeed vs State Of M.P (2010) 10 SCC 259 xiv
2. Abuzar Hussain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489 iv

3. Abdulwahab Abdulmajid Baloch v. State (2009) 11 SCC 625 xiii
of Gujarat
4. Aftab Ahamd Anasari v. State of 2010 2 SCC 583 xiv

Uttaranchal,
5. Akbar Sheikh (2009) 7 SCC 415 ix
6. A Mohnam v. State of Kerela 1990 Supp SCC 66 xii
7. Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488 x
8. Ashok Basak v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 10 SCC 660 xii

9. Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P (2012) 9 SCC 750 ix
10. Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State Of AIR 1979 SC 1149 ix
Haryana
11. Avishek Goenka v. Union of India (2012) 5 SCC 321 iv
12. Balco Employees Union v. Union of (2002) 2 SCC 333 i
India
13. Bangalore Wollen, Cotton and Silk AIR 1962 SC 1263 i
Mills, Co. Ltd. v. Corporation. of City of
Bangalore
14. Bhim Singh v. State of Uttrakhand (2015) 4 SCC 739 xv
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15. Bikash Bora v. State of Assam (2019) 4 SCC 280 xiii
16. Bikramaditya Singh v. State of Bihar (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 169 xii
17. Bishnupada Sarkar v. State of West AIR 2012 SC 2248 xii
Bengal
18. C. Chenga Reddy v State of AP (1996) 10 SCC 193 xv

19. Deepak v. State of Haryana (2015) 4 SCC 762 xiii
20. Essa v. State of Maharashtra 2013 (4) SCALE 1 iv
21. Gulam Hossain v. State of WB (2012) 10 SCC 489 ix
22. Gunga v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 2 SCC 775 ix
23. Hanumant v. State of M.P AIR 1952 SC 343 xv
24. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque AIR 1955 SC 233 viii
25. Hukam v state AIR 1977 SC 1063 xv
26. Independent Thought v. Union of India AIR 2017 SC 4904 iv
27. Jai Prakash Tiwari v. State of U.P (2016) 97 AIICC 592 ix
28. Jitendra Ram v. State of Jharkhand (2006) 9 SCC 428 ix
29. Jitendra Singh (2010) 13 SCC 523 ix
30. Javed Alam v. State of Chhattisgarh (2009) 6 SCC 450 xvi
31. Kartar Singh and Ujagar Singh v. Delhi (1979) 2 SCC 675 viii
Administration
32. Khalil Chishti v. State of Rajasthan (2013) 2 SCC 541 xi
33. Mal Singh v. Union of India and Ors. (1980) 2 SCC 684 viii
34. Manjula Krippendorf v. State (Govt. of AIR 2017 SC 3457 iv
NCT of Delhi) and Ors
35. Mano Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 79 xii
36. M. Nagaraj v. Union of India AIR 2007 SC 71 iii
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37. Mofil Khan and Anr. v. State of (2015) 1 SCC 67 iv

Jharkhand,
38. Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479 xiv
39. Nachimuthu v state of Tamil Nadu (2011) 14 SCC 441 xi

40. Nand Kishore v. State of Madhya (2011) 12 SCC 120 xi
Pradesh
.41. Nathu Singh and Ors. v. Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 675 viii
and Another
42. Nash v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 420 xiii
43. Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan and (2012) 5 SCC 201 ix

Ors.
.44. Padaala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P AIR 1990 SC 79 xv
45. Parichat v. state of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 535 xi

46. Pawan, (2009) 15 SCC 259 ix
47. PT Rajan v. TPM Sahir, AIR 2003 SC 4603 viii
48. Raghbir Chand v. State of Punjab (2013) 12 SCC 294 xvi
49. Rajindra Chandra v. State of (2002) 2 SCC 287 ix
Chhattisgarh and Anr.
50. Rajesh Rai v. State of Sikkim 2002 Cr.L.J. 1385 at P. xv
1390(Sikkim)
51. Raju Kumar v. State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC 235 x

52. Ramdeo Chauhan v. State of Assam (Crl.) 4 of 2000 ix
53. Ram Jag v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1974 SC 606 xi
54. Ramuthai v. State (2011) 13 SCC 212 xi
55. Ranganath Sharma v. Satendra Sharma (2009) 1 SCC (Cr.) 415 xi
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56. R.D Upadhyay v. State of A.P and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 1946 iii
57. Reena Banerjee and Anr. v. Govt. (NCT (2015) 11 SCC 725 iv
of Delhi) and Ors.
58. Rewa Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1978) Cr.L.J. 858 xiv
59. Roop Chand Adlakha v. DDA 1989 Supp (1) SCC 116 iii
60. RK Garg v Union Of India AIR 1981 SC 2138 iii
61. Salil Bali v Union of India (2013) 7 SCC 705 iii
62. Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 1480 viii
63. Sampurna Behura v. Union of India (2018) 4 SCC 433 iv
(UOI) and Ors.
64. Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh (2007) 13 SCC 360 xiv
and Ors.,
65. Satto v. State of UP (1979) 2 SCC 628 ii

66. Selvam v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 10 SCC 402 xi
67.68. Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan (2004) 10 SCC 632 xiv
69. Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of AIR 1984 SC 1682 xv

Maharashtra
70. Sher Singh and Another v. State of (1980) 2 SCC 696 viii
Punjab and Another
71. Shweta Gulati v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2004) 89 SCC 654 x
72. Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of AIR 1983 SC 484 xiv

Gujarat,
73. Sri Mahadeb Jiew and Anr. v. Dr. B.B AIR 1951 Cal 563 iv
Sen
74. State of Andhra Pradesh v. IBS Prasad AIR 1970 SC 648 xv
Rao
75. State of Maharashtra v. Goraksha (2011) 7 SCC 437 (¶27) xv
Ambaji Adsul
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76. State of Mysore v. Venappasetty, 1973 CrLJ 1568. x
77. State of Rajasthan v. Manoj Kumar 138 AIC 261 (SC) xii
78. State of Rajasthan v. Tej Ram. (1999) 3 SCC 507 xv

79. State of Tamil Nadu v. Shyam Sunder (2011) 8 SCC 737 iii
80. State of U.P. v. Babu Ram AIR 1961 SC 751 viii
81. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Munni Ram (2010) 14 SCC 364 xiv
82. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Rajvir (2007) 15 SCC 545 xiii
83. State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish (2005) 3 SCC 114 xv

84. Subedar v. State of Uttar Pradesh. AIR 1971 SC 125 xvi
85. Suchita Srivastava and Anr. v. (2009) 9 SCC 1 iv
Chandigarh Administration
86. Sunil Batra v. Union of India and Ors. (1982) 2 SCC 684 viii
87. Suresh Sakharam Nangare v. State of (2012) 9 SCC 249 xi
Madhya Pradesh
88. Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa (2003) 8 SCC 590 iv
89. Veer Singh v. State of U.P., 2010 (1) A.C.R. 294 xii
(All.)
90. Vijj v. State of Karnataka (2008) 15 SCC 786 x
91. Yadav Lohar v. State of Bihar 1991 Supp (1) SCC 214 xiii
FOREIGN CASES
S.NO. CASE LAWS CITATION PAGE NUMBER
1. Graham v. Florida 560 US 48 (2010) iv
2. Madrid v. Gomez 889 F. Supp. 1146 (ND Cal. ii

1995)
3. Miller v. Alabama 567 US 460 (2012) iv
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4. Roper v. Simmons 543 US 551 (2005) iv
5. S v Dyk (1969(1) SA 601(C) iv

6. Stanford v. Kentucky 492 US 361 iv
7. Winterbottom v Wright 152 ER 402 i
BOOKS
1. DR. HARI SINGH GOUR, 1 INDIAN PENAL CODE (14th ed. Law Publishers Pvt. Ltd.,
Allahabad 2013) .......................................................................................................................... x
2. JUSTICE G P SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (12th ed. Lexis

Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur 2010). .......................................................................... viii
3. KD GAUR, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. Lexis Nexis, Gurgaon
2013)............................................................................................................................................ x
4. M.P. TANDON, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (23th ed. Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad
2005)............................................................................................................................................ x
5. S.K. SARVARIA, R.A. NELSON’S INDIAN PENAL CODE (9th ed. Lexis Nexis
Butterworths Gurgaon 2002). ...................................................................................................... x
JOURNALS
1. Franklin E. Zimring, The Changing Legal World of Adolescene, MAcmillan Publishing Co.
New York, (1985) ...................................................................................................................... iii
2. Hon’ble Justice M.L Singhal, Medical Evidence and it’s use in trial of cases, J.T.R.I. Journal,
Issue – 3, September, 1995....................................................................................................... xiv
3. Northern Kentucky L. Rev. 205-224 (2014) ............................................................................... ii
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioners approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana under Article 1361 of the
Constitution of Indiana which gives discretionary power to the Supreme Court of Indiana to hear
any matter on appeal against the order passed by any court or tribunal in the territory of Indiana
where justice and equity so demands.
Whereas the last Petitioner approaches this Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing a Public Interest
Litigation under Article 322 of the Constitution of Indiana which gives the power to the Supreme
Court any petition in the form of a writ.
1
“(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave appeal
from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or
tribunal in the territory of India. (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or
order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.” 2 32.
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
2
The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of
any of the rights conferred by this Part (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by
clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 ) (4) The right guaranteed by
this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
a
Mr. Singhal Mr. Saxena
Employee
Son Daughter Son
Friends Friends Friends
Gaurav Ransom Peter Arther Phillips
Vaishali
Enemy
12th March,
8th March, 2015 Exhibition 12th March, 10th March, 2015 Arrest
2015 Arrest 2015 Arrest
Death Death by
15th May, 15th May, 15th May,
by head Asphyxia. Her
2015 Case 2015 Case 2015 Case
injury clothes were torn
admitted admitted admitted
and and she had
into Juvenile into Juvenile into Juvenile
internal several scratches
Court Court Court
bleeding and injuries.
Well aware of
Well aware of
circumstances 9th June,
circumstances and
insufficiency of age
Case admitted into 2015 Guilty
Sessions Court u/s304, 326,
Case admitted into 354 r/w 34
Sessions Court Juvenile
IPC, 1860
12th June, 2015 Case and
28th July, 2015
remanded back to Juvenile sentenced for
Guilty u/s 304,
Court 1 year in
17th December, 2014 326, 354 r/w 34
4th August, 2015 Guilty u/s special home
Juvenile Justice (Care IPC, 1860
and Protection of 304, 326, 354 r/w 34 IPC,
Children’s) Act Appealed the High 1860 and sentenced for 3 No further
Passed. Court which years in special home appeals
rejected the same
20th January, 2014
Appealed the Sessions Court
Juvenile Justice (Care
which dismissed the same
and Protection of
Children’s) Act
enforced. Revision Petition in the High
Court which rejected the same
PIL filed by ZIO 11th January, 2016 Appeal
Foundation filed in the Apex Court
challenging the act.
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ISSUES RAISED
……………………………….. ISSUE I………………………………..
WHETHER THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT, 2014
IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR NOT?
……………………………….. ISSUE II ………………………………..
WHETHER THE HIGH COURT AND SESSION’S COURT WERE JUSTIFIED IN REJECTING
THE TEST FOR DETERMINATION OF SHYAMA’S AGE OR NOT?
……………………………….. ISSUE III………………………………..
WHETHER SHEKHAR SHOULD BE ACQUITTED OF ALL THE CHARGES LEVELED

AGAINST HIM OR NOT?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

2014 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
The JJ. Act, 2014 is not Constitutional as it was not the need of the hour. It did not preced a
consultative process. It is violative of the Art. 14, Art. 15 and Art. 21 as it does not permit
reasonable classification of the juveniles belonging to the age-group of 16-18 yrs. in case of
commission of heinous offences. The procedure followed is not appropriate and does not stand
the test under the Constitution. The Act is not in consonance with various International
Covenants and Rules. The new act is not oa beneficial piece of legislation rather a legislation
which is not in juxtaposition to the JJ. act, 2000.
REJECTING THE TEST FOR DETERMINATION OF RANSOM’S AGE
The Courts of Law were not justified in rejecting the test on the ground that it is certain that in all
probabilities his age was > 16 yrs. The test should be conducted because different results would
have been given as the age of Ransom in probable sense is less than 16. As per the preliminary
assessment of the JJ. Board he was not found capax of committing the offence. His act does not
satisfy the ingredients of a heinous crime because of the ambiguity in the definition.
III. THAT PETER’S CONVICTION BY THE JUVENILE BOARD, SESSION COURT

AND THE HIGH COURT WAS NOT VALID
It is submitted that Peter’s guilt hasn’t been proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, medical evidence and ocular evidence. The prosecution has established
that there exists no chain of circumstantial evidence and it doesn’t point towards only conclusion
that Peter is not guilty and rules out any other possibility. Peter’s culpability isn’t clearly
established by his prior animosity with Gaurav and Vaishali and his subsequent act of grabbing
an opportunity to talk to Ransom. His presence at the crime scene where he was seen sneaking
away doesn’t complete the chain of circumstantial evidence. Hence, the decision of the High
Court must not be upheld.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

2014 IS NOT CONSTITUTIONAL
(¶ 1.) This is the humble submission of the counsel of Petitioners that the JJ. Act, 2014 is not
constitutional. The counsel has proposed this contention in a three–fold manner, [A] The act was
not the need of the hour, [B] The act is in contravention with the Constitution of Indiana, [C] The
act is not in consonance with the International Law.
A. The act was not the need of the hour
(¶ 2.) The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is not the need of the
hour. This sub contention has been proposed by the counsel of petitioners in a two-fold manner.
i. The bad law (JJ act, 2015) was a product of a hard case
(¶ 3.) The JJ. Act, 2015 was a bad law, product of a hard case as observed by Justice Robert Rolf
in the case of Winterbottom v. Wright stated: "This is one of those unfortunate cases in which, it
is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a remedy but by that consideration we
ought not to be influenced."3 The Nirbhaya case is one such bad example. It is therefore urged a
mere hardship is not enough4 no matter how horrifying or terrible it might be.5
(¶ 4.) The J. Verma Committee constituted in the aftermath of the Nirbhaya case, to look into
possible amendments to criminal law, also recommended against the reduction of the age of the
juvenile6. Despite cogent reasons proposed by the committees and the Apex Court, the
parliament
3
Winterbottom v Wright, 152 ER 402.
4
Bangalore Wollen, Cotton and Silk Mills, Co. Ltd. v. Corporation. of City of Bangalore, AIR 1962 SC 1263.
5
Balco Employees Union v. Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333
6
Justice J.S Verma, Justice Leila Seth, Gopal Subramanium, Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal
Law, 2013: Page 276 ¶ 45.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
succumbed to popular demand resonating through media frenzy and proceeded with the Act in its
present form.
(¶ 5.) Moreover, it is submitted that out of the 472 million children in our country, only 1.2 %
actually committed crimes in 2012 and 2013. In 2013, of all the children apprehended for crimes
under the Indian Penal Code, 2.17% were accused of murder and 3.5% were accused of rape.
That is 2% of 1.2%. These figures of the NCRB, account for the FIRs registered and not the
children who were actually found guilty.7
(¶ 6.) Therefore, it is not justified to treat a juvenile at par with an adult based on one bad
incident
ii. Ignorance on part of the government
(¶ 7.) The government jettisoned its responsibility to take into account the experience of
countries which have adopted the practice of transfer of children to the adult criminal justice
system.8 The Court in Madrid v. Gomez9, observed that the modern prison life may press the
outer bounds of what most humans can psychologically tolerate. The observation of J. Krishna
Iyer that the adult prisons are like "animal farms".10 The future of child offenders in adult
prisons, presents a bleak picture. Owing to such a system, the juveniles are at a greater risk of
committing suicide and suffering from sexual and physical abuse meted out to them by older
inmates. A direct causal link can be drawn to the effects of the brutalization and the harms
suffered by juveniles. The culture and environment in prison, fosters behavior in juveniles that
increases their chance of recidivism. They are also exposed to techniques which they can utilize,
in order to indulge in illegal activities, on their return to the society.
B. The act is in contravention with the Constitution of Indiana
7
National Crime Record Bureau, Crime in India 2013 Statistics, available at
http://ncrb.nic.in/StatPublications/CII/CII2013/Statistics-2013.pdf , last seen on 2/1/2017.
8
Donna Bishop et. al., The Transfer of Juvenile to Criminal Court: Does it make a difference?, 42 Crime and
Delinquency, 171-91 (1996); Karen Miner-Romanoff, Juvenile Offenders tried as adult: What they know and
implications for practitioners, 41 Northern Kentucky L. Rev. 205-224 (2014); Deanie C. Allen, Trying Children as
Adults, 6 Jones L. Rev. 27-64 (2002)
9
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (ND Cal. 1995)
10
Satto v. State of UP, (1979) 2 SCC 628.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
(¶ 8.) In State of Tamil Nadu v. Shyam Sunder11, the court held that, to make an act as Ultra
Vires or to make any amendment in it the relevant act or provision as the case maybe must be
proved violative of the fundamental rights.
(¶ 9.) The JJ Bill, 2014 was examined by the Department Related Parliamentary Standing
Committee, which in its 264th report took note that certain provisions of the legislation being
ultra vires of the Constitution. It also took cognizance of the fact that the children, are likely to
be adversely affected by the legislation. It rejected the bill as being unwarranted and
unconstitutional in the following words: "[T]he existing Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 recognizes
the fact that 16-18 years is an extremely sensitive and critical age requiring greater protection.
Hence, there is no need to subject them to a different or an adult judicial system as it will violate
Article 14, 15(3)12, 21 of the Constitution.13 In catena14 of cases, the constitutionality of
definition of child under 18 years was challenged as ultra vires Constitution. The new act also
violates Article 21 of the Constitution.
(¶10.) The counsel will further substantiate it in the following manner:
i. The act is inconsistent with article 14 of the Constitution of Indiana
(¶11.) The counsel humbly submits that inclusion of all under 18 into a class called juvenile
under the act is not valid as it does not provide separate scheme of investigation, trial and
punishment for offences committed by them and such categorization is not identifiable,
distinguishable and reasonable thus violating Article 1415.
(¶12.) Children and adults being on an unequal footing with respect to their psychological
development, ought not to be treated alike.16 Subjecting children in same manner as adults, is
11
State of Tamil Nadu v. Shyam Sunder, (2011) 8 SCC 737
12
R.D Upadhyay v. State of A.P and Ors., AIR 2006 SC 1946
13
Two Hundred Sixty Fourth Report The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Bill, 2014, Parliament
of India, http:// www.prsindia.org/ uploads/media/ Juvenile%20Justice/ SC%20 report-%20Juvenile%20justice.pdf.
14
Salil Bali v Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 705, Subramanian Swamy v. Raju, (2014) 8 SCC 390
15
Roop Chand Adlakha v. DDA, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 116.
16
M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 71, RK Garg v Union Of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138, Franklin E.
Zimring, The Changing Legal World of Adolescene, MAcmillan Publishing Co. New York, (1985).
[iii | P a g e ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
premised on the flawed assumption that children and adults can be held to the same standard of
culpability and that children are capable of participating in legal proceedings in a like manner.
Expecting the same level of psychological understanding and behavior as adults from children17,
is synonymous to treating unequals as equals thus violating Article 14.
ii. The act is inconsistent with Article 15(3) of the Constitution of Indiana
(¶13.) Article 15(3) of the Constitution mandates that states make special provisions in favor of
children, not against them.18 The state has a Constitutional obligation to safeguard their interests
and welfare in the real sense, not by doing them a favor, as charity.19
iii. The act is inconsistent with Article 21 of the Constitution of Indiana
(¶14.) It is submitted that, the main objective of the act is to provide for care, protection,
treatment, development and rehabilitation of the neglected or the delinquent juveniles.20 So, the
essence of the act is restorative and not retributive, providing for rehabilitation and integration of
children in conflict with law back into the mainstream society.21 The counsel hereby submits
that, the act is against Right to Life as it does not aim at providing better living conditions to the
Juveniles22 and also harms their dignity.23
C. The act was in contravention with the international law
17
S v Dyk, (1969(1) SA 601(C), Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 US 361, Roper v. Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005);
Graham v. Florida, 560 US 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama,567 US 460 (2012).
18
Sri Mahadeb Jiew and Anr. v. Dr. B.B Sen, AIR 1951 Cal 563; Independent Thought v. Union of India, AIR 2017
SC 4904.
19
Sampurna Behura v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., (2018) 4 SCC 433.
20
Avishek Goenka v. Union of India (2012) 5 SCC 321.
21
Abuzar Hussain v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489.
22
Essa v. State of Maharashtra, 2013 (4) SCALE 1
23
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, No. 02 of 2016, INDIA CODE, § 2(20);
Manjula Krippendorf v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Ors, AIR 2017 SC 3457, Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of
Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590; Suchita Srivastava and Anr. v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1; Reena
Banerjee and Anr. v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) and Ors., (2015) 11 SCC 725; Mofil Khan and Anr. v. State of
Jharkhand, (2015) 1 SCC 67.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
(¶15.) The impugned act dishonors the principle of pacta sunt servanda stated in the Article 26 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stating: every treaty signed by a country is
binding on it and the obligations imposed by treaties must be performed by the country in
good faith.24 A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty. The counsel hereby submits that in this case the country’s domestic
laws are inconsistent with the international law.25 This contention has been further substantiated
in a two-fold manner
i. The act is inconsistent with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(¶16.) The impugned amendment is against the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as the
object clause of the present amendment states: "And whereas, the Government of India has
acceded on the 11th December, 1992 to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by
the General Assembly of United Nations which has prescribed a set of standards to be adhered
to by all State parties in securing the best interest of child." The mention of UNCRC in the
objective of the impugned amendment is a mere eye wash as the amendment seeks to erode the
very definition of child as envisaged in the Article 1 of the convention which reads as "For the
purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen
years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier."
(¶17.) UNCRC, 1990 read with the concluding resolution of the committee on child rights
(constituted under the UN convention) of the year 2000 and the General Resolution of the year
2007 clearly contemplate the MACR as 18 yrs. and mandates member states to act accordingly.
(¶18.) General Comment No.10 specifically reminds State Parties of their obligations under the
UNCRC: "they have recognized the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as
having infringed the penal law to be treated in accordance with the provisions of article 40 of
UNCRC. This means that every person under the age of 18 years, at the time of the alleged
commission of an offence, must be treated in accordance with the rules of juvenile justice.26
24
Art. 26 of Vienna convention see at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/pacta-sunt-servanda last accessed on 11
August 2020.
25
K. Padmaja, Juvenile Delinquency, ICFAI University Press (2007).
26
General Comment No. 10, Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice, para 37, 38 (2007)
[v | P a g e ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ii. Fails to conform to the declaration of the rights of the child (declaration of Geneva)
(¶19.) The declaration is the first international instrument on children’s rights, advocated that
child offenders should be transformed, not penalized. The instrument casts a duty on humankind
that “the delinquent child must be reclaimed.”27
iii. Fails to conform to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice (Beijing rules)
(¶20.) The Beijing rules categorically spelt out the minimum standard to be followed by member
states. It states in detail, the treatment to be meted out to juveniles without distinction of any
28
kind. It focuses on rehabilitation aspects of the juvenile, while also stipulating a variety of
dispositions.29 Rule 2.2(a) defines juvenile as a child or young person who, under the respective
legal system, may be dealt with for an offence differently than an adult. Rule 4.1 mandates
Member states to refrain from a minimum age of criminal responsibility that is too low, bearing
in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.
iv. Fails to conform to the UN guidelines for the prevention of child delinquency (the Riyadh
guidelines)
(¶21.) The guidelines stressed and recognized in spirit that: part of maturing often includes
behavior that does not conform to societal norms and that tends to disappear in most individuals
with the transition to adulthood and avoid labelling a youth a deviant or delinquent as this
contributes to negative pattern of behavior.30
v. Fails to conform the UN rules for the protection of juveniles deprived of their liberty (the
Havana rules)
27
Covenant of the League of Nations adopting Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child on 26 September,
1924.
28
G.A. Res. 40/33, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Nov. 29,
1985).
29
Rules 24.1 and 25.1.
30
G.A Res. 45/112, United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Dec. 14, 1990).
[vi | P a g e ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
The Havana rules is the first international instrument that defines a juvenile is every person
under the age of 18.31
REJECTING THE TEST FOR DETERMINATION OF RANSOM’S AGE
(¶22.) It is the humble submission of the counsel of petitioners that the High Court and the
Session’s Court were not justified in rejecting the test for determination of Ransom’s age. This
contention has been proposed in a three-fold manner. [A] The preliminary assessment was not
conducted in consonance with the new act, [B] The ossification test should be conducted, [C]
The guilt has not been established beyond.
A. The preliminary assessment was not conducted in consonance with the JJ. Act, 2014
(¶23.) The essentials of the preliminary assessment were not fulfilled
i. Ransom did not commit a heinous offence
(¶24.) The definitions of both the serious offence and the heinous offence are vaguely worded.
The ambiguous classification certainly creates a fourth class. Thus, the offences under which
Ransom is charged accept § 302 of IPC, 1860 are not heinous offences.
ii. Ransom’s age is not between 16-18 yrs.
(¶25.) The Education Act in its § 11 says that the elementary education starts at the age of three
yrs. thus, the age of Ransom in all probability sense cannot be above 16 yrs. As mentioned by the
Hon’ble court in Rajindra Chandra v. State of Chhattisgarh that the standard of proof for age
determination is the degree of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
iii. Ransom was not capax of committing the offence
31
G.A Res. 45/113, United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (Dec. 14, 1990),
Rule 11(a).
[vii | P a g e ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
(¶26.) He did not possess the required mental capacity as the brain of a juvenile i.e. under the age
of 18 yrs. is still developing or still not mature enough to understand the circumstances and thus
it is not capable enough to develop the required intention to be charged under IPC, 186032.
B. The ossification test should be conducted
(¶27.) It is humbly submitted that the ossification test should be conducted to ascertain
Ransom’s age.
i. Understanding the word shall according to § 94 of the act
(¶28.) “The word ‘shall’ as observed by J. Hidayatullah “is ordinarily mandatory but it is
sometimes not so interpreted if the context or the intention otherwise demands”33, and this is also
pointed out by J. Subarao that “When a statute uses the word ‘shall’, prima facie is mandatory,
but carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute”34. If different provisions are connected
with the same word ‘shall’, and if with respect to some of them the intention of the Legislature is
clear that the word ‘shall’ in relation to them must be given an obligatory or a directory meaning,
it may indicate that with respect to other provisions also, the same construction should be placed.
35
Furthermore, a provision in a statute procedural in nature although employs the word "shall"
may not be held as mandatory if thereby no prejudice is caused. 36 The provision of § 94 of the
JJ. Act, 2014 may be construed as both mandatory and directory.37
(¶29.) Two considerations for regarding a provision as directory are: [A] absence of any
provision for the contingency of a particular provision not being complied with or followed and,
[B] serious general inconvenience and prejudice that would result to the general public if the act
32
Mal Singh v. Union of India and Ors. (1980) 2 SCC 684, Sunil Batra v. Union of India and Ors. (1982) 2 SCC
684, Nathu Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Another. (1980) 2 SCC 675, Sher Singh and Another v. State of
Punjab and Another (1980) 2 SCC 696, Kartar Singh and Ujagar Singh v. Delhi Administration (1979) 2 SCC 675.
33
Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1480.
34
State of U.P. v. Babu Ram, AIR 1961 SC 751.
35
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233
36
PT Rajan v. TPM Sahir, AIR 2003 SC 4603.
37
JUSTICE G P SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (12th ed. Lexis Nexis Butterworths
Wadhwa, Nagpur 2010).
[viii | P a g e ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
of the Government or an instrumentality is declared invalid for noncompliance with the

particular provision.38
(¶29.) In each case one must look to the subject matter and consider the importance of the
provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be
secured. The counsel hereby submits that the observation of the division bench in the above cited
case law is very clear stating that a provision can be regarded as directory if it will not result in
serious general inconvenience and prejudice to the general public by reading it in that manner. In
addition, Ransom’s age cannot be ascertained beyond reasonable doubt thus, Ransom’s age
should be ascertained through the test.
ii. Inconclusivity as an insufficient ground for rejecting the plea
(¶30.) The JJ. Act, 2014 states that In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds
for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the
Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence
by obtaining — (i) The date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or
equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence
thereof; (ii) The birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;,
(iii) And only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test
or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or
the Board” It is a well-accepted fact in the precedents of our Indian Judiciary that the last resort
for age determination of a juvenile is the Bone Test i.e. Ossification Test.39
(¶31.) The court of law has time and again relied on the fact that the ossification test in cases
where the certificates are manipulated or not available the Hon’ble court has always given the
judgement placing the argument entirely and primarily on the test report.40
38
Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State Of Haryana, AIR 1979 SC 1149.
39
Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P (2012) 9 SCC 750, Jai Prakash Tiwari v. State of U.P (2016) 97 AIICC
592, Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (2012) 5 SCC 201, Ramdeo Chauhan v. State of Assam (Crl.) 4 of
2000.
40
Rajindra Chandra v. State of Chhattisgarh and Anr. (2002) 2 SCC 287., Gulam Hossain v. State of WB (2012) 10
SCC 489, Akbar Sheikh (2009) 7 SCC 415, Pawan (2009) 15 SCC 259, Jitendra Singh (2010) 13 SCC 523, Jitendra
Ram v. State of Jharkhand (2006) 9 SCC 428, Gunga v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 2 SCC 775.
[ix | P a g e ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
iii. Benefit of Doubt
(¶32.) The Hon’ble courts have time and again stressed on the dignity of child and hence have
provided the benefit of doubt to the accused41.
III. THAT PETER SHOULD BE ACQUIITED OF ALL THE CHARGES LEVIED

AGAINST HIM
(¶33.) The hon’ble bench is beseeched to overturn the conviction of peter upheld by the juvenile
board, sessions court and high court as invalid and inappropriate and there has been a gross
miscarriage of justice as the fact that peter has committed the offence cannot be proved without
an iota of doubt and is nothing but sheer uncertainty. No accused should end up with a heavier
liability than what is strictly contemplated by the law and conversely that there should be not a
failure of justice through to light a consequence for wrongful conviction.42
A. Peter’s acts do not commend confidence under §34 of ipc,1860
(¶34.) In order to attract the provision of this section, it is not enough that there was the same
intention on the part of the several people to commit a particular criminal act or a similar
intention.43 Intention is a question of fact which is to be gathered from the acts of the parties.44 It
is trite law that § 34 is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. 45 It
means that if two or more persons do a thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them has
done it individually.46 Common intention requires a prior consent or a pre-planning.47 For
41
Shweta Gulati v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2004) 89 SCC 654, Raju Kumar v. State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC 235,
Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488
42
Vijj v. State of Karnataka (2008) 15 SCC 786
43
KD GAUR, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. Lexis Nexis, Gurgaon 2013).
44
M.P. TANDON, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (23th ed. Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad 2005).
45
S.K. SARVARIA, R.A. NELSON’S INDIAN PENAL CODE (9th ed. Lexis Nexis Butterworths Gurgaon 2002).
46
DR. HARI SINGH GOUR, 1 INDIAN PENAL CODE (14th ed. Law Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Allahabad 2013), State
of Mysore v. Venappasetty, 1973 CrLJ 1568.
47
State of Mysore v. Venappasetty, 1973 CrLJ 1568.
[x | P a g e ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
attracting the §34 of the impugned ethic necessitates commission of a criminal act by several
persons in furtherance of a common intention pointing out the participation of all48.
(¶35.) The presence of every ingredient can be clearly denied. Death of the deceased by asphyxia
and grievous blows indicate towards the commission of a criminal act but the burden of the same
cannot be levied upon Peter. The other essentials are further substantiated in a twofold manner.
i. There is no commonality of intent
(¶36.) In Ranganath Sharma v. Satendra Sharma49, it was held, “Direct proof of common
intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the
circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. The
prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or
meeting of minds of all the accused person be it pre-arranged or on the spur of the moment; but it
must necessarily be before the commission of the crime.”
(¶37.) Section 33 states that word act denotes a series of acts as well a single act. 50 Thus, even
many may have committed different acts, they have cumulatively committed criminal act which
resulted in death of deceased and are liable for same punishment51 but in the instant case that
culpability cannot be put onto Peter. Section 34 IPC includes commission of overt act 52,
Participation53, Specific Role54 but the only part attributable to the accused is the grievous
enmity which isn’t sufficient cause to hold the accused liable55 and there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused56. Participation in the case of common intention would not
48
Parichat v. state of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 535.
49
(2009) 1 SCC (Cr.) 415.
50
Section 33, Indian Penal Code, 1860
51
Selvam v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 10 SCC 402
52
Nachimuthu v state of Tamil Nadu (2011) 14 SCC 441
53
Suresh Sakharam Nangare v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 9 SCC 249
54
Nand Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2011) 12 SCC 120, Khalil Chishti v. State of Rajasthan (2013) 2 SCC
541
55
Ramuthai v. State (2011) 13 SCC 212
56
Ram Jag v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1974 SC 606
[xi | P a g e ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
depend on the extent of overt act.57 There is absence of any specific averment demonstrating the
role of the accused in commission of offence, no prima facie case can be made out against the
accused58. The said intention did not develop at the time of the incident as well and therefore, it
was held that Section 34 of the IPC cannot be resorted to hold the accused guilty of any crime. 59
Accused causing simple injuries60 61
and holding legs or arms cannot be made a ground for
formation of common intention. In Bikramaditya Singh v. State of Bihar62 it was held that
exhortation to kill the deceased was attributed as only role played by the accused though he was
armed with firearm at the time, implausibility of such conduct had accused really shared
common intention. The incident of the fight with Gaurav and strangulation of Vaishali had taken
place in heat of passion on account of a sudden erupted instance unfortunately calumniating in
demise, no, evidence suggests pre-mediation on part of accused.63The others cannot be attributed
the common intention of inflicting injuries which resulted in the death of the deceased.64
ii. That peter was present in the exhibition
(¶38.) The ocular evidence provided by Ram Manohar on 10th March, 2015 proves his presence
as he saw him sneaking out of the basement on the night of 8th March, 2015. Peter too has not
disputed this fact but he has time and again stressed that he was just present in the exhibition.
Mere presence of the accused on the spot when the incident took place is not sufficient to hold
57
Mano Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 79
58
Ashok Basak v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 10 SCC 660
59
Veer Singh v. State of U.P., 2010 (1) A.C.R. 294 (All.).
60
A Mohnam v. State of kerela 1990 Supp SCC 66
61
Suresh Sakharam Nangare v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 9 SCC 249
62
(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 169
63
Bishnupada Sarkar v. State of West Bengal AIR 2012 SC 2248
64
State of Rajasthan v. Manoj Kumar 138 AIC 261 (SC)
[xii | P a g e ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
the accused65 and can’t be the basis to record a finding of guilt66 and does not make a case
beyond reasonable doubt67. Such presence cannot establish intention of rape.68
B. There is no sufficient evidence to prove peter’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
(¶39.) The judgment pronounced by the Sessions Court opines that peter’s case has been proved
beyond reasonable doubts before juvenile board which was later upheld by the high court but the
lapses, had left serious lacunae in the case against the accused. Evidence against accused though
highly incriminating yet some loose links are not satisfactorily explained, handling the case
improbable.69
i. Penurious or no medical attestation present
(¶40.) The court emphasized that, even in if medical attestation supports the commission of
sexual assault on the victim. We needn’t elaborate on the issue any more light of the concurrent
finding in clear terms holds that sign of commissions of rape on the victim stood proved by
medical evidence beyond reasonable doubt.70 In present case, the proposition nowhere mentions
presence of Peter’s fingerprints on Vaishali’s body is enough to prove that Peter was not
involved as the proposition contains the medical testimony of others but not him. Moreover, the
proposition nowhere specifically mentions that he was involved in inflicting grievous blows to
Gaurav and strangulating Vaishali for her to die of asphyxia.
ii. Untrustworthy ocular testimony prevails
(¶41.) As the popular saying goes witnesses are eyes and ears of justice, the oral evidence has
primacy over the medical evidence. Oral evidence can’t be rejected on hypothetical medical
65
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Rajvir (2007) 15 SCC 545, Nash v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 420
66
Bikash Bora v. State of Assam (2019) 4 SCC 280
67
Yadav Lohar v. State of Bihar 1991 Supp (1) SCC 214
68
Om Prakash v. State of Haryana (2011)14 SCC 309
69
Abdulwahab Abdulmajid Baloch v. State of Gujarat (2009) 11 SCC 625
70
Deepak v. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 762.
[xiii | P a g e ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
evidence provided the oral testimony is reliable, creditworthy and inspires confidence. 71 Thus,
the position of law in instances where a contradiction prevails between medical evidence and
ocular evidence can be crystallized to the effect that though the ocular testimony of a witness has
greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence, when medical evidence makes the ocular
testimony impossible, that becomes a relevant factor in the process of evaluation of evidence.72
As per Sec 118, Indian Evidence Act, all persons shall be competent witnesses, unless they are
prevented from understanding or answering question put to them virtue of tender years, extreme
old age, disease or infirmity lunacy or any other cause of same kind.73
(¶42.) A chance and ocular witness, Ram Manohar’s statement requires a cautious and close
scrutiny and his presence at the crime spot must be explained74, if doubtful it must be
discarded75. Where a large number of offenders are involved, it is necessary to seek
corroboration at least from two or more witnesses as a measure of caution76, here, evidence of
the complainant’s witness is not corroborated by any other independent witness which fails to
commend confidence.77 Ram Manohar just saw him fleeing and not committing the act. Only one
firm conclusion can be made that Peter cannot is not blameworthy.
iii. Circumstancial evidence is fully established
(¶43.) Human agency can express faulty picture but circumstantial agency cannot fail78 literally
meaning men may tell lies, but circumstances do not.79 If the cumulative effect of all the facts
71
Hon’ble Justice M.L Singhal, Medical Evidence and it’s use in trial of cases, J.T.R.I. Journal, Issue – 3,
September, 1995, Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 484.
72
Abdul Sayeed vs State Of M.P, (2010) 10 SCC 259.
73
Sec 118, Indian Evidence Act, 1872
74
Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh and Ors., (2007) 13 SCC 360
75
Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632.
76
Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479
77
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Munni Ram (2010) 14 SCC 364
78
Rewa Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1978) Cr.L.J. 858.
79
Aftab Ahamd Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal, 2010 2 SCC 583.
[xiv | P a g e ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
form a chain so complete80 the guilt the conviction is justified ignoring the fact that isn’t,81
relying on the maxim, “Evidence has to be weighed not counted.”82
(¶44.) In State of Maharashtra v. Goraksha Ambaji Adsul83, the SC reiterated that in a case of
circumstantial evidence, if the prosecution is able to establish chain of events to satisfy
ingredients of commission of offence, accused would be liable to suffer consequences of his
proven guilt. In Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra84, the Apex Court described
the five golden principles that were laid down in Hanumant v. State of M.P85 of the proof based
on circumstantial evidence.
(¶45.) A chain of fully established facts consistent with hypothesis of the guilt excluding every
possible hypothesis except the one to be proved and should be of conclusive nature and tendency
not leaving behind any reasonable ground consistent with accused’s innocence.86 In cases
dependent on circumstantial evidence, to justify the inference of guilt, all the incriminating facts
and circumstances must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt any other
person and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt87
and the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn, should be fully proved along
with being conclusive in nature.88 Any other hypothesis except the one to be proved, provided by
the Petitioners, however extravagant and fanciful, cannot be the basis of an acquittal.89 The effort
of the criminal court should not be to prowl for imaginative doubts.90
80
Rajesh Rai v. State of Sikkim, 2002 Cr.L.J. 1385 at P. 1390(Sikkim)
81
Ibid
82
Padaala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P, AIR 1990 SC 79
83
(2011) 7 SCC 437 (¶27)
84
AIR 1984 SC 1682.
85
AIR 1952 SC 343, Ravinder Singh v. State (NCT) of Delhi.
86
State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114, Bhim Singh v. State of Uttrakhand (2015) 4 SCC 739.
87
Hukam v state, AIR 1977 SC 1063.
88
C. Chenga Reddy v State of AP, (1996) 10 SCC 193.
89
State of Andhra Pradesh v. IBS Prasad Rao AIR 1970 SC 648.
90
State of Rajasthan v. Tej Ram. (1999) 3 SCC 507.
[xv | P a g e ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
(¶46.) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for
the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and in all probability the act must
have been done by the accused91 which hasn’t been clearly established as it has already been
proved that grievous animosity92 and mere presence cannot be the ground. Sharing and talking to
Ransom only amounts to motive and not intention. There was no evidence much less credible
which was salvaged from the onslaught of witness.93
91
Ibid.
92
Subedar v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1971 SC 125.
93
Javed Alam v. State of Chhattisgarh (2009) 6 SCC 450.
[xvi | P a g e ]

PRAYER
Whereof in the light of facts of the instant case, written pleadings and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed before this Hon'ble Supreme Court that it may be pleased to hold, adjudge and
declare:
1. That the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2014 is unconstitutional.
2. That Ransom is not capax of committing the offences the charges of which are leveled
against him and that there is no need to conduct any test for determining his age.
3. That Ransom is not guilty under §§ 302, 326, 354 r/w § 34 of IPC, 1860.
4. That Peter is not guilty under §§ 302, 326, 354 r/w § 34 of IPC, 1860.
Pass any other order, which the court may deem fit in light of the facts of the case, evidences
adduced and justice, equity and good conscience.
And for this act of kindness, the counsel for the petitioner shall duty bound forever pray.
Sd/-
Counsels for the Petitioner
[xviii | P a g e ]

Manika, Kanika-Petitioner

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THE 2ND LEGAL INSIDER, MEMORIAL WRITING COMPETITION, 2020

THE 2ND LEGAL INSIDER, MEMORIAL WRITING COMPETITION, 2020

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

SLP NO. ………… OF 2016

UNION OF INDIANA .. RESPONDENT

WP(C) NO. ………… OF 2016

ZIO FOUNDATION .. PETITIONER

UNION OF INDIANA .. RESPONDENT

ON SUBMISSION TO THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................... 10

ISSUES RAISED .......................................................................................................................... 11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .................................................................................................. 12

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ......................................................................................................... i

I. THAT THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT,

III. THAT PETER SHOULD BE ACQUIITED OF ALL THE CHARGES LEVIED

PRAYER .................................................................................................................................... xviii

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER

AIR All India Reporter

GOI Government Of Indiana

IEA Indian Evidence Act

IPC Indian Penal Code

JJ. Juvenile Justice

NCRB National Crime Research Bureau

POCSO Protection of Children from Sexual Offences

r/w Read with

SCC Supreme Court Cases

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER

S.NO. CASE LAWS CITATION PAGE

2. Abuzar Hussain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489 iv

4. Aftab Ahamd Anasari v. State of 2010 2 SCC 583 xiv

8. Ashok Basak v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 10 SCC 660 xii

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER

15. Bikash Bora v. State of Assam (2019) 4 SCC 280 xiii

18. C. Chenga Reddy v State of AP (1996) 10 SCC 193 xv

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER

37. Mofil Khan and Anr. v. State of (2015) 1 SCC 67 iv

39. Nachimuthu v state of Tamil Nadu (2011) 14 SCC 441 xi

43. Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan and (2012) 5 SCC 201 ix

45. Parichat v. state of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 535 xi

51. Raju Kumar v. State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC 235 x

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER

65. Satto v. State of UP (1979) 2 SCC 628 ii

69. Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of AIR 1984 SC 1682 xv

72. Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of AIR 1983 SC 484 xiv

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER

76. State of Mysore v. Venappasetty, 1973 CrLJ 1568. x

78. State of Rajasthan v. Tej Ram. (1999) 3 SCC 507 xv

83. State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish (2005) 3 SCC 114 xv

1. Graham v. Florida 560 US 48 (2010) iv

2. Madrid v. Gomez 889 F. Supp. 1146 (ND Cal. ii

3. Miller v. Alabama 567 US 460 (2012) iv

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER

4. Roper v. Simmons 543 US 551 (2005) iv

5. S v Dyk (1969(1) SA 601(C) iv

7. Winterbottom v Wright 152 ER 402 i

2. JUSTICE G P SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (12th ed. Lexis

3. Northern Kentucky L. Rev. 205-224 (2014) ............................................................................... ii

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER