FREEDMAN v. MARYLAND 4.
Swear yan lang talaga yung background
Mar. 1, 1965 | Brennan, J. |
PETITIONER: Freedman (exhibitor of movies)
RESPONDENTS: Maryland CA
SUMMARY: A movie exhibitor was convicted of violating ordinance on
censorship of movies by the Maryland statute. This prompted him to attack
constitutionality of the ordinance on its procedural infirmity by saying it was a
prior restraint and the ordinance does not afford protection against a violation of
his freedom of expression procedurally. SC states that the statute did not provide
protection for his freedom of expression, stated the standard grounds for such
protection for all censorship laws and reversed his conviction.
DOCTRINE:
1. First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected
expression must rest on the censor
2. Second, while the State may require advance submission of all
films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of
unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a
manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor's
determination whether a film constitutes protected expression,
only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to
impose a valid final restraint
a. Censor has to within a specified brief period, either
issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the
film. Any restraint imposed in advance of a final
judicial determination on the merits must similarly be
limited to preservation of the status quo for the
shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial
resolution
b. The procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial
decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim
and possibly erroneous denial of a license
FACTS:
1. This was an appeal from the decision of Maryland CA to affirm the lower
court ruling that Freedman violated the censorship statute of Maryland
2. Freedman shown the movie “Revenge at Daybreak” in his theater without
submitting the film first to the State Board of Censors which violated the
censorship law of Maryland
3. The State concedes, had he submitted it for license, the movie would have
been given a license but considering he did not, constitutes already a
violation (parang mala prohibita sya)
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN section 2 of Maryland Censorship statute is void for imposing a
prior restraint? –YES
In a previous case in Times it was held that a submission requirement of movies
before showing was valid. But the SC states that the reliance by respondent in Times
was misplaced because the issue there was whether prior restraint is not allowed
under ALL CIRCUMSTANCES and held that no, there are times when prior
restraint is allowed (e.g. porno, movies that incite to rebellion, parang crim2 lang).
In this case the issue is more than just about prior restraint pre se but he focuses
particularly on the procedure for an initial decision by the censorship board,
which, without any judicial participation, effectively bars exhibition of any
disapproved film unless and until the exhibitor undertakes a time-consuming
appeal to the Maryland courts and succeeds in having the Board's decision
reversed.
Thus, upon determination by the board of the approval or disproval of the movie, it
can be appealed to them and re-examination made but after such decision can it then
be further appealed to the courts. So, while the case is pending in courts, there is a
status quo order that the movie will not be shown yet (medyo final sya while pending
in courts) (assuming the movie does not get a license from the board of course).
There is no standard as to the promptness or any time limit when the board will
release its decision. This is where the crux of his contention lies.
As to his standing, he was given such to challenge an overly broad licensing
discretion of an admin office and an otherwise void for vagueness statute which does
not delimit the parameter of the admin office’s time to give a decision (all in all his
attack focuses on the lack of procedural protection afforded by the statute to his
freedom of expression that is allegedly being suppressed by the statute in question).
The SC here affirms that movies do not receive the same protection as freedom of
the press but nevertheless says that any system of prior restraint has the heavy
burden of proving its constitutional validity since censorship tampers upon a
fundamental right protected by the Consti which is freedom of expression. And since
at this case, the discretion is posed on an admin officer, all the more does he care less
to protect the freedom of expression of the appellant promptly.
Therefore, applying the settled rule of our cases, we hold that a noncriminal process
which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional
infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate
the dangers of a censorship system.
1. First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression
must rest on the censor
 2. Second, while the State may require advance submission of all films, in
order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films,
the requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend
an effect of finality to the censor's determination whether a film
constitutes protected expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial
determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint
a. Censor has to within a specified brief period, either issue a
license or go to court to restrain showing the film. Any
restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination
on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of
the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with
sound judicial resolution
b. The procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial
decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and
possibly erroneous denial of a license

In applying these standards, the SC holds the Maryland statute was unably to satisfy
them. First, once the censor disapproves the film, the exhibitor must assume the
burden of instituting judicial proceedings and of persuading the courts that the
film is protected expression. Second, once the Board has acted against a film,
exhibition is prohibited pending judicial review, however protracted. Under the
statute, appellant could have been convicted if he had shown the film after
unsuccessfully seeking a license, even though no court had ever ruled on the
obscenity of the film. Third, it is abundantly clear that the Maryland statute provides
no assurance of prompt judicial determination. We hold, therefore, that
appellant's conviction must be reversed.

(SC then discusses that Maryland can incorporate these procedural safeguards by patterning
a censorship law about books in New York, but stated they were not imposing these to
Maryland, only suggesting them. The suggestion stated na since in advance naman tapos na
yung movie bago ipalabas, ishow na muna sa censorship board in advance para by the time
ng date of showing or release to the public, most probably may decision na and no delay is
incurred)

RULING: Ruling REVERSED